English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese
Related, Global News & Editorials
For May 20/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
http://data.eliasbejjaninews.com/eliasnews19/english.may20.20.htm
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Bible Quotations For today
Do not worry about anything, but in everything by prayer
and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known to God
Letter to the Philippians 04/01-07: “Therefore, my brothers and
sisters, whom I love and long for, my joy and crown, stand firm in the Lord in
this way, my beloved. I urge Euodia and I urge Syntyche to be of the same mind
in the Lord. Yes, and I ask you also, my loyal companion, help these women, for
they have struggled beside me in the work of the gospel, together with Clement
and the rest of my co-workers, whose names are in the book of life. Rejoice in
the Lord always; again I will say, Rejoice. Let your gentleness be known to
everyone. The Lord is near. Do not worry about anything, but in everything by
prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known to
God. And the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding, will guard your
hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus.”
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese &
Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on May 19-20/2020
Lebanese Ministry of Health announces 23 new COVID-19 cases
Lebanon's Hariri Hospital: One new Covid-19 case recorded today, no critical
cases
Lebanese Health Minister Hamad Hasan: Isolation of Some Areas May be Best
Solution
Lebanese Supreme Defense Council decides extension of public mobilization from
May 25 till June 7
Lebanese Cabinet convenes at Baabda Palace, agrees to cancel official secondary
exams and technical baccalaureate
Lebanese Govt. Cancels Official Exams, Defense Council Urges Mobilization till
June 7
General Security chief Maj. Gen. Abbas IbrahimR eportedly Holds Talks in Syria
Diab: If chaos continues, we will renew total lockdown
Berri tackles overall situation with diplomats, UNIFIL’s Del Col
Diab receives phone call from his Egyptian counterpart
LAF, UNIFIL complete probe into shooting of shepherd in Kfarshouba
Lebanese Man Pleads Guilty to Plotting to Send Drone Parts to Hezbollah
Hawat submits documents on cross-border smuggling to judiciary
Hariri Slams Bassil, Rules Out Trade with Syria
Strong Lebanon bloc demands financial appointments be made, gaps in government's
plan be fixed
Covid-19: Ghana’s High Commission requests information on stranded Ghanaians in
Lebanon
Lebanon Finance Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Rescue Plan Gives Govt. Credibility
in Dealing with IMF
Lebanon says it will honor Sonatrach fuel import contract amid probe
Lebanon still seeks IMF help but Hezbollah stands in the way
Three arrested in connection with murder of Lebanese student Aya Hachem
Angola Picks Lebanese Group Africell as Fourth Telecoms Operator
Le coup d’Etat bancaire du Hezbollah au Liban
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on
May 19-20/2020
US Navy issues new warning to Iran after close encounters in Arabian Gulf
Iran Launches ‘Resistance’ Award Named After Soleimani
Iran Says ‘All Options’ on Table if US Hinders Fuel Shipments to Venezuela
Cyberattack on Port: 'Iran crossed a red line - Israel had to respond'
Against evidence, Israel defense minister claims Iran withdrawing from Syria:
Experts
Bennett: Iran leaving Syria, but could come back if Israel let's up
UN Team Reports New Evidence Against ISIS in Iraq
Bitter rift in Assad family. Bashar vs tycoon cousin Makhlouf
Dispute between Government, Makhlouf Deepens Syria's Economic Woes
Syrian Government Seizes Assets of Assad Cousin Makhlouf
Canada/Readout: Ministers Champagne and Johnson Smith co-preside a second
meeting with UN Member States on addressing the COVID-19 financing challenge
Spain Govt. Seeks 2-Week Extension of Lockdown
WHO States Agree to Independent Probe of Coronavirus Response'
Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources published on May 19-20/2020
Iran’s coronavirus strategy: Neglect its people, revive its proxies/Dr.Walid
Phares/Al Arabiya/May 19/2020
China Rivalry May Put the US Back in the Coup Business/Hal Brands/Bloomberg/May
19/2020
Pandemic, Arabian Gulf Rentier-States and Foreign Labor/Charles Elias Chartouni/May
19/2020
Germany Takes Back its Sovereignty from the European Union/Soeren Kern//Gatestone
Institute/May 19/2020
Ramadan in the Time of Coronavirus/Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff/Gatestone
Institute/May 19/2020
How coronavirus pandemic might change our cities/Kerry Boyd Anderson/Arab
News/May 19/2020
Jordan-Israel treaty threatened by annexation plan/Osama Al-Sharif/Arab News/May
19/2020
The “Image of Hell”: Islam’s Siege of Malta/Raymond Ibrahim/May 19/2020
Israel: The Settlements Are Not Illegal/The annexation of lands in Judea and
Samaria is not contrary to international law/Michael Calvo/Gatestone
Institute/May 19/ 2020
India: Standing up to China in the Post-Coronavirus World/Vijeta Uniyal/Gatestone
Institute/May 19/ 2020
Officials: Israel linked to a disruptive cyberattack on Iranian port facility/Joby
Warrick and Ellen Nakashima/The Washington Post/May 19/2020
Tunisia’s ‘war against an invisible enemy/Benjamin Weinthal/Policy Brief/FDD/May
19/2020
The Enemy Is Here…The Twilight of the Iranian Revolution/Dexter Filkins/The New
Yorker/May 19/2020
The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on May 19-20/2020
Lebanese Ministry of Health announces
23 new COVID-19 cases
NNA/May, 19/2020
The Ministry of Public Health announced this Tuesday 23 new coronavirus
infections, 8 of them locally detected and 15 others among returnees, thus
taking the toll to 954 cases.
Lebanon's Hariri Hospital: One new Covid-19 case recorded
today, no critical cases
NNA/May, 19/2020
In its daily report on the latest developments of the novel Coronavirus, the
Rafic Hariri University Hospital announced on Saturday that out of 341
laboratory tests conducted today, one new Covid-19 case has been recorded, while
the remaining tests came out negative.
It added that the total number of laboratory-confirmed cases infected with the
virus that are currently present in the Hospital's isolation area has reached 47
cases, noting that it has admitted 20 cases suspected to be infected with the
virus, who were transferred from other hospitals. Meanwhile, the hospital report
stated that none of the infected cases have recovered today thus keeping the
total number of full recoveries to 177 cases.. “All those infected with the
virus are receiving the necessary care in the isolation unit, and their
condition is stable," the hospital report added. It also indicated that more
information on the number of infected cases on all Lebanese territories can be
found in the daily report issued by the Ministry of Public Health.In conclusion,
the Hospital reminded that "the Corona Virus Contact Center for emergency
response and knowledge of test results, operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
including public holidays, and can be reached through the number 01-820830 or
through the WhatsApp contact service 76-897961."
Lebanese Health Minister Hamad Hasan: Isolation of Some
Areas May be Best Solution
Naharnet/May 19/2020
The isolation of some regions “could be the best solution in light of what
happened last week” as to the uptick in coronavirus cases, Health Minister Hamad
Hasan said on Tuesday. “Commitment to restrictions can allows us to resume
normal life with the least possible damage,” Hasan added after a Higher Defense
Council meeting that recommended extending the state of general mobilization to
June 7. “We are in a transitional period, we want everyone's participation and
we stress the importance of the role of municipalities and civil society
associations,” the minister said. “We are seeking middle ground solutions and
masks are essential in this period,” he went on to say. Prime Minister Hassan
Diab had on Sunday announced the end of a four-day lockdown despite an ongoing
spike in the number of coronavirus cases. The country had on March 15 declared
general mobilization, ordered non-essential businesses shuttered and closed its
air, land and sea ports of entry.
Twenty-three more cases were recorded on Tuesday, raising the country's tally to
954.
Lebanese Supreme Defense Council decides extension of
public mobilization from May 25 till June 7
NNA/May, 19/2020
The Supreme Defense Council convened today at 2:30 pm, at the Presidential
Palace, in a session chaired by President Michel Aoun, and decided to submit an
end to the Cabinet to re-extend public mobilization announced by decree No.
6329/2020 starting from 25/5/2020 until 7/6/2020, as part of the measures to
limit Corona virus spread.
The defense meeting was attended by Prime Minister, Hassan Diab, and his Deputy
and National Defense Minister, Zeina Akar, in addition to ministers of: Finance
Ghazi Wazny, Foreign and Expatriates Nassif Hitti, Interior and Municipalities
Mohammed Fahmy, Economy and Trade Raoul Nehme, Justice Mary-Claude Najm, Public
Works and Transport Michel Najjar, and Health Hamad Hassan. In addition, Army
Commander, General Joseph Aoun, Director General of the Presidency, Dr. Antoine
Choucair, Director General of Internal Security Forces, Major General Imad
Othman, Director General of State Security, Major General Tony Saliba, Secretary
General of the Supreme Defense Council, Major General Mahmoud Al-Asmar, Acting
Director General of Public Security, Brigadier Elias Baysari, the President’s
Security and Military adviser, retired Brigadier-General Paul Matar, Government
Commissioner to the Military Court, Judge Peter Germanos, Director of Army
Intelligence, Brigadier General Antoine Mansour, Director of Information at the
General Directorate of Public Security, Brigadier General Manh Sawaya, Head of
ISF Information Branch, Brigadier General Khaled Hammoud, Assistant Director
General of State Security, Brigadier Samir Sannan, also attended the meeting.
Meeting Statement:
After the meeting, Major General Mahmoud Al-Asmar read the following statement:
“At the call of the President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun, the Supreme
Defense Council convened at 2:30pm today, Tuesday 19th May 2020, at the
Presidential Palace, to follow-up latest developments and procedures to limit
Corona virus spread. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister, Hassan Diab,
and his Deputy and National Defense Minister, Zeina Akar, in addition to
ministers of: Finance Ghazi Wazny, Foreign and Expatriates Nassif Hitti,
Interior and Municipalities Mohammed Fahmy, Economy and Trade Raoul Nehme,
Justice Mary-Claude Najm, Public Works and Transport Michel Najjar, and Health
Hamad Hassan.
The meeting was also attended by: Army Commander, General Joseph Aoun, Director
General of the Presidency, Dr. Antoine Choucair, Director General of Internal
Security Forces, Major General Imad Othman, Director General of State Security,
Major General Tony Saliba, Secretary General of the Supreme Defense Council,
Major General Mahmoud Al-Asmar, Acting Director General of Public Security,
Brigadier Elias Baysari, the President’s Security and Military adviser, retired
Brigadier-General Paul Matar, Government Commissioner to the Military Court,
Judge Peter Germanos, Director of Army Intelligence, Brigadier General Antoine
Mansour, Director of Information at the General Directorate of Public Security,
Brigadier General Manh Sawaya, Head of ISF Information Branch, Brigadier General
Khaled Hammoud, Assistant Director General of State Security, Brigadier Samir
Sannan.
His Excellency the President of the Republic, began the meeting with a brief
presentation on the procedures and measures taken since the announcement of the
extension of public mobilization on May 11, 2020 in what is related to Corona
virus prevention, and asserted the importance of security agencies cooperation
with municipal and voluntary councils and the civil society to contain the
spread of the pandemic. The President also called on citizens to be responsible
in applying prevention methods.
Then the Prime Minister made clarified that the field conditions still need
measures and procedures to announce public mobilization and that the available
data indicate that the pandemic is still widespread but will be contained
according to special isolation plans in certain geographical areas. The Prime
Minister also stressed the necessity of strict enforcement of the necessary
deterrent measures by the relevant security services.
Consequently, the Prime Minister proposed to extend public mobilization for an
additional two weeks, and briefed the attendees on the recommendation issued by
the committee concerned with following up the procedures to prevent corona
virus, which stipulated a proposal to extend the declaration of mobilization for
an additional two weeks, that is until 7/6/2020, provided that the economic
activities that could gradually resume work within their scope and according to
specific time stages are to be retained. Then the Minister of Health briefed the
attendees on some of the negative results that necessitate maintaining the
measures and procedures for announcing public mobilization, especially
preventive ones, and indicated that efforts are still required to the maximum
and at all levels to avoid entering the second wave of this pandemic.
Then the Interior Minister discussed the importance of coordination with
concerned authorities, especially the Ministry of Health, to obtain the required
information in order to take the necessary measures to contain the virus.
In preparation for the blessed “‘Eid Al-Fitr”, it was decided to assign the
Minister of Interior and Municipalities to take appropriate decisions regarding
the procedures to be adopted during the “‘Eid” holiday, based on the available
data at the time.
After deliberation and listening to competent ministers and also to heads of
military and security apparatuses, since the announcement of the extension of
the public mobilization on 11/5/2020 until today, it was decided to continue to
announce public mobilization. In the context of pursuing confronting this danger
with public mobilization, which is stipulated in Article 2 of Legislative Decree
No. 102/1983 (National Defense) with the plans and also special provisions
addressed by this article, in addition to the measures and procedures previously
taken by the Council of Ministers in its previous meetings, The Supreme Defense
Council decided to submit an end to the Council of Ministers which includes:
1.Re-extension of public mobilization announced by Decree No. 6329/2020,
starting from 5/25/2020 until 7/6/2020 inclusive.
2. Emphasizing on activating and implementing the measures and procedures
imposed by Decree No. 6198/2020 and Decree No. 6209/2020, Decree No. 6251/2020
and Decree No. 6296/2020 and Decree No. 6329/2020 and Resolution No. 49/2020 of
21/2020 issued by the Prime Minister (implementing instructions of Decree 6198)
and related decisions issued by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities,
during the period of extending public mobilization, mentioned above.
3.Maintaining economic activities that were allowed to gradually restore work
within its scope and according to the time stages referred to in Article 2 of
Decree No. 6296/2020 and within specific conditions based on the following
criteria: mixing intensity, number of mixing, possibility of adjustment, level
of priority and potential risks.
4. Asking military and security services to strictly deter each other, in order
to suppress violations, leading to the non-spread of the virus, and to
coordinate and cooperate with the civil society and local authorities to achieve
this.
5. Thanks the media for cooperating with the military, security, and health
services and asking them to shed more light on the pros of the prevent
Lebanese Cabinet convenes at Baabda Palace, agrees to
cancel official secondary exams and technical baccalaureate
NNA/May, 19/2020
The Cabinet convened today at the Presidential Palace and decided to complete
progress of the contract signed between “Sonatrach” and the Energy Ministry, and
to continue researching the issue presented by the Ministry in a future session
after receiving the opinion of the Legislative and Consulting Authority in the
Justice Ministry regarding it. The Council of Ministers also agreed to the
Education Ministry’s request to approve, exceptionally, the cancellation of the
2020 year of secondary school exams in all its branches and the technical
baccalaureate in all its forms, in accordance with the controls and completion
of the remote school year for all levels.T
At the beginning of the Cabinet session, President Aoun focused on the
importance of judicial investigations taking place, related to fighting
corruption, asserting the need to reach ends in all issues that it dealt with,
especially as the public opinion is following-up on what is going on, and
awaiting critical approaches in this field.
For his side, Prime Minister Hassan Diab said: “I appeal to all Lebanese not to
underestimate in Corona virus, and to take protective measures and ask security
forces to tighten the imposition of these measures, otherwise we will be facing
a major problem. If chaos continues, we will completely shut down the country
and impose unprecedented measures, to avoid chaos”.
Cabinet Statement:
At the end of the session, the Minister of Information Manal Abdel Samad read
the following statement:
“The Council of Ministers convened today in asession, at Baabda Palace, chaired
by the President of the Republic and attended by thePrime Minister and the
ministers. At the beginning, the President spoke focusing on the importance of
judicial investigations taking place in the context of combating corruption,
stressing that these investigations must reach end in all the tackled topics,
especially as public opinion is following what is happening and is awaiting
decisive approaches in this issue.
Afterwards, the Prime Minister said: “We are on the second day of the phase of
gradually reopening the country, but unfortunately, it is clear that people have
cut all stages and opened the country without adhering to the preventive
measures, and this is what we feared.
The number of injuries is increasing, and the fear today is that the situation
will turn into a disaster and that there will be a breakdown in the entire
health system that we have built over three months. The Lebanese, who committed
themselves to the measures, made great sacrifices, and they sustained economic
damage due to the closure. The medical, nursing and health teams exerted great
efforts during the last period. What is happening is frightening, and it is not
permissible to give up. We understand the economic conditions of commercial
enterprises,but we never understand people’s negligence and their lack of
responsibility. The situation cannot remain the same. It is necessary to
strictly enforce gags, sterilization, and spacing.
If the health collapse takes place, God forbid, the result will be disastrous
for the country. Once again, I appeal to the Lebanese not to underestimate this
pandemic, and to take protection measures. And I ask the security forces to
tighten up the imposition of measures, otherwise we will be facing a major
problem. If the chaos continues, we will completely shut down the country, and
we will institute unprecedented measures. The lives of people are more important
than the economy, and basically nothing of the economy will remain if we lose
the lives of the people”.
After that, the cabinet studied the topics on its agenda and took appropriate
decisions:
1- Completing the progress of the contract signed between “Sonatrach” and the
Ministry of Energy and Water and following up the research on the subject
presented by the latter in a future session after receiving the opinion of the
Legislative and Consulting Authority in the Justice Ministryregarding it.
2- Approval of the Education Ministry’s request, exceptionally, to cancel the
course of the year 2020 for the general secondary exams in all its branches and
the technical baccalaureate in all its forms, in accordance with the controls
and the completion of the remote academic year for all academic and vocational
stages.
3- Mandate the Council for Development and Reconstruction to renegotiate with
the company, the owner of the “Ghosta” factory for sorting and treating solid
household waste in light of the comments of the Ministers.
Questions & Answers:
In response to a question regarding “Sonatrach”, Minister of Information, Manal
Abdel Samad replied: “We are actually waiting for the legal opinion of the
legislature, and at the same time it is assumed that the judiciary is the one
who decides on such issues and deals with these issues, and we have no
interference in the judiciary. Appropriate actions will be taken in the
Cabinet”.
Responding to another question, Abdel Samad stated that “The term of Sonatrach
contract is continuous until 31-12-2020, and it is assumed that this contract
will be applied according to its provisions, since the contract is for the
contractor”.
Asked whether the Education Ministry had made specific proposals regarding the
academic year and professor demands, Minister Abdel Samad said: “What was
discussed is the cancellation of official exams as was approved, and at the same
time the student who will not take these exams does not mean that he has
successfully finished the school year, because there is a completion of the
academic year, and the student has to succeed in his school. Most universities
take school results for the current year as well as previous years for the
students. Hence, there is no contradiction between cancelling the 2020 session
of official exams and completing the school year”.
Asked about appointments, she replied “It has not been discussed. There was a
tendency to consider it for further research, but the topic was not discussed
today”. Concerning to re-close the country, Abdel Samad said: “Regarding the
cases of Corona and the stages we are going through, in light of the new
developments, things will be discussed, and if the Supreme Defense Council takes
any decision in this area, the matter will be presented again to the Cabinet”.
Question: Does this mean that you did not extend the mobilization?
Answer: “No. This requires an end by the Supreme Council of Defense. What will
be taken will be discussed in Thursday’s Cabinet session."
Asked if the cabinet decision regarding the start of the Al-Zahrani plant and
the exclusion of the Silaata plant was decided, Abdel Samad replied: “The
decision was taken in the previous session, and we considered that the start was
from Al-Zahrani. The decision was taken and no deliberation or discussion took
place”. In response to a question about excluding some places from re-opening,
the Information Minister said that “The decision to open stadiums and closed
clubs was not taken, because of the high risk rate, and even for swimming pools,
the approach was within a narrow framework and within the controls previously
set. In light of the progress that is taking place, we decide to move to the
fourth stage or remain within the third stage. However, at the present time and
within the risks that we are in, this framework has been put in place”.
Asked whether the issues of the Dollar exchange rate and the rise in commodity
prices were tackled, she replied: “Today the matter has not been discussed, but
there are many meetings that are taking place in the side at the level of joint
committees and specific meetings to address all these issues. They take place
regularly and daily within the measures taken from All ministries. Cabinet
measures are not the only ones nor thecomplete decisions. There are procedures
at the level of all ministries and relevant authorities. Every ministry
concerned within its framework, and any decision requiring the cabinet is
presented to the council. The Economy Ministry is moving in this framework and
has adequate answers in this regard. Sometimes the result is not directly and
quickly visible, but it will appear in the next few days”.
Asked if negotiations’ progress with the World Bank had been discussed, Abdel
Samad indicated that “This issue has not been discussed”.
Asked about the appointment mechanism on Lebanon TV, she replied: “Tomorrow,
Wednesday, May 20 is the last day for applications, until midnight, in the hope
that the mechanism will follow its natural course”.
Asked about what is being raised about the trend towards organizing the media
with what may be used to constrain journalists, Abdel Samad said “There is no
doubt that the matter has taken a totally opposite approach to that of which we
are moving. As long as we all agree on the same ideas, I do not really know who
is against whom. We have explained this matter at length. Last week, through
several media meetings, and our opinion became clear on this issue. Hence, the
misunderstanding of a certain idea is out of context”.
In response to the last question about whether the issue of school tuition was
tackled by the Education Minister, Abdel Samad replied “The Ministry of
Education should have a vision in this regard, but the matter was not raised at
the cabinet table”.--Presidency Press Office
Lebanese Govt. Cancels Official Exams, Defense Council
Urges Mobilization till June 7
Naharnet/May 19/2020
Cabinet on Tuesday officially decided to call off official school exams in light
of the coronavirus crisis as the Higher Defense Council recommended extending
the so-called state of general mobilization until June 7.“It has been
exceptionally agreed to cancel official school exams,” Information Minister
Manal Abdul Samad said after a Cabinet session. “The numbers of coronavirus
infections are on the rise and masks must be worn in a stricter manner,” she
added. “We have not taken any decision to reopen sport courts and clubs in light
of the gravity of the situation,” Abdul Samad said. She quoted Prime Minister
Hassan Diab as saying that “nothing will remain of the economy should citizens'
health be affected.” Diab also urged the Lebanese “not to take the pandemic
lightly” and called on security forces to “be strict in implementing the
measures.”Separately, Abdul Samad said Cabinet will carry on with the fuel
supply contract with Algerian state-run oil company Sonatrach according to
Lebanon's conditions, despite the latest controversy over a counterfeit fuel
shipment. She added that the thorny issues of administrative appointments and
the designation of a new Beirut governor were not discussed in the session. The
Higher Defense Council meanwhile recommended the extension of the so-called
state of general mobilization until June 7 during a meeting that was held at the
Baabda Palace. According to Foreign Minister Nassif Hitti, the Council did not
recommend the closure of any sector. Diab had on Sunday announced the end of a
four-day lockdown despite an ongoing spike in the number of coronavirus cases.
The country had on March 15 declared general mobilization, ordered non-essential
businesses shuttered and closed its air, land and sea ports of
entry.Twenty-three more cases were recorded on Tuesday, raising the country's
tally to 954.
General Security chief Maj. Gen. Abbas IbrahimR eportedly
Holds Talks in Syria
Naharnet/May 19/2020
General Security chief Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim visited Syria today and held
talks with Syrian authorities, a media report said on Tuesday. LBCI television
said Ibrahim discussed a host of files, including smuggling, illegal border
crossings and means to control the movement of individuals between the two
countries amid the coronavirus crisis. The issue of cross-border smuggling has
stirred controversy in Lebanon in recent days and the Lebanese Higher Defense
Council has agreed on a series of measures aimed at curbing it. Hizbullah chief
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah for his part said that ending smuggling requires
cooperation between the governments and armies of the two countries.
Diab: If chaos continues, we will renew total lockdown
NNA/May, 19/2020
Speaking at the Cabinet session which was held on Tuesday at the Baabda palace,
Prime Minister, Dr. Hassan Diab, appealed to the Lebanese "not to underestimate
the Coronavirus pandemic" and to abide by the precautionary measures in this
regard. Premier Diab called on the security forces to strictly implement these
[preventive] measures, “otherwise we will be facing a huge problem.”He said: "If
the state of chaos continues, we will renew total lockdown in the country and
impose unprecedented measures to prevent matters from getting out of control.”
Berri tackles overall situation with diplomats, UNIFIL’s
Del Col
NNA/May, 19/2020
House Speaker, Nabih Berri, on Tuesday received at his Ain El-Tineh residence
the ambassadors of Canada Emmanuelle Lamoureux, Switzerland Monika Schmutz
Kirguz, and Norway Leni Stenseth, with whom he discussed the overall situation
and most recent developments in Lebanon and the broad region. Speaker Berri also
received the UNIFIL Commander, Major-General Stefano Del Col, who briefed him on
the situation in the UNIFIL area of operation in south Lebanon. This afternoon,
Berri welcomed the US Ambassador to Lebanon, Dorothy Shea.
Diab receives phone call from his Egyptian counterpart
NNA/May, 19/2020
Prime Minister, Dr. Hassan Diab, on Tuesday received a phone call from his
Egyptian counterpart, Mostapha Madbouly. --PM Press Office.Talks touched on
bilateral relations and means to consolidate them
LAF, UNIFIL complete probe into shooting of shepherd in
Kfarshouba
NNA/May, 19/2020
A joint team of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the UNIFIL has completed the probe
into the shooting of a Syrian shepherd by the Israeli enemy troops in Kfarshouba
on Sunday, our correspondent reported.
A report will be submitted during the tripartite meeting in Ras Naqoura
Lebanese Man Pleads Guilty to Plotting to Send Drone Parts
to Hezbollah
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 19 May, 2020
A Lebanese man has pleaded guilty in federal court in Minnesota to conspiring to
export drone parts and technology from the US to the Hezbollah party in Lebanon,
reported The Associated Press. US Attorney Erica H. MacDonald said Monday that
Usama Hamade, 55, pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export goods and
technology. His brother, Issam Hamade, pleaded guilty in March in federal court
in Minnesota. Prosecutors said the brothers acquired sophisticated technology
for drones from 2009 to 2013 and illegally exported them to Hezbollah, which the
US considers a terrorist organization.
The Hamades were arrested in February 2018 in South Africa and were extradited
to the US last fall.According to an indictment, the parts included inertial
measurement units, which can be used to track an aircraft’s position, and
digital compasses, which can be paired with the inertial measurement units for
drone guidance systems. The parts also included a jet engine and 20 piston
engines.
Hawat submits documents on cross-border smuggling to
judiciary
NNA/May, 19/2020
"Strong Republic" bloc MP Ziad Hawat has submitted to the Prosecutor General at
the Court of Cassation a compilation of documents on smuggling operations taking
place through illegitimate Lebanese-Syrian border crossings, our correspondent
reported on Tuesday.
Hariri Slams Bassil, Rules Out Trade with Syria
Naharnet/May 19/2020
Ex-PM Saad Hariri on Tuesday criticized Free Patriotic Movement chief Jebran
Bassil's latest statements and ruled out a restoration of Lebanon's commercial
ties with Syria. “We are all Lebanese. Until when will we keep talking about the
rights of each sect? FPM chief Jebran Bassil spoke about Christians and if we
continue this way of thinking and this racism, the rights of both Muslims and
Christians will be lost,” Hariri said in a chat with reporters at the Center
House. Commenting on the thorny issue of electricity, Hariri said: “Bassil said
the problem has been running since 1974 and I say since 1988. Let him not talk
about history because I can also talk about it. Why hasn't an electricity
regulatory commission been appointed? And where is the board of directors?”As
for “the attack on political Harirism,” Hariri wondered if some parties want to
put his father, slain ex-PM Rafik Hariri, on trial.
“We want the corrupts to go to jail but the corrupts cannot send the decent
people to jail,” Hariri added. Referring to Marada Movement chief Suleiman
Franjieh's recent press conference, the former premier said: “Franjieh is honest
and people have this impression about him... and they believed everything that
he said in his press conference.”As to Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's
call for bigger economic cooperation with Syria, Hariri said “Syria's market is
important if there is an existent regime.”“But turning our economic system into
a system that resembles the one in Syria is out of the question,” Hariri added.
As for cross-border smuggling, the ex-PM said: “I failed to seal the border
because there were interests between Syrians and those who work with them, among
them Hizbullah. They were stronger than me.”
Strong Lebanon bloc demands financial appointments be made,
gaps in government's plan be fixed
NNA/May, 19/2020
The Strong Lebanon parliamentary bloc held its periodic meeting under the
chairmanship of MP Gebran Bassil, with talks featuring high on the current
situation, namely the files submitted to the judiciary, and the demands that the
facts be revealed in full to the Lebanese people, especially those relevant to
the cases of fraudulent fuel, warning against any attempt to divert the issue
from its correct course. The bloc believed that "the reform plan prepared by the
government will not be successful unless decisive steps are taken to fill the
gaps that we referred to in the Baabda meeting, most importantly the
restructuring of the banking sector rather than its liquidation."Conferees
demanded that the government "inform the Lebanese of the results of the measures
it has taken so far, or is yet to take, to monitor legitimate crossings and
close illegal ones. If that proves impossible, then it should abolish customs
and secure other resources of the State, through fees and taxes."
Uttering concern over the hike in food prices due to the unjustified rise in the
dollar exchange rate, the Strong Lebanon bloc demanded that "the government
first make financial appointments in vacant positions, which are essential in
implementing the government's plan, including the agreement with the IMF."
Covid-19: Ghana’s High Commission requests information on
stranded Ghanaians in Lebanon
NNA/May, 19/2020
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana is collating
information on Ghanaians and legal permanent residents who are stranded abroad
as a result of the closure of international borders in containment phase of the
covid-19 pandemic.
To this end, a statement issued by Ghana’s high commission called on eligible
nationals who are prepared to pay for their cost of travel to Ghana to submit
their details, as specified below, to Ghana’s Embassy in Lebanon no later than
Friday, May 22, 2020. The specified details include the national’s name, copy of
bio data page of passport, current location, telephone number, whatsapp number,
and e-mail address. The rest of the required information are date of travel from
Ghana, original date of expected return to Ghana, copy of return ticket, reason
for inability to return to Ghana, and confirmation of ability to pay for
arranged air travel. The statement added that government personnel on official
trips, and students on Ghana government scholarships who have completed their
course of study, were also expected to provide the relevant information as
indicated.
The embassy’s statement made clear that the above information should be sent to
the following mail address and telephone numbers of Ghana’s Embassy in Lebanon:
Email: ghanaembey@yahoo.com
Telephone:+9613750505/ +9613738310
Lebanon Finance Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Rescue Plan
Gives Govt. Credibility in Dealing with IMF
Beirut - Thaer Abbas/Asharq Al-Awsat/May, 19/2020
Minister of Finance Ghazi Wazni said that the Lebanese government’s success in
achieving the required reforms was the key to address the financial and economic
crisis, underlining the need for support from the various political forces in
this regard.
In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Wazni noted that the financial rescue plan
would give the government credibility in dealing with international institutions
and open the way for the implementation of the 2018 CEDRE conference pledges.
“The plan is mainly aimed at the international community, especially for
creditors and the International Monetary Fund,” he said.
He explained: “Last March, the government decided to suspend the payment of
international debt bonds (Eurobonds), which required us to prepare a
comprehensive financial plan that would serve as a platform for negotiating with
creditors, and to submit it to the IMF, which responded to the government’s
request for technical assistance at the time.”
Wazni emphasized that in view of state’s modest capabilities, the recovery
process would be impossible to achieve without external support that is closely
bound to actual and real reforms.
“We have reached the final version of the plan following discussions we had with
the Economic and Social Council and the observations that we have received from
professional unions and economic and financial experts, most of whom represent
the various political parties,” he noted.
The minister added that the government’s paper was an “economic, financial and
social vision that can be developed and modified and modernized after presenting
it to the relevant local and external groups, including political and economic
authorities.”
He said that Arab and foreign ambassadors have welcomed the plan during their
recent meetings with Prime Minister Hassan Diab.
“Most importantly, we received a positive impression from the IMF, especially
during the first official meetings that we launched last Monday,” he remarked.
Asked about the reservations expressed by the Central Bank (BDL) and the strong
rejection of the plan by the Association of Lebanese Banks, Wazni replied: “It’s
normal. The seven axes included in the plan represent the economic, financial
and social vision. The main axis that concerns the financial sector will be
discussed in the next stage with the BDL and the banking sector.”
The minister explained that Lebanon applied for about $10 billion in
installments over a period of three to four years. In addition, it requested
emergency financial assistance as part of the Fund’s initiative to counter the
repercussions of COVID-19.
“Based on Lebanon’s quota, we may get about $900 million dollars, and await the
answer within ten days,” he added.
On whether the IMF would set difficult conditions that Lebanon would fail to
meet, Wazni emphasized that the recovery plan drafted by the government “gives
it credibility in dealing with international institutions.”
“The confidence factor is very important for the country at the current stage.
When the government prepared its plan, it took into consideration the internal
Lebanese situation at the economic, financial, social, living and political
levels, as well as the approaches that the IMF usually follows. Thus, the
program is adjustable according to the course of negotiations with the Fund,” he
stated.
Asked about the government’s strategy with regards to the public sector, the
electricity file, the local currency exchange rate and other important matters
raised by the IMF, Wazni stressed that despite diverging views, negotiations
with the organization would continue until an agreement is reached.
“We will certainly face obstacles and disagreements, with the issue of
privatization and fixing the exchange rate. We have discussed all these matters
with them and will continue the negotiations in the next stage,” he remarked.
The minister went on to say: “If we have internal political support and backing
by the international community, our negotiating position will be strengthened.
Reforms are also a factor of strength, because the international community
expresses its willingness to support, but requires the initiation of reforms.”
Wazni revealed that French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has emphasized,
during a phone call, three matters of utmost importance: The endorsement of the
comprehensive financial plan; support by France and the international community;
and reforms as an important and essential condition.
“‘Then, France will support you in every sense of the word,’” he quoted Le Maire
as saying.
Commenting on the deteriorating economic and financial conditions, Wazni
emphasized that the government would continue to pay the salaries of public
sector employees and seek to provide all necessary medical needs.
“The World Bank provided between 450 and 500 million dollars to support the
fight against poverty... At the same time, the government provided cash
assistance to around 200,000 families in need,” he noted.
Wazni also said that the government was trying to focus on supporting the
agricultural and industrial productive sectors, especially institutions that
incurred severe losses due to the spread of the novel coronavirus.
“We turned to the IMF to secure more support to confront the outbreak and the
financing of SMEs,” he added.
The finance minister said that based on the figures provided by the BDL, there
are around $21 billion in foreign currency reserves.
“The BDL finances imports of gasoline, medicine, flour and raw materials for
industry, in addition to wheat because of the health emergency. In general, the
available reserves are sufficient to finance basic commodities for the two
current and next years,” he underlined.
Wazni noted that his relation with the BDL was based on trust.
“We have questions about the figures released by the central bank and the issue
of transfers in the recent period. Other than that, the government’s
relationship with the BDL is normal,” he remarked.
The government has appointed three companies to audit the BDL’s budget within
the framework of restructuring the financial sector, Wazni revealed.
He stressed that based on the proposed plan, the current exchange rate should be
maintained at LBP 1,515; otherwise commodity prices would soar.
“In the next stage, we will turn to the policy of floating the exchange rate,
meaning the gradual liberalization when we have defense resources that we are
looking to acquire after agreeing with the IMF, and with the return of the flow
of remittances from abroad and the implementation of the CEDRE pledges,” Wazni
emphasized.
The minister concluded by calling on brotherly countries and Arab and Islamic
investment funds to study the rescue plan positively and help Lebanon recover
from its crisis.
Lebanon says it will honor Sonatrach fuel import contract
amid probe
Reuters/Tuesday 19 May 2020
Lebanon will honor a fuel import contract with Algerian state energy firm
Sonatrach until the end of the year, the government said on Tuesday, as a
judicial probe continues over tainted fuel shipped to the country. Sonatrach,
which supplies Lebanon with fuel under a 2005 contract, has denied any
involvement in shipping tainted fuel. The Algerian presidency described the case
last week as a “Lebanese-Lebanese issue” in which Algeria was not involved.
Lebanese Energy Minister Raymond Ghajar said a new tender would be held when the
contract ends at the end of 2020. Speaking after a cabinet meeting, he said
“non-compliant” fuel had arrived in Lebanon twice. The fuel is used to power
electricity plants run by a state-owned company that has long bled public funds.
Judge Ghada Aoun, the investigating prosecutor, has pressed charges against
officials including the electricity company chairman and the oil installations
director. She ordered the arrest of 17 people last month. The state-run National
News Agency has described the investigation as a probe into fraud, bribery,
money laundering and manipulation.
The Algerian president has also ordered an investigation. Sonatrach Petroleum
Corporation (SPC), a London-based subsidiary in charge of the company’s
operations abroad, said in a statement issued on April 26 that it was in contact
with Lebanon to resolve the situation as soon as possible. It also refuted what
it described as untrue allegations about the involvement of a senior Sonatrach
official, saying that one of the people questioned in Lebanon was an independent
maritime agent working for Sonatrach. Lebanon informed Sonatrach about the bad
quality of a fuel cargo shipment in March, SPC said in the April 26 statement.An
energy industry source in Algeria said tests showed the fuel met standards
before shipment but authorities ordered more tests upon arrival in Lebanon. SPC
obtains cargoes from international trading companies before shipments go to
Lebanon.
Lebanon still seeks IMF help but Hezbollah stands in the
way
Agencies & The Arab Weekly/May 19/2020
BEIRUT--The Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Hassan Diab is continuing
to count on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) assistance to help the
country overcome its economic crisis, but aid from the international lender
could be stalled due to the presence of the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement in
government.
Hezbollah, a militant Shia group declared a terrorist organisation by several
Western countries, remains a part of Lebanon’s government, jeopardising Beirut’s
aid request to the IMF.
At the end of April, Germany declared Hezbollah a terrorist organisation and
banned all of its activity on German soil, a step similar to ones already taken
by the United States and several Arab countries.
Berlin’s move has raised fresh concerns in Lebanon, which is banking on IMF
support to help it overcome one of the worst economic crises in history.
Ali Al-Amin, a journalist and political analyst who is a vocal critic of
Hezbollah, said Germany’s decision was not a surprise and could pressure
Hezbollah to make new concessions.
“The decision reflects a new development in the European and German views
regarding Hezbollah… and that it indicates that the channels of communication
with Hezbollah became very narrow,” al-Amin said.
Asked whether Germany’s declaration would impact the IMF’s decision on whether
to provide aid to Lebanon, he said the “issue depends on the how much Hezbollah
is willing to give up when it comes to its external role, specifically relating
to its functions in more than one country.”
“As long as Hezbollah continues to insist on playing its role outside the
country, it will keep reflecting negatively how the international community
assists Lebanon,” al-Amin said.
However, Faisal Abdul Sater, a political analyst close to Hezbollah, does not
think Berlin’s declaration will have an impact on the IMF. “The Lebanese
government submitted its request to the fund and the last one has its
conditions, and in case he takes this step, he will directly follow up the
progress of the submitted plan” said al-Sater.
The IMF began remote discussions last week with Lebanon, which is seeking some
$10 billion in aid.
Tough negotiations lie ahead for the country, which will be expected to enact
economic reforms its sectarian leaders have long avoided, analysts say.
The 53-page rescue plan agreed to by the government in April after months of
haggling is recognised by officials, economists and diplomats as the most
piercing examination of how it came to pile up debt several times the size of
its economy.
But sources familiar with the IMF talks say the plan fails to set out a clear
roadmap for reforms for a patronage-ridden public sector that has been looted
for decades by the sectarian power-brokers and former warlords who dominate
Lebanon’s confessionally-based politics and have mismanaged the country.
They believe Lebanon’s political elite will shy away from agreeing to
comprehensive reform as they did ahead of four previous aid and soft-loan
packages since Lebanon’s civil war — and that they are underestimating how hard
the IMF will push for deep change before agreeing to help.
“They are trying to present a plan that the IMF will buy into, and that the
international community and creditors will buy into, without really addressing
the deeper problems in the country: reforms,” said Nasser Saidi, a former
economy minister and vice-governor of the central bank.
None of Lebanon’s main parties are opposed to going to the IMF, which is widely
viewed as the country’s last chance to secure much-needed aid. However, the
powerful Hezbollah movement has warned against conditions that would violate the
country’s sovereignty.
Although the current government lineup includes respected technocrats, it is
just as influenced by sectarian leaders as the previous administration, which
was brought down by mass protests against government corruption and
mismanagement. The difference now is that Lebanon’s cabinet more closely
reflects Hezbollah’s influence.
Camille Abousleiman, an international finance lawyer and minister who resigned
from the last government over its failure to enact reforms, argues the current
government should not wait for IMF pressure to go ahead and push for change.
The country’s customs, ports and border crossings are all known to be parcelled
out as smuggling rackets used to evade import levies. Meanwhile, the public
payroll continues to swell – a system that all parties use to reward their
followers.
But Hezbollah has resisted reform measures in these sectors, particular to
customs arrangements that it relies on to bring in a critical part of its
revenue.
The IMF is wary of being held responsible for a financial meltdown “made in
Lebanon,” as one official put it, adding that the fund would be taking on “a
reputational risk” if an adjustment plan is not seen as both fair and efficient.
Hezbollah, which also provides social welfare to some citizens, is under
pressure from poorer Shia supporters who have been hit hard already by increased
unemployment.
There is also added pressure from “extremely vocal” wealthy Shia diaspora
members, especially those in West Africa who have placed large deposits in
Lebanese banks that they now stand to lose, according to a Shia minister.
“‘We supported you and now we’re being strangled’,” these expat Lebanese are
saying, and Hezbollah is feeling the heat for acting as a shield for the
corruption of their government allies,” the former minister said.
Three arrested in connection with murder of Lebanese
student Aya Hachem
HRISTOPHER HAMILL-STEWART/Arab News/May 2020
LONDON: Police are questioning three men in connection with the murder of
19-year-old Lebanese student Aya Hachem in a town in north England.
The men, all from Blackburn and aged 39, 33 and 36, are suspected of the
drive-by shooting that took place outside a supermarket in broad daylight on
Sunday. A post mortem examination revealed that Aya died as a result of a
gunshot wound to her chest.
Police believe the law student was not the intended target of the attack, and
have appealed to the public for their help with the investigation. A statement
by Lancashire Police on Tuesday said: “Detectives are aware of a number of
videos circulating across social media and are asking people to report them to
the police. “We would also ask people not to share these videos out of respect
for Aya and her family.” Detective Chief Constable Terry Woods appealed directly
to those involved in crime in the area, saying his officers would “not be going
away until we've got justice for Aya and her family,” and that “it’s now time
for the criminal fraternity to come forward.” Police have said they are not
treating the shooting as terrorism-related or a racially-motivated. Tributes for
the slain student, who arrived in the UK with her family as a refugee, have
poured in from family, friends and the community.
Aya’s parents said they are “devastated” by her death, and that she was the
“most loyal devoted daughter” who “dreamed of becoming a solicitor.”They also
pleaded with members of the public to come forward with any information that
would help bring the perpetrators to justice.
Woods described Aya as the “perfect 19-year-old” and a “wonderful young
lady.”Mark Russell, the CEO of the Children’s Society where Aya was a trustee,
called her “a remarkable young woman, and an inspiring voice for children and
young people.”“It’s a complete tragedy that her life has been cut short,” he
said. The Blackburn branch of the Asylum and Refugee Community also paid tribute
to Aya. “Aya, one of our own, lost her life in a horrific senseless attack,
randomly caught up in a shooting,” the charity said. “Our hearts and prayers are
with them at this painful time.”
Aya’s family are waiting for the investigation to finish so they could take her
body back to Lebanon to be buried in her home village of Qlaileh, the BBC
reported.
Angola Picks Lebanese Group Africell as Fourth Telecoms
Operator
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 19/2020
Angola on Tuesday awarded the licence for its fourth telecoms network to
Lebanese group Africell, as sub-Saharan Africa's second-biggest oil producer
opens other economic sectors to foreign competition. Africell is already present
in four African countries -- Gambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone
and Uganda. Angola had awarded the licence last year to a domestic start-up
called Telstar but President Joao Lourenco annulled the decision, saying the
company failed to meet the bidding requirements. Angola's mobile phone market,
with almost 14 million users, is currently dominated by two privately held
companies -- Unitel and Movicel. A third operator, Angola Telecom, offers fixed
and internet access but no mobile services. Isabel dos Santos, daughter of
former president Jose Eduardo dos Santos, owns half of Unitel's share capital.
She was recently indicted for a host of high-level financial crimes. Angola is
ranked 146 out of 180 countries on Transparency International's corruption
perceptions index. Most of the country's 30 million people live in poverty,
failing to benefit from the flood of dollars from crude oil and diamonds.
مجلة فرنسية: هكذا ينوي “الحزب” الاستيلاء على السلطة في
لبنان
Le coup d’Etat bancaire du Hezbollah au Liban
A la une, Libre opinionJean-Christophe Cambadélis 0, 18 mai 2020 Jean-Christophe
Cambadélis
Par quel étrange paradoxe la France, qui a réagi avec promptitude lors de
l’avancée des djihadistes sur Bamako, laisse le Hezbollah s’emparer des banques
libanaises et donc prendre le pouvoir à Beyrouth, s’étonne l’ancien député
Jean-Christophe Cambadélis.
La communauté internationale a classé, à tort ou à raison, le Hezbollah dans la
catégorie « mouvement terroriste ». En Europe, ce fût le cas en 2013. Seul
François Fillon, pendant les primaires de la droite en France, avait, lors d’une
visite au Hezbollah, proposé d’inclure ce parti-milice dans la coalition anti-Daech.
Ce propos fut unanimement condamné et l’ancien Premier ministre n’a pas réitéré
la formule de son soutien « aux rebelles islamistes », comme la presse les
caractérise.
Le Hezbollah est aujourd’hui en position de force pour s’emparer du pouvoir. Il
fut le principal soutien au sol d’Assad en Syrie. Pendant que l’aviation russe
pilonnait Daech et que les démocrates syriens et la coalition avec les soldats
kurdes réduisaient les réduits intégristes en Irak, il a imposé le président
Aoun à la tête de l’État libanais. Il fut le principal bénéficiaire des
élections législatives. Au point que le Général iranien Qassem Soleimani,
récemment assassiné, a cru pouvoir dire « que son pays disposait dorénavant au
Parlement libanais de 74 députés ».
Le Hezbollah fut pris au dépourvu par la belle révolution du drapeau au Liban.
Dans ce pays laïque mais confessionnalisé, le drapeau libanais symbolisait une
nation au-delà des confessions.
Cette révolution condamnait le « système libanais » de corruption et de mainmise
sur l’État. Par un clin d’œil de l’histoire, ce pays, au déficit colossal de 92
milliards de dollars, soit 170 % du PIB, et avec 45 % de la population sous le
seuil de pauvreté, revendiquait ce que le FMI et la Conférence de Paris CEDRE de
2018 exigeaient pour redresser le pays.
Cette convergence de points de vue s’exerçait autour de la restructuration des
services publics : la réforme de la société de l’Electricité du Liban avec un
conseil d’administration et une autorité de régulation, l’indépendance de la
justice, le monopole d’État du commerce extérieur et des douanes. Et, bien sûr,
le peuple y ajoutait la dissolution du Parlement pour des élections libres de
citoyens libres et la lutte contre la corruption.
Dans un premier temps, le Hezbollah fut hostile à ce mouvement dont il disait
percevoir l’influence occidentale. On crut même voir quelques ratonnades à
l’initiative de ses partisans dans le centre de Beyrouth.
Puis, constant, avec le silence des chancelleries et particulièrement de la
France, le mouvement confessionnel radical chiite comprit que sans soutiens
extérieurs ni points d’appui intérieurs, la révolution voyait dans le président
Aoun le seul espoir de voir bouger les choses. La démission du Premier ministre
Hariri lui offrait une opportunité.
Dans un premier discours, le secrétaire général du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah,
déclara « comprendre la colère du peuple ». Il encouragea ce dernier à «
dialoguer avec le président Aoun », assurant les manifestants de l’oreille
attentive du chef de l’État.
Le président et le secrétaire général du Hezbollah reprirent à leur compte
l’idée émise par la révolution « d’un gouvernement de techniciens ». Ce mot
d’ordre avait l’apparence de l’exigence du peuple mais permettait d’offrir un
débouché pour faire rentrer la révolution dans son lit.
L’apparence « d’un gouvernement de techniciens » ne remettait pas en cause
l’essence d’une coalition où domine le Hezbollah. Ainsi naquit un gouvernement
que les Libanais ont affublé du sobriquet de « monocolore ». En effet, il s’agit
principalement d’une alliance Aoun /Hezbollah/Amal dont on comprendra que le
Hezbollah est le pivot.
Le cabinet Diab est un gouvernement de technicien.ne.s reconnu.e.s pour leur
parcours professionnel. Mais sont-ils indépendants ? Ce qui fut la principale
revendication de la rue. Chacun sait que la constitution du Conseil des
ministres fut subordonnée à un accord préalable des portefeuilles respectifs.
Le Premier ministre Hassan Diab s’en cacha à peine lorsque le 21 janvier 2020,
il installait son gouvernement. Il déclara, en substance, à la presse : « tout
le monde connaît la culture politique libanaise ».
Le Hezbollah, ayant réussi à s’installer dans la place sans un cri, était
confronté à la crise financière et la banqueroute de l’État. Car il ne pouvait
se permettre d’être emporté par celle-ci. Les données sont internationalement
reconnues : l’électricité représente 65 % de la dette avec 42 milliards de
dollars ; le financement de 9 millions de tonnes de pétrole alors que le Liban
en consomme 4 millions ; le soutien par différents biais à la dette syrienne,
sans oublier évidemment le flux de réfugiés migrants syriens que la communauté
internationale passe sous silence ; la Banque centrale libanaise sans le sou et
les banques privées dans le rouge.
La négociation avec le FMI devint stratégique, vitale pour le pays et la
coalition « monocolore ». Les 11 milliards en négociation avec le FMI sont une
nécessité pour le nouveau pouvoir. Le Hezbollah fit une entorse avec sa doctrine
« comptons sur nos propres forces » et accepta que l’on engage les négociations.
Mais il n’était pas question que l’on touche à ses chasses gardées.
Le trafic sur le fuel acheté par la Banque du Liban sera ainsi toujours revendu
à la Syrie. Le contrôle des douanes, assurant logistique et mainmise, restera en
place. L’électricité devra toujours échapper aux exigences du FMI, etc.
Les tours de passe-passe de la Banque du Liban ayant atteint leur limite, la
restructuration du secteur bancaire offrait tout à la fois un gage pour le FMI,
un argument dérivatif pour le peuple et offre la perspective d’une mainmise par
le Hezbollah sur ce secteur stratégique lui permettant d’asseoir définitivement
son pouvoir.
