English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese
Related, Global News & Editorials
For
April 21/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani
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Bible Quotations For today
Mary Magdalene went and announced to the
disciples, ‘I have seen the Lord’
“Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint John 20/11-18:
“Mary stood weeping outside the tomb. As she wept, she bent over to look into
the tomb; and she saw two angels in white, sitting where the body of Jesus had
been lying, one at the head and the other at the feet. They said to her, ‘Woman,
why are you weeping?’ She said to them, ‘They have taken away my Lord, and I do
not know where they have laid him.’When she had said this, she turned round and
saw Jesus standing there, but she did not know that it was Jesus. Jesus said to
her, ‘Woman, why are you weeping? For whom are you looking?’ Supposing him to be
the gardener, she said to him, ‘Sir, if you have carried him away, tell me where
you have laid him, and I will take him away.’Jesus said to her, ‘Mary!’ She
turned and said to him in Hebrew, ‘Rabbouni!’ (which means Teacher). Jesus said
to her, ‘Do not hold on to me, because I have not yet ascended to the Father.
But go to my brothers and say to them, “I am ascending to my Father and your
Father, to my God and your God.” ’Mary Magdalene went and announced to the
disciples, ‘I have seen the Lord’; and she told them that he had said these
things to her.”
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese
Related News & Editorials published on April 21-22/2020
Sunday night thoughts: Cross the gate/Dr.Walid Phares/April 19, 2020. Orthodox
Easter
Four New Coronavirus Cases in Lebanon
Lebanese protesters defy virus curfew and take to the streets
Hasan: Coronavirus Crisis Nearing Its End in Lebanon
29 Victims to Take Part in STL Proceedings against Ayyash
Poland Detains Lebanese Man Suspected of 'Planning Attacks'
Israeli Jets Stage Mock Raids, Overfly Many Regions
Bassil Warns against Haircut, State Assets Sale, Urges Funds Recovery
Ex-Mufti Says Islam Forbids Seizing People’s Deposits in Banks
Traffic to Be Diverted During Legislative Sessions at UNESCO
Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on
April 21-22/2020
Canada Killing: Rare Precedents
Israel's Netanyahu, Gantz agree emergency unity government
Wearing face masks, Syria’s Assad and Iran’s Zarif condemn West at Damascus
meeting
Erdogan accuses Assad regime of violating Idlib cease-fire
U.S. Benchmark WTI Oil Collapses to $0.01/Barrel
France Reaches 'Painful' Landmark of 20,000 Virus Dead
Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous
sources published on
April 21-22/2020
Oil: It is all about storage/Cornelia Meyer/Arab News/April 21/2020
Erdogan torn between two camps on Syria/Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib/Arab
News/April 21/2020
Young people at great risk from virus fallout/Chris Doyle//Arab News/April
21/2020
The Next Iranian Revolution/Why Washington Should Seek Regime Change in
Tehran/Eric S. Edelman and Ray Takeyh/FDD/April 20/2020
Iran's regime will develop nuclear submarines says navy commander/Benjamin
Weinthal/Jerusalem Post/April 20/2020
The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News &
Editorials published on April 21-22/2020
Sunday night thoughts: Cross the gate
Dr.Walid Phares/April 19, 2020. Orthodox Easter
Dear friends in the mother country, debating the past will take days and days
and will go into generations, that I have no doubt. But let's face a reality
that is harsh, cold and merciless. The 15 years of war which I have seen, and
the 30 years of occupation and terror which I have followed from afar, tells us
that what was done didn't work, we all like it or not. Blaming, forgetting,
dodging facts, won't help. Heavy losses have been incurred, battles were lost,
dreams were shattered, promises were not kept. The mother country is at the edge
of the cliff. Some believe it is in a free fall already. Yes, if nothing is
done. No, if something is done. The problem is what can and should be done?
That's what so many keep asking me. There are many answers, but not one single
answer would work if it is about returning to the old ways, the old words, old
narratives, old failed tactics and policies. All of them have been tried, none
has brought success. A plain reality that is inescapable. Maybe failures for
that small country have still served the narrow interests of a few who profited,
but certainly not the interests of the people. Otherwise why would an
overwhelming majority be complaining, frustrated, lost, terrified and angry?
In short, the path to the future goes through letting go of the tactics and
policies of the past. Once you cross that gate, you're in a new era. Then sit
and talk. Otherwise, all what you got left, would be memories of a better older
past...
Four New Coronavirus Cases in Lebanon
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
Four individuals have tested positive for the novel coronavirus COVID-19 on
Monday, raising Lebanon’s cases to 677, the Health Ministry announced. The
latest tally of the people recovering from the virus rose to 102, according to
the National News Agency. Coronavirus-related deaths remain stable at 21. On
Sunday, Interior Minister Mohammed Fahmi revised the duration of the nighttime
coronavirus curfew and essential shop closure, saying the curfew will now begin
at 8pm instead of 7pm. It will still end at 5am.
Lebanese protesters defy virus curfew and take to the
streets
Najia Houssari/Arab News/April 21, 2020
Only four new cases, health minister hints at May 10 as decision day for
restrictions on movement
BEIRUT: Protesters in Lebanon have defied curfews and lockdowns and taken to the
streets again — some demanding permission to reopen their shuttered businesses,
others complaining that the pandemic had worsened their already-desperate
financial plight. Barbers and other shop owners held a sit-in in Tripoli, asking
the government to allow them to open their shops while adopting precautionary
measures. Protests also erupted in Beirut as young people from Tarik Al-Jadida
organized a motorcycle convoy to the home of Prime Minister Hassan Diab,
chanting slogans against the increase in prices and the deterioration in living
conditions. Veteran activists from last year’s unrest threatened to “protest in
front of homes of politicians, bankers and owners of money exchange offices,”
and said “the revolution will show no mercy for the corrupt.” The General
Confederation of Lebanese Workers (CGTL), the highest representative body for
workers in Lebanon, warned that “neither wealth nor banks, movable, or immovable
property, would be spared from people’s wrath.” The CGTL said it held “the
political and financial authorities responsible for the current situation due to
bad management, corruption and complicity in everything that led to the crisis.”
Lebanon recorded only four more virus cases on Monday, raising the total to 677,
and Health Minister Hamad Hassan hinted at a deadline for the movement
restrictions.
“May 10 might be the right time to take a decision … in light of the decrease in
daily recorded cases,” he said. “May 15 might be the beginning of a gradual
return to schools and universities in Lebanon.”
Hasan: Coronavirus Crisis Nearing Its End in Lebanon
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
The toughest part of the ordeal “has passed” and the coronavirus crisis is
“nearing its end in Lebanon,” Health Minister Hamad Hasan said on Monday. “We
are taking delicate steps to reach a clearer stage that would allow for several
measures amid the difficult economic situation,” Hasan added in remarks to MTV,
in reference to the possible easing of the lockdown measures.As for the date of
ending the so-called state of general mobilization, the minister said it is up
to Cabinet to take the decision.
“We as a Health Ministry will increase the number of tests to more than 2,000
tests per day in order to evaluate the virus' epidemiological situation in
Lebanon,” he added. Lebanon recorded only one coronavirus case on Sunday and
four on Monday, which raises the country's total to 677.
The disease has killed 21 people in Lebanon while more than 100 have recovered.
29 Victims to Take Part in STL Proceedings against Ayyash
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen has granted the
status of victim participating in the proceedings (VPP) to 29 of 33 victims who
applied to participate in the proceedings in the Prosecutor v. Ayyash case
(STL-18-10), the STL said on Monday.
The Ayyash case relates to the three attacks against Marwan Hamadeh, Georges
Hawi and Elias Murr, which occurred in Lebanon on 1 October 2004, 21 June 2005
and 12 July 2005 respectively. Among the thirty-three victims' applications
transmitted to him by the Victims’ Participation Unit (VPU), Judge Fransen
rejected as incomplete four applications. The Pre-Trial Judge indicated that
this does not prevent the four applicants from subsequently providing additional
information so that their applications be reassessed, the STL said in a
statement.
