LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
March 03/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Trump the Deal-maker and the Middle East
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/March 02/18
Casting himself as the best friend Israel could hope for, President Donald Trump is promising, some may say threatening, to unveil his grand plan for a peace “deal” to end the so-called “Middle East problem”.
Trump has always fancied himself as a deal-maker; he has even written a book on the subject. It is, therefore, no surprise that he might want to put his skill to use on an issue which has defied numerous deal-makers for six decades.
What are the chances of him succeeding?
The short answer is: nil!
This is no reflection on Trump’s talent for deal-making.
The problem with the “Middle East problem” is that those who tried to solve it never managed to define it and, as a result, sacrificed the existential reality on the ground to the essential abstraction of elusive ideals.
The current phase of the saga began in 1945 at the end of the Second World War.
The first would-be deal-maker was Britain’s Prime Minister Clement Attlee, then responsible for the fate of the chunk of the Greater Syria of the Ottoman times, known as Palestine. Influenced by the Foreign Office which had already allocated a portion of the booty to Trans-Jordan, Attlee was apparently persuaded that the remaining bit should also be distributed among Arab states, then allies of Britain grouped in The Arab League.
However, Britain’s evolving position run into opposition from former US President Harry S Truman who also fancied himself as a deal-maker. To iron out differences between the two rival deal-makers, London and Washington created the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry.
Truman’s envoy to the commission was a Californian Catholic judge, Bartley C Crum, who admitted he knew nothing of the issue. However, during the months he spent in the region attending the commission’s many hearings, addressed by envoys from Arab countries and native Muslim, Christian and Jewish populations, he concluded that creating a “homeland” for the Jews, as promised by Great Britain in the Balfour declaration of1917, must be part of any “deal”.
At that time, however, Britain had moved beyond Balfour and hoped to create an Arab bloc against the looming Soviet danger in the region.
Both Attlee and Truman failed in imposing their divergent deals. And in February 1947 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin passed the hot potato to the United Nations.
In November 1947 the UN General Assembly cast itself as deal-maker by passing General Assembly Resolution 181 that recommended the creation of two states, one for Jews and the other for Arabs.
Britain was one of the 10 states that abstained while 13 others, (Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen) voted against.
However, it quickly became clear that the UN, too, had failed as a deal-maker.
The resolution was so long, so detailed and so laden with jargon that few apart from seasoned lawyers would comprehend let alone be able to implement it.
Rather than admit failure, the UN persisted in its deal-making delusion. Successive Secretary-Generals, from Dag Hammarskjold to Kurt Waldheim and passing by U Thant, appointed special emissaries to shape a “deal”.
Some emissaries, notably Sweden’s Gunnar Jarring, claimed that they were on the threshold of a deal. In every case they came close but no cigar.
Until the 1970s the issue was labeled “the Arab-Israeli conflict”, a term justified by four wars. The decade also marked the start of an inflationary trend in Mideast deal-making. Henry Kissinger, dubbed “the modern Metternich”, chased the mirage with his shuffle diplomacy, and failed.
He was succeeded in the role by President Jimmy Carter who achieved a truce between Egypt and Israel but kicked peace into long grass.
By the 1980s the conflict had acquired a new appellation: the “Palestine issue” and the seductive dream of a deal remained.
Since then the list of would-be deal-makers has continued to get longer, so long, in fact, that one could not mention all of them in a single column. Among the pretenders were French President Jacques Chirac, British Premier Tony Blair and, in a different register, the Norwegian government. In 2005 even Angela Merkel, just named Chancellor of Germany, toyed with the idea of playing Mideast deal-maker but, wise lady as she is, quickly turned to other matters.
There are many reasons why so many deal-makers have failed.
The first is that peace is never negotiated and is always imposed by the side that wins a war. There is not any instance in history, which is primarily a narrative of countless wars, in which an outsider has imposed peace on unwilling belligerents.
The second reason is that outside deal-makers have their interests and agendas which make an already tangled web even more complicated. For example, in the case of American deal-makers, how to win Jewish votes in the US without antagonizing the Arabs who sell us oil and buy our arms?
The third reason is that wannabee deal-makers do not fully appreciate the importance of the status quo, the reality on the ground.
Whenever a status quo is at least tolerable for both belligerents the desire for risking it in the hope of an ill-defined peace is diminished. Many people in the world live with status quo they don’t regard as ideal.
Russia and Japan coexist, trade with each other, and maintain correct relations despite being technically at war with the Russian occupation chunks of Kuril Islands.
China and India coexist despite the Chinese annexation of large Indian territories along the border.
Bolivia and Chile are still technically at war because of the Chilean annexation of Bolivia’s access to the ocean. By one count no fewer than 89 of the 198 members of the United Nations are involved in territorial disputes or are home to restive, sometimes secessionist minorities.
If we add irredentist dreams and claims rooted in myths or history, almost all UN members are in dispute with their neighbors. I haven’t met a Mexican who didn’t think that California and Texas belonged to Mexico. Nor would you find many Serbs ready to forget Pristina, their “holy city”, now in the hands of Muslim Albanians. And there are few Iranians who don’t feel sad that Baghdad, the site of their ancient capital of Ctesiphon, is now an Arab metropolis.
Finally, and more importantly, there could be no deal and no peace unless and until those involved in a conflict desire it. Without that desire the best one could aim for is a truce, allowing for coexistence, living and half living as the Anglo-American poet Elliot put it.
There is one thing that Trump the deal-maker could do. He could ask the Israelis and the Palestinians to work on an agreement, each in their own camp, on what they exactly want, and report to him.
My bet is that, at this moment, neither of the two sides would be able to shape any agreement in their own respective camp on what kind of a deal they might accept. And that, at least implicitly, means that both are happier with the status quo rather than the prolongation of a “peace process” which could never lead to peace and now is no longer even a process.

The prospect of Turkish-Greek flare-up over Cyprus gas!
Huda al-Husseini/Al Arabiya/March 02/18
Is Turkey about to open a military front against Greece? As a matter of fact, hostile statements and recent events in the Aegean have led to fears of a potential conflict between Turkey and Greece. Last Saturday, Turkish warships threatened to use force against an Italian ship in order to prevent it from extracting gas in Cyprus. There have been reports that Greek and Turkish vessels confronted each other in waters off uninhabited disputed islands on January 12. There have also been frequent violations of Greek airspace by Turkish fighter jets. On Monday, Greece reported 42 air incursions.
War with Greece not likely
Greece is furious about Turkish attempts to block the prospects of natural gas’ drilling around Cyprus. Yet, despite the growing tension between the two countries, going to war does not seem a plausible option, because Turkey is involved in many other issues at this time. Turkey also has close economic relations with Europe which will be affected by any war in the Aegean. Thus, initiating a conflict may lead to an economic suicide for Ankara.
Initially, Erdogan had started peace talks with Kurds when he was keen to show his benevolent side. Now, the Kurds are subjected to his political and militaristic rage. Erdogan has turned his back on democratic principles, which Turkey is supposed to share with its allies
Turkish public opinion is more worried about the Kurdish threat, not Greece. But the rhetoric of war in the Aegean serves the political agenda of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan well. With presidential elections scheduled for next year, Erdogan knows that using historic grievances guarantees winning the support of hardline voters.
Nevertheless, the prospect of a sudden misadventure in the Aegean could lead to unprecedented events. In fact, to resolve the recent collision between Turkish and Greek ships, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and Greece’s Alexis Tsipras spoke on the phone to defuse the situation. As a result of the growing tension, Athens has called on NATO to take a stronger stance against Turkey, urging Washington to use diplomatic pressure by threatening to put off sales of its jet fighter to Ankara.
Character arc of a totalitarian
Erdogan has quickly changed from being a democratic model into a leader seeking to establish totalitarian rule. In 2004, the European Union extended an official invitation to Turkey to join the bloc. It urged Turkey to curtail the strength of the Turkish army. However, there were soon accusations of conspiracy leading to the arrest of senior Turkish military officers and a failed coup attempt. Until now, there are doubts as to who suuports it. In response, Turkey resorted to a full scale repression and used violence as a strategy to create a one-man state.
