Detailed Lebanese & Lebanese Related LCCC English New Bulletin For September 29/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Syrians caught in the middle of an unwinnable war
Sinem Cengiz/Arab News/September 28, 2018
While EU foreign-policy chief Federica Mogherini was delivering a speech about the plight of the Syrian people at an EU event on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last week, there were other concerns, calculations and plans in the minds of the leaders of countries involved in the conflict. “There is no winner in this war. There might be military victories but there is no winner in this war — certainly not the people of Syria, who are paying the highest price,” Mogherini said at the event, which was attended by a large number foreign ministers, including those from Turkey, Russia, Lebanon and Jordan.
“Nobody will win, neither the war nor the peace, without a negotiated political solution. Too often we discuss of Syria but not with Syrians,” she added.
This is sadly the ugly truth. The discussions about Syria are concentrated more on the regime and the sphere of influence of other countries with vested interests rather than the Syrian people.  History provides a long list of examples, including the experiences in Libya and Iraq, that show no one can truly win a war when innocent people are affected. Even if one day the conflict ends, those who have been affected by years-long bloodshed will never be considered as winners, rather the losers in an unwinnable war. I’ve tried to rewrite this paragraph as best I can to make it clearer, but to be honest, I was not entirely clear on the point(s) the writer was trying to make here. Is it that even when a war is over and one side is declared the victor, the people are still losers as a result of the damaging effects on them and their country of years of conflict? That is my best guess, but it is not very clear and you might want the writer to clarify and have another go at expressing it. Though the prospects of peace seem distant at the moment, there is still hope for a political solution in Syria, but not one based on models applied to other war-torn countries in the past. Since the beginning of Syrian war, several models have been proposed, such as a “Dayton-Type solution,” a version of the American-brokered peace accord that ended the Bosnian War in 1995, or a “Kosovo-Type” agreement. History provides a long list of examples, including the experiences in Libya and Iraq, that show no one can truly win a war when innocent people are affected.
However, a tendency to oversimplify and misread the causes of Syrian conflict based on inaccurate comparisons does not help the Syrian people. The country needs its own unique solution, a recipe prepared in its own kitchen and served to all segments of Syrian society sitting at the same table — a solution based on a united and inclusive Syria. Beside the issue of the need for a political solution, as underlined by Mogherini, the matter of Syrian refugees is also at the top of the agenda at the UN General Assembly. The ongoing Syrian conflict has created what the UN describes as one of the worst refugee crises since World War II. More than 6 million Syrians are internally displaced, and a further 6 million have fled to other countries, mostly Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.
The experiences of these three countries with refugees have been similar but they have taken different approaches to the crisis, and as a result, the living conditions differ significantly in each. Unfortunately, there has not been a comprehensive comparative study of the status and conditions of refugees in these three countries. This month, Russian President Vladimir Putin, an ally of the Syrian regime, and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a supporter of the opposition forces, agreed to establish a demilitarized buffer zone in Idlib province to prevent a planned regime attack on the city. More than 3 million people live in the opposition-controlled province, raising fears of a humanitarian catastrophe if an assault goes ahead.
Given that there remains this risk of a major increase in the flow of refugees should the Idlib agreement collapse, a study examining the integration policies of the three countries, the local responses to the refugees and how these nations will handle another influx is vitally important.
Peace is at stake. It is hard to predict how the agreement will affect developments in Syria and the Syrian people. We can only hope it does not collapse, otherwise, we will once again take a step back from a political solution toward another refugee crisis likely to cause a humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions. The situation is not only unpredictable in Syria but also unprecedented in the region. It would not be wrong to argue that for the first time since World War II, almost all countries stretching from Iran to Libya are involved in conflicts, whether militarily or politically. This has not only raised the degree of uncertainty but also complicated further the understanding of alliances and enmities in the region. Because we do not see a direct war in Syria where one state is attacking another, but rather a proxy, ideological and sectarian war, the eventual loser will not be any specific state — it will be the Syrian people, sadly.
*Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. Twitter: @SinemCngz

Syria’s Kurds try to carve out a future among competing threats
Kerry Boyd AndersonKerry Boyd Anderson
Last week, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the main Kurdish party in Syria, marked the 15th anniversary of its founding. During that time, the party has shifted from being an obscure Kurdish political branch into one of the primary players in the fight against Daesh. Now, however, the party — and Syrian Kurds in general — face a critical turning point. In July 2012, the Assad regime withdrew its forces from the Kurdish areas of northeastern Syria to focus on fighting rebels in other parts of the country. While there are numerous Kurdish political parties, the PYD was the only one with the readily available militia and institutional structures capable of filling the resultant power vacuum. Since then, it has been the primary organization governing and defending the Kurdish areas of Syria.
The Syrian Kurds went from being “forgotten” people to global acclaim for their critical role in fighting Daesh from 2014 to 2017. They constituted the backbone of the multi-ethnic, US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which was the primary on-the-ground force fighting Daesh. Washington provided the SDF, including its Kurdish elements, with air support and, eventually, military equipment.
The Syrian Kurds might yet negotiate a deal with the Assad regime that provides them with a degree of self-governance.
However, as the threat posed by Daesh faded, US support for the Syrian Kurds became shaky. In November, President Donald Trump reportedly told the Turkish president that Washington would stop providing weapons to the Kurds. While there are still US troops in Syria focused on the mission to defeat Daesh, and working with the SDF, Trump said in March and in April that he wanted to pull out the US forces very soon. The president’s comments come on top of a history that has demonstrated the willingness of the US to turn its back on the Kurds. Kurdish leaders are aware, therefore, that they must find a way to survive in Syria without relying on US assistance.
The Kurds are now between a rock (Turkey) and a hard place (the Assad regime). They must decide which enemy is worse and which one they can work with. It seems clear that the PYD sees Turkey as its main enemy, while Turkey views the PYD as part of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist group, and has already taken significant action to undermine Kurdish territorial gains. It is likely that some Syrian Kurds view the Assad regime as the greater threat, but since the PYD is the strongest Kurdish faction, its choices will shape the future of the Syrian Kurds.
Nonetheless, the Assad regime is a threat. The Kurds previously suffered under it, partly for the same reasons other Syrians did and partly because the regime sought to wipe out the Kurdish identity. While the Kurds want autonomy, or some form of a strong role in a decentralized, federal Syria, the regime wants the Kurdish territory — and its valuable oil and agricultural resources — back under its control.
Over the summer, the PYD held discussions with the regime about the future of the Kurdish regions and other ethnically mixed territories that Kurdish-led forces captured from Daesh. It does not yet appear that the negotiations have led to any substantial agreements.
The Syrian Kurds might yet negotiate a deal with the Assad regime that provides them with a degree of self-governance. After a potentially draining offensive in Idlib province, the regime might be exhausted and willing to compromise. Its Russian and Iranian allies might persuade Assad to negotiate with the Kurds so he can focus on reinforcing his authority elsewhere. However, Iran has no interest in an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria that might encourage similar aspirations among its own Kurdish population. Moscow, meanwhile, hopes to strengthen relations with Ankara and is unlikely to support an agreement that Turkey would find unacceptable. Negotiations could fail and the Assad regime might attack the Kurds and regain control by force.
The Syrian Kurds have few friends. Iraqi Kurds have been an ally of sorts; they sent reinforcements during the battle of Kobani but are weaker now, and the Kurdistan Regional Government relies on its relations with Turkey. Despite tensions between Washington and Ankara, the US is unlikely to support Kurdish aspirations at the cost of its relationship with a NATO ally.
There are good reasons why the international community should be reluctant to abandon the Kurds.
Though far from a perfect example, the nascent Kurdish government is more moderate and democratic than most in the region and could play an important role in stabilizing a post-conflict Syria. The Kurds fought against Daesh, not only saving themselves but also diminishing the threat to the world, and they deserve something more for that than words of praise. Furthermore, a strong risk remains that Daesh, or some new version of an extremist group, will re-emerge in Syria and the world might once again want help from the Kurds.
**Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant with more than 14 years’ experience as a professional analyst of international security issues and Middle East political and business risk. Twitter: @KBAresearch

Is Trump a populist?
Mamdouh AlMuhaini/Al Arabiya/September 28/18
At the beginning of Trump’s era, his rivals described him as a fascist. This is of course not true because fascism means military parades, arresting traitors, mobilizing for war and oppressing the press. This is fascism as per Mussolini’s way as he did all of the above and also changed newspaper headlines because he adored the role of editor-in-chief, which was his job before he became a prime minister.