As to the legal representation, Fransen ordered that the victims be represented
within three distinct groups, each relating to one of the three attacks.
According to the Tribunal's Rules, the Registrar, after consulting the VPU, will
now designate counsel to represent the VPP. The Pre-Trial Judge instructed the
Registrar to designate one legal representative for each group gathering the
victims of each attack. Although Fransen's decision is public, the names and
identities of the victims are confidential at this stage. Victims of any of the
three attacks in the Ayyash case, who have not yet applied to participate in the
proceedings but intend to do so, should contact the VPU in that regard, the STL
said in its statement. The STL has tried Ayyash and three other Hizbullah
operatives in absentia over the 2005 murder of ex-PM Rafik Hariri and his
companions. The verdicts are expected later this year.
Hizbullah has dismissed the court as a political scheme against it and vowed
that the accused will never be found.
Poland Detains Lebanese Man Suspected of 'Planning Attacks'
Naharnet/Agence France Presse//April 21, 2020
Poland's special services said Monday they had detained a Lebanese citizen with
suspected ties to the Islamic State group who allegedly planned to launch
attacks in the country. The man, whose identity was not made public, was
detained on April 16 after being deemed "a real threat to Polish internal
security and to our country's citizens," according to Stanislaw Zaryn, spokesman
for Poland's special services. The suspect "was planning to set up a network in
Poland and elsewhere in the EU that would carry out terror attacks in Western
European countries," Zaryn said in a statement.
He had "family ties to terrorists belonging to the so-called Islamic State who
died in battle against the coalition forces in Syria and Iraq," the statement
added. The man had apparently been in frequent touch via the internet with the
Islamic State and other individuals linked to the group in EU member countries
while he was staying in Poland. The individual, who is now in a detention center
for foreigners in eastern Poland, is also alleged to have provided financial
support to Islamic State members in Syria.
Israeli Jets Stage Mock Raids, Overfly Many Regions
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
Israeli warplanes on Monday staged mock raids at medium altitude over the
southern Lebanese regions of Nabatiyeh and Iqlim al-Tuffah, the National News
Agency said. Israeli jets also overflew Metn, Rashaya and Western Bekaa at
medium altitude and Hasbaya , al-Orqoub, Mount Hermon and the occupied Shebaa
Farms at low altitude, NNA said. Israel has intensified its overflights in
Lebanon's airspace in recent days. On Saturday, it accused Hizbullah of
"provocative" activity along the Lebanese-Israeli frontier and said it would
complain to the U.N. Security Council. In a statement, Israeli Foreign Minister
Israel Katz accused Hizbullah of multiple attempts to breach the border Friday
night. He said Israel "thoroughly condemns" the incident and expects the
Lebanese government to prevent such threats. On Friday night, the Israeli
military fired flares along the volatile frontier after signs of a possible
border breach. It said it later found damage to its security fence, just inside
Israeli territory, in three locations. Israel and Hizbullah fought a month-long
war in 2006 that ended in a stalemate. Under a U.N.-brokered truce, Hizbullah is
barred from conducting military activity along the frontier. There was no
immediate comment from Hizbullah, but in recent days, both Hizbullah and the
Lebanese government have accused Israel of violating Lebanese airspace. Earlier
this week, Hizbullah said an Israeli drone destroyed one of its vehicles in
neighboring Syria near the Lebanese border, and Lebanon has reported Israeli
drones flying over the capital Beirut. Lebanese soldiers also faced off with
Israeli troops along the frontier.
Bassil Warns against Haircut, State Assets Sale, Urges Funds Recovery
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
Free Patriotic Movement chief Jebran Bassil on Monday noted that the country can
overcome its financial deficit without “touching bank deposits or selling the
state's assets.” “We are confident that Lebanon can overcome the huge financial
deficit without touching bank deposits or selling the state's assets,” Bassil
said after a meeting for the Strong Lebanon parliamentary bloc. “We won't accept
any salvation solution that doesn't begin with the recovery of granted, stolen
and overseas transferred funds,” Bassil stressed. Pointing out that the economic
and financial policies of the past 30 years “have led us into a collapse,” the
FPM chief said there is “a preemptive attack to prevent change and protect the
corrupts.” “These are the signs of the coming battle that they are threatening
the Lebanese with instead of closing ranks for salvation,” Bassil added,
referring to political rivals.
Calling on the government to “lay out its rescue plan as soon as possible,”
Bassil said Lebanon should not move from “financial engineering” operations to
“real estate engineering” tactics.
“If the state has erred, it has erred through individuals who bear the
responsibility, and the solution lies in holding them accountable and not in
selling the state's properties,” he added. “We have determined that $3.7 billion
were withdrawn from the banking system in January and February 2020 of the
category of deposits that exceed $1 million and a large part of them was sent
abroad,” Bassil went on to say, revealing that his bloc will also file a lawsuit
over “the funds that were smuggled around the October 17 period.” He added: “We
have called for approving a capital control law, starting by the issue of
smuggled funds, and today we reiterate our call. If it does not get passed in
Cabinet and parliament in a consensual way, we will submit it as a draft law.”
And hoping that seven urgent bills submitted by the bloc will be approved in
Tuesday's legislative session, Bassil warned that “the priority today is not for
a general amnesty law.”
“The issue of prison overcrowding should be resolved through special pardons or
a very limited general amnesty,” he suggested.
Ex-Mufti Says Islam Forbids Seizing People’s Deposits in
Banks
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
Former Grand Sunni Mufti of the Republic Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani warned
on Monday against seizing part of of people’s life savings in banks, saying it
is “prohibited” in Islam. “The Islamic legal pronouncement regarding deducting
part of people’s savings in Lebanese banks is forbidden. Seizing people’s money
is unlawful, and God Almighty knows best,” said Qabbani. The ex-mufti said that
“banks and the Lebanese State owe it to citizens who have entrusted them with
their lifelong savings and money. The state is obliged to pay its debts to these
people before paying any of its foreign debt or of its direct debt to banks.”The
ex-mufti’s remarks came amid talks the government is weighing the potential of a
haircut. Lebanese banks have been rationing deposit withdrawals and external
transfers. Lebanon has been grappling with an unprecedented economic and
financial crisis triggered by mismanagement, corruption and squandering of
public funds. The outbreak of the novel COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic has added
to Lebanon’s crises.
Traffic to Be Diverted During Legislative Sessions at UNESCO
Naharnet/April 21, 2020
A series of measures and traffic directives will be taken during the
Parliament’s two-day legislative sessions to be held this week exceptionally at
Beirut’s UNESCO Palace, the Internal Security Forces Directorate said in a
statement on Monday. The ISF said in its statement that several roads around the
area will remain closed until the end of the sessions. The Parliament will hold
its sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday in its first convention since it suspended
its activities over the outbreak of the coronavirus.
The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News
published on April 21-22/2020
Canada Killing: Rare Precedents
Agence France Presse/April 21, 2020
The killing which left at least 16 dead in Canada at the weekend is the worst of
its kind in the history of the country, which is largely free of major violence.
Some rare precedents in recent years:
- 1989: First mass killing -
Before this weekend's attack, the worst ever dates back to December 6, 1989,
when a gunman murdered 14 female students at Montreal's Ecole Polytechnique
before killing himself. It was at the time the worst mass killing and the first
such targeting of women in the country's history.
- 2018 car ramming: 10 dead -
On April 23, 2018, eight women and two men are killed in Toronto by a
25-year-old man with an apparent grudge against women who drives into them on a
busy street.
- 2017 mosque killing: six dead -
On January 29, 2017, a 27-year-old student with nationalist sympathies carries
out a shooting on a Quebec mosque after evening prayers that leaves six
worshipers dead and five seriously wounded.
- 2018 shooting: four dead -
On August 10, 2018, two police officers are among four people killed in a
shooting in the eastern Canadian city of Fredericton, New Brunswick.
The 48-year-old gunman fired a rifle from the third floor of a low-rise
apartment building, killing two, before turning his gun on police officers
alerted to the scene by neighbors.
