Detailed Lebanese & Lebanese Related LCCC English New Bulletin For September 25/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Turkey set to sink deeper into the Syrian imbroglio
Yasar Yakis/Arab News/September 24/18
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin last week struck an important deal on Idlib at a summit in Sochi.
Before the meeting, many observers thought that a confrontation between Turkey and Russia was likely. Hours before, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: “We have to admit that there are differences among the approaches.” With this statement, Russia may have wished to send a message to Turkey that the bargaining was going to be tough. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had floated the idea of opening humanitarian corridors to let civilians leave Idlib before the military operation. Turkey remained lukewarm to this idea, because it would dilute the cease-fire efforts.Despite this negative preamble, the summit was successful. It established a 15 to 20 kilometer-wide demilitarized zone around Idlib, between the rebels and the government forces, to be jointly patrolled. Putin said in the press conference after the meeting: “Jabhat Al-Nusra, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and other similar opposition factions must remove their heavy weapons, mortars, tanks and rocket systems from the demilitarized zone by Oct. 10.” He deliberately mentioned the names of the rebel organizations and the heavy weapons because he wanted to publicly put on record the critical points of his agreement with Erdogan.
In turn, the Turkish president said: “The opposition will continue to remain in the areas where they are. In return, we will ensure that the radical groups, which we will determine with Russia, will not operate in the area under discussion.”
In a sense, Turkey will have to do the dirty work in Idlib, but it chose to do so of its own volition.
This part of the statement implies that the two leaders had not yet identified which organizations are to be considered radical. Apparently there is much more hard work to do by experts to sort out the details left vague by the leaders for the sake of “constructive ambiguity.” The first controversy may arise here, between Turkey and Russia, because their definition of radical groups differs. Small-scale clashes may take place during the implementation of the agreement, but the deal has to be praised for having prevented a major operation. Turkey assumed a gigantic responsibility. It may have wished to buy time and postpone the bloodshed that would be inevitable in the case of a military operation. Or it may have wished to obtain leverage by gaining the allegiance of as many opposition factions as possible, giving it a stronger voice at the negotiating table. But many questions still remain unanswered: Who is going to force the HTS to take its heavy weapons out of the demilitarized zone and will Turkey fight them if they resist? The radicals know that such a move would tighten the circle around them by one more notch, and they would react accordingly. Turkish authorities have not yet disclosed the size of the military unit that will be deployed in Idlib. Experts estimate that 30 to 40,000 soldiers may be needed. The bigger the military presence, the more it will be exposed to harassments. On the other hand, the more the Turkish army moves from the moderate opposition toward the radicals, the stiffer the resistance will become.
Turkey will let the radicals choose between surrendering and being eliminated. Such an offer will push them to adopt a hostile attitude. If they surrender, where are they going to be sent or accommodated? If they ask to be evacuated to other Syrian provinces controlled by the Turkish army, such as Afrin, Al-Bab or Jarablus, what are they going to become after the Syrian government extends its sovereignty to these provinces? In a sense, Turkey will have to do the dirty work in Idlib, but it chose to do so of its own volition.
Had Turkey not proposed a cease-fire when the military operation was impending, carnage was going to become difficult to avoid, including high civilian casualties. A huge wave of refugees was going to move toward the Turkish border. Turkey’s initiative prevented this undesirable scenario.
By agreeing to this deal, Putin satisfied Turkey’s demand of delaying, postponing or canceling the military operation. He thus kept Turkey on board in the Astana process. The truce has provided a chance to cool down the conflict, though the possibility of its resurgence is not yet entirely avoided.
Paragraph 9 of the joint communique that followed the agreement provides for the strengthening of the Joint Russian-Turkish-Iranian coordination center that was established when the de-confliction areas were created. If the center functions effectively, NATO member Turkey will be cooperating with Russia more closely than with its allies. Despite its imperfections, the deal is worth the efforts made to achieve it. If it fails, the hostilities will resume, but the target group may be smaller after separating the moderates and the radicals.
In any event, Turkey’s continued involvement in Idlib may sink it deeper into the Syrian imbroglio.
*Yasar Yakis is a former foreign minister of Turkey and founding member of the ruling AK Party. Twitter: @yakis_yasar

Who killed the Revolutionary Guards in Ahwaz?