Does Trump do this? Of course not. The press insults him every day and he cannot throw a single editor in a cell in a police station. He’s a man of money and business and does not want to start new wars and is so far incapable of suspending his Secretary of Justice‎ Jeff Sessions whom he just offends every day for the purpose of making him quit, but Sessions, however, is holding on to his post. His rivals describe him as such to destroy his image and distort his reputation. It’s just a lie that’s accepted in the political conflict and the electoral game. Trump has repeatedly done it with his rivals, and he is the one who stirred controversy that Obama was not born in the US and asked him to show his birth certificate until he reluctantly did. It was a mere trick and an empty accusation but the aim was political and electoral and it was to put Trump’s name on the nationalist political radar again, and he succeeded.
In less than two years since he became president, he suffocated the Iranian regime, punished Assad, participated in eliminating ISIS, strengthened ties with allies and negotiated with the North Koreans. Populist presidents do not usually do this
Mamdouh AlMuhaini
In addition to accusing him of fascism, he’s also accused of populism. This is really worthy of a debate especially that this accusation is made on a daily basis in political articles and programs.
On the contrary
So the important question is: Is Trump really a populist like we hear every day? The answer is no. The populist is an isolationist, and he destroys or does not care about international institutions or world order, and tears apart trade agreements. Regarding isolationism, it’s difficult to argue that President Trump is a populist with a withdrawal approach in foreign policy as his men in this regard are hotheaded hawks.
In less than two years since he became president, he suffocated the Iranian regime, punished Assad, participated in eliminating ISIS, strengthened ties with allies and negotiated with the North Koreans. Populist presidents do not usually do this as they are politically isolated. They don’t deal with matters of the world and they retreat within their homelands. If we look at these populism standards, we would see they apply to his predecessor Barack Obama whose practical approach was purely isolationist.
It’s true that Trump attacked major institutions like the NATO but he did not undermine it, like he had threatened and promised, but he actually pushed other countries to contribute more to its budget hence strengthen it. Populism also means ending ties with traditional allies with whom there are mutual interests and who, through them alone, the formation of liberal world order is maintained.
Trump of course did not end these ties but he actually restored the coherence of the world order and his administration launched a war on the evil powers which seek to destroy it, like the Iranian regime which is suffering under the weight of economic sanctions. What about trade deals? Populists of course reject open free trade but the ongoing conflict between his administration and Beijing is not about that.
The Europeans are more harmed than the Americans from the Chinese partner that steals patents and that does not make fair laws of competition between the two parties. All indicators and statements say that Trump’s administration does not want to undermine commercial ties with China but wants to restore balance to them and push China to play by the same rules everyone else is playing by. The crisis with China is not new and many former presidents have suffered from it but Trump wanted to handle it. It will be an achievement that will increase his stakes and luck in the next elections.
In terms of domestic trade, Trump cannot be described as a populist. He used his mind and hunch as a businessman before anything else. He decreased taxes, eased restraints and stimulated investment hence the economy revived. We can say he is a populist in terms of local policy as he played on the national and patriotic sentiment to strengthen his electoral base and mobilize it behind him.
Trump is in fact a populist in the local political rhetoric but he is a traditional republican in foreign policy and economy and he did not deviate from the doctrine of his predecessors much. In brief, Trump is populist in rhetoric and a Republican in his actions. However he is completely different than a dangerous category of new republicans, like Ted Cruz, who can be described as populists and isolationists and who do not care about what happens in other countries even if massacres are committed against children. These figures criticized Trump’s foreign policy and were enraged every time he intervened on the foreign level, even if it’s to strike Assad. They of course do this to make political gains because foreign interventions are usually unpopular decisions.

Is China’s BRI idea beginning to catch the world’s attention?
Sabena Siddiqui/Al Arabiya/September 28/18
Representing 25 percent of the global population and generating one third of the world’s GDP, China-European Union (EU) relations happen to be next in global significance only to China-US relations. Bilateral trade has grown to such an extent that the EU is China’s biggest trade partner while China is the EU’s second largest trade partner after the United States as it has invested around $235 billion in the EU countries whilst slowing down its US investment to just $103 billion in 2015-2016.