Initially, Erdogan had started peace talks with Kurds when he was keen to show his benevolent side. Now, the Kurds are subjected to his political and militaristic rage. Erdogan has turned his back on democratic principles, which Turkey is supposed to share with its allies, especially NATO countries. However, neither his totalitarian rule nor his stance regarding the Kurds has provoked the wrath of Washington. However, his fiery statements against Washington, which did not change its strategy in Syria, did.
Before the visit of US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Ankara which took place last week, there was speculation about what needs to be done to restore amicable relations among the two NATO allies. Observers believe that Washington and Ankara will continue to safeguard their interests while maintaining their relations, which has been the norm since Turkey's admission into NATO in 1952. This somewhat optimistic outlook is entertained more by American officials than by their Turkish counterparts.
Turkish politicians have not forgotten the letter of US President Lyndon Johnson in 1964 to Turkish prime minister, when he advised him against taking any military action against Cyprus. Yet in July 1974, Turkey annexed the northern part of Cyprus. The Turks have not even forgotten the arms embargo of the 1970s and the arrest of some Turkish Special Forces personnel in northern Iraq during the 2003 invasion. In contrast, American politicians do not give much importance to such events. This is partially due to a misconception on both sides about the nature of the NATO alliance. Both sides think of it as an entity more than a defensive alliance initially established to stop Soviet expansion, and finally as a counter-terrorism mechanism to block any Russian efforts for destabilization.
There is a lot of literature about the values of NATO and that its main goal of providing greater security to its member states, as well as the conviction that an attack on one member state is tantamount to an attack on all.
This misconception has led to an idealistic view of NATO's capacity to foster amicable relations among its members, because the reality is each NATO member has developed an independent foreign policy to achieve its own goals.
On the one hand, Turkey seeks to stop the expansion of Kurdish-controlled areas in northern Syria and wants to prevent the creation of an independent Kurdish region along its borders, which it considers more important than defeating ISIS or other radical Islamic organizations. Washington, on the other hand, considers defeating ISIS and other radical groups as the most critical issue in Syria. Until ISIS is totally and fully eliminated, and until Turkey quashes all Kurdish hope of autonomous rule, the war in Syria will keep fomenting tensions between the two countries.
Is Turkey serious about NATO?
It is questionable whether President Erdogan acknowledges the importance of NATO membership as his predecessors did. He may even consider this alliance as a liability which keeps Turkey from acting unilaterally.
If Erdogan feels that his objectives require Turkey to renounce the NATO and the United States, he may take actions that advance the breaking up of NATO, by provoking a conflict over oil exploration around Cyprus or unnecessarily precipitating troubles against Greece in the Aegean Sea.
Tillerson held a three-hour meeting with Erdogan in the presence of the Turkish foreign minister as a trusted translator. This meeting allowed for honest discussions but its effectiveness could only be measured in coming weeks and months. The American media leaked that Tillerson offered three things to Erdogan: joint US-Turkish military garrisons in Manbij, establishing a buffer zone in Afrin, and gradually decreasing America’s relations with Syrian Kurd fighters. Still, the State Department spokeswoman declined to comment.
However, if both sides continue making hostile statements then a deep rupture in relations will appear highly possible. Russia will exploit Turkey's estrangement from the West to weaken the NATO alliance in the Black Sea region. Russian President Vladimir Putin has become an expert in profiting from the divisions within this alliance, using natural gas and information warfare as weapons. One Western politician told me: Erdogan's inclination to make enemies is a blessing to salvage the West! He does not seem to be helping anyone, he only works to isolate himself. He added that Turks should know that they cannot wander alone in the world, and that we will not interfere by supporting the Turkish opposition so as not to promote popularization in the country.
Does Erdogan trust Russia? How is his relationship with Iran, the ally of his enemy, Bashar al-Assad? The Kurds are his main worry, but now he is also worried about the oil and gas in Cyprus (Greece’s ally) and he also wants to antagonize the United States?
It seems that the president who thinks he is working to restore the Ottoman sultanate can use a quantum of serenity. The world has changed. The only thing left for him to do is reach China and North Korea.

Interfaith conference: Opportunities for dialogue and challenges of conflict
Fahad Suleiman Shoqiran/Al Arabiya/March 02/18
In September 2006, Pope Benedict XVI sparked a fierce media war between Christians and Muslims when during a visit to Germany, he described Islam “as a religion not constrained by rationality.” His remarks stirred uproar considering he is the head of the Christian religious institution which has a centuries-long history of blood with Islam. The conflict between the two religions was greatly influential in drawing maps, sparking conflicts and renewing vengeful sentiments.
Center for interreligious dialogue
To know more about this history, one can refer to the book Religions, from conflicts to competitions: Lessing and challenging Islam by Karl-Josef Kuschel. The book offers analyses of the verbal and theological conflict, creative competitions and military conflicts such as Crusades and conquest wars of Andalusia and the Balkans. Wisemen realized that the Pope’s harmful statements towards Muslims may affect international balance and bring back elimination wars and genocide plans to people’s minds. It was thus a must to take a decisive measure to prevent this fire from spreading.
Interfaith dialogues must be based on scientific and not diplomatic standards. Diplomatic speeches are important sometimes but when religious representatives and figures sit in one hall, they must be frank enough to clearly talk to one another
Six years after Pope Benedict XVI made these remarks (particularly in November 2012), Saudi Arabia announced inaugurating King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, KAICIID, in Vienna. During the press conference at the inauguration, late Saudi Prince Saud al-Faisal said: “Bringing together the followers of religions and cultures which influence people in this center aims to serve humanity and peace purposes and spread good all over the world so sectarian differences are no longer a reason for conflict but a factor towards harmony.”
The center’s establishment was met with positive reactions from across the globe as many bet on it to curb tensions and people’s constant motivations to plan protests, burn photos and chant slogans whenever someone makes a slip of a tongue.
The pope made the aforementioned statements although he is one of the most prominent Christian theologians who has held a teaching position at the University of Regensburg since 1969 and who participated in important dialogues with prominent philosophers like Jurgen Habermas, particularly to discuss the controversy of secularization and religion.
In other words, disasters are not only caused by enthusiastic masses that are driven behind extremist and ignorant symbols.
Denial of extremism
Meanwhile, aninterfaith dialogue is being held in Vienna. The dialogue’s events are distinguished for their calm speeches and dreamy visions, in addition for their confident denial of historical events. For example, Doctor Mohammed al-Issa, the secretary general of the Muslim World League said: “Religions are innocent of wars that were fought in their name.”
This was a general remark but history shows us that those who fought such wars were extremist believers in their religions. Their extremist beliefs strengthened their tendency to go to war to achieve political and economic goals and gain geographic influence.Therefore, there is no need to exonerate history to revive values of dialogue between religions as all nations’ histories are full of wars and genocides. Allow me however to commend Doctor Issa for emphasizing the significance of the values of enlightenment, religious pluralism and freedom of faith.
There’s a huge problem that’s unfolding away from conferences which may not produce practical recommendations that can be implemented. Religions’ battles today are spreading via other tools and in different forms. Philosopher Jacques Derrida warned of this in the book Religion in our World which he co-wrote with Gianni Vattimo. Derrida warned of the spread of cyber religious wars via digital platforms and television channels. “We must pay great attention, if possible, to what currently forms the essence of religion, and we must examine what’s being said in the name of religion across the world and in history books,” he said. Destructive wars between religious and sectarian television channels actually reflect what Derrida talked about.
Interfaith dialogues must be based on scientific and not diplomatic standards. Diplomatic speeches are important sometimes but when religious representatives and figures sit in one hall, they must be frank enough to clearly talk to one another and debate each other. They must begin dialogues with discussing religions, their fates and areas of differences as focusing on what religions have in common does not lead to a debate that offers knowledge but to holding a mere friendly meeting. Thus, institutions lose their role and value in the long run. Just like academics hold debates on ideologies and conclude their discussions by writing useful material, religious symbols must also revive debates instead of making reassurances and voicing dreamy visions.