Mashari Althaydi/Al Arabiya/September 24/18
Who murdered and injured dozens at the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s military parade a few days ago in the Ahwaz region in Iran: The Arab region that has revolted against Tehran’s oppressive authorities for years? The attack – as it is known – was shocking as it was captured live on television. It killed 29 people and injured many others. The enemies of the ruling Khomeini regime are many on both the domestic and foreign levels. There is the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, the largest real Iranian opposition network. There is also of course the Arab-Ahwazi opposition in all it colors, those who adopt the military option and those who reject it and those who want complete independence and those who reject it, while settling fora formula that guarantees the Ahwazis’ identity and interests. Of course, accusing Riyadh is nonsense, and so is accusing Abu Dhabi. They’ve never done this before, neither with Tehran nor with a country other than Iran, and they will not do it now and will not do it in the future. The Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz is one of the Ahwazi operating factions that adopted the operation, just like the mysterious ISIS. Of course, there is the opposition inside Iran from within the Republic’s tent, the sons of the Green Movement and last but not least, there are the Kurds. We here note the recent shelling of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s headquarters in Iraq by Iranian missiles.
Why is ISIS’s responsibility for the attack doubted?
Because the Iranian regime’s accusation of it is flawed with the suspicion of political exploitation of the Ahwaz attack, especially as Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was quick to hint that Saudi Arabia and other regional countries, as he described them, and of course the US stand behind the attack through ISIS. And as they said: “The Ahvazi struggle movement” or perhaps the Kurds. What’s important is that they are “agents” of Riyadh or Washington or Abu Dhabi. This is the Iranian regime’s narrative especially towards Riyadh as the daily newspaper Kayhan’s headline, and its editor-in-chief Hossein Shariatmadari, who is Supreme Leader Khamenei’s consultant, vowed retaliate in Riyadh! Of course, accusing Riyadh is nonsense, and so is accusing Abu Dhabi. They’ve never done this before, neither with Tehran nor with a country other than Iran, and they will not do it now and will not do it in the future. This terrorist militant behavior is the nature of the Iranian regime and its affiliates. May God have mercy on the soul of Rafiq Hariri as now the whole world knows who killed him and his comrades on that sad Lebanese day! Tehran’s regime is cornered due to American pressure, and President Trump promised to do more. He will dedicate a part of his UN speech to talk about the Iranian regime. Trump’s friend and attorney, New York’s former mayor Rudy Giuliani said during a meeting a few days ago that American sanctions on Iran will lead to a “successful revolution.”
Did the demons of the Revolutionary Guard in the dark secret world plan this operation? We cannot go in this direction, although the Revolutionary Guard experts have previously sacrificed Shiites in terror operations in Iraq to make bigger political gains. The real threat on the Iranian regime is the collapse of the economy and the people’s anger at the regime, including the oppressed Ahwazis. The real enemy of Tehran’s rulers is their evil policies, and not any other party.

High time Iran’s terror activities in Europe are stopped
Hossein Abedini/Al Arabiya/September 24/18
In retaliation to the recent nationwide uprisings in Iran, the Iranian regime continuously conspires to commit terrorist activities against its opponents in Europe. They see the ever-growing popular protests as a real threat to their stranglehold of the country.
Hundreds of thousands of Iranians in defiance of severe state repercussions attend protests regularly in over 140 cities calling for the overthrow of the Iranian regime. These protests are in response to nearly 40 years of oppression, human rights violations, and corruption that has left millions of Iranians in economic despair. The Iranian regime’s high-ranking officials have recognized the people’s alternative, the democratic coalition of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) of which the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) is a member, as key organizers of these protests who act at the behest of the will of the Iranian people.
As such, Iran’s primary focus is to eradicate the NCRI and PMOI who are based in Europe. The Iranian regime holds no prejudice as to who they target and how, including supporters, as shown in their recent terrorist attempt in Paris on June 30, 2018, at an NCRI-organized Free Iran Gathering. Their targets included all in attendance such as European MPs, American dignitaries and tens of thousands of Iranians who are also European citizens. On September 12, 2018, the NCRI in a press conference in London exposed Iran’s terrorist plans and activities in Europe. They identified key members within their chain of command, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Hassan Rouhani who hold key roles. Further, Iranian embassies across Europe were identified as terrorist hubs that spy on Iranian dissidents and human rights activists and carry out orders instructed by Tehran.
