English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For May 24/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
http://data.eliasbejjaninews.com/eliasnews19/english.may24.20.htm

News Bulletin Achieves Since 2006
Click Here to enter the LCCC Arabic/English news bulletins Achieves since 2006

Bible Quotations For today
I give you a new commandment, that you love one another. Just as I have loved you, you also should love one another. By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another.’
John 13/31-35: “When he had gone out, Jesus said, ‘Now the Son of Man has been glorified, and God has been glorified in him. If God has been glorified in him, God will also glorify him in himself and will glorify him at once. Little children, I am with you only a little longer. You will look for me; and as I said to the Jews so now I say to you, “Where I am going, you cannot come.”I give you a new commandment, that you love one another. Just as I have loved you, you also should love one another. By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another.’”

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on May 23-24/2020
Hezbollah’s bogus Liberation & Resistance Day/Elias Bejjani/May 25/2020
Lebanon’s COVID-19 Infections Surge
Corona Committee meets with international organizations' representatives
Lebanese editor allegedly beaten for Facebook post about Parliament speaker
Aoun-Nasrallah understanding in Lebanon at risk as Bassil bends to US pressure
Lebanon’s Berri takes sides with Hezbollah
President Aoun congratulates the Lebanese on occasion of Al-Fitr Feast and Liberation Day: We are a people who differ in politics but are united to the homeland
Hariri: We ask God to spare our countries the downfalls of political recklessness, economic instability
Lebanon’s Speaker Criticizes Govt and FPM, Warns Against Federalism
Berri receives congratulatory calls on Fitr Eid, apologizes for not welcoming well-wishers
Greenpeace: Sewage in the sea causes more serious diseases than Corona
Abou al-Hassan to the government: To stop the redundant literature
Strong Republic Deputies Okais, Saad submit law proposals on medication, pretrial detention
Lebanon to recieve new repatriation flights for stranded nationals
Coronavirus deals heavy blow to Lebanon's bus drivers, now unable to turn a profit
Lebanon to finally implement official capital controls
From The Achieve/When Is The Liberation?/By: General Michel Aoun/France May 27/2000/Translated by: Elias Bejjani
Twenty years after the IDF left Lebanon, the memories are flooding back/Anna Ahronheim/Jerusalem Post/May 23/2020
Twenty years out of Lebanon: The war with no name that would never end/Arieh O' Sullivan/Jerusalem Post/May 23/2020
Twenty years after Lebanon withdrawal: Return to the abyss/Seth J.Frantzman/Jerusalem Post/May 23/2020
A four-month coincidence? The Lebanon withdrawal and the Second Intifada/Herb Keinon/ـerusalem Post/May 23/2020

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on May 23-24/2020
Holy Sepulcher Church in Jerusalem to Open Again on Sunday
Pompeo calls for immediate halt to fighting Libya while GNA boasts of ‘advances’
Egypt Security Forces Kill 21 Militants in North Sinai
43 ISIS Attacks in Syria Since Beginning of Ramadan
Palestinian Forces Prevent Israeli Patrol From Entering Al-Khalil
US Reaches Understanding with Sudan over Bombing of 2 Embassies
Brussels Conference on Syria to Be Held via Videoconference in June
Libyan National Army Prepares for Air Battle by Downing 7 Turkish Drones
Israel's Netanyahu, Unbeaten in Elections, is Going on Trial
Pakistan Plane Crash Leaves 97 Dead, Two Survivors
Saudi Arabia orders the return of its ambassador to Iraq as soon as possible

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on May 23-24/2020
Abbas's Precious Gift to Iran: Hamas/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/May 23, 2020
The Old Organization and the New World ... the Necessity of Reform!/Zuhair Al-Harthi/Asharq Al-Awsat/May 23/2020
A new Iran nuclear deal? Not so fast/Ari Heistein and Dr. Raz Zimmt/Al Arabiya/May 23/2020
The Makhlouf episode raises questions about regime’s colossal fortune abroad and Alawites’ future/The Arab weekly/May 24/2020

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on May 23-24/2020
Hezbollah’s bogus Liberation & Resistance Day
Elias Bejjani/May 25/2020
Believe it or not, on May 25 each year since 2000 Lebanon has been celebrating the so-called “Liberation & Resistance Day.”
Sadly, this celebration commemorates a bogus event, and a phony heroism that did not actually take place.
On May 22, 2000 the Israeli Army unilaterally and for solely Israeli domestic reasons withdrew from the security zone of South Lebanon in accordance with UN Resolution 425.
This miscalculated and hasty withdrawal was a fatal Israeli decision that has inspired the Hamas terrorism acts and the on-going havoc in the Palestinian Gaza strip.
During the last 19 years many Israeli officials and politicians from all parties openly and harshly criticized Barak’s Government (Barak was PM at that time) hasty and unwise decision through which Israel’ abandoned its ally the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and gave Hezbollah all south Lebanon and the entire Lebanon on a plate of sliver.
The unilateral Israeli withdrawal created a security vacuum in south Lebanon.
The Syrians who were occupying Lebanon at that time and fully controlling its government, did not allow the Lebanese Army to deploy in the south and fill this vacuum after the Israeli withdrawal.
Instead Syria helped the Hezbollah militia to militarily control the whole southern region, and even patrol the Israeli-Lebanese border.
It is worth mentioning that the Israeli army’s withdrawal was executed without any military battles, or even minor skirmishes with Hezbollah, or the Lebanese and Syrian armies.
The Syrian regime, in a bid to justify both its on going occupation of Lebanon and the avoidance of disarming Hezbollah, came up with the “Shabaa Farms occupation big lie” and declared Hezbollah a Liberator, alleging it had forced Israel to withdrawal from South Lebanon.
Syria, in the same camouflaging and devious context, dictated to both its puppet Lebanese parliament and government to declare May 25th a National Day under the tag of “Liberation & Resistance Day”.
In reality Hezbollah did not force the Israeli withdrawal, and did not play any role in the Liberation of the southern Lebanese region.
In fact both Hezbollah and Syria deliberately hindered and delayed the Israeli withdrawal for more than 14 years.
Every time the Israelis called on the Lebanese government to engage in a joint, serious effort under the United Nations umbrella to ensure a safe and mutually organized withdrawal of its army from South Lebanon, the Lebanese government refused to cooperate, did not agree to deploy its army in the south, and accused the Israelis of plotting to divide and split the Syrian-Lebanese joint track.
This approach to the Israeli calls was an official Syrian decision dictated to all the Lebanese puppet governments during the Syrian occupation era.
Since then, Hezbollah has been hijacking Lebanon and its people, refusing to disarm and advocating for the annihilation of Israel.
This Iranian mullahs’ terrorist army stationed in Lebanon, is viciously hiding behind labels of resistance, liberation and religion.
Hezbollah has recklessly jeopardized the Lebanese peoples’ lives, safety, security and livelihood.
It has been growing bolder and bolder in the last 19 years and mercilessly taking the Lebanese state and the Lebanese people hostage through terrorism, force and organized crime.
Sadly, Hezbollah is systematically devouring Lebanon day after day, and piece by piece, while at the same time marginalizing all its governmental institutions in a bid to topple the Lebanese state and erect in its place a Shiite Muslim regime, a replica of the Iranian Shiite mullahs’ fundamentalist republic.
Meanwhile the free world and Arabic countries are totally silent, indifferent, and idly watching from far away the horrible crime unfolding without taking any practical or tangible measures to put an end to this anti-Lebanese Syria-Iranian scheme that is executed through their spearhead, the Hezbollah armed militia.
Who is to be blamed for Hezbollah’s current odd and bizarre status?
Definitely the Syrians who have occupied Lebanon for more than 28 years (1976-2005).
During their bloody and criminal occupation, Syria helped the Iranian Hezbollah militia build a state within Lebanon and fully control the Lebanese Shiite community.
But also the majority of the Lebanese politicians, leaders, officials and clergymen share the responsibility because they were subservient and acted in a dire Dhimmitude, selfish and cowardly manner.
If these so-called Lebanese leaders had been courageous and patriotic and had not appeased Hezbollah and turned a blind eye to all its vicious and human rights atrocities, intimidation tactics, crimes and expansionism schemes, this Iranian Shiite fundamentalist militia would not have been able to erect its own mini-state in the southern suburb of Beirut, and its numerous mini-cantons in the Bekaa Valley and the South; nor would Hezbollah have been able to build its mighty military power, with 70 thousand militiamen, or stockpile more than 200 thousand missiles and force the Iranian “Wilayat Al-Faqih” religious doctrine on the Lebanese Shiite community and confiscate Lebanon’s decision making process and freedoms.
Since Hezbollah’s emergence in 1982, these politicians have been serving their own selfish interests and not the interests of the Lebanese people and the nation. They went along with Hezbollah’s schemes, deluding themselves that its militia and weaponry would remain in South Lebanon and would not turn against them. This failure to serve the people of Lebanon allowed Hezbollah to make many Lebanese and most of the Arab-Muslim countries through its terrorism propaganda to blindly swallow its big lie of theatrical, faked resistance and Liberation.
Hezbollah would not have been able to refuse to disarm in 1991, like all the other Lebanese militias in accordance to the “Taef Accord,” which called for the disarmament of all militias.
Hezbollah would not have become a state inside the Lebanese state, and a world-wide terrorism Iranian-Syrian tool which turned against them all after its war with Israel in year 2006 and after the UN troops were deployed on the Lebanese – Israeli borders in accordance with the UN Resolution 1701.
On May 7, 2008 Hezbollah invaded Sunni Western Beirut killing and injuring in cold blood hundreds of its civilian citizens, and too attempted to take over by force Mount Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s General Secretary Sheik Hassan Nasrallah called that day (May 7, 2008) a great and glorious victory for his resistance, and keeps on threatening the Lebanese that a replicate of that day will take place if they do not succumb and obey his Iranian orders.
Hezbollah is a deadly dragon that the Lebanese politicians have been allowing him to feed on sacrifices from the southern Lebanese citizens, especially on those who were living in the “Security Zone” and who fled to Israel in May 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon.
This dragon who enjoyed devouring his southern sacrifices has now turned on all the Lebanese and if they do not stand for their rights and dignity, he will keep on devouring them all one after the other.
We call on the Lebanese government, the Lebanese Parliament and on all the free and patriotic Lebanese politicians and leaders to cancel the May 25 National Day, because it is not national at all, and also to stop calling Hezbollah a resistance, put an end for its mini-state, cantons and weaponry, and secure a dignified, honorable and safe return for all the Lebanese citizens who have been taking refuge in Israel since May 2000.
N.B: The original version of the above article was first published in 2010..It is republished with minor changes

Lebanon’s COVID-19 Infections Surge
Beirut - Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
The Lebanese authorities have tightened restrictions on two Lebanese towns, which have recently seen a surge in the number of COVID-19 infections. Strict measures were imposed in the eastern Bekaa region of Majdal Anjar, while a state of emergency was declared in the town of Mazboud in Mount Lebanon.
On Friday, the Health Ministry announced 62 new cases, including three among repatriated nationals, making the total number of infections reach 1,086 by noon. Health Minister Hamad Hassan conducted a visit to Majdal Anjar, where 32 new cases were reported on Friday. Security forces blocked 21 entrances to the town, and prevented access to it, except for medics, pharmacists and providers of food and agricultural materials. “If we don’t show a high degree of responsibility, then there is no doubt that the coronavirus will be disastrous. Overcrowding and social mixing cause a rapid spread of infection,” Hassan said during a conference at the town’s municipality. In Mount Lebanon, the results of the PCR tests for a number of residents of Mazboud confirmed 15 new cases. In response, the crisis cell in the municipality announced a state of public emergency in the town, which was completely isolated to help contain the epidemic and limit its spread. The health minister underlined the need to implement the intervention plan that his ministry put in place to confront the surge in COVID-19 infections, by coordinating the efforts with the various ministries, institutions and relevant authorities.

Corona Committee meets with international organizations' representatives
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
The Corona Virus Follow-up Committee, Saturday, held a meeting at the Grand Serail, chaired by the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council for Defense, Chairman of the National Committee for Disaster Management, Major General Mahmoud Al-Asmar, in the presence of the Advisor to the Prime Minister for Health Affairs Petra Khoury and representatives of a number of international organizations, namely the United Nations Refugee Organization (UNHCR), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), Doctors Without Borders (MSF), and International Organization for Migration (IOM). Talks during the meeting centered on the epidemiological developments in Lebanon, and setting an immediate mechanism to address the issue of the residential building in Beirut’s Ras al-Nabaa area, where conducted tests revealed a large spread of the virus among members of the Bengali community residing in said building. Conferees also tackled the need to conduct comprehensive PCR checks for the displaced, refugees and foreign workers in Lebanon. The first phase of the implementation plan related to the arrangement and operation of 29 quarantine centers in various Lebanese regions was also launched.

Lebanese editor allegedly beaten for Facebook post about Parliament speaker
Abby Sewell, Al Arabiya English/Saturday 23 May 2020
The editor of a local Lebanese publication says he was attacked by supporters of the Amal party after publishing a post on his personal Facebook page mocking the political party’s leader, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the outlet's editorial board said.
Bachir Abou Zeid, editor of the 17 Tishreen (17 October) newspaper that was formed during the mass protests in the country, wrote in a post Thursday, “Turn off (the lights) in front of Nabih Berri’s house and light the houses of the people.”
The post was a reference to Lebanon’s chronic electricity shortages and daily power cuts where the state-run utility fails to provide 24-hour power, with outages of at least three hours a day in Beirut and more in outlying areas.
The outages have increased in recent days, leading to protests around the country, including one in which demonstrators stormed an Energy Ministry office in Beirut.
Over the past few weeks, a few Twitter users have taken to pointing out streetlights left on during the day and calling on the Energy Minister to turn the lights off.
The day after making the post, Abou Zeid, who lives in the southern town of Kfar Roummane where Berri has a strong base of support, wrote that he had faced a stream of threats and accusations related to the first post. And early Saturday, the editorial board of the 17
Tishreen newspaper published a statement on its own Facebook alleging that Abou Zeid had been physically attacked by Amal supporters.
“The editorial board of the October 17 newspaper denounces the violent attack on its editor, Bashir Abou Zeid, in his hometown of Kfar Roummane, in front of the home of Mukhtar Ali Shukron, after he was pursued in front of his house, where he was chased by members of the Amal Movement in a motorcade, and they tried to kidnap him because of an opinion he had published on his page last night,” the statement said. “Bashir was taken to the Najda Hospital, where his injuries were examined by the pathologist.”
Officials from Amal and the Lebanese Communist Party met and issued a statement saying that “What happened in Kafrerman, is an individual incident, not of a political nature” and that it was being followed up on by “the competent authorities. In the statement, they also asserted that they have respect for “freedom of expression and expression of opinion for all, under the roof of the law,” Lebanon's National News Agency reported.
Ayman Mhanna, executive director of the Samir Kassir Foundation, a Lebanon-based press freedom group that tracks attacks and other violations against media workers, said the incident exemplified many of the issues faced by journalists in Lebanon, particularly those not affiliated with major media outlets, which are often connected to specific political parties. First, the perpetrators of all forms of aggressions enjoy complete immunity, and there is a situation of complete impunity also for all forms of crimes against journalists,” Mhanna said.
That is particularly the case, he said when the perpetrators “enjoy political support, political cover from one of the major political parties in Lebanon…because these big parties always provide protection and cover to the perpetrators if they belong to their ranks.”
On the other hand, he noted that journalists have continued to face detention or interrogation for writing on political topics. The Lebanese authorities he said are “still allowing police and the judiciary to summon journalist who do not belong to big parties, (while) whenever someone is physically attacked, whenever someone’s life is put in danger they don’t even dare to make one statement of solidarity.” Activists called for supporters of Abou Zeid to turn on their balcony lights at 8 p.m. Sunday in solidarity.

Aoun-Nasrallah understanding in Lebanon at risk as Bassil bends to US pressure
The Arab weekly/May 24/2020
The dispute between the FPM and Hezbollah is largely fuelled by a rift between Bassil, who is seen as the “legitimate” heir of Aoun, with the pro-Iran party.
Friday 22/05/2020
BEIRUT –Criticism of the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement by members of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the party of Lebanese President Michel Aoun, intensified in recent days, an indication that a 2006 understanding between the two groups is in jeopardy.
Reached between Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in February 2006 in the wake of former Prime Minister Rafic Harriri’s assassination, the “understanding of Mar Mikhayel,” defends the ownership of weapons as a “sacred means that is exercised by any group whose land is occupied,” giving cover to Hezbollah’s weapons.
But a dispute between former Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who heads the FPM, and Hezbollah’s leadership, has changed the relationship. The fiercest of criticisms by the FPM came from MP Ziad Aswad, who said during an interview on Thursday that it is impossible to keep on “manning the gun while the people are hungry,” in reference to Hezbollah’s arms. During the interview on the OTV channel, another member of the FPM, Naji Hayek, called for support for political federalism. The FPM-owned OTV also reported about an incident in which Hezbollah members allegedly prevented Lebanese customs officers from confiscating smuggled clothes. Other cases of money being smuggled into Syria were also discussed, putting the focus on the Iran-backed movement’s illicit dealings. The dispute between the FPM and Hezbollah camp is largely fuelled by a rift between Bassil, who is seen as the “legitimate” heir of Aoun, with Hezbollah. Bassil, who is reportedly preparing to seek the presidency, is making an effort to normalise ties with the US, which has threatened to impose sanctions on him due to his proximity to Hezbollah.
Earlier in May, former US Ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman said that the US had cause to impose sanctions on Bassil, noting that he has played a “personal role… in expanding Hezbollah’s grip over Lebanon by giving the organisation Christian cover and serving as a Hezbollah apologist.”
Bassil has made significant inroads with Washington in recent months, reportedly securing the transfer to Washington of Amer Fakhoury, a Lebanese-American former member of the South Lebanon Army militia that collaborated with Israel during its 18 year occupation. That move sparked outrage from Hezbollah’s leadership and supporters, who view Israel as their arch-foe in the region. Bassil has also responded to US pressure to isolate Hezbollah, which the US and other Western countries consider a terrorist organisation that does Iran’s bidding.
In late April, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer declared a total ban on Hezbollah activities in its country and declared the movement a “Shia terrorist organisation.”Hezbollah has so far refused to back Bassil’s efforts to secure the presidency in 2022, when Aoun’s mandate ends.
US Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea also reportedly pressured Basil to end his campaign to remove Lebanese Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh. With Bassil limited in his ability to manoeuvre and as the relationship between Aoun’s party and Hezbollah slowly disintegrates, the future of the alliance that forms the backbone of the Lebanese government is hanging by a thread.