Having had several opportunities for bilateral co-operation, it has been a viable and productive partnership. For starters, the EU countries had joined up the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in 2015 even though the US showed reluctance.
In return, China also joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) so working together is not something new in their bilateral relations.
Consequently, it was considered likely that the EU would become part of China’s mega-project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The absence of any rivalry and a general convergence of strategic interests could have made a sustainable, long-term partnership possible, especially as the EU did not feel geopolitically threatened by China.
However, it seems that the prospect of more Chinese leverage in Europe has made the EU somewhat unsure, particularly keeping in view its growing economic presence in Central and East European countries (CEEC).
The absence of any rivalry and a general convergence of strategic interests could have made a sustainable, long-term partnership possible, especially as the EU did not feel geopolitically threatened by China
Cross-border links
Recognizing the need for connectivity with Asia, the European Commission has gone ahead with a strategy of its own instead to create cross-border links, modernize transport and energy and improve digital infrastructure links with the continent.
Releasing the policy document, EU Foreign Affairs representative Federica Mogherini said, “Our approach is the European Union’s way to establish stronger networks and strengthen partnerships for sustainable connectivity.”
Increasing the EU’s external action budget to 123 billion euros for the years 2021-2027, it is proposed to raise further money from the private sector and implement mega-projects in Asia.
Seeking to benefit countries both in the ‘end-point’ and areas of transit, the focus is on speeding up investment and innovation while further strategy will be unveiled and put up for voting in October at the inter-governmental Asia-Europe forum meeting for 51 countries in Brussels.
Pledging to remain engaged with China, the EU made it clear in a press release that it would make sure that systems and networks would be inter-operable and the initiatives of both China and the EU would work with synchronicity. Presenting an opportunity for co-operation in line with the Belt and Road Initiative, construction of ‘the European way’ is not a direct counter to the BRI.
Instead, this new venture seems to symbolize that Europe wants to independently tackle and execute the project on its own terms and conditions. Though it may look like Europe is putting up a contender initiative to the BRI, the reality can still prove quite different.
More infrastructure plans are exactly what Asia has needed to be on par with developed countries since decades. Such new ventures highlight that planning the BRI was timely and beneficial from both the regional and global perspective.
Infrastructure gap
Being the fastest growing economic region in the world today, Asia does require a yearly investment of no less than 1.3 trillion euros ($1.5 trillion) to bridge its infrastructure gap. Providing significant opportunities for European companies, this development venture makes sense as the Trans-European transport network requires 1.5 trillion euros in the years 2021-2030.
Since a while, President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker’s Juncker Commission had been focusing on the field of infrastructure, recommending that a climate of entrepreneurship was the only way to bring back jobs, investment and growth to the EU.
Thus, pitching in and investing on infrastructure and trade connectivity works for both the EU and Asia. Ostensibly, plans were underway since 2016 to engage with Asia according to the EU’s Global Strategy, a ‘connected Asia’ covers political and security matters as well as trade and investment. Being a ‘rising continent’ due to its massive population, it remains the world’s biggest market for showcasing products.
In the meantime, the US is also planning to follow the Chinese example like the EU, by launching its own mega-infrastructure projects around the world. Offering developing countries alternate financing options for much-needed infrastructure, preparations are being made these days to finalize funding arrangements.
Working to resolve any barriers, the US Congress plans to pass a bill through Senate for facilitating “international development.” Having nearly wound up the Overseas Private Investment Corp., which promotes US investment abroad in 2017, this development represents a sharp U-turn in strategy.
Additionally, a new agency mainly based on the popular OPIC pattern would run several international development programs.
Summing it up, it appears that the BRI idea has been a success and various geopolitical and geo-economic factors have prompted more global powers to follow suit, in the long run it is beneficial for all as it helps to reduce the poverty and infrastructure gap in developing nations and works for the betterment of mankind.