The NCRI called for urgent action from European governments to prevent Iran from committing terrorism. The Iranian regime is feeling the effects of its unpopularity and now is in a desperate, weakened state, preparing to commit further terrible atrocities so as to hold on to power. Their fear of the organized Resistance, the NCRI, and its growing support supersedes their fear of retaliation by European countries as a result of decade-long appeasement policies.
Recent terror plots in Tirana and Paris
Since the Mullah’s hijacked the 1979 Iranian revolution, the regime has based their policies around terrorism so as to impose fear on a nation, cause instability in the region, and eliminate any opponents.  Although a large proportion of their terrorist activities have been based in the Middle East, there have been several operations in Europe such as the assassination of Kazem Rajavi, a renowned human rights activist in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 1990. Today, Iran has stepped up its operations in Europe. In March 2018, in Tirana, Albania, Iranian agents attempted to inflict causalities on Iranian political refugees who were in the midst of celebrating the Persian New Year. Two Iranian personnel under the guise of journalists were detained in relation to this foiled terrorist attack, which was confirmed by the US State Department and the Albanian government. Similarly, in June 2018 Iranian personnel attempted a terrorist attack on a gathering in Paris, France. In addition to tens of thousands of European citizens, nearly 600 parliamentarians and dignitaries from 70 countries around the world were in attendance - including cross-party delegation of members of parliament from the UK and American dignitaries such as Mayor Rudy Giuliani.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran called for urgent action from European governments to prevent Iran from committing terrorism. The Iranian regime is feeling the effects of its unpopularity and now is in a desperate, weakened state, preparing to commit further terrible atrocities so as to hold on to power. Their fear of the organized Resistance, the NCRI, and its growing support supersedes their fear of retaliation by European countries as a result of decade-long appeasement policies
An Iranian ‘diplomat’ in Vienna was arrested in Germany as being responsible for handing over bombs to the two perpetrators in Luxembourg who wished to attack the gathering in France. With the help of German, French and Belgium authorities – the attack was foiled hours before and perpetrators detained.
Most recently, in the United States, two Iranian operatives were arrested on charges of spying and collecting information to carry out a possible terrorist attack. This current new wave of terrorist activities by the Iranian regime should be of high concern to all governments.
Terrorism chain of command
In January 2018, according to information from within Iran, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) headed by Hassan Rouhani took the decision to carry out the Paris terrorist operation. Other members of the SNSC, include Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Commander of the Quds Force Qassem Soleimani. This plan was later taken to Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader, for final approval. After the Supreme Leader’s approval, the operation was assigned to a department within Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence Services (MOIS) named Organization of Foreign Intelligence and Movements. This department is responsible for terrorist operations and espionage outside of Iran, including Europe, and is headed by Reza Amiri Moghaddam, a top security official. Moghaddam was directly involved in instructing the Iranian ‘diplomat’ in Vienna, Assadollah Assadi, to execute the Paris operation.
Assadi used the Iranian embassy in Vienna to instruct a sleeper cell of terrorists in Belgium to carry out the attack. He was involved in personally handing over the bombs to the perpetrators, and has been detained since the terrorist plot was foiled, according to statement by Belgian and German authorities.
Role of Iran’s embassies in Europe
In addition to collecting intelligence, Iranian embassies are used to provide logistics support to terrorists including weapons, explosives and money. In some instances, assailants have used the embassies to hide after an operation. With around 30 embassies dotted across Europe, the Iranian regime has created a network to operate effectively in every location. By investigating and closing these embassies, Iran’s threat in Europe can be halted at its source.
Stopping Iran’s terrorist activities
The Mullahs believe the only solution to stopping their overthrow is to strike blows to the organized alternative to its reign and focuses on terrorism and propaganda to do so. For decades, Europe has taken the policy of appeasement in relations with Iran, and the regime intends to use this relationship as an advantage to operate across Europe. Resorting to tactics of terrorism, means that a policy of appeasement and continued diplomatic relations by European governments with Iran is illegitimate and a safety concern for innocent European citizens. Silence to the fact that Iran has plotted attacks in Europe, is tantamount to giving the green flag to the regime in Tehran to continue such terrible activities. We should not allow the Iranian regime, in its phase of demise, to threaten the lives of Iranian refugees, activists and opponents.