Lebanon’s Berri takes sides with Hezbollah
The Arab weekly/May 24/2020
BEIRUT--Lebanon’s powerful parliament speaker took aim May 22 at the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of President Michel Aoun, in an indication of his support to Iran-backed Hezbollah movement in a dispute between former Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who heads for the FPM, and Hezbollah’s leadership. Berri, who seldom gives public addresses, was speaking to mark the anniversary of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and al-Quds Day, a commemoration initiated by Iran in 1979 that falls on the last Friday of Ramadan.
Berri, also head of the Shia Amal Movement, warned against calling for federalism to resolve the crises, affirming that “neither hunger nor any other misfortune will lead us to give in to any Zionist scheme.”
He urged Lebanese political parties to end their rivalries, which only lead to disturbing public order. “We ought to stop throwing accusations left and right, and start shouldering our responsibilities, for the sake of liberating Lebanon, both from its judicial and its political shackles.”
Though Berri did not name Bassil, he was obviously responding to statements by the FPM’s president, also son-in-law of president Aoun, in which Bassil stressed the necessity of to “financial decentralisation” in Lebanon by separating areas with a Christian majority and those with a Muslim majority.
Made during a speech last week, Bassil’s statements were an attempt to win over members of the Christian community in Lebanon, who have long complained about the practices of Hezbollah, including the smuggling goods into Lebanon to avoid paying customs duties. Berri has previously clashed with Bassil on several occasions, with the FPM’s president once calling him a “thug” in a leaked video that was broadcast by “Al Jadeed” local TV station two years ago. In his May 22 speech, Berri also criticised the cabinet’s performance, calling on the government to take action to help citizens grappling with an economic crisis. “The government is asked to stop biding its time, waiting for what the negotiations with the IMF and donor countries may lead to, and start taking action on the ground, rather than merely drawing plans. Actions speak louder than words,” Berri said. The country’s currency has lost more than half its value since October amid a liquidity shortage that has largely frozen savers out of their deposits. Inflation and unemployment are soaring. Prime Minister Hassan Diab has said there is the risk of a major food crisis and many Lebanese may soon find it hard to afford bread. The government is negotiating with the IMF, aiming to unlock aid based on a recovery plan that details vast losses in the financial system. Lebanon defaulted on its sovereign debt in March for the first time. Diab took office in January with support from Berri, the Iran-backed Shia group Hezbollah, and President Michel Aoun, the Maronite Christian head of state. Sunni politician Saad al-Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Aoun’s Maronite rival Samir Geagea stayed out of his cabinet.The central bank has said it will start providing dollars for food imports as part of “necessary measures” to defend the currency.

President Aoun congratulates the Lebanese on occasion of Al-Fitr Feast and Liberation Day: We are a people who differ in politics but are united to the homeland
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
On the occasion of the blessed holiday of Eid Al-Fitr, the President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun, congratulated the Lebanese in general, especially the Muslims among them, and wished that this feast would bring to them the sublime meanings, religious and human values of hope for a brighter tomorrow, and their aspirations had been fulfilled by a homeland according to their aspirations and sacrifices. "The Eid comes this year at a time when Lebanon is going through a difficult stage that has been aggravated by the Corona pandemic, which spread throughout the world, excluding spaces of convergence and causing more concern after the increasing infection numbers," President Aoun said. President Aoun added: "Today I especially go to every Lebanese whose difficult circumstances and the spread of this epidemic prevented him from celebrating the joy of the feast with family, loved ones and friends, by saying that I share with you the feelings of grief that you feel, whether you are in a stone or in a hospital and are more firm in your hands, and I am confident that the determination that is in you capable of overcoming the harshest conditions.
"Let us make this holiday an occasion to join our hearts and hands, proving to ourselves and to the world that we are a people who deserve life as long as we have the will to overcome its difficulties, whatever kind, and it will not weaken our resolve to move forward towards future horizons that we want for our youth. Our sacrifices are all crowned with success and we deserve a homeland. The dates of convergence in it are the dates of our religious and national holidays that we have always made common" the President continued.
The President concluded, saying "It is not by chance that this blessed Eid Al-Fitr coincides with the holiday of resistance and liberation to confirm this convergence, that the country was made to prevent it, the most precious sacrifice, is our permanent feast. We are a people who differ in politics but unite on the homeland. We are always able to face challenges and triumph over risks to prove that we deserve the land that gave birth to us and which we narrated with the most precious blood of our youth, to preserve its unity and dignity".
Then, President Aoun sent a message to the Presidents of Arab and Islamic countries, congratulating and wishing them and their people prosperity and peace. --- Presidency Press Office

Hariri: We ask God to spare our countries the downfalls of political recklessness, economic instability
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri congratulated Saturday the Lebanese on the occasion of the Fitr Eid, saying via Twitter: “We rejoice in the arrival of the Fitr holiday, despite the worsening economic, financial and daily living crises, and the harsh conditions facing the Lebanese and Arabs due to the Corona epidemic. It is the joy of commitment to one of the pillars of the true religion that rises above the sorrows and troubles, and the joy of contributing to charity and lifting the injustice off the burdened and underprivileged….We ask the Lord Almighty to accept the fasting of believers and to render the times of the Lebanese, Muslims and Arabs joyful, to unify their word and lift off the scourge of the epidemic, and spare our countries the downfalls of political unruliness and economic shakiness."

Berri receives congratulatory calls on Fitr Eid, apologizes for not welcoming well-wishers
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
House Speaker, Nabih Berri, received on Saturday several congratulatory calls and cables on the occasion of Eid El-Fitr, most prominently from the President of the Republic Michel Aoun; former President Amin Gemayel; Prime Minister Hassan Diab; former heads of government, Saad Hariri, Najib Mikati and Tammam Salam; Egyptian Parliament Speaker Ali Abdel Aal; Iraqi Head of Parliament Mohammed Al-Halbousi; Yemeni House Speaker Yahya Ali Al-Raei; President of the National Assembly in Burkina Faso Al-Hassan Blaskendi; Acting Chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council Ahmed Bahr; former Iraqi Vice President Iyad Allawi; and former Kuwaiti Prime Minister Nasser Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Bin Mubarak Al-Sabah.Speaker Berri also received several calls and cables from various cabinet ministers, current and former deputies, ambassadors, members of the diplomatic and consular corps accredited in Lebanon, spiritual figures, and security and military leaders. Meanwhile, the House Speaker’s Press Office issued a statement in which it expressed House Speaker Berri’s apology for not receiving well-wishing visitors on the Fitr Eid occasion, while hoping that the Lord Almighty will bless the Lebanese, Arabs and Muslims with all abundance, peace of mind and stability.

Lebanon’s Speaker Criticizes Govt and FPM, Warns Against Federalism
Beirut- Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
Lebanon’s Speaker Nabih Berri on Friday criticized the cabinet’s performance, calling on it to take action to help citizens grappling with an economic crisis.
"The government is asked to stop biding its time, waiting for what the negotiations with the IMF and donor countries may lead to, and start taking action on the ground, rather than merely drawing plans. Actions speak louder than words," Berri said. In a speech to mark the Resistance and Liberation Day, Jerusalem Day, and Eid al-Fitr, Berri slammed the Free Patriotic Movement as he tackled failure to resolve the electricity dossier. The Speaker stressed the need to "free" the energy sector from the mentality of regional, sectarian and federal quotas by appointing a new "clean-handed" board of directors. Also, Berri warned against calling for federalism to resolve the crises, affirming that "neither hunger nor any other misfortune will lead us to give in to any Zionist scheme." He urged the Lebanese to end their political rivalries, which only lead to disturbing public order. “We ought to stop throwing accusations left and right, and start shouldering our responsibilities, for the sake of liberating Lebanon, both from its judicial and its political shackles."Turning to the present economic circumstances prevailing over the country, Berri deemed it "inconceivable that food and health security, and the fruit of the Lebanese people's lifelong labor, should be the victim of incorrect banking policy. From where we stand, we thus reiterate that citizens' deposits are sacred." Lebanon is currently one of the most indebted countries in the world while its pound has plummeted from 1,507 to more than 4,000 to the dollar on the parallel market in recent weeks, and inflation has soared. Last month, the Lebanese government approved an economic reform plan to save the country from its grave crisis and it requested aid from the International Monetary Fund to help the nation find a way out of a dire financial crisis based on its five-year rescue plan. Also on Friday, Berri chaired a meeting of the Parliament Bureau and set next Thursday as a date for the forthcoming general parliamentary session to discuss draft laws and law proposals on its agenda.Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the session should discuss draft laws concerning general amnesty, the draft law to lift banking secrecy, and a proposal presented by the government to receive LL1200 billion to be allocated for those affected by the COVID-19, in addition to a draft law organizing money transfers to outside Lebanon.

Greenpeace: Sewage in the sea causes more serious diseases than Corona
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
In an issued statement by Greenpeace on Saturday, it criticized the government's decision to open swimming pools on the pretext that chlorine does not transmit infection; while on the other hand, the government has prevented beaches from opening due to pollution from sewage flowing into the sea which may increase the possibility of spreading corona virus. In this connection, Middle East and North Africa Greenpeace Director, Zeina El-Hajj, explained that "sewage discharges in the sea are the basis of the problem, which must be addressed quickly…The polluted water causes many other problems, and more serious diseases than corona which may remain active for longer periods, like salmonella."

Abou al-Hassan to the government: To stop the redundant literature
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
MP Hadi Abou al-Hassan urged the government to abstain from superfluous chattering, deeming the achievements mentioned as “unrealistic”. Speaking in an interview with "Voice of All Lebanon" Radio Station this morning, Abou al-Hassan considered that "the electricity file is thorny, but it is the number one item on the path to reform.""Give us the electricity and the border-crossings issue," he underlined, addressing the cabinet. The MP expressed concern towards the continuing catastrophe that Lebanon is going through in terms of unemployment and poor living conditions, which threatens of an “empty-stomach revolution" he warned. "If the International Monetary Fund is not persuaded by the required reforms within the framework of a clear plan, there will be no external assistance for Lebanon, and the floating of the lira, in the event of its occurrence, will be disastrous and the country will enter into chaos," cautioned Abou al-Hassan. Meanwhile, the MP indicated that the Progressive Socialist Party is currently in a moment of convergence with several sides within the organization of differences and maintaining reconciliation in the Mountain region, noting that the meeting between former MP Walid Jumblatt and the President of the Republic was in this context.

Strong Republic Deputies Okais, Saad submit law proposals on medication, pretrial detention
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
Members of the “Strong Republic” Parliamentary Bloc, MPs George Okais and Fadi Saad, submitted Saturday a law proposal that aims to establish the National Drug Authority, which, according to the proposal, will ensure good governance and supervision of the process of importing, producing, and distributing medicine and medical supplies, based on a participatory process between the professional syndicates, such as the Pharmacists and Doctors’ Syndicates, and the Ministry of Public Health. As for the second project law submitted by MPs Okais and Saad, which was also signed by Deputies Wehbe Qatisha, Majed Eddie Abi al-Lamaa and Jean Talouzian, it aims to grant compensation to individuals who are held in pre-trial detention under certain conditions. The proposal is inspired by a similar French law that obliges the state to compensate for those unlawfully held in detention.

Lebanon to recieve new repatriation flights for stranded nationals
NNA/Saturday 23 May 2020
Seven MEA flights will arrive to Lebanon this Saturday afternoon, carrying more Lebanese expatriates wishing to return from abroad, as the part of the evacuation plan set by the Lebanese government to address the coronavirus pandemic. A flight from Larnaca is expected to land at 12:00 pm, followed by another from Doha (14:30), another from Paris (18:00), another from Moscow (20:30). Three more flights will follow, landing in Beirut after midnight, one coming from Abidjian and the other from London and Maputo in Mozambique.
The Paris and London flights will be carrying passengers on transit from the United States, Canada and South America. PCR testing will be conducted, and the necessary protective measures will be taken, as per the instructions of the Ministry of Public Health.

Coronavirus deals heavy blow to Lebanon's bus drivers, now unable to turn a profit
Abby Sewell, Al Arabiya English/Saturday 23 May 2020
For 15 years, Khaled Fadous has driven a rented taxi van between Lebanon’s capital Beirut and Tripoli in north. Coronavirus put him out of work temporarily, but now, he says he won’t be going back to work, given the requirement that vans can only run half full, meaning he no longer makes a profit.
“It’s better to sit at home, because you won’t cover your expenses,” Fadous said. “What are you going to be able to put away?” he said. “You need 30,000 [Lebanese lira] in fuel going and coming, and the rent of the van is 40,000.” At the current exchange rate, which has suffered significantly due to rising inflation, 30,000 lira is around $7.
For two months, the vans and buses that normally provide cheap transportation from Beirut to other areas of the country and between different neighborhoods within the city were ordered to stop running amid lockdown measures to slow the spread of COVID-19.
Now, as the country gradually reopens, the buses and vans have been permitted to start running again at reduced capacity, but many of the drivers are staying home, saying that the new regulations make it impossible to break even, while others are pushing the rules by continuing to crowd passengers in.
For Fadous, a driver from the impoverished town of Wadi Khaled near Lebanon’s border with Syria, and others who rent their vehicles driving is no longer profitable.
“The van takes 14 riders, and how do we work? We pick people up and drop them off, pick up and drop off. In normal days, yes, there’s a profit,” he told Al Arabiya English. “But now you can only take seven riders, and how much does each one pay? From Beirut to Tripoli maybe 4,000-5,000 Lebanese lira,” the equivalent of $1 or $1.25 at the current street exchange rate.
Since the country’s civil war, Lebanon has not had an organized, publicly funded transportation system. Instead, an informal system has grown to fill the gap, with a patchwork of private operators. Most drivers work as independent contractors without a fixed salary.
At Cola, an informal bus station in Beirut that sends buses and vans to outlying areas of Lebanon, some drivers were back to work earlier in the week, but the number of drivers and riders remained small. While most of the drivers wore masks, only about half of the passengers did, and while most of the vans appeared to be adhering to the 50 percent capacity rule, some did not.
Mustafa Fakhereddine, who drives from Cola to the town of Naameh in south Lebanon, was back to work. He complained that in addition to only being able to drive half-full, the drivers are now limited to working three days a week because of new regulations adopted during the lockdown that allow even and odd-numbered license plates to drive only on specific days.
Still, since he owns his own van and doesn’t have to pay rent, Fakhereddine said he will keep driving for now. “The ones who are renting, they won’t be able to make money at all,” he said. “Most of them gave the cars back to their owners and left.”Iman Shaar, who lives in the town of Aley in the mountains and commutes to her job as a filing clerk at a hospital in Beirut, said she had been driving to work for the past two months, but prefers to take the bus due to the expense of car maintenance and repairs and because “I’m not courageous in driving.”
She took the bus Tuesday for the first time since the lockdown began on March 15, to find that the price of her trip had increased from 2,000 lira to 3,000 and she now had to wait longer to find a ride.
“The bus came, but I had to wait half an hour,” she said.
As for the coronavirus, Shaar said she’s not worried about it. She was wearing a mask, but only for the benefit of other passengers, she said: “It’s to respect other people, only…for people not to be afraid of me.”
Tammam Nakkash, a transport systems expert and founding partner of TEAM International, a Beirut-based engineering and management consulting company, told Al Arabiya English, “Worldwide, mass transportation has been hit very hard by COVID-19 because of the requirement of distancing.”
But he noted countries with formal public transportation systems had been able to adjust to the COVID-19 threat by changing schedules to reduce crowding putting up protective barriers to protect travelers.
“In Lebanon, it’s a quite different situation, because we don’t have organized transportation,” he said. “…The whole thing is informal, and now you cannot be formal in an informal situation.”The idea of social distancing on a van or shared taxi, Nakkash, said, is “ridiculous.”
Knock-on effects
Chadi Faraj, founder of the Rider’s Rights NGO, which has launched a campaign to help drivers who lost their livelihoods, said he believed bus and van drivers should have been considered essential workers like healthcare or grocery store workers. The government forced the buses to stop running during the lockdown, as they weren’t deemed essential workers.
As a result, healthcare workers and others depending on mass transit were harmed, as they were forced, in some cases, to turn to expensive taxis to get to their jobs. “The transportation system, even if it were running less frequently, is essential in any community or city,” he said. Rather than shutting down the system altogether, Faraj said, the government and municipalities could have helped with measures like sanitizing the vehicles before and after trips.
There have been some – largely unsuccessful – attempts to create a formalized public transport system in Lebanon. The latest, the planned $300 million World Bank-funded Beirut Rapid Transit project, aims to build dedicated bus lanes on the highway between Beirut and its northern suburbs and plans for a fleet of 120 buses to run on the line, as well as 250 “feeder buses” running between main stations and outlying areas. While the coronavirus crisis has made people around the world more wary of public transportation, Nakkash said he does not think the pandemic will put a stop to the rapid transit project.
“We are starting from nothing,” he said. If anything, he said, the epidemic highlighted the need for a regulated transport system. “It’s a pro rather than a con against public transport.”
Commuters travelling in a taxi look at the remains of burned tires during ongoing anti-government protests in Jal el-Dib, Lebanon November 13, 2019. (Reuters)
Commuters travelling in a taxi look at the remains of burned tires during ongoing anti-government protests in Jal el-Dib, Lebanon November 13, 2019. (Reuters)
Meanwhile, for the drivers in the current system, Fadous, who was put out of work even before the coronavirus because of protests and accompanying road closures, said, “If the situation stays like this, we’re all going to be sleeping on the streets.”Like many of the out-of-work drivers, he got assistance of 400,000 lira from the government last month, but it didn’t go far.
The authorities, he said, should “give us an alternative – if they don’t want the vans to go, give us something else, give us work, give us help, give us anything. They haven’t left us any door open.”