Why militant fundamentalism is post-modern, not orthodox
Adil Rasheed/Al Arabiya/September 28/18
It might seem ironic but religious fundamentalism is quite a modern, sui generis phenomenon. As its quest for truth is driven more by casuistry than spirituality, it strives to confute the orthodox and traditional practices of various faiths, polities and cultures. Thus, fundamentalism is modern not merely because of its emergence in relatively recent times, but because it attempts to impose a systematic structure to dogma and is generally averse towards religion’s essentially metaphysical and esoteric dimensions. By discarding the intricacies of the metaphorical, fundamentalism clings to a literalist defense of scripture that invariably gives its arguments a reductionist, absolutist and intolerant streak. In its pursuance of minimalism to ostensibly achieve pristine purity of faith, it sets itself up against intellectualism, aestheticism and mysticism, and so it finds few scholars, thinkers or artists among its obscurantist following.
Fundamentalism in our times is remarkably innovative in that it has transported religion out of its spiritual realm and brought its distorted version into the socio-cultural, political and even economic domains
Metastasizing menace
The term fundamentalism originated in late 19th century when it referred to the extremist beliefs of certain Protestant sects in Britain and the US, which insisted on the literal inerrancy of the Bible.
However, this mimetic threat soon spread to other religions including some segments of Islam, even though this trend has arguably shown signs of general regress in recent times.
Although simplistic in its vehement adherence to “the inviolable basic principles”, fundamentalism in our times is remarkably innovative in that it has transported religion out of its spiritual realm and brought its distorted version into the socio-cultural, political and even economic domains.
Surprisingly like neo-liberalism, fundamentalism rejects tradition and “cultural specificity in favor of abstract universalism”. Thus, Muslim fundamentalist movements generally reject all the orthodox schools of religious jurisprudence or doctrines. In this, they are remarkably anarchist, even post-modern.
Post-modern moorings
In an article titled “Post-Modern Jihad”, published in The Weekly Standard soon after the September 11 attacks in 2001, Waller Newell (Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at Carleton University) wrote “the ideology by which al-Qaeda justifies its acts of terror owes as much to baleful trends in Western thoughts as it does to a perversion of religious beliefs. Osama’s doctrine of terror is partly a Western export.”
In the article, the scholar traces the influences of Nazi philosopher Heidegger and post-modern ideologues like Foucault on the Iranian Revolution and al-Qaeda.
He writes: “The relationship between postmodernist European leftism and Islamist radicalism is a two-way street: Not only have Islamists drawn on the legacy of European left, but European Marxists have taken heart from Islamist terrorists who seemed close to achieving the longed for revolution against American hegemony.”
According to noted expert on Islamist terrorism Olivier Roy, “In the 1960s, in Western Europe we had a tradition of youth radicalization from the Marxist revolution. Suddenly around the 1990s, the dream of the Marxist revolution disappeared and al-Qaeda and ISIS filled the vacuum”.
Similarly Ofri Ilani writes: “Individualism, hatred of the establishment and a cult of emotion activate the jihadists, just as they activated the anarchist assassins in the 19th century or the Red Brigades in the 1970s”.
The loss of meaning
Since ancient times, religion instituted meaning in human consciousness through its spiritual injunctions, ethical distinction of right from wrong as well as restrictions on the bestial and carnal instincts. With the coming of European enlightenment, rationalism and science set new standards of personal, societal and universal values.
However, with the rise of post-modern philosophies, certitude in established institutions of faith, ethics and even reason started to crumble and thereby the very construct of meaning began to blur. A similar trend is perceptible in the descent of militant fundamentalism from its avowed pursuance of essential religious truths to a near complete breakdown of any ethical construct it claimed to cling to.
Like post-modern Marxist revolutionaries, the bestial has gained pre-eminence over both the spiritual and the rational, leading to a near collapse of faith and any semblance of good sense. Borrowing ideas from their post-modern ideological mentors, groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have violated the very basic injunctions of their avowed faith.
As Newell puts it: “For Foucault as for Fanon, Hezbollah, and the rest down to Osama, the purpose of violence is not to relieve poverty or adjust borders. Violence is an end in itself … That is how al Qaeda can ignore mainstream Islam, which prohibits the deliberate killing of noncombatants, and slaughter innocents in the name of creating a new world, the latest in a long line of grimly punitive collectivist utopias.”
One could definitely add the name of ISIS on the list of these post-modern, neo-fundamentalist purveyors of violence. Not surprisingly, militant fundamentalism strives in places of utter chaos and confusion.
The remedy to clearly lies in restoring religion to its rightful and exclusive preserve of spiritualism, while leaving socio-political issues to institutions of national and international polity. There can be no space for religion in the political domain.