In a debate with Pope Benedict XVI, Jurgen Habermas who is not a fan of repeating the self-evident, said: “Religious awareness must succeed in the integration process in modern societies. All religions are in fact a vision of the world or an ideological understanding that demands its right to authority to establish a form of life in its entirety. However, religion must give up this right and the right to monopolize interpretation and to organize comprehensive life considering the conditions of science’s secularism, neutralization of the state’s authority and comprehensive religious freedom.”
Dialogues between religions are important but their tools and techniques as well as their extent of frankness and discussion approaches require renewal that matches the extent of challenges and the fates of conflicts.

Greater Damascus: The Final Touches on the New Demographic Map
إياد أبو شقرا: إنجاز الخريطة الديموغرافية لمحيط دمشق
Eyad Abu Shakra/Asharq Al Awsat/March 02/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/62831
“Ghouta will fall. That is the message. And when it falls, Idlib must surely be next. And then the Syrians must decide how to break the US-Kurdish hold on Raqqa”, clearly and succinctly, wrote Robert Fisk in ‘The Independent’.
Fisk did not forget to mention that Eastern Ghouta (Northeast and East of Damascus) was now a besieged “enclave”; however, he did not bother to say why it became an “enclave” after 7 years of killing, destruction and systematic population displacement.
Stranger still, that as Fisk used the word ‘Syrians’ in the above opening quote to mean the Damascus regime, ignoring the fact that this Regime was not fighting alone, but was backed throughout its wars of destruction and displacement by the Russian air force and Iran’s sectarian militias brought into Syria from Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan…
Fisk knows more than many the true nature of the Al-Assad family regime, even before the Massacre of Hama in 1982; and yet he regards that Bashar Al-Assad and his brother Maher who is now shelling Eastern Ghouta – with the intention of uprooting and transferring its inhabitants, as was the case with Western Ghouta, Wadi Al-Ajam and Wadi Barada – represent ‘the Syrians’.
Perhaps, he also believes that he who has killed a million Syrians and displacing millions, with direct Russian support, as part of Iran’s settlement grand project connecting Iraq with the Mediterranean coast, not only represent the Syrian people but also Syria’s ‘sovereignty’!
This is a simple example of how some Western experts, circles and media have approached the Syrian debacle; specifically, since former US President Barack Obama decided his administration’s priorities in the Middle East.
The western focus has shifted from the moral duty to support a peaceful popular uprising against a sectarian dictatorship that controlled Syria since the autumn of 1970, to a “war against terrorism” that was allowed to proliferate and commit atrocities, in order to justify aborting the uprising, and rehabilitate dictatorship and ‘non-suicidal’ sectarianism. That latter is the famous term alluding to Iran’s, and used by Obama while marketing his nuclear deal with the Iranian regime.
On the other hand, it would be naïve to think that the ‘Iranian considerations’ were the only ones behind Barack Obama’s decision to stand against the Syrian Uprising. In fact, there is smart and dynamic representative of other interests in Washington, precisely inside the Democratic Party: which is ‘The Israeli Lobby’. This ‘Lobby’ has been comfortable with the Damascus regime’s commitment with ‘peaceful co-existence’ with Israel across the October 1973 ceasefire in in the Golan Heights.
The Israelis know the nature of Al-Assad regime only too well. They understand its strengths, weaknesses and existential priorities. The have also become familiar with its outbidding and escalating belligerent rhetoric while providing Israel one service after another. This is why we have noticed that Israeli pragmatism decided against taking a jump into the unknown; and taking the risk of replacing a ‘useful situation’ with non-guaranteed alternative.
Thus, with intersecting Israeli and Iranian – subsequently, ‘Obamist’ – interests in Syria, the decision was reached to leave the Syrian people to face its own fate.
Meanwhile, in another side of the arena, there were two important players: First, Turkey, the regional power hoping to reclaim its Ottoman imperial role and pose as the protector of Sunni Muslims in an area where Iran and Israel were in the ascendency with American approval. Second, Russia, which under a ‘neo-Tzarist’ rule, has decided to keep its last remaining foothold in the Arab world after losing Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011.
Turkey flexed its muscles and resorted to loud rhetoric, while Russia used a more efficient approach combining its UN ‘veto’ and employed diplomacy and misleading negotiations as a cover of changing the rules of engagement on the ground.
Soon enough, Turkey suffered two regional setbacks: the first, when it became involved in inter – Arab conflicts; the second, when it had to beat a retreat in the face of Russian threats after it downed a Russian military aircraft in November 2015 over the Turkish – Syrian borders.
These two setbacks were bound to cost Ankara the initiative, and limit its grandiose geo-political ambitions in Syria; especially, following Moscow’s and Tehran’s exploitation of Washington’s bet on the Kurds.
Given these developments, Ankara realized its limitations, as well as the risks of being accused of ‘supporting terrorism’; and seeing Washington’s rush to bolster secessionist Syrian Kurdish militias, Ankara saw a common cause with Moscow and Tehran that soon resulted in the Astana Process, the first political ‘coup’ against the Geneva Peace Process for Syria.
As for Moscow, and following its gains from Obama’s policy appeasement with Iran, it gained again from the confusion and chaos in Donald Trump’s administration. This has allowed the Russians, while liaising with Israel, to uncover their real ambitions in Syria, and provide the much-needed cover to Tehran and Al-Assad’s regime to carry on their demographic change in the country.
The policy of demographic change has resulted so far in uprooting and displacing the populations of eastern Aleppo, the western and southern suburbs of Damascus, as well as Wadi Barada (the valley of Barada River), with the intention of linking Damascus with Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon to the west.
All that after the mass displacement of the populations of the majority of Homs city neighborhoods, as well as several areas in the provinces of Homs, Hama and Idlib; and under the pretext of fighting ISIS, many parts of the provinces of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor, Al-Hasakah, and even Deraa.
Today, when Robert Fist talks with conviction about the imminent fall of Ghouta, and Idlib later on, he does because there are no more illusions, despite the futile haggling taking place in the UN Security Council.
The fact of the matter is that the demographic conspiracy against Syria is fast nearing its completion. The dubious ‘evaporation’ of ISIS, and the rush of secessionist Kurdish militias to hand back the territories they control to the Al-Assad troops and Iranian militias lead by Suleimani and protected by Putin’s air force, only confirm that we are now in the last phase.
What’s next?
Well, logically, what remains of the set ‘scenario’ are determining the details of the Kurdish-American co-operation east of the Euphrates River, and settling the issue of Southern Syria with Israeli input.
The pre-2011 is now dead. This is a painful fact that one needs to accept; however, what is even worse and more dangerous is that we are going through the redrawing of new maps in an increasingly fragile and weak region.

Why Europe's Google Rulings Don't Benefit Consumers
Leonid Bershidsky/Bloomberg/March 02/18
Perhaps the most baffling aspect of the European Commission's ruling against Google last year, which included a 2.42 billion euro ($3 billion) fine, is that the remedial action Google was allowed to take didn't make the market in question, shopping searches, any fairer or any more accessible to smaller players than it was before the ruling. Now there's a reason to expect the ruling in another Google case -- the one dealing with the company's treatment of phone makers who use its Android operating system -- to be just as useless for the cause of fair competition.
Reporters for Politico have discovered that FairSearch, the non-profit group that filed the Android complaint in 2013, is under the full legal control of two giant companies: US-based Oracle and South Africa-based Naspers, which owns shares in China's Tencent and Russia's Mail.ru. At the time the complaint was filed, Microsoft was also part of the effort, but it left FairSearch in 2015. Other companies that have been mentioned as FairSearch members are so-called adherent members without voting rights who "do not participate actively in the achievement of the association's goals."
This makes sense on a certain level: The small firms don't have the deep pockets to hire expensive lawyers and PR consultants (FairSearch is working with elite firms Clifford Chance and Burson Marsteller). FairSearch has rejected Politico's findings as immaterial, and some of its "adherent members" have backed this stance. But the implication is clear: If, at the end, it all comes down to Oracle's and Naspers's desire to keep Google in check, Google may end up punished but consumers and smaller companies won't get much out of it.