Lebanon to finally implement official capital controls
Georgi Azar/Annahar/May 23/2020
Any fresh dollars, however, can still be used freely to withdraw or transfer abroad.
BEIRUT: Lebanon is set to pass the long awaited capital controls law months after banks began limiting both withdrawals and transfers abroad. The piece of legislation came to fruition after the Free Patriotic Movement and Amal Movement agreed on a draft law. The draft law may be approved during a legislative session on Thursday after consultations with the International Monetary Fund over the course of next week.Banks started implementing de facto capital controls over six months ago as nationwide political unrest coincided with a loss of confidence in the sector.Depositors flocked to their banks in attempt to withdraw their savings only to be rebuffed. “It’s great that they’re passing this law, finally, but the question remains why it took more than 6 months ... and what happens to people, especially PEPs, who were capriciously allowed to exit through “Super-Wasta” prior to passing this law? Did they get away with it,” financial expert Dan Azzi told Annahar. Barring any amendments, the law will limit all transfers abroad to medical or education expenses, as well as payments to settle rent. It will also include exceptions for any taxes or mandatory payments by foreign authorities, according to copies obtained by Annahar.
Transfers to secure “raw materials or any medical, technological or industrial equipment” will also be exempt. According to the latest draft, transfers will be capped at $50,000 per year per individual. Any fresh dollars, however, can still be used freely to withdraw or transfer abroad.

From The Achieve/When Is The Liberation?
By: General Michel Aoun/France May 27/2000
(Translated by: Elias Bejjani)
Initially we were very happy when Israel confirmed its withdrawal date from South Lebanon. Our happiness stemmed from the fact that one of the two occupiers (Israel Syria) has decided to leave our country. Accordingly we called on the Lebanese people to share with us the joy of this imminent Israeli withdrawal event. The so- called Beirut government was extremely worried and considered the Israeli confirmed withdrawal plan a trap. Its officials even tagged all those Lebanese that welcomed the withdrawal plan as Israeli agents.
This puppet government has crossed the Israeli withdrawal event boundaries and turned it into a liberation festivity for south Lebanon. It has also superseded all the actual standards and concepts of liberation and forged each and every one of them. Its acts are treacherous, contradictory and inconsistent in nature. Its officials have adopted this mocking style as a governing pattern, and have been justifying contradicting stances simultaneously. They went too far with this circus-like behaviour revolving around advocating for their subservience and treason. We wonder if South Lebanon has actually returned back to Lebanon, and if so under what sovereignty it is now to justify the joyful drum beating and jubilation celebrations?
What is there for the Lebanese regime and its deceitful society to be proud of, when the Israeli withdrawal had forced thousands of innocent Lebanese citizens to flee out side the country’s borders? Why were the Southern women scared and the mothers escaped with their children to the Israeli camps? Is it not because of the threatening speeches’ uttered towards the Southern residents promising and voicing revenge and cold blood murder? This blood shedding savage policy has been hailed and adopted by the regime because an apparent inability to assume its security and judiciary responsibilities.
Under what jurisdiction the head of the state has uttered rhetoric empty assurances to his scared fleeing people and how could he ask them to return to their land and homes? Who would trust his reassurances when he personally has no say in any of the state’s affaires, and when his official role has been characterized by an on going shameful phenomenon of abandoning responsibilities and breaking oaths?
Where is the judiciary?
Where are the Security Forces?
Where is the nation’s army?
If all these three institutions were not prepared for such critical circumstances, then why they have been in existence?
Have these institutions made vehicles for imposing the state’s sovereignty and its Uni-thinking style on universities, to oppress freedoms and muffle free thinking?
What delight is in the triumph liberation festivities when the people of the liberated land have been forced by the liberators to flee the country fearing for their lives? The Southern people have been fighting courageously for the last 25 years, refusing to abandon the land they worship and the identity they honor. The successive Lebanese governments have abandoned them for quarter a century and left them isolated encountering unbearable circumstances. They are now paying the price of the occupier’s withdrawal in which they had no say as they have paid previously the price of the occupation that was forced on them.
This carton-like Lebanese state is required morally and legally to make public any initiative its successive governments has taken during the last twenty five years to rescue the Southern residents and these residents declined to accept. Then, and only then it can start prosecuting them and not before that. The Beirut regime is making the residents of the liberated territories, who are actually the victims, legally accountable for the occupation. The heroic Southern residents who resisted the occupation and refused to leave their land are now the target of reprisal and savage official campaign spearheaded by officials and politicians who were originally responsible for the occupation of the Southern region and for the pain, destruction, poverty, displacement, loses and sufferings of all the Lebanese people since 1975. The free world countries and UN should not allow this judicial mockery to be inflict on our innocent patriotic southern people.
To be joyful because Israeli has left our land, or forced to do so, is the norm, but to celebrate liberation at this time, is a premature act. Why? Because territories freed from the Israeli occupier have joined a country whose sovereignty is fully confiscated by another occupier, the Syrian. Meanwhile, festivities for liberation should take place only when all foreign occupying forces leave, and when the country reclaims its independence, sovereignty, freedom and its free decision making process. Then, and only then, under the umbrella of a free and independent judiciary the citizens who broke the nation’s law will face fair trials in accordance to law and principles of justice. In the meantime what we are now witnessing in occupied Lebanon is a biased, selective, unfair, revenges, double standard and politicized judiciary.
Till the day of actual liberation becomes a reality, we refuse to participate in festivities of freezing and leave its ecstasy for the drug addicts.
Long Live Free Lebanon
France May 27/2000

Twenty years after the IDF left Lebanon, the memories are flooding back
Anna Ahronheim/Jerusalem Post/May 23/2020
جيرازالم بوست/ ذكريا بعد بعد 20 عاماً على مغادرة الجيش الإسرائيلي لبنان
Military Affairs: The nameless, forgotten war claimed the lives of hundreds of soldiers and left thousands more with traumatic mental scars, which for many are only now being treated.
Two decades after the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, the forgotten, nameless war has once again grabbed headlines.
Men who served there, either with the IDF or the South Lebanon Army (SLA), are opening up old wounds buried deep inside and are finally telling their stories, stories of bravery, youthfulness, fear and tragedy. For the thousands of soldiers who spent time in Lebanon during Israel’s 15-year presence from 1985 to 2000, the memories are still fresh.
Lt.-Col. (res.) Shay Shemesh served for several years, both as a soldier and as an officer, in the security zone in southern Lebanon until the withdrawal.
“When we returned to Israel for furloughs, we felt a little bit like aliens. After spending 64 days in an outpost deep inside Lebanon, where all I saw were troops, you come home and you see that life continues and no one wants to kill you,” he recalled. “You feel like you didn’t come from another country but from another planet. It got to such a point that when I got home, I just wanted to return to Lebanon because I didn’t feel like I belonged.”
Shemesh, who served as a battalion commander and deputy brigade commander in the Kfir Brigade, said it was a normal feeling for many soldiers. Because, while combat soldiers were told what to expect in Lebanon and how to prepare for their deployment there, it was different when they returned to Israel.
“I would tell my troops all the time to look behind them, to look and see the communities of the north, to Kiryat Shmona, the moshavim and kibbutzim. And then, to look ahead and see Hezbollah. It was that simple and clear and everyone understood that,” he recounted on a webinar held by Alma Research and Education Center, an organization that gives briefings on Israel’s security challenges on the northern border. “At the entrance to every outpost there was a sign that read ‘for the security of the citizens of Israel.’”
Brig.-Gen. Alon Friedman, former chief of staff of the Northern Command, enlisted in the IDF’s Golani Brigade in 1982 and spent years in Lebanon, serving there as a soldier, officer and as brigade commander before the withdrawal.
“I found myself as a very young soldier already inside Lebanon. I grew up fighting in Lebanon, defending the border of Israel,” Friedman said on the webinar.
According to him, the mission was very clear to both soldiers and commanders deployed across the border. “The only way to defend Israel from terrorist attacks was to be in Lebanon and not let anyone close to the border. You know that a few meters from the border are families and children who are sleeping, and we have to be there to protect them.”
IDF TROOPS first entered Lebanon in 1978 to root out Palestinian terrorists. While the Israeli military withdrew from most of the country in 1985, it kept control of a 1,000-sq.km. security zone 20 km. deep, in order to prevent terrorist attacks which had plagued the civilians of the North in the ’70s and ’80s.
Shemesh was a commander of the Taybeh outpost in the Lebanon security zone in the mid-1990s until the withdrawal. He explained that from 1995 until the withdrawal on May 24, 2000, the IDF had gone from being on the offensive to being on the defensive.
“At first we went on the offensive. There were more foot patrols and we always tried to get to where the enemy was. We felt more secure, we would even go out with jeeps that weren’t armored or that were semi-armored. And our outposts weren’t totally armored either. Of course, there was a bomb shelter, but otherwise it was like any other military outpost,” said Shemesh.
But as time rolled on, toward the end of the 1990s, everything changed.
“We went from one event to the next event... from the mortar that fell or the anti-tank missile fired at us. We became more protective, more defensive. We went out less. The outposts all became one big protective zone, everything turned into one big bunker,” he recalled. “We almost never lifted our heads out of our outposts; we would use periscopes or long-range cameras because of the fear of mortars and anti-tank missiles.”
Shemesh told the audience that during his last command post in Lebanon, outside the southern Lebanese village of Taybeh, “we would sometimes get between 100 and 150 mortars and rockets fired at us within 24 hours. We never left our bunkers.”
The commander of the IDF’s Kfir Brigade, Col. Eran Oliel, told The Jerusalem Post that his time at outposts along the Litani River made him realize how important it was to always be ready for the enemy.
“There could be months of quiet and then: Boom! Something would happen,” he said. “I always had to believe that an attack could happen at any moment. Whenever the enemy wanted, they could attack.”
Like Shemesh, Oliel remembered one incident where Hezbollah kept firing mortar rounds at his outpost for 45 minutes.
“I remember the sounds of the mortars striking the roof. There were only two times that we had time to fire back, and there were other troops still outside making sure that Hezbollah operatives would not be able to overrun the outpost. It was a daily occurrence for many troops.”
One thing Oliel always spent time thinking about was an attack by Hezbollah.
“Every night we were warned about Hezbollah. In those days we didn’t have cellphones, we were completely cut off. I remember that feeling,” he said, as we sat in his office at a base in southern Israel. “And in those days our capabilities as an army were not as good as what we have now. I would take a post in the winter, and the fog would roll in and I wouldn’t be able to see anything. But we knew that fog was the best time for Hezbollah to attack us.”
THOSE LAST few years saw officers like Shemesh do everything they could in order not to lose any soldiers.
“You are always being fired upon and you are always worried. But you can’t see the enemy, and it wasn’t like that before. We just never saw the enemy, and we were doing everything possible to not lose any soldiers. That was the big change; we lost the initiative and went from offensive to defensive.”
During his time in Lebanon, Friedman lost 25 soldiers and commanders. He also lost many good friends, such as the commander of the IDF liaison unit to south Lebanon, Brig.-Gen. Erez Gerstein.
“To lose people – each one of them is an entire world – is very difficult, and you take every death personally. On the other hand, it encourages you very much to keep on going and to continue, because you know they fell to defend our country, our people. And someone needs to continue the mission. And when someone fell, we felt like they ordered us to keep going,” he said.
Though official numbers put IDF casualties at 256, with roughly two dozen soldiers killed per year, the unofficial number stands at 675. That number does not include those who were wounded during their time in Lebanon, and, especially, it does not take into account all those who came back with psychological wounds.
“There are people that have been dealing with these issues for years, and there are others where it only came out years later,” Shemesh said. “Now that the country is marking 20 years since the withdrawal, a lot of people are opening up.”
He told the webinar audience that toward the end of Israel’s time in Lebanon, troops were ordered by Col. Shmuel Zakai – who at the time served as commander of the Golani Brigade – not to cry at the funerals of their comrades, in order to show the strength of the IDF.
“He said if you want to cry, cry afterward and alone. During the funerals we had to be strong and not cry,” said Shemesh.
But, he said, the soldiers in Lebanon didn’t fully understand the depth that the pictures of the funerals and wounded soldiers had on the Israeli public. “People didn’t want any more wounded... they didn’t want any more funerals,” he said.
With the number of troops killed in Lebanon increasing, the Four Mothers protest movement was founded in 1997 by four civilian mothers living in northern Israel. Their goal was bringing their boys out of Lebanon.
The movement had a great influence on Israeli public opinion. It was established following the 1997 Israeli helicopter disaster in which 73 soldiers heading to Lebanon were killed after two helicopters carrying troops into the security zone collided.
“I was in the commander’s course when the tragedy happened,” Oliel said. “I remember the names of all the 73 soldiers being read on the radio. Seventy-three soldiers who were heading to Lebanon were all killed at once.”
Two years later, Gerstein was killed by a roadside bomb along with two other soldiers and Israel Radio correspondent Ilan Roeh.
The Four Mother’s movement without a doubt caused a seismic shift in Israel’s outlook on the IDF’s raison d’être in Lebanon.
Even Shemesh’s mother was part of the movement, and he himself didn’t look at it as something political. “It was mothers who wanted to protect their sons. And that’s the most natural thing there is.”
FIFTEEN YEARS after the first IDF convoy entered Lebanon, under intense public pressure, prime minister and defense minister Ehud Barak made the decision that Israel would unilaterally withdraw from the security zone.
“In one night they told us we were withdrawing from Lebanon,” Shemesh recalled. “The night of the withdrawal was a celebration because we completed our mission, but at the same time I couldn’t explain to my troops why we were withdrawing. In one night they told us we were going – before we beat the enemy and before peace was achieved.”
It was a decision that would surprise IDF soldiers and leave a feeling of betrayal among troops of the SLA who – for years – had fought shoulder to shoulder with Israeli soldiers against Hezbollah, suffering considerably higher casualties than Israel.
The SLA was an outgrowth of the predominantly Christian Army of Free Lebanon splinter group, which had broken from the Lebanese Armed Forces following the onset of the civil war in 1975. With some 2,500 troops, the SLA was Israel’s key ally in south Lebanon.
Claude Ibrahim, a former officer in the SLA, who also took part in the Alma webinar, said that the people of southern Lebanon who had fled from internal Lebanese conflict to the security zone “really believed in Israel. People believed the words of senior IDF officers like it was the word of God.”
But, Ibrahim said, no one thought the withdrawal would actually take place. There was always talk of a withdrawal, “but no one took it seriously... no one believed that Israel would just pick up and leave.”
As May 23 drew closer, senior SLA officers had a meeting with their Israeli counterparts who told them that the time had come, Israel would be withdrawing.
“They told them they would be alone,” he said. “They told them that there wouldn’t be any help, not financial, not health, no arms. You have to deal with what you have. Not even the border would be open. You can decide if you want to stay and fight or to come to Israel.”
According to him, all SLA officers said they wanted to stay and fight, but then started to think and feel that it wouldn’t be like 1976 where SLA had the support of the country. Things had changed in Lebanon over the years; the civil war had ended, and Syria was occupying the country.
“After the Syrians occupied Lebanon, we became the enemy of the country. Not only the enemy of Hezbollah but the enemy of Lebanon. When talk of the withdrawal became real, we started to ask ourselves who was our main enemy? Hezbollah? The Lebanese Armed Forces? Israel isn’t supporting us,” said Ibrahim.
According to Ibrahim, toward the end of Israel’s time in the security zone, SLA soldiers “couldn’t even fire one bullet” against Hezbollah without the permission of the IDF. “They would be told to ‘watch and report,’ nothing more.”
He said that the time before the withdrawal was also really tough psychologically. “People started getting enlisted into groups against their families.... Hezbollah already had a really strong presence, and they turned us into traitors.”
With the dangers to their families increasing, some 7,000 family members of SLA soldiers and officers fled into Israel, which was expecting only some 450-600 individuals to come.
And while they have been given citizenship, many former SLA fighters who are now between 54 and 65 years old do not speak Hebrew, and with no salary or pension, many have had trouble keeping a roof over their heads. Since 2000, thousands have left Israel for third countries and only 3,000 remain.
“These are men who didn’t serve for just two years; they served for 15-25 years. IDF soldiers who served in Lebanon and came out with traumas, at least they returned home. They returned to their mothers, their girlfriends or their wives. They returned to a warm and loving environment,” Ibrahim said.
Meanwhile, he continued, “after years of serving alongside the IDF, even wearing their uniforms, in one day SLA fighters lost their homes, their families, land, respect and their pride. They lost all of that and left for Israel.”
Jonathan Elkhoury, whose father fought in the SLA, fled to Israel when he was nine years old.
“A few days before the withdrawal, Nasrallah said that SLA soldiers have three options: flee with the enemy to their country, surrender, or be butchered while hugging their mothers. My father fled to Israel the day Israel left, and my mother, brother and I stayed a year and a half under Hezbollah,” he said. “When my father fled, we had to burn everything – his pictures, his uniform, his documents – and we were left with only one photo.”
For the Israelis who served in south Lebanon, many felt like they were running away and hadn’t fulfilled the mission they were sent to accomplish.
For Shemesh, it was a feeling of emotional turmoil when he took that last step from Lebanon into Israel.
“On the one hand it was a feeling of relief because I left Lebanon, I was safe, but on the other hand it was one of failure because I didn’t beat the enemy,” he told the Post. “When the withdrawal happened, it was a feeling of closure, but I felt like I didn’t fulfill my mission, we missed our goal.”
The withdrawal was poorly carried out, contended Shemesh, with soldiers “always looking back to see that no one was firing on us. I felt like we were running away.”
“It wasn’t right what happened there. When we were there, we always told our soldiers that we were protecting our citizens from Hezbollah, and we would leave only when we have peace or when we conquer the enemy. None of that happened. What did we do until now? For what?”
The withdrawal from Lebanon, Shemesh said, sent a message to other terrorist groups – both in Gaza and the West Bank – that this is how you beat the IDF: not through military operations or diplomacy but by wearing them down until they withdraw.
“We lost our deterrence,” he told the Post. And, while in the next war – and there will be one – “we will beat Hezbollah, the price will be high.”