Iran’s blame game deflects attention from regime’s support of terror
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/September 28/18
Iran’s state-owned Persian news outlets have this week dedicated significant coverage to the attack that occurred during a military parade in the southwestern city of Ahvaz on Saturday. Gunmen opened fire, killing at least 25 people and wounding 55 more. The military parade was being carried out by members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite Quds Force.
The attack casts doubts on the Iranian leaders’ claim that it is the safest country in the region. Last year, a pair of attacks shocked the capital of Tehran, where at least 12 people were killed at the Iranian Parliament and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s mausoleum, which is one of Iran’s most sacred places.
Iranian leaders have long been attempting to project Iran as the safest and most secure country in the Middle East in order to further rally and galvanize domestic and international support, as well as increase the popularity of the IRGC, which safeguards the nation.
An important issue to address is the Iranian leaders’ reaction to this development. In such scenarios, the theocratic establishment resorts to various tactics. First of all, instead of examining the underlying causes of the attack, it plays the blame card.
For example, immediately after the attack and without providing any evidence or proof, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei accused other countries in the region, particularly the Gulf Arab states. He said in a statement on his website: “This crime is a continuation of the plots of the regional states that are puppets of the United States, and their goal is to create insecurity in our dear country.”
The message was the same across the Iranian regime’s political spectrum. Even the so-called moderate politicians of Iran joined the hardliners in pointing fingers at other nations. For instance, Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif blamed other countries in the region and their “US masters.”
Such a tactical game played masterfully by the Iranian regime will only escalate tension in the region, and increase distrust among nations.
The attack casts doubts on the Iranian leaders’ claim that it is the safest country in the region
It should be noted that the reason behind this strategy is to deflect attention from the regime’s support for terrorist and militia groups across the region. Iran has been providing military, financial, intelligence and advisory assistance to various Shiite militia groups in countries including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The Islamic Republic has also sheltered terrorist leaders from extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, according to several intelligence reports.
Iran’s sectarian agenda of supporting Bashar Assad and Shiite militia groups across the region has intensified regional sectarianism and empowered extremist groups such as Daesh to recruit more fighters. In a recent survey on global terrorism, the Islamic Republic was again ranked as the top state sponsor of terrorism in the world.
Iranian leaders will more than likely attempt to buttress their unfounded arguments that extremist groups are Tehran’s rivals, or that Iran is fighting extremism and terrorism in the region. This is to assist the hardliners in further justifying the deployment of more forces and intensifying their involvement in the region.
By blaming other nations for the attack, Iranian leaders are also attempting to deflect media attention away from the dire situation of the people in Ahvaz, which is the capital of Khuzestan Province. The IRGC parade, which was intended to show Iran’s military strength, was conducted in one of the country’s most neglected cities.While the Iranian people have been struggling politically and economically, the citizens of Ahvaz in particular have been encountering extreme difficulties for various reasons. In spite of the fact that Ahvaz is rich in natural resources, the indigenous Arab residents of Khuzestan are plagued with severe socioeconomic deprivation, suffer from one of the highest rates of poverty in Iran, and have a high level of water and air pollution. The nearby oil facilities surround and suffocate the city by releasing toxic materials and pollutants into the air. In fact, Ahvaz was in 2015 ranked the most polluted city in the world by the World Health Organization. The failures of the Iranian regime mean that Ahvaz’s residents are facing such difficulties and poverty while they are living in one of the most oil-rich cities of the Islamic Republic.
Finally, Iran should be cognizant of the fact that its policy of supporting terror groups can have unintended consequences. In the next phase, the IRGC will most likely attempt to impose fear in the country, capitalize on rally round the flag syndrome, justify its military engagements in the region, galvanize more public support for involvements in other regional countries, increase the military budget, and tighten domestic control through heightened securitization by police and intelligence forces.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh

Welcome to Sanctuary Sweden!
Judith Bergman/Gatestone Institute/September 28/18
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13016/sanctuary-sweden
Translations of this item:
Feras, an illegal alien to begin with, and a convicted felon, was allowed to stay in Sweden for the sole reason that he committed a violent hate crime against Swedish Jews. This despite the fact that Sweden had rejected his asylum request, and he therefore lacked any legal right to stay in the country.