- 2016 school shooting: four dead -
On January 22, 2016 a 17-year-old high school student opens fire in a school in
a small aboriginal community in Saskatchewan western Canada, shooting dead two
brothers and two trainee teachers and wounding seven others. It is Canada's
worst school shooting in a quarter of a century.
- 2014 police shooting: three killed -
On June 4, 2014 three officers from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are killed
in an attack in the street of Moncton, the main city in New Brunswick.
The 24-year-old killer, caught after a 30-hour manhunt, is sentenced to 75 years
behind bars, the longest sentence imposed in recent Canadian history since the
death penalty was abolished.
Israel's Netanyahu, Gantz agree emergency unity government
Agecies/Arab News/April 21, 2020
JERUSALEM: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his centrist election
rival Benny Gantz signed an agreement on Monday to form an emergency coalition
government that would end a year of political deadlock. Netanyahu's right-wing
Likud and Gantz's Blue and White party issued a joint statement saying they had
clinched a unity deal, which follows elections in April and September 2019 and
on March 2 in which neither won a governing majority in parliament. Official
details of the power-sharing deal were not immediately disclosed, but a source
in Blue and White said the two had agreed Netanyahu would remain prime minister
for a set period until Gantz takes over in October 2021.Until then, Gantz, a
former armed forces chief, will serve as defence minister and several of his
political allies, including two members of Israel's Labour Party, will receive
ministerial portfolios as well.
During the negotiations the parties cited a number of sticking points, including
the planned annexation of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank where
Palestinians seek a state, and setting a nomination process for judges. The
Palestinians condemned the formation of a new Israeli "annexation" government,
saying the agreement would wreck hopes of peace. "The formation of an Israeli
annexation government means ending the two-state solution and the dismantling of
the rights of the people of Palestine," Palestinian prime minister Mohammed
Shtayyeh tweeted.
Wearing face masks, Syria’s Assad and Iran’s Zarif condemn West at Damascus
meeting
Agecies/Arab News/April 21, 2020
AMMAN: Syrian President Bashar Assad and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javid
Zarif wore face masks on Monday for their meeting in Damascus where they said
the West was exploiting the coronavirus pandemic for political ends, state media
said.
State media said Assad conveyed condolences to Iran, where more than 5,200
people have died from the disease. Echoing comments by Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani, Zarif, who was also wearing gloves, was quoted as saying the US
administration showed its “inhumane reality” by its refusal to lift sanctions on
Syria and Iran when coronavirus was spreading around the world. Assad said the
handling of the crisis showed the West’s moral failure. USSecretary of State
Mike Pompeo has held out the possibility that the United States may consider
easing sanctions on Iran and other nations to help fight the epidemic but given
no concrete sign it plans to do so. Speaking last month, Pompeo said
humanitarian supplies were exempt from sanctions Washington reimposed on Tehran
after President Donald Trump abandoned Iran’s 2015 multilateral deal to limit
its nuclear program.
The United States has also ratcheted up sanctions on Syria since the uprising
against Assad began in March 2001. The State Department says it is “trying to
deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against
civilians.”
The Syrian government says it has 39 confirmed cases of coronavirus and three
dead. Medics and witnesses say there are many more. Officials, who deny any
cover-up, have imposed a lockdown and measures including a night-time curfew to
stem the pandemic.
The presence of thousands of Iranian militias fighting alongside Assad’s forces
in Syria and Iranian pilgrims have been cited by some medics and humanitarian
workers as a main source of the contagion in Syria.
Erdogan accuses Assad regime of violating Idlib cease-fire
Agecies//Arab News/April 21, 2020
Erdogan said the Syrian regime was using the coronavirus outbreak as an
opportunity to ramp up violence in Idlib, and added that Turkey would not allow
any “dark groups” in the region to violate the cease-fire either
ISTANBUL: Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday that the Syrian regime
was violating a cease-fire in the northwestern Idlib region, warning that
Damascus would suffer “heavy losses” if it persisted. Turkey and Russia, which
back opposing sides in Syria’s war, agreed on March 5 to halt hostilities in
northwestern Syria after an escalation of clashes there displaced nearly a
million people and brought the two sides close to confrontation. Speaking in
Istanbul after a Cabinet meeting, Erdogan said the Syrian regime was using the
coronavirus outbreak as an opportunity to ramp up violence in Idlib, and added
that Turkey would not allow any “dark groups” in the region to violate the
cease-fire either. Separately, Syria’s Kurds set up a specialized hospital for
coronavirus cases, the Kurdish Red Crescent said Monday, after the first
COVID-19 death was reported in the northeastern region.
The United Nations on Friday said a man aged in his fifties had on April 2
become the first fatality from COVID-19 in northeast Syria. In a region
suffering from a lack of medical supplies, the news further raised fears of a
breakout, including in its thronging camps for the displaced. Kurdish Red
Crescent co-director Sherwan Bery said a new 120-bed facility was now ready to
welcome any moderate cases of the virus around 10 km outside the city of Hasakah.
The hospital “is to just focus on the COVID-19 infection cases” and keep them
all in the same place instead of across different hospitals, he said.
The idea is “to not spread contamination to other areas,” Bery said. AFP
journalists saw a large ward containing dozens of beds spaced out several meters
apart, with tall oxygen tanks by their side. “We are preparing for the moderate
cases,” Bery said, but efforts were also ongoing to set up an intensive care
unit for severe cases, there or in another location.
U.S. Benchmark WTI Oil Collapses to $0.01/Barrel
Naharnet/Agence France Presse//April 21, 2020
The U.S. benchmark crude oil price collapsed on Monday, falling to one cent a
barrel amid an epic supply glut caused largely by the coronavirus pandemic's hit
to demand. After beating the record low multiple times, West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) for May delivery continued to sink to the unheard of price of a penny a
barrel, before inching up to $0.27 at about 1815 GMT in New York. Sellers of the
May contract have just one more day to find buyers, but with storage in short
supply, they are struggling to find takers. The WTI contract for June delivery
is trading at a still low $22 a barrel.
France Reaches 'Painful' Landmark of 20,000 Virus Dead
Naharnet/Agence France Presse//April 21, 2020
France on Monday announced it had become the fourth country worldwide to
register over 20,000 deaths from the novel coronavirus, after recording 547 new
fatalities in the epidemic."Tonight, our country has passed a barrier that is
symbolic and particularly painful," top health official Jerome Salomon told
reporters. He announced that the country's total death toll was 20,265, while
welcoming new falls in the numbers in hospital and intensive care. Salomon noted
that the coronavirus death toll was now was well above the 14,000 people who
died in France's worst recent flu epidemic and even topped the 19,000 killed by
the 2003 heatwave. France is the fourth country to record more than 20,000
deaths, following the United States -- by far the worst affected worldwide --
Italy and Spain. Its death toll includes 12,513 people who died in hospital and
7,752 people who lost their lives in old people's homes and other nursing homes.
But Salomon also welcomed data indicating that a person with COVID-19 in France
was now infecting on average fewer than one other person, as opposed to three
before the country went into lockdown more than a month ago. "This is how we
will manage to put the brakes on the epidemic," he said. The number of people in
intensive care infected with COVID-19 fell for the 12th day in a row, by 61
patients to 5,863.
"The fall... is being confirmed but it remains very slight," said Salomon.
Meanwhile the number of patients in hospital fell by 26 -- the sixth successive
daily decrease -- to 30,584.
- 'Collective immunity low' -
France has been in lockdown since March 17 in a bid to slow the spread of the
epidemic. But President Emmanuel Macron announced last week that the lockdown
could begin to be eased from May 11.
Schools could gradually reopen then but cafes, cinemas and cultural venues would
remain closed, and there could be no summer festivals until mid-July at the
earliest. Unlike some European countries, France has been giving daily tolls of
deaths in nursing homes. In one old people's home in Mars-la-Tour in the
northeastern Moselle region, 22 of 51 residents out died from COVID-19 over the
last two weeks, its director said.
In a press conference on Sunday, Prime Minister Edouard Philippe warned it would
take a long time to defeat the epidemic, emphasizing the initial easing would
only be partial.