Therefore, certain urgent and imperative measures should be taken to halt Iran’s activities: Firstly, without any political considerations or favors, Iran’s terrorists must be prosecuted in European courts instead of extradition to Iran. With regards to the detained terrorists behind the Paris 2018 attack, they must be tried in Belgium where they were detained. Secondly, Western governments should arrest, try and expel any Iranian intelligence ministry spies and agents and finally all European countries including UK must shut down and investigate with immediate effect Iran’s centers, and hidden sleeper cells in Europe.

ISIS Is Poised to Make a Comeback in Syria
Hassan Hassan/ The Atlantic/September 24/18
On the surface, the Syrian civil war appears to be nearing its final stage. Bashar al-Assad's regime and its Russian and Iranian backers won the battle that mattered the most for them in July, when they drove the moderate rebels out of their last bastion in the southern Syrian city of Deraa. With that military victory, any hopes of a moderate takeover must be laid to rest. But while the rebels have been defeated, their grievances remain. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, mostly by government and government-allied forces; millions have been displaced; whole towns have been bombed out of existence. Now the situation is poised to worsen as the regime is readying its forces to attack Idlib, home to Turkish-backed rebels, jihadis, and countless civilians.
The demise of the rebellion has set the stage for jihadis allied with Islamic State and al-Qaeda to pick up the pieces. If history is a guide, they will exploit the volatile situation; they will co-opt the resistance against Assad, the surviving symbol of repression, use it to fill their ranks, and establish a permanent post in the region. The Trump administration has just one last chance to get peace talks back on track and curb extremist influence.For years after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, dozens of armed groups of various ideological backgrounds sustained a deadly resistance against American troops. At one point, the United States seemed like it was losing the war as jihadis and others forced American troops into fortified barracks. The situation began to shift in 2007 and 2008, thanks to a counterinsurgency strategy led by General David Petraeus.
Drafting off a troop “surge,” Petraeus did not defeat the insurgency so much as transform it, converting former foes fighting an occupation into allies against the specific threat of jihadis within the broader conflict. For a time, many Sunnis saw the Americans as partners who would enable them to control their areas independently; no longer would they have to answer to the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. Together they turned Iraq into a much safer place. But the U.S. did not resolve the underlying problems that had fueled the fight against American soldiers and the government in Baghdad. The U.S. did not push for the true integration of Sunni forces into the Iraqi state or secure them any real semblance of self-government. On the contrary, the U.S. stood by as Baghdad clamped down on Sunni communities to avoid a perceived threat to Shia hegemony.
Jihadis preyed on Sunni disillusionment and, to coin a phrase, rose from the ashes of the surge. By the summer of 2014, al-Qaeda in Iraq, which became the Islamic State, was able to set itself up as the only true militant opposition to the government in Baghdad; all other rebel forces had been vanquished. isis took over one third of Iraq, and seemingly overnight it morphed into a transnational organization operating across the region. isis could not have come to control such vast areas by virtue of its military strength alone. It grew so quickly because the U.S. occupying force had only deflected the insurgents’ energy, without ever resolving their complaints. isis effectively tapped into what one might call the insurgency’s latent energy.
In Syria, a similar process may be playing out.
In the early months of 2015, it seemed as though Assad and Iran might lose to the Syrian rebels—just as it seemed the U.S. would lose to the insurgents in Iraq prior to 2007. The rebels controlled most of the country, and were marching into Assad’s strongholds in western Syria. But then Russian President Vladimir Putin intervened. The Russians waged a relentless air campaign, and, on the ground, directly engaged local forces opposed to the regime as well as their regional backers. Turkey, once the rebels’ most committed sponsor, started working closely with Moscow to redraw the military and political map in Syria. With time, the Syrian rebellion degenerated from a mass movement animated by revolutionary zeal into a confused mess beholden to foreign interests. Instead of waging all-out war against the regime, it focused primarily on de-escalating the conflict through local ceasefires guaranteed by Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The Russians succeeded in fragmenting the rebels and threw their ranks into disarray. Thus in Deraa two months ago, even though the rebels were heavily armed and boasted large numbers, they surrendered to the Russians without much of a fight. They had already crumbled from within thanks to a combination of Russian military force and diplomacy.