La hezbollahisation des banques se mit en place avec à la clé l’épargne des
Libanais et comme trophée quelques grosses fortunes qui n’ont pas mis assez
rapidement leur argent à l’étranger. Que demande le peuple ?
Le plan de restructuration bancaire est d’une simplicité biblique. Expropriation
des banques et c’est là où se situe le coup d’État : La création de « cinq
nouvelles licences de nouvelles banques commerciales » administrées par des
proches du nouveau pouvoir. La liste des futurs reprenants des nouvelles
licences provoqua la risée de la communauté libanaise.
Devant l’inquiétude provoquée par ce « coup de Beyrouth », Hassan Nasrallah
sortit de son silence. Dans un entretien télévisé le 4 mai 2020, il indiqua,
comme s’il était dépositaire du pouvoir, que le plan était amendable. Il est
vrai que la hausse des impôts et le gel des embauches dans le secteur public
inquiétait. Et il se fit plus clair déclarant : « néanmoins le secteur bancaire
a commis plusieurs erreurs » faisant référence, notamment, « aux sanctions
bancaires contre le parti-milice chiite ordonné par les États-Unis » et conclut
le propos par un « ne soyez pas plus américains que les Américains ».
Et c’est ainsi que le Hezbollah compte prendre définitivement le pouvoir au nom
de la révolution sans une manifestation ou un seul coup de feu.
Il s’agit de confisquer la révolution au nom de la révolution comme Chavez au
Venezuela a pris le pouvoir légalement avant de nationaliser à tout va au nom de
la Révolution bolivarienne.
Personne, en tout cas pas la France, ne trouve à redire car la stabilité du
Liban vaut bien une restructuration bancaire. Comme si c’était vraiment le sujet
de ce qui se joue à Beyrouth.
Mais est-on si sûr d’une stabilité à venir ? Le Hezbollah profite de
l’interminable crise politique israélienne, du conflit de pouvoir à la tête de
l’État irakien, des tensions entre la Turquie d’Erdogan et le pouvoir
convalescent d’Assad, voire la sécession kurde, la focalisation américaine sur
l’Iran, et, bien sûr, la gestion planétaire du Covid-19.
Mais lorsque tout le monde se réveillera, il sera trop tard. Le Hezbollah aura
un État. Et ce n’est pas la promesse de laisser Israël camper sur le Golan qui
stabilisera les choses. La pression sera grande sur le pouvoir au Liban. Et le
Hezbollah ne lâchera pas sa proie. Est-ce que Maduro a rendu le pouvoir ?
Le Hezbollah n’est pas le mouvement chaviste, loin de là. Il ne s’appuie pas sur
la rente pétrolière. Il a d’autres moyens de se faire respecter et la France en
sait quelque chose. Il peut même, ayant les leviers de commande au Liban,
s’émanciper de son tuteur iranien.
Voilà pourquoi, il serait temps d’ouvrir les yeux, de mettre le holà au Liban et
de soutenir réellement le peuple libanais et sa révolution en faisant en sorte
qu’elle ne soit pas confisquée et que le pays se redresse réellement.
C’est l’intérêt des Libanais, de la région, de la sécurité intérieure européenne
et française. Comme cela l’était pour la lutte contre Daech ou le barrage au
fondamentalisme au Mali.
Jean-Christophe Cambadélis
Ancien député et membre de la Commission des affaires étrangères
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US Navy issues new warning to Iran
after close encounters in Arabian Gulf
AP/May 19/2020
WASHINGTON: The US Navy warned Tuesday it will take “lawful defensive measures”
against vessels in the Middle East that come within 100 meters (yards) of its
warships, offering specific guidelines after a recent close encounter with
Iranian vessels in the Arabian Gulf.
Defensive measures have typically included turning a ship away from the
approaching vessel, sounding its horn, shooting off flares and ultimately firing
warning shots to force the vessel away. But offering a specific distance is new
for the Navy.
“Our ships are conducting routine operations in international waters wherever
international law allows and do not seek conflict,” said Cmdr. Rebecca Rebarich,
a Bahrain-based 5th Fleet spokeswoman. “However, our commanding officers retain
the right to self-defense if deemed necessary.”
While 100 meters may seem far, it's incredibly close for large warships that
have difficulty in turning quickly, like aircraft carriers. The US Navy has
years of experience with Iranian forces getting that close, namely the
hard-line, paramilitary Revolutionary Guard. Their armed speedboats routinely
cut across their paths when going through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow mouth
of the Arabian Gulf through which 20% of all oil passes. Tensions have been high
between Iran and the US ever since President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew
America from Tehran's nuclear deal with world powers in 2018. Last summer saw a
series of escalating attacks targeting oil tankers and other sites around the
Arabian Gulf. It reached a crescendo in January with the US drone strike in
Baghdad that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and an Iranian ballistic
missile strike of American forces in Iraq in retalation.
Those tensions had been expected to rise after Iran’s government overcame the
initial chaos that engulfed its response to the coronavirus pandemic. In April,
the US accused Iran of conducting “dangerous and harassing” maneuvers near
American warships in the northern Arabian Gulf. Iran also had been suspected of
briefly seizing a Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker just before that.In April, Trump
warned on Twitter: “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down and
destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”
Iran Launches ‘Resistance’ Award Named After Soleimani
London, Tehran- Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 19 May, 2020
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani approved a resolution by the Islamic Republic's
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution to launch a new award named after
slain military commander Qassem Soleimani, who was targeted by a US airstrike
last January. The award is granted in the main category of "struggle and
resistance" and six sub-fields of "people and society", "culture and art",
"politics", "education and research", "media", and "sports".A 19-member body
would oversee the award to be held biennially. The body consists of
representatives from militias and factions allied with Tehran including Lebanese
Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine Jihad, and Houthis. It
also includes, inter alia, the Islamic Republic's Foreign Minister, and the head
of the state-run Radio and Television Organization. The body would set general
policies of culture and education in the country on all levels, as well.
The award will be presented to individuals from “the field of struggle and
resistance,” IRNA said. Iran uses the term “resistance axis” to describe its
network of proxies, allies, and terrorist organizations in the region.
This isn’t the first time Iran declares publicly its link to armed factions and
militias in the regions, after the killing of Soleimani upon orders by US
President Trump in Baghdad. Amirali Hajizadeh, head of the aerospace division of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, appeared in a press conference earlier
and behind him, several flags of Tehran allies were raised. This stirred
criticism from close circles at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as it
indirectly proves the US criticism against the IRGC regarding its role outside
the Iranian borders.
Iran Says ‘All Options’ on Table if US Hinders Fuel
Shipments to Venezuela
London - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 19 May, 2020
The Iranian government announced that all options are available in response to
any American move against its five oil tankers bound to Venezuela to transport
fuel, in defiance of US sanctions. For the second time in a week, government
spokesman Ali Rabiei stated Iran’s desire to continue exporting oil to Venezuela
and establishing trade relations with Caracas, which is under US sanctions. “No
country is required to comply with the United States’ unilateral sanctions,” he
stressed. In response to a question on Iran’s possible response to US threats to
prevent oil exports from Iran to Venezuela, the official said his country wants
to be assured of the absence of US “piracy”. He expressed hope that the
international community would take a step in this regard. “We hope that America
does not make such a mistake … If they take any action, we reserve the right to
respond and will respond accordingly,” Rabiei noted. At least one tanker
carrying fuel loaded at an Iranian port has set sail for Venezuela, according to
vessel tracking data from Refinitiv Eikon last week, which could help ease an
acute scarcity of gasoline in the South American country. Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Abbas Mousavi warned Monday that that the US will receive a “serious
response” from Iran if it carries out any action against its oil tankers. “I
hope that the Americans will not do anything stupid, because that will face a
serious response from Iran,” the semi-official ISNA news agency quoted him as
saying.
“The activities of these ships are completely official and legal. In fact, this
is being done within the framework of free trade, and there is no legal obstacle
to doing this legitimate trade.”He described threats by US officials as
“shameless,” stressing that “any US response against the legal navigation of our
ships will be met with a decisive response, and America shall bear its
repercussions.”Iran complained to the United Nations on Sunday and summoned the
Swiss ambassador in Tehran, who represents US interests in the country, over
possible measures Washington could take against the fuel shipment to Venezuela.
A senior official in President Donald Trump’s administration told Reuters on
Thursday Washington was considering measures it could take in response to Iran.
Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi passed on a message to the
ambassador warning against any US threat against the tankers, according to a
report on the foreign ministry website. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
also wrote a letter to UN chief Antonio Guterres warning that any American
measures against the shipment would be dangerous, illegal and a form of piracy,
the report added.
Cyberattack on Port: 'Iran crossed a red line - Israel had
to respond'
David Rosenberg/Arutz Sheva/May 19/2020
Israeli cyberattack on Iranian port was retaliation for Iranian attack on
Israel, Western source says. 'Iran crossed a red line.'
A cyber-attack on an Iranian port attributed to Israel was carried out in
retaliation for a similar attack by Iran on an Israeli target, according to a
report by Channel 12 Tuesday morning.
Hours after The Washington Post published a report Monday evening claiming that
Israel was responsible for a May 9th cyber-attack on the Shahid Rajee terminal
at the Bandar Abbas port in Iran, Channel 12 reported that a Western source not
only confirmed that Israel was indeed behind the May 9th attack, but explained
Israel’s reasoning behind the cyber-strike.
The source told Channel 12 that the May 9th cyber-attack on Iran was carried out
in response to an attack Iran launched in late April.
“Israel carried out the attack. Iran had crossed a red line, and Israel had to
respond,” the source said.
“The cyber-attack on the Bandar Abbas port in Iran was Israel’s response to the
cyber-attack that [Iran] had carried out against Israel two weeks ago against
the water infrastructure – an attack which failed.”
“The Israelis are hoping that the Iranians stop here. They [the Iranians]
attacked the water infrastructure; they didn’t do much damage, but they crossed
a red line and [the Israelis] were obliged to respond.”
Israeli Air Force Major General (Res.) Amos Yadlin, who currently leads Israel’s
Institute for National Security Studies, tweeted Tuesday morning that the
cyber-attack on the Shahid Rajee terminal in Bandar Abbas appeared to be an
Israeli retaliation for the attempted cyber-attack on Israel’s water system.
“It looks like this was an Israeli response to the Iranian attack on the Israeli
water and sewer system.”
Earlier this month, it was reported that Iran was behind an attempted
cyber-attack on Israel’s water infrastructure network, and that the attack had
been launched through American servers.
A senior official at the US Dept. of Energy “reiterated the Trump
administration’s commitment to protecting America and its allies against these
sorts of attacks.”
Days later, Israel’s Security Cabinet held a meeting on Thursday to discuss the
unusual cyber-ttacks launched against Israel's water infrastructure, News 13
reported. "This is an attack which defies all [ethical] codes, even in war. Even
from the Iranians, we did not expect such a thing. This is an attack which it's
forbidden to conduct,” a senior Israeli official said at the time.
Against evidence, Israel defense minister claims Iran
withdrawing from Syria: Experts
Emily Judd, Al Arabiya EnglishظTuesday 19 May 2020
The Israeli defense minister’s claim that Iran is withdrawing its presence from
Syria is being undercut by experts and satellite imagery from the ground.
Outgoing Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said Monday that Iran “is
significantly reducing the scope of its forces in Syria,” but didn’t provide
details or evidence to back up the claim.
An Israeli defense official under Bennett repeated the same claim two weeks
earlier, saying Tehran “has been evacuating military bases” in Syria “since the
start of the coronavirus outbreak,” Israeli news outlet Haaretz reported.
‘No change in the Iranian presence’
Bennett’s statement may have neglected to convey the full reality of the
situation on the ground, for possible policy reasons, according to expert Walid
Phares, who some Iranian forces may have left Syria – but others have taken
their place.
“What was not said in public is the fact that other Iran-led units have entered
Syria from Iraq. Some Iranian assets have left the Assad controlled territory,
but other pro-Iranian militias have entered that territory to replace them,”
Phares said in an interview with Al Arabiya English.
“I believe such a scenario is very possible in light of Iranian regime’s current
priorities,” he added.Local Syrian sources contradict Bennett and suggest there
has been “no change in the Iranian presence” in the country, according to former
Israeli Defense Forces Colonel Miri Eisin.
The timing of Bennett’s statement, made on the day he was leaving his position
as defense minister, and after he failed to reach an agreement with Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, should be taken into consideration, said
Eisin.
“I separate political rhetoric on the day a minister is going to be in the
opposition, from reality on the ground,” said Eisin, who served in the Israeli
intelligence community and was a former adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert.
Israel views Iran's presence in Syria as a threat as Tehran has historically
used its resources in Syria to launch rocket attacks against Israel.
Imagery shows Iran building on Syrian military base
Another blow against Bennett’s claim is a recent US media report that signals
Iran is starting new military projects in Syria.
Fox News reported on May 13 that Iran is building a new tunnel at the Imam Ali
military base in the eastern Syrian city of Albu Kamal. The report provided
satellite images captured a day earlier showing bulldozers at the front of the
structure. The imagery was captured by civilian satellite company Image Sat
International (ISI), whose intelligence analysis concluded the tunnel is to be
used “for the storage of vehicles carrying advanced weapons systems,” according
to the Fox News report. Similar tunnels on the base, located near the border
with Iraq, have been dug during the past nine months, according to ISI.
The construction comes just two months after the US struck the base, killing at
least 18 fighters from the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMU),
according to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Possibility of attack US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief General Kenneth
McKenzie told Al Arabiya English in November that Iran has the ability to strike
Israel and would probably use long-range ballistic missiles if it were to carry
out an attack. Eisin said Iran has had the capability to attack Israel for many
years, but that having the capability and having the intention are two distinct
issues.
“The issue with Iran is the interpretation of their intentions,” said Eisin,
adding that she does not think Iran would directly attack Israel, but
indirectly. Syria's President Bashar al-Assad and Iran's Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif, wearing face masks as protection against the spread of the
coronavirus disease (COVID-19), meet in Damascus, Syria, in this handout
released by SANA on April 20, 2020. Syria's President Bashar al-Assad and Iran's
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, wearing face masks as protection against
the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), meet in Damascus, Syria, in
this handout released by SANA on April 20, 2020. “Iran prefers to use its
proxies, disputes, and disquiet to achieve their aims,” said Eisin. “They arm
Hezbollah and let them fight. They help Assad and let him fight."
Israel has conducted many raids inside Syria, seeing the presence of Lebanese
Hezbollah and its ally Iran in the country as a strategic threat.
Less than a month ago Israeli warplanes fired missiles toward areas near
Damascus on April 27, the Syrian regime army said. The Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights reported the strikes hit targets belonging to Iran and its regional
proxies.
Israel did not comment on the report.
Bennett: Iran leaving Syria, but could come back if Israel let's up
Gary Willig/Arutz Sheva/May 19/2020The defense minister exchange
ceremony was held Monday evening at the Kirya in Tel Aviv as outgoing Defense
Minister Naftali Bennett stepped down for incoming Defense Minister Benny Gantz.
In a joint decision, the ministers concluded that the exchange ceremony will be
conducted in a modest and limited format, with no honor guard and orchestra,
attended by the chief of staff, the head of the Mossad, and the management of
the Ministry of Defense. During the ceremony, Bennett stated that Iran is
leaving Syria, but those gains could be reversed if Israel lets up on the
pressure against the Iranian presence in Syria.
"We must not let up on Iran for a moment. We have proven that if you focus on
hitting the octopus on its head you can push it back. You have to attack and put
it on the defensive. If we let go of the pressure on our enemy - everything can
be turned around," Bennett said.
Bennett thanked the senior defense officials for their service and support.
First of all, I would like to thank my friend, Chief of Staff Major General Aviv
Kochavi. We have merited to have a serious, smart, dedicated, creative, and
Zionist commander in all of aspects. The champions of the General Staff and all
the officers I met are dedicated and energetic people who dedicate their lives
to the highest cause of all - the Jewish state of Israel. A big thank you also
to the Director General of the Ministry of Defense Udi Adam, who has great
experience and great heart. I wish you success later in your journey. I would
also like to thank all the Ministry of Defense staff, and my dedicated bureau
staff, who I was privileged to work with. And my biggest thanks, to Gilat, my
wife and my friend, And to my kids Yoni, Michal, Abigail and David, who are the
rock of my life."
Turning to the incoming Dfense Minister, Bennett said: "Benny, I pass on to you
the baton at a time when the state of Israel is in a good, stable, perhaps
quiet, security state, and Iran is in the process of withdrawing from Syria. But
if we let go of our pressure even for a moment, it could all be reversed at
once. Since the beginning of the year, and thanks to the ongoing efforts of the
IDF and the security establishment, no Israeli civilians have been killed by
terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, last week we lost the late Golani Amit Ben
Yigal in action in Kfar Ya'av. In recent months, one single rocket has been
fired from Gaza, and not a single incendiary or arson balloon has been
launched."
"In the north, upon my entering the post, we have set a key and essential goal:
to remove Iran from Syria. No more stopping the consolidation, or pursuing one
or the other, but removing the Iranian octopus arm. We have clearly told the
Iranians: 'Get out of Syria. You have nothing to look for here. Syria will
become a Vietnamese mud where they will be based, paying a growing price for
blood and treasure.' For them it is a terrorist adventure 1000 miles from home,
and for us it is our children's lives. "The actions have brought results: Iran
has significantly reduced the scope of its forces in Syria, and is even clearing
a number of bases. Iran has begun a process of withdrawal from Syria, but the
task must be completed. This is within reach. I am convinced, Benny, that you
will complete this task," Bennett stated.
incoming Defense Minister Benny Gantz said he intends to lead multi-year
programs to the IDF and the security system that will enable them to deal with
present threats and future challenges.
Gantz also addressed the security challenges facing the State of Israel,
declaring, "We will protect Israeli citizens from distant and imminent threats,
locate them, identify them and destroy them."
Addressing the Trump Administration's peace plan, Gantz said: "As someone who is
also active in the political dimension, I am committed to doing everything
possible to advance political arrangements and strive for peace - peace has been
and remains, an important Zionist goal. We will advance the peace program of the
US government and President Trump. Responsible and important political measures
require a strong security system, capable of assessing and preparing for the
strategic reality facing the State of Israel, which has the attentive ear of the
decision makers and is connected to them. We have that, and it will continue to
be that way."
The minister concluded his remarks and referred to the newly formed government:
"The strength of Israeli society is measured not only by its iron fist, but also
by the readiness of all its components to fight, the strength of the home front,
and the strength of the entire society. I look to Israeli society today. These
are the days of undermining trust in government institutions. One of the reasons
for establishing the current government as far as I am concerned is the harsh
sense of trying to ignite - G-d forbid - to approach and win a civil war. I have
won battles, I have fought in wars. This war I do not want to win, this war I
must prevent."
UN Team Reports New Evidence Against ISIS in
Iraq
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 19 May, 2020
A UN investigative team says it has made "significant progress" in collecting
new sources of evidence in Iraq against ISIS extremists, including over 2
million call records that should strengthen cases against perpetrators of crimes
against the Yazidi minority in 2014. The team also reported progress in its
investigations of the mass killings of unarmed cadets and military personnel
from the Tikrit Air Academy in June 2014 and crimes committed by ISIS extremists
in Mosul from 2014 to 2016.In a report to the UN Security Council obtained by
The Associated Press, the investigative team said it is continuing to engage
with the Iraqi government on pending legislation that would allow the country to
prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide allegedly committed
by ISIS. "In the coming six months, the team will continue its work with the
government of Iraq in order to capitalize on this opportunity, with a view to
securing the commencement of domestic proceedings based on evidence collected by
the team," the report said.
The ISIS group´s self-declared "caliphate" that once spanned a third of both
Iraq and Syria, has been defeated on the ground but its fighters are still
staging insurgent attacks. The atrocities its fighters and supporters committed
have left deep scars. Thousands of members of Iraq´s Yazidi minority, mainly
women and girls, were raped and enslaved, while men were killed. Suspected
homosexuals were pushed off roofs to their deaths. Captured Americans and other
Westerners were beheaded, and an unknown number of suspected opponents were
killed.
A Security Council resolution backed by more than 60 countries to refer the
Syrian conflict to the International Criminal Court was vetoed by both Russia
and China in May 2014. The General Assembly established an independent panel in
December 2016 to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those
responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity in Syria.
In September 2017, the Security Council voted unanimously to ask the UN to
establish an investigative team to help Iraq preserve evidence and promote
accountability for what "may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide" committed by ISIS extremists, both in Iraq and the Levant which
includes Syria. The latest report by the investigative team said that as a
result of its expanded cooperation with the Iraqi judiciary, security services,
and Directorate of Military Intelligence, it stands "at a pivotal moment in its
work." Cooperation with the Iraqi judiciary in obtaining call data records and
with Iraqi security services in extracting and analyzing data from cellphones,
SIM cards, and mass storage devices previously used by ISIS "have the potential
to represent a paradigm shift in the prosecution of ISIS members," the
investigators said.
The data has provided "access to a wide range of internal ISIS documents, cell
data, videos, and images," they said. The team said it is already identifying
evidence that can fill gaps in ongoing proceedings as a result of the cell phone
data as well as from putting documents held by Iraqi authorities in digital
form, and using enhanced discovery and evidence-management systems.
In its investigation of attacks committed by ISIS against the Yazidis in Sinjar
district in August 2014, the team said the recent receipt of more than 2 million
call data records from Iraqi cell phone service providers "relevant to time
periods and geographic locations connected to this investigation provides a
significant opportunity to strengthen case files in relation to alleged
perpetrators."As for the investigation into the mass killings at the Tikrit Air
Academy in June 2014, the team said its work has been helped by continuing
cooperation from the Iraqi national commission established to investigate the
crimes, including reports on the exhumations and autopsies of victims. The team
said it has also obtained accounts from survivors and is seeking additional call
data records. The investigators said cooperation with Iraqi domestic courts and
non-governmental organizations has further advanced its collection of evidence
of ISIS crimes in Mosul between 2014 and 2016. Exhumations at two mass grave
sites close to Mosul that began in March have been temporarily halted due to the
COVID-19 outbreak and "will provide a significant focus of upcoming
investigative activity," the team said. Looking ahead, the team said it has
established two additional field investigation units to look into crimes
committed by ISIS against Christian, Kakai, Shaba, Sunni, and Turkmen Shiite
communities in Iraq.
Bitter rift in Assad family. Bashar vs tycoon cousin Makhlouf
DebkaFile/May 19/2020
Syria’s finance minister on Tuesday, May 19, ordered the seizure of assets
belonging to Rami Makhlouf, President Assad’s billionaire cousin who helped
bankroll the regime’s war effort. It was explained as a “precautionary seizure”
to guarantee payment of sums owing to the Syrian telecom regulatory authority.
Two days earlier, Makhlouf, 51, once a member of the president’s inner circle,
claimed in a video statement that he was told to quit as head of Syriatel, the
largest mobile operator in the country. This was the latest in a batch of videos
he released warning that any actions taken against him could be
“catastrophic”for the country’s war-devastated economy.
On Sunday, the billionaire used a Facebook video to charge that Assad’s henchmen
were forcing him to step down as head of Syriatel, unless he forked out $180
million in so-called “unpaid taxes.” He was filmed in his sumptuous villa
outside Damascus.
The Makhlouf videos started coming after security officials detained 60 managers
and technicians of his businesses some weeks ago. “They said you have until
Sunday to either comply or the company will be taken, and its assets seized,”
Makhlouf said, adding that board members had also been targeted. Describing
himself as a legitimate businessman, he said he was forced to forfeit 120 per
cent of his profits or be arrested.
“Whoever thinks I will resign under these conditions, doesn’t know me,” he said.
Makhlouf’s personal wealth was estimated in 2008 at $60 billion. His business
empire is spread widely across banking, real estate, construction, oil trading,
luxury tourism, restaurants, duty free retail and Syria’s first private airline.
In that year, he was placed under US sanctions for corrupt practices, such as
manipulating the Syrian judicial system to intimidate rivals and obtain
exclusive foreign licenses and contracts. Parts of the Makhlouf business empire
had meanwhile been transferred to Dubai.
This spat in the normally secretive Assad clan has burst into the public domain
and driven the first rift in the minority Allawi sect that rule the country
since a failed attempt to overthrow Assad’s father Hafez after he seized power
in 1984. Some of its privileged members fear a presidential crackdown is coming
against those seen as wanting in loyalty or having amassed large fortunes under
the Assad patronage.
Once one of the most influential members of the Assad regime, Makhlouf is being
targeted and, unless he can get out in time, he may have to part with some of
the fortune he amassed as a favorite of the ruling elite. He would not be the
first high-flyer to disappear under Assad’s rule.
Dispute between Government, Makhlouf Deepens Syria's
Economic Woes
Damascus - Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 19 May, 2020
Concerns over the economy increased in Damascus as the result of the dispute
between the government and businessman Rami Makhlouf. The latter warned of an
“economic meltdown” in the event that his company, Syriatel, collapsed. The
government’s Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority had informed two
of Makhlouf’s companies, Syriatel and MTN mobile phone, to pay about 234 billion
Syrian pounds to the state treasury as a penalty, after failing to meet a
deadline to pay hundreds of millions in dues. The businessman, who for decades
had the country’s most prominent economic pillars, is facing a series of
measures that would affect his shares in the state-owned Syrian Telecom Company
(Syriatel), the country’s biggest mobile phone company. Makhlouf published on
Facebook on May 10 a letter from Syriatel to the government saying the company
was ready to pay immediately “a first instalment to be determined on the basis
of the liquidity available to the company.” He also criticized the
Telecommunications and Regulatory Authority for posting a statement that
contradicts his letter.In response, the Authority issued a document on May 16,
signed by five managers of Syriatel Mobile Telecom, in which they declared their
approval of the Authority’s requests, but noted that Makhlouf had refused to
give them the green light to proceed with the agreement. Syria’s security bodies
had launched a campaign of arrests earlier this month targeting dozens of
employees of companies affiliated with Makhlouf, and stormed his house in Yaafur.
In a video on social media, the businessman implored his cousin, President
Bashar Assad, to “intervene and put an end to the security services’ operations”
and the release of his employees and managers.
Amid the dispute, anxiety mounted in the Syrian street over an economic
deterioration, in parallel with the strict health measures imposed by the
government over the coronavirus outbreak, which have compounded unemployment and
poverty.
Syrian Government Seizes Assets of Assad Cousin Makhlouf
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 19 May, 2020
The Syrian regime decided on Tuesday to seize assets belonging to Rami Makhlouf,
a cousin of President Bashar Assad and one of Syria's richest men, and his wife
and children, according to a government document seen by Reuters. The document,
stamped May 19 and signed by the Syrian finance minister, said the
"precautionary seizure" aimed to guarantee payment of sums owned to the Syrian
telecom regulatory authority.Makhlouf said in a video statement issued on Sunday
that officials had told him to quit as head of mobile operator Syriatel. The
unprecedented public tussle has uncovered a rift at the heart of the ruling
elite. Makhlouf, once widely considered part of the president's inner circle and
the country's leading businessman, has a business empire that ranges from
telecoms and real estate to construction and oil trading.
Canada/Readout: Ministers Champagne and Johnson Smith
co-preside a second meeting with UN Member States on addressing the COVID-19
financing challenge
May 19, 2020 – Ottawa, Ontario - Global Affairs Canada
The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Canada, and Senator the Honourable Kamina Johnson Smith, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Trade of Jamaica, today co-presided via video conference a
second extraordinary meeting of the United Nations Group of Friends of
Sustainable Development Goals Financing.
This meeting, which reconvened Ambassadors from across the membership of the
United Nations, featured presentations on the climate finance and COVID-19
challenges from Mark Carney, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for
Climate Action and Finance and Mahmoud Mohieldin, the UN Secretary-General’s
Special Envoy on Financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
The group discussed additional actions to respond rapidly to the global economic
crisis facing developing countries and support their efforts to build back
better for more resilient societies. They also took note of the work being
conducted by the UN to improve developing countries’ access to financing to
support their SDGs and climate action objectives.
The Foreign Ministers committed to continue working together to strengthen the
multilateral system and to meet again as required to review progress on the
COVID-19 financing challenge.
Spain Govt. Seeks 2-Week Extension of Lockdown
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 19/2020
Spain's government on Tuesday said it would seek parliament's approval to extend
the state of emergency by another fortnight, until June 7, even as the number of
new coronavirus cases keeps falling. The current state of emergency is set
to expire on May 23 and Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez had initially said he would
seek an extension of around a month. But the government reduced the request to
two weeks to secure the support of the center-right Ciudadanos party, thereby
guaranteeing it would pass during Wednesday's vote in the 350-seat chamber where
Sanchez's coalition is in a minority. "If there is no state of emergency, we
won't have the capacity to restrict movement and the ongoing sacrifice that
everyone has made will have served for nothing," government spokeswoman Maria
Jesus Montero said.
The lockdown was first imposed on March 14 and it has since been renewed four
times, despite growing criticism of Sanchez over his management of the crisis,
notably from his rightwing opponents who did not support the last extension two
weeks ago.
The government has also not ruled out a further extension, having shown itself
in favor of continuing until the rollback of the lockdown restrictions is
completed at the end of June. "Limiting mobility, which is a fundamental
right, can only be achieved like this," said Health Minister Salvador Illa.
The government says the decree has allowed it to battle the epidemic and bring
down the daily number of new cases, which on Tuesday stood at 295, health
ministry figures showed.
Over the same period, 83 people died from the virus, in what was the third
straight day the figure had been under 100. Fernando Simon, the health
ministry's emergencies coordinator, said the medical authorities had managed to
reduce the time between initial consultation and diagnosis of infection "to
under 48 hours." This, he said, meant that "if the cases of the epidemic flared
up again, we would be capable of locating (them) quickly". Spain has suffered
one of the most deadly outbreaks of the virus, suffering more than 27,700 deaths
out of more than 232,000 cases.
But the government's management of the crisis has come under fire in recent days
with street protests in Madrid and other cities, where demonstrators banged pots
and demanded Sanchez's resignation amid cries of "freedom". "(These protests)
are demanding freedom of movement and what that means at this point in time...
is the freedom for the infection to spread and freedom to impact the health of
other people," spokeswoman Montero said. Figures from a survey by the state-run
Center for Sociological Studies (CIS) published on Tuesday showed 95 percent of
Spaniards support the lockdown and 60 percent believe it should be extended,
despite the protests.
WHO States Agree to Independent Probe of Coronavirus
Response
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 19/2020
World Health Organization member states agreed Tuesday to an independent probe
into the U.N. agency's coronavirus response as U.S. criticism mounted over its
handling of the pandemic. Countries taking part in the WHO's annual assembly,
being held virtually for the first time, adopted a resolution by consensus
urging a joint response to the crisis. The resolution, tabled by the European
Union, called for an "impartial, independent and comprehensive evaluation" of
the international response to the pandemic, which has so far infected more than
4.8 million people and killed over 318,000.
It said the investigation should include a probe of "the actions of WHO and
their time-lines pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic." The United States did not
disassociate itself from the consensus as some had feared after Washington
chastised the WHO on the first day of the assembly Monday and lashed out further
against China over its role in the outbreak.
'Puppet of China'
U.S. President Donald Trump threatened late Monday to pull the United States out
of the WHO, accusing it of botching the global coronavirus response and of being
a "puppet of China". His comments, which drew a harsh rebuke from Beijing, came
after his health secretary Alex Azar earlier in the day insisted the WHO's
"failure" to obtain and provide vital information on COVID-19 had proved deadly.
"We must be frank about one of the primary reasons this outbreak spun out of
control: there was a failure by this organisation to obtain the information that
the world needed, and that failure cost many lives," Azar said in a video
address to the WHO's assembly. He demanded an independent review of "every
aspect" of the U.N. health agency's response to the pandemic. While WHO chief
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on Monday welcomed the call for a review, he insisted
there was no need for a dramatic overhaul of the organisation. What the global
community needs to do, he said, is to "strengthen, implement and finance the
systems and organisations it has -- including WHO."Trump has been locked in a
bitter spat with Beijing, alleging it covered up the initial outbreak in China
late last year before the disease unleashed death and economic devastation
across the planet. With more fatalities and cases in the United States than any
other country by far, the under-pressure U.S. president has blamed the WHO for
not doing enough to combat its initial spread. Trump had already suspended U.S.
funding to the U.N. body, and after his White House comments Monday, he tweeted
a letter he had sent to Tedros threatening to make that freeze permanent and
withdraw from the organization. This is turn prompted a harsh reaction from
Beijing which said Tuesday that Washington was "shirking responsibility." On the
sidelines of the escalating row, the EU on Tuesday stepped up its support for
the WHO. "This is the time for solidarity, not the time for
finger-pointing or for undermining multilateral cooperation," EU foreign affairs
spokeswoman Virginie Battu-Henriksson told reporters in Brussels.
Tuesday's resolution at the WHO assembly -- which is not binding and mentioned
no countries by name -- also called for nations to commit to ensuring
"transparent, equitable and timely access" to any treatments or vaccines
developed against COVID-19. And it addressed the controversial issue of the
origin of the virus, which first emerged in China late last year, urging the WHO
to help investigate "the zoonotic source of the virus and the route of
introduction to the human population."
The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources
published on May 19-20/2020
Iran’s coronavirus strategy: Neglect
its people, revive its proxies
Dr.Walid Phares/Al Arabiya/May 19/2020
د.وليد فارس/العربية: استراتجية إيران بما يتعلق بالورونا
فيرس: اهمال شعبها وتقوية وتمويا أذرعتها الميليشياوية
Iran’s strategies to ride the recent wave of events, both in the region and with
the United States, is on the minds of many observers of the Middle East.
Before the coronavirus outbreak, Iran was attempting to survive the critical
months leading up to the US presidential elections, the outcome of which could
either crush or unleash Tehran’s interim and long-term goals.
Now, Tehran is attempting to use the COVID-19 pandemic to quell issues at home
and to consolidate its proxies, while the world’s attention is focused on the
health crisis.
Pre-coronavirus events
Toward the end of last year, after three months of unending demonstrations
inside Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-controlled regime
calculated that any longer stretch of popular uprisings would eventually lead to
paralysis of the system, especially considering the biting US sanctions against
them. All calculations indicated an eventual socio-economic collapse and chaos,
leading to a long, protracted revolt – so Tehran’s rulers chose to escalate
against “foreign enemies” to silence the domestic one - its own people.
First to bear the ire of the Ayatollahs were Gulf leaders. From missiles fired
by the Iran-backed Houthi militia from Yemen at targets in Saudi Arabia, to the
sabotage of UAE ships, to a blatant missile bombardment of Aramco, the regime
aimed for a long-distance ballistic war with “enemy regimes.”
The US, however, did not let this go unanswered and responded with
deployment-deterrents in the Gulf region, upsetting Iran’s intentions.
Because the Trump administration became a formidable obstructive force, having
pulled out from the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal and designating the IRGC as a
terror entity, Tehran turned its ire - and fire - toward the US military
presence in Iraq.
Tehran directed its Iraqi militias, the infamous Hashd Shaabi, and terror group
Kataib Hezbollah to aggress American units.
Washington, unlike during the Obama years, responded heavily against the
militias, eliminating the very top of the chain of command, military commander
Qassem Soleimani, leaving the regime and its allies in the region—including
Lebanese Hezbollah—in a state of shock.
From January until the coronavirus pandemic, Iranian plans have been obstructed.
Unable to slam the Gulf states with frontal attacks because of US deterrence,
shocked by the American responses in Iraq, and sinking into an expanding
domestic revolt, the regime was in its worst shape.
It had no choice but to wait out the Trump administration’s last ten months in
the hope that the President’s opposition would prevail at the ballot box. The
month-long impeachment hearings against President Trump in Congress encouraged
the Ayatollahs to be patient for what they projected to be Trump’s demise in the
fall. The pre-coronavirus Iran strategies were simply to maintain the status
quo, avoid enflaming tensions with US forces, and rely on domestic American
politics to remove the administration-obstacle by end of year.
Iran’s coronavirus blessing
Then came the coronavirus from Wuhan. Iran was the second country to witness a
nationwide spread, most likely due to heavy international travel between Iran
and China.
The illness saturated most Iranian cities and towns without relief since its
incapacitated government had spent its cash and the Iran nuclear deal money on
itself and on militias across the region, instead of equipping the country with
a capable health infrastructure. Deaths rose, but demonstrations died out inside
Iran.
Though many Iranian officials contracted COVID-19, the upper echelon of the
regime understood the opportunity this crisis provided to evade an effective
mass uprising. And across the Atlantic, the United States was badly hit by the
virus with tens of thousands of deaths and a bleeding economy.
COVID-19 became a double blessing for the Khomeinists. It smashed the uprising
at home and is keeping the Americans busy in their homeland.
Iran’s coronavirus strategy
Iran quickly took advantage of the world panic regarding the plague with revised
strategies taking shape by mid-February. New plans capitalized on America’s
inward focus toward saving its population and the Gulf States and Israel’s
refocused scramble to fight the spread. Basically, Iran has been moving swiftly
to regroup, reorganize, rearm, redeploy and further dominate its four
“colonies.”
In Iraq, the IRGC has been consolidating the militias. In Syria, Iran is
assisting President Bashar al-Assad in retaking Idlib province and encircling
the Kurdish areas. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is clearly in charge of the new
cabinet. And in Yemen, the Houthis are dodging UN solutions and ignoring
ceasefires proposed by the Arab Coalition. Iranian activities are picking up on
several continents, including an air bridge with Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.
Tehran’s coronavirus strategies are quite somber. Unimpressed and unmoved by the
death toll among its own people, the regime is investing all it can to exploit
the global crisis and strengthen its strategic position—with its eyes fixed fast
on November 4. It is developing its ballistic missiles (some even under the
camouflage of a no-longer-secret military space program) while also investing
heavily in worldwide propaganda efforts against the US.
Last, but not least, its long lobbying arm is pushing to weaken Trump’s ability
to retaliate with impact on Congressional anti-war legislations barely vetoed by
the White House. Iran is preparing for two eventualities. If Donald Trump loses
in November, the Ayatollahs will enjoy victory and a return to the benefits of
the Iran Deal—in a stronger position than at the end of 2019. And if Trump wins
a second term, the regime wants to be as ready as possible with a new balance of
power in the region and maximum deterrence capabilities.
* Dr. Walid Phares is a Middle East expert, author and former Donald Trump
foreign policy advisor. He serves as a Co-Secretary General of the Transatlantic
Parliamentary Group.
China Rivalry May Put the US Back in the Coup Business
Hal Brands/Bloomberg/May 19/2020
By all accounts, the US government was not involved in the failed plot this
month to overthrow President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. One would hope that
the Central Intelligence Agency could do better than a farcical scheme that was
disowned by the Venezuelan opposition, penetrated by regime security forces and
disrupted as soon as it began.
Yet this trivial episode invites us to think seriously about the role of covert
intervention and regime change in US policy. Just as the US sought to undermine
or topple unfriendly regimes during the Cold War, it may look to such methods
again in its increasingly heated rivalry with China. Caution will be necessary:
History tells us that while covert intervention can sometimes be a
cost-effective tool of competition, it is fraught with risks and profound moral
trade-offs.
Covert action came of age during the Cold War. In the late 1940s, when the CIA
and National Security Council were born, the US began developing a global
capability for intervention under the cloak of secrecy. Over the succeeding
decades, it would seek to destabilize or replace numerous governments that were
slipping into the Soviet sphere or softening up their countries for communist
influence. The US didn’t do this gratuitously, or to protect American
investments overseas. Washington resorted to covert action because its leaders
believed that the geopolitical balance was fragile and that the US needed
affordable methods of competing along a nearly global periphery. And because
waging that struggle against a ruthless enemy in an often-unstable Third World
might require fighting dirty, America must be able to do so in quiet,
non-attributable ways.
The CIA successfully overthrew, or helped overthrow, governments in Guatemala
and Iran in the 1950s. It prosecuted a shadowy struggle from Central America to
southern Africa to Afghanistan through the end of the 1980s. In most cases, the
US subverted communist or other unfriendly authoritarian regimes, but it also
targeted democratically elected leaders such as Chile’s Salvador Allende, who
were seen as taking the wrong side in the Cold War. “We are facing an implacable
enemy whose avowed objective is world domination,” a classified report on CIA
operations concluded in 1954. “There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto
acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.”
Yet that same statement showed why covert action felt awkward — even morally
reprehensible — to many Americans. The CIA suffered severe blowback in the
1970s, when revelations of its role in Chile and its efforts to assassinate
foreign leaders came to light.
After the Cold War, covert intervention receded in importance. According to
published reports, the US sought covert options for toppling the Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein and other sworn enemies. Absent the Soviet threat, however, the
geopolitical imperatives of competing for influence everywhere became less
pressing.
Meanwhile, the spread of democracy and the rise of overt tools for promoting it,
such as the quasi-autonomous National Endowment for Democracy, gave the US less
morally ambiguous ways of shaping political outcomes. Why send spooks to
influence an election in Georgia or Ukraine when Washington could send
nongovernmental groups and election monitors instead? As Allen Weinstein, a
founder of the National Endowment for Democracy, said, “A lot of what we do
today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”
It’s not so easy anymore. American officials can no longer assume the inevitable
emergence of a friendlier, more democratic world. US competition with China
(and, to a lesser degree, Russia) is intensifying and sprawling geographically.
A few years from now, Washington might find itself desperately seeking covert
options to prevent some important country in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East
or Southeast Asia from aligning with Beijing.
If that seems far-fetched, consider how much the US-China rivalry has escalated
over the past three years, and where that trajectory might lead in another
decade. Or remember that US policymakers of the late 1940s probably never
imagined that America would wage a complex covert struggle over Angola a
quarter-century later. One timeless rule of international politics is that
strategic competition takes countries places they may not initially expect, or
want, to go.
But is covert intervention a good idea? Some analysts argue that it rarely works
and should be avoided, yet this is probably the wrong standard. Countries
usually resort to covert action when other options have either failed or are
deemed undesirable, so the likelihood of success is low to begin with. That
built-in handicap notwithstanding, the US did, in some cases, get serious
strategic mileage out of its meddling.
In the late 1940s, covert support for democratic politicians in Italy played a
modest but probably important role in shoring up that country against communist
challenges at the polls. For the cost of a few hired mobs, the US facilitated
the toppling of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953, securing its
strategic flank in the Persian Gulf for 25 years. CIA support helped the
Indonesian military consolidate power after it toppled an increasingly
anti-American Sukarno in 1965, thus avoiding the prospect of Southeast Asia’s
most important country turning hostile.
During the 1970s, when the Third World was convulsed by ideological radicalism
and the US was experiencing its post-Vietnam hangover, covert action was
critical to holding the line. Finally, in the 1980s, the Reagan administration
used a wide-ranging covert offensive to put intense pressure on Soviet clients
in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola, and to drive up the costs of Moscow’s
global presence. Without covert action, America might not have won the Cold War.
Unfortunately, some of these examples also tell a darker story. By aiding the
Indonesian military in 1965, the US implicated itself in horrific violence that
killed half a million people. The price the US ultimately paid for conspiring
against Mossadegh and backing the shah of Iran was measured in the enmity of the
anti-American regime that took power in 1979. The US supported some decent
people fighting against Communist regimes in the 1980s, and some truly awful
ones as well, including some who would go on to play an important role in a
blossoming international jihad. And in destabilizing Allende’s regime in the
early 1970s, the US helped extinguish Chilean democracy for nearly two decades.
The nature of covert intervention is that it is difficult to be choosy in one’s
partners or their methods, which can create a moral mess for a democratic
superpower. A sense that almost anything would be better than ascendant
communism led the US to embrace expedients — authoritarian regimes, efforts to
kill foreign leaders such as Patrice Lumumba in the Congo or Fidel Castro in
Cuba — that were ugly. When that happened, covert action could become a cause of
anti-Americanism in the Third World rather than a solution for it.
Not least, because covert operations are high-risk endeavors, they can backfire
spectacularly. The US created some of its own problems in Indonesia in the 1950s
by trying, and failing, to spur a separatist movement against Sukarno’s
government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 pushed Castro to undertake a covert
offensive of his own, meant to overthrow US allies in Latin America. It also
caused Nikita Khrushchev to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba, leading to the most
dangerous crisis of the Cold War.
One tragedy of geopolitical rivalry is that it often presents great powers with
unappealing choices. The alternative to a bad outcome may be one that is worse,
both morally and strategically. That’s why the US so often resorted to
behind-the-scenes intervention in the Cold War, and why it may prove useful in
the future. But history shows that covert action is no cure-all for a country’s
geopolitical challenges. In some cases, it can produce tragedies of its own.
Pandemic, Arabian Gulf Rentier-States and Foreign Labor
Charles Elias Chartouni/May 19/2020
Pandemics are not only viral catalysts, they are, also, catalysts of economic,
social and political disruptions as it demonstrates in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
the overall Arabian Gulf region. The plummeting oil revenues are displaying the
vulnerabilities of the Rentier-State paradigm, be it at the economic, social and
political levels. The brittleness of an emerging diversified economy, the
incipient social liberalization, the massive reliance on the professional and
raw labor skills of foreign manpower, the bloated and inept bureaucracy of the
Rentier-States catering to regimes survival, and the governmental policies which
have, so far, failed to oversee the progressive transition of the economy into
the private sector mostly run by professional expatriates, and a mass of
unskilled labor providing for basic social services ( Construction workers,
household workers, running the basic logistics and infrastructure, food and
pantries, .... ). The Covid 19 pandemic and its cascading fiscal and economic
crises have undermined the traditional oil sources revenues and their induced
power base, and undercut the financial lifelines of Rentier-States, their
patrimonial legitimacy, clientelist networks, and exposed their structural
vulnerabilities, insofar as modernizing underdeveloped economic systems, and
enabling them integrate the international division of labor.
Otherwise, the pandemic has hardly hit communities of unskilled workers who have
been working under inhumane conditions for decades ( insalubrious collective
dormitories, daunting hours of slave labor under searing heat, improper diet,
absence of social security and health insurance, discretionary indentured labor
... ) are unraveling under the pressure of the consecutive bankruptcies
targeting the construction sector, the money laundering financial platforms, the
pharaonic delusions of artificial islands, world football competitions,
international academic transplants and the famous museums simulacrums...,. The
heightened crisis of unemployment is setting in and raising the thorny
questions, of the sustainability of spurious economic schemes, the imperative
necessity to overhaul the division of labor after the massive repatriation of
foreign labor, the intricate issues of its replacement by local residents, the
weakening of the patrimonial levers of governance, and their incidence on
political stability in societies where radical Islam is ready to seize on
systemic failures to promote its subversive agendas.
The seismic impact of these major disruptions on ramshackle social orders that
have not succeeded their orderly transition into modernity, the creation of
alternative operational paradigms, and the endogenous management of the complex
systems which underpin contemporary States and economics, and the abrupt
transformations of social order, raises sundry questions on their ability to
conduct substantive changes in the absence of a reformist political culture and
its attending political and professional elites. The overall challenges are
quite heavy to address at a time when the dynamics of change are impelled by
structural breakdowns, considerable diminishing resources, and absence of
coherent reformist plans and elites. What mostly matters at this stage is
whether the incumbent power elites have come to terms with the nature of the
incoming challenges, their readiness and ability to engage them on the very
basis of reformist agendas and effective societal alliances.
Germany Takes Back its Sovereignty from the European Union
Soeren Kern//Gatestone Institute/May 19/2020
The seemingly obscure ruling... has called into question the legitimacy of the
EU's supranational legal and political order.... The German court's ruling marks
a new phase in the debate over the balance between national and supranational
sovereignty.
The European Union is now engaged in a power struggle with its largest member
state, Germany. The legal feud threatens to unravel not only Europe's single
currency, the euro, but the EU itself.
"What amazes me is the one-sidedness and the zealous tone that is struck by some
here. It is clear that the European Court of Justice has been claiming an
unlimited precedence for European law for 50 years, but almost all national
constitutional and supreme courts have objected to this for just as long. As
long as we don't live in a European superstate, a country's membership is
governed by its constitutional law." — Judge Peter Michael Huber, a member of
the German Constitutional Court who helped write the ruling.
"One thing should never be forgotten: Europe is not a federal state, but a legal
community developed from the founding core of an economic community in clearly
limited areas of national sovereignty. Any sovereignty of the European Union is
only derived from the sovereignty of the constituent member states." —
Klaus-Peter Willsch, a member of the German parliament.
Germany's Constitutional Court has issued an unprecedented ruling that directly
challenges the authority of both the European Central Bank and the European
Court of Justice. Pictured: The judges of the German Constitutional Court in
session on May 5, 2020 in Karlsruhe, as they issue their ruling on the European
Central Bank's bond-buying program.
Germany's Constitutional Court has issued an unprecedented ruling that directly
challenges the authority of both the European Central Bank and the European
Court of Justice.
The seemingly obscure ruling, which seeks to reassert national sovereignty over
bond purchases by the European Central Bank, has called into question the
legitimacy of the EU's supranational legal and political order.
The European Union is now engaged in a power struggle with its largest member
state, Germany. The legal feud threatens to unravel not only Europe's single
currency, the euro, but the EU itself.
On May 5, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG)
ruled that the European Central Bank's practice of buying vast amounts of
government bonds, a monetary policy known as quantitative easing, is illegal
under German law as neither the German government nor the German parliament
signs off on the purchases.
The European Central Bank has purchased government debt worth €2.7 trillion
($3.2 trillion) since March 2015, when, in an effort to stabilize the eurozone
during the European sovereign debt crisis, it launched its flagship stimulus
program, the so-called Public Sector Purchase Program.
The European Central Bank argues that large-scale purchases of government bonds
are a monetary stimulus needed to reinvigorate the eurozone economy. Critics
counter that the bond purchases have flooded markets with cheap money and
encouraged over-spending by governments, especially in debt-ridden Southern
Europe.
In a 110-page ruling, the German court said that the European Central Bank had
not only failed to justify the massive bond purchases, but also that those
purchases did not meet the "principle of proportionality," as required by
Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
The proportionality principle, which stipulates that an EU action must be
limited to what is necessary to achieve an objective, regulates the exercise of
the powers conferred by the member states to the EU.
In its ruling, the German court ordered the German Central Bank to stop
participating in the bond-purchasing program unless the European Central Bank
proves, within three months, the "proportionality" of its actions. Without
German participation, the program could be terminated.
The German court also accused the Court of Justice of the European Union of
"exceeding its judicial mandate." In December 2018, the European court ruled in
favor of the European Central Bank's bond-purchasing program. The German court
said that the European court's ruling was ultra vires (beyond its authority) and
therefore not binding. The German court's ruling poses an unprecedented
challenge to Court of Justice, the top EU court in matters of European Union
law.
By design or default, the German court's ruling, delivered at the height of the
coronavirus pandemic, has created extraordinary financial, legal and political
uncertainty at a time that Europe is already experiencing an economic shock
without precedent.
Italy and Spain, the eurozone countries most impacted by the pandemic, are also
the most dependent on support from the European Central Bank, which recently
committed to purchasing an additional €750 billion in bonds. Economists warn
that if the European Central Bank were to stop purchasing government bonds, the
ensuing loss of liquidity could push Italy and Spain into default and lead to
the unravelling of the eurozone.
The German court's ruling marks a new phase in the debate over the balance
between national and supranational sovereignty. Considering what is at stake, EU
officials have pushed back hard. The President of the European Commission,
Ursula von der Leyen, said that Germany has no legal right to challenge the EU
and threatened a lawsuit:
"The recent ruling of the German Constitutional Court put under the spotlight
two issues of the European Union: The Euro system and the European legal system.
"The European Commission upholds three basic principles: that the Union's
monetary policy is a matter of exclusive competence; that EU law has primacy
over national law and that rulings of the European Court of Justice are binding
on all national courts.
"The final word on EU law is always spoken in Luxembourg. Nowhere else.
"The European Commission's task is to safeguard the proper functioning of the
Euro system and the Union's legal system."
European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde echoed that she was undeterred
by the German court:
"We are an independent institution, accountable to the European Parliament,
driven by mandate. We'll continue to do whatever is needed... to deliver on that
mandate. Undeterred, we will continue doing so."
In a press release, the European Court of Justice insisted that Germany has no
jurisdiction: "In general, it is recalled that the Court of Justice has
consistently held that a judgment in which the Court gives a preliminary ruling
is binding on the national court for the purposes of the decision to be given in
the main proceedings. In order to ensure that EU law is applied uniformly, the
Court of Justice alone — which was created for that purpose by the Member States
— has jurisdiction to rule that an act of an EU institution is contrary to EU
law. Divergences between courts of the Member States as to the validity of such
acts would indeed be liable to place in jeopardy the unity of the EU legal order
and to detract from legal certainty. Like other authorities of the Member
States, national courts are required to ensure that EU law takes full effect.
That is the only way of ensuring the equality of Member States in the Union they
created."
In an interview with the German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a
member of the German Constitutional Court, Judge Peter Michael Huber, who helped
write the ruling, responded:
"What amazes me is the one-sidedness and the zealous tone that is struck by some
here. It is clear that the European Court of Justice has been claiming an
unlimited precedence for European law for 50 years, but almost all national
constitutional and supreme courts have objected to this for just as long. As
long as we don't live in a European superstate, a country's membership is
governed by its constitutional law." Huber warned that the European Commission's
threat of legal action would backfire:
"An infringement procedure [legal action] would trigger a significant
escalation, which could plunge Germany and other member states into a
constitutional conflict that would be difficult to resolve. In the long term,
this would weaken or endanger the European Union."
In an interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, Huber added:
"From the point of view of the European Commission President von der Leyen,
European law always applies without any restrictions. That is wrong. Other EU
member states also assume that national constitutions take precedence over
European law.
"The message to the ECB is actually homeopathic. It shouldn't see itself as the
'Master of the Universe.' An institution like the European Central Bank, which
is only thinly legitimized democratically, is only acceptable if it strictly
adheres to the responsibilities assigned to it."
Friedrich Merz, a member of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative
Christian Democrats who is vying to succeed her as chancellor, said that the
German court's ruling will have far-reaching consequences:
"This judgment will make European legal history. It must be a special task of
German economic policy in the future to point out the negative consequences of
the European Central Bank's purchase programs."
The pro-EU columnist Martin Wolf, writing for the Financial Times, noted:
"In the absence of other eurozone support programs, the chance of defaults has
jumped. Indeed, spreads on Italian government bonds have duly risen a little
since the court's announcement. A crisis might ultimately ensue, with
devastating effects; perhaps even a break-up of the eurozone.
"Others might follow Germany in rejecting the jurisdiction of the ECJ and EU.
Hungary and Poland are obvious candidates. Future historians may mark this as
the decisive turning point in Europe's history, towards disintegration....
"One point is clear: The constitutional court has decreed that Germany, too, can
take back control. As a result, it has created a possibly insoluble crisis."
Writing for the influential German blog Tichys Einblick, Klaus-Peter Willsch, a
member of the German parliament, wrote that the ruling demolished the absolutist
claims to power of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the
European Court of Justice:
"One thing should never be forgotten: Europe is not a federal state, but a legal
community developed from the founding core of an economic community in clearly
limited areas of national sovereignty. Any sovereignty of the European Union is
only derived from the sovereignty of the constituent member states. That is why
Article 5 (2) of the Treaty on European Union states:
'Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain
the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the
Treaties remain with the Member States.'
"I therefore think that criticism of the decision of the top German judges is
not only inappropriate, but also completely unfounded.
"Last week, our constitutional court defended the interests of German citizens.
It reminded the European Central Bank and the European Court of Justice of the
limits of the applicable law. Now it is up to us in politics gratefully to
accept and implement the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court instead of
disparaging our constitutional judges as enemies of Europe! The German
constitutional state lives and it protects its citizens! We should all be happy
about that!"
*Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
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or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Ramadan in the Time of Coronavirus
Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff/Gatestone Institute/May 19/2020
Ramadan in war-torn Afghanistan is especially hard on the poor who suffer from
malnutrition. Lockdown means no work: "If we can't work, we can't buy food and
we will be fasting for 24 hours."
This year's Ramadan is impacted by the worldwide Covid-19 pandemic. Pictured:
Worshipers wearing masks gather for Friday prayers at the Old Town Mosque in
Sarajevo, Bosnia on May 8, 2020. (Image source: iStock)
It is this year's Ramadan. More than 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide are currently
refraining each day from water and food from sunrise to sunset. The day of
fasting is usually concluded by "Iftar", a communal breaking of the fasting by
eating three dates, followed by a meal. The main focus of the daily Ramadan
festivities is on the community, the gathering of family and friends. In recent
years, Muslim societies in non-Muslim countries have extended their frequently
grand Iftar-festivities to include politicians and other stakeholders. For
instance, in 2019, the Islamic Faith Community of Austria organized an
interfaith Iftar which included a speech by the mayor of Vienna.
This year's Ramadan is impacted by the worldwide Covid-19 pandemic. As Islam
does not have a central authority akin to the Pope in the Catholic faith, there
are no central rules for the celebration of Ramadan in 2020. Each community,
each Muslim denomination, provides its own interpretation of what faithful are
generally to do during the annual month of fasting.
Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, in order to curb the spread
of the virus, has banned the country's annual "exodus" called "mudik" which
commonly occurs at the end of Ramadan, when people return to their villages
across the island country. While mosques in Indonesia's deeply conservative
autonomous province of Aceh are packed despite the Covid-19 pandemic, due to a
ruling by clerics claiming that Aceh has not been affected by the virus, in
other parts of the country, most people are banned from leaving their cities.
In Turkey, Ramadan festivities have been marred by high numbers of Covid-19
deaths. Cities and municipalities have therefore prohibited the erection of
public tents for mass Iftar dinners. In addition, drummers are banned from
walking down the streets to wake people to break the fast. Thousands of Turkish
expatriates are unable to return to their families due to closed borders and
grounded airplanes. Students in Istanbul cannot travel to be with their parents
in other parts of Turkey.
Iran, one of the most hard-hit countries in the Middle East, has allowed Friday
prayers in mosques for the first time in more than two months. Prayers are
permitted in more than 180 administrative districts; local television stations
aired footage of worshipers wearing masks and keeping more distance than usual
on their prayer rugs. In the capital city of Tehran, however, mosques still
remained locked.
In neighboring Iraq, the Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani has issued a fatwa,
or religious opinion, detailing reasons for Muslims to refrain from fasting. For
instance, if one can work from home, he or she must fast. On the other hand, if
one needs to work, then fasting is waived and copious quantities of water should
be drunk as, according to the fatwa, a dry throat will enable the coronavirus to
spread in the body. In the end, Sistani concluded the fatwa by saying a person
must fast unless he or she has a good reason not to.
Clerics at Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the most important theological
institution for Sunni Muslims, have a different view of the obligation of
fasting: "Not fasting during Ramadan due to coronavirus is not permissible, and
fasting is a duty and a must for Muslims." Other religious authorities even
argued that fasting may prevent contracting the coronavirus. Health experts in
the United Arab Emirates contended that only an actual illness excuses a Muslim
from fasting:
"It is permissible not to fast if the health condition of a coronavirus-infected
patient is critical and is advised by his doctor not to fast because he/or she
needs to keep drinking water and taking medicine."
Dubai's Islamic Affairs and Charitable Activities Department offers daily
"e-Ramadan" religious lessons and seminars in different languages.
The Egyptian government has extended the night-time curfew already in place, but
eased the times from 9pm to 6am. This is especially hard on people during
Ramadan, when families regularly go out after breaking their fast to purchase
more food, candies and other goods. Night-time activities are part of every
Ramadan, with numerous outdoor activities and gatherings taking place for old
and young. Malls, stores, and restaurants (take-out and delivery only), however,
are open for business until 5 pm.
The Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted religious festivities for the month of
Ramadan. Very early on in this crisis, in late February 2020, Saudi Arabia
halted all travel to Mecca and Medina, thereby effectively banning the annual
Hajj pilgrimage.
Ramadan in war-torn Afghanistan is especially hard on the poor who suffer from
malnutrition. Lockdown means no work: "If we can't work, we can't buy food and
we will be fasting for 24 hours." Ramadan is now a synonym for permanent hunger.
There are appeals at mosques to those more fortunate to organize food handouts.
Despite government-organized food distribution, and instead of congregating in
the mosques, many people, including children, are forced to wander the streets
and beg for food.
Muslims in Austria face none of Afghanistan's challenges. From the beginning of
the government-imposed lockdown, the Islamic Faith Community of Austria (IGGÖ)
instructed their faithful to shelter in place. Mosques were closed by order of
IGGÖ, which urged Muslims to turn their homes into mosques, while at the same
time lamenting the likely closure of smaller mosques due a lack of Ramadan
donations. With the country gradually reopening, IGGÖ has also issued guidelines
for restarting mosque operations with public prayers allowed at certain times of
the day. However, the breaking of the fast must still take place in private
homes, "a large, but necessary sacrifice", says Ümit Vural, the president of
IGGÖ.
The chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, Aiman Mazyek, regrets
the challenges posed by the coronavirus, especially the breaking of the fast:
"It will only be possible among the closest family. I am afraid this [rule] will
still be in effect for the feast at the end of Ramadan." Some mosques preach
online, and Muslim youth associations offer their help grocery shopping for the
community's elders.
People adapt in times of crisis, and just as Jews and Christians celebrated
Passover and Easter, Muslims have been making their feasts meaningful even in
these challenging circumstances.
Elisabeth Sabaditsch-Wolff is an Austrian human rights activist fighting for the
right to freedom of speech as enshrined in the U.S. First Amendment. In 2009 she
as charged for incitement to hatred and later found guilty for denigrating the
religious teachings of a legally recognized religion. Her case was later
accepted at the European Courts for Human Rights. She is the author of the book,
"The Truth is No Defense."
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
How coronavirus pandemic might change our cities
Kerry Boyd Anderson/Arab News/May 19/2020
Urbanization is one of the defining global trends of the last 70 years, and the
number of people living in urban areas has been projected to dramatically
increase over the next 30 years. However, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
pandemic has highlighted a major risk to high-density urban populations, raising
the question of whether it could derail urbanization.
According to UN data, the percentage of people living in urban areas grew from
34 percent in 1960 to 55 percent in 2018. It is thought the number of people
living in urban areas overtook those living in rural areas for the first time in
2007. The UN has projected that the urban population will hit 68 percent by
2050. However, some European Commission researchers have suggested that the UN
numbers significantly underestimate the world’s urban population, which might
already be as high as 84 percent. Regardless of how urban populations are
counted, their growth has reshaped societies around the world, driven both by
migration from rural to urban areas and by population growth, which tends to be
more concentrated in urban areas.
There is a long history of connections between higher population densities and
the spread of disease, and COVID-19 is no exception. In many countries, the
virus hit cities and their surrounding metropolitan areas hardest. The pandemic
has hit rural areas too, but cities are clearly more vulnerable to widespread
transmission. A significant body of public health research finds that population
density increases the risk for diseases to spread. Essential responses to the
pandemic have included efforts to decrease density, such as sending college
students home from crowded campuses, canceling large gatherings, and
implementing social distancing measures.
With the pandemic tragically reminding people that higher densities come with
greater risks, will it derail the trend of urbanization? This is a difficult
question to answer, given a lack of data and applicable precedent, and the
recentness of the pandemic’s emergence.
There is some reason to argue that the pandemic will not significantly stop a
trend as strong as urbanization. Cities are major economic engines and
recovering from the economic crisis associated with the pandemic will require
the type of economies of scale and innovation that cities are particularly good
at promoting. Also, people tend to strongly prefer an urban or non-urban
lifestyle, and the pandemic is unlikely to change those attitudes. The results
of a recent experiment conducted at Harvard University suggest that hygiene
perceptions have little relation to people’s views of population density. People
are likely to prefer or dislike an urban lifestyle regardless of its association
with a higher risk of disease.
On the other hand, there is a possibility that the pandemic will slow or reshape
urbanization. This will depend significantly on how bad the pandemic turns out
to be and how long it lasts. The frequent interaction of large numbers of people
is essential to any city’s energy and appeal. If people have a reasonable fear
of attending events with hundreds or thousands of others — such as eating in
packed restaurants or riding on crowded public transportation — cities will not
be able to thrive.
There also is some evidence to suggest that urbanization was not the unstoppable
trend that it had seemed; for example, in some countries with aging
demographics, there was a risk that some cities would shrink even before the
pandemic. Many other cities were struggling with congested transportation
networks, overwhelmed infrastructure, large slums, socioeconomic inequalities,
pollution, and crime. The combination of the pandemic striking cities hard and
the global economic crisis — on top of these pre-existing problems — might
reduce the attraction of cities and their ability to serve as engines for
economic opportunity. Mid and small-sized cities might grow at the expense of
large cities.
The pandemic is very likely to change the future of cities, even if urbanization
continues. Teleworking might become much more common, easing transportation
burdens but also potentially allowing some people to leave cities while
retaining their jobs. Future city planning might incorporate more parks and open
spaces into urban environments. Cities might consider decentralizing some
services, such as medical centers, and expanding digital infrastructure.
Hopefully, cities in the developing world will use the pandemic as an
opportunity to improve access to basic services and to improve housing.
If people have a reasonable fear of attending events with hundreds or thousands
of others, cities will not be able to thrive.
Beyond the question of what effect the pandemic is likely to have on
urbanization, there is a more subjective question of what effect it should have.
There are many advocates for urbanization, who argue that cities drive economic
development, are more inclusive, and are more environmentally sustainable. These
advocates have some valid points, but they also tend to personally prefer an
urban lifestyle and consider it to be superior. There are others who point out
the problems that many cities have and who argue that suburban and rural
environments are better for people and the environment. These critics of
urbanization also have valid points and also tend to be people who personally
prefer suburban, small city, or rural lifestyles and consider them to be
superior. These strong personal preferences make it difficult to form objective
prescriptions for the future.
COVID-19 is very likely to prompt discussions about the benefits versus the
risks of density. It is too early to fully evaluate the risks, as the virus
continues to spread, but a reassessment of density and adjustments to urban
planning will be necessary in the long term — particularly because COVID-19 is
unlikely to be the last pandemic affecting cities.
*Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant with more than 16
years’ experience as a professional analyst of international security issues and
Middle East political and business risk. Her previous positions include deputy
director for advisory with Oxford Analytica and managing editor of Arms Control
Today. Twitter: @KBAresearch
Jordan-Israel treaty threatened by annexation plan
Osama Al-Sharif/Arab News/May 19/2020
Jordanians and Israelis have been left wondering what exactly King Abdullah
meant by his stern warning to Israel last week that moving forward with the
annexation of parts of the West Bank “could lead to a massive conflict with
Jordan.” In an interview with German magazine Der Spiegel, he said: “I don’t
want to make threats and create an atmosphere of loggerheads, but we are
considering all options. We agree with many countries in Europe and the
international community that the law of strength should not apply in the Middle
East.”King Abdullah admitted last year, on the eve of the 25th anniversary of
the signing of the peace treaty between the two countries, that bilateral
relations were at their lowest point. And, last September, he warned that, if
Israel went ahead with the annexation of the Jordan Valley — as pledged by Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — it would have a direct impact on the Jordanian and
Egyptian peace treaties with Israel. But this was the strongest warning to
Israel he has made in recent memory.
The king’s strong words, calculated as they were, coincided with a crucial visit
to Israel last week by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on the eve of the
formation of a new Israeli government headed by Netanyahu. The US position on
the issue of annexation remains unclear. It is embedded in Donald Trump’s peace
vision that was released in January and rejected by the Palestinians as well as
Arab countries, but multiple sources have suggested that Pompeo urged Netanyahu
not to move ahead with the controversial, not to mention illegal, move at this
stage. That is not to say that the US has reversed its position on annexation.
But sources revealed that the US has given the Palestinians a few crucial months
to engage in peace negotiations with Israel — or else.
It is also suggested that annexation could take place in two stages: One that
aims at extending Israeli sovereignty over key Jewish settlements in the West
Bank, including parts of the so-called Area C, as early as July and no later
than September; and a second that is more contentious, with the annexation of
the Jordan Valley, which constitutes more than 30 percent of the West Bank’s
area.
The latter is seen as a direct challenge and threat to Jordan. It signals the
death of the two-state solution, ushering in multiple scenarios, including the
collapse of the Palestinian Authority, the forced settlement of Palestinian
refugees in host countries like Jordan, and the revival of Israeli far-right
claims that Jordan is an alternative Palestinian state. These scenarios
constitute an existential threat to the national security of Jordan — a red line
for the Jordanian monarch.
But what would Jordan do and what did King Abdullah mean by a “massive
conflict?” The peace treaty had delineated the borders between Israel and Jordan
and excluded the Jordan Valley as a common frontier. It was understood that the
Jordan Valley would constitute the border between the future Palestinian state
and the Hashemite kingdom. The annexation of the Jordan Valley by Israel would
be seen as a direct violation of the peace treaty. One option would be for
Jordan to suspend the treaty while contesting the Israeli move. It is believed
that this position has already been delivered to members of the UN Security
Council.Another option is the termination of the controversial liquid gas deal
between Jordan’s national electricity company and a US-Israeli conglomerate.
Legal experts in Jordan argue that the coronavirus crisis allows the kingdom to
take such a move. Jordan would pursue diplomatic channels to contest Israel’s
annexation, while hoping that the international community would also take
serious steps in response, including imposing sanctions.
Jordan has “advised” Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to engage the Trump
administration in a bid to delay Netanyahu’s plans, while awaiting the outcome
of the US presidential election in November. The Palestinians have not been
forthcoming. Reports of Jordanian-Palestinian coordination in the case of
annexation are not credible.
The annexation of the Jordan Valley by Israel would be seen as a direct
violation of the peace treaty.
Jordan’s reaction may be less confrontational if Netanyahu’s annexation excluded
the Jordan Valley. The issue of extending Israeli sovereignty over West Bank
settlements under a land swap deal has been mentioned in previous
Israeli-Palestinian understandings and is referred to in Trump’s peace vision.
But Jordan will not sit idly by if Netanyahu goes as far as annexing the Jordan
Valley. King Abdullah understands the sensitivity of the current phase in terms
of Jordan’s strategic ties to the US and changing geopolitical realties in the
region and beyond. But his stern warning has echoed in both Israel and the US.
There is mounting pressure on Netanyahu from Israel’s security and military
establishments not to take the confrontation with Jordan to the next level.
There are also reports that the US may engage the Palestinians through the
Middle East Quartet in a bid to keep Trump’s peace vision alive.
Whatever the next few weeks brings, King Abdullah appears to be ready to adopt
extreme measures if Netanyahu does go ahead with his annexation plans. The
Israeli PM must consider his next move carefully, as the fate of his country’s
peace treaty with Jordan hangs in the balance.
*Osama Al-Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.
Twitter: @plato010
The “Image of Hell”: Islam’s Siege of Malta
Raymond Ibrahim/May 19/2020
Jean Parisot de Valette gives thanks for the delivery of Malta (painting by
Charles-Philippe Larivière, b.1798).
Today in history, May 18, 1565, one of the most symbolically important military
encounters between Islam and Europe began: the Ottoman Turks besieged the tiny
island of Malta, in what was then considered the heaviest bombardment any locale
had been subjected to.
Around the start of the sixteenth century, Muslim pirates from Algiers began to
terrorize the Christian Mediterranean. Like their terrestrial counterparts, they
too were indoctrinated in and emboldened by Muhammad’s promises: “A campaign by
sea is like ten campaigns by land,” the prophet had said, “and he who loses his
bearings at sea is like one who sheds his blood in the path of Allah”—that is,
he is rewarded either in the here or hereafter. The piratical lust for booty
was, accordingly, heightened by dreams of “martyrdom.”
When Suleiman “the Magnificent”—better known among Muslims as Suleiman “the
Ghazi” (jihadi/raider)—became Ottoman sultan in 1520, he instantly took the most
notorious of these Barbary pirates, Khair al-Din Barbarossa, into his service
and helped him prosecute the sea jihad on Europe. The ensuing reign of terror
forced Europeans along the Mediterranean coast to relive the days of their
ancestors in the centuries before the Crusades, when the Middle Sea was first
inundated with jihad and slave raiding. Over the following two decades, hundreds
of thousands of Europeans were enslaved, so that, by 1541, “Algiers teemed with
Christian captives, and it became a common saying that a Christian slave was
scarce a fair barter for an onion.”
Despite the seaborne jihad’s successes, “You will do no good,” a seasoned
corsair counseled Suleiman, “until you have smoked out this nest of vipers.” He
was referring to the Knights Hospitaller, who came into being soon after the
First Crusade (c.1099) and were now known as the Knights of Saint John,
headquartered in Malta. Suleiman had evicted them from Rhodes in 1522—whence for
two hundred years they had frustrated all Ottoman naval attempts—and Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V had bequeathed the island of Malta to the homeless
Hospitallers in 1530. They were the emperor’s response to the sultan’s
corsairs—and, for more than three decades, a thorn in Suleiman’s side.
In March 1565, after having finally decided to eliminate this “headquarters of
infidels,” Suleiman dispatched one of the largest fleets ever assembled—carrying
some thirty thousand Ottomans—to take the tiny island, which had a total
fighting population of eight thousand. Pope Pius IV implored the kings of Europe
to Malta’s aid, to no avail: the king of Spain “has withdrawn into the woods,”
complained the pope, “and France, England and Scotland [are] ruled by women and
boys.” Only the viceroy of neighboring Sicily responded, but he needed time to
raise recruits.
Jean Parisot de Valette (1494–1568), the Grand Master of the Knights—“his
disposition is rather sad,” but “for his age [seventy-one], he is very robust”
and “very devout”—made preparations for the forthcoming siege, including by
explaining to his men what was at stake: “A formidable army composed of
audacious barbarians is descending on this island,” he warned; “these persons,
my brothers, are the enemies of Jesus Christ. Today it is a question of the
defense of our Faith as to whether the book of the Evangelist [the Gospel] is to
be superseded by that of the Koran? God on this occasion demands of us our
lives, already vowed to His service. Happy will those be who first consummate
this sacrifice.”
On May 18, the Ottomans commenced nonstop bombardment, first targeting St. Elmo,
one of Malta’s key forts. “With the roar of the artillery and the arquebuses,
the hair-raising screams, the smoke and fire and flame,” a chronicler wrote, “it
seemed that the whole world was at the point of exploding.” The vastly
outnumbered and soon wearied defenders, who were ordered to “fight bravely and
sell their lives to the barbarians as dearly as possible,” did just that; and
for every Christian killed defending the fort, numerous Muslim besiegers fell.
After withstanding all that the Ottomans could throw against it for more than a
month, on June 23, St. Elmo, by now a heap of rubble, was finally stormed and
captured.
Virtually all 1,500 defenders were slaughtered. The same grisly fate Salah
al-Din (Saladin) had centuries earlier consigned to Islam’s staunchest
enemies—the Knights Templars and Hospitallers at the disastrous Battle of Hattin
(1187)—was now meted out to their heirs. The Knights of Saint John “were hung
upside down from iron rings . . . and had their heads split, their chests open,
and their hearts torn out.” Ottoman commander Mustafa ordered their mutilated
corpses (along with one Maltese priest) nailed to wooden crosses and set adrift
in the Grand Harbor in order to deride and demoralize the onlooking defenders.
It failed: the seventy-one-year-old Valette delivered a thundering and defiant
speech before the huddled Christians, beheaded all Muslim prisoners, and fired
their heads from cannon at the Turkish besiegers. The Ottomans proceeded to
subject the rest of the island to, at that time, history’s most sustained
bombardment (some 130,000 cannonballs were fired in total). “I don’t know if the
image of hell can describe the appalling battle,” wrote a contemporary: “the
fire, the heat, the continuous flames from the flamethrowers and fire hoops; the
thick smoke, the stench, the disemboweled and mutilated corpses, the clash of
arms, the groans, shouts, and cries, the roar of the guns . . . men wounding,
killing, scrabbling, throwing one another back, falling and firing.”
Although the rest of the forts were reduced to rubble, much Muslim blood was
spilled for each inch gained; for “when they got within arms’ reach the scimitar
was no match for the long two-handed sword of the Christians.” Desperate
fighting spilled into the streets, where even Maltese women and children
participated.
It was now late August and the island was still not taken; that, and mass
casualties led to mass demoralization in the Ottoman camp. Embarrassed talk of
lifting the siege had already begun when Sicily’s viceroy Garcia de Toledo
finally arrived with nearly ten thousand soldiers at St. Paul’s Bay. There,
where the apostle was once shipwrecked, the final scene of this Armageddon
played out as the fresh newcomers routed the retreating Ottomans, who finally
fled on September 11—a day which, wittingly or unwittingly, would be avenged by
the jihadi “descendants” of the Ottomans in 2001.
“So great was the stench in the bay,” which was awash with countless bloated
Muslim corpses, “that no man could go near it.” As many as twenty thousand
Ottomans and five thousand defenders died. After forty years of successful
campaigning against Europe, Suleiman finally suffered his first major defeat.
One year later he succumbed to death, aged seventy-one.
More importantly for Europe, a chink in the Ottoman armor was first perceived
thanks to Malta’s spirited resistance; it showed that a tiny but dedicated force
could hold out against what was till then deemed an unstoppable Ottoman war
machine.
Accordingly, when in 1570 Ottoman forces invaded the island of Cyprus, the pope
easily managed to form a “Holy League” of maritime Catholic nation-states,
spearheaded by the Spanish Empire, in 1571. To everyone’s dismay—Christian and
Muslim—the Holy League prevailed at the battle of Lepanto. As Miguel Cervantes,
who was at the naval clash, has the colorful Don Quixote say: “That day . . .
was so happy for Christendom, because all the world learned how mistaken it had
been in believing that the Turks were invincible by sea.”
But that sentiment was first realized six years earlier, by the heroic defense
of Malta—when the tide of war between Islam and Europe first turned to the
latter’s favor.
The above account was excerpted from the author’s book, Sword and Scimitar:
Fourteen Centuries of War between Islam and the West. Raymond Ibrahim is a
Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center; a Judith Rosen Friedman
Fellow at the Middle East Forum; and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the
Gatestone Institute.
Israel: The Settlements Are Not Illegal/The annexation of lands in Judea and
Samaria is not contrary to international law
Michael Calvo/Gatestone Institute/May 19/ 2020
Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired (Art.
26.1) and that the exercise of these rights shall be free from discrimination of
any kind (Art. 2). — UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 13, 2007.
Among others, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Israel and Luxembourg voted in
favor of the Declaration. Since 2007, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United States, who voted against, formally endorsed the Declaration in 2010. In
their relations with Israel, these states cannot claim that the Declaration does
not apply to Israeli Jews, since such position would amount to blatant racial
discrimination.
[I]t cannot seriously be contended, as the EU, France, Britain, Russia, China
and other states do, that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal and
that annexation is contrary to international law. This position is political,
not legal.
Article 80 of the United Nations Charter (1945) recognized the validity of
existing rights that states and peoples acquired under the various mandates,
including the British Mandate for Palestine (1922), and the rights of Jews to
settle in the Land of Palestine (Judea-Samaria) by virtue of these instruments.
(Pr. E. Rostow). These rights cannot be altered by the UN.
"Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements...nothing in
this Charter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing
international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may
respectively be parties." — Article 80, paragraph 1, UN Charter)
According to international law, the Jews are the indigenous people of the lands
referred to as Judea, Samaria, Palestine, Israel and the Holy Land. Jewish
rights of "settlement" in the so-called "West Bank" therefore exist; it cannot
seriously be contended, as the EU, France, Britain, Russia, China and other
states do, that Jewish communities in the West Bank are illegal and that
annexation is contrary to international law. Pictured: The Israeli settlement of
Maale Adumim, at the edge of the Judean Desert.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 13, 2007, by a majority of 144
states in favor, 4 votes against, and 11 abstentions, recognized that indigenous
people (also known as first people, aboriginal people or native people) have the
right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired (Art. 26.1) and that the exercise
of these rights shall be free from discrimination of any kind (Art. 2).
With domestic state practice, the legal status and rights of indigenous peoples
has evolved and crystallized into international customary law.[1] For example,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared that "there is an
international customary law norm which affirms the rights of indigenous peoples
to their traditional lands". The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
affirmed that land rights of indigenous people are protected and that these
rights are "general principles of law".
Among others, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Israel and Luxembourg voted in
favor of the Declaration. Since 2007, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United States, who voted against, formally endorsed the Declaration in 2010. In
their relations with Israel, these states cannot claim that the Declaration does
not apply to Israeli Jews, since such position would amount to blatant racial
discrimination.[2]
According to international law, the Jews are the indigenous people of the lands
referred to as Judea, Samaria, Palestine, Israel and the Holy Land, and
therefore fulfill the criteria required by international law. The Jews are the
ethnic group that was the original settler of Judea and Samaria 3,500 years ago,
when the land was bestowed upon the Jews by the Almighty. Leaders of this world,
who chose to make abstraction of history, misleadingly refer to Judea and
Samaria as the "West Bank" of the Jordan River (which includes Israel) or the
"Occupied Palestinian Territories".
After the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), British
Mandate for Palestine (1922), San Remo Resolution (1920), and Treaty of Sevres
(1920) created international law, and recognized and re-established the
historical indigenous rights of the Jews to their land. The signatories of these
treaties and the Mandate (Britain, France, Turkey, Japan, Italy, etc.), are
bound by them.
With the Mandate for Palestine, accorded to Great Britain in August 1922, the
League of Nations recognized "the historical connection of the Jewish people
with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that
country". The Jewish people's right to settle in the Land of Palestine, their
historic homeland and to establish their state there, is thus a legal right
anchored in international law.
UNDRIP reaffirms the right of the Jewish people as the indigenous people, and
"especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources."
Recent UN General Assembly Resolutions stating that the settlement of Jews in
Judea Samaria is contrary to international law are no more than recommendations
and have never led to amendments of existing binding treaties. UN Security
Council Resolutions, stating that Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria are
illegal, are not binding. Only resolutions taken under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter are binding on all UN member states. For example, Security Council
Resolution 2334 was adopted on December 23, 2016 by a 14–0 vote. Four permanent
members of the Security Council -- China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom
-- voted in favor; the US abstained. This resolution was not adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not binding. That resolution states that
Israel's settlement activity constitutes a "flagrant violation" of international
law. It has "no legal validity". This resolution violates the UNDRIP, the
British Mandate and the other treaties.
The right of the Jewish people to "settle" in the so-called West Bank, and
Israel's right to annex parts of Judea and Samaria (part of Palestine) derive
from the Mandate (Levy Report of July 9, 2012). Pursuant to the Mandate, the
right to annex some parts of Judea and Samaria is a direct consequence of the
right of the Jews to settle in all Palestine i.e. the territory of the 1936
Mandate.
Article 80 of the United Nations Charter (1945) recognized the validity of
existing rights that states and peoples acquired under the various mandates,
including the British Mandate for Palestine (1922), and the rights of Jews to
settle in the land (Judea and Samaria) by virtue of these instruments. (Pr. E.
Rostow). These rights cannot be altered by the UN.
"Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements...nothing in
this Charter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing
international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may
respectively be parties." (Article 80, paragraph 1, UN Charter)
In a series of decisions and advisory opinions on Namibia, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that a League Mandate is a binding international
instrument like a treaty, which continues as a fiduciary obligation of the
international community until its terms are fulfilled. In the case of Namibia,
the Court upheld the Security Council's ruling that South Africa had abandoned
its rights as Mandatory Power by breaching some of its fundamental duties. The
Mandate survived as a trust, based on legal principles confirmed by Article 80
of the Charter.
Like the South West African Mandate, the Palestine Mandate survived the
termination of the British administration as a trust under Article 80 of the UN
Charter (Pr. E Rostow).
Jewish rights of "settlement" in the so-called "West Bank" therefore exist; it
cannot seriously be contended, as the EU, France, Britain, Russia, China and
other states do, that Jewish communities in the West Bank are illegal and that
annexation is contrary to international law. This position is political, not
legal. Despite UN resolutions to the contrary, the establishment of Israeli
civilian settlements in the West Bank is not inconsistent with international
law.
Israel, the Jewish State, as a member of the international community has the
right but also the duty to fulfill the Mandate that most nations disregarded,
fearing terrorism and the Muslim world, and animated by 2,000 years of religious
hatred and anti-Semitism.
One hundred and three years passed since the Balfour Declaration, 73 years since
the 1947 UNGA Resolution 181 was rejected by the Arab states, 52 years since the
1967 Six Day War, and 27 years since the Oslo Accord. The Oslo Accords of 1993
and 1995 were signed but did not lead to peace. The Palestinian Authority (PA)
does not want peace; they refused Israel's offers, made in 2000 and in 2008, for
a Palestinian state and to live in peace.
The participation of the Palestinian Authority security apparatus in the murders
of Jews since 1993 is proof, as well as the pay-to-slay program for prisoners
implicated in terror-related offenses. PA President Mahmoud Abbas' threats that
the Palestinians will provoke an "uprising" after the Bahrain Conference and
after an annexation should be taken seriously. Abbas is definitively not
interested in peace.
Israel has the duty to draw the logical consequences of this behavior and annex
all or some of the territories in Area C, to secure the existence of its
population within secure borders, and to be able to receive those of the
millions Jews still living in exile who wish to settle in Israel.
*Michel Calvo was born in Tunis, Tunisia. An expert in international law, he was
a member of the International Court of Arbitration representing Israel. He is
the author of The Middle East and World War III: Why No Peace? with a preface by
Col. Richard Kemp, CBE.
[1] S. Wiessner, 'The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples' in A Constantines and N. Zaikos (eds.), The Diversity of International
Law (Brill, Leiden, 2009) at 343–362.
[2] France, which voted for the Declaration, pushed for a tough EU response to
any Israeli annexation move. This is no surprise since on June 2015, the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination remains concerned by the
failure of France to fully recognize the existence of indigenous peoples in its
overseas territorial collectivities.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
India: Standing up to China in the Post-Coronavirus World
Vijeta Uniyal/Gatestone Institute/May 19/ 2020
In true Orwellian fashion, top Chinese diplomats are still demanding that
foreign governments rewrite the history of the coronavirus outbreak.
While India had shown restraint, Communist China has shown little. The Chinese
air force has continued its incursions into Taiwanese air space. China has also
tightened its grip on artificial islands it created in the South China Sea by
setting up fictitious local governments on them. These weaponized islands...
trample on the sovereignty of many of its maritime neighbors, including the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.
The United States and rest of the Western world would do well to see the
pandemic as a wake-up call and decouple their crucial and strategic sectors from
dependence on China in any way. As US General Jack Keane has repeatedly warned
the US, China a not a friend; "it is a predator economically, geopolitically and
militarily."
The world is looking to India and its Asian Pacific allies, in a strong alliance
with the West, to take a stand and face China's increasing military,
geopolitical and economic intimidation.
The United States and rest of the Western world would do well to see the
pandemic as a wake-up call and decouple their crucial and strategic sectors from
dependence on China. In the coming post-coronavirus world order, India is well
placed to challenge China's stranglehold over global and regional supply chains.
Pictured: US President Donald Trump shakes hands with India's Prime Minister
Narendra Modi in New Delhi on February 25, 2020.
As coronavirus leaves behind a trail of human suffering and economic
devastation, nations across the world have begun asking critical questions about
the global pandemic. Countries are enquiring into Communist China's handling of
the pandemic, which first appeared late last year in the central Chinese city of
Wuhan.
As early as January 14, China had used the World Health Organization (WHO), a
United Nations agency, to spread disinformation about the human-to-human
transmissibility of Covid-19, a remark that led US National Security Advisor
Robert O'Brien later to call the WHO a "tool of Chinese propaganda."
While U.S. President Donald J. Trump faced mostly undeserved, politicized
criticism for questioning China's culpability in the spread of the worldwide
pandemic and his calls for an international probe into it, more and more
capitals across the Western world are making similar demands.
On March 20, The Washington Post attacked President Trump for even mentioning
China in context of the pandemic. "Trump has no qualms about calling coronavirus
the 'Chinese Virus.' That's a dangerous attitude, experts say."
As late as the end of March, CNN was still claiming that President Trump was
targeting China for "political reasons... using entrenched stereotypes and fear
of the other to cast off any blame that might fall on him from this crisis."
On May 1, however, the New York Post reported that "[m]ore US allies and other
countries are joining the Trump administration's call for an investigation into
China, the World Health Organization and the origins of the deadly coronavirus
pandemic."
In the Asia-Pacific region, Australia has taken lead in asking for an
international investigation into Beijing's culpability in the spread of the
pandemic. "Now, it would seem entirely reasonable and sensible that the world
would want to have an independent assessment of how this all occurred, so we can
learn the lessons and prevent it from happening again," Australian Prime
Minister Scott Morrison said on April 29. Australia's demand was supported by
New Zealand.
By way of response, China's Ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, threatened a
boycott of Australian goods if Prime Minister Morrison's government continued to
insist on an independent investigation into the outbreak.
In Europe, Sweden took a similar stance, asking the European Union to start a
probe into "the origin and spread" of the coronavirus. "When the global
situation of Covid-19 is under control, it is both reasonable and important that
an international, independent investigation be conducted to gain knowledge about
the origin and spread of the coronavirus," Sweden's health minister Lena
Hallengren told the nation's parliament in a written statement on April 20.
Under threats of cutting Europe's medical supplies, China forced the EU to water
down a report exposing Beijing's global disinformation campaign. "The European
Union toned down part of a report about Chinese state-backed disinformation
because it feared Beijing would retaliate by withholding medical supplies," the
Hong Kong-based newspaper South China Morning Post, citing diplomatic sources,
disclosed on April 25.
China, which first covered up the outbreak of the contagion in city of Wuhan, is
now running a global disinformation and intimidation campaign, trying to blame
the United States or Italy for the coronavirus. So far, apparently too many
countries are now aware of China's intentions. As Mathias Döpfner, CEO of
Germany's largest publishing house, Axel Springer, argued recently in Die Welt:
"Economic relations with China might seem harmless to many Europeans today, but
they could soon lead to political dependence and ultimately to the end of a free
and liberal Europe... Should we make a pact with an authoritarian regime or
should we work to strengthen a community of free, constitutionally governed
market economies with liberal societies?... If current European and, above all,
German policy on China continues, this will lead to a gradual decoupling from
America and a step-by-step infiltration and subjugation by China. Economic
dependence will only be the first step. Political influence will follow."
At the moment, it is unclear if China's charm offensive, if one could call it
that, is working.
Most recently, on May 4, Sharri Markson reported on a leaked 15-page research
document, obtained by Australia's Saturday Telegraph, written by the "Five Eyes"
-- the intelligence services of the US, the UK, Canada Australia and New
Zealand.
"It states that to the 'endangerment of other countries' the Chinese government
covered-up news of the virus by silencing or "disappearing" doctors who spoke
out, destroying evidence of it in laboratories and refusing to provide live
samples to international scientists who were working on a vaccine."
In true Orwellian fashion, top Chinese diplomats are still demanding that
foreign governments rewrite the history of the coronavirus outbreak. Under
President Xi Jinping's instructions, Chinese diplomats are running a global
campaign of intimidation to divert world's attention from Beijing's culpability
in the spread of the coronavirus. Dubbed "Wolf Warrior" diplomacy, referring to
a popular Chinese movie series of the same name, the strategy aims at silencing
and intimidate Western governments, critical media outlets, and think tanks. The
good news is that the world is finally getting a good look at the true face of
China.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi telephoned his Indian counterpart, S.
Jaishankar, on March 24, and suggested that India not use "China virus" to
describe the Covid-19 contagion
"It's not acceptable and detrimental to international cooperation to label the
virus and stigmatise China," Beijing's envoy to New Delhi, Sun Weidong, said
following the call.
Apparently unwilling to risk creating a problem, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi's government has so far refrained from confronting China for its handling
of the outbreak. To India's credit, it did play a constructive role in
combatting the global pandemic. India came to the aid of its allies by shipping
large consignments of the drug hydroxychloroquine and other medical supplies to
55 countries, including the U.S., Britain, France and Israel.
While India had shown restraint, Communist China has shown little. The Chinese
air force has continued its incursions into Taiwanese air space. China has also
tightened its grip on artificial islands it created in the South China Sea by
setting up fictitious local governments on them. These weaponized islands,
fielding military facilities such as naval ports and military airfields, trample
on the sovereignty of many of its maritime neighbors, including the Philippines,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.
The United States and rest of the Western world would do well to see the
pandemic as a wake-up call and decouple their crucial and strategic sectors from
dependence on China in any way. As US General Jack Keane has repeatedly warned
the US, China a not a friend; "it is a predator economically, geopolitically and
militarily."
Beijing has used its status as world's biggest manufacturer, intellectual
property thief, and debt-trap lender to force governments across the world into
silence over its culpability for the deadly and devastating pandemic.
In the coming post-coronavirus world order, India is well placed to challenge
China's stranglehold over global and regional supply chains. Prime Minister
Modi's "Make in India" initiative, originally envisaged to create jobs in
manufacturing sector, could also position the country as an alternative
destination for rerouting global supply chain needs, especially in critical
sectors such pharmaceuticals, industrial manufacturing, telecommunications and
information technology.
To take advantage of a post-coronavirus realignment, India would do well to
upgrade its infrastructure and seriously cut its bureaucratic red tape.
Modi came to power in 2014 on promises of streamlining the bureaucracy to foster
a free economy. Since he took office, India has eased the government's red tape
and opened up the country to foreign companies and investment. During his
tenure, the country advanced 79 places on the global "Ease of Doing Business"
survey released by the World Bank annually, from 142nd to 63rd place. The
country still trails China, which, until its pandemic, ranked 31. India,
however, plans to invest $1.39 trillion on a series of critical infrastructure
projects, including roads, railways, digital connectivity and power sectors.
The world is eagerly looking to India and its Asia-Pacific allies, in a strong
alliance with the West, to take a stand, face China's increasing military,
geopolitical and economic intimidation, and take up its historic mantle of
leadership.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No
part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied
or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
Officials: Israel linked to a disruptive cyberattack on Iranian port facility
Joby Warrick and Ellen Nakashima/The Washington Post/May 19/2020
On May 9, shipping traffic at Iran’s bustling Shahid Rajaee port terminal came
to an abrupt and inexplicable halt. Computers that regulate the flow of vessels,
trucks and goods all crashed at once, creating massive backups on waterways and
roads leading to the facility.
After waiting a day, Iranian officials acknowledged that an unknown foreign
hacker had briefly knocked the port’s computers offline. Now, more than a week
later, a more complete explanation has come to light: The port was the victim of
a substantial cyberattack that U.S. and foreign government officials say appears
to have originated with Iran’s archenemy, Israel.
The attack, which snarled traffic around the port for days, was carried out by
Israeli operatives, presumably in retaliation for an earlier attempt to
penetrate computers that operate rural water distribution systems in Israel,
according to intelligence and cybersecurity officials familiar with the matter.
A security official with a foreign government that monitored the May 9 incident
called the attack “highly accurate” and said the damage to the Iranian port was
more serious than described in official Iranian accounts.
“There was total disarray,” said the official, who spoke on the condition that
his identity and national affiliation not be revealed, citing the highly
sensitive nature of the intelligence. A U.S. official with access to classified
files also said that Israelis were believed to have been behind the attack.
The Washington Post was shown satellite photographs depicting miles-long traffic
jams on highways leading to the Shahid Rajaee port on May 9. In a photograph
dated May 12, dozens of loaded container ships can be observed in a waiting area
just off the coast.
Officials: Iranian operatives linked to cyber attack on Israeli water plants
The Israeli Embassy did not respond to requests for comment. The Israel Defense
Forces declined to comment. Iran has repeatedly denied involvement in the failed
April 24 hacking attempt on Israeli water distribution networks.
If accurate, the reports point to a new round of tit-for-tat blows between the
two bitter Middle East rivals, although U.S. cybersecurity experts said the most
recent exchanges have been relatively restrained so far.
“Assuming it’s true, this is in line with Israeli policy of aggressively
responding to Iranian provocation, either kinetically or through other means,”
said Dmitri Alperovitch, a cybersecurity policy fellow at the Harvard Belfer
Center and founder and former chief technology officer of CrowdStrike, a
cybersecurity firm. “Any time you see Iranian escalation, as with their buildup
of rocket capacity in Syria, you have consistently seen Israeli retaliation with
bombing runs on those positions. So it appears they have now applied that
doctrine in cyberspace.”
The sprawling Shahid Rajaee port facility is the newest of two major shipping
terminals in the Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas, on the Strait of Hormuz.
The attack on the port’s computers was confirmed on May 10 by Mohammad Rastad,
managing director of the Ports and Maritime Organization, in a statement carried
by Iran’s ILNA news agency.
“A recent cyber attack failed to penetrate the PMO’s systems and was only able
to infiltrate and damage a number of private operating systems at the ports,”
Rastad was quoted as saying.
On May 8, The Post, citing foreign intelligence sources, reported that Iran had
been linked to the attempted cyberattack on at least two rural water
distribution networks in Israel. Officials familiar with the incident said
hackers sought to cripple computers that control water flow and wastewater
treatment, as well as a system that regulates the addition of chlorine and other
chemicals. The intrusion was detected and thwarted before significant damage was
done.
Stuxnet was the work of U.S., Israeli experts, officials say
Investigators found that the hackers routed their attempted attack through
computer servers in the United States and Europe — a common tactic used by
adversaries of the West. Israeli Water Authority officials detected the attempt
and immediately took measures, including changing system passwords.
Each country has accused the other of similar attacks in the past. Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in 2019 that Israeli officials are “constantly
detecting and foiling Iranian attempts” to penetrate the country’s computer
networks.
Years earlier, U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies unleashed a computer worm
called Stuxnet on Iranian uranium-enrichment plants in an attempt to disrupt
Iran’s nuclear program. Neither country officially confirmed its role.
Tunisia’s ‘war against an invisible enemy’
Benjamin Weinthal/Policy Brief/FDD/May 19/2020
Tunisia appears to have contained its COVID-19 outbreak despite a weak
healthcare system and has begun to ease its anti-virus restrictions. Nine years
after the ouster of the Ben Ali regime, successive elected governments continue
to demonstrate resiliency, but much work lies ahead.
Situation Overview
On May 10, authorities in Tunis recorded no new COVID-19 cases for the first
time since early March. The nation of 11.7 million people has registered 1,037
COVID-19 cases and 45 deaths. In early May, Tunisia allowed half of its
government staff to return to work and reopened parts of the transport, food,
and construction sectors. Shopping malls and retail stores such as clothing
shops and hair salons reopened, too.
After Tunisia reported its first COVID-19 case on March 4, the government acted
quickly to contain the virus. Tunisia’s newly elected Prime Minister Elyes
Fakhfakh set the tone, declaring a “war against an invisible enemy.” On March
16, Tunisia closed its borders, suspended international flights, and restrict
public gatherings. The government imposed a curfew on March 18, at which point
Tunisia had reported just 29 coronavirus cases. A nation-wide lockdown began on
March 22 as the number of confirmed cases rose to 75.
Tunisia’s military and law enforcement imposed sweeping measures to enforce
social distancing and the nationwide quarantine, including army patrols. Police
used robots – the “P-Guard” – to confront Tunisians who violated the lockdown in
public spaces. Laudably, the army has not exploited the situation by
overextending its powers, thus earning widespread popular support.
Buoyed by the positive numbers, the parliament has rallied around Fakhfakh. In
April, lawmakers voted overwhelmingly to grant Fakhfakh’s government temporary
special powers, allowing it to issue decrees, seek financial assistance, and
strike purchasing agreements without first consulting Tunisia’s fractious
legislature.
Industry and civil society have also rallied around the flag. 150 workers spent
a month voluntarily self-isolating in Tunisia’s Consomed factory, churning out
50,000 face masks per day as well as other protective gear.
COVID-19 in the Greater Middle East
Country Cases Deaths
Turkey 149,435 4,140
Iran 122,492 7,057
Saudi Arabia 57,345 320
Pakistan 42,125 903
Qatar 33,969 15
UAE 23,358 220
Israel 16,621 272
Kuwait 15,691 118
Egypt 12,229 630
Algeria 7,201 555
Bahrain 7,156 12
Afghanistan 7,072 173
Morocco 6,930 192
Oman 5,379 25
Iraq 3,554 127
Sudan 2,591 105
Somalia 1,421 56
Tunisia 1,037 45
Lebanon 931 26
Jordan 613 9
W. Bank & Gaza 386 2
Yemen 128 20
Libya 65 3
Syria 58 3
Source: JHU Coronavirus Resource Center
Data current as of 1:00 PM, May 18, 2020.
Implications
Despite the low number of cases and the high spirits, Tunisia’s economy is in
trouble. It is expected to shrink by 4.3 percent this year, the largest
contraction since Tunisia secured independence from France in 1956. According to
one estimate, the tourism industry could suffer a loss of $1.4 billion and
400,000 jobs, equivalent to roughly 3.5 percent of the Tunisian population.
The economic pinch has already triggered protests in poverty-stricken areas of
the capital. The lockdown has disproportionately hurt Tunisia’s poor and migrant
workers, many of whom hail from sub-Saharan Africa. Additional protests by
low-wage workers and migrants could resurface due to the bleak economic outlook.
What to Watch for
Tunisia’s efforts to return to some sense of normalcy are crucial for the
country. The poor and even the middle class can now begin to generate income
again. But it is unclear how the economy will function while some restrictions
linger and with tourism still on hold. Meanwhile, jihadi forces will continue to
test Tunisia’s security apparatus, which is on alert after thwarting a pair of
terrorist attacks in April and May.
More broadly, Tunisia’s fragile democracy is still in the process of building
institutions. How the government handles the economic fallout from the COVID-19
crisis will be an important litmus test for the continued solidification of
Tunisia’s democratic process.
*Benjamin Weinthal is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Military and
Political Power (CMPP). For more analysis from Benjamin and CMPP, please
subscribe HERE. Follow Benjamin on Twitter @BenWeinthal. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD
and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute
focusing on national security and foreign policy.
The Enemy Is Here…The Twilight of the Iranian Revolution
Dexter Filkins/The New Yorker/May 19/2020
دراسة عن نظام الملالي كتبها دكستر فيلكنز في مجلة ذي نيويوركر: العدو هنا…شفق
الثورة الإيرانية
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/86374/dexter-filkins-the-new-yorker-the-enemy-is-here-the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution-%d8%af%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%86-%d9%86%d8%b8%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%84/
For decades, Ayatollah Khamenei has professed enmity with
America. Now his regime is threatened from within the country.
One night last December, the chief resident physician at a hospital in the
Iranian city of Gorgan was asked to consult on a baffling case: a patient was
racked with a mysterious virus, which was advancing rapidly through his body.
The doctor, who asked to be identified only as Azad, for fear of retribution by
authorities, performed a CT scan and a series of chest X-rays, but the virus
overwhelmed the patient before he could decide on a treatment. After reading
reports from China, Azad determined that the cause of death was the coronavirus.
“I’d never seen anything like it before,” he told me.
More patients started coming in, first a few at a time, then in droves, many of
them dying. When Azad and his colleagues alerted hospital officials that they
were treating cases of the coronavirus, they were told to keep quiet. “We were
given special instructions not to release any statistics on infection and death
rates,” a second doctor told me. The medical staff was ordered not to wear masks
or protective clothing. “The aim was to prevent fear in the society, even if it
meant high casualties among the medical staff,” Azad said.
As the weeks went on, and the epidemic exploded in China, the Iranian media
remained nearly silent. Two reporters who work at a news outlet in Tehran told
me that they could see accounts of the virus on social media, but their editors
made it clear they should not pursue them; nationwide parliamentary elections
were scheduled for February 21st, and news about the virus could discourage
voters. “Everyone knows what stories can get you in trouble,” one reporter told
me. “It was understood that anything that helped to lower turnout would be
helping the counter-revolutionaries, and no one wanted to be accused of
supporting foreign-based opposition groups.”
Officials were also worried about relations with China—one of the few countries
that has continued to buy Iranian oil since the imposition of American-backed
sanctions. For weeks after the outbreak was reported in Wuhan, Iran’s Mahan Air
continued direct flights there. Mahan is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, the powerful security force that increasingly acts as a shadow
government in Iran.
Two days before the election, on February 19th, the Iranian government finally
announced that two citizens had died of the coronavirus. In the Tehran newsroom,
bitter laughter broke out. “We reported deaths before we even reported any
infections,” the reporter told me. “But that’s life in the Islamic Republic.” By
then, hundreds of sick patients were crowding the hospital in Gorgan. So many
bodies piled up that a local cemetery hired a backhoe to dig graves. “It was
worse than treating soldiers on a battlefield,” the second doctor said.
Soon, Iran became a global center of the coronavirus, with nearly seventy
thousand reported cases and four thousand deaths. But the government maintained
tight control over information; according to a leaked official document, the
Revolutionary Guard ordered hospitals to hand over death tallies before
releasing them to the public. “We were burying three to four to five times as
many people as the Ministry of Health was reporting,” Azad said. “We could have
dealt with this—we could have quarantined earlier, we could have taken
precautions like the ones the Chinese did in Wuhan—if we had not been kept in
the dark.” On February 24th, Iraj Harirchi, the deputy health minister, appeared
at a press conference and denied covering up the scale of infections. He looked
pale and flustered, and he repeatedly wiped sweat from his brow. The next day,
he, too, tested positive.
In mid-March, the Washington Post published satellite photos of newly dug mass
graves. A few weeks later, inmates rioted at prisons across the country,
terrified that they were trapped with the virus, and guards opened fire, killing
at least thirty-five. As the pandemic devastated an economy already weakened by
sanctions, Iran asked the International Monetary Fund for an emergency loan of
five billion dollars. It was the first time in nearly sixty years that the
government had appealed to the I.M.F., which it has historically described as a
tool of U.S. hegemony.
With the country spasming, Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran’s theocratic
system, suggested that the United States and its allies had deployed a
biological weapon. “Americans are being accused of creating this virus,” he
said, during a speech in March. “There are enemies who are demons, and there are
enemies who are humans, and they help one another. The intelligence services of
many countries coöperate with one another against us.”
Even as Khamenei spoke, the virus was spreading to the highest levels of the
regime, which is heavily populated by elderly men. At least fifty clerics and
political figures were infected, and at least twenty died. The Supreme Leader
was said to be closed off from most human contact, but his inner circle was
still susceptible; two vice-presidents and three of his closest advisers fell
ill. The virus, which seemed able to reach anyone, sharpened a sense of crisis
among ordinary Iranians. Khamenei, who has led the country since 1989, is eighty
years old and a prostate-cancer survivor, rumored to be in poor health. What
will become of the country when he dies?
In February, I paid a clandestine visit to the home of a reformist leader in
Tehran, who spent several years in prison but remains connected with like-minded
officials in the regime. Concerned that he might be at risk by talking to me, I
took a circuitous route to his apartment; midway through the trip, I got out of
my taxi, walked to the next block, and hailed another.
My host told me that the country has reached a decisive phase. Public confidence
in the theocratic system—installed after the Iranian Revolution, in 1979—has
collapsed. Soon after Khamenei took power, he promised Iranians that the
revolution would “lead the country on the path of material growth and progress.”
Instead, Iran’s ruling clerics have left the country economically hobbled and
largely cut off from the rest of the world. The sanctions imposed by the United
States in 2018, after President Trump abrogated the nuclear agreement between
the two countries, have aggravated those failures and intensified the corruption
of the governing élite. “I would say eighty-five per cent of the population
hates the current system,” my host said. “But the system is incapable of
reforming itself.”
Speculation about Khamenei’s longevity is rampant in the senior levels of
government and the military. “The struggle to succeed him has already begun,” my
host said. But Khamenei has spent decades placing loyalists throughout the
country’s major institutions, building a system that serves and protects him.
“Khamenei is like the sun, and the solar system orbits around him,” he told me.
“This is my worry: What happens when you take the sun out of the solar system?
Chaos.”
Before the revolution remade Iran, Khamenei was a young cleric in the city of
Mashhad. He had grown up modestly, the son of a cleric; a slender man, he had a
long, thin face adorned by large round glasses that gave him an owlish demeanor.
He was a devotee of Persian poetry and literature, and also came to admire
Tolstoy, Steinbeck, and especially Victor Hugo, whose “Les Misérables” he
described as “a miracle . . . a book of sociology, a book of history, a book of
criticism, a divine book, a book of love and feeling.” Khamenei was influenced
by the radical Islamist thinkers of his time, particularly Sayyid Qutb, who
extolled the use of violence against enemies of the religion. But, at family
gatherings, he kept his harsher ideas to himself. “He hugs people, he kisses the
children, he talks very well with children,” a relative who grew up with
Khamenei told me. “When he wears the political dress, that’s when he becomes
bad. That’s when he becomes aggressive.”
As Khamenei was forming his views, the country was in tumult. In 1953, an
American-backed coup had displaced Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically
elected Prime Minister. He was replaced by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of
Iran, who dominated the country, with help from the U.S. and from a ruthless
force of secret police. In the years that followed, an exiled ayatollah named
Ruhollah Khomeini raised an increasingly fervid opposition, built around the
idea that a state led by clerics, answerable only to God and set against Western
notions of modernity, could lift up the country after decades of humiliation.
Khamenei embraced this revolutionary world view and began travelling the
country, urging clerics to rouse their congregants. Soon after, he got married,
and his wife, Mansoureh, was struck by his intense conviction. “In the first
months of our marriage, my husband asked me, ‘How would you feel if I was
arrested?’ ” she said, in a 1993 interview with an Iranian women’s magazine. “I
was very upset at first. But he spoke about the clashes, the risks and problems,
and how this is the duty of all people, and that convinced me completely.”
Khamenei was imprisoned six times by the Shah’s secret police, including a
stint, in 1974, at a Tehran prison euphemistically named the Joint Anti-Sabotage
Committee. Houshang Asadi, a cellmate there, remembers him as a kindly if
austere man, gentle enough to feed one of his fellow-prisoners after a session
of torture. Khamenei would read the Quran aloud and sob, lost in the words of
the Prophet, or simply peer at the sky through the bars of his cell. Asadi, an
atheist, preferred to pass the time by entertaining his cellmates with a large
repertoire of jokes. “Whenever I told a sex joke, Khamenei didn’t like it,”
Asadi said when I met him in Paris, where he lives in exile. “I told them
anyway, because everyone else liked them. He would plead with me to stop.”
After the Shah fled, in 1979, and Khomeini became the country’s Supreme Leader,
Khamenei was named the deputy defense minister, and the Friday prayer leader for
the city of Tehran. He started amid a crisis. Not long before, a group of young
zealots had stormed the American Embassy and taken fifty-two hostages, most of
them diplomats, whom they accused of being spies. The siege lasted four hundred
and forty-four days and destroyed any hope of an early American-Iranian
rapprochement.
Khamenei opposed the seizure at first, but endorsed it when it became impossible
to undo. John Limbert, a political officer who was among those held at the
Embassy, recalled that, several months into the ordeal, Khamenei visited with a
camera crew, intending to show that the hostages were well treated. Limbert
tried to turn the tables, pretending that he was hosting Khamenei in his home.
“I apologized for not being able to offer him anything to eat or drink, and for
the really bad conditions,” Limbert told me. “He didn’t apologize, but he was
confused and embarrassed. He knew I was taunting him.”
The revolutionary government had established itself, but it was not fully in
control. In 1980, Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, sent his army across the
border, beginning a catastrophic war that lasted eight years and killed as many
as a million people. Within Iran, the leftist groups that had once fought
alongside the Islamists were excluded from power; when Khomeini led a crackdown
on his former allies, some of them fought back. Among them was the
Mujahideen-e-Khalq, an extremist group bolstered by funding from Saddam. The
M.E.K. established a vast camp in Iraq, where a cultish atmosphere prevailed,
with spouses banned and members required to record their sexual thoughts in
special notebooks. From across the border, the group launched a campaign of
assassination and terror attacks.
In June, 1981, as Khamenei prepared to give a sermon at Tehran’s Abouzar Mosque,
a bomb, planted in a tape recorder and placed in front of him, exploded. He was
gravely wounded; according to his own account of the incident, his pulse
stopped. He lost his hearing in one ear and the use of his right arm. Afterward,
he gave a bluff assessment of the injury’s effects: “I won’t need the hand; it
would suffice if my brain and tongue work.” But people who knew him said that he
seemed changed. The relative who grew up with him noted that he shakes hands
only with his left hand. “For forty years, he’s had a piece of meat hanging from
his body, and it still causes him pain,” he said. “This personal experience made
him deeply angry inside—it gave him a grudge against people.” A few months after
the attack, Khamenei was elected President.
Eight years later, Khomeini died, leaving the revolution without a unifying
figure. According to Iran’s constitution, the Supreme Leader would be chosen by
a group of senior clerics known as the Assembly of Experts. Khamenei was a
member of the assembly, but not a highly placed one and not a favorite for the
job. His selection was engineered by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the
dominant political leaders of his time, who replaced Khamenei as President; many
believe that he saw Khamenei as easy to manipulate. When the choice was
announced, Khamenei made a show of proclaiming his lack of expertise in Islamic
theology. “I am truly not worthy of this title,” he told the assembly. “My
nomination should make us all cry tears of blood.” Skeptics regarded this as a
classic display of taarof, a Persian tradition of overweening, even insincere
politeness.
The job gave Khamenei nearly absolute power: control of every branch of the
government, command of the armed forces, and supervision of the judiciary. He
proved to be a nimble and energetic autocrat, creating a parallel structure for
each institution. “This is how he kept everyone weak,” Mehdi Khalaji, a former
Shiite cleric in Iran who is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, said. Khamenei also oversaw the country’s largest concentrations of
wealth: an array of institutional funds, built on property seized from the
Shah’s élite, which came to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
By this time, Khamenei and Mansoureh had four sons and two daughters; he moved
the family into a house in central Tehran, at the end of Palestine Street, and
walled it off from the public. The compound eventually grew to contain some
fifty buildings, but Khamenei presented himself as an ascetic, dressing and
eating simply. “We do not have decorations, in the usual sense,” Mansoureh told
the women’s magazine. “Years ago, we freed ourselves from these things.” (There
were no pictures of her accompanying the interview. In four decades, she has
never been seen in a photograph.)
In office, though, Khamenei moved fiercely against his enemies. He continued the
regime’s efforts to assassinate turncoat exiles, killing as many as a hundred
and sixty people worldwide. He also helped preside over a murderous campaign
against the M.E.K., in which tens of thousands of members were executed.
Khamenei, still convinced of the power of literature, made dissident writers and
intellectuals a special target, banning books, closing newspapers, and
imprisoning artists. “Poetry must be the vanguard of the caravan of the
revolution,” he decreed.
Over the years, reformers in and out of the government pushed to strengthen the
rule of law, to allow the press greater freedom, and to curtail abuses by
security forces. Time and again, Khamenei sabotaged any serious effort at
liberalization. One of the most notable moments came in 1997, when a reformist
candidate named Mohammad Khatami won the Presidency in a landslide. As Khatami
began to pursue his agenda, he encountered immediate resistance from inside the
regime. Early in his term, the country was shaken by what became known as the
Chain Murders: the killing of about eighty artists and dissident intellectuals,
some of whom were mutilated, stabbed, or given lethal injections. The press,
seizing on the new freedom that Khatami allowed, produced a series of exposés,
revealing that the murders had been carried out by operatives from the Ministry
of Intelligence and Security, largely to terrorize Khatami’s most articulate
supporters.
In response, the Iranian government closed the newspaper Salam, which had
reported vigorously on the scandal. Protests began at Tehran University, and
quickly spread to colleges around the country. Khamenei had initially expressed
revulsion at the murders, but, when it became clear that the protesters
threatened his power, he turned on them. Security forces attacked a dormitory at
Tehran University, killing four students, wounding three hundred, and arresting
four hundred more. Khamenei was unmoved. “Officials in the government,
especially those in charge of public security, have been emphatically instructed
to put down the corrupt and warring elements with insight and power,” he said.
Khatami, rendered virtually powerless, left office in 2005.
This February 11th, the forty-first anniversary of the revolution, a celebration
was scheduled for downtown Tehran. I was at a restaurant in the city that
morning, when a waitress overheard me discussing plans to attend. “You’re
going?” she asked with a sneer. “They force people to be there—they blackmail
them. They tell people that if they don’t go they will lose their jobs.”
A parade wound down Independence Boulevard for more than two miles. Along the
way, placards proclaimed the victory of the revolution, and on every block hung
portraits of Khomeini and Khamenei. The festivities seemed subdued, though, with
small bands of marchers shepherding kids bundled against the cold. Some of the
attendees dutifully cried “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” But when
Hassan Rouhani, the country’s President, came to the lectern in Freedom Square
there was barely a murmur. Most people carried on talking to one another.
“Rouhani promised that after the nuclear deal most of our problems would be
solved,” a woman named Majideh told me. “We decided to believe in a miracle.
Look what happened.”
The sense of unreality didn’t stop at the parade; it accompanied me throughout
my time in Iran. Even the circumstances of my arrival seemed cynically managed.
I’d been asking for years for permission to visit, only to be refused. Then, in
February, I got an unanticipated call from the Iranian Interests Section, in
Washington, informing me that a visa had been approved. (Some Iranians suggested
that, with international tensions high and the pandemic still in its early
stages, the regime wanted to make a show of confidence.) The visa, I was told,
took effect immediately and would expire in six days. I ran for the airport.
In Tehran, I was met by a pleasant, capable woman, assigned by a government
contractor to be my guide. The arrangement was designed to limit my contact to
people approved by the government. It meant that the most revealing
conversations were those I set up on my own, with Iranians willing to risk
meeting me after my minder had gone home for the evening. There weren’t many
takers. Early in my visit, a Tehran lawyer, who quietly supports women’s-rights
initiatives, offered to bring together activists from four separate
organizations. They all refused. “I’m sorry,” she said. “It’s too dangerous.”
The dissidents who agreed to meet me spoke of surviving waves of reform and
repression. One night, I met Bahman Ahmadi Amouee, a journalist and an activist,
at a quiet restaurant, where we shared a meal of kebab koobideh, an Iranian
specialty of minced lamb and spices. In the late nineties, when Khatami loosened
constraints on the press, Amouee made the most of it. As a reporter for a
newspaper called Hamshahri, he wrote a series detailing how businessmen and
senior government officials exploited the country’s closed market to enrich
themselves. One memorable article asked why nearly all of Iran’s chadors—the
head-to-toe cloaks worn by most women—were imported. “The reason for this,” he
told me, “is that powerful people, in the government and out, get rich from the
imports and by blocking competition.” Amouee’s pieces were read and discussed
all over Tehran; criticizing the government was an exhilarating novelty. Khatami
wasn’t thrilled, Amouee said, but “he tolerated it.”
Amouee also covered the Presidential election of 2009, which turned out to be
the starkest test of Khamenei’s commitment to popular rule. The election pitted
a conservative incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, against a well-liked challenger,
Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Almost immediately after the polls closed, the authorities
declared Ahmadinejad the winner—seemingly too soon for the votes to have been
counted. Iranians, especially those from the educated middle class, poured into
the streets to protest that the outcome had been rigged. It was the beginning of
what came to be called the Green Movement.
Amouee and his wife, Jila Baniyaghoob, a journalist and a women’s-rights
activist, joined the protests. “The regime stole the election,” he said. “The
people wanted their dignity.” But, as the demonstrations gained strength, the
security forces swept in, arresting, beating, and killing protesters. Khamenei
expressed regret for the violence, but also made it clear that the protesters
were going too far. “They are not related to the candidates,” he said. “They are
related to the vandals, to the rioters.” On the ninth day of protests, police
came to Amouee’s home and arrested him and Baniyaghoob for spreading
anti-government propaganda. She was sentenced to a year in prison; he was
sentenced to five. For the first three months, he was confined to a closet-size
solitary cell, where the lights were always on—“white torture,” he called it. “I
couldn’t feel anything, I couldn’t smell anything. I just wanted to talk to
someone, but there was no one. I talk in my mind, sometimes I lose my mind.”
By the time the demonstrations subsided, ten months later, Mousavi was under
arrest, and some four thousand demonstrators had been detained; at least seventy
had been killed, and many others raped and tortured in prison. But the election
and the protests marked a turning point for the Islamic Republic. Months later,
a leaked video of a meeting of Revolutionary Guard commanders spread to the
Internet. In the video, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, who was then the leader of
the Guard, said that the problem was not that a reformist was prevented from
capturing the Presidency—it was that the reformers had challenged the tenets of
the revolution. “It was a blow that weakened the fundamental pillars of the
regime,” he said. The protests had presented the ruling class with a “new
paradigm,” in which it could no longer count on popular support, he said.
“Anyone who refuses to understand these new conditions will not be successful.”
Amouee was released in 2014. Since then, he’s been bouncing from job to job,
working as an editor and sometimes writing without a byline. (His memoir, “Life
in Prison,” was published last month in the United States.) I asked if he felt
safe talking to me, and whether he wanted his name published. He didn’t
hesitate. “It is my right,” he said. After dinner, as Amouee and I drove to my
hotel, we passed a darkened intersection, where armed officers were pulling over
cars and searching them. “It’s all about maintaining fear,” he said.
Khamenei did not always project menace. When he was first chosen to be the
Supreme Leader, he was seen as weak, lacking the respect of his
fellow-clergymen. So he turned to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. To
build support, he reached far down into the ranks and appointed new colonels and
brigadiers. “Khamenei micromanages the whole system, so everyone is loyal to
him,” Khalaji, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said. “He is
hyperactive. He knows every low-ranking commander and even the names of their
children.” The I.R.G.C. became the principal basis of Khamenei’s power. In turn,
he made it the country’s preëminent security institution.
During the Green Movement, the Guard and its plainclothes militia, known as the
Basij, were instrumental in crushing dissent. According to Abbas Milani, the
director of the Iranian Studies program at Stanford and a former political
prisoner in Iran, the uprising amounted to a political anointment. “Clearly, the
regime believed it was going to lose control, and the I.R.G.C. and the Basij
saved the day,” Milani said. “The result is that the I.R.G.C. now has the upper
hand. Khamenei knows that without the I.R.G.C. he’d be out of a job in
twenty-four hours.”
The most visible symbol of the I.R.G.C.’s strength is the Basij, whose members
can be seen on street corners in every Iranian city. A less visible measure is
its manipulation of the economy. When the clerics took hold, after the
revolution, they secured control of large sectors of the economy, including oil
production, factories, and ports. During the next two decades, an array of
state-owned enterprises were privatized—but, rather than going to skilled
businesspeople, many of them were acquired by the I.R.G.C. and its associates.
Today, elements of the Guard are thought to own construction companies, oil
refineries, and mines, along with a nineteen-story luxury mall in a posh
neighborhood of Tehran. No one is entirely sure how much of the economy the
group controls; credible estimates range from ten per cent to more than fifty.
One indication of its wealth came in 2009, when its investment arm paid $7.8
billion for a majority stake in the Telecommunication Company of Iran; the
I.R.G.C.’s total budget, on paper, was only five billion. In Iranian society,
the Guard has grown into an untouchable élite. “They have their own schools,
their own markets, their own neighborhoods, their own resorts,” a former senior
Middle Eastern intelligence officer told me. “The neighborhoods look like a
carbon copy of Beverly Hills.”
Since taking office, Trump has made a series of efforts to strangle the I.R.G.C.
In 2017, the Treasury Department designated the Guard as a terrorist
organization, and Secretary Steven Mnuchin pledged to “disrupt the I.R.G.C.’s
destructive activities.” But sanctions imposed by the West had a perverse
effect. Because few countries could trade with Iran, the businesses that the
I.R.G.C. controlled came to exercise near-monopolies within the country. As the
U.S. and its allies policed international shipping, the I.R.G.C. tightened its
hold on the sea-lanes and the airports, where oil smuggling and drug trafficking
were flourishing.
When Rouhani became President, in 2013, he started working to restrain the
I.R.G.C.’s power. He moved to take away some of its business holdings,
encouraging the idea that “all soldiers must return to the barracks.” He also
led negotiations with the West over the country’s nuclear program, which the
Guard oversees. But both initiatives ultimately foundered, and the I.R.G.C.
pushed back with a campaign of its own. In 2017, prosecutors, many of them loyal
to the Guard, began a series of criminal investigations of people close to
Rouhani, imprisoning his brother on corruption charges.
Tensions became so acute that officials publicly discussed efforts to neutralize
Rouhani. In a speech in August, 2018, Khamenei complained of usurpers who were
“working on the enemy’s plan.” Two months later, Ezzatollah Zarghami, a former
I.R.G.C. general and head of Iranian state broadcasting, said in an interview
that the chiefs of several leading state enterprises had been preparing to “take
over in many of those areas and manage them instead of the government.”
The effort was thwarted, but there may have been another. Masoud Bastani, an
Iranian journalist whose reporting has landed him in prison three times, told me
that, late last year, the I.R.G.C. was moving to strip Rouhani of much of his
power. A source who is familiar with the inner workings of the Guard told me
that officers were planning to arrest roughly a hundred people close to the
President.
But, before anything could happen, Rouhani’s administration threw the country
into chaos. On November 15th, the government announced that it was raising the
price of gasoline by fifty per cent. The news was released quietly—in the middle
of the night, on a national holiday—but it was still met with outrage; Iranians
drive everywhere, and rely on government-subsidized gasoline. Ordinary citizens
began swarming into the streets to protest, touching off the largest and most
disruptive riots since the revolution.
On the second day of the protests, Pouya Shirpisheh, a twenty-seven-year-old
electrical engineer, was driving home from work, in the Tehran suburb of Karaj,
when he passed a crowd gathering to demonstrate; social media had been pulsing
all day with talk of the protests. At home, he shared a lunch of okra stew with
his mother, Nahid. Afterward, he told her that he was heading into the streets,
and asked if she wanted to come along. She agreed, on one condition: “Only if
you hold my hand.” Pouya’s sister, Mona, decided to join him, too.
The Shirpishehs were sick of the revolution, even though Pouya’s father had
fought in the Revolutionary Guard for five years during the Iran-Iraq War. Pouya,
who was hoping to marry soon and build a life, loathed it most. “Pouya loved
poetry and nature—he saw beauty in everything,” Nahid told me. “He also loved
history, and he used to say these clerics have ruined our country. He used to
say, ‘We’ve never had such a terrible time, ever, in our history.’ ” The
protests quickly became an outlet for broader frustrations. “We can see that the
government is spending our money on other countries, sending it to Hamas, to
Syria and Hezbollah,” Nahid said. “The protests weren’t about gasoline. They
were about protesting the same bunch of people in charge for forty years,
deliberately seeking a fight with the U.S. It is these people who have turned
Iran into a pariah state. We cannot have any fun—Iran is a joyless religious
dictatorship. We are forced into fake identities.”
As the family joined the demonstration, Nahid experienced a rush of euphoria.
The crowd was angry, but not violent. “America is not the enemy!” the marchers
roared. “The enemy is here!” The police fired tear gas, but the marchers kept
surging forward. Nahid felt suddenly free: “I turned to Mona and said, ‘This is
the best night of my life.’ ”
Pouya told his mother that he’d torn his shoe and was heading back to the car,
and then he disappeared into the crowd. Nahid heard the sound of gunfire,
sporadic at first and then sustained. She pushed through the throng, seeing
people fall around her, bleeding from gunshot wounds. “How horrible it will be
for the mothers of these sons,” she told herself. Then she spotted Pouya in the
arms of a group of protesters. He had been shot in the head. “That’s my son!”
she screamed. Nahid and Mona pulled Pouya into the car and raced him to a
hospital. He was dead before they arrived.
The following days brought no relief to the family. “I was crazy with grief,”
Nahid said. At first, the security forces refused to turn over Pouya’s body.
Then they dragged Nahid and her husband to the police station for questioning.
Plainclothes officers lingered outside the family’s home. Men called on the
phone and threatened them, she said: “When we asked who killed Pouya, the agent
said it must be the M.E.K.,” the opposition group. When they finally received
Pouya’s body, two thousand sympathizers turned out for a ceremony to mourn his
death; policemen lurked at the periphery. In the months after her son’s death,
Nahid began to visit the mothers of other slain Iranians. “The crackdown showed
us that this regime will do whatever it takes to hold on to power,” she said.
The November demonstrations were remarkably distinct from those in 2009. The
earlier protests were led by the middle class and by university students, and
took place largely in major cities. The more recent demonstrations were begun by
workers, the regime’s traditional base, and spread rapidly throughout the
country. They also turned violent; in many cities, demonstrators burned stores
and trashed police stations. “The 2009 protests showed that the regime had lost
the middle class,” a shop owner who witnessed protests in his Tehran suburb told
me. “The protests in November show that they’ve lost the working class, too.”
The regime struck back brutally. “It happened very fast,” a Western diplomat in
Tehran told me. “The government switched off the phones and the Internet and
responded massively—and the whole thing was over in three days. I think the
regime was genuinely afraid.” Iranian authorities confirmed that some seven
thousand people had been arrested, but they have not disclosed the number of
civilians killed. Amnesty International estimated the death toll at three
hundred; Reuters, citing unnamed officials close to Khamenei, put the number at
fifteen hundred. One dissident politician I spoke to endorsed the higher number,
saying that she had been told two hundred people were buried in one area in a
single night. “Then there is the second phase by the police, which few people
talk about,” she added. “They examine photographs of license plates to identify
leaders and speak to informants to identify more. They arrest these people,
too.”
In a nearly unprecedented sign of unrest, the demonstrators began to fight back.
According to Iranian news accounts, at least six police officers and soldiers
were killed, apparently by protesters. Four of them were shot to death, even
though civilians are largely forbidden to have guns; others were stabbed.
Security forces encountered resistance in such areas as Kurdistan and Khuzestan,
which border neighboring countries. A YouTube video, purportedly taken in
Khuzestan, shows security forces shooting civilians as they flee into a marsh.
“That suggests there is some kind of organized resistance,” Ali Alfoneh, a
senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, in Washington, said. “Ordinary
civilians don’t hide in a marsh.”
A few politicians tried to raise an outcry. Parvaneh Salahshouri, a member of
parliament, made a speech from the floor of the legislature, in which she
denounced the military’s influence on the government’s decisions. “How can I, as
a representative of the people, watch the murder of my country’s young?” she
said. She told me that she was accosted and harassed for days afterward.
Khamenei attempted to shift the blame, maintaining that the decision to use
force had not been his. But he showed no pity toward those killed, saying that
the security forces had fired on “hooligans” and dupes of foreign agents. “Such
actions are not carried out by ordinary people,” he said of the protests. “They
are thugs.” Khamenei warned that he would not stand in the way of the security
forces in the future.
President Rouhani did not appear in public for several days. During my visit,
though, he held a press conference, and I asked him how many civilians the
government had killed. He gave a rambling response before concluding, “You’re
going to have to ask the medical examiner’s office.” (Iranian reporters later
reached out to the medical examiner in Tehran. The office demurred, saying, “The
Ministry of Interior is responsible for announcing these statistics.”)
When I returned to my seat, an Iranian reporter, her face surrounded by a
chador, turned to me and spoke loudly enough for much of the room to hear. “I
noticed the President didn’t answer your question,” she said, in flawless
English. “We hate him.”
Away from direct confrontation with the Islamic Republic, Iranians carry on a
parallel existence. It is a crime for women to leave the house without a hijab,
but, in the well-off sections of northern Tehran, it is not uncommon to spot
women walking down the street with their hair defiantly exposed. So many areas
of private life fall under the state’s purview that flouting the law is hard to
avoid. In 2014, six Iranian men and women recorded themselves dancing to
Pharrell Williams’s song “Happy,” and posted the video on YouTube, with the
title “Happy We Are from Tehran.” The authorities arrested them for violating
laws that prohibit dancing with the opposite sex. They were sentenced to a year
in prison and ninety-one lashes apiece.
At times during my visit, Tehran reminded me of Eastern Europe in the eighties,
when ordinary people, constrained by a sclerotic communist system, coped by
living as if the state did not exist. One night, I attended a dinner party in a
middle-class neighborhood of Tehran. Iranian music drifted from the stereo.
Women wore skirts and leather boots, their hair uncovered. Bottles of arrack and
wine, homemade but delicious, were arrayed on a table. One of the men told me
that illicit parties were so common that he had been making a living as a d.j.
Almost every party received a visit from a police officer, who said, usually
with a wink, that the music was too loud. “I give him some money, and he goes
away,” the man told me. Another man complained about the daily struggle of
making his business work in an unpredictable and corrupt system, with chronic
shortages of material and unruly inspectors pushing for bribes. “Plan for the
next quarter?” he said. “I can’t plan for tomorrow morning.”
In Iran, some of the most intense unrest comes from frustration with the
regime’s intrusions into private life. One evening, I met a young woman, who
went by Sara, who was involved in a recent protest movement to open soccer games
to women. The protests gained prominence in 2018, when thirty-five women—many of
them Sara’s friends—gathered outside a match between two Tehran soccer clubs and
demanded to be allowed in. They were attempting to do openly what other young
women had been doing in secret, by flattening their breasts, painting on
mustaches, dressing up in boys’ clothes, and sneaking inside. All thirty-five
were arrested.
The Iranian regime has repressed the women’s movement with particular ferocity.
In 2017, a woman named Vida Movahed climbed onto a utility box in downtown
Tehran, removed her hijab, and waved it around on a stick. More women followed,
and became known as the Girls of Revolution Street. The authorities arrested not
only them and Movahed but also her lawyer, Nasrin Sotoudeh, who was sentenced to
thirty-eight years in prison and a hundred and forty-eight lashes.
Sara was nervous about meeting me in public. “It is really dangerous,” she said.
“Me sitting here talking to you might get me in deep trouble.” Still, she was
poised and determined, insisting that she be granted her rights. “If you want to
know how we live, you have to watch ‘The Handmaid’s Tale,’ ” she said. “This is
the real Gilead. Margaret Atwood, she wrote our story before we were born.”
Last year, a twenty-nine-year-old woman named Sahar Khodayari was arrested while
trying to sneak into a soccer match and charged with “appearing in public
without a hijab.” She set herself on fire and died. Afterward, the authorities
finally conceded—a little. Under pressure from fifa, the international soccer
authority, the Iranian government agreed to allow women to attend matches of the
national team, as long as it was playing foreign opponents. Sara described the
thrill of entering Tehran’s stadium for a match between the Iranian and
Cambodian teams. “The soccer field is really green when you see it,” she told
me. Even though the women were relegated to a roped-off area behind a goal,
“everyone was screaming and crying,” she said. “It was the dream.”
I asked Sara why the authorities were concerned about something as trivial as a
soccer match. “They know that if they open the doors to the stadium they should
open other doors, too,” she said. “But the women of this country are not going
to stop. I am absolutely prepared to go to prison.” All her friends felt the
same way about the authorities, she said. “The problem they have with us is
that, if women get power, they’re going to take them down. That is the fact.
They are going to overthrow the government.”
On April 9th, Khamenei appeared on Iran’s Channel 1 to talk about the
coronavirus. Since the outbreak began, Iran has been devastated by the virus,
with a hundred and fourteen thousand confirmed cases, nearly seven thousand
dead, and no reasonable prospect of containment. Instead of acknowledging the
government’s failures, Khamenei declared a triumph. “The Iranian nation had a
brilliant performance in this test,” he said. “The people’s coöperation has also
created beautiful, fascinating, and astonishing scenes, and they can be seen
everywhere.” Iran’s example shone in contrast to that of the West, he said,
where crazed residents had emptied store shelves, committed suicide, and “fought
with one another over toilet paper.” He added, “The Wild West has been revived.
That is what they say.”
From the start of his time in government, Khamenei has proclaimed his loathing
of the United States. In 1987, he told the U.N., “The history of our nation is
in a black, bitter, and bloody chapter, mixed with varieties of hostility and
spite from the American regime.” He seems to take pleasure in recounting
America’s sins; during one meeting with government officials, he gave a
discourse on “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” as a depiction of “the realities of America and
the American government.”
The sense of enmity goes both ways. Ever since the revolution, the U.S. has
pressed the Iranian regime over its sponsorship of terror and its nuclear
program. But Khamenei has used the confrontation to justify crushing domestic
opponents and to explain away economic mismanagement. Rising tensions with the
U.S. have nearly always coincided with crackdowns on dissidents and
intellectuals, and with the exclusion of reformers from ballots. In 2010,
Mohammad Khatami told Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie
Endowment, that the Supreme Leader had once confided, “We need the United States
as an enemy.”
The Iranians’ ultimate gamesmanship has involved the nuclear accord. For years,
Khamenei opposed direct talks with the United States but periodically made
concessions, even occasionally agreeing to halt the program altogether; all the
while, he led his country closer to a usable weapon. Finally, in 2013, with the
country crippled by sanctions, he began signalling that he was open to talks,
calling on Iranians to demonstrate “heroic flexibility.” The country’s leaders
hoped that a deal would produce a surge in the economy. That prospect collapsed
when Trump cancelled the deal and imposed even harsher sanctions.
Several Iran experts in the U.S. told me that they believed the regime might
resume negotiations after the Presidential elections this fall. Their reasons
for optimism varied. Some argued that, if Trump lost, the nuclear deal could be
revived; others said that, if Trump won, Khamenei would have no choice but to
negotiate. Iranian officials rejected both scenarios, telling me that the
Supreme Leader would never again make a deal. “The United States can’t be
counted on to keep its word,” Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran
University, told me.
Over time, there have been hints that the regime is maintaining covert
capabilities. The most recent ones surfaced in 2018, after Mossad, the Israeli
intelligence agency, carried out a brazen plot to steal nuclear secrets from a
secure warehouse in Tehran. Arriving in a semi truck before midnight, a team of
agents broke into the facility and, using high-intensity torches, cut open
safes. For six hours, they carted off documents and CDs, leaving just before an
armed guard was due to begin his morning shift. According to a former senior
U.S. intelligence official, the Iranian military launched an enormous dragnet
operation, but the Israelis escaped across the border into Azerbaijan. Another
former intelligence official told me that several members of Iran’s security
forces were arrested afterward. “There was a big purge,” he said.
When reports of the raid emerged, Iranian officials said that the whole thing
was a hoax, and that the documents were phony. The Israelis maintain that “the
archive,” as they call it, was a history of Iran’s nuclear-weapons program until
2003, when the regime claimed to have largely suspended it. According to a
Western expert, the documents detailed the existence of two nuclear sites that
had been hidden from inspectors; one had produced uranium hexafluoride, a
material used in the enrichment process, and the other was a facility for
testing weapons components. Western officials couldn’t determine whether the
sites were active, but, when international inspectors, alerted by the Israelis,
asked to visit them, the Iranians refused—and razed the testing facility. “There
was a rush to clean up the site,” the expert told me.
Last spring, Iran announced that it was abandoning the constraints imposed by
the nuclear agreement, and stepped up its enrichment of uranium. A Western
official who tracks the program told me that, at the current rate, the Iranians
could have enough enriched material for a bomb in less than seven months. David
Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security,
estimates that it could take half that long. Constructing a sophisticated weapon
with the enriched uranium would likely require twelve to eighteen months more. A
crude device could be ready to test much sooner, though—perhaps in the Iranian
desert. Such a device probably couldn’t be launched at an enemy, and would
likely use much of the enriched uranium that Iran has. But, the Western official
said, “the world would suddenly look quite different.”
Thus far, Iranian leaders apparently have not begun working to weaponize a
nuclear device. Yet the uncertainty has refocussed Western intelligence analysts
on a pressing question: Will Khamenei decide to build a weapon?
Most analysts I spoke to believe that he will not, unless the regime faces an
existential threat from outside the country. But if he dies? “The day he’s gone,
then I think all options are on the table,” the Western official said.
On January 6th, Khamenei stood at the front of a huge crowd at Tehran University
and wept. He was there for the funeral of Qassem Suleimani—the head of the élite
Quds Force, who had, through military pressure, political maneuvering, and
ruthless terror attacks, made Iran the most influential country in the Middle
East. He had been killed three days before, on Trump’s orders, when an MQ-9
Reaper drone struck his convoy near the Baghdad airport. Footage shared with me
by an Iraqi official showed one of Suleimani’s hands, charred and torn from his
body, with a distinctive ruby signet ring still intact—enough to prove his
identity.
Suleimani’s killing provoked an outpouring of national mourning, with millions
of Iranians coming to see his body as his funerary procession travelled the
country. In Tehran, the line of mourners stretched more than three miles. During
the funeral, Khamenei lamented, “God, the wrapped bodies that are in front of
our feet are your worshippers and the children of your worshippers.” He seemed
to be bidding goodbye not just to a national hero but also to someone whose
popularity he could never hope to match.
Suleimani was a principal architect of Iran’s foreign policy, but he was also
believed to have been deeply involved in domestic decisions, including the
suppression of the rebellions in 1999 and 2009. He was the Supreme Leader’s
closest counsellor—“Khamenei saw him like a son,” Marandi, the professor at
Tehran University, who knew Suleimani, said—and was the only Revolutionary Guard
general who was never rotated out of his job. A senior Iraqi official recalled
once asking Suleimani why he didn’t run for President. Suleimani thought for a
moment and said, “Why would I do that?” The official explained his logic:
“Suleimani had all the power and no accountability.”
Suleimani was also expected to help Khamenei orchestrate the selection of a
successor, insuring that the next Supreme Leader suited his wishes. According to
Iran’s constitution, the process is as regimented as the Vatican’s method for
anointing a Pope: the new leader is to be selected by the Assembly of Experts,
who have largely been appointed with Khamenei’s approval. But most current
members belong to the original revolutionary generation, and are now visibly
slowed by age. Sadjadpour, of the Carnegie Endowment, described the
demographics: “The median age is deceased.”
Khamenei’s first choice is likely to be his son, Mojtaba, a cleric in Tehran. In
recent years, Khamenei has elevated Mojtaba’s profile and given him more
responsibility in overseeing the government. But many Iranians believe that,
after Khamenei departs, the I.R.G.C. will become enmeshed in selecting a new
Supreme Leader. Some expect the Guard to try to rule outright. Several former
commanders have already assumed prominent political roles, aided by the
institution’s ability to spend its vast resources on favored candidates. “The
I.R.G.C. is not going to take over all of a sudden,” Alfoneh, of the Arab Gulf
States Institute, said. “It’s a slow-motion coup that’s been in the works for
years.”
Most people I spoke with believed that the Guard would maintain a façade of
clerical rule. Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s Chief Justice, is frequently mentioned as a
candidate. Raisi, along with leading the judiciary, is an influential member of
the Assembly of Experts. He also proved his revolutionary fervor at the end of
the Iran-Iraq War, when he helped carry out the extrajudicial killings of
thousands of M.E.K. prisoners and other leftists. “He’s drenched in blood,”
Reuel Gerecht, an Iran analyst and a former C.I.A. officer, told me.
The coronavirus outbreak has only strengthened the I.R.G.C.’s influence. In
March, Khamenei gave the Guard responsibility for containing the virus, and
since then it has deployed tens of thousands of troops throughout the country. A
public-health specialist working for the Ministry of Health told me that
thousands of Basij militiamen are moving around Iran, without any protective
gear, to disinfect buildings and streets. “The guards are trying to solve the
coronavirus problem in Iran by brute force,” the specialist said. In Tehran and
elsewhere in the country, the Guard has attempted to control information about
the virus, including death statistics, the specialist said: “The guards want to
contain any damage that has been caused by the wrong decisions—or lack of
decisions—made by Khamenei, and blame them on the executive branch, the
President, and the Ministry of Health.”
Many Western diplomats and experts believe that the I.R.G.C. is dominated by
officers intent on preserving the status quo, which has enriched and empowered
them. With Khamenei still in power, most signs suggest that the Iranian state is
becoming even more conservative. Before the parliamentary elections in February,
legal and clerical authorities barred seven thousand candidates—more than half
of those who attempted to run. Among them were ninety current members of
parliament, including a number of conservatives. “Some were probably corrupt,” a
Western analyst who works in the region told me. “Some were not considered loyal
enough.”
Still, some Iranians believe that many of the I.R.G.C.’s senior officers want to
steer the country in a direction closer to that of China: strict politics, but a
freer market. The reformist leader I spoke to, who is in touch with several
I.R.G.C. officers, believed that one of the generals would ultimately emerge as
a benevolent strongman—“our Napoleon”—to guide Iran toward greater prosperity.
The government would be run by technocrats, not clerics, and the generals would
loosen controls on freedom of speech and dress. “They want to reach out to the
middle class,” he said. “Think about it: the moment they get the clerics out of
government, they would be incredibly popular.”
That prediction struck many Western experts as overly optimistic. The
reform-minded officers inside the I.R.G.C. probably make up only one of several
factions, which exist in a state of internal rivalry and dissension. If those
factions are unable to agree on a Supreme Leader, then the process could go out
of control. “I think the selection of a new leader needs to happen quickly—it’s
a twenty-four-hour thing,” a Western diplomat in Tehran told me.
The deteriorating relations with the U.S. have had visible effects on Iran’s
domestic politics. The latest crisis is driven by the two countries’ struggle
for influence in Iraq, where Iranian-backed militias have stepped up attacks on
American personnel; it was these attacks that prompted Trump to kill Suleimani.
Khamenei vowed revenge, and, on January 8th, Iranian missiles struck two U.S.
military bases in Iraq, wounding several soldiers. Later that day, a Ukrainian
Airlines plane went down near the Tehran airport, with a hundred and seventy-six
people on board. The government initially denied any involvement, but reports on
social media revealed that the Revolutionary Guard had shot down the plane,
mistaking it for an enemy cruise missile. Angry demonstrations broke out.
“Everyone was against the government then,” Sara told me.
Many Iranians I spoke to believed that the regime would strike again, in an
attempt to humiliate Trump before the election in November. Some told me that it
might try to take American hostages—evoking memories of the Embassy seizure in
1979, which helped destroy Jimmy Carter’s Presidency. One academic with ties to
the Iranian leadership said, “I think the fate of Trump lies in the hands of
Tehran.”
This may be bluster, but, as Iran’s economic problems deepen, the regime could
find itself increasingly tempted to create a diversion. The same might be true
for Trump, whose rhetoric has grown more bombastic since the Suleimani strike.
In April, he tweeted, “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down
and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”
Iranian state media responded with equal belligerence, calling the idea “a fake
Hollywood tale.”
Even as Iranians speculate about who will succeed Khamenei, many believe that,
whoever becomes Supreme Leader, the revolution is no longer salvageable. One of
them is Faezeh Rafsanjani, a former member of parliament and the daughter of the
late President Rafsanjani. Faezeh grew up amid the country’s ruling élite but
gradually became disenchanted with its ideology. In 2009, she emphatically
endorsed the protesters. Speaking to a crowd of demonstrators, she compared
Khamenei to the Shah—a cardinal insult—and denounced what she saw as a theft of
the people’s vote. “The protests must continue, until they realize that a fraud
of this magnitude cannot be pushed aside,” she said.
The speech helped establish Rafsanjani as one of the country’s leading
dissidents, whose famous name made her criticisms all the more threatening to
those in power. Rafsanjani became a target of unrelenting harassment, especially
by members of the Basij. In one incident, captured in a video that surfaced in
early 2011, Rafsanjani was walking out of a mosque when she was confronted by an
overbearing militiaman. “You whore!” he growled, inches from her face. “Do you
want me to rip your mouth open? Should I rip your mouth open right here? We’ll
ruin you! We’ll kill all of you!”
Asked about the incident a couple of months later, Rafsanjani told an
interviewer, “This government is run by beasts and thugs.” She was arrested,
convicted in a closed courtroom of spreading anti-government propaganda, and
sentenced to six months in prison. In 2017, she was jailed again, for
criticizing the Revolutionary Guard; she served both of her terms in the
infamous women’s ward of Evin Prison.
On a gray morning, I met Rafsanjani in her office. She wore a pink head scarf
that obscured her face, but her eyes burned with urgency and intelligence.
(Despite being a proponent of women’s rights, she wears hijab as a matter of
personal preference.) While she talked, she sat—and occasionally stood—behind a
metal desk covered with heaps of papers.
Rafsanjani had little faith left in the system founded forty-one years ago.
“Even the people who say they are reformers are not really reformers at all,”
she said. She noted that Rouhani had taken office with an overwhelming mandate
for change. “I had hopes for him, but he’s the same color as the rest of them,’’
she said.
Rafsanjani did not blame the Trump Administration or the American sanctions for
the country’s problems; like many Iranians I spoke to, she felt that blaming the
U.S. was a weak excuse for the regime’s failure to reform itself. “The
coronavirus is just one instance,” she said. “There have been many events in
recent years that show that our politics have gone wrong.” Iran’s increasing
schisms, she argued, were the result of the regime’s flawed ideas. “One is the
inessentiality of human life, which seems to be one of our most seriously
pursued policies,” she said. “Another is the national-security lens—we look at
things that have nothing to do with politics or security through the lens of
national security. And when you put these two together you start to realize why
these things keep happening.”
Isolated and dysfunctional, the Islamic Republic had reached a dead end, she
said: “The regime has lost all popular support, and yet it is incapable of
change. The result is that the Iranian people have lost hope. We are hopeless
now.”
Just before I headed home from Iran, I visited a Western ambassador in Tehran.
When I told him that I was going to the airport, he said, “It’s the second
checkpoint you need to worry about. That’s the I.R.G.C.” On my way, I stripped
everything from my phone and laptop—e-mail, photographs, encrypted-chat apps.
At Tehran International, I breezed through the security lines until I got to the
checkpoint nearest the boarding gate. I was waiting for my backpack to come
through the X-ray machine when a man put his hand on my shoulder. “We have some
questions we’d like to ask you,” he said.
I was led to a room the size of a walk-in closet, where five men were waiting.
As we sat down, our knees touched. One man, sweating, with a pinched face and an
ill-fitting shirt, led the questioning. Another man translated. There was no
chitchat.
“We’ve been watching you,” the interrogator said. I thought of all the Iranians
I had met after hours, who would be in danger now. “You have been seen speaking
to people without permission.”
The interrogator took my phone, and one of his men carried it out of the room. I
wondered how long my plane would wait for me.
“You have been seen entering restricted areas,” he said.
I thought of Nicolas Pelham, a correspondent for The Economist. He’d been
granted a visa by the Iranian bureaucracy and then been detained by the
I.R.G.C.—one power center seeming to overrule another. He was held for seven
weeks.
The questioning continued for several minutes, as the time of my flight came and
went. The interrogator asked about Masoud Bastani, the muckraking journalist.
“Who gave you license to meet Bastani?’’ he demanded. I was terrified that
Bastani would be sent back to prison. But, as the interview went on, I realized
that they didn’t actually know whom I had met with.
“You have been observed photographing restricted sites,” the interrogator said.
By then, the man had come back with my phone. Grasping for something, I told the
interrogator to check it.
He looked at the phone, and found nothing. For a moment, he seemed embarrassed.
Then he handed it back to me.
“You were right—you were not taking any photos,” he said. “You are free to leave
the Islamic Republic. Have a nice flight.”
*Published in the print edition of the May 25, 2020, issue, with the headline ”
*Dexter Filkins is a staff writer at The New Yorker and the author of “The
Forever War,” which won a National Book Critics Circle Award.