"Our life from May 11 will not be like our life before, not immediately, and
probably not for a long time," he said. Salomon said data indicated less than 10
percent of the population in France had been infected with the virus, noting
this meant there was going to be no herd immunity in the country on May 11. "The
levels of immunity are probably higher in the areas that have been worst
affected," he said. "The collective immunity in France is low, as many other
countries are indicating as well." France has 114,657 confirmed cases, but
officials say the real figure is much higher due to a lack of testing.
The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources
published on
April 21-22/2020
Oil: It is all about storage
Cornelia Meyer/Arab News/April 21/2020
The West Texas intermediate (WTI), also known as the Texas light sweet, fell to
historic lows since markets opened in Asia. By mid-afternoon, WTI had fallen by
39.52 percent to $11.05 per barrel. Brent had fallen by 6.8 percent to $26.17
during the same time period.
This differential can be explained by the fact that in North America storage is
filling up fast. Some shale producers offer a physical barrel at the rock-bottom
price of $2; paying off-takers for a barrel they purchase may become reality.
Brent is more fungible and can be used by countries such as China, India and
Korea to fill up their strategic reserves at ultra-low prices. However, those
storage facilities will fill up soon too.
The fact that the May contracts trade substantially lower than later durations
is indicative of the current storage crisis and the expectation that the
situation will relax once the OPEC+ deal with G20 countries, which is expected
to take out a combined 15 million barrels per day (bpd), comes into force on May
1. The OPEC+ part of the deal constitutes the only real production cuts. The G20
part is achieved by natural attrition due to falling demand.
Last week, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published a chilling demand
outlook in its April report. Oil demand will go down by 9.3 million bpd for the
year, 29 million bpd in April, 26 million bpd in May and 15 million bpd in June.
The OPEC+ production cuts will clearly not be sufficient to balance the market
in the face of such historic demand destruction. What they will do, however, is
flatten the curve and allow storage to build more gradually, notwithstanding the
fact that the world is running out of storage capacity nonetheless.
There are a few mitigating factors. The IEA points out in its report that the
OPEC+ cuts are in reality more in the magnitude of 10.7 million bpd than 9.7
million bpd because of the timelines and baselines from which they were
calculated.
The agency also predicts that output in the US and Canada will fall by 3.5
million bpd at current low-price levels.
The Trump administration is working on plans to support its oil industry,
considering even paying companies to leave barrels in the ground. This is
important for two reasons. Firstly, we need to give the shale industry a way to
come back once the crisis is over. Secondly, shale producers have a relatively
high cost base, many of them also high leverage. Allowing too many bankruptcies
in this space would have a devastating effect on some of their lenders.
Goldman Sachs released its price forecasts, which ranged between $33 and $45.55
per barrel from the second to the fourth quarter. They admitted to an upside
risk if the recovery was steep and cash-strapped producers struggled to ramp up
production as well as bringing back shut-in fields.
This tallies with the views of the IEA, which does not forecast prices but
estimates that we could see a demand overhang in the second half of 2020,
pointing out that this would lead to a welcome reduction in stocks.
What happened overnight in Asia was yet another sign of just how tense the
situation has become in the oil markets. The IEA’s Executive Director, Fatih
Birol, pointed out that demand destruction in 2020 will erase 10 years' worth of
global demand growth in one go.
What happened overnight in Asia was yet another sign of just how tense the
situation has become in the oil markets.
We should not lose sight of the fact that, depending on the shape and speed of
the recovery, we might see higher oil prices in future years, which would give
an inflationary impetus to any recovery.
Most international oil companies have slashed capital expenditure (capex). Even
Gulf Cooperation Council oil companies are reviewing their capex programs. In
all previous downturns, these national oil companies were the stalwarts
maintaining capex when everyone else cut. Some independents, especially if they
are highly levered high-cost producers, may never come back. Oil is a long-cycle
business, and a dollar invested today will produce a barrel anywhere between 18
months and 10 years, depending on geography and production methodology. This
means that we shall only then see the full impact and degree of the damage
inflicted on the sector by the pandemic.
*Cornelia Meyer is a business consultant, macro-economist and energy expert.
Twitter: @MeyerResources
Erdogan torn between two camps on Syria
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib/Arab News/April 21/2020
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu last Tuesday announced that Turkey’s
position on the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system it has bought has not
changed, and that it will be activated as planned. Meanwhile, President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has pleaded for the West’s help in Idlib as he faces the Assad
regime, which is supported by Russia and Iran.
For a while, Erdogan managed to maintain relations, however strained, with both
the US and Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other. However, now is the
time for Erdogan to choose a camp, otherwise he will lose on all fronts. If he
does not downgrade relations with Russia, he will not get the support he wants
from the West. If he keeps his relations with NATO without getting the required
support, Russia will view him not as an ally but as an adversary in a weak
position, and it will not give him a favorable deal on Syria.
Erdogan has an uncomfortable relationship, to say the least, with the West. His
mounting frustration with his Western partners led him to diversify his
alliances and cozy up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Erdogan’s tensions
with Europe and the US came at a time when Moscow rushed to support the
faltering Bashar Assad and change the balance of power in favor of the Syrian
dictator. Hence, Erdogan wanted to hedge his bets and garner a better bargaining
position with the US and the West.
The refugee situation put a lot of pressure on Erdogan domestically, especially
with the worsening economic situation. He has always accused the Europeans of
not doing enough. He said that refugees from Syria have cost his country $40
billion and Europe has not fulfilled its commitments to Turkey; namely granting
Turkish citizens visa-free travel to Europe and an enhanced EU-Turkish customs
union. On the other hand, the Europeans accused Erdogan of blackmailing them and
using vulnerable refugees as a negotiating card instead of forging a partnership
with Europe in order to see how to accommodate them. One of his alleged reasons
for last October’s incursion in northeastern Syria, to the east of the
Euphrates, was to relocate the refugees back to their own country, though in
other people’s homes.
In the fight against Daesh, the US relied heavily on the Kurds, which led to
their empowerment. This was an alarming sign for Erdogan, who saw in that a
factor that could help mobilize the Kurds at home, especially with the People’s
Protection Units’ (YPG) connections to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). He
wanted to create some balance and not be too dependent on the US.
As he saw the Americans getting too close to the Kurds, Erdogan went ahead and
bought the S-400 system from the Russians. Though his argument was that American
missiles came with too many conditions, no proper financing facilities and no
technology transfer, the Russian missiles were off the shelf and also included
no technology transfer. The transaction also led the US Congress to block
Turkey’s involvement in the F-35 fighter jet project.
However, the purchase of the S-400 had a more strategic value than a technical
one. To add to it, Erdogan joined Russia in the Astana process, which is a
parallel and competing track to the Geneva process aimed at negotiating a peace
settlement in Syria. From Erdogan’s perspective (not being sure of his Western
allies’ commitment to his project in Syria), he preferred to hedge his bets and
open a channel with Moscow. The shooting down of a Russian jet in 2015 after it
entered Turkish airspace was expected to trigger a clash, but Erdogan used it
for a rapprochement with Putin.
Erdogan’s behavior angered the US, especially his incursion into northeast
Syria. Though the operation was conducted with the tacit blessing of the Trump
administration and after the withdrawal of American troops, it led to an angry
wave against Turkey in the US. Recognition of the Armenian genocide — a
resolution that had been adjourned for a long time — received the backing of
both chambers of Congress. Sen. Lindsey Graham called for Turkey to be
sanctioned and suspended from NATO if it attacked the Kurds.
Too close a relationship with Putin might mean accepting Assad as the leader of
Syria indefinitely.
However, too close a relationship with Putin might mean accepting Assad as the
leader of Syria indefinitely. This would greatly alter the image of Erdogan in
the Arab world. He has tried to portray himself as a leader of the Sunni Muslim
world by advocating issues such as Syria and Palestine. On the other hand, if he
retreats from facing Assad, he will look like a loser and will be opening the
door for a wave of attacks from his domestic opponents, especially given that
Turkish intervention in Syria has been framed as an integral part of national
security.