Often, as the Iraq example demonstrates, the demise of an insurgency helps its most extreme elements. After the superficially successful surge, isis gained a monopoly over political violence in Sunni Iraq; it no longer had to compete for influence and recruitment with its erstwhile violent rivals.
There are signs that jihadis associated with both isis and al-Qaeda in Syria are similarly well positioned. Granted, local alternatives to these extremist groups still exist, but they no longer present a coherent message of resistance. For example, Adham Akrad, a moderate rebel commander from Deraa with the Free Syrian Army, appeared in a video recently urging the government to release individuals previously given guarantees of safety by Russia. Unlike jihadis who strongly reject any reconciliation with the regime, Akrad seemed to acknowledge that he was negotiating with a dominant power.
Other rebel groups that once dominated the militant landscape in Syria —Jaish al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham — have been weakened to the point of irrelevance. Some of these forces were also rivals to isis and al-Qaeda. Their disappearance is a net gain for the jihadis.
Despite wishful thinking, the conflict in Syria is not over yet. One third of Syria is still outside of the regime’s control, under Turkish influence in the northwest and American protection in the east. As in Iraq, moreover, the regime’s military gains could prove temporary.
There is a vast arc of vulnerable areas that Damascus probably cannot secure: a rough terrain of deserts and river valleys extending from the Israeli borders in the southeast to Iraq in the east and then to Turkey in the northwest.
Already the two main jihadi groups, al Qaeda and isis, are becoming the last men standing in these rural and remote areas. It will not be difficult for them to tap into a pool of human and material resources to fight against a vicious, deeply unpopular dictatorship controlled by an Iranian-backed minority sect. To win recruits, jihadis may not even need to win hearts and minds—they need only convince the disaffected that they represent the only viable opposition left against the government. Having inherited the Syrian uprising and its energy, they could become permanent fixtures of the Syrian scene.
Again, unless grievances are resolved, insurgencies do not simply go away. They can lie dormant for years or even decades, only to re-emerge later. Indeed, the Syrian conflict over the past few years could be traced in part to the Islamist insurgency of the 1970s and 1980s waged against the current president’s father, Hafez. That rebellion was seemingly crushed after the government launched a deadly campaign in Hama, killing between 10,000 and 30,000 people. The government also embarked on a systematic and educational campaign to uproot Islamism from Syrian society. Yet many individuals who lived in exile after 1982, or their descendants, have gone on to fight Hafez’s son. And many groups integral to the current uprising, including Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Nour ad-Din Zinki, and Faylaq al-Sham, could be considered the direct ideological heirs of the old Islamist insurgency.
To date, the U.S. has made serious military and diplomatic mistakes that could help the jihadists inherit the insurgency.
The Trump administration has limited its operations to eastern Syria. It has allowed northwest Syria to fall completely off its radar and given over the south to Russia. Already, the northwest has become a stronghold for two of the most dangerous al-Qaeda franchises, one focused on global jihad and another on local battles. And isis has its eyes on the south.
In order to win against extremists in the short and long term, the U.S. must expand its aperture, not narrow it, even as it recognizes that a military victory by Assad will make it impossible to resolve the tensions that could fuel new conflicts. Luckily, the U.S. has an important card to play: its presence in the east. From this base, the U.S. could help create a truly representative governing body that—in the future, once peace finally arrives—will have some autonomy from Damascus. The U.S. should agree to leave Syria only after it achieves a meaningful political settlement that recognizes local authority. To realize this goal, the U.S. should work with its European allies to revitalize the Geneva process. The U.S. is suffering from serious Middle East fatigue, but an apparent victory isn’t good enough. Its choice is clear: Root out the problems that drive violent radicalism now, or fight the jihadists again in the future.