Twenty years out of Lebanon: The war with no name that would never end
Arieh O' Sullivan/Jerusalem Post/May 23/2020
جيرازالم بوست/ بعد 20 سنة على الخروج من لبنان..حرب لا اسم لها ولن تنتهي أبداً
Like the War of Attrition, the conflict in Lebanon settled in Israeli consciousness.
It was 3 a.m., May 24, 2000. You could hear the distinct rattle of the tanks’ treads approaching in the bible-black night. The earth rumbled. Soldiers swung open the heavy iron Fatima Gate, through which so many thousands of Israeli troops have poured into Lebanon over the past two decades. And suddenly history was being made as the armored column rolled into view and the last of the Israeli soldiers left Lebanon.
They gazed down from their monstrous battle taxis, unshaven and covered in dust from the wildest night ride of their lives, and didn’t even try to hold back their elation. Once through the breech, many shouted, even yelped for joy. Some swapped high-fives, others hugged. One group unfurled the Israeli flag and smiled for the hoard of photographers.
There was no evidence of the feared humiliation of exiting the security zone with their tails between their legs. Only relief that the IDF had managed to stage this complicated retreat under fire without even one soldier getting so much as a scratch.
“I cried the whole way because I was so moved by the situation. Every one of us looked death in the eyes and none of us wanted to die. I never told my parents about it, so they wouldn’t worry,” said St.-Sgt. Gilad Hadad.
I wrote this that night, and now – looking at the battered reporter’s notebooks 20 years later, after burying in my mind all those days and nights and countless stories written during the decades of Israel’s war in Lebanon – it’s all coming back. And not just for me but for many Israeli men, particularly those in their 40s and 50s who lived it (see box).
The IDF presence in Lebanon had become such a given in the national conscience over the 1980s and ’90s that likely none of the soldiers withdrawing that night ever envisioned that when they were drafted a year and a half, two years before that, they’d shut the door on one of the most divisive chapters of Israel’s history.
In the summer of 1982, I was a 21-year-old soldier in an NCO course and was dispatched to Beirut where we mopped up the southern neighborhoods. After Christian leader and president-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, our brigade led the charge into West Beirut, taking over one of the PLO headquarters as the Jewish state completely conquered the capital of an Arab state.
Eventually, I became a journalist, and the IDF withdrew to the south in 1985 and set up a security zone to prevent the PLO and later the Shi’ite Hezbollah from attacking Israel. It established a 2,500-strong militia called the South Lebanon Army as proxies, arming them and setting them up in outposts.
But in a march of follies, the SLA couldn’t or wouldn’t do the job, and the IDF launched periodic operations against the Palestinians and Hezbollah – Operations Accountability, Grapes of Wrath. The IDF eventually set up a dozen outposts in the security zone, whose names would be etched in IDF lore: Rehan, Aishiya, Dla’at, Beaufort, Karkom, Rotem and more. It created the Egoz unit to wage a tough battle of ambushes against a well-respected, growing, Iranian-backed Hezbollah army.
Like the War of Attrition, this conflict settled in Israeli consciousness, and the public was reminded of it and the battles only when the IDF lost and casualties mounted, or when Katyushas were fired.
In late 1996 I spent some time with Golani soldiers at the infamous outpost at Beaufort, a well-preserved Crusader castle overlooking the Litani River. A young lieutenant, Alon Babayan, looked out at his platoon and warned the soldiers to keep their helmets on.
“Every mother of these guys is expecting me to return their son healthy and in one piece. The responsibility is heavy. Just thinking about is hard. But we want to kill terrorists. That’s our job and that’s why we are here. We came here to kill,” the 21-year-old platoon commander said.
This, like other outposts, was placed on a highly visible peak to serve as a deterrent. But by this time the hilltop bunkers and trenches were nothing more than targets. Even to go to the toilet, soldiers had to don their flak vests and helmets. It was a place where every hour outside, a man found himself confined in body armor.
“You can’t know what it’s like, man. At any moment a [mortar] round can hit this outpost. You can go crazy,” said Ra’anan Hartman, a bespectacled 20-year-old radio operator who spent many months on the front.
“If we weren’t here, then we would be in Kiryat Shmona and Hezbollah would be hitting civilians. There is nothing imperialistic about our presence here,” asserted Sgt. Gil Sharabi.
The IDF invested hundreds of millions of shekels fortifying the outposts. All barracks, dining rooms, kitchens, showers and latrines were buried under concrete and iron.
The soldiers were chomping at the bit. But Hezbollah didn’t fight fair. Adopting classic guerrilla tactics, Hezbollah located the IDF weak points – they were the supply convoys, the umbilical cords to the combat troops. Just one foot across the border and you were deep inside Lebanon. Half the casualties in Lebanon were from roadside charges while patrolling or moving in convoys.
The IDF paved alternative, less exposed routes across the security zone. Bulldozers cleared away all large boulders 20 meters from the sides of roads and set up cement walls at sensitive sites to block Sagger missiles. Between the walls, drivers simply sped up.
Every time a convoy moved, it required a military operation of minute detail. Soldiers were sent from their outposts to guard suspected ambush sites. The 20-kilometer ride to Beaufort Castle became a 50-minute roller coaster. Every civilian was suspected of being a Hezbollah gunman, every car a potential suicide bomb.
Just after this, in early 1997, the IDF decided to start ferrying in troops by helicopter, a move that proved to be devastatingly tragic. On February 4 of that year, two transport helicopters collided above She’ar Yashuv, killing 73 servicemen aboard.
As a military reporter I got the news early, and as the young soldier in the IDF Spokesman’s Unit read out the names to me, I checked off nine Golani soldiers I’d recently interviewed in Beaufort, including the young lieutenant Babayan.
I collected the photos I’d taken of him and his troops and paid a shiva call to the family in Jerusalem. I told them how sorry I was for his death, and shared with them the article I wrote, how I’d made him and his soldiers heroes.
Over 112 soldiers died in 1997. In the fall of 1998 the IDF suffered a wave of defeats, as Hezbollah found a chink in its armor, and a squad of the IDF’s top commandos were wiped out. When Shaul Mofaz took over as chief of staff that year, the tactics changed.
Because of casualties and Israel’s increasing hypersensitivity to casualties, he admitted to military reporters that he ordered reduced “initiated actions,” a euphemism for going out and hunting down Hezbollah gunmen, and instead increasing use of warplanes and high technologies.
“If I can kill the terrorists from afar, or if I know how to do it by other methods without endangering soldiers, then I should do it,” Mofaz said. “Don’t judge the amount, but the results.”
The results were that the IDF had been able to extract a heavier toll from Hezbollah, about 45 terrorists a year.
But the IDF also knew that without proving its might from time to time, it could turn into a paper tiger in the eyes of the enemy.
ONE NIGHT, in February 1999, I got a beep about 2 a.m. to inform me that three officers, including the head of a paratrooper reconnaissance unit, had been killed in a firefight with Hezbollah guerrillas up in Lebanon. By 5:30 a.m. I was on the road, headed north.
It was to be one of those days where you keep coming to forks and have to make decisions. It started with the decision to leave home or not. I decided to head to Tel Aviv. Once there I had to decide whether to head north.
The army hadn’t decided if there would be a press conference, but I could see that with three officers dead and not one dead Hezbollah gunman to account for, the army had a lot of explaining to do.
I couldn’t catch a ride since the other military reporters, who formed a small community then, lived north of Tel Aviv and were just then leaving. So I caught a taxi to meet a bus. The bus was filled with soldiers heading to the North, Golan, Lebanon.
I was one of the few people in the country who knew what was happening in Lebanon, because the military censor had prevented the reporting of it until the families were notified.
I spoke to a young lieutenant who was headed back up to his platoon in Lebanon and told him. He was devastated. Unlike in Vietnam, I imagine, officers here are respected, followed and revered.
I got to the town of Rosh Pina and hitched a ride up to Safed, where the Northern Command was located, and walked into the wooden shack just before the briefing started.
Ilan Roeh, the jovial, heavyset Israel Radio reporter for the north, was clowning around as he moved the flags back and forth over the podium.
Afterward I hung around the headquarters, chatting to the officers there, and tried to find out more about the clash. I chatted for a while with a young brigadier-general named Erez Gerstein, the commander of the IDF liaison unit to south Lebanon – a sort of Lawrence of Arabia to the SLA. (He had a hell of a job training that ragtag militia made up of Christians, Druze and Shi’ites. “Don’t judge them by Israeli standards,” he’d say. “Compare them to the other Lebanese militias.”)
I was surprised at his light attitude. I expected depression. He told me and a couple of other military reporters that in Lebanon it’s the luck of the draw. Whoever fires first usually wins. These paratroopers simply “stepped on” the equally surprised Hezbollah gunmen. The fact that they got away was the main screwup.
The Hezbollah gunmen turned up in Sidon later that day not only alive, but with an IDF-issue M-16 and even a bloodied uniform and radio they took from the officers. It was a real insult to the IDF.
A WEEK later I got a phone call: there’d been an explosion in Lebanon. There were wounded. I called the Northern Command, and the speaker could only tell me: “It’s bad, but I can’t say anything else.”
I called the special spokesman’s unit for military reporters in Tel Aviv, and was told that four people had been killed. “It looks like Ilan Roeh was one of those killed,” one of the soldiers said.
My heart jumped. A reporter? Killed? Ilan? It could just as easily have been me on one of my journeys to Lebanon. And then I heard another casualty was Gerstein. I couldn’t believe it. What a blow by Hezbollah. What a loss for us.
The army seemed to be in a mess. Obviously, I had to go to wherever there was going to be news. The army couldn’t say if or when there was going to be a briefing. “It’s still going on, Arieh” was all I could get.
I had to think. The IDF couldn’t sit quietly by as its generals were killed. It was bound to react. Any reaction would draw Katyusha rocket retaliation. It could get nasty. It was Purim. A colleague called and told me he was heading north.
I made a plane reservation and flew from Tel Aviv to the small airfield in Rosh Pina. Joining up with Alan Ben-Ami, the military reporter for Israel Radio’s English news, we grabbed a taxi and sped up the mountain road to Safed. I called ahead and told them to hold the general’s briefing until we got there.
There were so many questions. Did Hezbollah target Gerstein? Did his fearless, swaggering, nothing-can-hurt-me recklessness kill him? What about Roeh? He should be there asking the questions as he always was.
The army made us military reporters sign a waiver every time we crossed the border into that killing zone, so they would not be responsible for any harm that might come to us. Roeh did that afternoon, but when tragedy struck, the army “did the right thing” and posthumously drafted him as a reservist, and he was honored with a military funeral.
It was clear that the army couldn’t let this incident pass quietly, but it was caught in a double bind. If it lashed out at Hezbollah, attacked its leadership in Beirut or in any way struck at civilians, then Hezbollah would start lobbing Katyusha rockets into Israel.
Maj. Oliver Rafowitz, IDF media liaison of the Northern Command, a Frenchman who was the only son of a Holocaust survivor, told us to “stick around. Things are bound to heat up.”
We hitched a ride to Kiryat Shmona, listening to Israel’s leaders on the radio saying that Israel was going to strike back. As we approached the Galilee Panhandle, the cars heading south started to increase and became a constant flow of fleeing residents. The rest were headed to shelters.
We decided to head up to Metulla and checked into the old familiar Arazim Hotel, where journalists used to gather during crises. CNN had arrived, and the foreign reporters, too. It looked like war was brewing. I filed my story only half an hour before we closed the paper.
On the way to my room, I asked the manager where the bomb shelter was.
“Really?! It’s down there, but you won’t be going there,” he said.
He told me to leave the tap running for a bit for the hot water to run. I gave up after 15 minutes and went to bed. It was quite a night. The Israeli Air Force ended up surgically destroying a number of empty cement buildings across Lebanon, claiming they were Hezbollah headquarters. No civilians were killed and by Lebanese accounts, no guerrillas were killed either, and the night passed without Katyushas.
I got up at the crack of dawn because most Katyusha attacks happen then. Nothing. Quiet.
By morning the whole gang was there, eating olives and cheese and drinking cups of coffee like in the good old days of Operation Grapes of Wrath and Operation Accountability. The people of the entire northern border region were still ordered to remain in their shelters.
By noon I realized that the “war” was over.BUT THE incessant guerrilla warfare against Hezbollah was taking a toll on the IDF, and soldiers found themselves for the first time openly saying the IDF should quit the security zone because they don’t want to be the last to die. Ehud Barak was elected prime minister after running on a campaign promise to finally withdraw the IDF from south Lebanon by the summer of 2000. It was getting harder and harder to interview troops in Lebanon. The IDF steadily refused.
Yediot Aharonot and Maariv began splashing large headlines quoting soldiers saying they were scared and that they no longer had any reason to be in Lebanon, and quoting commanders deriding them as sissies.
In what may become for historians a memorable point in the IDF’s Lebanon dilemma, OC Northern Command Gabi Ashkenazi was widely quoted as calling soldiers who voiced these fears “rags and crybabies.”
Israeli soldiers could hardly be characterized as ruthless or brutal, but were they sissies? What did the army expect, since it treated soldiers like children?
For dinner dessert, soldiers were given krembos. If these were just any normal worldly grunts, the soldiers would have thrown them back and demanded whiskey or beer or dames. But not Israeli soldiers.
In Lebanon, soldiers set out into the bush with an ambush mattress so they were comfortable when they lay in pursuit of Hezbollah guerrillas. Their pouches were filled with power food, they had heated underwear and the best radio and night vision equipment money could buy.
Field commanders in Lebanon said there had been an upsurge in appeals by parents not to take their sons to Lebanon. Those whose sons who were already there were asking for them to be returned, and those whose sons were about to go up were asking that they not be taken. They reportedly used excuses, personal problems and illnesses.
“What am I to do when a mother threatens to self-immolate? I am in a bind,” one officer told me.
The grassroots group Four Mothers began gaining momentum, and its pressure was having an effect.
SINCE THE IDF wasn’t allowing reporters into the security zone, I took advantage of an offer to join then-deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh in south Lebanon. We flew north in an old, rusty chopper from the Yom Kippur era. Cruising low, about 230 meters, we landed at the provisional IDF headquarters in Marjayoun and packed into armored Mercedes cars for a short ride from the chopper pad to the base. The old fortress was the French equivalent to the Tegart forts the British built across Israel.
“We don’t allow any SLA guys in here,” said a general. The IDF was becoming increasingly wary of its south Lebanese allies.
Inside, Sneh met with SLA commander Gen. Antoine Lahad, a frail 72-year-old man who spoke little English. There had been a lot of talk about us pulling out of Lebanon unilaterally, and that would basically leave our SLA allies to the dogs.
We soon headed out toward an IDF outpost. I popped open the trunk of our Mercedes and pulled out a flak vest and helmet, and off we went.
“Didn’t Ilan Roeh wear one of these?” I asked, knowing full well that it didn’t help my Israel Radio colleague when the roadside bomb blew his Mercedes to tiny bits.
After a nerve-wracking ride in south Lebanon, we made it finally to the outpost of Shani. A young Ethiopian lieutenant briefed Sneh, a former brigadier-general, in the trenches, and I looked out to the ridges across the Litani gorge, spotting the outposts of Sujud, Rehan and Aishiya.
Mortar shells fired by Hezbollah guerrillas were dropping onto the IDF and SLA outposts, puffing in explosions as they hit and sending pillars of smoke spiraling to the sky. Be we couldn’t hear the explosions. They were so close, yet so far away. Israeli warplanes hit back, turning the horizon into a gouache of fire and smoke. War and a front-seat view. It was almost pornographic.
We then made our way to the SLA outpost of Tel Nahas, where the deputy defense minister assured the officers that Israel had no intention of withdrawing unilaterally.
“We have a moral responsibility here,” Sneh said in Arabic. “The SLA are our allies, our brothers in arms, and we can’t let you down. We aren’t going to turn anyone into refugees. We didn’t fight together for 23 years to get up and abandon you here.”
In January 2000 Hezbollah succeeded in killing Col. Akel Hashem, the unofficial deputy commander of the SLA. “Hezbollah will get their just deserts sooner or later,” Sneh announced. “They won’t go without punishment.”
But the IDF kept its response proportionate, and instead of destroying bridges and plunging Beirut into darkness with a massive air assault, as it did following Hezbollah Katyusha attacks the previous summer, this time airstrikes hit just three Hezbollah targets.
The IDF was being severely restrained by the near-zero casualty tolerance of the Israeli public. Its whole doctrine in south Lebanon was based on preventing casualties. But with Hashem’s death and Israel’s declared intention to quit Lebanon by the summer, soldiers in the SLA sensed they were about to be abandoned.
The IDF was getting out in July. It was to be a withdrawal to the recognized border based on UN Security Council Resolution 425. That was the official version. It was being meticulously planned. The operation was dubbed Orech Ru’ah (Stamina). The army began diluting its positions, so by May soldiers were down to eating battle rations and living out of a small bag.
“Don’t worry,” Ashkenazi told us military reporters. “When we pull out of Lebanon, you will be with the last of the soldiers in the outposts.”
Relations between the IDF and military reporters were tense. The army refused to let any of us into the security zone. Matters had come to a head in what was supposed to be an off-the-record briefing with Ashkenazi. The gruff, Golani-bred general was not known to like journalists at best, and in this case ended up in a shouting match with some of us over just this matter.
Ashkenazi had been critical of then-Channel 1 reporter Alon Ben-David for speculating in a broadcast that the IDF was about to pull out of its outpost at Rehan. After the broadcast, Hezbollah began to heavily shell the position and a number of soldiers were wounded.
But in the third week of May, Shi’ite villagers and Hezbollah gunmen armed mainly with cameras and flags preempted the IDF and converged on the SLA outpost of Taybeh. The SLA militiamen, mostly Shi’ites, fled and set into motion the disintegration of the security zone.
Chaos was starting to appear. The IDF beefed up its forces along the border.
“At this stage, we are adjusting our deployment to the reality on the ground,” Ashkenazi said. “There is not a decision for getting out, and when it is made, we will be found ready.”
Still, while not purely lying to the press, the senior command as well as prime minister Ehud Barak were telling reporters that a withdrawal would take time. June 1 was mentioned. Barak was rebuffing pressure from the IDF echelon to move it forward, even though preparations along the international border were not yet ready.
I was summoned to a briefing of military analysts with IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz in the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv on Monday, May 22, and he told us it could take at least a week to get the soldiers out. It turned out that the orders had already been given to be out by dawn Wednesday. We military reporters started feeling like pawns in a disinformation campaign.
Despite the swift and total collapse of the SLA’s 70th battalion, the IDF still had faith in the remaining regiments, which were made up of Christians and Druze.
But like in most wars, the end came like lightning. Tuesday, May 23, I was back up in Metulla hanging out at the Fatima Gate, trying to get a story. Crowds of people started to flood into the village of Kela on the Lebanese side of the border.
Putting on Ray-Ban sunglasses and tucking my polo shirt into my trousers to look like a Shin Bet agent, I slipped across the border and stepped into a human tragedy – streams of refugees fleeing in fear of their lives, carrying battered suitcases filled with clothes, photos and anything else they could grab at short notice. An Israeli man had also sneaked across the border and was handing out bags of Bamba and Bisli to the children.
Sweat trickled down the face and neck of Capt. Suleiman Nahak and slid over the gold cross dangling from a chain. He was clutching two bags of his worldly possessions, as he moved with his wife and two daughters toward a bus that would take them away from his homeland, perhaps forever, to Israel, where they would have to build new lives.
A stream of automatic gunshots rang out not 200 meters away, and the hundreds of panicking refugees shrieked: “Hezbollah! Hezbollah!”
They pressed against Israeli soldiers and riot police in full regalia, who were brought in to keep order, as troops ran off in the direction of the shooting.
“I am not afraid to fight,” said the 36-year-old SLA officer. “But I have my family to worry about. I leave my home. I don’t think I’ll ever return. With Hezbollah we cannot live. They make peace with no one, not with Jews, not with us. Everybody is fleeing. They are bad people.”
While most were Christian, Nahak said there were also Muslim and Druze militiamen fleeing as well, many with the ubiquitous Mercedes vehicles.
The sun was casting its rays over the Rimal ridge, silhouetting the Beaufort Castle and the IDF outposts guarding the Litani gorge. IAF helicopter gunships hovered overhead, as IDF artillery near Metulla fired suppression rounds to keep the Hezbollah guerrillas at bay for as long as possible. The refugees were streaming in from the towns and villages, such as Ain Iblin and Remshe, which were being taken over by Hezbollah.
Just as they were coming over, the IDF called on all residents in the North to return to their bomb shelters in anticipation of a Hezbollah rocket attack. Two rockets slammed into the countryside near Biranit.
Ironically, it was also Lag Ba’omer, and tens of thousands of Israelis, mostly haredim, were converging on the grave of Shimon Bar Yochai at the foot of Mount Meron to celebrate. Police were desperately trying to unravel horrific traffic jams as throngs of people headed toward the mountain, seemingly oblivious to the war taking place just 20 minutes up the road.
My driving thought was to get this story in before the paper went to bed.
By nightfall, we understood that the end was near, very near. Military reporters, all with sheepish grins on their faces and anguished that we were not riding back with the troops, gathered at the Egel Gate adjacent to Metulla to see the convoys return.
THE PULLOUT began at 8 p.m., Tuesday, May 23, for the Golani and Armored Corps soldiers at Rehan, the deepest IDF stronghold. About 19 kilometers north of Metulla, the outpost had been one of the most attacked positions, and suffered a number of casualties the week before from incessant Hezbollah mortar attacks.
“We blew it up,” said Sharon Shetubi, 20, of Ramle. “The flash was amazing, lit up the whole sky.”
Rehan and the rest of the dozen IDF outposts were destroyed by IDF sappers, to prevent them from being used by Hezbollah guerrillas.
“Nothing was left. For three months it was my home. I know this sounds weird, but I’ll miss it. I’m ready to return there right now,” said Avichai Cohen of Ma’aleh Levona.
The IDF planned for a withdrawal under fire, and indeed Hezbollah came through, dropping shells throughout the night. There was also the fear that Hezbollah guerrillas would try to ambush the convoys as they made their way back to Israel.
The convoy from Rehan set out but only inched along, as commanders made sure not to expose their flank. At one point, one of the Nakpadons, a mean-looking, homemade armored personnel carrier designed for the Lebanon conflict, flayed out one of its treads, and that took precious time to fix. A tank fired at suspicious movement. They continued.
“We passed Aishiya and they blew it up. We passed Dla’at and saw that being blown up, too. The explosion from Beaufort was something else,” said Guy Segel, 20, from Hayogev.
He had spent four months operating a Merkava tank at Rehan. Just before they were to end their tour, the army told his platoon they would remain “for the duration.”
“They said we would stay there till we pulled out of Lebanon. That was three months ago,” said Segel, dressed in his Dacron tankers suit. “I’m glad it’s finally over.”
Convoys set out during the night from the other outposts, as warplanes swooped down and delivered the death knells to the vacated IDF and SLA positions. Some posts burned, bathing the night horizon in an orange glow. Throughout the withdrawal, IDF artillery kept up a steady but light barrage at suspected Hezbollah mortar emplacements.
In the distance, another convoy of Artillery Corps soldiers from the Shareife outpost crossed into the country and flicked on their headlights as they passed in through a different gate.
Once in the country, the soldiers made the de rigueur phone calls to the folks.
“That’s it. It’s over, Dad. We’re back in the country,” said St.-Sgt. Moshe Shuni from Sha’arei Tikva. Even at 3:30 a.m., no parent was likely upset to hear this from his or her son in Lebanon.
“Will I miss it? I’ll miss the episodes with my mates, but not Lebanon,” Shuni said.
One soldier from the Golani 13th Battalion said they were careful not to take any needless actions in the end, because no one wanted to be the last soldier killed in Lebanon.
“I’ll miss the days in Lebanon. There is nothing like it. You learn how to be a soldier there. You go through a lot there. There is where a soldier can test himself. There is where friendship is measured,” said the soldier, who refused to give his name but still had the number “26” written on his hand, as each convoy numbered its soldiers.
At about a quarter to seven on the morning of May 24, Brig.-Gen. Benny Gantz locked the Fatima Gate and suddenly became unemployed.
As commander of the IDF liaison unit responsible for the eastern sector of the security zone and the SLA, Gantz was given the symbolic honor, captured by photographers and transmitted around the world.
“I’m happy it was carried out without one injury. We were really anxious about this,’’ said Gantz. “I’ve been in and out of Lebanon since the [1978] Litani invasion. It was a very strange feeling now. I guess I’m unemployed,” said Gantz, who would go on to become IDF chief of staff and then, maybe, prime minister.
I hung around for a press conference with the IDF brass, who tried to paint the retreat as a victory because not one IDF soldier had been hurt. But back in the Arazim Hotel in Metulla a man sat collapsed on a couch, a shadow of himself. He was broken, chain-smoking in the corner. A general without an army.As Hezbollah guerrillas were ransacking his villa a few hills away, Lahad, commander of the now defunct SLA, was full of bitterness toward Israel for its total and complete withdrawal from the security zone.
“The manner in which the retreat was carried out was unfair and unreasonable. The IDF was humiliated because it retreated so fast, and it gave Hezbollah a victory it never even dreamed of,” Lahad said in his characteristic hoarse whisper.
“For over 24 years we were together, and you decided within 24 hours to change direction. What do you want us to do now? Go with Hezbollah? Please, their flags are flying from the fence,” Lahad said. “Israel destroyed in 24 hours relations that were built over 24 years. We worked hand in hand, but suddenly Israel pulled back its hand and shook us off.”
But for Israelis, the withdrawal gave us something strange, even a little scary, something we hadn’t encountered in years: a border. A demarcation, an end we hoped. We go only this far; and from there on, it’s them. And that’s a fact. *The writer was the defense correspondent for The Jerusalem Post from 1996–2006.

Twenty years after Lebanon withdrawal: Return to the abyss
Seth J.Frantzman/Jerusalem Post/May 23/2020
جيرازالم بوست/ العودة إلى الهاوية بعد الإنسحاب الإسرائيلي من جنوب لبنان
Today’s Israeli military and political leaders are in many ways part of the withdrawal generation, learning the time’s tough lessons.
On the morning of May 24, 2000, Lebanese residents of towns near the border with Israel woke up to a new reality. The Israelis were gone.
The residents might have guessed something was happening when a massive explosion rocked the ancient Crusader castle Beaufort at midnight. The explosion lit up the sky. Israeli troops had already left the site, which had been one of Israel’s bases. Artillery and aircraft provided cover.
Lebanese prime minister Selim Hoss reached out to UN secretary-general Kofi Annan at daybreak, even though it was still midnight in New York City. He claimed Israelis might have destroyed the Beaufort in their hasty withdrawal. In southern Lebanon, families, children and Hezbollah members made their way up to see the old Israeli fortifications, now ripped apart and destroyed.
The decision to withdraw from Lebanon 20 years ago this month was part of prime minister Ehud Barak’s policy, one he highlighted during his campaign against Benjamin Netanyahu in 1999. It was a different time. These were the Oslo years of the peace process. Israel was supposed to end its foreign wars and give land for peace. When Israel did withdraw, there was going to be a peace dividend from the Americans.
Barak was praised by US president Bill Clinton, who hoped it would revive the peace process. It occasioned a “collective sigh of relief,” Eytan Bentsur at the Foreign Ministry said. Barak saw the long years of war in Lebanon as ending, closing a bookend on the tragedy.
In the parlance of that time, major Western media saw Hezbollah as “guerrillas.” They launched “raids” on Israel and fired Katyusha rockets. These were the days when Israel was seen as the problem, not the religious extremists in command of Hezbollah. But Hezbollah did listen to Barak initially and there were fewer attacks in the period leading up to the withdrawal. However, beginning in May 1999, there was renewed rocket fire on Kiryat Shmona and northern Israel.
Israel’s partners in southern Lebanon, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), suffered attacks by Hezbollah as well.
It is extraordinary how from the view from 20 years later, the characters of 2000 are roughly the same as today. Netanyahu may have lost the election, but his brand of using strength in the face of enemy threats was still his brand then. Hassan Nasrallah was the Hezbollah leader, predicting in 2000 that Israel would lose the war.
FROM THE perspective of 20 years later, it is worth looking back at this important decision to leave Lebanon. It came in the wake of Israel leaving Sinai; the Oslo Accords; the 1997 Hebron Protocol; and the Wye River Memorandum of 1998.
Land for peace. Israel had withdrawn from Egypt and peace had taken place. Israel was going to withdraw from more parts of the West Bank, giving Palestinians more power, more police, more ability to have autonomy and weapons, and peace was supposed to result. The withdrawal from Lebanon would be icing on the cake. Israel’s years of wars and “Greater Israel” pretensions and occupying Arab land and even Arab capital cities was at an end.
With the peace process came a belief that Israel could manage a withdrawal and achieve peace in Lebanon. Syria, which occupied parts of Lebanon, had clashed with Israel in the past. But by 1993, Syria had lost its Soviet patron and was ready for talks over the Golan. Israel cemented control over southern Lebanon along the Israeli border in a security zone that had around 200,000 people, 55% of whom were Shi’ites, with smaller populations of Druze, Sunnis and Christians. The Christians and some others, including Shi’ites, joined the SLA of 2,500 fighters to work with Israel.
Syrian president Hafez Assad thought his country could work with the Americans after the Gulf War and get the Israelis out of Lebanon and the Golan, a “two-for.” Syria told the Americans that Israel must withdraw to the 1967 border, abandoning the Golan, and Syrian supported Lebanon’s position that Israel must withdraw to the international border of 1923, negating an area called Mount Dov or Sheba’a farms, which is disputed between Syria and Lebanon and Israel.
Syria had sent Gen. Hikmet Shihabi to discuss an agreement with Israel in the 1990s and he met with Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, former IDF chief of staff. Barak would task Uri Saguy, former head of military intelligence, to deal with Syria’s then-foreign minister Farouk al-Sharaa. Could Syria be lured away from Lebanon? Israeli chiefs of staff told US diplomats they thought it could. Syria’s Assad was weaker in the 1990s, his army falling apart without Soviet aid, and he was concentrating on chemical weapons and ground-to-ground missiles. Israeli military experts suggested it was a mistake to withdraw from Lebanon without a Syrian agreement.
WE NOW know that the Palestinians were watching Lebanon closely, with both Yasser Arafat and Hamas leaders gambling that they could remove Israel with a little violence, the way Nasrallah had appeared to do in Lebanon. Hezbollah hadn’t killed thousands of Israelis, but it had killed just enough to make Lebanon a quagmire. Two hundred and thirty five Israelis had been killed in Lebanon between 1985 and 2000. Palestinian groups thought that Gaza and Ramallah could become a quagmire for Israel, too. It was “wind in the sails” of the Palestinians, Brig.-Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser would later conclude.
Indeed, IDF chief of staff Shaul Mofaz would tell the army matter-of-factly in 2000 that Israel had left. It was not a victory. Israel was ready to declare non-victories. It was “historic” and that is what mattered. The boys had come back home. Hezbollah was chuffed. Nasrallah would give a speech a year after celebrating how much stronger Hezbollah was. Iranian weapons were flowing in. Syria, momentarily deterred by the US invasion of Iraq, would grow bolder as well.
But Hezbollah would eventually become even more powerful than the Syrian regime in some ways. Hezbollah would plot and assassinate Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, leading to Syria’s withdrawal. Later Hezbollah would launch an attack on Israel in 2006, launch street battles and assassinations against Lebanon’s other parties between 2007 and 2009 and put its own man at the seat of power in Lebanon, before intervening in Syria’s civil war.
The success of Hezbollah after the Israeli withdrawal was known to US officials. In 2003, US diplomats sought to reach out to Syria via Moscow, according to US diplomatic cables, and warn Syria of its role in letting Iran move long-range rockets to Hezbollah. “The growing stockpile may likewise enhance Hezbollah’s perception of its deterrent capacity and embolden it to increase border attacks against Israel,” the US said.
Hezbollah was also providing training to the Palestinians, equipping them with explosives training with Iranian IRGC members in the Beka’a Valley. Hezbollah was accused by the US of coordinating a March 12, 2003 attack in Shlomi that killed six Israelis and of sending operatives to the West Bank. It also helped the Palestinians coordinate the Karine A shipment from Iran, filling a ship with missiles and weapons. And, as early as 2001, it had helped the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command smuggle weapons from Lebanon. Nasrallah, a growing celebrity after the Israeli withdrawal, would tell the London Sunday Times that three Hezbollah members had even sought to move weapons via Jordan.
WHY DIDN’T Israel see the writing on the wall? Why wasn’t it clear that the withdrawal from Lebanon could lead to ramifications across the region, emboldening Hezbollah and the Palestinians, helping fuel the Second Intifada that broke out just months later, and then the Second Lebanon War that took place in 2006?
In many ways, today’s Israeli military and political leaders are part of the withdrawal generation who have learned the tough lessons of what happened. That doesn’t mean they think Israel should go back into Lebanon, or Gaza from which Israel withdrew in 2005. It means they understand that Hezbollah and other groups have to be deterred and that they can be easily emboldened if they feel they can import weapons freely and use them.
We know some of the discussions that went into the withdrawal from news reports and published accounts, such as Amos Gilboa’s book The True Story of How Israel Left Lebanon. Barak had to face down complaints from within the security establishment about his policy. Maj.-Gen. Amos Malka was critical. Ronen Bergman notes in a 2016 piece at Ynet that the IDC command at the time was “portrayed as being closed-minded for its continued opposition to a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon.”
Barak could rely on rising stars in the IDF during the withdrawal and the complexities that led up to it. At his side would be Gabi Ashkenazi, who would go on to be chief of staff from 2007 to 2011 and rebuild the IDF after the failures of the Lebanon War; as well as Gadi Eizenkot, who would be in charge during some 1,000 Israeli airstrikes in Syria as chief of staff from 2015-2019, interdicting shipments to Hezbollah; as well as current vice prime minister Benny Gantz, who would also go on to be chief of staff from 2011 to 2015, beating back Hamas in the 2012 and 2014 wars.
Barak’s plan was to move out quickly and not give Hezbollah or the Syrians the chance to bleed Israel anymore.
“What interest does Israel gain from the fact that it continues to hold the security zone?” he asked in March 2000. By leaving, Hezbollah would lack legitimacy, no longer being able to say it was the “resistance.” Israel’s logic was that the buffer zone on the border wasn’t bringing security, but was pinning Israeli soldiers to posts and empowering Hezbollah. Barak had initially wanted Syria on board, but sought out the UN instead. The prime minister believed, according to reports, that an agreement would bring quiet and that Israel could withdraw properly.
The problem was that Damascus wanted Israel to pay, and it saw that Israel was in a corner, having made promises to leave. US efforts to beg Assad didn’t work, even when Clinton met the Syrian dictator in Geneva. The New York Times said Clinton bet Assad would bend – but the Syrian didn’t. It was now March 28, and Israel was stuck.
IT APPEARS that in the last weeks leading up to withdrawal, the IDF was perplexed by the way the political echelons had handled it. The IDF’s assessment was that Hezbollah would be able to attack Israeli civilians along the border. At the time, the Ynet article reminds us, far-Left Israeli politician Yossi Sarid was helping push the plan. Israel tried trusting in the UN to shepherd the repositioning of forces. Israel would withdraw in line with UN Resolution 425 and no longer be seen as occupying Lebanon, which would supposedly end any need for Hezbollah to “resist” Israel.
But Hezbollah was smart. It invented a new need to “resist” based on Israel holding on to Mount Dov, even though it wasn’t part of Lebanon.
Israel’s withdrawal was made possible partly by deceiving its former SLA partners, who were not told of the plan. This worried Benny Gantz, who was running a Lebanon Liaison Unit, according to Bergman’s account. Ashkenazi was also concerned. In the end, the SLA fell apart and disintegrated. The decision to leave by May 24 was made on May 22. The Israelis were out by the morning of the 24th and posts had been blown up. Eighteen years of being in Lebanon had ended.
The withdrawal looked like a retreat, but Barak was praised at the time for his efforts to bring peace and work within the UN framework.
The problem is that the withdrawal, while successful and not leading to any casualties, did appear to be a Hezbollah victory. The enemy took over former Israeli and SLA posts. They celebrated, and continue to make merry. Barak gambled on reducing Israel’s exposure to terrorism in Lebanon and returning to the border, protecting several hundred kilometers of winding roads along the border where Hezbollah might lie in wait to ambush Israel.
But the real changes in Hezbollah’s posture came not just with its missile program or plotting attacks, but its international role. At a February 26, 2006 Joint Counterterrorism Group meeting between Israel and the US, the diplomats and experts looked at how Hezbollah was inspiring Hamas and other groups on how to confront Israel. It posed a “multi-layered threat,” the meeting members noted. “It has deployed activities around the globe,” including strategic units in Argentina, and was developing drones with Iranian help. Brig.-Gen. Dani Arditi concurred, according to US diplomatic cables. Hezbollah had supported five attacks against Israel in 2005.
Other issues were impacted by the withdrawal. Some countries reduced support for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on the border. The force declined from 5,000 to 2,000 personnel and from 15 countries to seven participants by 2003. Hezbollah also leveraged its claims of “victory” over Israel to expand its political role, increasing seats in parliament from nine to 11 and then to 13. The movement also increased its clout over time, invading parts of Beirut in 2008 clashes and holding the presidency hostage from 2014 to 2016, until pro-Hezbollah Christian Lebanese politician Michel Aoun could be brought into power.
One man who appeared on the scene during the Israeli withdrawal was Imad Mughniyah, Hezbollah’s second in command and a key link with Iran. According to the Bergman account, his presence was noted by Israelis on May 22. He was “Israel’s No. 1 most-wanted target” and he was in “Israeli intelligence crosshairs.” He was coming to southern Lebanon to watch Israel withdraw and perhaps stir up trouble. Israel left 24 hours later.
On February 12, 2008, Mughniyeh was killed in Damascus. His car blew up. He died – one of many whose lives were transformed by Israel’s withdrawal.

A four-month coincidence? The Lebanon withdrawal and the Second Intifada
Herb Keinon/ـerusalem Post/May 23/2020
صدفة الشهور الأربعة...الإنسحاب من لبنان والإنتفاضة الثانية
While then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak downplayed the connection between the two events, officials who were deeply involved in diplomatic events at the time do connect the dots.
The headline on May 24, 2000 in The Guardian, a paper not known as particularly friendly to Israel, told the tale: “Chaos and humiliation as Israel pulls out of Lebanon.”
The prime minister at the time, Ehud Barak, the architect of the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon some 18 years after Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee, had hoped it would happen in a very different way.
Two years prior, campaigning for his 1999 election against then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Barak had promised a withdrawal from Lebanon within a year of coming into office. This promise followed the helicopter disaster that killed 73 soldiers being ferried into Lebanon, and as the Four Mothers anti-war protests picked up steam. His message resonated with a public increasingly weary of the cost of the seemingly endless war in Lebanon and looking for a way out.
A fan of big, brash moves, not only did Barak propose to withdraw all the troops from Lebanon, but he also promised to negotiate a permanent status deal with the Palestinians – skipping over various interim steps.
Barak, the former head of the Sayeret Matkal (the IDF General Staff Reconnaissance Unit), was nothing if not bold and daring. He was hell-bent either on making peace with Israel’s enemies through dramatic steps, or “pulling back the curtain” so the whole world could see that while Israel showed a willingness to take giant steps toward moving peace forward on various fronts, there was no partner on the other side.
And the withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24 was a result of the realization that, at least regarding Syria, there really was no partner on the other side.
Just six months after coming into power in July 1999, talking initially with and about the Palestinians before shifting gears to a Syria-first policy, Barak met with the Syrians at Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in the hope that a deal could transpire with Syrian president Hafez Assad, terminally ill at the time and represented by his foreign minister, Farouk a-Shara. Barak hoped such a deal would then facilitate and make possible a withdrawal from Lebanon.
IT DIDN’T work out that way. Assad’s representative didn’t budge at Shepherdstown, and Assad himself did not move when he met then-US president Bill Clinton in Geneva some three months later. A deal was not in the cards, which meant that if Barak was committed to leaving Lebanon – as he promised the public – he would be doing it unilaterally, without a deal.
In an interview last month with Maariv, Barak said that he met with then chief-of-staff Shaul Mofaz shortly after his government was established.
“I made it clear to him that if there will be an agreement with the Syrians, it is reasonable to think that the Lebanon issues would also be solved through an agreement. But even if there will not be an agreement, I am determined to leave Lebanon by July 2000.”
And leave by then he did.
www.jpost.com/middle-east/20-years-after-lebanon-pullout-war-with-hezbollah-wont-be-walk-in-park-628430
But rather than doing so in an orderly fashion, it was done overnight and in a chaotic manner, as Hezbollah had overrun positions Israel had handed over to the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA).
Barak wanted to avoid the perception that Israel was leaving Lebanon under fire, and – as The Guardian reported at the time – “badly wanted an orderly withdrawal with an expanded United Nations peacekeeping force taking control of border areas. But with the SLA in disarray, a refugee influx that has taken the government by surprise and the rapid arrival of Hezbollah well before Israel has had time to complete its electrified border fence and other defences, that prospect has evaporated.”
In a word, the withdrawal was a mess.
BARAK, WROTE veteran US diplomat and Mideast negotiator Dennis Ross in his book The Missing Peace, understandably “sought to make withdrawal look like Israel’s decision, made out of strength and conviction. But Hezbollah had other ideas.”
Ross wrote that while on a logistical level, carrying out the withdrawal in 20 hours when things started to look bad was “another source of pride” for the IDF, in the region “particularly given the collapse of the SLA, the withdrawal looked like a defeat.”
Barak admitted that tactical mistakes in carrying out the withdrawal might have been made.
“These types of tactical errors could happen as well to good people, and I take full responsibility,” he told Maariv. “We paid the price in unpleasant headlines and photographs. But [of] what [importance] is that in the face of ending a tragedy that lasted 18 years. And without any wounded!”
What importance?
All of a sudden, Ross wrote, “there was a new model for dealing with Israel: the Hezbollah model. Don’t make concessions. Don’t negotiate, Use violence. And the Israelis will grow weary and withdraw.”
While Barak had hoped that the withdrawal would put an end to the bloodletting in Lebanon and show that Israel would take matters into its own hands and not remain anyone’s hostage, the message that reverberated throughout the region was starkly different.
Israel, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah said in his victory speech on May 26 at Bint Jbeil, less than 48-hours days after the IDF withdrawal, is an easily defeatable “spider web.”
“We offer this noble Lebanese model to our people in Palestine,” Nasrallah declared. “To free your land, you don’t need tanks, a strategic balance, rockets, and cannons; you need to follow the way of the past self-sacrifice martyrs who disrupted and horrified the coercive Zionist entity. You, the oppressed, unarmed and restricted Palestinians, can force the Zionist invaders to return to the places they came from. Let the Falasha go to Ethiopia, and let the Russian Jews return to Russia.
“The choice is yours, and the model lies right in front of your eyes,” he continued. “An honest and serious resistance can make the freedom dawn arise. Our brothers and beloved Palestinians, I tell you: Israel, which owns nuclear weapons and the strongest war aircraft in the region, is feebler than a spider’s web – I swear to God.”
Nasrallah’s message to the Palestinians who had engaged for the previous seven years in long, drawn-out negotiations with Israel was loud and clear: Don’t waste your time, just blow hard on the spider web – and it will disappear.
And there were definitely those who heard that message. Four months later, on September 28, the Palestinians launched the Second Intifada.
IN A PBS documentary in the spring of 2002 called Shattered Dreams of Peace: The Road from Oslo, Mohammed Dhalan, who was the Palestinian security chief at the time, said the minute the Palestinians saw Israeli soldiers “running away and allowing the Lebanese to liberate themselves, they ask, ‘Why don’t we do it their way?’”
In the same documentary, Israeli negotiator Uri Savir quoted Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei as saying to him after the withdrawal from Lebanon, “The message to every Palestinian will be clear: Kill and get the land.”
An article last week in Makor Rishon cited a survey of Palestinian public opinion quoted in a 2010 book by the pollsters Yaakov Shamir and Khalil Shikai, Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Public Imperative During the Second Intifada, that “as a result of the unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon, 63% of the Palestinians believed that they needed to adopt the violent methods of Hezbollah.
“For the first time, the Palestinian public totally lost confidence in diplomacy, and was willing to adopt violence as an alternative means to ending the occupation,” they wrote. “The young militants wanted to force Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the occupied territory, like what happened in southern Lebanon in May 2000.”
Barak, however, still cautions against drawing a connection between the two events.
“And those who think that leaving Lebanon strengthened the Palestinians, I say, if we had stayed in Lebanon and continued to bleed without contributing to our security, then what? The Palestinians would have raised a white flag? Gotten on their knees and begged for mercy?
“No. On the contrary, had we stayed in Lebanon and kept a force there of a division or more, it would have been difficult to effectively carry out Operation Defensive Shield [in 2002, the turning point in the intifada].”
While Barak downplayed the connection between the two events, officials who were deeply involved in diplomatic events at the time do connect the dots.
“In a textbook case of unintended consequences, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon fostered an environment supporting increased radicalism, not moderation,” Ross wrote. “Hezbollah was celebrated for forcing the Israelis out. Resentment toward the Israelis, the West, the ‘haves,’ spilled out and expressed itself. The latent desire to humiliate those who humiliated the Arabs was once again apparent.”
And Yasser Arafat felt the sucker for negotiating with Israel. He was haggling over deployments and land percentages with but spotty results, while Nasrallah was fighting Israel… and winning.
THEN-US AMBASSADOR to Israel Martin Indyk wrote in his book on the period, Innocent Abroad, that on May 27, the day after Nasrallah’s “spider web” speech, Arafat traveled to Egypt to consult with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, and “the Egyptians found him deeply troubled by the impact of Hezbollah’s triumphalism.”
Arafat, according to Indyk, “complained bitterly to Mubarak that Nasrallah was exporting his violent ideas to the streets of the West Bank and Gaza.”
Two months after the Lebanon withdrawal, Barak met Arafat at Camp David under Clinton’s watchful eyes. There Barak laid down a peace proposal for the Palestinians whereby they would get about 90% of the territories, administrative control over most of the Arab neighborhoods in east Jerusalem and all the villages surrounding the capital, and joint administration over the holy sites in the city.
Yet it was not enough for the Palestinian leader, who was unwilling to budge from his maximalist demands. And he was influenced in remaining calcified in his positions by seeing what had transpired just two months earlier in Lebanon.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, who at the time was internal security minister and a negotiator at Camp David, said in a Channel 13 television interview in 2017 that Arafat told him at the summit that the Lebanon withdrawal was imprudent.
“Complete foolishness,” Ben-Ami quoted Arafat as saying. “How foolish you were when you left Lebanon unilaterally. There were 500 fighters there … and they managed to throw you out of Lebanon, and here I am negotiating with you.”
In other words, why negotiate, why make concessions, when a small number of fighters forced Israel to withdraw completely to the international border in Lebanon – it made no sense.
Ben-Ami was quoted in Makor Rishon as having written in 2005 that he had “no doubt” that the withdrawal from Lebanon left a “deep impression on Arafat’s consciousness.”
“He felt humiliated and embarrassed that he had to negotiate with us on border changes, while 500 guerrillas forced Israel to withdraw to Lebanon’s international border,” he said. “The Lebanonization of the struggle against Israel, he believed, would break Israel’s will. The lesson he learned from Israel’s defeat in Lebanon was that the Israeli people are worn out and have doubts about its ability to absorb losses in a low-intensity conflict.”
Arafat’s conclusion: launch his own low intensity conflict.
In the 15 years that Israel held the security zone in Lebanon, it lost 559 soldiers, an unsustainable situation that the public in 2000 was no longer willing to tolerate and which Barak was determined to change. Israel needed to withdraw, he concluded.
The question that remains 20 years later for most Israelis is not whether Israel should have left Lebanon – most believe it should have – but rather how it should have done so. Few look at the manner in which that pullback was carried out, and its aftermath, as a model to emulate.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on May 23-24/2020
Holy Sepulcher Church in Jerusalem to Open Again on Sunday
Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem will open on Sunday for the first time in two months. It is built on the site where Christians believe Jesus was crucified, buried and resurrected. Leaders of the three denominations sharing the site said in a statement Saturday that entrance will be limited to 50 people at a time. Worshippers cannot enter if they have symptoms and must wear face masks and should keep a distance of 2 meters. They should also avoid touching or kissing stones and other objects at the holy site.The church was closed in March along with most other sites in the Holy Land, in keeping with strict measures imposed by the Palestinian Authority and Israel to contain the outbreak.It remained closed throughout the Easter last month, when Jerusalem’s Old City is normally packed with tens of thousands of pilgrims and tourists. Priests observed Easter rituals in small groups, mostly behind closed doors.

Pompeo calls for immediate halt to fighting Libya while GNA boasts of ‘advances’
The Arab weekly/May 24/2020
WASHINGTON –US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pressed Libya’s Turkish-backed government May 22 for a ceasefire and criticised the flow of weapons as Tripoli pushes back against a year-old offensive by the Libyan National Army, headed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.
In a phone call to Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, Pompeo reiterated “US opposition to the continued level of weapons and munitions being brought into the country,” the State Department said. Pompeo and Sarraj “emphasised the importance of an immediate halt to the fighting and return to political dialogue,” a statement said. The international conference held in Germany last January called for a cease-fire and a return to negotiations, but increased Turkish interference and Ankara’s continued deployment of mercenaries as well as attacks on LNA positions led to the failure of international efforts and an escalation of military operations.
Pompeo’s statement did not name any country for sending in weapons, but the GNA’s key military supplier is Turkey, which signed deals with Tripoli last November. The signed agreements paved the way for Turkish military intervention in Libya and produced a maritime border demarcation map that is favourable to Turkey in the Mediterranean. The deals also led to increased military involvement by Turkey in Libya, where Ankara is supporting militants and militias loyal to the GNA with military equipment and mercenaries in their fight against the LNA.
Pompeo’s call for a ceasefire is in contrast to GNA statements boasting about its military advances and ignoring any international calls for a truce. A report last month by the International Crisis Group said that Turkey has sent into Libya at least 100 military officers, shiploads of weapons and aerial defences as well as at least 2,000 pro-Turkish fighters from Syria. Official Turkish news reports have been highlighting the contribution of Turkish-supplied drones to the developments in Libya, especially the capture of al-Watiya airbase.
On May 20, a statement by the White House noted US President Donald Trump and his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron discussed their concern about “worsening foreign interference” in Libya and “agreed on the need for urgent de-escalation.”
Libya and its neighbours The United Nations envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, warned the Security Council May 19 that the escalating fighting, driven by a flood of foreign-supplied weapons, warplanes and mercenaries, risked “turning the Libyan conflict into a pure proxy war.”The GNA announced May 18 that it had recaptured al-Watiya airbase, after the withdrawal of LNA forces from all front lines in Tripoli. The LNA, which announced a unilateral ceasefire, said it was hoping to avoid bloodshed during the final days of Ramadan and allow people to prepare for the holiday, according to spokesman Ahmed al-Mismari

Egypt Security Forces Kill 21 Militants in North Sinai
Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
Egypt said Saturday that security forces killed 21 militants in two separate raids in the restive northern Sinai Peninsula. The Interior Ministry said the militants were plotting attacks during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, which begins Sunday and marks the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. It said two Egyptian officers were wounded in the raids.It said security forces exchanged fire with extremists as they stormed a farm used as a hideout, killing at least 14 militants. In a simultaneous raid, security forces killed seven militants in a shootout as they stormed a house used as a hideout in another area, the ministry said. It added that police found weapons, explosive devices and suicide belts. Egypt has been battling militants in the northern part of Sinai Peninsula for years, but the insurgency became far more deadly after the 2013 ouster of President Mohammed Morsi, a member of the now-banned Muslim Brotherhood, amid nationwide protests against his brief rule. An ISIS affiliate based in the Sinai has carried out high-profile attacks in recent years, mainly targeting security forces and Egypt’s Christian minority.

43 ISIS Attacks in Syria Since Beginning of Ramadan
London - Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Friday that since the beginning of Ramadan, it has documented 43 ISIS attacks against regime forces and their loyal Syrian and foreign militiamen in the Syrian desert, as well as Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the eastern Euphrates region.
According to the Observatory, the attacks ranged between blasts, executions and ambushes. “Neither SDF and international coalition security campaigns in the eastern Euphrates nor the large reinforcement brought in recently by the Iranians and regime forces to the desert have been able to contain ISIS’ growing activities and attacks,” the Britain-based watchdog said. In areas under the control of regime forces and loyalists, SOHR said it documented 11 ISIS attacks, mainly concentrated in the desert of Deir Ezzor and Homs, leaving 37 regime soldiers and loyal militiamen dead, in addition to the killing of a civilian woman in a field execution.In SDF-held areas, the Observatory documented nearly 32 ISIS attacks, mostly concentrated in cities and towns of the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, which left 21 persons dead. Meanwhile, Observatory sources confirmed that the international coalition carried out Friday a new airdrop in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, targeting in Al-Shuhayl town the house of a person who lives outside Syria and is inhabited by a displaced family from Bukamal. It said a group of SDF and coalition members raided the house and arrested the men living there. There were no further details on the identity of the men. An ex-ISIS member, who lives next to the targeted house, was killed during the operation. On May 19, Observatory activists reported an airdrop conducted by US forces in the Deir Ezzor countryside. That was the third operation of its kind to be carried out in the area in three consecutive days. On Friday, the US Central Command announced that US-led coalition forces and their Kurdish allies killed two regional ISIS leaders in a raid in eastern Syria this week. Ahmad 'Isa Ismail al-Zawi and Ahmad 'Abd Muhammad Hasan al-Jughayfi were killed in the May 17 joint raid on an ISIS position in Deir Ezzor province, CentCom said in a statement. Since its territorial defeat in Syria in March 2019, ISIS attacks have been restricted to the vast deserts stretching from Deir Ezzor to Homs in the center of the country.

Palestinian Forces Prevent Israeli Patrol From Entering Al-Khalil
Ramallah, Tel Aviv/Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
Palestinian and Israeli forces clashed on Friday in the first dispute between the two sides since the cessation of security coordination between them, sources said. On Thursday, an Israeli patrol tried to enter the city center of Al-Khalil (known as Hebron), when Palestinian forces blocked their passage, preventing them from accessing the city. The Israelis sent for an additional force but were met with a stringent Palestinian position. Minutes later, and after consulting its leadership, the patrol decided to withdraw in order to avoid an escalation. Observers considered the incident as the first sign of tension after the interruption of security coordination – one of the measures adopted by the Palestinian leadership to face Israeli plans to annex areas in the West Bank. While Israeli authorities tried to reduce the significance of the incident, Fatah movement, which broadcast a video of the dispute, said that the situation on the ground would change in the wake of the cessation of the security coordination. Palestinian sources stressed that its decision to halt coordination would not mean that the security in the West Bank would no longer be under control. “The Palestinian leadership, instead, will focus on enforcing the rule of law in favor of the Palestinian state,” the sources emphasized.In Israel, the former commander of the Israeli forces, General Gadi Shamni, warned of the consequences of stopping coordination. In an interview with the Israeli army radio on Friday, he said that “cooperation with the Palestinian Authority is essential to thwart terrorism, and without it, there is a risk of escalation of armed operations and clashes.”Meanwhile in Washington, a group of 18 Democratic senators addressed a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Alternate Prime Minister and Defense Minister Benny Gantz, warning against the consequences of unilateral annexation of West Bank lands. The senators expressed “grave concern” over the Israeli government’s agreement “to consider unilateral annexation of Palestinian territory as early as this July.”They stated that such move would hinder a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

US Reaches Understanding with Sudan over Bombing of 2 Embassies
Washington - Elie Youssef/Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
The United States and Sudan have reached a common understanding on the “contours” of a future bilateral claims agreement linked to the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the US State Department’s top diplomat for Africa said on Thursday.
“This final agreement will reflect Sudan’s agreement to pay – it would include compensation in connection with claims relating also to non-US nationals killed and injured in the embassy bombings,” US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs Tibor Nagy told a teleconference.
“This has been a high priority for the US government given that these foreign nationals were our employees and contractors, so obviously two sets of litigants: US citizens and non-US nationals.”Asked about his expectations whether Sudan will be removed from the list of state sponsor of terrorism, Nagy said the termination of the designation of state sponsor of terrorism is not going to be “flipping a switch.”“It is a process involving several branches of the US government,” he stressed. “I wish I could give you a definitive answer. Unfortunately, I cannot.”
Nagy didn’t give further details, noting that he wants to be very careful about what he says because he is not a “lawyer or a legal expert.”Regarding the compensation Sudan will have to pay, Nagy did not mention a specific amount but said those details were being worked out.
“We have discussed obviously numbers with the parties involved, but in no way can we make those public yet,” he added. Asked about the next steps after the Supreme Court ruled that Sudan has to pay more than four billion dollars to the victims of the US East African embassy attack, the official said the US obviously notes the May 18 decision. “We also recognize that litigation related to those claims is going to continue.”“I want to underline that we remain absolutely committed to our efforts to work with Sudan to achieve a resolution of the claims related to the 1998 East Africa bombings,” he stated. On Monday, the US Supreme Court ruled that the African nation can’t avoid punitive damages in lawsuits, accusing it of complicity in the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people. The ruling reinstates about $826 million out of a total $4.3 billion in punitive damages. Twelve Americans were killed by the Aug. 7, 1998 truck bombs that detonated outside the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The lawsuits involve 567 people, mostly non-US citizens who were employees of the US government and their relatives.

Brussels Conference on Syria to Be Held via Videoconference in June
Brussels- Abdullah Mustafa/Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
The fourth Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region will be held via videoconference on June 30, European Union foreign affairs spokesman Peter Stano has said. In written statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Stano added that the conference would enable participants to discuss more support for the refugees and neighboring countries that received them and were affected by the conflict in Syria. It will also be an opportunity to discuss means of finding a political solution to end conflict, he added. The spokesman avoided answering a question on the parties invited by the EU to participate, being the initiator of this conference. He cited statements by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell after a video conference of EU foreign ministers last week. “I’ve informed the ministers about the preparations for the fourth Brussels Conference on the future of Syria and the region. The ministerial event will take place on 30 June, I’m afraid in the digital format”, Borrell said. “This conference will be an opportunity to come with ambitious pledges and to express support for a credible political solution to the Syrian conflict, mediated by the United Nations,” he added. In September 2019, the EU published a report on the progress against the pledges made at the third Brussels conference on “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” on behalf of the Brussels Conference co-chairs. It showed that for 2019, donors have already contributed 92 percent ($6.4 billion) of the pledges made to provide funding in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. As for 2020 and beyond, an EU statement indicated that only 32 percent of the pledges announced ($752 million) are already available. Of the $21 billion worth of loans pledged for 2019 and beyond, $14.8 billion (71 percent) have been made available in refugee-hosting countries.
The international community pledged seven billion dollars in funding to support humanitarian, stabilizing, and development activities in 2019 in Syria and the region, and a further $2.4 billion for 2020 and beyond. In addition, international financial institutions and donors also announced $21 billion in loans for 2019 and beyond. Earlier this week, the EU Commission in Brussels has published detailed guidance on how coronavirus-related humanitarian aid can be sent to countries and areas around the world that are subject to EU sanctions, including Syria.

Libyan National Army Prepares for Air Battle by Downing 7 Turkish Drones
Cairo – Khaled Mahmoud/Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
The Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by Khalifa Haftar, announced on Friday the downing of seven Turkish drones, in what was interpreted as a response to Ankara’s warning to the military of “grave consequences” if its interests in Libya were attacked. Hours after Ankara’s threat, the LNA announced that its air defenses shot down seven Turkish drones in various regions in less than six hours. The LNA said drones of the “Turkish invaders” were downed in the Qaryat and Abou al-Gharib regions south of Bani Walid and Tarhuna cities. Another aircraft was shot down over Wishka.
This takes to 90 the number of drones downed by the LNA since it launched its operation to liberate Tripoli in April 2019. The LNA also announced the destruction of 20 Government of National Accord (GNA) armored vehicles in an airstrike in Gharyan city. Politically, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticized the flow of weapons to Libya. Pompeo placed a phone call to GNA chief Fayez al-Sarraj to "reiterate US opposition to the continued level of weapons and munitions being brought into the country," the State Department said. The statement was seen as a jab at Turkey that has been backing the GNA with weapons. Pompeo and Sarraj "emphasized the importance of an immediate halt to the fighting and return to political dialogue," a statement said. Fighting on Thursday centered around al-Asbiah, some 120 kilometers west of Tripoli. LNA spokesman Ahmed al-Mismari said the military carried out a series of airstrikes against Turkish President Recep Tayyip “Erdogan’s takfiri militias” in Asbiah and the surrounding regions. Mismari said four warplanes have become newly available after they were out of service for a long time. He added that LNA teams succeeded in refurbishing them, without specifying the type of aircraft, but promising “excellent results” from them. “The time has come for them to be used at their maximum fire power,” he stressed. The GNA, meanwhile, did not announce any new accomplishment on the ground, with a spokesman calling on the residents of Tarhuna, Wishka, Mizdah and Sirte to steer clear of LNA positions. The GNA will provide safe passage for trapped civilians. In Tarhuna, after days of military buildup, the GNA said it was blocking the coastal road stretching from Castelverde to al-Qoaah, claiming it was protecting civilians from the LNA’s arbitrary shelling.
The GNA had recently launched an attack in an attempt to recapture Tarhuna from the LNA. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya, meanwhile, expressed its concern over the latest fighting in the country. In a terse statement, it said it “is following with great concern the military developments and mobilization around the city of Tarhuna. UNSMIL reminds all parties of their obligations in accordance with international humanitarian law and warns against any acts of retribution, including attacks against civilians, extrajudicial punishments, looting, robberies and torching of public and private properties. UNSMIL calls on all parties to refrain from military escalation and resort to peaceful means.”

Israel's Netanyahu, Unbeaten in Elections, is Going on Trial
Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
After entering the record books last year as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu will once again make history when he becomes the country’s first sitting leader to go on trial. Surrounded by security guards, Netanyahu is set to march into Jerusalem’s district court for arraignment on a series of corruption charges on Sunday. The stunning scene will push Israel into uncharted political and legal territory, launching a process that could ultimately end the career of a leader who has been undefeatable at the ballot box for over a decade, reported The Associated Press.
Netanyahu has been charged with fraud, breach of trust and accepting bribes in a series of cases. He is accused of accepting expensive gifts, such as cartons of champagne and cigars, from wealthy friends and offering favors to media moguls in exchange for favorable news coverage of him and his family.
In the most serious case, he is accused of promoting legislation that delivered hundreds of millions of dollars of profits to the owner of a major telecom company while wielding behind-the-scenes editorial influence over the firm’s popular news website. Netanyahu has denied the charges, claiming he is the victim of an “attempted coup” by overaggressive police, biased prosecutors and a hostile media. “It’s the classic deep state argument,” said Gayil Tashir, a political scientist at Israel’s Hebrew University. Netanyahu claims “an unelected movement is trying to remove him from power just because he is a representative of the right,” she said, according to the AP.
Netanyahu is not the first Israeli leader to go on trial. Both former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and former President Moshe Katsav went to prison in the 2010s — Olmert on corruption charges and Katsav for rape. But they stepped down to fight the charges. As opposition leader in 2008, Netanyahu led the calls for Olmert to leave office, famously saying a leader “up to his neck” in legal troubles had no business governing a country. But as the investigations have piled up, culminating with his indictment last November, Netanyahu has changed his tune. He has rejected calls to resign while repeatedly lashing out at the country’s legal system. Among his favorite targets have been a former police chief and the current attorney general — both Netanyahu appointees — and the country’s Supreme Court. Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit recently filed a complaint to police over anonymous threats sent to his mobile phone.
Netanyahu’s conspiratorial claims of victimhood have played well with his base of religious and nationalist supporters. But it is unclear whether they will hold up in court, given the lack of evidence.
In the courtroom, the legal arguments are more likely to focus on his claims that his gifts were genuine shows of affection from close friends and that he never received anything in return for the favors he is accused of offering.
The case is expected to last for several years, given the vast number of witnesses and documents that are expected to be presented. Netanyahu has done his best to avoid this moment. During a three-year investigation, which was slowed by Netanyahu's trips abroad and occasional security crises, he repeatedly claimed that investigators would “find nothing because there is nothing.” He briefly tried, but failed, to win parliamentary immunity from prosecution. In March, his hand-picked justice minister delayed the trial by two months, citing coronavirus restrictions.
This week, judges rejected Netanyahu’s request to stay home on Sunday and allow his lawyers to represent him. Netanyahu had argued that his presence was unnecessary and costly, and that having his security detail in the courtroom would violate social-distancing requirements.
Nonetheless, he enters the courtroom with renewed strength. After three bruising elections over the past year, Netanyahu was sworn into office this week for a fourth consecutive term. All three elections were seen as referendums on his fitness for office, and all ended in deadlock. After the most recent vote in March, his rival, Benny Gantz, appeared to have mustered enough support in parliament to pass legislation that would have disqualified Netanyahu from serving as prime minister while under indictment.
But in a stunning turnaround, Gantz, citing fears of a fourth expensive election and the coronavirus pandemic, agreed to shelve the legislation and instead form a power-sharing government with Netanyahu. The Supreme Court cleared the way for Netanyahu to remain in power. In a key ruling, it said an indicted politician may serve as prime minister — even though Israeli law requires all other office-holders to resign if charged with a crime. Under their deal, Netanyahu was forced to yield some powers to Gantz, with each wielding a veto over most key decisions. Gantz will hold the title of “alternate prime minister,” and after 18 months, they will swap jobs. Tashir, the political scientist, said the agreement creates troubling conflicts of interest. Netanyahu made sure he would be involved in the appointments of key officials, including Supreme Court judges and the next attorney general, who could influence any appeals process.
“Netanyahu’s perspective all this year was interfering with his own trial,” she said. Under the deal, the alternate prime minister, like the premier, will not be required to resign due to criminal charges. That could ensure that Netanyahu remains in office throughout his trial and even into a possible appeals process.
It will also give him the opportunity to continue to attack the legal system. Netanyahu’s eldest son Yair, who often acts as his unofficial spokesman, posted a profile picture on Twitter that spells the word “prosecution” with a sewing machine as the first letter. The message: the case against the prime minister is unfairly “stitched up.”

Pakistan Plane Crash Leaves 97 Dead, Two Survivors
Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 23 May, 2020
All but two of the 99 people on board a Pakistan passenger plane were killed when it crashed into a residential neighborhood of Karachi, officials said Saturday, as rescue workers toiled through the charred and twisted wreckage strewn across the street. The Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane had made multiple approaches to land at Karachi airport on Friday when it came down among houses, sparking a rescue operation that lasted into the night. PIA spokesman Abdullah Khan said on Saturday the flight data recorder from the airliner was found, including both the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder. "The black box had been found late yesterday, we are handing it over to the inquiry board," he said. The bodies of all the passengers and crew had been recovered, the Sindh Health Ministry said, adding that 19 had been identified. DNA testing was being carried out at the University of Karachi to help identify the dead. Flames and plumes of smoke were sent into the air as the plane came down, its wings slicing through rooftops before crashing onto a street. Residents were the first to search through debris for survivors, with witnesses reporting the cries of a man hanging from the plane's emergency exit door.
A local hospital earlier reported it had received the bodies of people killed on the ground. PIA said air traffic control lost contact with the plane traveling from Lahore to Karachi just after 2:30 pm (0930 GMT). The disaster comes as Pakistanis prepare to celebrate the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan and the beginning of Eid al-Fitr, with many traveling to their homes in cities and villages. Sarfraz Ahmed, a firefighter at the crash site, told AFP that rescuers had pulled bodies from the Airbus A320 aircraft who were still wearing seatbelts. Residents near the scene recounted how their walls shook before a big explosion erupted as the aircraft slammed into the neighborhood. "I was coming from the mosque when I saw the plane tilting on one side. It was so low that the walls of my house were trembling," said 14-year-old Hassan. Another resident, Mudassar Ali, said he "heard a big bang and woke up to people calling for the fire brigade".An AFP reporter witnessed charred bodies being loaded into ambulances. "It was an (Airbus) A320, which is one of the safest planes," PIA chief executive Arshad Mahmood Malik said at a press conference. "Technically, operationally everything was in place."Aviation minister Ghulam Sarwar Khan said the captain, Sajjad Gull, had been described by the airline as a senior A320 pilot with extensive flight experience.Airbus said that the plane had first entered service in 2004 and was acquired by PIA a decade later and had logged around 47,100 flight hours. PIA promised a full independent investigation.
'Prayers & condolences'
Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan said he was "shocked and saddened" by the crash, tweeting that he was in touch with the state airline's chief executive. "Prayers & condolences go to families of the deceased," he wrote on Twitter.The Pakistan military said security forces were deployed to the neighborhood and helicopters were used to survey the damage, while offering condolences over the "loss of precious lives."Commercial flights resumed only days ago, after planes were grounded during a lockdown over the coronavirus pandemic. Pakistan has a chequered military and civilian aviation safety record, with frequent plane and helicopter crashes over the years. In 2016, a Pakistan International Airlines plane burst into flames after one of its two turboprop engines failed while flying from the remote north to Islamabad, killing more than 40 people. The deadliest air disaster on Pakistani soil was in 2010, when an Airbus A321 operated by private airline Airblue and flying from Karachi crashed into the hills outside Islamabad as it came in to land, killing all 152 people on board. An official report blamed the accident on a confused captain and a hostile cockpit atmosphere. PIA, a leading airline until the 1970s, has seen its reputation sink due to frequent cancellations, delays, and financial troubles. It has been involved in numerous controversies over the years, including the jailing of a drunk pilot in Britain in 2013.

Saudi Arabia orders the return of its ambassador to Iraq as soon as possible
Tuqa Khalid, Al Arabiya English/Saturday 23 May 2020
Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Iraq will resume his duties as soon as possible, Saudi’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud said on Saturday, according to state news agency SPA. The move was to strengthen Saudi-Iraqi relations as per the Saudi leadership’s directives, the Prince added.
The announcement came during a meeting in Riyadh between Iraq’s deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister and acting oil Minister, Ali Allawi, and a number of Saudi officials including, the Foreign Minister, Minister of Commerce, and Minister of Finance. The two countries agreed to continue working to rebalance oil markets and stressed their commitment to output cuts agreed in mid-April by OPEC+, the group composed of OPEC, Russia and other oil producing nations. The Saudi officials also discussed the land borders with Iraq and trade relations between the two countries, including: the start of the Saudi Commercial Attaché’s work in Iraq in the upcoming period and increasing the efforts to open the Jadeedah Arar port soon. Later in the day, Saudi Arabia's Deputy Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Salman said the Kingdom stood with Iraq to support it in its path of progress and peace. “We look forward to Iraq returning to being one of the Arabs’ pillars, strong and resurgent, and that its people live the life they deserve in peace and prosperity,” the Prince said on Twitter. “The Kingdom stands with Iraq to support it in the path of progress, peace, and brotherly relationships with its Arab neighbors, in the interest of Iraq and its dear people,” he added.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on May 23-24/2020
Abbas's Precious Gift to Iran: Hamas
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/May 23, 2020
By halting the security crackdown on Hamas, Abbas would be paving the way for terrorists to kill him and his associates in the West Bank, as they had already begun to do in 2007 in the Gaza Strip, and possibly again in a coup in 2014.
If and when Abbas does suspend security coordination with Israel, he will be sending a message to Iran and its Palestinian proxies that the time has come to turn the West Bank into a center for Jihad against Israel and the "infidels."
At the same time, Abbas will be signing his own death warrant: Hamas has apparently not relinquished its desire to "hang Abbas in front of the Palestinian people." It appears to be decision time: Will Abbas ally himself with those who are protecting him or with those who execute him as a traitor?
If Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas halted his security agreement with Israel, as he has repeatedly threatened to do, he would be signing his own death warrant. Photo of Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas.
The Iranian-backed Hamas movement has welcomed Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's latest threat to renounce all agreements and understandings with Israel and the US, including security cooperation.
"We hope that this time Abu Mazen's (Abbas's) decision is a serious one," said Saleh Arouri, deputy head of the Hamas "political bureau." Arouri added that the return of the "armed resistance" to the West Bank was now possible "and even closer than some may think."
The Hamas official repeated his movement's rejection of any peace agreement with Israel, including the Oslo Accords, signed between the PLO and Israel in 1993. "Since day one, we have rejected the Oslo Accords," Arouri explained. "We have also strongly opposed all security agreements with the occupation, and therefore we welcome Abu Mazen's decision to halt the security coordination [with Israel]."
Iran's other Palestinian proxy, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), also seems to be satisfied with Abbas's recurring threat to renounce all agreements with Israel, including security coordination.
"We take Abu Mazen's announcement seriously and look forward to its implementation," said PIJ Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah. "What is required of the Palestinian Authority is a big step towards unity."
Why are Hamas and PIJ so happy with the Palestinian leader?
Abbas's threat, which came in response to an Israeli plan to extend Israeli law to parts of the West Bank, is undoubtedly a precious gift not only to his Palestinian political rivals in Hamas, but also to Iran, whose leaders continue to talk about the need for "eliminating the Zionist regime."
On the same day Abbas made his announcement, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, wrote on Twitter: "Eliminating the Zionist regime doesn't mean eliminating Jews. We aren't against Jews. It means abolishing the imposed regime and Muslim, Christian and Jewish Palestinians choose their own government and expel thugs like [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu. This is 'eliminating Israel', and it will happen."
In another comment on Twitter on May 19, Khamenei said that the West Bank, where Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are based, "must be armed, just like Gaza."
The Iranian leader is actually saying that his country is seeking to turn the West Bank into a launching pad for terrorist attacks in order to achieve the goal of eliminating Israel. Bizarrely, he is promising to destroy Israel, but without killing Jews.
Khamenei evidently sees Abbas's decision to renounce all agreements and understandings with Israel and the US as a positive development that would facilitate the mission Iran and Hamas share to export anti-Israel terrorism to the West Bank. The Iranian leader wants the West Bank to become like the Gaza Strip, from where Hamas and its allies have been firing rockets at Israel for several years.
If Abbas goes through with his threat to halt security coordination with Israel, that would mean an end to his efforts to prevent Iran's Palestinian proxies, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, from proceeding with their ambition of extending their control to the West Bank. By halting the security crackdown on Hamas, Abbas would be paving the way for terrorists to kill him and his associates in the West Bank, as they already began to do in 2007 in the Gaza Strip, and possibly again in a coup in 2014.
In recent years Abbas's security forces have arrested hundreds of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members in the West Bank as part of an effort to prevent these groups from undermining his regime. Israel, for its part, has been helping Abbas by routinely arresting Hamas members and officials who pose a threat to his government.
It is rare for a Hamas leader to praise Abbas. Hamas and Abbas have been engaged in a power struggle since 2007, when the Islamist movement, Hamas, staged a violent coup in the Gaza Strip, hurled members of the Palestinian Authority from high buildings and overthrew the Palestinian Authority regime, along with Abbas, who, since then, has not even been able to return to his house in the Gaza Strip. Like their masters in Tehran, however, the leaders of Hamas now apparently believe that Abbas may finally have decided to join the Iranian-led "axis of evil" by cutting Palestinian ties with Israel and the US.
Therefore the leaders of Hamas are now heaping praise on Abbas and urging him to "translate his words into deeds." The message Hamas is sending to Abbas is, "Thank you for finally realizing that the armed struggle is the only way to destroy Israel. Let us join forces in the Jihad to eliminate Israel."
Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist; its charter states that "the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it or part of it. No Arab country and no Arab king or president have that right."
The charter also makes it clear that [peace] "initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas]. For renouncing any part of Palestine means renouncing part of the religion; the movement educates its members to adhere to its principles and to raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their Jihad. There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad."
For several years now, Hamas has been strongly condemning Abbas because of his perceived support for the two-state solution and contacts with Israel, including security coordination between the Palestinian Authority security forces and the IDF in the West Bank. At one point, when Abbas was quoted as saying that he was not opposed to the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri responded by announcing that the Palestinian leader's statement did not represent the Palestinian people.
In 2014, Hamas went further by calling for removing Abbas from power and putting him on trial for "high treason." Yahya Abadseh, a senior Hamas official in the Gaza Strip, said that Abbas should be toppled and brought to trial for "betraying the Palestinian people and endangering their interests by imposing sanctions on the Gaza Strip and collaborating with foreign parties."
Three years later, another senior Hamas official, Marwan Abu Ras, called for "imposing [Islamic] sharia law against Abbas by hanging him in front of his people." Abu Ras too accused Abbas of "treason" and "collaboration" with Israel.
Additionally, paying verbal respects after a death constitutes high treason in the eyes of Hamas. A year ago, the terrorist organization accused Abbas of betraying the Palestinians by offering condolences to Israeli President Reuven Rivlin over the death of his wife in June 2019. Hamas spokesman Abdel Latif Qanou said, "Abbas's condolences to the President of the Zionist entity over the death of his wife is a betrayal of our Palestinian people, a stab [in the backs of] the families of the [Palestinian] martyrs, and a disregard for their noble feelings."
If and when Abbas does suspend security coordination with Israel, he will be sending a message to Iran and its Palestinian proxies that the time has come to turn the West Bank into a center for Jihad against Israel and the "infidels."
At the same time, Abbas will be signing his own death warrant: Hamas has apparently not relinquished its desire to "hang Abbas in front of the Palestinian people." It appears to be decision time: Will Abbas ally himself with those who are protecting him or with those who execute him as a traitor?
*Khaled Abu Toameh, an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem, is a Shillman Journalism Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

The Old Organization and the New World ... the Necessity of Reform!
Zuhair Al-Harthi/Asharq Al-Awsat/May 23/2020
The world is obviously not in the best condition today in light of everything that is happening, most notably the escalating American-Chinese conflict and coronavirus's catastrophic social, economic, and health implications. This has opened the door for rethinking the role of international organizations, starting with the United Nations (UN), and reforming them. The aging organization has become flabby and can longer deal with crises and fulfill its role. Narrow interests and a few major states’ international alliances have hampered its performance, and its principles have become more like slogans.
This organization has unfortunately become incapable; its bodies a series of isolated islands without standards running in a vicious cycle. This is exemplified by the fact that those who have dealt with it claim that they have lost confidence in it. The reasons behind that are not new, even before the crises that we are dealing with today, as a new world is taking form as a result of the pandemic. As the international organization becomes more incompetent, voices are bound to be raised, with every failed attempt made by the Security Council to solve issues, insistence on the necessity of change is reinforced, especially that we are talking about an organization that has been around for more than seven decades. The circumstances, events, and delicacy of the phase that the world is going through have given momentum to calls for radical reform of both content and essence.
The lack of solutions and ways out, as well as the ever-increasing failures and stories of delays have become hallmarks of the meagerness of the UN’s role. Memory is flooded with suspended issues and accumulated crises. Note, for example, the chronicity of the Palestinian issue, the North Korean crisis, Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missiles and interference in foreign affairs and support for terrorism, the Indian-Pakistani conflict and that of China with Taiwan, the Western Sahara issue, Sudan and its issues, and the South American crises. Not to mention the scandals of its peacekeeping missions during the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, and today in Syria and Libya. The events in Yemen, for example, unequivocally reflect the imbalance, confusion, and lack of planning from which the United Nations suffer. While international resolutions and principles of international law are clear and explicit, their fickle and self-contradictory implementation is nevertheless dubious.
The organization's successive steps have pushed many to reconsider the UN’s structure and the Security Council’s role and decision-making mechanism. Many have grievances over the administrative and organizational structure of the UN’s bodies, most notably the veto system, which is inconsistent with an explicit text in the United Nations Charter stipulating the "principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”. There is also the issue of the voting system in the International Monetary Fund, not to mention its dubious selection of envoys for managing crises and global issues, swayed by favoritism and allegiances, and finally the obstruction of the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council because of its impact on the balance of power.
Two centuries ago, the philosopher Immanuel Kant was the first to propose the establishment of a federal system that included all of the world's countries. In his conception, it would focus on punishing any country that violates the rights of another. The idea of a system of collective security was founded on preventing illegal breaches of the international system's status quo. Indeed, the form it would take evolved after the development of several different formulas for organizing the international community in the aftermath of the European Wars, starting with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which laid down the rules and foundations for ensuring the security of its member states on a collective basis. International relations swiftly continued its path toward cooperation with the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, passing through the Vienna Convention in 1815, which entrenched the concept of collective security, making it a critical component of international relations.
The League of Nations existed between 1919 and 1945, but it failed to carry out its mission. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Allied countries, led by America, who emerged from the Second World War victorious, established the United Nations in 1945, which had six main agencies, General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat. Facts like these indicate that the organization, throughout its history, has been developing and incrementally reforming. It has not always been the same entity and has changed, which further supports the calls for reform. Many agree that the UN has structural deficiencies and that it needs not minor, but major surgeries.
In any case, since taking office as Secretary-General of the UN, Antonio Guterres was unable to make a difference despite his enthusiasm. Of course, he cannot just wave a magic wand, but the current circumstances may motivate Guterres to use them according to certain agreement and arrangements, especially after multipolarity has returned with China and Russia, in order restore the UN’s status and to strengthen its body that has been wrecked by damage and corruption in line with this new world and on the basis of neutrality, professionalism, and integrity.
There is a need for a new formulation of the international organization, fixing the imbalance in the capacity to impose international policies and relations. The rapid changes that people are living today give a stronger case for the calls for real reform that changes its structure and not just its appearance.

A new Iran nuclear deal? Not so fast
Ari Heistein and Dr. Raz Zimmt/Al Arabiya/May 23/2020
Both US presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Joe Biden, have declared their intentions to reach an agreement with Tehran on its nuclear program. In his 2018 speech withdrawing the US from the JCPOA, Trump said, “The fact is, they are going to want to make a new and lasting deal, one that benefits all of Iran and the Iranian people. When they do, I am ready, willing, and able.” His challenger from the Democratic Party noted, “If Iran moves back into compliance with its nuclear obligations, I would re-enter the JCPOA as a starting point to work alongside our allies in Europe and other world powers to extend the deal’s nuclear constraints.” While these scenarios may technically be within the realm of possibility, recent developments in both the US and Iran make them highly unlikely.
The working assumptions underpinning these plans is that Iran will return to the negotiating table with the US. President Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, which was implemented after the US withdrawal from the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal, is based on the premise that by squeezing Iran economically more than President Obama did will enable Trump to reach a more stringent and comprehensive agreement with the Iranians. In contrast, Biden appears to believe that by shifting from “America first” to a more multilateral approach in coordination with allies, as well as defusing the crisis and then engaging in talks with Iran, his administration will be able to save the JCPOA from collapse and build on it with follow-on agreements.
It is almost certain that no negotiations will take place before the 2020 US presidential elections, as both Iran and the US will wait to recalibrate their approaches based on the electoral results. Yet, even after the elections – regardless of who wins – it is possible that Iran will not seek to enter into another agreement with the US. While one could point to the 2012-2015 negotiations as proof that Iran is willing to take a more pragmatic rather than hardline approach on its nuclear program, to assume that the conditions that facilitated the JCPOA agreement exist today would be to ignore significant developments that have since taken place.
In 2012, Iran was indeed forced to make a strategic policy shift and agreed to negotiate. Economic sanctions certainly played a significant role in Iran’s decision, but the change of its policy cannot be explained merely by economic considerations. The election of Hassan Rouhani as president in the summer of 2013 created an opportunity for a change of direction in Iran’s policy and made it possible to speed up the talks between Iranian and American representatives that had begun months earlier. At the same time, Iran’s significant progress in the nuclear realm provided Tehran with the ability to temporarily freeze some elements without giving up its military nuclear breakout option, which is perceived by Supreme Leader Khamenei as a vital guarantee of regime survival.
The current state of the Iranian political system, which has further radicalized over the last two years, does not provide favorable conditions for renewing negotiations and reaching a new deal. In the recent parliamentary elections held in February 2020, the hardliners succeeded in regaining full control of the Iranian parliament and the coronavirus pandemic has provided the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with an opportunity to further increase its involvement in state affairs while exploiting the weakness of Rouhani’s government.
In terms of foreign policy, over the past year Iran has implemented a policy of “maximum resistance” in response to the US maximum pressure policy. Today, Khamenei is well aware of the economic grievances of his countrymen, but still adheres to his position that the solution to the economic crisis exacerbated by sanctions lies in a “resistance economy.” This means reducing Iran’s dependence on foreigners and relying instead on domestic production. For Khamenei, the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal merely confirmed his paranoid, radical anti-US worldview. In Khamenei’s view, the US should not be trusted and was using the nuclear issue as an excuse to pressure, isolate, and weaken Iran to set the stage for the ultimate US strategic goal: regime change.
Nearly a decade after Khamenei reluctantly agreed to allow talks with “The Great Satan,” it is unlikely he will be convinced to do so again. At the age of 81, approaching the end of his rule, Khamenei seems preoccupied with his legacy no less than with his country’s current problems. He does not appear willing to enter the history books as the leader who led his country to further concessions, especially after the diplomatic approach he approved in the past did not yield the desired results.
But even if it were possible for Tehran and Washington to reach an agreement, it can either be credible or long-term – but not both. Deals based on executive agreement, like the JCPOA, have already proved vulnerable to the shift in foreign policy accompanying a US presidential transition. Similarly, even if a future “JCPOA 2.0” is enshrined as a treaty by the US Senate, it is conceivable that the next president could withdraw (as was done with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia). The weakness of such foreign policy accords has become especially glaring in recent decades, as each successive president seems intent on reversing the direction of their predecessor.
It is worth noting that the US “maximum pressure” campaign has highlighted that Washington has more economic leverage over Iran than was initially anticipated, even when it is acting unilaterally. That may provide some incentive for Iran to make an agreement, but that revelation alone is unlikely to be the decisive factor in Iranian decision-making.
Though it is uncertain whether a new nuclear deal will prove to be within reach, whoever the next US president is may not have a better, realistic alternative. US efforts to reach a new agreement should be grounded in the following three assumptions: 1) Pressure will be necessary for any future agreement, 2) No agreement is forthcoming until at least November 2020, and 3) The less leverage the US has going into negotiations, the less it will be able to shape a future agreement. All that said, both candidates would be well-advised to develop a “Plan B” for how to cope with the Iranian nuclear threat, so as to be prepared for the very real possibility Tehran refuses to return to the negotiating table.
*Ari Heistein is a research fellow and chief of staff to the director at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
*Dr. Raz Zimmt is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) specializing in Iran and a veteran Iran-watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces.

The Makhlouf episode raises questions about regime’s colossal fortune abroad and Alawites’ future
The Arab weekly/May 24/2020
One of the amusing aspects of the crisis inside the ruling family in Syria, with both its Assad and Makhlouf branches, is to hear them talk about the rule of law.
One side is suddenly threatening to appeal to justice as if there has ever been rule of law in Syria since the Ba’ath Party came to power in 1963, and even before that when Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj ruled Syria during the period of Egyptian-Syrian unification between February 1958 and September 1961.
Strangely enough, when the union with Egypt was abolished, there appeared to be a flicker of hope that Syria might revert to being a normal country with a reasonable and modern constitution, governed by normal people.
In 2020, in reaction to the escalating campaign by the Assad family to gain control of the telecommunications company Syriatel, most of which is owned by the Makhlouf family, Rami Makhlouf began talking about the need for everybody to adhere to the rule of law. Makhlouf was slapped with what can only be described as a ransom tax of nearly $180 million by Syrian authorities.
Makhlouf suddenly forgot how he and his brothers became majority owners of Syriatel, and how Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawiris was kicked out of the new venture immediately after the latter’s company played the role required of it in the founding stage.
At that time, Syriatel needed investors and specialised expertise. Certainly, the last thing Rami thought about when Sawiris was removed from Syriatel was the law, which was nothing but a soft tool in his hand.
Things remained as they were in Syriatel until Syrian President Bashar Assad, his wife Asma al-Akhras and his brother Maher started to have greedy ideas about the Makhlouf fortune and how to acquire it all. They started by placing Syriatel in the framework of a new cartel controlled by Asma, who seemed to have recently developed great business ambitions.
Now the matter is not really the small fortune that the Makhlouf brothers owe to the Syrian treasury, but rather the whole fortune of the Makhlouf family that the Assad family is looking to recover. The Assad clan reasoned that they originally owned a part of this fortune, given that Mohamed Makhlouf, the patriarch who created the wealth, served as a business front for the Assad regime and as its financial arm.
Most of this wealth, of which Syriatel is a part, is deposited in accounts outside Syria, in Europe in particular, according to those familiar with the secrets of the Syrian regime. The Makhlouf family, led by patriarch Mohamed, the brother of Anisa, Hafez Assad’s wife, amassed a tremendous fortune worth billions of dollars based on controlling oil interests.
To get a better idea of the size of this fortune, all one needs to do is listen to the testimony given a few days ago to Russian TV channel RT by Firas Tlass, businessman and son of Mustafa Tlass, who was minister of defence during the reign of Hafez Assad. With the death of Anisa and Mohamed Makhlouf’s illness, the Makhlouf clan lost their source of power.
In one segment of the interview, Firas Tlass said: “When Rifaat al-Assad passed away, he was replaced by Mohamed Makhlouf, who had secured the help of Lebanese business advisors, then British ones and then South African ones (to build his fortune), and created a network of lawyers who established for him companies abroad. During this period of the 1980s, foreign companies flocked to invest in oil exploration in Syria, and Makhlouf became a partner with each oil company that entered Syria.”
“There is a popular belief among Syrians that the Syrian oil and its revenues never appear in the Syrian budget (the state’s budget). In fact, this appears either in the General Petroleum Corporation, or in the Ministry of Oil, but what happens is that the Oil Marketing Office, which is responsible for selling the oil, was selling it to only seven companies, and if any company in the world comes to buy oil directly from Syria, there will always be someone from the Oil Marketing Office who will whisper to you: ‘See so and so’. This so and so is Mohamed Makhlouf (aka Abu Rami). And when you go to Mohamed Makhlouf, he tells you: ‘We will make a contract in Cyprus with this company so that you pay it 7% commission’. And this is in fact a high commission because oil commissions usually vary between 0.5 and 1%. But you will recover this 7% in the form of a deduction on the price of Syrian oil. In other words, Syrian oil is in fact sold at 7% less than its real price and the difference is pocketed by companies in the name of the two families, Al-Assad and Makhlouf. This system has been in place since 1986 or 1987. When Syrian oil began to be sold commercially according to real export operations, we started looking at huge figures, even though these figures did not hit the billions until the 1990s, because Syria was not exporting any more than between 200 and 220 thousand barrels.”
Firas Tlass also relayed how Mohamed Makhlouf gained hundreds of millions of dollars from selling operation licenses to companies building infrastructure in Syria. An incredulous interviewer asked him: “But oil is a public sector in Syria; is Mohamed Makhlouf a partner of the state or an agent of the state?”
“All of the oil extracted in Syria is sold through the Oil Marketing Office,” Tlass answered, “and no one has the right to buy Syrian oil unless he is registered with the Oil Marketing Office, and if you go to them to register your company, you will be categorically rejected even if you are the largest company in the world … unless you have a contract with Mohamed Makhlouf, who gets his 7% commission. On a $ 50 million sale, the family gets $ 3.5 million, and we are talking here about 6 to 7 million dollars per day.”
In the short run, Bashar Assad will bring Rami Makhlouf to heel. However, that will not stop people from raising many questions, chiefly what future awaits the Syrian regime if Bashar, Asma and Maher defeat Rami. Then again, what effects will this family feud have on the Alawite community itself? This internal tension is unprecedented in the sect’s history.
The big problem for the Alawites is that this vicious internal feud is taking place while Syria’s future is at stake.
Rami Makhlouf has the keys to the foreign accounts. Who then will be able to recover the fortune in these accounts at a time when all Syrian figures associated with the regime are on US and European sanctions list?
Moreover, is there anyone close to the Assad family who can be entrusted with any account that may escape Rami Makhlouf’s control and the myriad of front businesses protecting him from sanctions?
This is truly a tragedy of a colossal fortune and of a family that has been ruling Syria and controlling the fate of the Alawites for a long time now.