In a March congressional hearing, “limited” US assistance to Turkey was advised,
including the deployment of Patriot missile batteries to enable its NATO ally to
create a no-fly zone. However, Turkey will not be able to face Assad, Russia and
Iran alone. Erdogan will need NATO’s help to push back against the Syrian
regime’s forces. If he does not get that kind of support, he will have to
compromise and accommodate Assad and Russia.
Though Turkey cannot decide the fate of Syria, it can decide which camp will
decide the country’s fate. The question remains which side Erdogan will choose.
Most likely it will be whoever gives him a better deal.
*Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on
lobbying. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Exeter and is an
affiliated scholar with the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and
International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.
Young people at great risk from virus fallout
Chris Doyle//Arab News/April 21/2020
French healthare workers with a coronavirus patient at Strasbourg University
hospital on March 16, 2020. (Reuters)
At the outset, the received wisdom was that the coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
was an old person killer. Young people would be spared the ravages of this
pestilence. Anyone in excess of seven decades was especially vulnerable.
Our knowledge of this virus has since grown. No longer is it just some flu-like
epidemic, but a highly contagious viral pandemic that has (officially) hit all
but 15 countries. The global public needs to forget some of these early
assumptions.
Perfectly fit and healthy young people have tragically died from the virus. Your
birth date offers far from total protection, so we all must take the threat
seriously. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention made a first analysis
that showed that, of those hospitalized in the US, 38 percent of COVID-19
patients were under 55, while 20 percent were between the ages 20 of 44.
But underneath this is another misleading assumption: It is not the elderly who
will pay the heaviest price for this pandemic, it is the young. Perhaps the
young may not lose their lives in so great numbers as the 70-plus age group, but
they will have to bury their loved ones, or have them buried on their behalf in
some anonymous ceremony nobody can attend. They will have to handle the loss and
the grief.
Our mental health is and will continue to be under massive pressure. Studies
demonstrated that about 10 to 29 percent of people in quarantine during the 2003
SARS outbreak suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. The World Health
Organization has even published a guide to safeguarding your mental health
during the outbreak. And who knows how many more pandemics we may face in the
decades to come? Is this going to become a more regular feature of our lives,
alongside challenges from antibiotic-resistant bacteria and the impact of
climate change?
Children are not immune. They are suffering from acute anxiety and parents
cannot shield them from the news of what is going on outside their homes.
Isolation, grief and fear will haunt them. They may miss out on months of vital
schooling, even exams. All this will disrupt the vital process of learning
social skills and making friends. Schools are closed and many cannot substitute
this with online alternatives. What about families who do not have computers or
sufficient bandwidth. In any event, this is no substitute to face-to-face
learning. But also imagine being stuck in a house with abusive parents or one
where domestic violence is escalating. Such abuse traumatizes children for
decades.
However, there are unexpected upsides. The US has just experienced its first
March since 2002 without a school shooting. Hillary Clinton tweeted: “It
shouldn’t have taken a pandemic to make this possible.”
The economic depression this pandemic is producing will, of course, hit the
future of the younger generations. The International Monetary Fund has estimated
that the global economy will shrink by 3 percent in 2020. Unemployment is
escalating everywhere and we do not know how and when this will end. With
economies in freefall, the certainties of a comfortable upbringing will be
ripped up. Small businesses are going under, but big brand names are also
struggling, not least in the leisure and hospitality sector.
Few consider how the extra government spending will be paid for. Consider the
scale of the $2.2 trillion stimulus package in the US — it will saddle the
nation with debt for decades. But the US is not alone.
It is unlikely that we will ever return to life as it was on Jan. 1, 2020. In
all likelihood, this pandemic will impact how we run our lives in ways we cannot
yet predict. This may include our relationships with our governments and the
outside world. People may also have a different attitude to travel. Countries
will want to have greater domestic production of essential goods and more
self-reliance. Globalization may have fewer fans. The supporters of closed
borders may also win more plaudits and more votes. This will have a negative
impact on the more open and cosmopolitan world young people have tended to
aspire to. Dangerously, the pandemic has shown how vital international
cooperation is, given the shocking and debilitating collective effort.
In all likelihood, this pandemic will impact how we run our lives in ways we
cannot yet predict.
Maybe, while being stuck at home, some people will thrive and learn new skills.
An opportunity beckons and some are taking it. In Britain, one survey showed
that the under-35s’ favorite lockdown pastimes — aside from using social media —
are trying out new forms of exercise, reading books and playing board games.
Most parents would be thrilled to see their children reading more books.
A collective effort could mitigate all long-term negatives if we can learn the
lessons. Human arrogance has been well and truly burst, not least in Europe and
the US, which, at the end of February, seemed far less concerned than those in
Asia or the Middle East. People realize that we may have to take greater care of
our planet and not always dismiss things as scare stories and overreactions.
Perhaps we could all tap into the collective efforts so well exemplified by
health and front-line workers, who have kept people alive, our fridges stocked,
our parcels delivered and our services running.
*Chris Doyle is director of the London-based Council for Arab-British
Understanding. Twitter: @Doylech
The Next Iranian Revolution/Why Washington Should Seek
Regime Change in Tehran
Eric S. Edelman and Ray Takeyh/FDD/April 20/2020
“Regime change” is a toxic phrase in Washington. It conjures up images of the
Iraq war, with the United States trapped in a quagmire of its own making. That
is why those who favor a coercive U.S. approach to Iran are routinely charged
with secretly supporting regime change. In response, the accused almost always
deny it. They don’t want regime change, they insist: they just want the Islamic
Republic’s theocrats to change their behavior.
But no such transformation will ever take place, because the Iranian regime
remains a revolutionary movement that will never accommodate the United States.
That is why regime change is not a radical or reckless idea but the most
pragmatic and effective goal for U.S. policy toward Iran—indeed, it is the only
objective that has any chance of meaningfully reducing the Iranian threat.
Backing regime change emphatically does not mean advocating a military invasion
of Iran, but it does mean pushing for the United States to use every instrument
at its disposal to undermine Iran’s clerical state, including covert assistance
to dissidents. The United States cannot overthrow the Islamic Republic, but it
can contribute to conditions that would make such a demise possible. The regime
is weaker than many Western analysts believe; a campaign of external pressure
and internal resistance could conceivably topple it. Recent years have witnessed
explosions of broad-based public opposition to the regime. Iranians are hungry
for better leadership. The question for Washington should be not whether to
embrace regime change but how to help the Iranian people achieve it.
We Are Never Ever Getting Together
For the past 40 years, almost every U.S. president has tried to reach some kind
of accommodation with Iran. Ronald Reagan’s attempt led him to the greatest
scandal of his presidency, when he traded arms for Americans held hostage in
Lebanon by the Iranian-backed militia Hezbollah. Bill Clinton unsuccessfully
sought to develop a road map for détente with Tehran. George W. Bush came into
office displaying moral contempt for the clerical autocracy, only to have his
administration spend a considerable amount of time talking to Iran’s leaders
about the future of Afghanistan and Iraq. And then came Barack Obama, whose
desperation to make a deal with Tehran produced an agreement that granted Iran
sanctions relief and paved its path to the bomb.
In 2018, President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of that deal and
imposed crippling sanctions on Iran that went beyond any that had come before.
Trump has repeatedly denounced the regime, and earlier this year, he ordered the
killing of Qasem Soleimani, the famed commander of the elite Quds Force, a unit
of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But for all this surface
antagonism, the internal logic of the Trump administration’s approach resembles
that of its predecessors: inflict pain on Iran in order to gain leverage in
prospective negotiations. Trump still wants to make a deal—and in fact, he is
the first U.S. president to propose meeting with Iranian leaders.
All these administrations have failed to understand that the Iranian regime
remains, at heart, a revolutionary organization. Once in power, revolutionaries
often yield to the temptations of moderation and pragmatism. The requirements of
actually running a government and addressing domestic concerns eventually lead
them to adapt to the prevailing international order. But four decades after its
birth, the Islamic Republic continues to avoid that fate. Its elites still cling
to the revolution’s precepts even when they prove self-defeating. That is
because the revolution’s leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, did not rely on
secular principles; he made religion his governing creed. Khomeini’s ideology
rested on a politicized and radicalized version of Shiite Islam, one that often
contradicts long-standing traditions of the faith. But for its most dedicated
core of supporters, the Iranian theocracy remains an important experiment for
realizing God’s will on earth. Led by Khomeini’s successor, Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei, these true believers retain control of the most powerful branches of
Iran’s government and have successfully resisted the reformist efforts of
various presidents and parliaments.
For Khomeini and his disciples, the continued vitality of their revolution
mandated its relentless export. This was to be a revolution without borders; its
appeal would not be limited by cultural differences or diverging national
sensibilities within the Muslim world. Khamenei has faithfully carried out that
mission, backing proxy militias throughout the Middle East with the goal of
advancing Iranian-style Islamism and undermining the U.S.-backed regional
security order. In the mullahs’ preferred narrative, the imperialist United
States seeks to exploit the region’s resources for the aggrandizement of the
industrial West. Achieving that goal requires Washington to subjugate the Muslim
world by backing corrupt Arab monarchies and an illegitimate Zionist entity. The
Iranian regime sees resisting that American dominance as a divine imperative.
That is why the Islamic Republic will never evolve into a responsible regional
stakeholder. It will never permit genuine political contestation or allow an
organized opposition to take shape. It will never abandon its nuclear ambitions
for the sake of commerce. And it will never recognize any U.S. interests in the
Middle East as legitimate. The revolutionaries will never give up their
revolution.
Carpe Diem
Since there is no prospect of a sustainable accommodation with the theocrats,
the only U.S. policy that makes sense is to seek regime change—that is, to do
everything possible to weaken the government and strengthen those inside Iran
who oppose it. The aim should be to help the large number of Iranians who want
to restore the original promise of the 1979 revolution that overthrew the shah—a
movement that drew support from a broad base of groups, including liberal and
pro-democratic ones, before it was hijacked by Khomeini and his Islamist
faction. The United States should be modest about its capabilities and
understand that it cannot always shape events. But given the theocracy’s
domestic vulnerabilities, Washington can still carve out a considerable role in
attenuating the regime’s power. The United States cannot choose the precise
mechanics of how the regime might fall or the exact contours of what would
replace it. But it can exercise a good deal of influence on both.
Today, the Islamic Republic is at an impasse. The regime faces a disaffected
populace that is losing its sense of fear and becoming more willing to confront
the government’s security services on the streets. No one is sure what a
post-theocratic future would look like, but an increasing number of Iranians
seem willing to find out. And despite the revolution’s spirit of intransigence,
postrevolutionary Iran has not been without its share of reformers. By the early
1990s, an eclectic group of politicians, clerics, and intellectuals sought to
reconcile faith and freedom. Recognizing that a rigid definition of religious
governance would threaten the entire system, the reformers wanted to create a
new national compact that would preserve Iran’s Islamic traditions and also
uphold democratic values. The reform movement captured both the presidency and
the parliament in the late 1990s but was thwarted by Khamenei and the
hard-liners. Still, courageous movement leaders of that era, such as Abdollah
Nouri, Mostafa Tajzadeh, and Saeed Hajjarian, continue to struggle within Iran
for an accountable government.
Iranians are losing their sense of fear and becoming more willing to confront
the government’s security services on the streets.
Their views found potent expression during the so-called Green Movement of 2009,
which saw Iranians demonstrating in support of reformist figures running for
president that year and demanding good governance and the restoration of Iran’s
place in the international community. When it became clear that the regime had
rigged the outcome in order to guarantee the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
a conservative firebrand, the movement vastly expanded, capturing the national
imagination and bringing unprecedented numbers of people into the streets. The
regime had to resort to brute force to regain control. Today, more than a decade
later, the leading figures of the movement, the opposition candidate Mir Hossein
Mousavi and the dissident cleric Mehdi Karroubi, still languish under house
arrest.
The Green Movement may be a distant memory for the Western commentariat, but it
haunts the regime. In a speech he gave a few months after the crackdown,
Mohammad Ali Jafari, then the head of the IRGC, conceded that the protests had
brought the regime “to the border of overthrow.” In 2013, Khamenei told an
audience of university students that the Green Movement had posed “a great
challenge” and brought the government to “the edge of the cliff.” After the
uprising, the regime decided that it could no longer tolerate reformers in its
midst. In a remarkable act of self-sabotage, the regime purged itself of some of
the country’s most popular politicians.
In the past two years, Iran has been rocked by the most serious demonstrations
since the 1979 revolution, outstripping even the Green Movement. Compared with
earlier episodes of mass dissent, today’s protests pose a far greater threat to
the theocracy, because they represent a revolt of the working classes and the
poor, which have accounted for the majority of demonstrators in recent years.
During earlier protests, the regime discounted the participation of university
students (whom the mullahs saw as the spoiled offspring of the wealthy classes)
and middle-class protesters (who the clerics believed were motivated less by
ideological opposition than by a desire for Western-style material comforts).
But the clerics saw the poor as the regime’s backbone, tied to the theocracy by
piety and patronage.
That bond has weakened, however, owing to Iran’s economic collapse. Inflation
and unemployment are skyrocketing. Oil exports, which were at 2.5 million
barrels a day prior to the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, have now
fallen to as little as 248,000 barrels a day. This has forced the regime to cut
fuel subsidies, and the loss of oil income has made it hard for the state to
meet its pension obligations and maintain its affordable-housing programs. With
the welfare state under pressure, appeals for sacrifice from corrupt mullahs
ring hollow. “Clerics with capital, give us our money back!” was a popular chant
at protests last year.
But working-class and poor demonstrators have gone beyond expressing economic
grievances and have embraced political slogans with an alacrity that has shocked
the regime. In December 2017, for example, protests engulfed Iran after the
prices of basic goods soared. Marchers in major cities openly chanted “Death to
Khamenei!” and “The clerics should get lost.” The demonstrations faded after the
regime unleashed its security forces. But last November, a sudden increase in
fuel prices provoked riots in hundreds of cities; some 1,500 people died at the
hands of the police and security forces. This time, the demonstrators did not
just call for the death of their leaders; they also decried Iran’s involvement
in conflicts elsewhere. (“Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran!” “Leave
Syria, think about us!”) Even as the regime condemned American imperialism,
Iran’s leaders always assumed that their own imperial projects would burnish
their legitimacy. But it appears that many Iranians no longer want to waste
their resources on Arab civil wars.
Marchers in major cities openly chanted “Death to Khamenei!” and “The clerics
should get lost.”
In January, after the U.S. drone strike that killed Soleimani, massive crowds of
mourners flooded the streets of Iran’s cities, and many believed that the attack
had united Iranians behind their regime. Just weeks later, however, the illusion
of solidarity was shattered by large-scale popular protests that erupted when
the government admitted, after days of official denials, that Iranian air
defenses—on high alert for U.S. incursions—had accidentally shot down a
Ukrainian civilian airliner departing Tehran’s airport, killing 176 people. Far
from rebounding to the mullahs’ advantage, the regime’s latest confrontation
with the United States reminded Iranians of the costs of their government’s
belligerence.
The government’s legitimacy took another hit with the outbreak of COVID-19. As
the novel coronavirus spread, the Islamic Republic not only failed to protect
the health and safety of its citizens but actively impeded their ability to
protect themselves by withholding information and hiding the extent of the
problem—a response that will diminish the regime’s credibility even further and
add fuel to the outrage and anger that have been building for years.
How Can I Help You?
Although Iran is brimming with dissidence, no coherent resistance movement has
emerged. Washington cannot create one, but by overtly weakening the regime and
covertly aiding forces inside Iran that can foment popular demands for change,
the United States can help the currently disconnected strands of opposition to
consolidate. Washington should seek to further drain Iran’s economy, invite
defections from the ranks of the regime’s enforcers, and surreptitiously enable
those who dare to challenge the regime. But it cannot go any further than that:
regime change itself—that is, the removal and replacement of the theocracy—must
be undertaken by the Iranians themselves.
Adopting the goal of regime change will not be terribly costly, but it will
require a stepped-up program of covert action to aid those elements within
Iranian civil society that are contesting the regime’s legitimacy. Chief among
those are professional syndicates, such as labor unions and teachers’ unions,
which have gone on strike to protest government policies and actions, and
student groups, which have organized protests on college campuses. Purged
reformers routinely write open letters protesting the regime’s abuses, and they
have continued to do so in the aftermath of the crackdown on demonstrations.
Last November, from under house arrest, the Green Movement leader Mousavi
published a statement on the website Kaleme.com in which he compared the
regime’s conduct to an infamous massacre conducted by the shah’s troops in
September 1978. Also in November, the reformist former president Mohammad
Khatami, whom the regime has tried to silence, denounced the crackdown, writing
on Instagram that “no government has the right to resort to force and oppression
in confronting protests.” These powerful messages were widely reported by
international media outlets and reposted on social media. But it is difficult to
assess how many Iranians were aware of them, since the government actively
blocks Internet access. That is why it is essential for the United States to
supply the regime’s critics and opponents with technology and software that they
can use to evade censorship, communicate with one another, and get their
messages out.
Such covert technical assistance is critical, but it is not the only way that
Washington can help foster opposition. Direct (but secret) financial support
must also play a role. Iranian trade unions should be a particular focus of U.S.
efforts. During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, strikes carried out by oil and
transportation workers were essential to paralyzing the shah’s regime. In recent
years, steelworkers, truckers, bus drivers, railway workers, teachers, and
sugarcane workers have called strikes to challenge the current regime. By
secretly channeling funds to groups that could carry out similar strikes, the
United States can further cripple Iran’s economy.
In addition to taking such covert steps, Washington should make adjustments to
its public diplomacy regarding Iran. U.S. officials should take every
opportunity to highlight the regime’s human rights abuses and to warn that
violators—especially those involved in the use of force to repress popular
protests—will be held accountable by the international community when there is a
new order in Iran. At the same time, Washington should stress that any member of
the Iranian regime who wishes to defect will be guaranteed sanctuary in the
United States. The CIA should establish a mechanism for contacting and
extracting all who wish to leave. Even a small number of defectors can sow
distrust in the system, forcing the security services to constantly look for
unreliable elements among its ranks and conduct periodic purges. This would
hamper operational efficiency by eliminating some cadres on whom the security
services rely and creating distrust and suspicion in the state’s apparatus of
repression.
Beyond such policies and official rhetoric, the United States must do more to
overcome the regime’s propaganda by making accurate information and honest
analysis available to the Iranian people. Currently, Washington spends $30
million a year on Farsi-language media outlets run by the U.S. Agency for Global
Media, including Radio Farda and Sedaye America, which offer news and
entertainment programming via radio, television, and the Internet. According to
the agency, this programming reaches nearly a quarter of all Iranian adults. The
U.S. government should augment that effort by openly funding radio and
television programming created by Iranian exiles living in the United States.
And although traditional forms of media are important, the U.S. government could
bring even more attention to the regime’s corruption and economic mismanagement
by using Instagram, Telegram, Twitter, and other social media platforms to
highlight specific instances of graft and name the regime insiders responsible
for them.
Under Pressure
Aiding dissidents inside Iran is only half the battle, however. To weaken the
regime’s grip on the country and create an opening for other forces to take
power, the United States must also expand the Trump administration’s highly
successful campaign of “maximum pressure” against the Iranian economy. Critics
of the Trump administration were quick to dismiss the plan, insisting that
unilateral sanctions would not do much to strain Iran’s finances. But they
overestimated the willingness of foreign corporations to risk their ability to
do business in the United States. Even though the governments of their home
countries have not sanctioned Iran, firms such as the French energy company
Total, the German manufacturing conglomerate Siemens, and the Danish shipping
giant Maersk have stayed out of Iran in order to avoid Washington’s sanctions.
Going forward, the United States should blacklist Iran’s entire financial
sector, pressure the global financial messaging platform SWIFT to expel all
remaining Iranian banks from its network, fully enforce all sanctions on Iran’s
non-oil exports (including petrochemicals), and require auditors who certify the
financial statements of any company doing business with Iran to adopt stiffer
due diligence measures.
The United States must also increase the price that Iran pays for its military
adventurism in the region. The strike against Soleimani was an important first
step toward directly imposing costs on Iran rather than merely targeting its
proxies. Iran’s meddling has already made it vulnerable to blowback in places
where its proxies have wreaked havoc. In Iraq in recent months, people have
taken to the streets in huge numbers to protest Tehran’s overweening influence.
Outrage over Iran’s long reach has also driven recent protests in Lebanon, where
many are fed up with Hezbollah, the militia and political group that Iran backs.
Washington should capitalize on Tehran’s failing fortunes in the region by
aiding the forces that are standing up to Iran—including by providing financial
support via covert means, if appropriate—and by using naval and air assets to
interdict the flow of Iranian military supplies to the regime’s proxies.
The need to intensify the pressure on Iran should also inform U.S. military
strategy and posture in the region. The United States should maintain a small
military presence in Syria to observe and obstruct Iranian efforts to convert
Syrian territory into a “land bridge” through which to supply its proxies. And
Washington should encourage Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
to cooperate on developing shared early warning systems and defenses against the
cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran would likely
deploy in any conflict with its neighbors. Steps such as these would further
weaken the Iranian regime by thwarting its bid for military dominance in the
region, neutralizing the value of some Iranian military investments, and
imposing additional costs on the country.
What The Critics Miss
There are many objections to a regime-change agenda. One is that U.S. assistance
to pro-democracy forces, human rights activists, and regime critics in Iran
would discredit them in the eyes of other Iranians. But surely, Iranian
dissidents themselves are the best judges of that risk; Washington should
identify the most promising recipients of U.S. aid and let them decide for
themselves whether to receive it. And it is worth noting that in all the
protests that Iran has witnessed in the past decade, the United States has never
been the subject of condemnation. Indeed, in 2009, many Green Movement
demonstrators called on Obama, in vain, to publicly embrace their cause. Even
Trump didn’t become a target of any street protests last year. And some of the
most viral Internet content to emerge from those protests were videos showing
demonstrators going out of their way to avoid walking on American flags that the
authorities had painted on the ground in public spaces in order to force people
to disrespect the United States by treading on its flag.
Other skeptics of regime change might object that the Algiers Accords of 1981,
which ended the crisis over the U.S. hostages that Iran seized in 1979,
obligates Washington to refrain from interfering in Tehran’s internal affairs.
The United States should publicly make clear that it no longer believes itself
to be bound by that agreement, which was negotiated under duress and which Iran
has repeatedly and egregiously violated by abducting and killing U.S. officials,
sponsoring proxy attacks on American forces, and supporting terrorist groups.
The era of arms control diplomacy between the United States and Iran has
essentially ended.
Some critics might contend that openly pursuing regime change would dash any
hope of restricting Iran’s nuclear program through negotiations. But that
assumes that there is the possibility of a reliable arms control agreement with
the current regime; there is not. The nuclear deal that Iran entered into with
the United States and other powers was fatally flawed: it did not proscribe the
domestic enrichment of uranium on Iran’s part or the development of advanced
centrifuges, and all its most important terms were saddled with sunset clauses.
And since the Trump administration pulled out of the agreement, Iran’s leaders
have made it clear that they will not negotiate a new deal or extend the
expiring restrictions of the existing one.
The truth is that the era of arms control diplomacy between the United States
and Iran has essentially ended. Still, to maintain international pressure and
congressional support for an aggressive policy, the United States should remain
open to negotiations even after it embraces regime change as a goal. For their
part, the Iranians might see virtue in engaging in talks with a hawkish
administration in the hope that doing so might persuade the administration to
abandon regime change as a specific objective.
Another common objection to a U.S. strategy of regime change in Iran is the
notion that any government that followed the theocracy would be even worse. Some
advocates of this view insist that a successful regime-change policy would lead
only to the rise of unsavory leaders from the ranks of the IRGC. In this
account, Iran would go from a belligerent theocracy to a fascist military
dictatorship. This argument wrongly assumes that the IRGC has carved out an
identity for itself separate from the cleric-led regime it serves. In reality,
the clerical oligarchs and the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards are
indivisible. They believe in the same ideology and confront different facets of
the same predicament: the mullahs anguish about why young people pay no
attention to their revolutionary exhortations; the IRGC’s generals face the
daunting task of sending conscripts drawn from the lower classes to their old
neighborhoods to beat up and shoot their protesting peers.
Finally, critics of a policy of regime change sometimes warn that if the Islamic
Republic fell, Iran would become a failed state along the lines of Iraq in the
aftermath of the U.S. invasion of 2003 or Libya in the years since the U.S.-led
intervention in 2011. But there are significant differences between Iran and
those countries. An Iranian state and polity have existed for thousands of
years: unlike Iraq and Libya, Iran is not an invention of European postcolonial
cartography. What is more, although ethnic tensions do exist in Iran and the
regime in Tehran does repress religious minorities, Iranian society is
overwhelmingly Shiite and not riven by the ethnic and sectarian divisions that
plague Iraq or the tribal factions that make Libya difficult to govern. Finally,
even under the theocracy, Iranian civil society has flourished, and it has not
been atomized as its counterparts were by the dictators who long ruled Iraq and
Libya.
Of course, those characteristics do not guarantee that Iran would develop into a
liberal democracy if the theocracy were to fall, and it is impossible to predict
with precision what would happen in the event of a revolution. The unrealized
hopes of the Arab Spring provide a strong cautionary example. But compared with
many Arab countries, Iran has a deep history of vibrant politics, an informed
civil society, a lively press, a creative intellectual scene, and a large and
literate middle class.
Indeed, the history of Iran since the beginning of the twentieth century is the
tale of a long struggle between people seeking freedom from monarchs and mullahs
determined to preserve the prerogatives of power. The constitutional revolution
of 1905 established the country’s first parliament, and in the years that
followed, feisty parliamentarians boldly imposed restraints on monarchs. Reza
Shah Pahlavi challenged that system after he came to power, in 1925, and
momentarily imposed his will on it. But after his abdication, in 1941, Iran
returned to a more pluralistic path, with prime ministers and parliaments that
once again mattered. In 1953, Prime Minster Mohammad Mosaddeq sparked a crisis
by moving to nationalize the oil industry; the coup that removed him from office
is often seen as a U.S.-British plot to prevent Iranian autonomy. In fact,
Mosaddeq was himself trying to derail Iran’s democratic evolution with his own
brand of autocracy, and his overthrow was mostly an Iranian initiative. And then
came a quarter of a century of dictatorship under the shah, Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, who was eventually overthrown in 1979 by a populist revolutionary
movement that contained many coalitions but whose main aim was to create a
representative government that was sensitive to Iran’s traditions.
Now it is the mullahs’ turn. In every decade of its existence, the theocratic
regime has faced a rebellion. The liberals were the first to object to the
mullahs’ power grab, in the 1980s. University students, always a political
vanguard in Iran, gave up on the theocracy with their own uprising in 1999; ten
years later, another wave of youthful rebellion hit the regime. And in the past
few years, Iranians have once more pushed back. Students, workers, clerics, and
merchants are agitating against despotic rule, just as they have for much of the
last century. The people protesting in the streets today are the ones who will
lead Iran tomorrow, and their struggle is worthy of Washington’s embrace.
A Change Is Gonna Come
The Iranian people want an accountable government and do not share their
leaders’ animus toward the West. But things don’t always happen just because
they should. To avoid outcomes such as those in Iraq and Libya, a U.S. policy of
regime change must include plans for steering a post-theocratic Iran in the
right direction, since Washington would share a large degree of responsibility
for the outcome. After a collapse of the regime, the United States would have to
immediately lift all sanctions and set up an international donors’ conference to
inject money into Iran’s economy and bring its oil back to the market. Even if
the United States helped get rid of the old regime, it would have influence over
a new Iranian government only if Washington were prepared to make a long-term
commitment to the rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would require an
initial injection of U.S. financial assistance to stabilize the Iranian economy
and pave the way for further contributions by others. The U.S. president and
congressional leaders would have to make the case to the American public that
such aid was critical to regional stability and U.S. national security. And
Washington would have to make clear to Iran’s new rulers that any aid would
depend on their complete abandonment of the country’s nuclear weapons program.
Governing Iran would be a difficult task for any new leaders. Although there
would inevitably be purges in the aftermath of the collapse, Washington would
have to press the new rulers of Iran to make room for members of the old elite
who wished to be part of the new order. Iran’s nuclear program would leave
behind dangerous detritus. Ideally, a robust effort led by the International
Atomic Energy Agency would account for all of Iran’s nuclear technology and
enriched uranium. But failing that, the U.S. military would need to take
unilateral action to remove the more sensitive aspects of the program to prevent
them from falling into dangerous hands.
Regime change in Iran would not be pretty. It would not immediately solve all
the problems between Washington and Tehran, much less immediately stabilize the
Middle East. But the United States should at the very least attempt to empower
the Iranian people to get the kind of government they deserve. Otherwise,
Washington is doomed to repeat its past mistakes: pretending that it is possible
to negotiate with the mullahs and blindly expecting that a theocratic
revolutionary movement will somehow produce “moderates” willing to steer the
regime away from its recklessness—or naively hoping that a popular revolt will
succeed without any support from the outside. That approach has failed for more
than 40 years. It’s time to try something different.
*Eric Edelman is a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and a senior advisor at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
*Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Iran's regime will develop nuclear submarines says navy
commander
Benjamin Weinthal/Jerusalem Post/April 20/2020
“None of the international pacts ban using peaceful nuclear energy but the peace
we are talking about doesn’t find meaning without maintaining defense
readiness," Rear Admiral Khanzadi said.
BERLIN – The head of Iran’s navy announced on Thursday that the Islamic Republic
will build nuclear submarines.
“It’s a kind of neglecting if the Islamic Republic does not think about using
nuclear propulsion in submarines… this domestic capability exists in the Defense
Ministry regarding the production of submarines bigger than Fateh – and
certainly, the developing of submarine propulsion is on the agenda of the Navy,”
Rear Adm. Khanzadi said, according to a report by the state-controlled Mehr news
agency.
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Khanzadi said that “None of the international pacts ban using peaceful nuclear
energy, but the peace we are talking about doesn’t find meaning without
maintaining defense readiness.”
He continued that “when there is no deterrence and readiness for a defense, no
peace and stability will be established – and so the Armed Forces of the country
are present to ensure sustainable peace.”
Writing in the National Interest online in early April, Caleb Larson said that
in 2018, Iran notified the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, that it was seeking to “construct naval nuclear propulsion in the
future.”
He noted that “To this day, only a handful of countries are in the nuclear
submarine club – the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and India
(although it should be pointed out that the Indian nuclear submarines are on
lease from Russia, with the option of purchase after the lease is up).” Larson
wrote that “Iran would likely beg, borrow or steal tech from another country to
have any chance of a viable nuclear sub.”
The Jerusalem Post has documented Iran's illicit nuclear proliferation efforts
in Germany since 2015, after reviewing numerous German intelligence reports.
The Post reported last week that the prestigious Washington-based Institute for
Science and International Security published a report on its website outlining a
newly revealed Iranian-regime nuclear weapons plant that was discovered by
Israel.
The authors of the report indicate that, “Iran should declare this site to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and allow its inspection, since the
facility was designed and built to handle nuclear material subject to safeguards
under Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.”
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s activities at the Shahid Mahallati facility show
deception, according to the report. “Iran has clearly been dishonest with the
IAEA. During discussions in September 2015, ‘Iran informed the Agency that it
had not conducted metallurgical work specifically designed for nuclear devices,
and was not willing to discuss any similar activities that did not have such an
application,'" the report read, however, that the “activities at Shahid
Mahallati and Shahid Boroujerdi are a dramatic contrast to that statement."
The United States government has repeatedly classified Iran's regime as the
worst state-sponsor of terrorism.