The precedent that this case establishes is highly disturbing: If you commit crimes against Jews that can "be perceived as a serious political crime directed against other Jews," then you might be eligible for asylum in Sweden. The rights of Sweden's vulnerable Jews have apparently ceased to matter.
In Sweden, and perhaps other places as well, it appears that that the "human rights" of foreign aspiring murderers are more important than the human rights of law-abiding citizens.
Are you in a European country illegally, flouting your deportation order and committing arson? No problem. If the country to which you are to be returned might conceivably harm you, instead you are welcome to stay in Sweden, commit more crimes and harm Swedes.
A Swedish Court of Appeal recently overturned the deportation ruling against one of three convicted perpetrators of an arson attack against the synagogue of Gothenburg in December 2017, on the grounds that it would be in contravention of his "fundamental human rights".
The 22-year old Arab man from Gaza, known as Feras, was in Sweden illegally when he committed the attack. His asylum request had been rejected by the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket); he had apparently been told to leave the country, but he did not. For reasons that are unclear, he was not held for deportation, but still walking around freely in Sweden.
Feras used that freedom to participate in an attack on the Gothenburg synagogue. Approximately 10-15 other young men, of whom only three were charged, joined him. It seems that while young Jews were gathered for a party in an adjacent building, Feras and his friends threw burning objects at cars parked inside the synagogue fence. No one was hurt and the fires were quickly extinguished by rain, leaving only marginal material damage. The court therefore refused to categorize the crime as attempted murder, as the prosecution had requested. Both the lower court and the Court of Appeal did find, however, that the arson attack constituted an anti-Semitic hate crime.
Previously, the lower court had convicted Feras of "grossly unlawful threats and attempted serious damage" and had sentenced him to two years in prison and subsequent deportation. The Court of Appeal nevertheless said that Feras "...committed grossly unlawful threats with the intention of violating members of the Jewish congregation, but that the act can also be perceived as a serious political crime directed against other Jews."
"Given the possible interest of Israel in the matter and the insecure situation prevailing at the border crossings to Gaza and the West Bank and in the areas themselves, the Court of Appeals considers there is reasonable reason to fear that NN's fundamental human rights would not be safeguarded if he were expelled to Palestine. The Court of Appeal therefore rejects the prosecutor's request for deportation..."
The court also referred to reports concerning human rights and democracy in Israel and "Palestine" by Sweden's Foreign Ministry.
The court, in other words, speculated that because Feras tried to burn Jews, which "can also be perceived as a serious political crime directed against other Jews," Israel has a security interest in questioning him. For that reason alone -- with no evidence or details set forth -- returning him to the region of Israel and Gaza would supposedly be in contravention of his "fundamental human rights". The Court of Appeals' ruling meant that Feras, an illegal alien to begin with, and a convicted felon, was allowed to stay in Sweden for the sole reason that he committed a violent hate crime against Swedish Jews. This despite the fact that Sweden had rejected his asylum request, and he therefore lacked any legal right to stay in the country. After he finishes serving his two years in prison, he will be out, and free possibly to commit new hate crimes against Jewish citizens in Sweden.
The precedent that this case establishes -- if the case is not appealed and reversed by the Supreme Court -- is disturbing: If you commit crimes against Jews that can "be perceived as a serious political crime directed against other Jews," then you might be eligible for asylum in Sweden. The rights of Sweden's vulnerable Jews have apparently ceased to matter.
Actually, no Swedish citizens' rights appear to matter in the Swedish court system anymore. In 2017, a report showed that 75% of foreigners who were sentenced to prison and subsequent deportation for serious crimes were nevertheless set free after serving their sentences and allowed to stay in Sweden for a variety of reasons. In the years 2000-2014, Swedish courts did not even sentence to be deported 20% of convicted foreign rapists, who were registered to the same address in Sweden. For pedophile rapists the number was even lower: 17%. According to more recent statistics, 9 out of 10 convicted foreigners in Sweden are not deported.
The problem extends to terrorists as well. In 2017, for example, a Syrian who arrived in Sweden as a "refugee" in 2015 was acquitted in court of attacking Shia Muslims with firebombs. However, having said in monitored conversations that he saw himself as a jihadist who wanted to become a martyr, and considering that he had been in touch with ISIS, Swedish intelligence evidently deemed him too dangerous to stay in Sweden. The immigration authorities sought to have him deported to Syria, but they did not succeed. It seems the law does not permit his deportation to Syria: he risked being arrested or executed there. Instead, he was also released to walk freely around in Malmö.