Why foreign nationals should beware of traveling to Iran
الدكتور ماجد ربيزاده: لهذه الأسباب على الأجانب الحذر من السفر إلى إيران
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/September 24/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/67684/dr-majid-rafizadeh-why-foreign-nationals-should-beware-of-traveling-to-iran-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%83%d8%aa%d9%88%d8%b1-%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%af-%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%87-%d9%84/
At these critical times, foreign nationals ought to be extremely cautious about traveling to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some foreign governments have prudently begun to warn their citizens. For example, the British Foreign Office has recently warned all UK-Iranian dual nationals not to travel to Iran. Its statement declared: “There is a risk that British nationals, and a higher risk that British/Iranian dual nationals, could be arbitrarily detained in Iran. All British nationals should consider carefully the risks of traveling to Iran.”
While some may view such a move as unprecedented, it is without adoubt a significant blow to the so-called moderate administration of Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif.
One of the promises of the Iranian president and the loyalists of his political party, the Moderation and Development Party, has been to improve diplomatic relationships with the rest of the world, specifically European countries. Iranian leaders have also been boasting that the EU is on the side of Tehran after the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly labeled as the Iran nuclear deal, and imposed sanctions on Tehran.
Rouhani also famously pledged to improve the nation’s tourism industry and attract more tourists in order to enhance the country’s economy. In fact, the president encouraged foreign citizens to come to Tehran and frequently put significant emphasis on the intersection between the private sector, tourism and foreign nations. He wrote on Twitter: “Our approach to develop #tourism sector is to develop ground for private sector. We welcome Iranian investors, both home and abroad.”
Foreign nationals ought to be extremely cautious about traveling to Iran as the regime is desperate for more hostages to exploit for political, geostrategic and financial gain.
It is important to point out that the UK has wisely realized the danger that its citizens can face in case they travel to Iran, in spite of the fact that the UK has an embassy in Tehran and in spite of the fact that the UK and the Iranian government have diplomatic ties at this moment.
The British government has become extremely frustrated with the Iranian regime’s treatment of British citizen Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe. Zaghari-Ratcliffe — a project manager at the Thomson Reuters Foundation — was with her infant daughter when the Islamic Republic confiscated their passports. She has since been imprisoned for more than two years on trumped-up charges such as orchestrating a “soft overthrow” and “spreading propaganda against the state.”
Despite the fact that the UK has increased trade with Iran (up 153 percent in the 12 months to March 20), reopened its embassy in Tehran and strengthened its ties with Iran in the last few years, specifically after the nuclear deal, the Iranian authorities have not changed their policy of hostage-taking.
In fact, the number of foreign nationals imprisoned in Iran has increased in the few years since the West enhanced its political and economic ties with the Islamic Republic. The US State Department has also acknowledged the increasing threat against Americans since the deal was reached, stating in a travel warning: “Iran has continued to harass, arrest, and detain US citizens, in particular dual nationals.”
The Iranian regime seeks to achieve several objectives by targeting foreign citizens and taking them hostage. One objective is to use hostages as political pawns and leverage against other governments. This has been the policy of the theocratic establishment since the revolution in 1979, starting with the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, which led to 52 Americans being held hostage for 444 days. The regime released them when it had achieved its political and ideological objectives.
Another objective is to pressure other governments into granting Tehran more economic concessions. For example, in the case of Zaghari-Ratcliffe, Tehran attempted to pressure the UK government into paying off $530 million of debt. The Iranian regime also secretly received $400 million in cash from the Obama administration when it swapped four Iranian-Americans for seven Iranian prisoners in the US.
The regime is also trying to keep Iranian society insulated from exposure to the West, since Iran’s ruling clerics oppose and resent any cultural, political or social influence linked to the West. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has frequently warned that the biggest threat to Iran is the infiltration of Western culture and ideology. This is because he and the senior cadres of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fear that the Western culture and lifestyle will further push Iran’s youths into rising up against the regime.
In a nutshell, foreign nationals ought to be extremely cautious about traveling to the Islamic Republic, particularly at this critical time. Hostage taking is a core pillar of the ruling mullahs’ foreign policy and the regime’s revolutionary ideology. The theocratic establishment is desperate for more foreign hostages in order to exploit them as political, geostrategic and financial pawns. The UN should take Iran’s hostage-taking policy seriously and hold the Iranian authorities accountable.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh