LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
April 07/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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The UK's New Warfare Doctrine Looks Familiar
Leonid Bershidsky/Al Arabiya/Friday, 06 April, 2018
Modern warfare is, in part, about marketing. So, in its National Security Capability Review, the UK government chose a glitzy, tech-sounded new-age name: "fusion strategy." That may have part been to avoid the term "hybrid warfare" often applied to today's Russian warfighting. The difference is subtle but important.
"Call it non-linear war (which I prefer), or hybrid war, or special war, Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically focused operations in the future," British Russia expert Mark Galeotti wrote in the blog post that launched (to the author's lasting regret) the inaccurate term "Gerasimov Doctrine." He was referring to the 2013 speech by General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff. In it, Gerasimov dissected a purported Western war strategy, employing propaganda and economic warfare to soften up the adversary for military action by special forces aided by private military companies and domestic opposition. He argued that Russia should preempt these efforts, rather than copy them. The UK's "fusion strategy" aims to "use our security, economic and influence capabilities to maximum effect to protect, promote and project our national security, economic and influence goals." One of the goals is to counter "a well-established pattern of Russian state aggression." So far, so predictably sweeping.
But many of the specific ideas mirror those discussed in Russia in the earlier part of this decade: Modernization of the armed forces with a focus on rapid deployment; building a stronger cyber capability and increasing recruitment of tech workers for government service; expanding the international reach of the national broadcaster and state soft power-projecting organizations; improving the domestic communication of the national security agenda, strengthening counterpropaganda efforts and increasing foreign development aid to "fragile states and regions." Everything -- economic innovation, public relations, defense capability, foreign aid -- is part of the security agenda, just like in Russia's 2015 National Security Strategy; it's a holistic approach, or a hybrid one if you like. That's a matter of semantics.
Rival powers always portray their strategies as defensive, and in recent years, the UK has had a lot more right to this claim than Russia. If it took part in foreign military operations, it has been at the urging and under the direction of the US As for non-conventional ops, the UK hasn't conducted any known cyber offensives, weaponized the BBC (whose independence is in theory guaranteed by its Royal Charter) the way Russia has done with RT or employed mercenary forces in conflicts. It has most certainly not poisoned any former double agents in foreign lands with a military-grade nerve agent such as Novichok, used to attack Sergei and Yulia Skripal earlier this month. So Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson had some justification for saying on Wednesday that "all you need to know about the difference between modern Britain and the government of Vladimir Putin" is that "they make Novichok, we make lightsabers" (the latter is a reference to the latest Star Wars movie having been produced in the UK).
Russia's change to an aggressive posture from a more benign post-Cold War stance occurred after Putin's government convinced Russians that everything the country did was part of national security. He was able to unite economic, technological and media initiatives under a large national security umbrella and to convince Russians they needed to keep a beady eye on external enemies. The public accepted what the state told them and so almost all spheres of Russian life became fair game for weaponization.
The UK has a deep, historic democracy and a fiercely independent, pluralistic media that isn't easily manipulated. But the government's intention to "create a cross-government soft power strategy," suggests it is looking to amplify its message in whatever ways possible. The document promises to respect "the independence of the BBC World Service, British Council and the many British institutions and brands that contribute to our soft power." It's difficult, however, to keep media and cultural organizations independent when they're part of a "soft power strategy" proclaimed and run by the government for national security purposes. If I worked for the BBC, especially for the World Service, I might guard my independence a little more jealously after that.

Syria: The Putin-Erdogan Summit Was a Missed Opportunity
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/April 06/18
Earlier this week Russian President Vladimir Putin, still beaming from his re-election victory, tried to heighten his global profile with a much-advertised “summit” with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
(A brief tripartite sitting with Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani was later added as a footnote to “exchange views” on Syria.)
At tactical level Putin and Erdogan need each other.
Erdogan gives Putin, who is asserting himself as the arbiter of Syria’s future, as an “Islamic” cover to counter claims that Russia, having bombed large parts of Syria into rubble and killing tens of thousands of civilians, is now at war with Islam. It is no accident that Kremlin’s recent “advice” to Muslim preachers in mosques across the Russian federation includes the claims that Putin’s moves in Syria are backed by Erdogan.
For his part Erdogan, too, needs Putin a tactical level. It was Putin who told his protégé Bashar al-Assad not to press acclaim for control of Syrian Kurdish areas annexed by Turkey in recent operations. Russian forces in Syria looked the other way as Turkish forces carved out the Syrian cordon sanitaire that Erdogan wanted.
It was also thanks to a nod and a wink from Putin that the mullahs of Tehran suddenly ceased their initially violent denunciation of Turkey for annexing chunks of Syrian territory. Furthermore, Erdogan, as any middleweight player in a power game knows, needed a big power protector against another big power, in this case the United States.
More importantly, perhaps, both Putin and Erdogan needed each other complete Iran’s exclusion from the top table on Syria, a process that started in 2015 when Putin rode in to claim the title of protector for what is left of Assad’s ramshackle regime. A group of Iranian parliamentarians who visited Damascus recently were surprised to find posters celebrating the “victory” of Putin and Assad with no mention of Iran’s “Supreme Guide” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, let alone Gen. Assam Soleimani the self-promoting the poster-boy of “Imamist Jihad”.
Another poster distributed in Deir az-Zour puts giant images of Putin and Assad in the front section with small images of Khamenei and the Lebanese "Hezbollah" chief Hasan Nasrallah in the background.
To hammer in the point that we are witnessing a two-man show, Putin and Erdogan did all they could to be seen together, announced grandiose plans for a nuclear industry in Turkey, re-hashed old projects for oil and gas pipelines and even evoked the sale of Russian military hardware to Turkey.
The Putin- Erdogan tandem’s aim is to marginalize Iran’s role in Syria, to encourage US President Donald Trump’s penchant for withdrawal from the Syrian quagmire and to allow no space for any Arab initiative on Syria. With the remnants of the Assad regime reduced to irrelevance, Putin and Erdogan hope to seize sole control of Syria’s destiny.
But how realistic is such an ambition? The short answer is: not very!
There is no doubt that Iran’s role in Syria has been dramatically reduced while Putin has denied Iran its own share of Syrian territory in which to set up a permanent base through which to maintain control over Lebanon. Iran’s fundamental weakness in Syria is that it has no indigenous constituency. Tukey can count on the sympathy of the Muslim Arab majority in Syria while Russia is cast as protector of the Alawite and Christian minorities there. Iran, however, cannot count on any such popular support base. But Iran remains the biggest paymaster for the Assad regime. In fact, before travelling to Turkey for a mini-meeting with Putin and Erdogan, Rouhani had hinted that he would demand that Russia and Turkey make a serious contribution to the cost of keeping Syria “safe from terrorists”. Iran’s other asset in Syria is the estimated 40,000 mercenaries he has recruited from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That makes ran the second largest military force on the ground after the remnants of Assad’s army and ancillaries’. Putin and Erdogan would be mistaken if they think they could easily exclude Iran from the Syrian scene. Putin and Erdogan would be equally wrong if they take a Trumpian tweet as a US decision to withdraw from Syria. It may be hard to guess Trump’s next move on Syria or, indeed, on any other issues. But, right now, political, diplomatic, economic and military facts on the ground point to an American comeback to the Middle East as a major player. With victory over the so-called Islamic Caliphate now almost complete the US would be ill-advised to throw away its laurels and hand the trophy to rivals and adversaries in the region.
Putin and Erdogan may also be underestimating the ability of Arab states to seek a leading role in shaping Syria’s future. The prospect of a Turko-Russian tandem to dominate the region, with Iran playing second violin, is unlikely to leave most Arab states indifferent.
Machiavellians may suggest that it is not so bad to let Putin and Erdogan, with the mullahs of Tehran hanging to their tailcoats, to remain bogged down in a Syria reduced to the status of an ungoverned territory consisting of mile after mile of rubble. With their economies in meltdown mode Russia, Turkey and Iran are in no position to rebuild Syria into anything resembling a functioning state.
That immense task requires genuine international participation which means an active role by the United States, the European Union, the Arb state; China and Japan among others.
Putin and Erdogan have not been able to forge a realistic policy on Syria.
Such policy could only be based on one inclusion and one exclusion.
The inclusion part would aim at acknowledging the interests and concerns of all foreign powers as well as all domestic forces involved in the seven-year old imbroglio that country. Such inclusion need not take the model of the Berlin Conference on the division of colonies among major European powers. But it would have to accept cold realities on the ground at a time priority must be given to restoration of a measure of stability. The exclusion part would have to apply to the Assad regime which is already no more than walking caricature of the “undead”, and to the remnants of its evil twin "ISIS". Syria can be saved, but only if it is saved for all, starting with its martyrized people. This week we heard nothing from Putin and Erdogan to show that they understand that simple fact.

The Ankara conference: We are strangers here!
Mashari Althaydi/Al Arabiya/April 07/18
The photo that brought together Russia, Iran and Turkey’s leaders who were meeting in Ankara to discuss the Syrian affair sums up the current gloomy Arab scene. With a big smile, the three countries reached an agreement despite the different political beliefs that drive them and the conflicting biases in Syria. Russia and Iran are the reason why Bashar al-Assad’s regime stayed. Meanwhile, Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has beaten the drums of the “verbal” war against the Assad regime from the beginning. Erdogan drew plenty of red lines for Assad in Syria, like not allowing another Hama-like scenario in Aleppo, and later on, “Sufficient was Allah for the believers in battle.”It’s all clear. What happened in Ankara is a “regional” version similar to the Yalta Conference which was held after World War II to divide the spoils of war and global influence
A joint statement
A joint statement following the summit between the three leaders, Erdogan, Rowhani and Putin, in Ankara, said the three countries are working “to bring peace and stability in Syria”. Yes! Russia from its air base in Khmeimim and through its air force in Ghouta and Northern Syria, Iran through the gangs of Qassem Soleimani and Nasrallah and Khazali’s militias, and Turkey through the Muslim Brotherhood brigades and the shelters in Gaziantep that house the fighters of Syrian fundamentalist groups are all “working to bring peace in Syria.” It’s all clear. What happened in Ankara is a “regional” version similar to the Yalta Conference which was held after World War II to divide the spoils of war and global influence. In a joint press conference, Rowhani said: “Today, we officially announce the end of the Syrian war.” While Putin said: “We agreed to cooperate in settling the Syrian crisis.” As for Erdogan, he said: “Those who do not comprehend that ISIS and the Kurdish fighters serve the same aim cannot contribute to (achieving) permanent peace in Syria.” Perhaps the only thing that may disrupt the division of the spoils of war in Ankara is US President Trump’s retreat from his “strange” decision to exit Syria as seen following his meeting with his national security team. The hawk Mike Pompeo was firm as he noted that a hasty withdrawal may harm US interests in terms of stabilizing ISIS’s defeat and curbing Iran. US Secretary of Defense Mattis agreed with Pompeo, according to Ash-Sharq al-Awsat.
Arab countries missing
Alright, so these are all non-Arab countries. Some are neighboring countries, like Iran and Turkey, and some are far like Russia and the US. Where are the Arab countries? Or rather, where are the original protagonists of the Syrian story,
Bashar and his rivals?
The photo of Putin, Rowhani and Erdogan smiling and holding hands in Ankara while discussing Syria’s future is the photo of the year. While returning from a meeting with the Roman emperor, poet Imru' al-Qais, who was known as the Lost King, fell ill at a mountain near today’s Ankara – some say it was in Ankara itself. As he was dying, he saw a woman by his side and said: O neighbor mine, the time of visiting draws near, And I will remain forever with you here
O neighbor, We are both strangers here, And every stranger is in fact a relative to another stranger.