In Sweden, and perhaps other places as well, it appears that that the "human rights" of foreign aspiring murderers are more important than the human rights of law-abiding citizens.
*Judith Bergman is a columnist, lawyer and political analyst.
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The Shia Arabs of Khuzestan
Mehdi Khalaji/The Washington Institute/September 28/18
Tribal identity supersedes religious affiliation in this community, helping explain why Tehran can expect further challenges from this southwestern province.
In the aftermath of the September 22 attack in Ahvaz, in Iran's Khuzestan province, many have remarked on the Arab residents of the area. Yet unlike other ethnic minorities in the country—e.g., Kurds in the northwest and Baluch people in the eastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan and western province of Kurdistan—these Arabs are predominantly Shia. A decade ago, in reaction to systematic discrimination against Arab citizens and a desire to be welcomed by the pan-Arab movement, a wave of the area's Iranians converted to Sunni Islam, but just as quickly the trend dissipated. This is perhaps because tribal identity prevails over religious tendency in the social makeup of the Ahvaz Arab community.
This tribal rule posed a major obstacle to national consolidation and modernization under Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose government fought against the forces of Sheikh Khazal al-Kabi, the strongman who presided over the area. With its ultimate victory in 1925, the central government took full control over Khuzestan. Yet Reza Shah sought conformity from residents, enacted through measures such as a ban on school instruction in local languages and the printing of publications in any language other than the official tongue, Persian. Such dictates have stirred frictions ever since.
After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic leadership followed the Pahlavi dynasty's lead by continuing to subvert the demands of ethnic minorities. Under the Pahlavis, oil-rich Khuzestan, brimming with oil companies and refineries, had become one of Iran's most developed and prosperous provinces, but the eight-year war with Iraq wreaked widespread destruction in the province.
As for links between Iranian Arabs—who are largely concentrated in Khuzestan—and Arabs abroad, they can be explained in roughly two ways:
The historical tribal relationship between the Khuzestan Arabs and Arabs in neighboring Basra province, in Iraq. Indeed, borders drawn in the twentieth century divided both tribes (ghabile) and subtribes (ashira), such as the Bani Kab, Bani Said, Bani Turuf, Bani Khaled, Bani Tamin, Bani Assad, and al-Kanana. Over the last decade, the opening of borders has facilitated widening interactions and relationships within families and tribes, in turn creating security concerns for the Iranian government. This plays out especially through the ability of anti-government elements such as Mujahedin-e Khalq and Salafist groups to cross into the country. Also, given Basra's status as a historic center for Akhbari Shiism, Arabs in Khuzestan tend to have little faith in the official Shia clerical establishment. Akhbaris—"literalists," as translated—do not share the views of the dominant Usuli school in Iran and are politically quietistic. They do not believe in the legitimacy of ijtehad (independent reasoning by clerics) and have no source of emulation (marja taqlid), as Usuli Shiism requires. Both tribal ties and theological affinities reinforce anti-government sentiments within Khuzestan's Arabs and anti-Iran sentiments within the Shia community in southern Iraq.
The role of Iranian Arab elites, who became Westernized as a result of Pahlavi-era modernization and tend to be secular and advocate pan-Arabism. Since the inception of the Islamic Republic, pan-Arabism has been a security concern for the regime, never more than during the Iran-Iraq War and corresponding emergence of pro-Saddam groups. Pan-Arabism intertwined with separatist ambitions gave rise to organized opposition groups and an ongoing clash between government and Arab activists. These activists accuse the Islamic Republic of carrying out discriminatory anti-Arab policies, intentionally keeping the province underdeveloped and poor, and preventing Arab citizens from holding sensitive or high-level positions in government bureaus.
In broad-brush terms, the Khuzestan Arab community illustrates the ways in which the Middle East divide often transcends that between Sunni and Shia, or between Arab and Persian. For the Iranian regime in particular, in light of the recent terrorist strike, complex ethnic and tribal aspirations in Khuzestan could be the source of future headaches, if not crises.
*Mehdi Khalaji is the Libitzky Family Fellow at The Washington Institute.