That's exactly what happened last year. The search monopolist was slapped with the fine (which it's contesting) for prominently surfacing its own suggestions when a user searched for a product to buy, and burying comparison websites' competing results. It was told to fix the problem andcame up with an auction-based mechanism for the top spots on the search output page, in which competitors could bid for space against Google Shopping. That service was required to show a profit so it couldn't always outbid the others. It hasn't worked. Search for something to buy in any European country and you'll get results from Google Shopping. Google has told me that competitors were placing ads, too, but I don't know what one needs to do, or how many times a search needs to be repeated, finally to stumble upon an alternative.
In the Android case, which is likely to be resolved in the next few months, the idea is to stop Google from forcing phone makers to preinstall its apps and from barring access to the Google Play store -- the official source of Android apps -- for producers who install Android "forks," versions of the system that Google doesn't support. As an Android user, I'm not sure how the EU can help me with any of this. I want the Google apps preinstalled, rather than the useless bloatware supplied by phone makers such as Samsung.
Even if I cannot remove an app that came with my phone -- which traditionally has been easier on Android than on Apple's MacOS -- the various interfaces available for the system can be tweaked so that I'll never see it. It's easy for an Android user to replace the default browser if one doesn't like Google's Chrome (I've done so) and to use a search engine other than Google (sadly, none works as well -- but privacy advocates aren't prevented from using DuckDuckGo, for example). And as for Android forks, they're for geeks who are fine with common applications not working right on their devices.
Nor is it clear how a ruling against Google could address any of Oracle's or Naspers's direct competition concerns. Oracle's beef with Google is about the use of elements of Java, an Oracle-owned programming language, in Android. Naspers is a major player in online classified ads, a business in which it clashes with Google. Neither would benefit directly from a change in Google's relationships with phone makers.
One can, however, easily see Oracle and Naspers rejoice at another publicity black eye for Google and another huge fine. Margrethe Vestager, the competition commissioner, is the European Commission's undisputed star, who is often mentioned as a potential successor to its current president, Jean-Claude Juncker. But what if her crusade against US tech is no more than a reflection of the increasingly high-stakes lobbying game played in Brussels by non-European tech giants?
Google's declared EU lobbying costs, between 5.25 million and 5.5 million euros in 2016, the latest year for which data have been available.

طفيل أحمد: الفتوى الباكستانية الرسمية ضد الجهاد هي كاذبة وخادعة ولا معنى لها والعالم سيكون افضل من دونها
The Pakistani State's Official Fatwa Against Jihad Is Bogus, Deceptive, And Meaningless; The World Will Be Better Without It
By: Tufail Ahmad/MEMRI/March 02/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/62919
Introduction
On January 16, 2018, the government of Pakistan unveiled a fatwa ("Islamic decree"), which was described as the Pakistani "nation's unanimous declaration to counter extremism and end terrorism."[1] Media reports said that the fatwa was seconded by more than 1,800 Islamic scholars.[2] The fatwa is published as a book called Paigham-e-Pakistan ("The Message Of Pakistan"), written by the researchers of the Islamic Research Institute at the International Islamic University, Islamabad (IIUI). The revision and endorsement of the 121-page book, as noted in it, was carried out by "eminent scholars of all schools of thought, muftis [jurists] and professors of national universities."
The draft of "The Message Of Pakistan" was presented at a seminar on May 26, 2017. At the seminar, a joint declaration and a fatwa were also released. Later, religious scholars from divergent schools of Islam discussed and approved "The Message Of Pakistan," which will be referred to in this article as the Fatwa. "The Message identifies the problems faced by the State of Pakistan and provides basis to devise a strategy to achieve the goals of Objectives Resolution," the preface says and adds: "This document is now published with the approval of the State of Pakistan to implement it as a bisic [sic] national code of conduct." The Objectives Resolution refers to a code which, in short, led to the Islamization of the Pakistani state and unleashed religious extremism in Pakistani society.
The Fatwa was released at a function in Islamabad presided over by Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain and attended by Islamic scholars, academics, and government ministers. Releasing the Fatwa, President Hussain said: "The Pakistani nation's foundational declaration is the Constitution of Pakistan which was prepared in the light of the Koran and the Sunnah and the thoughts of the Father of the Nation M.A. Jinnah, and which is trusted by the entire nation. Whereas, the Islamic scholars' Fatwa illustrates and seconds [the Constitution]."[3]
Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal, speaking also on the occasion, stated: "If we want to correct our direction for the future, it is necessary that society is peaceful and stable because without them we cannot embark on this journey"; "Pakistan was not created so it could be just one more addition to a list of the world's poorest countries"; "The Fatwa will provide a platform for national unity... So that in the 21st century, we can make Pakistan a distinguished country, an Asian tiger..."[4] Despite this noble goal, a running deception behind this Fatwa, as discussed below, is its total silence about how Islam treats religious minorities.
The Fatwa – Or "The Message Of Pakistan"
The 121-page book is divided into the following sections: the Message from the President Mamnoon Hussain; the Preface written by Prof. Dr. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq of IIUI; Chapter 1 – Islamic Code of Conduct; Chapter 2 – Islamic Republic of Pakistan; Chapter 3 – The State of Pakistan and Challenges Faced by Pakistani Society; Chapter 4 – Joint Declaration; Chapter 5 – Unanimous Fatwa. Chapter 5 contains the fatwa that was issued at the seminar held on May 26, 2017, and comprises the following sub-sections: 5.1 Request for Fatwa (Istifta), 5.2 Unanimous Fatwa (Response to Istifta), 5.3 Unanimous Fatwa: Key Points. Chapters 6 through 10 give the names of over 1,800 researchers, writers, and Islamic scholars who have written or endorsed the Fatwa.
Chapter 1 – Islamic Code Of Conduct
Chapter 1 is a discussion of the Islamic code of living. It begins with the Koranic idea that Allah sent prophets and messengers to all communities "at regional level and not at global or international level" – "inasmuch as their messages were limited to the communities for which they were sent." Koran verse 30:47 is cited: "We did indeed send, before thee, messengers to their (respective) peoples." Then the argument moves on. "When it was time for the world to shift from localism to globalism," it notes, "a comprehensive and complete code of life," i.e. Islam, was sent through Prophet Muhammad. It cites Koran verse 21:107 – "We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures" – to buttress the argument that the Prophet was sent for all of mankind.
Once the argument that the Prophet was sent for all is established, problems emerge. "The aim of Islamic system of worship is to raise the spirit of being subservient to Allah," it notes, which would mean that all humans, Muslims or non-Muslims, pray before Allah. It states that Islam's purpose is "to promote such high moral values that are reserved for welfare, national unity through fulfilling the rights and obligations, upholding a just system in the society." Based on this point, it says the Prophet "started to implement revelation-based just system in Medani [i.e. of Medina] society in 622 CE" as a result of which many tribes such as "the Aws, Khazraj, immigrants and other non-Muslim Arab clans became united under the political leadership of Prophet Muhammad."
This is a problematic area. The chapter notes: "Under this situation, the Jews were the only people who were outside the sphere of this social system. When the Prophet... invited Jews into this social system, it became impossible for them to reject the offer for their own survival and other security reasons." Here it avoids mentioning how between 700 and 900 Jews of the tribe of Banu Qurayzah were surrounded and finally butchered one by one for failing, by not upholding an agreement, to be part of the Medani political system.[5] It lauds the view that the principle of equality under the Treaty of Medina allowed everyone to be equal and "equalised the blood money of Banu Qurayzah with the other clans of Jews [like Banu Qaynuqa, who were higher in the social ranks and required less blood money]."
Cover page of the Fatwa issued by Pakistan.
