English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For October 10/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Bible Quotations For today
Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it
The Narrow and Wide Gates
Matthew07/13-27: “Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it.
Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles? Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. Thus, by their fruit you will recognize them.
“Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the one who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me on that day, ‘Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name and in your name drive out demons and in your name perform many miracles?’ Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!’The Wise and Foolish Builders.“Therefore everyone who hears these words of mine and puts them into practice is like a wise man who built his house on the rock. The rain came down, the streams rose, and the winds blew and beat against that house; yet it did not fall, because it had its foundation on the rock. But everyone who hears these words of mine and does not put them into practice is like a foolish man who built his house on sand. The rain came down, the streams rose, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and it fell with a great crash.”

Question: "How should a Christian respond to unanswered prayer?"
GotQuestions.org/October 10/2020
Answer: How many Christians have prayed for someone, only to see their prayers go unanswered? How many have prayed and perhaps have “given up” because either they have become discouraged through a weakness of faith or have come to the conclusion that whatever they have been praying for isn’t God’s will? Nevertheless, how we deal with unanswered prayer is not just for our own benefit but for the benefit of others as well. When we pray, we are engaging in the most precious and God-given act of communication with the One to whom we are accountable in all our affairs. We have been truly bought at a steep price—the blood of the Lord Jesus Christ—and therefore we belong to God.
Our privilege of prayer is from God, and it is as much ours now as when it was given to Israel (Deuteronomy 4:7). Yet, when we pray or speak to the One in Heaven, there are times when He seems not to answer. There can be many reasons for this, and the Scriptures suggest why and how our prayers are being dealt with by the One who is so tender and loving, who Himself loves our communing with God the Father, for He, Himself, is our representative (Hebrews 4:15).
A primary reason why prayer is unanswered is sin. God cannot be mocked or deceived, and He who sits enthroned above knows us intimately, down to our every thought (Psalm 139:1-4). If we are not walking in the Way or we harbor enmity in our hearts toward our brother or we ask for things with the wrong motives (such as from selfish desires), then we can expect God not to answer our prayer because He does not hear (2 Chronicles 7:14; Psalm 66:18; James 4:3). Sin is the “stopper” to all the potential blessings that we would receive from the infinite “bottle” of God’s mercy! Indeed, there are times when our prayers are heinous in the Lord’s sight, most notably when we clearly do not belong to the Lord either because of unbelief (Proverbs 15:8) or because we are practicing hypocrisy (Mark 12:40).
Another reason why prayer seems to go unanswered is that the Lord is drawing out of our faith a deeper reliance and trust in Him, which should bring out of us a deeper sense of gratitude, love and humility. In turn, this causes us to benefit spiritually, for He gives grace to the humble (James 4:6; Proverbs 3:34). Oh, how one feels for that poor Canaanite woman, who cried out incessantly to our Lord for mercy when He was visiting the region of Tyre and Sidon (Matthew 15:21-28)! She was hardly the person a Jewish rabbi would pay attention to. She was not a Jew and she was a woman, two reasons that Jews ignored her. The Lord doesn’t seem to answer her petitions, but He knew all about her situation. He may not have answered her stated needs immediately, but still He heard and granted her request.
God may often seem silent to us, but He never sends us away empty-handed. Even if prayer has not been answered, we must rely upon God to do so in His own time. Even the exercise of prayer is a blessing to us; it is because of our faith that we are stirred to persist in prayer. It is faith that pleases God (Hebrews 11:6), and if our prayer life is wanting, does that not reflect our spiritual standing also? God hears our impoverished cries for mercy, and His silence inflames us with a sense of persistence in prayer. He loves us to reason with Him. Let us hunger for the things that are after God’s heart and let us walk in His ways and not our own. If we are faithful to pray without ceasing, then we are living in the will of God, and that can never be wrong (1 Thessalonians 5:17-18).

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 09-10/2020
Four killed in explosion at Beirut bakery
Lebanese-born Armenian opera singer Kevork Hadjian dies on Nagorno-Karabakh frontline
Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Draws in Fighters from Lebanon
Report: France 'Tasks' New Ambassador with Handling Macron’s Initiative
Who will be representing Lebanon, Israel at next week’s border talks?
Lebanon's Ex-PM Hariri Says Candidate to Head Next Government
Hariri to Begin Talks Monday, Baabda Says His New Stance 'Advanced'
Lebanon Caretaker PM: Ending Subsidies Will Lead to Social Explosion
Discussions on Lebanon’s Electoral Law Spark Sectarian Divisions
Lebanon on Edge as Time, Money Run Out
Hezbollah: maritime border talks do not mean normalization with Israel
Hawat Files 2nd Complaint over Fuel Smuggling as Crisis in Lebanon Soars
LF Hits Back over Hariri's 'Distortion of Facts'
Wildfires Break Out across Lebanon amid Heatwave
Hezbollah’s Secrets Explode—and Are Covered Up—Again/Assaf Orion/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
Hezbollah is buying time with farcical Lebanese-Israeli maritime border talks/Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya/October 09/2020

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 09-10/2020

Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks on Karabakh Begin in Moscow
Karabakh Rivals Heading towards Truce, Says France
LA's Huge Armenian Diaspora Mobilizes for Karabakh
U.S. Issues Additional Sanctions Against Iranian Banks
Iran diplomat warns of retaliation over Belgian bomb plot if found guilty: Document
Rouhani calls for human rights advocates to condemn US sanctions on Iran
Qatar Mediates to Resolve Issue of Taxes Collected by Israel
Palestinian Negotiator Erekat Facing 'Difficult' Coronavirus Symptoms
Russians Slam Assad for Dodging Political Responsibilities
Makhlouf Asks Assad to Punish ‘Conspirators’ Against his Companies
Minister Champagne travels to Europe to meet with key partners on the situations in Belarus, Nagorno Karabakh and the Eastern Mediterranean
Libyan National Army Calls for Disbanding Militias before Political Process
UN Food Agency Wins Nobel Peace Prize

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 09-10/2020

The Greatest Example of Muslim Deceit (Taqiyya) in Western History/Raymond Ibrahim/October 09/2020
Between a rock and hard place: Iran’s dilemma in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict/Ali Hashem/Al-Monitor/October 09/2020
Iran at Risk From Spillover of Armenia-Azerbaijan Clashes/Brenda Shaffer/Policy Brief/October 09/2020
Kuwait’s Precarious Mediation Role May Be Imperiled by the Emir’s Passing/Elana DeLozier/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
An October Surprise with Iran? Calculations and Policy Implications
Mehdi Khalaji, Ariane Tabatabai, and Michael Eisenstadt/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
Flare-Up in Nagorno-Karabakh: The Iranian Dimension/Farzin Nadimi/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
The Baku Balance: How Azerbaijan Juggles Israel and Iran/David Pollock/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
Without Russian Aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan Has the Upper Hand in Nagorno-Karabakh/Robert M. Cutler/Foreign Policy/October 09/2020
Bandar’s Anger or the Resentment of Saudis?/Salman Al-Dossary/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 09/2020
Yes it Hurts, No it Doesn’t/Amir Taheri/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 09/2020
Pasteur's Noble Vision/Lawrence Kadish/Gatestone Institute/October 09/2020
Fighting in the Caucasus: Erdogan's Ottoman Ambitions/Con Coughlin/ Gatestone Institute/October 09/2020

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on October 09-10/2020

Four killed in explosion at Beirut bakery
Simon Rushton/The National/October 09/ 2020
A diesel tank at a bakery in Beirut’s Tariq Al-Jadida neighbourhood has exploded, killing four people. The Lebanese Red Cross confirmed the initial death toll and that there were a number of wounded people. A short while later, the number of victims rose to four. “Two bodies and a number of wounded were taken to Al-Maqasid Hospital as a result of the explosion of the diesel tank that caught fire this evening,” said George Kittana, secretary-general of the Lebanese Red Cross. Eyewitness Ali Ghannam said: “We were cleaning the street then suddenly a very strong explosion shook the place and everything starting falling down. "A diesel or gasoline tank was blown in the air then fell down, causing fire and electricity cables to be cut, and people ran away. We still don’t know the details.”The explosion reportedly panicked local residents and damaged a large number of neighbouring buildings.
The army cordoned off the blast site, a bakery, and evacuated residents who were trapped on the upper floors of the building. Lebanon Civil Defence said the explosion caused a large fire which has been brought under control. Lebanon is still suffering after August's huge explosion in Beiru port, which killed at least 190, injuring 6,500 and leaving 300,000 people homeless. About 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate stored at port exploded in what was one of the biggest non-nuclear blasts in history. The eight-month-old government resigned after the blast, but no politician has apologised and the local investigation has yet to pinpoint responsibility for the disaster. Former prime minister Saad Hariri has said he is a possible candidate to head a new government to stem the country's economic collapse. French President Emmanuel Macron last month extracted a pledge from all political sides in the former French protectorate to back speedy government formation as part of a roadmap out of the crisis, but efforts so far have failed. President Michel Aoun is to hold parliamentary consultations on naming a new premier on Thursday next week. Even before the blast at Beirut port and the coronavirus pandemic, Lebanon was facing its worst economic crisis since the end of a 15-year civil war in 1990.

Lebanese-born Armenian opera singer Kevork Hadjian dies on Nagorno-Karabakh frontline
Lemma Shehadi, Al Arabiya English/Friday 09 October 2020
The Lebanese-born Armenian opera singer Kevork Hadjian was killed in combat in Nagorno-Karabakh on Thursday, according to an Armenian broadcaster Yerkir. Hadjian was born in Anjar, in the Bekaa Valley, and lived in Armenia as a repatriate. He was known as a tenor for singing Armenian songs and giving concerts to the Armenian army. According to the report, Hadjian was part of a platoon of volunteers led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or the “Dashnak”, an Armenian nationalist political party that is also active in Lebanon. Days after the fighting began on September 27, reports circulating in the mainstream press and social media networks, stated that hundreds of ethnic Armenians in the diaspora had signed up as volunteers to join the frontline. However, the current number of Lebanese-Armenian volunteers involved in the hostilities is unknown, according to diaspora networks in Beirut.
Hadjian’s death comes as the conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the disputed territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, escalated in its second week. Civilian settlements have been hit by both sides, with over 50 reported civilian deaths, dozens of injured and thousands displaced. On Friday, ceasefire talks were hosted in Russia, and a spokesperson for the French presidency said the parties were “moving towards a truce.”

Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Draws in Fighters from Lebanon
Associated Press/October 09/2020
For the past two weeks, Raffi Ghazarian has been glued to the TV at home and at work watching news about the fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. If it goes on, the 50-year-old Lebanese of Armenian descent says he's ready to leave everything and volunteer to defend his ancestral land.
Some from Lebanon's large ethnic Armenian population have already travelled to join the fight, according to members of the community, although they say the numbers are small. The new eruption of violence in the Caucasus region strikes close to home for Lebanon's Armenians. Red, blue and orange Armenian flags are flown on balconies, windows and roofs of buildings in Bourj Hammoud, Beirut's main Armenian district. Anti-Turkish graffiti in English and Armenian mark walls all over the streets.
Fighting has raged since Sept. 27 in the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving several hundred dead. The enclave lies within Azerbaijan but has been under the control of ethnic Armenian forces backed by neighboring Armenia since 1994, when a truce ended a years-long war that killed an estimate 30,000 people. On the other side of the latest fighting, Turkey has sent hundreds of Syrian opposition fighters to back its ally, Azerbaijan, according to a Syrian war monitor and three Syria-based opposition activists.
Lebanese-Armenians have been sending money and aid as well as campaigning in the media in support of ethnic Armenians in the enclave, which they refer to as Artsakh. The support they can give is limited — Lebanon is passing through a severe economic crisis, and banks have imposed tight capital controls.
Lebanon is home to one of the largest Armenian communities in the world, most of them descendants of survivors of the 1915 genocide by Ottoman Turks.
An estimated 1.5 million died in massacres, deportations and forced marches that began in 1915 as Ottoman officials worried that the Christian Armenians would side with Russia, its enemy in World War I.
The event is widely viewed by historians as genocide. Turkey denies the deaths constituted genocide, saying the toll has been inflated and that those killed were victims of civil war and unrest.
"We will not allow what happened in 1915 to happen again. We will fight until the last Armenian soldier," said Ghazarian, standing next to a coffee stand decorated with Lebanese and Armenian flags.
"This is not a war between Muslims and Christians. This is a war for the existence of the Armenian entity and we are ready," said Ghazarian, who owns a clothes shop. Lebanese legislator Hagop Pakradounian, who heads the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the largest and most powerful Armenian party in Lebanon, said volunteers going from Lebanon to Armenia act on their own, and there is no decision by any organization or the community itself to send them. "We cannot tell them not to go. They are free," Pakradounian told The Associated Press in his office in Bourj Hammoud. "We consider it a war against all the Armenian people and a continuation of the genocide project since the Ottoman Empire."
Meanwhile, Turkey has sent more than 1,200 Syrian fighters — most of them members of Turkish-backed opposition groups — to fight alongside Azeri forces, according to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human rights, an opposition war monitor that tracks Syria's nine-year conflict. The Observatory's chief, Rami Abdurrahman, said 72 Syrian fighters have been killed so far.
Three opposition activists in Syria corroborated the report. They said Turkish security companies recruit the men ostensibly to work as guards at oil facilities in return for around $1,200 a month, but most end up on front lines. One of the activists sent AP photos of young men allegedly killed in Azerbaijan.
A citizen journalist based in northern Syria said he knows some of the fighters who joined the battle, adding that warnings they sent about the intensity of the fighting and the dangers made others who were planning to go change their minds. The deployment is similar to what happened in Libya, where battle-hardened Syrian fighters helped tip the balance of power in favor of the U.N.-supported government of Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj, an ally of Turkey.
Armenia has repeatedly said over the past week that Turkey sent Syrian fighters to back the Azeris, a claim that Ankara and Azerbaijan deny.
Syrian President Bashar Assad told Russia's RIA Novosti news agency that Turkey is bringing "terrorists" from Syria and Libya to fight in Azerbaijan, accusing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of being "behind the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh."
French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Russia's Vladimir Putin about the conflict last week. Macron later told reporters he had information "that we're confident in" confirming Turkey's deployment of Syrian mercenaries in the fighting. "It's a very serious new development that also changes the balance of things," he said. Russia's Foreign Ministry expressed concern over reports about "militants from illegal armed groups" from Syria and Libya being sent to the conflict zone. Hikmet Hajiyev, a foreign policy aide to the Azerbaijani president, said this week that "we completely reject" the claim, calling on those who make the accusations to give evidence. Maj. Youssef al-Hammoud, an official with the so-called Syrian National Army, an umbrella for Turkish-backed armed opposition groups in Syria, strongly denied in a telephone call with the AP that any fighters were being sent from Syria to Azerbaijan. "This is an Armenian media campaign," al-Hammoud said. Lebanon's Armenians are doing what they can to help. Yeghia Tashjian, a freelance researcher, said he was writing articles to raise awareness about what Armenians are being subjected to.
"For us, this is existential war that it is important to win not just for emotional or nationalist issues but because it is our homeland and we should fight for it," Tashjian said. In Bourj Hammoud, Tro Mandalian, who works in a perfume distribution business, said Armenians' opponents always had bigger armies but still Armenians survived. "We have strong hearts," he said. "Let them try us," he said. "We don't surrender and we only kneel to God."

Report: France 'Tasks' New Ambassador with Handling Macron’s Initiative
Naharnet/October 09/2020
France’s new ambassador to Lebanon, Anne Grillo, has reportedly been tasked with following up on Macron’s initiative towards Lebanon, al-Liwaa daily reported on Friday. Quoting a western diplomat on condition of anonymity, the daily said that “the Elysee has tasked Grillo, who arrived in Beirut on Wednesday, to pursue talks with representatives of the country’s top political blocs and parties whom Macron had met at the Pine Residence on September 2, after which an agreement to form a mission government made of specialists was reached.”“Very happy to have arrived in Beirut and to take over as the head of the @AmbaFranceLiban (French Embassy in Lebanon) to continue France’s unfailing commitment alongside Lebanon and the Lebanese,” Grillo said in her first tweet after arriving in Beirut. Macron last month extracted a pledge from all political sides in the former French protectorate to back speedy government formation as part of a roadmap out of the crisis, but efforts so far have failed. Nidaa al-Watan newspaper on Friday quoted a “French source” as saying that “Lebanese officials have failed to respect the commitment they made to Macron by foiling his initiative. The French Presidency decided not to involve itself in the formation process that should have led to lining a reform-minded government.”“French Ambassador Anne Grillo is going to hold talks at the local level, the Presidency will not intervene anymore,” the source told the daily.Lebanon is mired in its worst economic crunch in decades, and still reeling from a massive explosion at Beirut’s port on August 4 that killed more than 200 people, wounded thousands and ravaged large parts of the capital.

Who will be representing Lebanon, Israel at next week’s border talks?
Joseph Haboush, Al Arabiya English/October 09/2020
Israel on Thursday announced the members of its delegation that will participate in next week’s first meeting with Lebanon over disputed maritime borders, mediated by the United States and United Nations. An official Lebanese source also revealed to Al Arabiya English who Lebanon’s delegation would be comprised of during the meeting to be held at a UN building in south Lebanon, on Oct. 14. Representing the Lebanese army and heading the delegation will be Brig. Gen. Bassam Yassine. Col. Mazen Basbous will also represent the Lebanese military alongside Wissam Chbat, the head of the Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA). Maritime affairs expert Najib Masihi will be on the Lebanese delegation as will Hadi Hashem, a senior official from Foreign Ministry. “This is the tentative list, but we were waiting to see who Israel would send and what level of officials. Now that they revealed the names tonight, we’ll see if Lebanon’s delegation is changed at all,” the source said. As for Israel, media reports quoted Tel Aviv’s Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz as saying there would be six team members. He said the following would be on the delegation: Ehud (Udi) Adiri, director-general of the Energy Ministry; Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Reuven Azar; and Brig. Gen. Oren Setter from the army.
US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker has previously said he will be present at the talks. On the UN side, Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jan Kubis will be attending. The specific dispute on the maritime border is almost a decade old. US diplomat Frederick Hoff went to Beirut in 2011 in an effort to reach a solution after potential offshore oil, and natural gas reserves were discovered. Hoff came up with what became known as the “Hoff Line,” which would have seen Lebanon get around 550 sq. km. out of the 860 sq. km. that is disputed.
Succeeding Hoff was Amos Hochstein, who was unable to make any notable progress. The issue sat on the back burner for years until US President Donald Trump was elected and dispatched then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to have a go at getting Lebanon and Israel to reach a deal.
Tillerson’s efforts, like his tenure as the top US diplomat, were short-lived. Nevertheless, Washington continued hammering away over the years, and Ambassador David Satterfield was handed the file. Familiar with both countries and their officials, Satterfield spent significant time flying between Beirut, Washington and Tel Aviv mediating.Before being appointed as the ambassador to Turkey, Satterfield made notable progress and laid down the initial text between Lebanon and Israel. His efforts were close to succeeding before his time ran out as acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, since 2017. Schenker was able to push the final agreement forward in recent weeks but was quick to point out that the talks had nothing to do with normalization.

Lebanon's Ex-PM Hariri Says Candidate to Head Next Government
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Lebanon's former prime minister Saad Hariri Thursday said he was a possible candidate to head a new government to stem the country's economic collapse after a massive port blast. French President Emmanuel Macron last month extracted a pledge from all political sides in the former French protectorate to back speedy government formation as part of a roadmap out of the crisis, but efforts so far have failed. "I am definitely a candidate" to head the next government, Hariri said during a live interview on the MTV television channel. I "will not close the door on the only hope left for Lebanon to stem this collapse," he said. The country is mired in its worst economic crunch in decades, and still reeling from a massive explosion at Beirut´s port on August 4 that killed more than 200 people, wounded thousands, and ravaged large parts of the capital. President Michel Aoun is to hold parliamentary consultations on naming a new premier on Thursday next week. Hariri said he was ready to start making phone calls during the coming week "if all political teams still agree on the program" discussed with Macron. The former premier stepped down under street pressure last autumn after mass protests erupted demanding the overhaul of a political class accused of being inept and corrupt. The government that followed, headed by Hassan Diab, resigned in the wake of the huge Beirut blast. The next premier designate, Mustapha Adib, last month bowed out just weeks after being nominated, after his efforts to hammer out a cabinet were blocked by the country's two main Shiite political parties -- Hezbollah and Amal -- seeking to keep the finance ministry under their control. Forming a government can drag on for months in multi-confessional Lebanon, where a power-sharing agreement seeks to maintain a fragile balance between all sides. But Hariri said all political sides had agreed with Macron, who visited Beirut twice in the wake of the blast, to set aside their differences for six months to save the country from further deterioration. "Every political side can invent a problem to government formation," Hariri said. "But if the political parties really want to stem the collapse and rebuild Beirut, they must follow the French initiative," he said.

Hariri to Begin Talks Monday, Baabda Says His New Stance 'Advanced'
Naharnet/October 09/2020
Ex-PM Saad Hariri will launch contacts on Monday with all the parliamentary blocs that were present at the Pine Residence meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, media reports said on Friday. “The Center House is awaiting public responses from the parliamentary blocs to act accordingly and decide on the next steps,” Center House sources told LBCI TV. “What’s important is to reactivate communication among the political forces, which had been severed in the wake of (PM-designate) Mustafa Adib’s resignation, in order to rescue and revive the French initiative in terms of the formation of the government, its economic program, the rescue of Lebanon and the reconstruction of (blast-hit) Beirut,” the sources added. Sources close to President Michel Aoun meanwhile told LBCI that the presidential palace is awaiting the outcome of the contacts that Hariri will carry out with the various parties. “Hariri’s stance was advanced (in Thursday’s TV interview) and he has shifted from the phase of refusing to be a premier during this stage to the phase of declaring himself to be a PM candidate within the French initiative,” the sources added. Mustaqbal Movement sources meanwhile told al-Jadeed TV that “Hariri did not nominate himself but rather said that he is a natural candidate for the premiership, seeing as he is the head of a large parliamentary bloc, the leader of a broad political movement and a former prime minister.” The sources added that Hariri will explore the reactions of the parties to his latest stance on the new government and will hold consultations with the ex-PMs, al-Mustaqbal bloc and al-Mustaqbal Movement ahead of “reactivating political communication as of Monday.” Hariri said Thursday that he is a possible candidate to head the new government to stem the country's economic collapse after the massive port blast.
Macron last month extracted a pledge from all Lebanese political sides to back speedy government formation as part of a roadmap out of the crisis, but efforts so far have failed. "I am definitely a candidate" to head the next government, Hariri said during a live interview on the MTV television channel.
I "will not close the door on the only hope left for Lebanon to stem this collapse," he said. The country is mired in its worst economic crunch in decades, and still reeling from a massive explosion at Beirut’s port on August 4 that killed more than 200 people, wounded thousands and ravaged large parts of the capital. President Aoun is to hold parliamentary consultations on naming a new premier on Thursday next week. Hariri said he was ready to start making phone calls during the coming week "if all political teams still agree on the program" discussed with Macron.
The former premier stepped down under street pressure last fall after mass protests erupted demanding the overhaul of a political class accused of being inept and corrupt. The government that followed, headed by Hassan Diab, resigned in the wake of the huge Beirut blast.
The next premier designate, Mustafa Adib, last month bowed out just weeks after being nominated, after his efforts to hammer out a cabinet were blocked by the country's two main Shiite political parties -- Hizbullah and Amal -- seeking to keep the finance ministry under their control. Forming a government can drag on for months in multi-confessional Lebanon, where a power-sharing agreement seeks to maintain a fragile balance between all sides. But Hariri said all political sides had agreed with Macron, who visited Beirut twice in the wake of the blast, to set aside their differences for six months to save the country from further deterioration. "Every political side can invent a problem to government formation," Hariri said. "But if the political parties really want to stem the collapse and rebuild Beirut, they must follow the French initiative," he said.

Lebanon Caretaker PM: Ending Subsidies Will Lead to Social Explosion
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Lebanon’s caretaker prime minister on Friday adamantly rejected any move to end subsidies of goods in the crisis-hit country, warning it would lead to a “social explosion” as the central bank’s reserves dwindle and the local currency continues to drop, throwing more Lebanese into poverty. Prime Minister Hassan Diab, who resigned in August — days after a massive blast in Beirut's port killed almost 200 people and wounded thousands — warned that the “Lebanese are passing through a difficult period amid divisions” between political and sectarian groups at the expense of the people. He urged politicians in the corruption-plagued country to overcome their differences and form a new government that would quickly work on dealing with the crisis. Lebanon is mired in the worst economic and financial crisis in its modern history. It defaulted on paying back its debt for the first time in March, and the local currency has lost nearly 80% of its value amid hyperinflation, soaring poverty, and unemployment. Talks with the International Monetary Fund on a bailout package have stalled since July. The Labor Union called for protests next week against any move by the central bank to end subsidies. Diab said that had his government not decided to default on paying back the massive debt, the central bank’s reserves would have dropped $5 billion, to $17.5 billion. He added that Lebanon paid $4 billion to subsidize imports of fuel, wheat and medicine — and the figure could reach $7 billion by year's end. “The central bank, along with all those who support or cover such a decision, shall bear the responsibility for any move toward lifting subsidies,” Diab said in a televised speech. He warned that such a move “will generate a social explosion with disastrous consequences.” Some officials have said that in the next few months, the Central Bank is expected to end subsidies on basic goods. Since the local currency’s collapse, the bank has been using its depleting reserves to support imports of fuel, wheat and medicine. President Michel Aoun has called for binding consultations with members of parliament next week to name a new prime minister. Prime Minister-designate Mustapha Adib resigned in late September, following a disagreement on the shape of the government, a month after he was chosen to form a new cabinet.

Discussions on Lebanon’s Electoral Law Spark Sectarian Divisions
Beirut - Nazeer Rida/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Lebanese political parties are engaged in a dispute on the electoral law that to be adopted in the next parliamentary elections set for May 2022. Sectarian divisions began to emerge during a joint meeting of the parliamentary committees held on Wednesday to study electoral draft-laws. Some deputies support a proportional representation system free from any religious affiliations with the establishment of a Senate where sects are fairly represented. However, other MPs consider such a draft-law as a threat to confessional balances in the country. During Wednesday’s meeting, lawmakers from Speaker Nabih Berri’s Development and Liberation bloc proposed a draft-law turning Lebanon into a single electoral district, based on full proportional representation without so-called preferential votes. The proposal ignited sectarian divides. Despite their differences on political issues, the two largest Christian parliamentary blocs - the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Lebanese Forces (LF) – held onto organizing the elections based on the current electoral law, with a few amendments. Both parties fear that any electoral law turning Lebanon into a single electoral district would damage the sectarian balance in the country, sources opposed to the draft-law proposed by Berri’s bloc told Asharq Al-Awsat Thursday. “The FPM and the LF hold onto the current law,” the sources said, which they said provides the best representation. The current law, applied during the 2018 elections, is based on a proportional representation system with redrawn districts and preferential votes, allowing Christians to secure a seat for the majority of their deputies with Christian votes. In the last elections, the FPM secured 29 deputies, and the LF 16 MPs. The FPM considers the establishment of a Senate as an attempt to “change the system” in Lebanon, a move that requires further discussions among the political parties. Christian deputies also consider it inappropriate to discuss the electoral law amid worsening political and economic crises. “This is not the time for political bickering and for discussing contentious issues. Rather political parties should seek to form an independent cabinet and hold early elections,” head of the LF media office Charles Jabbour told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Lebanon on Edge as Time, Money Run Out
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Fouad Khamasi fills his taxi every day with about 40,000 Lebanese pounds' worth of fuel. It could cost at least four times that much if subsidies come to an end. The Beirut cab driver, 53, can just about afford to buy fuel and feed his kids. He worries the price of subsidized foods and key imports - wheat, fuel, medicine - will skyrocket. "These are the toughest days I've ever seen," Reuters quoted him as saying. "Some days, you stick your hand in your pocket and find nothing ... I leave the house and just pray. Whatever I make, it does nothing. It's a joke."Time and money are running out for Lebanon. Foreign reserves have dropped far below what the state already deemed "dangerous levels" when it defaulted on its huge debt in March, meaning it cannot afford to keep subsidies for long. Leaders in power for decades have yet to enact a financial rescue plan, a year after huge protests against them swept the country, and they have failed to secure aid from foreign donors. Talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stalled earlier this year when Lebanese government officials, bankers and political parties could not agree over how big the losses were in the financial system and who should bear them.
After a massive explosion at Beirut's port in August that killed nearly 200 people and caused billions of dollars worth of damage, France stepped in. But rival sectarian politicians could not get past the first hurdle on the French roadmap towards financial aid: naming a new cabinet quickly.
The currency, which has lost more than 80% of its value against the US dollar since last autumn, weakened after the French effort faltered. Meanwhile, comments from officials indicating an end to some subsidies within months have triggered panic buying, raising the specter of food shortages and a more dramatic crash in the currency. In the nation of some six million people, more than 55% of whom are below the poverty line, many are bracing for hunger and cold as winter looms. "Everything that happened since last October could have been avoidable," Nasser Saidi, a former vice central bank governor, told Reuters.
He said targeted aid to the poorest Lebanese would be more effective than subsidies across the board, which had benefited smugglers taking goods into Syria. "It's all kicking the can down the road. What should have been done is a full economic and financial plan," Saidi said.
Importers of key commodities said they had not been given a timeline to plan for how long subsidies could last. Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh has said the bank could not finance trade indefinitely, although he gave no timeframe.
President Michel Aoun said recently of reserves: "The money will run out. What can we say?"An official source close to the government told Reuters the money left for subsidies would last six more months by cutting support for some goods.
The state, which critics say is mired in corruption, and the paralyzed banking sector, its biggest creditor, have traded blame for the crisis. Meanwhile, the wealth gap, already one of the region's largest, widens. In a country that relies heavily on imports and produces little, prices for many items including diapers have tripled. In Beirut, men and women, some with young children, can often be seen digging for food in dumpsters near city intersections. Two months after the port blast, Lebanese expect life to get even harder. Many families now rely on charity. The meltdown could render people more dependent on political factions for aid and security, in a throwback to the militia days of the civil war. Some analysts have warned that security forces, their wages fast losing value, would not be able to contain rising unrest. Hospitals fighting a surge in COVID-19 cases are overstretched. Fuel shortages have left city streets dark. Cars line up at petrol stations for rationed fuel. "We're scared we won't be able to go on," said Siham Itani, a pharmacist who fears price hikes and being robbed. She said supplies of insulin and blood pressure medication had dwindled.
Another pharmacist said a masked man had held her up at gunpoint, asking for baby food. Mostafa al-Mohalhal, who at 62 suffers from diabetes, stored four insulin vials in his fridge, but the daily power cuts spoiled them.
"If the price rises, how will I pay for them?" he said. "People will die in the streets."

Hezbollah: maritime border talks do not mean normalization with Israel
Reuters, Ynet/October 09/2020
Terrorist group's political wing says Beirut not interested in expanding U.S. and UN-mediated talks meant to 'reclaim our land, so as to delineate our national sovereignty'
Lebanon's Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc said on Thursday that negotiations with Israel over maritime borders "are not connected to" making peace with Israel. The Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, Hezbollah’s political wing, said in a press release that Beirut does not have any interest in expanding talks beyond the maritime dispute. “It has absolutely nothing to do with ‘reconciling’ with the rapacious Zionist enemy, nor with the normalization that some Arab countries have adopted,” the bloc added, referring to the historic Abraham Accords, signed between Israel and Gulf neighbors Bahrain and the UAE on September 15.Lebanon's parliament speaker Nabih Berri confirmed last month that a framework had been agreed for talks with Israel to end a long-running maritime border dispute between the two nations that are formally at war. Berri, who said the army would lead the Lebanese team, told a news conference negotiations would be held in south Lebanon near the border under the auspices of the United Nations and the United States would push for a deal as fast as possible. The talks will begin on October 14 and will be held at the headquarters of the UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, in the southern border town of Naqoura. Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, who will lead the Israeli delegation, later confirmed the statement. "Our goal is to end the dispute over the demarcation of economic water between Israel and Lebanon in order to help develop natural resources for the benefit of all the peoples of the region," said Steinitz. "For the first time in 30 years, civil-political negotiations between Israel and Lebanon will take place after two years of indirect contacts."

Hawat Files 2nd Complaint over Fuel Smuggling as Crisis in Lebanon Soars
Naharnet/October 09/2020
Strong Republic bloc MP Ziad Hawwat filed a complaint with the Public Prosecution office on Friday about illegal border crossings and smuggling of Lebanon’s subsidized fuel into Syria. “Fuel is being smuggled uncontrollably without any deterrence from the security forces, while Lebanese citizens stand in queues to fill their tanks,” said Hawat in remarks he made outside the Justice Palace. “Security agencies are not playing their role in this regard,” Hawat said accusingly, estimating the amount of smuggled fuel to Syria at $500 thousand per month. He emphasized that “smuggling is ongoing. We won’t keep silent, we will raise our voice and that’s why I filed my second complaint today which I attached with documents. Brokers are providing a cover for smuggling,” Hawat stated. Lebanon is losing millions of dollars as fuel smuggling has become increasingly public amid an unprecedented economic and financial crisis.
Lebanon’s Central Bank plans in the upcoming two months to stop subsidies on basic commodities like wheat, medicines and fuel over shortage in foreign reserves.
 

LF Hits Back over Hariri's 'Distortion of Facts'
Naharnet/October 09/2020
The Lebanese Forces on Friday snapped back at ex-PM Saad Hariri over what it described as his “distortion of facts.”“The LF’s media department regrets what ex-PM Saad Hariri raised overnight” in his live interview on MTV, which “contained a falsification and distortion of facts,” the media department said in a statement. “The stages during which the government’s work was paralyzed were not linked to the political disputes between the Free Patriotic Movement and the LF, as ex-PM Hariri tried to suggest, because those disputes were technical over certain files, topped by the electricity file,” the LF said.
It also criticized Hariri for “siding with (ex-)Minister Jebran Bassil by refusing the organization of a call for tenders via the Procurement Administration and insisting on the (power) ships solution.”The LF also slammed Hariri for “resorting, as usual, to the approach of settlements and concessions” during the formation of the last government he led, describing that as “one of the reasons behind the current collapse.”As for the LF’s refusal to name Hariri to lead a new government following his 2019 resignation, the media department attributed that to “the popular majority’s rejection after the Oct. 17 uprising of all those who had been in power prior to that date,” and to the LF’s “vision for the country’s salvation through the formation of a government that is totally independent from all political forces.”

Wildfires Break Out across Lebanon amid Heatwave
Naharnet/October 09/2020
Forest fires were raging Friday in several regions across Lebanon amid a heatwave accompanied by strong winds. In the southern district of Tyre, the flames approached homes in several villages and gutted vast areas of dry grass and fruit trees. Many residents evacuated their homes as several medics suffered suffocation injuries. Army helicopters and troops, UNIFIL peacekeepers, Civil Defense teams and crews from the Islamic Risala Scout Association and the Islamic Health Society were fighting the wildfires according to the National News Agency. A major blaze meanwhile erupted in Israeli territory facing the Lebanese towns of Houla and Hounin, sparking fears that it could spread into Lebanese territory due to strong winds.Other wildfires, some close to homes, were also reported in the South and in the northern regions of Akkar, Dinniyeh and Minieh, and the Mt. Lebanon regions of Chouf, Northern Metn and Upper Metn.

Hezbollah’s Secrets Explode—and Are Covered Up—Again
Assaf Orion/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/91123/assaf-orion-the-washington-institute-hezbollahs-secrets-explode-and-are-covered-up-again-%d8%a3%d8%b3%d8%a7%d9%81-%d8%a3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%87/

تقرير يكشف اسرار ومخاطر مخازن اسلحة حزب الله في داخل المناطق السكنية ويفيد التقرير بأن الحزب الإرهابي الملالوي هذا يحاول التستر على استراتجيته المتمثلة في اخفاء مخازن اسلحته ولكن مع كل انفجار في واحد من مخازنت تنكشف محنته وكذلك مدى سعيه المستمر للحصول على صواريخ دقيقة وتعزيزد مهاراته الإعلامية
The group is once more trying to conceal its strategy of hiding military assets in civilian areas, but each self-explosion and Israeli exposure reveals more about Hezbollah’s political plight, its persistent quest for precision missiles, and its skill with information operations.
Last week saw another round in Israel’s efforts to expose Hezbollah’s precision weapons and its longstanding human-shield strategy inside Lebanon, with the group inevitably fighting back through denials and cover-ups. As the new revelations and the group’s counterpunches make clear, the status quo poses a profound risk to both the Lebanese people and regional security. In response, Israel and the international community need to pursue more intensive information campaigning, integrative policy, and peacekeeping improvements.
DUELING SPEECHES
On the evening of September 29, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the UN General Assembly by video. Recalling the August 4 port blast in Beirut and the September 22 explosion in Ain Qana, he revealed the existence of a “secret arms depot” near a gas company in the capital’s Janah neighborhood, urging the Lebanese people to demand that Hezbollah and Iran “tear these depots down.” Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces published further details about Hezbollah’s Janah site along with two other manufacturing sites for precision-guided missiles in the Laylaki and Choueifat neighborhoods, both sheltered beneath residential buildings.
This sequence was a repeat of what happened two years earlier, when Netanyahu’s September 27, 2018, Hezbollah’s Secrets Explode—and Are Covered Up—Again UN speech exposed three Hezbollah precision missile sites in civilian areas and the IDF released details right afterward. In an attempt to disprove those allegations, Lebanon’s foreign minister at the time, Gebran Bassil, took a delegation of foreign ambassadors to one of the sites on October 1, but Israel derided this as a cover-up, noting that three days was plenty of time for Hezbollah to clear out a missile factory.
This year, the group responded more quickly. Just an hour-and-a-half after Netanyahu’s UN video speech began, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah used his own preplanned television address to declare that a media tour would be arranged that night to “prove Netanyahu’s lies.” He also claimed that the short notice he was giving—he began speaking at 8:42 p.m., and the promised tour was scheduled for 10:00 p.m.—would not be enough time to allow for the removal of any alleged missiles from the site, proving that none were there in the first place. The IDF soon tweeted the coordinates of each site and wryly noted, “Let’s hope the journalists get there before Nasrallah’s moving trucks do.” Predictably, the tour resulted in no incriminating missile footage—at least at first glance.
The next day, the IDF struck back with a video and more infographics that took a closer look at the tour footage, identifying the Hezbollah members who led the tour and pointing out the presence of machinery used in missile manufacturing. Also released was drone footage of a van traveling between Choueifat and Burj al-Barajneh, where a fourth missile manufacturing site was exposed beneath an apartment building.
HEZBOLLAH’S HISTORY OF EXPLOSIONS AND COVER-UPS
Netanyahu’s mention of the Ain Qana explosion was telling as well. In addition to heavily damaging several houses in the area, that incident bore signs of the same cover-up tactics Hezbollah has used in previous cases. Past reports issued by the UN secretary-general describe four arms explosions at Hezbollah sites within the jurisdiction of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) south of the Litani River: Khirbet Selim in July 2009, Tayr Filsay in October 2009, Shahabia in September 2010, and Tayr Harfa in December 2012.
In all of these cases, Hezbollah members cordoned off the sites, sometimes violently. In Khirbet Selim, for example, fourteen peacekeepers were injured and eighteen UN vehicles damaged when they attempted to gain access. Within the cordon, thorough cleanup operations took place, with Hezbollah removing remnants of arms and ammunition and transferring them elsewhere. Access was not granted until most incriminating remains were gone; in some cases the facility had even been repainted.
In Khirbet Selim, the UN concluded that the explosion occurred in an active Hezbollah arms and ammunition depot. In Tayr Filsay, the residential building destroyed by the blast was reportedly owned by a local Hezbollah official and had been used as an ammunition depot, but evidence pinpointing the presence of explosives and ammunition was harder to come by—as with all the other sites, signs of tampering were clear. In Tayr Harfa, the ground was bulldozed before UNIFIL was allowed access two hours later (though Israel watched over the bulldozing with drones). Investigators still found sufficient “metallic ordnance fragments” to conclude that the blast resulted from a “detonation of a large quantity of explosives,” indicating a direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Yet UNIFIL’s request to excavate the site was denied by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which share Hezbollah’s interest in minimizing exposure and political consequences.
Shahabia apparently took longer to clean, as UNIFIL was denied access for more than twenty-four hours. Even while the cordon was in place, UNIFIL claimed to be “on the spot,” when in fact it had simply formed an outer “blue ring” at a distance around the LAF’s inner “red ring” in accordance “with standard operating procedures.” IDF drones flying overhead had a clear view of Hezbollah’s innermost undeclared “yellow ring,” where LAF and UNIFIL personnel were still prohibited and dozens of people were frantically evacuating suspicious objects and loading them onto trucks. The IDF gave the UNIFIL commander realtime updates on these activities throughout the night, but the trucks nevertheless departed the area unhindered, ending up in a Nabatiyah mosque across the Litani.
Last month’s Ain Qana explosion occurred outside UNIFIL’s area of responsibility, but Hezbollah still scrambled to cover it up. In an Al Jazeera report on the incident, Hezbollah sources stated that “the explosion was caused by a ‘technical error’ at their arms depot”—but later claimed “the building belonged to a Hezbollah-affiliated de-mining association.” They then gave the same excuse offered for the Tayr Harfa incident, namely, that it resulted from “explosive remnants of the 2006 war.” According to the BBC, an army unit arrived at the site “instantly” after the blast “and launched an investigation,” yet Al Jazeera noted that “Hezbollah members imposed a security cordon around the blast area.”
Interestingly, more than seven weeks before the Ain Qana incident, a self-described Norway-based journalist tweeted in Arabic that the village was home to Hezbollah’s engineering unit, and that the group had been using several residences to manufacture explosive charges and store tons of explosive material since 2008, using a dairy as cover. Issued shortly after the Beirut port blast, the tweet ended with a warning that any explosion at this factory would cause a major human tragedy in Ain Qana. When an explosion finally did occur, Lebanon’s state-owned National News Agency issued a typical deflection, emphasizing that it coincided with “intensive” traffic from Israeli aircraft.
PUBLIC MESSAGING AND INTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS
Hezbollah’s prompt reaction to Netanyahu’s challenge demonstrated not just its improved response time at the tactical level, but mainly the heavy strategic pressure it is currently experiencing. After the port tragedy, the group became more attuned to growing public anger over its strategy of embedding arms and ammunition in populated areas. Netanyahu’s words were aimed at that raw nerve, and Hezbollah’s instant “media tour” response indicates that he struck home. At the same time, the manner in which Israel presented its evidence gave the group some room to cast itself as the winner of the first round in this exchange. The IDF’s animated clip included missile icons, and Netanyahu’s imprecise wording (ranging from “secret arms depot” to “missile factory” to “missile explosive depot”) strayed from the military’s set terminology (“missile manufacturing sites”), allowing Hezbollah to focus the tour on the lack of actual missiles at the site. Whether this exonerated the group in the public’s eye remains to be seen, especially since the IDF quickly countered that move.
This information warfare is not just about winning hearts and minds at the strategic and political level. It also has implications at the military and operational levels, where Israeli intelligence efforts are continually striving to pierce Hezbollah’s operational security efforts as a secret military organization. Every exposure of a Hezbollah military site—whether by public revelations or self-explosions—forces the group to confront dilemmas on each of these fronts, while also raising intelligence risks for Israel.
For example, authorities had to declassify material in order to expose the sites highlighted by Netanyahu. While this move will likely disrupt Hezbollah’s precision missile project and spur complete evacuation of these sites, it also poses risks to Israeli sources and methods. In addition, it effectively removes these sites from the IDF’s list of enemy “unknown knowns” and potential future strike targets. At the same time, however, Hezbollah’s decision to vindicate itself via a media tour unwittingly gave Israel free indoor reconnaissance at Janah, and the IDF’s subsequent public revelations showed deep inside knowledge of the group’s personnel and missile project. Any secretive organization confronted with such an exposure would go reeling in search of security breaches real and imagined, potentially reaping further intelligence gains for its adversaries.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The deep problems underlying these info-tactics have only worsened over the years: Lebanon and the international community must still reckon with the fact that Hezbollah maintains its own military arsenal and foreign policy outside the government’s control; embeds its forces and weapons in populated areas, thereby exposing civilians to safety hazards and turning them into human shields in the event of another war; and persists in developing precision missiles and other advanced threats that risk provoking Israel to take preventive action. Lebanese and international acquiescence to Hezbollah’s embedded arsenal and cover-up mechanisms may wind up deferring an adequate response until it is too late. Thus far, UN mechanisms have failed to address these problems even in the south, where UNIFIL is obligated to help the LAF ensure that only government personnel have military weapons.
One step that could help reduce the mortal risk to Lebanese civilians is ending the false distinction between Hezbollah’s “terrorist wing” and “political wing.” Germany has joined the United States and Britain in designating Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization, but France is now engaging even more deeply and openly with the group’s political figures in the apparent hope that feeding steaks to this tiger will miraculously transform it into an herbivore. Going forward, more military and security elements should be incorporated into the French-led push for Lebanese reform.
Another key step is to address Hezbollah’s human-shield strategy by sanctioning group members and other Lebanese figures who enable it, including within the LAF. Moreover, if additional explosions occur south of the Litani, UNIFIL must insist on immediate access to the sites and place drones or helicopters over them. The “private property” pretext that Lebanon and Hezbollah are increasingly using to bar peacekeepers access contravenes the UN’s duty to protect civilians and must be overridden. The UN’s narrow interpretation of this duty is to act against imminent threats only, but seemingly non-imminent threats can be just as deadly when neglected for too long.
Perhaps most important, the Janah case exposed Hezbollah’s vulnerability to public uproar against its dangerous conduct. Israel and its allies should therefore increase political pressure on the group through more-frequent, credible, and unsettling exposure of its secrets, lies, and crimes—not just once every couple years at the UN General Assembly, but as part of a continual campaign.
*Assaf Orion is the Rueven International Fellow with The Washington Institute. Prior to retiring from the IDF in 2016, he held a leadership role in the Planning Directorate that included coordinating with UNIFIL and the LAF.
 

Hezbollah is buying time with farcical Lebanese-Israeli maritime border talks
Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya/October 09/2020
مكرم رباح: حزب الله يحاول شراء الوقت من خلال محادثات هزلية تتناول ترسيم الحدود البحرية اللبنانية-الإسرائيلية
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/91139/__trashed-5/
Lebanon’s recent announcement that it would start talks with Israel to demarcate its maritime border was welcomed by many. But on closer inspection, the move is a farce that has little chance of solving Lebanon’s problems.
In theory, the demarcation of the contested areas between Lebanon and Israel will allow both sides to benefit from the oil and gas fields on their border and encourage international oil companies to invest in the area. This is especially important to Lebanon given that any injection of funds would help its crumbling economy and stop the rapid devaluation of the currency and the accompanying inflation.
On face value, Hezbollah’s agreement to the talks may appear to be a softening of its position on Israel. The Trump administration, which mediated the process, can also present the talks as another diplomatic achievement following the normalization deals between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain.
However, a closer inspection reveals the talks are a farcical attempt by Hezbollah to ease mounting pressure against it. Hezbollah and its Iranian overlords are trying to buy time amid biting US financial sanctions, repeated Israeli attacks against its fighters, and the recent mysterious explosion in their military facilities.
It is no fluke that Iran, through Hezbollah, has sanctioned the demarcation to commence a mere month from the US presidential elections. Iran hopes Democratic nominee Joe Biden will win, facilitating the reinstatement of the 2015 nuclear deal.
The Trump administration secured the talks by going through Nabih Berri, the Shia speaker of parliament who heads the Hezbollah-allied Amal party. This was a baffling mistake, as it gave Hezbollah a public relations victory, suggesting that it needed to be consulted with to achieve progress. Instead, the proper move would have been for the US to engage directly with the executive branch, which has the constitutional right to negotiate demarcation issues.
The talks themselves may also aid Hezbollah and its Iranian backers. Hezbollah’s position in the country is currently so entrenched that any new sources of funds from gas revenues could be hijacked by the organization, cementing its hold over the Lebanese state.
What will take place on October 14 – the date outlined for the talks at the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) headquarters on the border – will not just be talks about merely demarcating the border. Instead, the talks are a clear message that Iran wants to pursue its version of normalization with Israel. But unlike the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which have normalized diplomatic relations with Israel, Iran’s approach is not based on normal relations. As with the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran likes to present itself as open to diplomacy while in fact using the grace period from talks to gain more ground through expanding its militia network. Even if it engages the US and Israel in any forms of talks, Iran will refuse to disarm its Hezbollah or work toward empowering Lebanon. Instead, Iran’s approach means tightening its grip over all aspect of the Lebanese state, or what remains of it. Rather than normalization, Iran is willing to engage in just demarcation while advancing its aims elsewhere.
Even then, Hezbollah has only showed openness to demarcating borders that do not undermine its interests. There has been no progress made on the disputed Shebaa Farms, a 28 square kilometer region right on the nexus of the Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli border, which technically belongs to Syria and is currently occupied by Israel. The Shebaa Farms has long provided Hezbollah with the pretext to keep its arms and therefore putting it at the center of the demarcation talks would have given the Lebanese people, or at least those fighting for them, the chance to demand the decommissioning of Hezbollah’s arms.
Nevertheless, even if these maritime demarcation talks do not remove the Shebaa pretext, they have proven that diplomatic channels are the best recourse for Lebanon to achieve its long-term interests. Yet , the Lebanese state is nowhere to be found, and its diplomatic channels have been completely hijacked by Hezbollah and its allies who have alienated and ostracized the international community. This includes Emmanuel Macron’s France, which has expressed eagerness to help.
The August 4 Beirut Port blast did not only destroy the eastern part of the capital but it also killed and injured many of the families of the diplomatic corps in Lebanon. This corps always went out of its way to help Lebanon, was underserving of a phone call or even a consolation letter to check up on their children and spouses, will hold this intended lapse to heart.
The Israeli-Iranian demarcation, or possible normalization, using Lebanon has proven yet again that Hezbollah has no red lines, and that if the Lebanese truly want their country to become worthy again, they should reconnect with the international community and ask their assistance to redraw a new map that leads them to reclaim their lost state. Ultimately demarcation, or the illusion of it, should not sideline the ever-important demands for Lebanon’s neutrality and disassociation – the only exit from Lebanon’s current inferno.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 09-10/2020

Armenia-Azerbaijan Talks on Karabakh Begin in Moscow
Agence France Presse/October 09/2020
Armenia and Azerbaijan held their first high-level talks on Friday after nearly two weeks of fierce clashes over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, with hopes rising that a ceasefire could be brokered in Moscow.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who has repeatedly vowed to use his military to retake the breakaway province, said the talks represented a historic opportunity for Armenia. "We are giving Armenia a chance to settle the conflict peacefully," he said. "This is their last chance."Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said his country was "ready for the resumption of the peace process" led by international brokers. France, which along with Russia and the United States is part of a group mediating the two countries' long conflict, said there was a chance of a breakthrough at the talks but it was far from certain. "We are moving towards a truce tonight or tomorrow but it's still fragile," President Emmanuel Macron's office said in a statement to AFP. Armenian and Azerbaijani defense officials said heavy clashes continued overnight and reported further civilian deaths, after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the meeting in Moscow late Thursday and appealed for a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds. Shelling started again on Friday in Stepanakert, the provincial capital of Karabakh, where an AFP journalist heard several loud explosions and saw the remains of a rocket in a crater next to a cemetery for dead soldiers.
Fledgling mediation efforts -
Renewed fighting over Karabakh -- an ethnic Armenian region of Azerbaijan that broke from Baku's control in a devastating war in the early 1990s -- has claimed some 400 lives and forced thousands of people from their homes.
The heavy clashes erupted late last month, with both sides blaming the other for the biggest outbreak in violence since a 1994 ceasefire left the status of Karabakh in limbo. The region's declaration of independence has not been recognized by any country -- even Armenia -- and the international community regards it as part of Azerbaijan. The Kremlin said late on Thursday that following a series of calls with Pashinyan and Aliyev, Putin had invited their foreign ministers to Moscow and called for an end to hostilities "to exchange dead bodies and prisoners". Putin's announcement of the talks came shortly after international mediators from France, Russia and the United States launched their first efforts to resolve the fighting in Geneva. The countries make up the "Minsk Group" that has sought a solution to the Karabakh conflict for decades but have failed to stop sporadic outbreaks of fighting. The negotiations in Geneva went ahead without Armenia, which refused to participate while the fighting was ongoing, and there were no public statements following the closed-door talks.
Mounting civilian toll
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin during a visit to Yerevan reiterated that Russia was prepared to help bring about peace alongside Minsk Group members. "It's important to make sure that all hostilities are halted and to start a diplomatic settlement of the conflict," he said. Since the fighting restarted both sides have accused the other of shelling areas populated by civilians and thousands of people have been displaced by the clashes. Stepanakert is dotted with damaged buildings and unexploded ordnance following days of shelling. AFP journalists have also witnessed destruction in villages in Azerbaijan near the front line. Armenia accused Azerbaijan on Thursday of hitting the iconic Ghazanchetsots (Holy Savior) Cathedral leaving a gaping hole in its roof and several journalists injured. Armenia's rights ombudsman Artak Beglaryan told AFP this week that the renewed fighting has displaced around half of Karabakh's 140,000 residents and forced some 90 percent of its women and children from their homes. Dozens of civilians have been confirmed killed and the Armenian side has acknowledged 350 military deaths, while Azerbaijan has not admitted to any fatalities among its troops. Turkey's strong backing for Azerbaijan has sown fears in the West that the conflict could spiral into a full-blown war embroiling Ankara and Moscow, which has a military treaty with Armenia. Putin and Macron are among the world leaders to denounce the reported deployment of pro-Turkish fighters from Syria and Libya to Karabakh and Iran this week warned of "terrorists" who had joined the conflict from abroad.

Karabakh Rivals Heading towards Truce, Says France
Agence France Presse/October 09/2020
Armenia and Azerbaijan were moving "towards a truce" to end fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, the French presidency told AFP, with a deal expected late Friday or on Saturday. Senior diplomats from the warring parties were meeting in Moscow even as clashes over the disputed region showed no sign of abating. "We are moving towards a truce tonight or tomorrow but it's still fragile," President Emmanuel Macron's office said in a statement to AFP. Macron spoke by telephone with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan late on Thursday and with Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev on Friday.
The French presidency said the talks were part of a "coordinated process" with Russian President Vladimir Putin since the start of the week. A resumption of peace talks would be negotiated over the coming days in the framework of the so-called Minsk group, which spearheads efforts by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to bring an end to the long-running Karabakh conflict. France chairs the group jointly with Russia and the United States.The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan are expected in Moscow on Friday at Putin's invitation.

LA's Huge Armenian Diaspora Mobilizes for Karabakh
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
No sooner had the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh escalated last month than the huge Armenian community in Los Angeles began mobilizing to send food, medical equipment, and other supplies to the "homeland."
"The second it started, we were like 'what are we going to do?' and we started working immediately," said Sosse Krikorian, who spoke with AFP this week near Los Angeles as she sorted aid destined for the tiny enclave at the heart of the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The territory -- referred to as the Republic of Artsakh by Armenians -- is recognized as part of Azerbaijan but its population is majority ethnic Armenian. For Los Angeles's Armenian community -- one of the largest in the world -- the decades-old conflict, thousands of miles away, is very much personal and the latest escalation of violence has triggered an outpouring of support. "We're all very connected to our homeland. Armenia is sacred for us," said Nora Hovsepian, chairwoman of the Armenian National Committee of America-West Region (ANCA-WR). Hovsepian estimated the number of Armenians across the United States to be at 1.5 to two million, with about one million living in California alone, the majority of them in the Los Angeles area. "Every Armenian that you talk to these days wants to do something, whether it's donating money, donating goods, calling media outlets or calling members of Congress," added Hovsepian who was born in the US and whose ancestors fled the Armenian genocide.
'Armenia is my homeland' -
The outpouring of solidarity from the community in LA is visible throughout the city, notably in the majority-Armenian suburb town of Glendale or in "Little Armenia," where many shops proudly display the Armenian flag or have set up collection boxes. Celebrities who trace their roots to Armenia, like singer Cher or reality TV star Kim Kardashian, have also sought to shine a spotlight on the deadly conflict on social media. Others like 21-year-old Krikorian help by gathering aid supplies destined for the fighters on the frontline. "We already shipped over 1,000 boxes of medical supplies... and we have another flight coming up soon," proudly says her father Joe Krikorian, who heads a non-profit that provides extensive first-aid training in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. "They're running short on a lot of things," he added. "We're getting calls every day 'we're out of sutures, we're in need of tourniquets' and we're trying to get it there as soon as possible." Krikorian, who was born in Lebanon, said dozens of volunteers and family members have turned out to help at his company while other organizations in the LA region were collecting clothing or food. "I only have American citizenship but Armenia is my homeland -- it's my blood, it's my roots, my grandparents were part of the genocide," said the 48-year-old. Armenians say that up to 1.5 million people were killed by Ottoman Turks during World War I in what amounted to genocide, a claim supported by some 30 countries. Turkey rejects the genocide label and says that Turks also died in civil strife. Raffi Sarkissian, a board member at ANCA who heads a small team of volunteers planning to travel to the enclave in the coming days, said the biggest challenge has been sorting out logistical issues to ensure the aid reaches the enclave. He said a lot of the aid has been stuck in Europe or the US because of the heavy fighting and his aim was to set up a supply chain to ensure medical equipment and other supplies reach Armenia and eventually the front line. "Right now, because of logistics, we need to be on the ground over there," he said. "That way we can assess with the local government whatever is needed."

U.S. Issues Additional Sanctions Against Iranian Banks
The New York Times/October 09/2020
The penalties, which could effectively lock Iran out of the global financial system, were the latest sign that the Trump administration plans to maintain its maximum pressure campaign against the country.
WASHINGTON — The Trump administration on Thursday imposed a new round of economic sanctions against Iran’s financial sector, as Washington seeks to increase pressure on Tehran in the weeks leading up to the presidential election.
The measure imposes penalties against 18 Iranian banks and comes days before a United Nations arms embargo on the country is set to expire. The action could effectively lock Iran out of the global financial system, further cratering its already collapsing economy.
It was the United States’ latest round of sanctions against Iran after the Trump administration’s attempt last month to unilaterally restore international economic penalties that much of the rest of the world has refused to enforce.
Critics said the new sanctions were unlikely to achieve the Trump administration’s goal of forcing Iran back into negotiations — both to limit its nuclear program and to end its hostilities across the Middle East — and would further distance the United States from key European allies.
“Our maximum economic pressure campaign will continue until Iran is willing to conclude a comprehensive negotiation that addresses the regime’s malign behavior,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement. “Our sanctions are directed at the regime and its corrupt officials that have used the wealth of the Iranian people to fuel a radical, revolutionary cause that has brought untold suffering across the Middle East and beyond.”Last month, the Trump administration said it was reimposing United Nations sanctions against Iran over the fierce objection of American allies, in part to keep a global arms embargo in place beyond its expiration date of Oct. 18. But the European Union has its own weapons embargo against Iran that is not set to expire until 2023, and officials in Britain, France and Germany resisted supporting the broader international sanctions in hopes of keeping alive an accord to limit Tehran’s nuclear program that has faltered since the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018. Critics of the American sanctions announced on Thursday said they could have a chilling effect on investment in Iran and potentially deter humanitarian aid from flowing into the country, where over 27,000 people have died from the coronavirus pandemic. “Iranians WILL survive this latest of cruelties,” Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, said on Twitter, adding, “Culprits & enablers—who block our money—WILL face justice.”
Multiple experts say that the Treasury Department has carved out exemptions in the sanctions for humanitarian aid transactions, issuing waivers and written assurances that tell financial institutions or businesses engaged in humanitarian aid that they will not be penalized. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin said that the sanctions issued Thursday would “continue to allow for humanitarian transactions to support the Iranian people.”But the sanctions will most likely weaken Iran’s currency, the rial, and further restrict Iran’s foreign exchange reserves. Earlier sanctions banned most major commercial sales and limited Iran’s oil trade.

Iran diplomat warns of retaliation over Belgian bomb plot if found guilty: Document
Reuters/Friday 09 October 2020
An Iranian diplomat charged in Belgium with planning to bomb a meeting of an exiled Iranian opposition group in France warned authorities of possible retaliation by unidentified groups if he is found guilty, according to a police document. Belgian prosecutors charged Vienna-based Assadolah Assadi in Oct. 2018 and three others with planning an attack that year on a rally of the Paris-based National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) attended by high profile former US, European and Arab officials. Assadi, who goes on trial on Nov. 27, was the third counsellor at Iran’s embassy in Vienna. French officials have said he was in charge of intelligence in southern Europe and was acting on orders from Tehran. He is one of the first Iranian diplomats to face trial on terrorism charges in the European Union. Tehran has repeatedly dismissed the charges against Assadi, calling them a “false flag” operation by the NCRI’s political arm, the MEK, (Mujaheedin-e Khalq), which presents itself as an alternative to Iran’s theocracy. Assadi has not commented on the charges and his lawyer has declined to comment on them. Minutes of a March 12 meeting between Assadi and Belgian police, seen by Reuters and confirmed as authentic by his lawyer, show the diplomat initially set out Tehran’s long-standing grievances with the MEK’s activities in the past. He then warned Belgian authorities that his case was being closely watched by undisclosed groups in Iran and neighboring countries. “According to ASSADI Assadolah we (Belgium) do not realize what is going to happen, in the event of an unfavorable verdict,” the minutes, taken by the Belgian police, say.

Sources identify Iran diplomat arrested on suspicion of plotting attack in Paris
Assadi told police that armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria, as well as in Iran, were interested in the outcome of his case and would be “watching from the sidelines to see if Belgium would support them or not”, according to the minutes. He declined to answer when asked by police if any kind of organization was involved. Asked about Assadi’s comments, a spokesman for the Belgian federal prosecutor said: “Such threats can occur, but we always take the necessary security measures.” The spokesman declined to comment further or say whether intelligence services had been informed of Assadi’s statement. Assadi said he was making the statement at his own behest and had not discussed it beforehand with the Iranian embassy, according to the record of his 31-minute encounter with police. The embassy could not immediately be reached for comment. Assadollah’s lawyer, Dimitri de Beco, denied his client was making threats. “It is absolutely not a threat of retaliation and if it’s understood that way it’s a misinterpretation,” he told Reuters. “He will explain the sense of his remarks to the court.”Tehran accuses European states of harboring the MEK, which it deems a terrorist organization. The group had been based in the Iraqi capital Baghdad under former president Saddam Hussein and was on the US State Department’s terror list from 1997 to 2012 when it was taken off it renounced violence. A coordinated intelligence operation between French, German and Belgian services thwarted the planned attack in the days prior to the NCRI rally, in which the keynote speech was given by US President Donald Trump’s lawyer Rudy Giuliani. Assadi was arrested while on holiday in Germany and handed over to Belgium, where two of his suspected accomplices had been arrested with 500 grams (one lb) of TATP, an explosive, as well as a detonation device. France said Iran’s intelligence ministry was behind the plot and expelled an Iranian diplomat, while the European Union froze the assets of an Iranian intelligence unit and two of its staff.

Rouhani calls for human rights advocates to condemn US sanctions on Iran
ReutersFriday 09 October 2020
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani on Friday dismissed new US sanctions as unable to break the Islamic republic’s “resistance” and said Washington has already done all it can to pressure Tehran. US President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sweeping sanctions on Iran’s banking sector on Thursday by designating 18 major Iranian banks to “stop illicit access to US dollars.”“The Americans have so far done all they could against the great nation of Iran,” Rouhani said, according to his official website. “They cannot break the resistance of the Iranian nation with these inhumane” actions, he added. According to Rouhani, the US administration is following “domestic aims” by such “political-propaganda attempts.” The sanctions are part of Washington’s policy of “maximum pressure” against Tehran aimed at reining in the Islamic republic. They were reimposed after Trump in 2018 unilaterally withdrew the US from a landmark accord with world powers and Iran, which limited the Islamic republic’s nuclear program in exchange for international sanctions relief. The US says that transactions involving humanitarian goods such as food and medicine are exempt and that sanctions are “directed at the regime.”
Rouhani said the sanctions are “attempts to create serious obstacles in fund transfers for medicine and food” and called them “cruel, terrorist and inhumane”. He also called on the world’s “human rights advocates” to condemn the move. “All countries witness that America’s attempts are completely against international laws and regulations, and in the time of the coronavirus are against human rights,” Rouhani said. Iran has been struggling to contain the Middle East’s worst Covid-19 outbreak since February, with the virus so far killing more than 28,000 and infecting over 492,000 in the country.
 

Qatar Mediates to Resolve Issue of Taxes Collected by Israel
Ramallah- Kifah Zboun/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Palestinian and Qatari officials discussed Qatar's mediation to resolve the issue of taxes collected by Israel, known as Maqasa, a reliable Palestinian source told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. The idea was officially suggested during bilateral meetings in Doha, the sources added, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) expects Qatar to reach a settlement. The PA has since May refused to accept the taxes collected on its behalf in protest against Israel's planned annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank. It has also severed security and civilian coordination with Israel, which were laid out under the Oslo Accords.
An EU official said on Thursday that the European Union has no intention to stop financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. The EU continues supporting the PA to enable it to perform its role in the Palestinian territories and fulfill its duties to the Palestinian people, Shadi Othman, a communication officer at the EU in Jerusalem, told reporters in Ramallah. "The EU is encouraging the Palestinian Authority to take the tax revenues from Israel. It's a Palestinian right," Othman said. A day earlier, the Israeli media reported that the EU warned the Authority that it would suspend the financial aid if it continues to refuse the tax revenues from Israel. EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell called Abbas last Wednesday to tell him that he will not be getting any more aid money in light of the situation, Walla News reported. Borrell also called on Abbas to renew cooperation with Israel. The EU, Germany, the UK, and Norway told the Palestinians to take the tax money Israel collected but Abbas refused. Palestinian government spokesperson Ibrahim Melhem stressed that the Palestinian-European ties are based on the spirit of cooperation, partnership, and respect to international law. He added that these ties aren't connected to any political demand.

Palestinian Negotiator Erekat Facing 'Difficult' Coronavirus Symptoms
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said on Friday he was suffering “difficult” symptoms after contracting coronavirus, but that things were “under control”.Erekat, 65, a lawmaker from Jericho in the occupied West Bank, said on Twitter that he was in isolation and receiving medical treatment at home one day after he confirmed that he had caught the virus. He has cancelled all meetings and appointments. There is heightened concern over his vulnerability because he underwent a lung transplant in the United States in 2017. In tweets on Friday, Erekat said he was experiencing “difficult symptoms resulting from my lack of immunity as a result of lung transplantation”. But he thanked well-wishers and said “things are under control, thank God”. Erekat is secretary general of the Palestine Liberation Organization and is one of the youngest members of the PLO’s most senior bodies, the Executive Committee. A member of Fatah, the most powerful faction within the PLO, he has been one of the most high-profile faces of the Palestinian leadership for decades, especially to international audiences. A veteran negotiator and spokesman, he is one of the most senior advisers to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and also served in senior positions under Abbas’ predecessor, Yasser Arafat. His negotiating days date back to the earliest public negotiations with Israel in 1991 at the Madrid Conference during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, when Erekat was part of the PLO team that also included Hanan Ashrawi.
Iraq Warns Iran of the Dangers of a US Withdrawal
Baghdad - Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Iraqi Foreign Minister Fouad Hussein announced that he had informed Iran of the dangers of the US withdrawing from his country.
In a televised interview, Hussein said that he made calls with several top Western diplomats to dissuade Washington from its decision to close its embassy in Baghdad. “There is a decision to stop all attacks on western embassies in Baghdad and to open an investigation into committed assaults,” Hussein noted.
He said that his country needs to hold “a transparent and clear dialogue with Iran," noting that he explained to Iranian officials during his meetings with them the current situation in Iraq, and that he expects Tehran to "take positive steps" towards the country.
Hussein also voiced strong rejection for the presence of armed factions outside state authority, adding that the attacks targeting the Green Zone, embassies and citizens must stop without a cost.
He highlighted that he had communicated the “seriousness” of the situation in Iraq to party and political leaders.
“A group of people suspected of being involved in the attacks were arrested,” Hussein said. Hussein also held a meeting with ambassadors of European Union countries in Iraq.He reviewed the efforts of the Iraqi government in securing missions and organizing their work in Iraq, expressing his aspiration to activate cooperation relations in view of the cooperation and partnership agreement concluded between the two sides.
They also discussed the situation of European non-governmental organizations in Iraq, and the need to overcome obstacles that hinder their work.
Hussein vowed to overcome all difficulties and obstacles in various fields.
During a meeting with US Ambassador Matthew Tueller, Hussein discussed the initial decision to close the US embassy in Baghdad, and affirmed that the Iraqi government has taken several security, technical and organizational measures to create a suitable environment for the work of all missions in Baghdad.

Russians Slam Assad for Dodging Political Responsibilities
Moscow - Raed Jaber/ Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's recent statements have attracted wide-spread criticism from Russian circles that accused him of seeking to dodge political obligations. Not heeding the significance of Russia’s intervention in 2015 about the course of war in Syria, Assad commented on the Iranian presence and stressed that the war in Syria will continue in the direction of the eastern Euphrates region and Idlib. Assad spoke in an interview with Russia’s state-run news agency RIA Novosti. Displaying clear contrast with Russian public policy on the situation in Syria, Assad downplayed the work of the constitutional committee, a matter which Moscow highly values. When asked about the moment that symbolizes a turning point during the conflict, Assad pointed out that there are many transformative moments. “It’s been now nearly ten years since the war started, so we have many turning points that I can mention, not only one,” Assad said. He, however, confirmed the significance of 2013, the year when, according to Assad, government forces began to liberate a number of areas, especially in central Syria. “Then in 2014, it was in the other direction when ISIS appeared suddenly with American support and they occupied a very important part of Syria and Iraq at the same time; this is when the terrorists started occupying other areas, because ISIS was able to distract the Syrian Army from fulfilling its mission in liberating the western part of Syria,” the president added.
As though he was belittling the event of Russian forces stepping into Syria, Assad said: “Then the other turning point was when the Russians came to Syria in 2015 and we started liberating together many areas. “
“In that stage, after the Russians came to Syria to support the Syrian Army, I’d say the turning point was to liberate the eastern part of Aleppo; this is where the liberation of other areas in Syria started from that point.”
When asked about the war ending in Syria, Assad said: “No, definitely not. As long as you have terrorists occupying some areas of our country and committing different kinds of crimes and assassinations and other crimes, it’s not over, and I think their supervisors are keen to make it continue for a long time. That’s what we believe.” There is a gap between Assad’s statement and the Russian vision for developments in Syria, which leans more towards a political settlement for the conflict.

Makhlouf Asks Assad to Punish ‘Conspirators’ Against his Companies
Damascus - London - Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
Rami Makhlouf, business tycoon and cousin of Syrian President Bashar Assad, demanded on Thursday a public hearing to punish all persons who plotted against his companies. “Many Syrians await immediate and practical measures to stop the fraud, deception and the return of usurped property to the Syrian people,” Makhlouf posted on his Facebook page Thursday. Makhlouf said that the Justice Ministry received a letter he sent to the Chairman of the High Judicial Council, Bashar Assad, explaining his wish to open a public and transparent investigation to unveil the identity of those who stole the assets of the Syrian people. Last week, Makhlouf accused the powerful security forces of backing the stripping of assets from charities owned by his holding company, Ramak Development and Humanitarian Projects, and selling them to corrupt politically influential businessmen. “They have turned to robbing these humanitarian bodies and its projects by selling their assets,” he said in his social media posting. Makhlouf revealed that he had sent a letter to Assad to help restore the rights to the poor who rely on the charities and their projects for aid. Since late April, the Syrian tycoon has taken to Facebook with messages and videos that have appeared to expose a rift within the ruling Alawite sect over allegations by the Syrian government that Makhlouf has hidden money overseas.The 51-year-old businessman has been embroiled in a power struggle with the state since last year. A few days ago, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said security services have released dozens of employees working in companies owned by Makhlouf.

Minister Champagne travels to Europe to meet with key partners on the situations in Belarus, Nagorno Karabakh and the Eastern Mediterranean
October 9, 2020 - Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada
The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Foreign Affairs, will travel next week to Greece, Austria, Belgium and Lithuania where he will meet with key European partners to discuss how the international community can address the situations in Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Eastern Mediterranean.
In Athens, the Minister will meet with Greece’s Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Dendias.
In Vienna, Minister Champagne will meet with Austria’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Schallenberg, as well as with key interlocutors, including the acting Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Tuula Yrjölä.
In Belgium, Minister Champagne will meet with Sophie Wilmès, Belgium’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Foreign Trade. While in Brussels, he will also hold meetings with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, as well as with NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg. This will be an opportunity for Minister Champagne to discuss European peace and security issues from the perspectives of both the EU and NATO while demonstrating Canada’s continued commitment to collective action in defending and enhancing security, stability and prosperity.
Finally, the Minister will travel to Lithuania, where he will meet with his counterpart, Linas Linkevičius. At Canada’s initiative, he will also participate in a meeting of the Baltic Group with the Foreign Ministers of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Their discussions will focus on regional security matters, including Belarus and the Canada-led NATO battlegroup in Latvia.
While in Vilnius, Minister Champagne will also be meeting with Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
Minister Champagne will follow all applicable health and safety protocols, including public health advice measures, and will quarantine for 14 days upon his return to Canada.

Libyan National Army Calls for Disbanding Militias before Political Process
Cairo - Khalid Mahmoud/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
The Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, has reiterated its conditions for a political settlement with Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), including disbanding militias.
During a meeting, GNA’s Presidential Council asserted the necessity of resuming the political, security and economic process in line with the Berlin Conference outcomes. The conferees assessed the world’s stance from the Libyan crisis, and discussed measures to enhance the performance of public services and the efforts exerted to fight the coronavirus pandemic. However, Director of LNA’s Moral Guidance Department Brigadier General Khaled al-Mahjoub stated that militias must be disbanded and mercenaries must be expelled. Mahjoub ruled out any political solution before the eradication of terrorism. His comments came as US Ambassador to Libya Richard B. Norland headed on Thursday to the Turkish capital, Ankara, for talks on the Libyan crisis. “I’m continuing my travels in Ankara for consultations with Turkey on how best to support de-escalation and the Libyan Political Dialogue in a constructive way, that returns full sovereignty to Libya,” the diplomat said on Twitter. Further, senior officers of GNA’s Libyan Defense Ministry participated on Thursday in the first meeting convened by the US military commandment in Africa (AFRICOM) to discuss an initiative on mine clearing.
In a related context, GNA’s Interior Ministry revealed that three Libyan men have been arrested on suspicion of attacking and killing a Nigerian migrant worker. Witnesses said that the suspects forced their way into the factory where the victim was working and set him on fire. The UN has described the man’s death as “another senseless crime” in Libya. “Those responsible must be held to account,” tweeted Federico Soda, the head of the UN’s International Organization of Migration (IOM) mission in Libya.

UN Food Agency Wins Nobel Peace Prize
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 9 October, 2020
The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded on Friday to the World Food Program (WFP) for its efforts to combat hunger and improve conditions for peace in conflict areas, the Nobel Committee said. The WFP was honored for "its efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict," it said. The Rome-based organization says it helps some 97 million people in about 88 countries each year and that one in nine people worldwide still do not have enough to eat. "The need for international solidarity and multilateral cooperation is more conspicuous than ever," Chairwoman Berit Reiss-Andersen of the Norwegian Nobel Committee told a news conference. The WFP is deeply honored by its Nobel Peace Prize win, a spokesman said, describing it as "a proud moment". "This is humbling," Tomson Phiri told reporters during a regular briefing in Geneva, adding it was "really a proud moment" for the UN organization. "One of the beauties of WFP activities is that not only do we provide food for today and tomorrow, but we also are equipping people with the knowledge, the means to sustain themselves for the next day and the days after." The prize is worth ten million Swedish crowns, or around $1.1 million, and will be presented in Oslo on Dec. 10, the anniversary of prize founder Alfred Nobel’s death. This year’s ceremony will be scaled down due to the pandemic.
On Monday, the Nobel Committee awarded the prize for physiology and medicine for discovering the liver-ravaging hepatitis C virus. Tuesday’s prize for physics honored breakthroughs in understanding the mysteries of cosmic black holes, and the chemistry prize on Wednesday went to scientists behind a powerful gene-editing tool. The literature prize was awarded to American poet Louise Glück on Thursday for her “candid and uncompromising” work.
Still to come next week is the prize for outstanding work in the field of economics.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 09-10/2020

The Greatest Example of Muslim Deceit (Taqiyya) in Western History
Raymond Ibrahim/October 09/2020
Recently we learned that Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, member of the Supreme Council of the UAE and ruler of Sharjah, called for the transformation of the Cathedral of Cordoba back to the Mosque of Cordoba, since Spain’s Christians “don’t deserve it.”
What we weren’t told is what occasioned him to say this—the all-important context of his demand—namely, his new book, The Inquisition (original Arabic here). Devoted to showing how the Spanish Inquisition abused Muslims, al-Qasimi apparently believes it makes a strong case for Spain to turn the cathedral into a mosque, as a form of “reparation.”
During an Arabic language satellite program discussing his new book, he said (in translation):
Allah willing, this book will have an impact; and here we demand at least the return of the mosque of Cordoba to us. I’ve demanded this before, and they informed me that the municipality had given it to the church. So I said to them, “The one who doesn’t own gave to the one who doesn’t deserve.” For this is our possession as Muslims; moreover, its return is easy and near, Allah willing.
In other words, and because his book makes the argument that Spain abused its Muslims in extreme ways—including by forcing them to convert to Christianity against their will—the least it can do now is forfeit the cathedral to Islam.
However, just as the sheikh ignores the fact that, “not only was the mosque [of Cordoba] built on a Christian site, but it was also built using materials from the sixth century Christian building destroyed by Muslims in the ninth century,” so too does he ignore why Spain subjected the Muslims to an inquisition in the first place.
In 1492, the Reconquista came to a close with Granada’s surrender. Instead of migrating to North Africa—whence most of its jihadi allies, namely the Almoravids and Almohads, had hailed—its nearly half-million Muslim population chose to remain. They were initially granted lenient terms, including the right to travel abroad and practice Islam freely. However, whenever the opportunity arose, they launched many hard-to-quell uprisings—several “involving the stoning, dismembering, beheading, impaling, and burning alive of Christians”—and regularly colluded with foreign Muslim powers (e.g., Ottoman Turks) in an effort to subvert Spain back to Islam.
A final “Muslim uprising in 1499, and the crushing of this revolt in 1501, led to an edict that Muslims had to convert to Christianity or leave the peninsula.” Contrary to popular belief, the motivation was less religious and more political; it was less about making Muslims “good Christians” and more about making them “good citizens.” So long as they remained Muslim, thereby operating under the highly divisive doctrine of “loyalty and enmity,” they would remain hostile and disloyal to Christian Spain; and because secularism, atheism, multiculturalism, or just general “wokeness,” were not options then, the only practical way Muslims could slough off their tribalism and fully participate in a Christian kingdom was by embracing its faith.
Under such circumstances, sharia is clear: Muslims should try to emigrate. But there has always been one important caveat: whenever Muslims find themselves under infidel authority, they may say and do almost anything—denounce Muhammad, receive baptism and communion, venerate the cross, all anathema to Islam—so long as their hearts remain true to Islam.
Such is the doctrine of taqiyya, which has traditionally defined Islam’s modus operandi under non-Muslim authority. Even before the Reconquista in Spain, “Sunni Muslims had invoked taqiyya to justify dissimulation under Christian domination in other periods and regions, including Sicily after the Norman conquest in 1061–91 and the Byzantine Marches.” Unsurprisingly, then, taqiyya defined Islam in post-Reconquista Spain; one authority refers to a 1504 fatwa urging Spain’s subject Muslims to employ taqiyya as “the key theological document for the study of Spanish Islam.”
Once the edict to convert or emigrate appeared, virtually the entire Granadan population—hundreds of thousands of Muslims—openly embraced Christianity but remained crypto-Muslims. Publicly they went to church and baptized their children; at home they recited the Koran, preached undying hate for the infidel and their obligation to liberate al-Andalus.
That these “Moriscos”—that is, self-professed Muslim converts to Christianity who were still “Moorish,” or Islamic—went to great lengths to foist their deception cannot be doubted, as explained by one historian:
For a Morisco to pass as a good Christian took more than a simple statement to that effect. It required a sustained performance involving hundreds of individual statements and actions of different types, many of which might have little to do with expressions of belief or ritual per se. Dissimulation [taqiyya] was an institutionalized practice in Morisco communities that involved regular patterns of behaviour passed on from one generation to the next.
Despite this elaborate masquerade, Christians increasingly caught on: “With the permission and license that their accursed sect accorded them,” a frustrated Spaniard remarked, “they could feign any religion outwardly and without sinning, as long as they kept their hearts nevertheless devoted to their false impostor of a prophet. We saw so many of them who died while worshipping the Cross and speaking well of our Catholic Religion yet who were inwardly excellent Muslims.”
Christians initially tried to reason with the Moriscos; they reminded them how they became Muslim in the first place: “Your ancestor was a Christian, although he made himself a Muslim” to avoid persecution or elevate his social status; so now “you also must become a Christian.” When that failed, Korans were confiscated and burned; then Arabic, the language of Islam, was banned. When that too failed, more extreme measures were taken; it reached the point that a Morisco could “not even possess a pocketknife for eating with that did not have a rounded point, lest he savage a Christian with it.”
A Muslim chronicler summarizes these times: “Such of the Muslims as still remained in Andalus, although Christians in appearance, were not so in their hearts; for they worshipped Allah in secret. . . . The Christians watched over them with the greatest vigilance, and many were discovered and burnt.”
Such are the origins of the Spanish Inquisition (which, contrary to popular belief, targeted many more Muslims than Jews). For no matter how much the Moriscos “might present the appearance of a most peaceful submission,” a nineteenth century historian wrote, “they remained nevertheless fundamental Musulmans, watching for a favourable opportunity and patiently awaiting the hour of revenge, promised by their prophecies.”
Thus, when a rumor arose in 1568 that the Ottoman Turks had finally come to liberate them, formerly “moderate” Muslims near Granada, “believing that the days under Christian rule were over, went berserk. Priests all over the countryside were attacked, mutilated, or murdered; some were burned alive; one was sewed inside a pig and barbequed; the pretty Christian girls were assiduously raped, some sent off to join the harems of Moroccan and Algerian potentates.”
In the end, if Muslims could never be loyal to infidel authority— constantly colluding and subverting, including with foreign Muslims—and if conversion to Christianity was no solution due to the dispensation of taqiyya, then only one solution remained: between 1609 and 1614, all Moriscos were expelled from the Peninsula to Africa, whence Islam had first invaded Spain nearly a millennium earlier.
This, of course, is a fuller explanation as to why Spain’s Muslims were subjected to the inquisition than al-Qasimi is willing to give, for obvious reasons: dissembling and ever subversive Muslims (past or present) do not garner much sympathy—certainly not for Spain to start making concessions.
He also seems to miss the great irony: at least the Spaniards were liberating their own country, and giving those whose ancestors had invaded the opportunity to leave unmolested. This is far more lenient than how Islam has always behaved—invading non-Muslim nations and giving infidels three choices: convert, live as subjugated dhimmis, or die—as the learned sheikh knows full well.
Note: Quotations in the above account were excerpted from and documented in the author’s book, Sword and Scimitar: Fourteen Centuries of War between Islam and the West. Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center, a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Gatestone Institute, and a Judith Rosen Friedman Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Between a rock and hard place: Iran’s dilemma in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Ali Hashem/Al-Monitor/October 09/2020
Tehran is sending forces to its borders in anticipation of the Armenian-Azeri conflict spilling over.
In a country where a quarter of the population belongs to the Azeri ethnicity, over 400 miles of border are shared with Azerbaijan and the official version of Islam in both countries is Shiism, it shouldn’t be a very difficult choice to make when the northern neighbor goes to war.
However, there are many reasons for Iran to think twice before siding with Azerbaijan in its recent conflict with Armenia.
Armenia shares about 27 miles of border with the Islamic Republic and plays a positive role as the only Christian neighbor to the sanction-laden country.
Iranians of Armenian origin make up the overwhelming majority of the country’s Christian minority, which number more than 150,000 of the total population of 84 million. As for the Azeris, there is no accurate number, but according to several sources it varies between 10 million and 20 million.
In the city of Tabriz in the north of Iran, dozens of Azeri Iranians headed out into the streets slamming the state’s neutral position on the war, while others demonstrated in Tehran chanting slogans in support of the army of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
The official Iranian stance — expressed by the Foreign Ministry on several occasions — has been to call on both parties to practice restraint, offering to mediate.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh told Reuters earlier this week, “Iran has prepared a plan with a specific framework containing details after consultations with both sides of the dispute, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as regional states and neighbors, and will pursue this plan."
It is important to note that Iran's official stance, despite offering mediation and refraining from taking sides, recognizes the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region as an Azeri territory and calls on Armenia to withdraw from it.
This was expressed by Ali Rabiei, spokesman of the Iranian presidency, and also unofficially but remarkably by Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, who expressed this view to Kayhan daily, the newspaper whose editor in chief is believed to be one of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s confidants.
Khamenei, an Azeri-Iranian himself, has yet to comment on the developments, but a number of his representatives in Azeri-populated northwestern Iran issued a statement declaring support for Azerbaijan in the conflict.
The signatories — Khamenei’s representatives in the provinces of Ardabil, East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan and Zanjan — stressed, "There is no doubt that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan and its government's move to recapture the region is completely legal, according to Sharia, and in line with four resolutions of the United Nation's Security Council.”
Moreover, Khamenei’s representative in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ali Akbar Ajagnejad, said during a speech Oct. 3 that he is ready to go to Nagorno-Karabakh and fight beside the Azeri youth until he is martyred.
For the moment, the Iranian stance seems to be inconsistent, but the fact is that decision-makers in Tehran are counting on time to get them a solution that would rid them from the urge to take a side, for whatever the side they take, there are going to be some bitter repercussions.
If Tehran decides to support Armenia, then the internal implications aren’t going to be easy, given the wide support Azerbaijan enjoys among the Azeris inside Iran; besides, it goes without saying that ties with Azerbaijan will receive a blow.
This is going to give Israel, which has backed Azerbaijan by selling arms, additional leverage on Iran’s borders. Just a few weeks ago, Israel reached a normalization agreement with both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, giving it an unprecedented reach to the waters of the Persian Gulf.
On Sept. 30, a drone that entered Iranian airspace was downed by the country’s air defenses. Iran’s concerns over Azerbaijan’s drones is related mainly to the fact that most of Baku’s drones are bought from Israel.
Back in 2014, Iran blamed Azerbaijan, without naming it, for being the base of an Israeli drone that Tehran says to have shot down near the highly sensitive nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz in central Iran.
Although Iranian officials didn't specify Azerbaijan, they said the drone came from a “former Soviet republic to the north.” Azerbaijan's government has denied the claim calling it a "provocation."
Another sensitive element that makes Iran want this war to finish before it gets to the point of no return are the recent reports about the transferring of Syrian fighters by Turkey to fight alongside Azerbaijan.
A report by Al-Monitor’s Sultan Kanj confirmed these reports, highlighting the fact that Turkish-backed Syrian militants are turning into a regional task force ready to intervene wherever Ankara is involved. This itself is a matter of concern to Tehran, which does not accept having such forces close to its border. To Iran, this is a threat for stability on its northern border and a weight for Turkey it is unlikely to accept in its backyard.
Moreover, there are reports that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is looking to take advantage of Russia being bogged down in conflicts elsewhere to claim a bigger role in this conflict.
The flock of fighters to both sides of the border is in fact a matter of concern to Tehran. Christian Armenian fighters heading from Lebanon and Syria to Armenia to fight alongside Armenian forces in Artsakh — as the region is known in Armenian — is also a long-term threat for stability and brings close to home the fragility of the Levant.
The Armenian-Azeri rivalry outside Iran might for many reasons spill over the borders of the Islamic Republic, and this is what Tehran is anticipating by sending forces to the border areas.
The promise of stability that Iran’s Islamic establishment has always made to justify its involvement in conflicts away from home, such as in Syria and Iraq, is now under threat, especially with the cocktail of players on the other side of the border.
The economy is another element that worries the Iranian decision-makers, with pressure mounting day after day amid additional US sanctions. The plan to link the Iranian southern port city of Chabahar to Russia through a railway crossing through Azerbaijan creates more reasons for concern in Tehran. While on the Armenian side, a 90-mile-long gas pipeline makes it clear that this time Iran can't cherry-pick its position based on its own preferences alone.
Back in the 1990s, the Karabakh conflict created a dilemma of another type for Iran.
Tehran mediated between the two newly established countries, though it was more on the Azerbaijani side. This is reflected in the diaries of late President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and in several other accounts by Iranian officials who witnessed that period. According to a report by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Mashregh News, Iran facilitated the transfer of hundreds of Afghani fighters to Azerbaijan to fight alongside the government of late President Haydar Aliyev, the father of current President Ilham Aliyev. However, in less than two years, Aliyev’s alliance with the Iranians came to an end, and he called on them to leave and started a crackdown on their main ally, the Islamic party, whose leadership was arrested for allegations it is financed by Tehran.
After 1994, Iran shifted to be more on Armenia’s side due to the political differences with Aliyev. Yet Iranian volunteers continue to flock to Azerbaijan to fight beside the Azeris in the war with Armenia, and many Iranian fighters were killed and buried in several locations around the war front.

Iran at Risk From Spillover of Armenia-Azerbaijan Clashes
Brenda Shaffer/Policy Brief/October 09/2020
Intense fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan is taking place in proximity to Iran’s northwestern border, which it shares with both countries. While Turkey has sided firmly with Azerbaijan and Russia stands behind Armenia, Iran may face the greatest risk of any neighboring country because the war has resulted in vocal domestic opposition, sparked tensions with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and carries the risk of a potential spill-over into Iranian territory.
Iran has a substantial Azerbaijani minority – approximately one-third of the population – which is protesting Tehran’s support for Armenia. Most of Iran’s Azerbaijani population is concentrated near its border with the conflict zone, but Tehran also has a significant Azerbaijani community. The outbreak of fighting last week has prompted protests in multiple Iranian cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, Urmia, and Zanjan. More than 20 Azerbaijani activists in Ardebil have been arrested, and Amnesty International has warned that they are at risk. Unrest among Azerbaijanis may augment ongoing anti-regime activity.
The current protests demand that Tehran stop Russian convoys to supply Armenia via Iran, as confirmed by Iranian state television. Representatives of the Azerbaijani community in Iran have also threatened to disrupt the convoys if they continue. Iranian officials acknowledge that Tehran has supported Armenia since the onset of the latter’s conflict with Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, out of fear that Azerbaijan could attract Iran’s own Azerbaijani population. If domestic Azerbaijani opposition remains active, Tehran may find it difficult to sustain its material support for Armenia.
Many of the battles between Armenia and Azerbaijan are taking place in close proximity to the Iranian border, leading Iranian officials to declare their readiness to defend that border. Already, Azerbaijan has regained control of regions and infrastructure near the border, such as the Khudafarin bridge on the Araz River. Tehran runs a joint hydroelectric project near the bridge together with Armenia’s occupation authorities.
Tehran warned both sides to avoid “intrusions” after it alleged that artillery fire hit villages on the Iranian side of the border. Reportedly, Iran is fortifying its troops and air defenses in the region. The return of Baku’s control over some Armenian-occupied territories bordering Iran now lengthens the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, something Tehran has worked to avoid, preferring an Armenian presence.
Iranian alignment with Armenia and Russia has also led to tension with Turkey, whose media outlets, including government-sponsored TRT, have criticized Iran’s support for Armenia. Some Turkish outlets have mocked Iran’s alleged commitment to “Islamic solidarity” given that it now sides with majority-Christian Armenia. Over the last year, Turkey has significantly reduced its imports of natural gas from Iran, a trend that is likely to continue in light of their further disagreements.
Tehran also is likely not happy that Azerbaijan is using Israeli-supplied weapons in close proximity to Iran’s border. Israel’s support for Azerbaijan also seems to be fostering appreciation for Israel among a significant number of Azerbaijanis in Iran. Since Turkey and Israel both support Azerbaijan, this may provide an opportunity for Ankara and Jerusalem to improve relations.
While Russia and Turkey may each gain from the developments in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, it seems that Tehran only loses.
*Brenda Shaffer is a senior advisor for energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where she also contributes to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP). She is also a faculty member at the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School. For more analysis from Brenda, the Iran Program, and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Brenda on Twitter @ProfBShaffer. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_Iran and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Kuwait’s Precarious Mediation Role May Be Imperiled by the Emir’s Passing
Elana DeLozier/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
The country’s six decades as regional intermediary have been undercut in recent years by younger Gulf leaders less inclined to traditional methods of conflict resolution, and Sheikh Sabah’s death may put this role at further risk.
At a time when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are more bitterly divided than ever, Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah’s departure from the scene removes one of the great moderating influences in Middle Eastern affairs. The late leader had been a fixture in public life since he began a forty-year tenure as Kuwait’s foreign minister in 1963, prior to becoming prime minister in 2003 and emir in 2006. Like Sheikh Zayed of the United Arab Emirates and Sultan Qaboos of Oman, he will go down in regional history as a singular figure who shepherded his country into modern times. He was instrumental in creating the GCC in 1981 and used his version of shuttle diplomacy to keep the six member states broadly in sync. More recently, however, even his magic touch had depreciated as the next generation of Gulf leadership assumed power, and a potential succession battle to determine the next crown prince could hurt Kuwait’s chances of continuing his role as regional mediator.
A VULNERABLE STATE
Sheikh Sabah’s decades-long emphasis on diplomacy was not only a reflection of his personal skill set, but also a protective strategy born from Kuwait’s geographic vulnerability. In the 1920s, the country lost some two-thirds of its territory to the al-Saud family under a British dictate. In addition, the Saudis imposed an economic blockade and threatened complete annexation. After Kuwait achieved formal independence in 1961, Iraq claimed the country as part of its territory just six days later. In the decades that followed, the notion that Kuwait was Iraq’s “19th province” lingered, perpetuating anxiety among the citizenry. Repeated border incursions and skirmishes occurred throughout the 1970s while Sheikh Sabah was foreign minister, shaping his view of Iraq as a constant threat. These fears were realized when Saddam Hussein invaded in 1990, just three years after the jarring Tanker War that saw Kuwaiti-flagged ships attacked by Iran.
Given this history of vulnerability, Sheikh Sabah focused on building partnerships that could protect Kuwait, including with the United States and GCC. He also sought to mollify tensions through the provision of foreign aid and mediate conflicts to calm a volatile neighborhood. The latter focus earned him the nickname “the dean of Arab diplomacy.” Under his direction, Kuwait is credited with easing tensions or resolving conflict between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in North Yemen (1968), Bangladesh and Pakistan (1974), Abu Dhabi and Dubai (1979), Saudi Arabia and Libya (1982), Oman and South Yemen (1984), and Turkey and Bulgaria (1989), among others.
END OF AN ERA?
Over the past few years, however, this gift for shuttle diplomacy seemed to lose its potency amid new regional dynamics and a younger generation of Gulf leaders. In December 2017, Kuwait hosted the first GCC Summit to be held since the ongoing regional rift over Qatar erupted, but the event fell apart after its first morning session. Then, in September 2018, Saudi crown prince Muhammad bin Salman met with the emir in Kuwait but apparently cut his visit short. Sheikh Sabah’s project to patch up the rift stalemated thereafter, notwithstanding consistent U.S. backing for his efforts. Ultimately, the emir was unable to convince the increasingly powerful crown princes in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi to reconcile with Doha, and his reportedly close relationship with the emir of Qatar was not enough either.
These setbacks point to a wider shift away from the Gulf’s old way of conflict resolution, in which disputes were addressed behind closed doors, trusted intermediaries were dispatched to iron out a path to reconciliation, ample room was allowed for face-saving, and elders often had the last word. This model still had some potency in 2014, when the guidance of another elder statesman, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, reportedly helped mollify a previous spike in the growing GCC rift. By 2017, however, this method was out. The gloves were off, and the very public nature of the rift—underscored by citizens being tacitly allowed to criticize regional states and leaders on social media to an unprecedented degree—prevented any of the parties from saving face without the other side capitulating.
Emir Sabah’s passing therefore represents the end of an era in GCC relations, paving the way for reshaping Kuwait’s role among its neighbors and, perhaps, recalibrating broader Gulf diplomacy. The loss of a respected mediator—who at minimum could de-escalate crises even as his ability to resolve them diminished—may make the region even more volatile. If Sheikh Sabah could not convince Gulf leaders to come to the table, how will the new emir or his eventual successor command such respect?
Moreover, no other Gulf state is positioned to assume this role if Kuwait cannot. Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are all participants in the rift, which has extended to proxy battles from Libya to the Horn of Africa. Oman, the lone remaining GCC member, plays a slightly different role as facilitator rather than mediator, and its policy of neutrality on hot-button issues (e.g., the Qatar rift, the Yemen war, and Iran) has frequently aggravated Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
FOCUS ON STABILITY
Kuwait’s initial succession process has been smooth, with Crown Prince Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah (age eighty-three) sworn in as emir. But the country’s longer-term posture is more likely to be determined by who becomes the next crown prince. Well before Emir Sabah’s passing, the prospect of being named as Sheikh Nawaf’s heir apparent had already triggered jockeying for position among potential front-runners. That jockeying will likely continue in the near term, especially since Kuwait’s succession dynamics are complicated by the National Assembly’s constitutionally mandated involvement in selecting the crown prince. A protracted succession battle would further hurt the country’s chances of reviving its mediator role.
Perhaps more worryingly, if Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE find an ally in Emir Nawaf or the next crown prince, they could tilt the Gulf rift toward one camp without resolving any of the grievances that started the dispute in the first place. Attempts to curry favor may already be underway as each Gulf state decides who will visit Kuwait to offer condolences. Regional diplomats have also expressed concern that the younger, more assertive leadership in the above states may choose to meddle in Kuwaiti succession politics through the National Assembly, setting a dangerous precedent.
In light of these risks, the United States should methodically and publicly signal its support for Kuwait’s stability. In an initial positive sign, the Trump administration sent a delegation led by Defense Secretary Mark Esper to offer condolences for Sheikh Sabah’s passing. This is a welcome step after it committed the diplomatic gaffe of sending a low-level delegation to Oman this January following the death of Sultan Qaboos, who had similarly been a steadfast U.S. friend for fifty years. The administration made amends by sending Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to be Oman’s first international guest after the forty-day mourning period, and the Esper delegation to Kuwait indicates that it may have further learned its lesson. Indeed, Kuwait’s commitment as a U.S. partner and its importance to U.S. interests in the region should not be undersold. As the potentially perilous process to choose a new crown prince commences, Washington would be best served by expressing how much it values the moderation that Kuwait’s emir has traditionally brought to this quarrelsome region.
*Elana DeLozier is the Rubin Family Fellow at The Washington Institute.

An October Surprise with Iran? Calculations and Policy Implications
Mehdi Khalaji, Ariane Tabatabai, and Michael Eisenstadt/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
Three experts on Iranian politics and strategy assess the possibilities of last-minute dramatic developments between the two adversaries before the U.S. election.
On October 6, The Washington Institute held a virtual Policy Forum with Mehdi Khalaji, Ariane Tabatabai, and Michael Eisenstadt. Tabatabai is the Middle East Fellow at the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy. Eisenstadt is the Institute’s Kahn Fellow and director of its Military and Security Studies Program. Khalaji, a former Iranian journalist and Qom-trained theologian, is the Institute’s Libitzky Family Fellow. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of their remarks.
MEHDI KHALAJI
Negotiations between the United States and Iran are inevitable, regardless of the result of November’s election. While Iran’s leaders tend to speak aggressively when the country is strong, in times of weakness they call for dialogue. This cautious outlook was reinforced by America’s targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020, which came as a surprise to Iranian leaders given President Trump’s public aversion to military conflict in the region.
Iran’s elites are ambivalent about the outcome of the U.S. election. On the one hand, they would likely have an easier time negotiating with a Biden administration and would relish the embarrassment that an electoral defeat would cause President Trump. On the other hand, their experience with President Obama led them to feel that negotiations with a Republican administration would be more conducive to securing a sustainable deal that enjoys support from America’s allies in the region.
After the killing of Soleimani and the COVID-19 crisis, Iran is in a fragile state. The people continue to suffer economically and psychologically, for which they view the government as responsible. The public is also highly averse to another significant shock, even as retaliation for Soleimani’s death. Iran’s leaders are well aware of this sentiment and are doing what they can not to alienate traditionally loyal segments of the population. This consideration may reduce the chance of any pre-election belligerence and even increase the likelihood of concessions in a conflict area such as Iraq, which could in turn pave the way for talks.
If Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei chooses to negotiate with the United States, it is unlikely that his delegation would include current president Hassan Rouhani, foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, or any other members of the previous negotiating team. Rouhani’s critics in government insist that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) surrendered too many of Iran’s interests, though they affirm that the country is now in a better position to negotiate.
ARIANE TABATABAI
Iran’s primary objective in the run-up to the U.S. election is to preserve the status quo while applying limited pressure on Washington. As such, the Islamic Republic’s leaders are quite content to sit back and wait for the results.
Iran’s main pre-election activity has been in the information and cyber realms. The Iranian state has amplified COVID-19 conspiracy theories, and officials have also publicly criticized racial injustice in America, even expressing their support for this year’s protests in U.S. cities. Such actions aim to exacerbate American political polarization and diminish the appeal of democratic governance abroad and domestically. Additionally, Iran-backed entities have recently attempted to hack numerous prominent targets, including the Trump campaign, the World Health Organization, and companies conducting COVID-19 vaccine research.
Iran has also avoided several potentially escalatory steps in advance of the election. Although the country continues to violate the JCPOA, it has not made any additional provocative moves in the nuclear realm in recent months. Such inaction effectively keeps the deal on life support until after the election. International monitoring and verification can help prevent development of a covert weapons program, yet the Islamic Republic’s decision so far not to build a nuclear bomb is seen as more of a political choice than the result of technical impediments. Iran may decide to develop a weapon as a source of leverage in future negotiations, especially in the case of a Trump reelection, but there is no indication it has made that decision already.
There is little chance that a rogue commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps takes action against the United States without government approval. Iran is a unitary state, and any action with such significant strategic implications would require approval from several power centers. An attack that goes against Iran’s strategy would be more likely to come from one of its proxies.
Regardless of U.S. administration, however, Iran still wants to demonstrate that it can push back against the U.S. maximum pressure campaign, mainly in an effort to gain leverage in future negotiations. The challenge for Tehran is how to do so without giving President Trump ammunition for his reelection campaign, and without sparking a crisis that leads to a direct military confrontation.
MICHAEL EISENSTADT
Iran’s initial aims in its response to the U.S. maximum pressure campaign were twofold: compelling Washington to ease or lift sanctions, and inducing Europe to ignore them. The Islamic Republic has achieved little progress toward these goals and realizes that it is unlikely to do so before the U.S. election. Iran’s leadership will probably refrain from any kind of major pre-election military activity (i.e., an “October surprise”) lest it give President Trump an inadvertent boost at the polls.
Over the past two years, Iran’s attacks on oil transport and infrastructure progressed in complexity from a simple limpet mine attack on stationary tankers, to a limpet mine attack on moving tankers, to a complex drone and cruise missile strike on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia. Since then, Iran has limited its actions against the oil industry to diverting a small number of tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz. This decrease could be attributable to international outcry against actions that disrupt global oil flows, or to a reinforced U.S. and European naval presence in the Persian Gulf
Attacks in Iraq by Iranian proxy groups followed a similar pattern in 2019, with the number of attacks on U.S. forces—as well as the quantity and caliber of rockets used—increasing until an attack in December killed an American soldier. After a spike in rocket attacks following Soleimani’s death in January 2020 and another spike in March that killed three coalition soldiers (two American and one British), Iranian proxies in Iraq have once again upped the frequency of their attacks since June. Although rocket strikes persist, the most recent operations have involved improvised explosive devices used against Iraqi-operated logistical convoys on which the U.S. embassy relies. By targeting such support elements without directly endangering Americans, these attacks enable Iran to ratchet up pressure on the United States and strike a defiant pose while avoiding potentially escalatory acts.
If anything, the real October surprise was the American threat to shutter the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The warning may have tempted the Iranians to escalate in the hopes of achieving their long-term goal: ending the U.S. presence in Iraq specifically and the region more broadly. That said, Tehran is likely conflicted because the costs of such action could outweigh the gains. Any significant military move could bolster President Trump’s chance of victory in November. Closing the embassy also have the following effects: enabling the United States to be less constrained in its response to Iranian actions; depriving Iranian proxies of a source of leverage over the United States; and laying some groundwork for U.S. sanctions on Iraq that might have adverse indirect consequences for the already-struggling Iranian economy.
Yet while Iran is unlikely to conduct a major attack before the U.S. election, this does not preclude the possibility of such an event after November 3. If Joe Biden wins, an attack could serve the dual purpose of humiliating President Trump on his way out while signaling resolve to the incoming administration. In the case of a Trump victory, Iran would presumably want to catalyze negotiations so that it can obtain sanctions relief, though it may be torn between fomenting a crisis or quietly extending an olive branch to achieve this goal.
This summary was prepared by Henry Mihm. The Policy Forum series is made possible through the generosity of the Florence and Robert Kaufman Family.

Flare-Up in Nagorno-Karabakh: The Iranian Dimension
Farzin Nadimi/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
New hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan are forcing Tehran to balance domestic demographic concerns and its desire to expand military ties with Yerevan.
Because it shares borders and generally good relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran has a great interest in seeing the two countries defuse their latest surge in hostilities over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region and return to the status quo. At present, however, Tehran seems too preoccupied with other issues and too powerless to influence the conflict. Its Foreign Ministry has long lacked the skills required to mediate such disputes—its last ceasefire effort was in 1992, and that agreement was dead in the water from the moment it was signed. Likewise, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is not eager to get involved militarily, at least for now. The question, then, is how Iran will react if the hostilities persist—or if they open new opportunities to further its interests.
For example, Tehran worries that if Azerbaijan were to recapture large swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh with active support from Turkey, the situation could foment serious dissent among those Iranian Azeris who harbor a strong sense of ethnic identity or separatist views. Azeri-majority areas in northwest Iran have already seen protests and calls for closing the Norduz border crossing with Armenia, which would bar shipments of goods and the passage of Russian military trucks. In response, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s local representatives issued a rare joint statement supporting Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, a clear attempt to defuse Azeri unease at home. Similarly, the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s October 5 statement calling for an immediate ceasefire also emphasized the importance of “respect for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” urging Armenia to withdraw from “occupied territories of Azerbaijan” without specifically naming Nagorno-Karabakh. (Yerevan’s forces also control parts of Azerbaijan that lie between the breakaway region and Armenia’s borders.)
Such statements align with Iran’s growing eagerness to enhance its strategic relations with Baku, not least because the two countries share more than 200 kilometers of maritime boundaries in the hydrocarbon-rich Caspian Sea that need to be delimited. In February 2018, Iranian defense minister Amir Hatami visited Azerbaijan to discuss closer cooperation between their defense industries. A year later, the chiefs of each country’s armed forces exchanged visits to further strengthen those ties, and February 2020 saw the second meeting of their joint military commission. The two militaries have also explored closer training ties and student exchanges, in addition to conducting occasional joint naval drills off the shores of the Caspian, where both of Iran’s naval academies reside. Moreover, Iran does not hide its intent to become a major arms supplier to Baku—in September 2018, it began participating in the Azerbaijan International Defence Exhibition (ADEX). The lifting of UN arms restrictions on October 18 will open additional opportunities to deepen all of these military ties.
At the same time, however, Tehran has occasionally felt compelled to deviate from its traditionally good relations with Azerbaijan in order to criticize the country’s growing military and security ties with Israel. It has even indirectly accused Baku of allowing Israeli drones to spy on nuclear facilities deep inside Iran. In 2014, the IRGC claimed to shoot down one such unmanned aerial vehicle near the Natanz enrichment plant almost 600 kilometers from the Azerbaijan border—though images released by the Corps indicated that the UAV was in fact an Iranian model.
Tehran’s claims aside, Azerbaijan is indisputably one of the biggest buyers of Israeli weapons, including reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions (i.e., drones armed with warheads), antitank and antiaircraft missiles, artillery rockets, and precision-guided semi-ballistic missiles with ranges up to 400 kilometers. The loitering munitions and LORA, EXTRA, and Lynx ballistic missiles have been extensively and effectively used in the latest hostilities.
As for the conflict’s other main combatant, Iran’s military ties with Armenia are more low key but enjoy a longer history. For example, Tehran has long used Armenian front companies to bypass international sanctions on arms and aviation transfers. In 2008, the United States accused at least one Armenian firm with close ties to the political elite in Yerevan of buying Russian arms for Iran. The suspected purchase occurred in 2003, and the arms eventually turned up in the hands of Shia militias fighting U.S. forces in Iraq.
More recently, former Armenian defense minister Vigen Sargsyan led a high-ranking mission to Tehran in February 2017 to discuss military ties. And in July 2020, Iran’s ambassador in Yerevan further pursued the subject in a meeting with current defense minister David Tonoyan.
POTENTIAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT?
If Russia does not intervene in the conflict, the continuing effectiveness of Turkish and Israeli systems may gradually tip the balance toward Azerbaijan, perhaps helping Baku’s forces seize enough territory in the south and north to cut Nagorno-Karabakh off from Armenia. Despite its interest in preventing such an imbalance, Iran is highly unlikely to supply Armenia with any significant weapons systems such as ballistic missiles. Yet it may allow Russian weapons to reach Armenia if Moscow decides to send them, most likely by air. And in the longer term, Iran might help Armenia develop its own missile and drone industries.
The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has been no stranger to drone activities over the past decade, but the deadly exchanges seen in the latest eruption are reinforcing the efficacy of UAV warfare and precision weaponry. Azerbaijan relies mostly on Israel and Turkey for its drone fleet, but Armenia’s small UAV industry could benefit from Iran’s extensive experience in that field. Nagorno-Karabakh’s own forces acquired Iranian Shahed-123 drones years ago, as seen during a 2011 military parade in Stepanakert. This system is the same type that the IRGC has used in recent years for surveillance missions in Afghanistan and Syria; the IRGC Navy has also fielded an armed version.
Even so, Iran is well aware of the major disparity between its Azeri and Armenian communities, which constitute 16-24 percent and 0.2 percent of the country’s population, respectively. For this reason, and assuming the conflict persists, Iran’s future military engagement with Armenia will most likely be covert, perhaps with IRGC-Qods Force advisors helping the country organize its planned “auxiliary militia” using the experience they gained in Iraq and Syria. Finally, the performance of Israeli loitering drones and guided ballistic missiles in Nagorno-Karabakh is giving Iran definitive evidence of their potency, raising the specter of further proliferation in the region.
*Farzin Nadimi is an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Gulf region.

The Baku Balance: How Azerbaijan Juggles Israel and Iran
David Pollock/The Washington Institute/October 09/2020
David Pollock is the Bernstein Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on regional political dynamics and related issues.
The current conflict in the Caucasus between Azerbaijan and Armenia is an extraordinary case where Israel and Iran, while both claiming neutrality, are actually tilting toward the same side: Azerbaijan. Israel buys Azerbaijan's oil and sells it advanced weapons, now being used to deadly effect; while Iran proclaims its support for Azerbaijan’s “territorial integrity”—code words for its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh and adjoining bits of territory held by Armenian separatists. How does this small though oil- and gas-rich country of 10 million mostly Shia Muslims, right on Iran’s northern border, manage this remarkable geopolitical feat?
A few years ago, in search of the answer, I journeyed to Baku to lecture at a “strategic studies” think tank conference and at the local diplomatic academy, and I have since then kept up with some Azerbaijani colleagues. They are often serious yet affable and stridently nationalist while also cosmopolitan, and many of them are multilingual in totally unrelated tongues: their native Azerbaijani—very close to Turkish—plus Russian, English, Farsi, and sometimes even Arabic. But such personal qualities go only so far in explaining their country’s ability to navigate its much larger neighbor’s regional rivalries.
One thing I discovered on this first visit is that democracy is not the answer to Azerbaijan’s quest for security, stability, or support from competing outside powers. Ever since independence from the ruins of the Soviet Union in 1991, the country has been ruled by men from just one family: first Heydar Aliyev, a communist-era strongman holdover, and now Ilham Aliyev, his equally autocratic son. If there are rumblings of dissent, petrodollars and anti-Armenian sentiment usually suffice to suppress them. One local acquaintance summed up the prevailing cynicism about democracy this way: “Yes, we have a parliament, but some of its members don’t even bother to show up. I don’t understand it—at least, sell your vote!”
Instead, the secret of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy success so far lies in a very delicate, deliberate balancing of interests and threats. Its government and elite, nominally Shia Muslim but almost uniformly secular in practice, generally despise Iran’s oppressive theocracy, but they also fear Iranian agents and Hezbollah proxies on their soil, who have periodically attempted to hit Israeli or American targets there.
Less obviously but no less importantly, Azerbaijani people care about their millions of ethnic kinsmen across the border who constitute Iran’s largest minority by far, around double the number of Azeris in Azerbaijan itself. Conversely, Iran’s regime views with some concern the potential “nationalist” sympathies of its subject ethnic Azeris for their wealthier, healthier, and socially freer kinfolk just across the border in Azerbaijan. As such, both governments take good care to maintain healthy diplomatic and commercial relations in order to protect both themselves and their distant relatives in Tabriz or Tehran. And they make sure that the Israelis do not directly threaten Iran too much from Azerbaijani territory.
A classic case in point, never officially acknowledged by any interested party, occurred around a decade ago. At the height of unresolved tension back then over Iran’s nuclear program, serious rumors began to circulate that Israel was on the verge of bombing it. A report even appeared in the press that some Israeli military aircraft were moving to bases nearby in Azerbaijan. But that report itself ended the plot, if indeed it existed. The leak signaled that Baku, or perhaps Washington, or both, were opposed to any such action and had decided to expose and thereby preempt it.
At the same time, Azerbaijan relies partly on Israel to counter potential internal security or other threats from Iran. Some of this lies in the realm of intelligence, early warning, cybersecurity, high-tech equipment and training, and the like. Some cooperation is more political in nature: Azerbaijani officials and experts believe, probably with good reason, that their close ties with Israel help solidify their good relations with the United States—which of course shares its own strong interest in containing Iran and protecting Azerbaijan against Iranian influence. A recent, highly symbolic step in this diplomatic dance was the very public participation by Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Washington, rare among Muslim-majority delegations, in the White House ceremony celebrating the new peace accords between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain.
This tight American connection leads straight to the larger geopolitical juggling act that Baku must maintain between the United States and Russia. Decent relations with both are essential, in Azerbaijani eyes, for protection not only against possible Iranian designs, but also against Russia’s own ambitions, whether in neighboring Armenia, in the common energy-wealthy Caspian littoral, or inside Azerbaijan itself. Without actual Russian military backing, my Azerbaijani hosts told me, the vastly outnumbered Armenians could not hold on to Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet Azerbaijan has little choice but to accommodate Russia anyway, precisely in order to avoid even worse security outcomes.
So Baku, in its own interest, continues to balance these opposing regional and global players against each other: Israel and Iran, American and Russia. The key is never to align fully or exclusively with any of them, so that none is provoked to lash out too harshly, and all keep an interest in playing along. In the current conflict, Turkey has also entered the fray on Azerbaijan’s side, though so far its support is more rhetorical than real.
Nevertheless, for now, it seems doubtful that even this truly unusual combination of allies will enable Azerbaijan to recapture all of its disputed territory. And it may always remain in some potential jeopardy from its much more powerful neighbors, or, just possibly, from some outburst of internal opposition. The most likely scenario, however, is that Baku’s skill at keeping unlikely bedfellows together will continue to preserve its own core interests without altering the fundamental tensions at stake. Neither Israel nor Iran is poised to gain a decisive advantage from either one’s ties with Azerbaijan, which is just the way Baku wants it.

Without Russian Aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan Has the Upper Hand in Nagorno-Karabakh
Robert M. Cutler/Foreign Policy/October 09/2020
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has overplayed his hand by spouting belligerent nationalist rhetoric and refusing to negotiate—and Putin isn’t coming to his rescue.
The renewal of fighting in the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian forces could have been foretold. A four-day outbreak of hostilities in mid-July occurred in northwest Azerbaijan, 60 miles away from Nagorno-Karabakh, but that is not even the proximate cause of today’s fighting.
The current conflict broke out in the late 1980s, when Armenians in Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) began organizing to take the territory out of Azerbaijan. When the NKAO Regional Council voted to unite with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in February 1988, central Soviet authorities abolished the local government and instituted direct rule from Moscow.
In 1992, a year after the two countries became independent, Armenian forces seized control of the “Lachin corridor,” a winding mountain road since improved with funds from the Armenian diaspora, connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Turning northward, they then seized and held the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan. They continued, until early last month, to hold not only the former NKAO but seven additional Azerbaijani districts outside the former NKAO, forming a bloc having a long common border with Armenia.
For a quarter century, Azerbaijan has had to support a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons representing 10 percent of its total population.
That was the situation when the war ended in 1994. Despite periodic skirmishes, the worst of which were in 2016, the status quo remained—until last month. The whole area under occupation represents 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory. No fewer than four U.N. Security Council Resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884) adopted in 1993 called for Armenian troops to leave all these occupied territories without delay.
Approximately 800,000 Azerbaijanis were ethnically cleansed from those areas. Another 200,000 were driven out of Armenia proper, finding shelter as refugees in Azerbaijan. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) set up its “Minsk Group”—co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia—to promote negotiations for settlement of the conflict. For a quarter century, Azerbaijan has had to support a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons representing 10 percent of its total population.
Azerbaijan was patient for over a generation. With Armenia, it subscribed to the Madrid Principles for a settlement, proposed by the Minsk Group more than a decade ago. These called for returning the seven districts around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; giving Nagorno-Karabakh an interim status that would provide “guarantees for security and self-governance”; linking it with Armenia by a corridor; determining its final legal status “through a legally binding expression of will”; returning all refugees and displaced people to their former places of residence; and putting in place a peacekeeping operation.
These negotiations languished. Azerbaijan warned over the years that the use of force would be a last resort if the peace process were exhausted. This resort to force finally occurred after Armenia overtly and unilaterally rejected the Madrid Principles.Azerbaijan warned over the years that the use of force would be a last resort if the peace process were exhausted. This resort to force finally occurred after Armenia overtly and unilaterally rejected the Madrid Principles. That rejection of the agreed basis for talks brought negotiations to an impasse. Baku still attempted to revive the defunct peace talks. By doing so, it probably sent Yerevan the wrong signal.
Instead, Armenia completely discarded the Madrid Principles. The country’s current prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power in what resembled a “color revolution” in May 2018, was initially conciliatory toward Azerbaijan. Early on, he gave the impression that he was an open interlocutor ready to discuss thorny issues. Unfortunately, he was unable to make good on the many promises he made to the Armenian public—promises that, if realized, would have improved Armenia’s isolated socioeconomic situation and heavy dependence on Russia. After failing to deliver on these preelection promises, Pashinyan became a victim of the irredentist nationalism seemingly required to survive in Armenian domestic politics.
Trapped there, he seems then to have fallen hostage to his own nationalist rhetoric, which has in turn strengthened domestic Armenian populism and militarism. This irredentist nationalism finally touched not just the Nagorno-Karabakh issue—which Pashinyan, like his predecessors, politically manipulated—but extended to other neighbors beyond Azerbaijan.
In particular, Pashinyan ended up making territorial claims against Turkey. He did this by unleashing a debate over the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which never entered into force and was replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Sèvres had been the Allies’ attempt, after World War I, to liquidate the Ottoman Empire and distribute its territories. In that division, Armenia would have received part of what is now the northeastern region of modern Turkey.
During the centenary celebrations of this Treaty of Sèvres, in August 2020, Pashinyan characterized the never ratified treaty as a “historical fact” and called for the restoration of historical justice. This meant that the Armenian state, in his person as head of government, was overtly claiming title to lands that have been part of Turkey for 100 years.
The previous year, in March 2019, his defense minister, Davit Tonoyan, had declared in front of the Armenian community in New York: “As the minister of defense, I announce that this [old] format, territories [in exchange] for peace, I have rephrased it. We are doing the opposite—a new war for new territories.” This threatening slogan could have referred to more territories around those already occupied, to Azerbaijan’s exclave Nakhchivan, or to yet other lands. What it meant was that Azerbaijan should have anticipated military provocations from Armenia to carve out new territories. These came with the July-August hostilities in the country’s northwest Tovuz region, 100 miles from Nagorno-Karabakh, which had been peaceful for over 26 years.
The domestic political pressure against Pashinyan increased when he put former President Robert Kocharyan and former Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan on trial, respectively for “overthrowing the constitutional order of Armenia” and for embezzlement. Sargsyan, who was Kocharyan’s handpicked successor, had jailed Pashinyan in 2009 in connection with the latter’s protests against allegedly fraudulent elections. Both Sargsyan and Kocharyan are originally from Karabakh itself and members of the same political clan that dominated Armenian politics from the mid-1990s until just a couple years ago.
In words akin to a verbal annexation, Pashinyan declared that the territories were part of Armenia itself.
Five months after Tonoyan’s statement in New York, Pashinyan in August 2019 undermined the myth that Armenians in the occupied territories—which they called the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,” and is unrecognized internationally—governed themselves. Specifically, in a controversial speech on Aug. 5 during the pan-Armenian games held in Khankendi (also called Stepanakert), Pashinyan declared that “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia, and that is all.” In words akin to a verbal annexation, he declared that the territories were part of Armenia itself.
No Armenian politician had said that since the war in the early 1990s, first because it was political dynamite—since the territory was internationally recognized to be part of Azerbaijan—and second because Armenia sought to maintain the fig leaf of independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from Armenia proper. Indeed, in the Chiragov et al. v. Armenia court case before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the court ruled in 2015 that in fact it was Armenia, and not the local administration in Nagorno-Karabakh, that exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.
Pashinyan’s declaration represented a definitive rejection of the OSCE’s Madrid Principles, according to which the territories’ final status would be the product of negotiations. His was the first Armenian government failing to give the Madrid Principles at least lip service.
In July, after several months of belligerent rhetoric, he explicitly and overtly confirmed his rejection of the Madrid Principles by proposing seven new conditions for negotiations with Azerbaijan. The Madrid Principles had called for the eventual participation in those negotiations by both the Armenian and the (ethnically cleansed) Azerbaijani populations of Nagorno-Karabakh. Pashinyan now demanded that Armenian representatives from the region should participate on an equal basis with Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves—and without their expelled ethnic Azerbaijani counterparts.
As the conflict escalates, Pashinyan now has a Vladimir Putin problem; the man who could act as Armenia’s patron and ally is not doing so. Kocharyan and Sargsyan both had good personal relations with Russia’s president. When Pashinyan was in the political opposition, however, he criticized Armenia’s dependence on Russia and the advantage that Russia took of Armenia’s weakness and isolation. As a result, Putin is not particularly sympathetic to Pashinyan. The Russian media have not always treated him kindly.
Russia still more or less kept a show of political balance as a Minsk Group co-chair, having refrained from extending open political and military support to Armenia, despite having a military base at Gyumri in Armenia hosting 3,000 soldiers as well as an air base near the capital, Yerevan. Russia has generally supported Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, despite developing increasingly friendly relations with Baku as well over the last dozen years.
Today, the Russian military continues to resupply Armenia. It flew generous resupplies to Armenia even during the July hostilities. The airplanes took a Russia-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Armenia flight path because Georgia refused overflight rights. Azerbaijan did not understand Russia’s military assistance to Armenia in the middle of the conflict, since Baku had been significantly improving its relations with Russia after the United States lost interest in the region more than a decade ago.
The Kremlin has been caught out in the South Caucasus. It was preoccupied with Belarus, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the uproar over the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, and increasing domestic protest.
Azerbaijan succeeded in late September in taking control of strategic heights overlooking the two highways that connect Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. (Indeed, a further incitement to Azerbaijan was probably an official Armenian government announcement in late July that a third would be constructed this year.) The Armenian military probably knows that it is in danger of facing a long-term siege there. It has been trying to distract and provoke Azerbaijan with increasing attacks on civilian Azerbaijani towns and cities outside the conflict region.
Russia is keen to preserve its influence in what it calls its “near abroad,” where it cohabited with the countries concerned for 70 years under the Soviet Union, not to mention a further-reaching imperial Tsarist history. It sells arms to both sides. Thanks to Western embargoes, it is now Azerbaijan’s largest arms supplier, although Baku pays Moscow full world prices in hard currency, whereas Yerevan pays domestic Russian prices with ruble-denominated loans from Moscow.
Turkey, on the other hand, has always expressed political and military support for Azerbaijan’s struggle to recover its occupied territories. It has not acted any different this time; indeed, Turkish drones purchased by Azerbaijan were an important factor turning events in Azerbaijan’s favor. Azerbaijan also now has missile batteries and long guns, mainly from Russia, that it did not have before. With those and new drones from Turkey, it has been picking off Armenian tanks and other armor rather regularly and with relative impunity, although it has suffered some losses.
Given the close ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Pashinyan himself has played the Turkophobia card and even the religious card, going so far as to suggest that the conflict between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan is a clash of civilizations. This all seems to betray a certain desperation. Russia declines to support him as strongly as he had wished, and the worldwide Armenian diaspora has been unable to help him when push came to shove.
Azerbaijan’s battleground victories are mounting. Yerevan’s rejection to engage in meaningful negotiations and withdraw from Azerbaijani lands enhances Baku’s determination to make more advances. Twenty-six years of waiting for negotiations have only produced an increasingly worse situation. Azerbaijan still hosts 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons; Armenia has increased its settlements in the occupied territories; and goods manufactured there are labeled as “made in Armenia” and exported without a problem to the European Union. The rhetoric out of Yerevan has only gotten worse over time.
The Kremlin has been caught out in the South Caucasus. It was preoccupied with Belarus, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the unexpected uproar over the poisoning of the opposition activist Alexei Navalny, and increasing domestic protest and dissatisfaction. It is possible that Moscow will wait until Azerbaijan achieves certain territorial gains to weaken Pashinyan in Armenia and then use its own influence in Yerevan to oust him and install another Armenian leader more pliable to Russia’s wishes.
In doing so, Russia would accomplish several objectives. It would keep the conflicting parties on a short leash by perpetuating a lingering conflict, thus maintaining the Kremlin’s clout in the region while earning some points with Azerbaijan, with which it enjoys generally good relations. Moreover, it would punish the so-called revolutionary and unpredictable Pashinyan for overstepping Armenia’s historic role as a client state of Russia.
*Robert M. Cutler is a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Twitter: @RobertMCutler

Bandar’s Anger or the Resentment of Saudis?
Salman Al-Dossary/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 09/2020
Prince Bandar bin Sultan appeared in three episodes on Al-Arabiya channel, during which he revealed the flawed historical positions of the Palestinian leadership, which were sufficient to summarize decades of ingratitude, denial, and non-loyalty. Towards whom? Towards countries that have served the Palestinian cause the most. Who would blame Prince Bandar for his anger “after hearing low-level statements from the Palestinian leaders,” as he said?!
Throughout his diplomatic and political career, Prince Bandar witnessed the extent of the contradictions and ingratitude with which the Palestinian leaders met the efforts of the Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia, in the service of their cause. These contradictions caused severe damage to the cause and harmed the Palestinian people the most.
The Saudi expert’s speech came to undermine the Palestinian leaders’ bet on the continuation of the Saudi silence over proven historical facts and undeniable evidence of decades of material, political, and economic support.
Then was the straw that broke the camel’s back; with the Palestinian leaders’ attack on the Gulf States, and even their disdain and underestimation. Is Bandar not allowed, after all this, to be angry?!
If the Palestinian issue was known to be the most complex, not in the region, but in the world, then Bandar bin Sultan’s two-hour presentation was sufficient to untangle all these complexities. He relied on information not opinion, and logic not emotions, to tell the painful truth that many hesitate to state.
But Bandar was courageous, frank, and direct in confronting everyone with it: The main problem of the Palestinian file lies in its own leaders and not in the long list of states, governments, and people, who are usually blamed for abandoning the cause. As for why “no Saudi official had come out to talk about what the Palestinian leaders were doing?!” The first reason, according to Prince Bandar, is that “Saudi Arabia aims to serve the Palestinian people because their cause is just.”The second reason, in my opinion, is that the Kingdom does not target peoples in its positions, unlike the Palestinian leaders who not only lashed out at Saudi citizens but also incited a segment of their citizens against the Gulf peoples through abuse and harm.
The third reason is that Prince Bandar, for four decades, “kept silence” until he was overwhelmed with anger and was forced to reveal the bitter truth.
Prince Bandar threw a stone into a stagnant pool. The Palestinian issue can no longer remain Othman’s shirt, through which entire countries and people are insulted and accused of treason. We are not talking here about states’ positions and decisions. Rather, we are talking about peoples, who have finally realized that they are blamed, accused, insulted, and betrayed even if they consider the Palestinian issue to be their first cause. Thus, Bandar bin Sultan did not only express his own anger, but rather the resentment of a people, who were accused of ignorance and dependency, as if that was a punishment for their historical positions for a cause they backed more than its own people did.
Governments take stances that are compatible with their interests. The Saudi official position is very clear regarding the Kingdom’s keenness to reach a permanent and just solution to the Palestinian cause with the aim to establish peace. As for the message sent by Bandar bin Sultan, it was addressed to the Saudi citizens; those who have backed the Palestinian cause for seventy years, defended it and fought for it, but were finally met with ingratitude and condemnation. The time has come for someone to correct the path, not in revenge against any side, nor an attack on anyone, but rather to rectify fallacies that lasted for decades. Bandar bin Sultan did not only express his anger but was a shaking voice expressing Saudi popular resentment.

Yes it Hurts, No it Doesn’t
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al-Awsat/October 09/2020
While Tehran leaders have turned relations with the United States into the central issue of Iranian politics, they still seem unable to decide whether the present tension between the two sides hurts or helps their regime.
One group within the establishment claims that the sanctions re-imposed by President Donald Trump actually helps the regime and hurts the US. In his recent talks to various US think tanks and media, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has defended that thesis with his usual panache. According to him, Trump has “isolated” the US while the Islamic Republic has earned “worldwide sympathy and support.”Gen. Hussein Salami, commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is equally sanguine about his claim that, far from hurting, the Islamic Republic is on course to become a global power.
“We have already reached the Mediterranean and prepare to go even further,” he said in a recent speech. We are now in a position to occupy and set on fire all military bases of the United States in the region and beyond.”
The general believes that even when it comes to military hardware, the Islamic Republic won’t be hurt by the re-imposition of a UN embargo.
The official media are equally divided. The segment controlled by the IRGC peddles the claim that sanctions have helped Iran to develop a self-sufficiently economy capable of producing all that is needed. It goes even further by hailing “the end of reliance on oil exports” as the realization of a dream that generations of Iranians had since the 1950s. In a recent speech Eshaq Jahangiri, 1st Assistant to President Rouhani, claimed that income from oil had now fallen to $7 billion a year. Doing without selling oil was a dream that supporters of Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadeq also trumpeted when, facing a British embargo, managed to survive without exporting oil for two years :1951-52. Most other nations in the world also manage to survive without exporting oil.
The position of “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei, the man supposed to have the final word in Tehran, isn’t always clear. At times he claims that the aim of the revolution is the destruction of America at almost any cost. And, yet, he has been involved in negotiations, secret or above-board, with the “ Great Satan” for almost four decades. He also approved the so-called “nuke deal” dictated by President Barack Obama, putting large segments of Iranian industry, trade and scientific research under foreign tutelage.
There is, however, another faction that puts the blame for almost all of Iran’s current problems on Donald Trump. The most vocal spokesman for that faction is Hojat al-Islam wa al-Muslemeen Hassan Rouhani who acts as President of the Islamic Republic.
Under his administering the value of the Iranian currency, rial, has fallen from 3,000 to 30,000 in just six years. Inflation has spiraled to almost 50 percent, while the economy is shrinking by an average of three percent a year. According to official statistics over 30 percent of Iranians live below the poverty line with more than a quarter of the work force unemployed.
In his recent speech, Rouhani all but claimed that the sanctions re-imposed by Trump have been even more effective than Washington says.
“The Americans say they have damaged our economy by tens of billions of dollars,” Rouhani said. “The damage is higher. In the past three years they have done more than $150 billion in damage to our economy.”
Describing US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as “the Minster of Crimes”, Rouhani said Pompeo’s claim of preventing Iran from accessing $70 billion of its own money in foreign banks was an underestimation. The Hojat al-Islam even blamed the failure of his government to cope with the Covid-19 crisis on Pompeo who “prevented us from securing a $5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.”
The Hojat al-Islam claims that without “Trump’s sanctions” our people would have had a much more comfortable life.
What causes this apparent division in the analysis of the regime’s central foreign policy problem? One reason may be the fact that two different audiences must be addressed.
One audience consists of the Democrat Party in the US with which part of the Islamic regime hopes to make a deal based on the one offered by Obama. The message to please that audience is that Trump’s Iran policy has failed, just like all his other policies and that the US has suffered more than Iran has.
The other audience is the people in Iran who feel they are poorer than they were six years ago and blame the leadership for its ineptitude, corruption and failure to develop a better foreign policy and stop using resources on foreign adventures. However, there may be a subtext in that: preparing public opinion for yet another climb-down in the fight against the “Great Satan”. After all, if people are convinced that making a deal with Washington is the key to all problems they would welcome what Khamenei calls “a heroic flexibility.”
The question now is whether their climb-down will come with Trump still in the White House of will the mullahs wait for Joe Biden, the “little devil” they know better.

Pasteur's Noble Vision
Lawrence Kadish/Gatestone Institute/October 09/2020
It is Communist China the source of COVID-19, and a country that has, as its openly stated aim, global domination. Equally dangerous are those in league with Beijing. Their eyes are on cheap labor and a market of 1.5 billion consumers. These sympathizers wish, for their personal profit, to trade away the future of our democracy. They are collaborating with Marxist Communists and need to be exposed and held accountable for being accomplices to tyranny and the deaths of more than 1,000,000 people by the virus exported by China.
Pasteur's Noble Vision stands in stark contrast to a Vision of Evil as he reminds us that, "It is surmounting difficulties that makes heroes... (and)... It is in the power of man to cause all infectious diseases to disappear from the world."
It is Communist China that will use anyone and any means to reduce America to a second rate power.
"It is not the germs we need worry about. It is our inner terrain," said Louis Pasteur. "It is surmounting difficulties that makes heroes... (and)... It is in the power of man to cause all infectious diseases to disappear from the world."
"It is not the germs we need worry about. It is our inner terrain," Louis Pasteur put the world on notice.
One of the greatest microbiologist in history is still warning all of us about where the real danger lies in this era of politics and pandemic. It is important to look beyond COVID and see what really threatens our nation's future.
It is Communist China, the source of COVID-19, and a country that has, as its openly stated aim, global domination. Equally dangerous are those in league with Beijing. Their eyes are on cheap labor and a market of 1.5 billion consumers. These sympathizers wish, for their personal profit, to trade away the future of our democracy. They are collaborating with Marxist Communists and need to be exposed and held accountable for being accomplices to tyranny and the deaths of more than 1,000,000 people by the virus exported by China. It is Communist China that will use anyone and any means to reduce America to a second rate power.
Pasteur's Noble Vision stands in stark contrast to a Vision of Evil as he reminds us that, "It is surmounting difficulties that makes heroes... (and)... It is in the power of man to cause all infectious diseases to disappear from the world."
Every American patriot needs to heed Pasteur. Our central problem is not about germs. It is about those from China abroad and their Fifth Columnists at home who are trying to destroy our freedoms and control the Free World. The warning is clear for those wise enough to hear it. It is time to act.
*Lawrence Kadish is a real estate developer, entrepreneur, and founder and president of the Museum of American Armor.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Fighting in the Caucasus: Erdogan's Ottoman Ambitions
Con Coughlin/ Gatestone Institute/October 09/2020
Turkey's support for Azerbaijan, which could prove to be decisive in the conflict, stems from Mr Erdogan's determination to recreate the glory of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkey formed the epicentre of the Muslim world.
The latest outbreak of violence -- the most serious to affect the region since the early 1990s -- began at the end of last month, after Azerbaijan was accused of launching a full-scale assault against Armenian positions in the mountainous enclave, prompting a full-scale mobilisation of Armenian forces.
Even so, Mr Erdogan's intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute puts him at odds with another major power with aspirations to increase its influence in the region, namely Russia.
As the bitter fighting intensifies between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, it has emerged that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is supplying the Azeris with weapons and mercenaries in their campaign to reclaim control of the enclave. Pictured: A part of the city of Stepanakert in Nagorno-Karabakh, damaged by artillery shelling, on October 8, 2020.
The emergence of Turkey as a key player in the latest eruption of violence in the disputed Caucasus region of Nagorno-Karabakh needs to be seen within the context of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ambition of recreating the Ottoman Empire.
As the bitter fighting intensifies between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan over the disputed territory in the Caucasus Mountains, it has emerged that Mr Erdogan is supplying the Azeris with weapons and mercenaries in their campaign to reclaim control of the enclave.
Apart from supplying conventional weapons, there have been suggestions that Turkish-made cluster bombs -- which are banned under international law -- have been used in attacks on Armenian positions.
In addition, Ankara has been accused of sending Syrian rebels to Azerbaijan to help with its campaign to reclaim the enclave.
Turkey's support for Azerbaijan, which could prove to be decisive in the conflict, stems from Mr Erdogan's determination to recreate the glory of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkey formed the epicentre of the Muslim world.
Although the territory that now constitutes modern Azerbaijan was never under direct Ottoman control, the local tribes came under the influence of Muslim Turks, to the extent that many Azeris today speak a form of Turkish dialect.
More recently the bond between Turkey and Azerbaijan has resulted in the two countries undertaking joint military exercises on a regular basis.
Never one to miss an opportunity to expand Turkey's influence in the Muslim world, Mr Erdogan has been quick to lend his backing to Azerbaijan in its bid to reclaim control over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Within hours of the conflict erupting, the Turkish president tweeted, "The Turkish people will support our Azerbaijani brothers with all our means as always," adding for good measure that Armenia was "the biggest threat to regional peace."
The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh dates back to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s when the territory, whose population is primarily Armenian, opted to break away from the control of neighbouring Azerbaijan, a country composed mainly of Shiite Muslims.
The decision prompted a bitter war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1992 after both countries gained independence from the Soviet Union, claiming the lives of an estimated 30,000 people.
Since then an uneasy truce has settled on the region as a result of a Russian-brokered ceasefire in 1994.
The latest outbreak of violence -- the most serious to affect the region since the early 1990s -- began at the end of last month, after Azerbaijan was accused of launching a full-scale assault against Armenian positions in the mountainous enclave, prompting a full-scale mobilisation of Armenian forces.
During the recent fighting, it is estimated that more than 300 people have been killed and thousands forced from their homes as the fighting has intensified.
On one level, Turkey's support for Azerbaijan is not surprising in view of its long and troubled relationship with the Armenian people, with the Turks accused of being responsible the systematic mass murder and expulsion of around 1.5 million Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.
Even so, Mr Erdogan's intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute puts him at odds with another major power with aspirations to increase its influence in the region, namely Russia.
Russia regards Armenia as an important regional ally, and maintains an important military base at the country's second largest city, Gyumri.
Consequently, Mr Erdogan needs to proceed with caution so far as his support for Azerbaijan is concerned. Otherwise he could find that Russian interest in the Caucasus presents a formidable obstacle to his plans to recreate Turkey's Ottoman glory.
*Con Coughlin is the Telegraph's Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.