Chapter 1 discusses how the Prophet "established such a society in the city of Medina where Muslims, Jews and non-Muslim Arabs developed relationship based on justice, equality and fulfillment of rights and obligations with no discrimination." Several verses from the Koran are cited to forward the argument that such an Islamic society was and must be based on the following principles: fairness and justice (verse 5:8), gods of other religions must not be reviled (verse 6:108), non-Muslims should be invited into the fold of Islam through arguments and good deeds (verse 16:15), humans should walk the earth with humbleness (verse 17:37), forgiveness is better than revenge (verse 42:40), human dignity must be protected (verse 5:32), etc.
This chapter's key conclusion is: "In this system of social justice, non-Muslims, women and children are specifically protected." While this argument itself is valid, this chapter fails to shed light on the biggest criticism of Islam that it protects minority groups only when they surrender before the political authority of the Islamic state, and their good treatment by Muslims comes only when they pay jizya (the Islamic tax on non-Muslims) or convert to Islam. Pakistan's own record on this point is bad: Pakistani citizens who are not Muslims are not permitted by law to become the president of Pakistan – a point President Hussain avoids mentioning in his Message in the Fatwa.
Chapter 2 – Islamic Republic Of Pakistan
Chapter 2 is a discussion of the historical context in which Pakistan was created out of the Indian subcontinent. It makes a factual statement: "Muslims ruled Subcontinent for centuries but they never tried to convert its inhabitants to Islam by coercion. At the time when Muslims took over the rule in the Subcontinent, during their reign and after the end of their rule in the region non-Muslims remained in majority." It notes that the Muslim rulers lost decisively in the War of 1857 to the British, who realized in the early decades of the 20th century that they must leave India to the Indians by introducing a model of "British democracy."
The essential characteristic of all modern democracies is that citizens – irrespective of their race, religion, caste, gender, or other primordial identities – are equal. However, the unwritten argument that Islam does not accept a system of government in which non-Muslims can live as equals is buttressed again by Chapter 2. It observes that when the British were leaving, "Muslims of the region realized that this scenario will result in Hindu rule in the Subcontinent making Muslims once again subjects of a non-Muslim government." This is a problematic argument because it means that Muslims will never be willing to live under non-Muslims even if they were given equal status as citizens in a democracy, and also that non-Muslims in an Islamic state must live as second-class citizens, or dhimmis. That is, they must live as minorities, but not as equals. The president of Pakistan, who wrote his Message to accompany this Fatwa, needs to explain why a non-Muslim Pakistani citizen cannot become the president of the Pakistani state. Until he explains this, this Fatwa remains, by any definition, bogus.
"To avoid this situation [i.e. the situation under democracy in which Muslims and non-Muslims could be equal partners], Muslims started their struggle to achieve an independent state where Muslims could live their lives as per their own culture," this chapter observes, adding that the state of Pakistan was created "as an Islamic Republic" – "first of its kind after the state of Medina [by Prophet Muhammad]" – due to a mass political movement birthed by Pakistan's Islamist national poet Muhammad Iqbal and M.A. Jinnah, the founder. Although Pakistan emerged as an "Islamic Republic," it is interesting that this Fatwa describes Pakistan as an Islamic State, with a capitalized S – the name used by the jihadi group Islamic State (ISIS).
Jinnah advocated the creation of a Pakistani society and legal system based on the teachings of the Koran and Sunnah where ijtihad – consensus by reasoning as a source of law-making in Islam – played a vital role. But, this chapter soon sinks into victimhood by arguing that Pakistan became bedevilled by various problems and notes: "India unjustly occupied the territory of Kashmir." This is historically incorrect because in 1947-48, the Kashmiris – who were not part of Pakistan and India – saw Pakistanis as invaders and their Hindu king requested military help from India. Soon, this chapter lends support to the Islamist arguments when it notes that the first Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan presented the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949, in the constituent assembly.
The Resolution, now part of the Pakistani constitution, is the main source of religious extremism in Pakistani society. In 2010, noted Canadian-Pakistani academic Izzud-Din Pal wrote an article titled "Objectives Resolution: the root of religious orthodoxy" in which he noted: "When the Objectives Resolution was introduced, the country was known as Pakistan, not Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Its structure was republican... This structure is still western and democratic, and distinction between Muslims and minorities is out of tune with it. Pakistan has not succeeded in reconciling these two conflicting objectives. In this sense, the religious leaders have a consistent position. Their concept of Islamic state leaves the decision-making to a few 'pious' citizens [i.e. Muslims]."[6]
M.A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan (image courtesy: The News, Pakistan).
Article 2A of the Pakistani Constitution states: "The principles and provisions set out in the Objectives Resolution reproduced in the Annex are hereby made substantive part of the Constitution and shall have effect accordingly."[7] The Resolution invests the authority of Allah in the state of Pakistan, observing: "The authority... [Allah] has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him" and in a system under such an authority "Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Koran and the Sunnah."[8]
Chapter 2 celebrates the Objectives Resolution which, it says, "provided a framework for the constitution of Pakistan and established that the principles provided by Islam... so that people of Pakistan could live their individual and social lives in accordance with the injunctions of the Holy Koran and Sunnah." It also notes: "Rights of Muslims and non-Muslims are guaranteed in the Objectives Resolution and it had been decided that all citizens of Pakistan shall enjoy equal status." But, this so-called equal status is flouted by Article 2 of the Pakistani Constitution, which declares: "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan," and by Article 41 (2) which states: "A person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim." The Fatwa will die an infant if the Objectives Resolution is not eliminated, along with Articles 2 and 41(2). All three of these points are relevant to how non-Muslims are governed, or rather mistreated, under Islam.
This chapter leaves a wide field open for Islamic clerics by arguing that no law can be passed in Pakistan "which is against the teachings of Islam" and "existing laws shall also be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam." This labored point is intended to counter arguments by jihadi groups that Pakistan is not an Islamic state. "The youth is usually misled by the anti-state elements [i.e. jihadi groups] by deluding them that governing system of Pakistan is un-Islamic and constitution of Pakistan is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam," it notes. Even the Fatwa's argument that jihadi groups are anti-state is invalid. It is established that the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) births, nurtures, and shelters jihadi leaders, from Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar to Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Hakartul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin, and Jaish-e-Muhammad founder Maulana Masood Azhar, among numerous others.[9]
This chapter also observes that the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) – a constitutional body – has declared 95 percent of the laws to be compliant with Islam. The remaining five percent means: "Despite several achievements of Pakistan, we are still far from achieving our goals and objectives that were set in the Objectives Resolution."
hapter 3 – The State Of Pakistan And Challenges Faced By Pakistani Society
Chapter 3 begins a discussion of issues involving the narratives of jihadi groups. It states: "the use of force, armed escalation against the state, terrorist activities and all forms of anarchy, that our country [Pakistan] is facing, are strictly prohibited in Shari'ah and considered rebellion." It adds: "This sort of war is not only against an Islamic State [sic] but also against Allah and His Messenger [Prophet Muhammad]." A question begins to arise if all forms of armed rebellion against an Islamic state are extremism. The Fatwa does not answer how the armed rebellion by Aisha, the wife of Muhammad, against the fourth Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib would be classified. Unless the Fatwa comes out with a nuanced view on the issue of rebellion, it leaves a wide scope for jihadis to put forward their own counter arguments.
It seems the Fatwa is inspired by the Pakistani army's, specifically that of the ISI, doctrine of necessity, which becomes clear when Chapter 3 sees only the "anti-state" argument as valid. This would mean that the Islamic Emirate (the Afghan Taliban organization), Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Hizbul Mujahideen – all of which are not against the Pakistani state or the ISI – are not terrorist groups and therefore legitimate in the eyes of the state of Pakistan. This is, let's not forget, an official Fatwa issued by the Pakistani state. This chapter says: "Anti-state forces rebelled against the State of Medina, immediately after the death of the Prophet, which Abu Bakr... crushed successfully." It cites Koran verse 5:33, which forbids rebellion against Allah, who in turn has vested his authority in the state of Pakistan, as the Objectives Resolution notes.
Chapter 3 urges Muslims to "do their own struggle against those elements who are fighting against Pakistani armed forces" and notes that Islamic jurists believe hirabah ("unlawful war") is a punishable crime. "Muslim scholars are in agreement that even if a ruler is reluctant to implement Shari'ah, still no one has the right to do armed struggle against him," it says. It cites Koran verses 49:9-10 in support of this. These verses are quoted: "If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah..." These verses allow one group of Muslims to fight against another group of Muslims, and therefore defeat the key argument of this chapter. Though cited with good intentions, such verses can be used equally by the jihadi groups to crush those Muslims who differ with them.
It cites Koran verses against divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims, or between Muslim sects, which could mean a call to war to end these differences. It quotes verse 3:105 – "Be not like those who are divided amongst themselves and fall into disputations after receiving Clear Signs..." – and verses 30:31-32 – "Turn ye back in repentance to Him, and fear Him: establish regular prayers, and be not ye among those [non-Muslims] who join gods with Allah – Those who split up their Religion, and become (mere) Sects..." Some of this chapter's arguments, which are well known, include that non-Muslims, women, the elderly, and those who are not warriors must not be killed. It notes that the second Caliph Abu Bakr sent troops to the Levant (present-day Syria region) and ordered them "not to kill any woman, child or old person and do not cut fruit trees, not to destroy any population center and not to kill or injure any animal unless you need it for your food."
The Objectives Resolution forms part of the Pakistani Constitution.
Chapter 3 introduces a very short discussion of jihad, noting: "Terrorists do not differentiate between jihad and traditional wars." It distinguishes between two types of jihad. The first is qital, "which under specific circumstances is the responsibility of the State," and the second is harb, which is traditional warfare. It does not offer a clear distinction between the two, except for stating that the Prophet's life shows that qital was an exception. It states: "Islamic jurists are of the opinion that qital is not mandatory under normal situations. Rather, it is partially obligatory (Farz kifayah). Therefore, it is required that qital should only be declared by the State." It still means that an Islamic state can order qital under "normal situations."
One of the key arguments jihadi groups have advanced is that different states ruled by Muslim rulers are not Shari'ah-compliant and therefore Muslims cannot depend on such states to issue a call for jihad. The Fatwa under review also admits that in the case of Pakistan, too, about five percent of the country's laws are still not Shari'ah-compliant, thereby opening space for jihadi groups to fill this gap. It says the Koranic injunction "of helping others in the matters of good and piety is completely ignored" by extremist groups, but does not cite any Koran verse. To be fair, Koran verses do teach fairness, justice, and brotherhood, though there are also verses contrary to these teachings.
Some Koran verses are also cited to argued that citizen charters and international covenants must be upheld by Muslims. However, such arguments are forwarded to strengthen the hand of the Pakistani state. The unwritten argument throughout this Fatwa remains: Terrorist groups functioning under the ISI's command can continue to operate, notably in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Chapter 4 – Joint Declaration
Chapter 4 is a joint declaration by the writers of the Fatwa and the Islamic scholars who endorsed it – some of them with their additional notes. Based on the discussions in Chapters 1 through 3, there are 22 clauses, or steps, forwarded by these scholars to be followed by Pakistani people and officials in the light of the Koran and the Sunnah. These clauses are given below, along with arguments on why and how they fail humanity at large, especially non-Muslim Pakistani citizens:
1. The Constitution of Pakistan is "Islamic" and "every Pakistani must fulfil his/her oath of loyalty with the State of Pakistan in every situation." It is unclear why a Pakistani non-Muslim citizen should support a constitution that is openly religiously discriminatory.
2. "All citizens have the guarantee to fundamental rights within the parameters of law" including in matters of belief, worship, and freedom of assembly. This is flouted by a 1974 Pakistani law forbidding Ahmadi Muslims from worshipping as they believe and deems them infidels.
3. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is "an Islamic state" and "no law shall be enacted in Pakistan against the dictates of the Holy Koran and Sunnah." Such a religiously prejudiced clause makes non-Muslim Pakistani citizens subservient to Islam and impinges on their religious freedom.
4. "Peaceful efforts for the implementation of the injunctions of the Holy Koran and Sunnah is the religious obligation of every Muslim. This right is given to him by the Constitution of Pakistan and it is not prohibited in the country." This clause empowers every Pakistani Muslim to start implementing Islamic shari'a as interpreted by them.
5. "[T]here is no justification to declare personnel of the government, military or other security agencies as infidels [for their negligence in implementing the Pakistani constitution]. There is no justification in Shari'ah to launch any armed activity against them." All Islamic clerics in Pakistan today say that Ahmadi Muslims are infidels and therefore demand that they be removed from government and military positions. Are such clerics who endorsed the fatwa not jihadis?
6. This clause notes that Pakistan's war against terrorism is supported by "ulama [Islamic scholars], mashaikh [Sufi mystics] and people from all walks of life are in full solidarity with armed forces." Contrary to this, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, the country's largest religious organization, has refused to call Pakistani soldiers martyrs and says that slain Taliban leaders are martyrs.[10]
7. "The fatwa with the title of 'qatl-e na haq' (unjust killing), declaring suicide attacks absolutely prohibited (haram qat'i), issued by the representatives of all religious schools of thought in the light of Shari'ah is fully endorsed." This point seems to refer to a 2010 fatwa. However, most Pakistani fatwas have rejected such terror actions only inside Pakistan, not in Afghanistan or Kashmir.
8. "Sectarian hatred [between Shias and Sunnis], armed sectarian conflict and imposing one's ideology on others by force is in clear violation of the injunctions of Shari'ah and is disorder on earth." This is right in principle. But even noted Pakistani-Canadian cleric Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri, notwithstanding his own fatwa against jihad, has said Shias are from among the infidels.[11]
9. "All public and private educational institutions must not impart any hostile military education or training, hatred, extremism and violence." In principle, this point is just. In practice, all provincial governments have published school textbooks that teach hate against Pakistani Hindus, Christians, and other religious minorities.[12]
10. "It is imperative to take administrative steps and do intellectual jihad against extremist mindset." This is good in intention. But in practice, jihadi units such as Idarat-ul-Pakistan are nurtured inside the Pakistani military, notably as revealed by Pakistani Taliban militant Adnan Rasheed, a former staff of the Pakistan Air Force.[13]
11. "[I]n accordance with the Islamic teachings and the law of land no one is permitted to speak or write against any person, institution or school of thought using insolence, hatred or baseless allegations." It remains to be seen what Islamic scholars who endorsed the Fatwa will say about numerous hateful references to kuffar ("unbelievers") and mushrikeen ("idolaters") in the Koran.
12. "Sections 295-298 of Pakistan Penal Code shall be fully enforced in its letter and spirit..." This set of laws, especially 295-C, which prescribes the death penalty for blasphemy, has become a major issue in Pakistani society where cases against non-Muslims are routinely filed on false accusations of blaspheming against Islamic personalities. Unless Pakistan removes its blasphemy laws, no progress can be made and this Fatwa will remain meaningless in its intention. In fact, this clause seems to be a total surrender before Islamic clerics in Pakistan.
13. "It is the responsibility of an Alim [Islamic scholar] and Mufti [Islamic jurist] to explain Shari'ah ruling on clear statements of infidelity [i.e. whether a person has become infidel], but to decide about someone that he/she has committed infidelity is the prerogative of judiciary." This clause in this Fatwa effectively makes the Pakistani judiciary subservient to every Islamic cleric.
14. "[T]he land of Pakistan at no time shall be allowed to be used for the propagation of any kind of terrorism, intellectual and practical training of terrorists, recruitment of terrorists, conducting terrorist activities in other countries and other such ulterior motives." Contrary to this official Fatwa, the Pakistani state is routinely and publicly allowing jihadi group Jaish-e-Muhammad to run teaching courses on "jihadi verses" across Pakistan as of February 2018.[14]
15. This clause in the joint declaration states: "Schools of thought and juristic denominations are there among Muslims from the early period of Islam"; "Ethics of disagreement shall be made part of the curriculum of public and private educational institutions." This is an honorable goal.
16. "[T]he state institutions and their officials are also bound to perform their duties in accordance with true Islamic teachings." This clause opens a wide field for government officials to interpret their religious actions as per their beliefs. Perhaps for this reason, the Islamabad High Court banned celebrations of Valentine's Day in 2016 and extended the ban this year.[15]
17. This clause sets a noble goal: "Building upon Islamic principles, the reconstruction of Pakistani society is imperative where democracy, liberty, equality, tolerance, harmony, mutual respect and justice are ensured. So that congenial atmosphere for peaceful coexistence is achieved."
18. This is a religiously prejudiced clause. It states: "Human dignity and respect for Muslims are to be ensured." As an aside, it also notes: "Further, to protect the rights of senior citizens, women, children, hermaphrodites, and all other underprivileged classes it is necessary to implement Shari'ah rulings on official and unofficial levels." It is extremely sad that this entire 121-page Fatwa is so prejudiced and hateful that it does not even consider the need to mention Pakistani Hindus, Pakistani Christians, Pakistani Sikhs, and Pakistani Jews (some live anonymously).
19. Further to Clause 18, this clause again does not deem that Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and Jews are words that should exist in Pakistan. But, it does mention: "Non-Muslims living in Pakistan enjoy all such civil and legal rights for the protection of their life, property and dignity that their fellow Muslims avail within the bounds of law and constitution." Practically, none of these rights, not even dignity, is available to non-Muslim Pakistanis. Even the word "minority" is pejorative and hateful in Pakistani society. Practically, Islam protects minorities only when it rules over them.
20. This clause is about women's rights as protected by Islam, but it is specifically about Muslim women and does not say anything about non-Muslim Pakistani women. It states: "In accordance with the teachings of Islam, women have right to vote, education and employment." This will effectively mean that non-Muslim Pakistani women's rights are not protected.
21. A major issue in Islamic societies nowadays is the use of loudspeakers and television by religious scholars to outdo rival sects. This clause states: "All forms of illegal use of loudspeaker shall be discouraged"; "Legal action shall be taken against the hate speeches delivered from the platform of mosque"; "Polemical discussions on religious topics on television channels are reprehensible and shall be declared cognizable crime." It remains to be seen how these points will be implemented.
22. This clause is meant to curb freedom of thought and expression in Pakistani society. It states: "Right of freedom of expression of the electronic media shall be regulated by law"; "Every program that damages Islamic identity of Pakistan shall be banned."
Chapters 6 through 10 give the names of writers and clerics who endorsed the Fatwa.
Chapter 5 – Unanimous Fatwa (May 26, 2017)
"The Message of Pakistan" also includes a fatwa issued by Islamic clerics at a May 26, 2017 seminar. This fatwa is included in Chapter 5. A fatwa is usually an Islamic legal opinion given in response to a question, or a set of questions. The 2017 fatwa was delivered in response to the following five questions: 1. "Whether Pakistan is an Islamic state or an un-Islamic state? Further, can a state be declared un-Islamic and its government and armed forces as non-Muslim if Shari'ah is not implemented in its entirety?" 2. " Under the given circumstances, is armed rebellion against the government or army permissible, in the name of struggle for implementation of Shari'ah?" 3. "Whether the Holy Koran and Sunnah provide any justification for suicide attacks that are being carried out all over Pakistan in the name of implementation of Shari'ah and jihad?" 4. "If the answer to the above three questions is in negative, then whether the actions taken by the government and armed forces of Pakistan to combat insurrection are permissible according to Shari'ah? Should the Muslims come forward and support these actions?" 5. "Several armed sectarian clashes are also taking place in our country aiming to impose one's ideology on others by force. Are these activities justified in Shari'ah?"
The 2017 fatwa mirrors the arguments in Chapters 1 through 4 discussed above, but there are additional points. In response to the first question, it says Pakistan is an Islamic state because "Article 31 of the Constitution provides detailed policy principles to enable the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the Islamic way of life" and "in Article 227 it is affirmed that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Koran and Sunnah." It also notes that "merely due to some functional issues" declaring Pakistan "as infidel is not permissible, rather it is a sin."
To the second question, it responds: "Armed struggle against Pakistani government or its armed forces certainly fall within the category of rebellion that is categorically Haram (illegal) as per the Shari'ah." It also quotes a hadith (Sahih Muslim, Hadith No. 4768) according to which Prophet Muhammad said that a person can condemn an act of a ruler if he "indulges in an act of disobedience of Allah" but "should not withdraw himself from his obedience." In response to the third question, the 2017 fatwa quotes the Koran verse 4:29 – "And do not kill yourselves" – and declares that "suicide is unacceptable in Islam." Similarly, it says a suicide attack to kill "another believer [i.e. Muslim]" is like a double crime forbidden by Koran verse 4:93, which says: "Whoever kills a believer deliberately – his recompense is Hell..."
It also presents a third scenario in which a non-Muslim is killed, not necessarily in a suicide attack, in an Islamic state. It quotes the Prophet Muhammad as saying that such killing violates "the covenant with Allah." All three types of suicide attacks discussed here fall silent on and therefore approve of killing non-Muslims in a non-Islamic state, notably in Kashmir. It is also interesting that the entire 121-page document is silent on the situation in Afghanistan. Since the discussion in the entire book is about Pakistan as the Islamic state, this silence potentially means that such suicide attacks are permitted in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It is known for sure that in the post-9/11 years Islamic clerics have issued many fatwas against jihad, forbidding it only in Pakistan. There is no mention of "Afghanistan" and "Kashmir" in the entire discussion within the context of the subject at issue: extremisms and jihad.
In response to the fourth question, the 2017 fatwa declares that anyone fighting against the government "in the name of implementation of Shari'ah" is "committing High Treason" against an Islamic state. To the fifth question, it declares that it is haram to kill each other on the basis of sectarian (Sunni-Shia) differences, and interestingly upholds Pakistan's controversial blasphemy laws, which have become a source of daily nightmare for Pakistani non-Muslims. This 2017 fatwa was endorsed by the Jamia Naeemia madrassa of Karachi, with an "additional note," which in effect is not additional and practically supports the above line of argument to serve the Pakistani military and its ISI.
A 9-point summary of Chapter 5 also endorses the Pakistani military line. The peoples of India and Afghanistan, who are on the receiving end of the Pakistani military-sponsored jihadi war, will find absolutely nothing in this 121-page Message of Pakistan. If the state of Pakistan is sincere in offering equality and peace to non-Muslims within Pakistan itself, here is what it must do as a first step: abolish Article 41 (2) which states: "A person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim." This will allow a non-Muslim Pakistani citizen to become the president of Pakistan and revolutionize the principle of equality that Islamic clerics say Islam teaches.
* Tufail Ahmad is Senior Fellow for the MEMRI Islamism and Counter-Radicalization Initiative.
[1] Roznama Ummat (Pakistan), January 17, 2018. In this dispatch, the spelling of English words and names within quotes has been standardized to conform to American English.
[2] Roznama Express (Pakistan), January 17, 2018.
[3] Roznama Ummat (Pakistan), January 17, 2018.
[4] Dawn.com (Pakistan), January 16, 2018.
[5] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 6078 Article By MEMRI Scholar Tufail Ahmad: Lies, Duplicity And Deceit In The Name Of Allah, June 19, 2015.
[6] Dawn.com (Pakistan), June 20, 2010.
[7] The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (as modified up to February 28, 2012) http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf, accessed February 24, 2018.
[8] The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (as modified up to February 28, 2012) http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf, accessed February 24, 2018.
[9] Firstpost.com, September 26, 2016.
[10] The Express Tribune (Pakistan), November 13, 2013.
[11] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 920 The Ideology And Politics Of Pakistani Religious Leader Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, January 15, 2013.
[12] See MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1020 Textbooks In Pakistani Government Schools Teaching Hate Against Christians And Hindus, Jihad And Martyrdom To Young Students, September 30, 2013.
[13] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 6128 Article By MEMRI Scholar Tufail Ahmad: 'Pakistan's Continuing War Against Indian Civilization', August 7, 2015.
[14] See MEMRI JTTM report Jaish-e-Muhammad Organizes Courses On 'Jihadi Verses' In Pakistani Towns Of Bahawalpur, Peshawar, Nowshera, Faisalabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, February 14, 2018.
[15] The Nation (Pakistan), February 15, 2018.

Kuwait’s homegrown priest celebrates Bible and bedouin culture
قسيس كويتي يمارس مهامه الكنسية في الكويت بحرية كاملة منذ 18 سنة
AFP/ِArab Times/March 02/2018
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/62928
KUWAIT CITY: Dressed in a traditional white Gulf headdress and with two red crosses embroidered on his black clerical robe, Kuwait’s first homegrown priest cuts a unique figure in the predominantly Muslim emirate.
Father Emmanuel Benjamin Jacob Gharib, 68, celebrates both the Bible and Gulf Arab culture with his Christian congregation in Kuwait City.
In an interview with AFP ahead of the 20th anniversary of his ordination, he stressed the level of acceptance he has felt from fellow Kuwaitis.
“Everyone welcomes me wherever I go,” said Father Emmanuel.
Born in the Qibla district of Kuwait City, Gharib was raised in a devout Christian family and surrounded by mostly Muslim neighbors.
Like many Christian Kuwaitis, his roots lie elsewhere in the Middle East.
The priest’s father was born to an Assyrian family in southeast Turkey but forced to flee Ottoman massacres against the Armenian and Assyrian Christian minorities.
The Red Cross took his father to Iraq, where he would eventually wed Gharib’s mother — a fellow Assyrian — in the northern city of Mosul in 1945.
With the former Ottoman cities reeling from the upheaval of World War I, the couple decided to build their future in Kuwait.
They raised four girls and three boys — the eldest Emmanuel — in a religious environment, taking them to Sunday School each week.
They always felt close to their Muslim neighbors.
Priesthood
Emmanuel Gharib was not always destined for the priesthood.
He graduated from engineering school with a degree in geology in 1971 and soon found a job at the Kuwaiti oil ministry.
Ten years into his career, Emmanuel Gharib and his wife took part in a religious conference in Kuwait.
“That was the turning point,” he said. “That was where the Lord changed my life... where I was born again and began my journey with Jesus Christ.”
He quit his job and embarked in 1989 on a theology degree at the Evangelical Theological Seminary in Cairo.
He was ordained as a priest in 1999 and subsequently elected to head the National Evangelical Church of Kuwait, becoming the first and only Gulf Arab priest.
Father Emmanuel also serves as vice president of the Islamic-Christian Relations Council in Kuwait, which he co-founded in 2009.
Evangelical Church
Father Emmanuel’s own landmark next year will coincide with the 85th anniversary of the Evangelical Church in Kuwait.
But the presence of Christians in Kuwait dates back even further, to the arrival of American Evangelical missionaries and the founding of the American Mission Hospital in the early 1900s, he said.
Kuwaiti “society began to have a positive view of the missionaries during the Battle of Jahra because the Mission Hospital played a big role in treating the wounded,” Father Emmanuel said, referring to Kuwait’s 1920 battle against Saudi-backed Wahhabi militants.
Over the past century, Christians have immigrated from Turkey, Iraq and Palestine during periods of upheaval, gaining citizenship under a 1959 Nationality Law, although a later law banned non-Muslims from naturalization.
At the last count, according to Father Emmanuel, Kuwait has 264 native Christians from eight extended families, out of a total native population of 1.35 million.
The local Christian population is dwarfed by 900,000 expatriate workers of various Christian denominations and nationalities — from Lebanese to Filipinos.
Unlike Saudi Arabia which bans the construction of churches, Christians of different denominations are “free to practice” in several churches and Kuwait City municipality has provided land to bury their dead, he said.
Christian Kuwaitis say they feel a greater sense of identification with one of their own as priest.
“An Egyptian or Lebanese priest performs the same liturgy but a Kuwaiti priest can communicate the teachings of the Bible in the Kuwaiti dialect,” said Abu Nader, a 63-year-old parishioner.
For 54-year-old Eyad Noman: “Our relationship with him is very strong... He is one of us.”

Why Iranian regime should face justice over Syria
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/March 02/ 2018
There has been debate recently over sending some Syrian leaders to face the International Criminal Court in order to prosecute those who have committed war crimes. But little attention has been given to other state actors who actually play the same role, if not more intensively, by committing or facilitating heinous crimes against Syrian civilians.
The Iranian regime is typically involved in military operations across Syria through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite branch the Quds Force, along with domestic and foreign militias. Even the Iranian leaders have admitted their direct military role in the Syrian war. Soldiers from the IRGC, as well as military advisers and trainers, are ubiquitous in Syria, dominating and significantly influencing the local political and military command-and-control systems, as well as often appearing on the front lines.
Regarding the latest bombing and massacre in Ghouta, the Iranian regime even showed its desire to escalate the war and civilian casualties by ignoring the UN ceasefire. Appearing unconcerned with the deaths of civilians, including many women and children, Gen. Mohammed Baqeri, Iran’s military chief of staff, pointed out defiantly that pro-Damascus forces will continue the assault despite the truce, which is aimed at allowing aid access and medical evacuations.
Without the Iranian regime’s financial, political, military, advisory and intelligence assistance, Syria’s leaders would not have been capable of committing war crimes at such an extensive level. Efforts should be made to hold not only the Syrian officials, but also their main backers — the Iranian leaders — to account.
To do so, realistically, there exists several obstacles that can only be overcome with robust leadership. One of the major issues is that, while Iran is a signatory to the ICC’s Rome Statute, it has not yet ratified the treaty. This means there are two other options that need to be pursued in order to investigate Iran’s role: Either the Iranian regime has to give jurisdiction to the ICC, or the ICC would require a referral from the United Nations Security Council.
It goes without saying that the Iranian regime would not voluntarily accept ICC jurisdiction, since it is fully aware of its direct and indirect involvement in the Syrian war. Hence, the other members of the Security Council ought to pressure Russia publicly in order to allow such a referral and to uphold justice.
Many believe that the ICC is the only judicial mechanism to addressing war crimes in Syria, but many states also have the alternative of creating an international committee or tribunal to hold the Iranian leaders accountable.
Senior leaders and IRGC generals have been operating with impunity and must be taken before the International Criminal Court to be held accountable for war crimes.
An international tribunal might not be as powerful as the ICC but, if it indicted those senior Iranian leaders who are responsible for war crimes in Syria, other states could pursue various steps to hold those leaders accountable; such as freezing their assets, issuing visa bans against them, and refraining from negotiating with them. This approach can be powerful in delegitimizing these individuals and the Iranian regime in the international arena.
If there is a consensus to take this path, there are many countries that would be willing to bring these war criminals to justice. Remember that the Arab League has previously called for accountability in Syria, including a referral to the ICC and calls for “fair international trials.” Formerly, 64 countries, alongside the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Syrian National Coalition, supported investigating those who are committing war crimes in Syria.
Finally, it is worth noting that individual states or international organizations can also utilize the legal concept of “universal jurisdiction.” Applying this indicates that, regardless of individual nationality, states or international organizations can claim jurisdiction over state and non-state actors who commit grave breaches of international laws, such as massacres, war crimes and torture.
History has proved that peace, stability and security will not be fully obtained without criminal indictments of those military generals, politicians and militia leaders who commit horrific war crimes. When people observe that justice has been done, this would be the beginning of peace, and with less antagonism and incentive to take the law into one’s own hands in order to punish the perpetrators.
Senior Iranian leaders and IRGC generals, who are directly or indirectly involved in war crimes in Syria, should not be allowed to continue operating with impunity. Bringing them to justice would be the first step toward addressing the Syrian situation. It is incumbent on the ICC, the UN Security Council, the international community and individual states to hold them accountable.
**Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. He serves on the boards of the Harvard International Review, the Harvard International Relations Council and the US-Middle East Chamber for Commerce and Business. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh