LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 02/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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The Mullahs and the Tale of a Betrayal
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al-Awsat/June 01/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/65066/amir-taheri-the-mullahs-and-the-tale-of-a-betrayal-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9/
Until last week I thought that while President Obama was selling the American establishment a bill of goods on his cute “Iran nuke deal”, in Tehran President Hassan Rouhani was telling the truth, at least to his boss Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. After all Rouhani has a doctorate in Islamic Theology from the Caledonian College in Scotland and, as a good Muslim, wouldn’t tell anything but the truth.
Obama was telling the Americans that his “historic deal” had blocked all avenues for Iran to develop a nuclear arsenal forever without firing a shot. He even cited a “fatwa” by the Islamic Republic’s “Supreme Guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbidding all nuclear weapons. The fact that no one apart Obama himself claimed to have seen the “fatwa” was neither here nor there. After all, a US president wouldn’t tell a fib on so important a matter.
So you can imagine my disappointment when I found out that Obama hadn’t been alone in deceiving his side of the bizarre show and that Rouhani, too, had been economic with the truth to the point of leading the ayatollah up the garden path.
By all accounts Khamenei was angry enough to expose Rouhani as a turbaned version of Pinocchio in public. Having summoned 220 top civilian and military officials to review the consequences of the virtual collapse of the so-called “nuke deal” Khamenei demanded that Rouhani provide report on how things stand now.
In 2015, Rouhani had described the “nuke deal” as “the greatest diplomatic victory in the history of Islam.” Last week, in his report to Khamenei, he was as boastful but even less truthful.
“In the latest event, meaning its leaving of a multilateral international accord, America has suffered a new political, legal and moral defeat, the Glasgow theologian boasted.
“As a result the Islamic Republic of Iran has scored yet another political, legal and moral victory.”
Rouhani’s boast was so brazen that Khamenei decided to break his silence even if that meant pointing the finger at his president for being economical with the truth.
“But did we enter those negotiations to unmask the Americans?” Khamenei demanded. Was that out negotiating aim? Or did we enter negotiations, as told at the time, to have sanctions lifted? As you see sanctions haven’t been lifted and they are now threatening to restore the few sanctions that had been suspended.”
According to accounts of the stormy meeting, part of which presented in official media in Tehran, Rouhani manifested a degree of chutzpah that even mullahs might admire. He claimed that there was little to worry about because “all countries in the world apart from a few tiny or illegitimate ones, and especially the European nations have sided with Iran.”
Khamenei, however, wouldn’t be led up the garden path, even if that meant pointing the finger at his president as a consummate affabulatore.
“We don’t want to pick a quarrel with the Europeans,” the ayatollah said. “But we must know the truth that the three European nations, Britain, Germany and France, will always follow America on all sensitive issues. You remember the ugly gesture of the French foreign minister who said the Europeans were playing good cop to the American bad cop. These people say something and when it comes to action do something else.”
The short clips shown of the encounter indicate no reduction in Rouhani’s chutzpah. Looking for any old fig-leaf he promises to “divide the Europeans from the Americans so that the US ends up as loser”.
However, that boast didn’t wash either as a smirk appearing around the ayatollah’s beard spread to 220 other beards across the conference hall.
“Did we enter the deal cause trouble between the Americans and the Europeans?” Khamenei demanded. “Or did we go along to achieve an end to sanctions as promised? As the sanctions have not been lifted all other matters are worthless.”
Rouhani’s biggest fib came when he claimed that the Obama “deal” had helped Iran achieve the right to enrich uranium, albeit at the lowest degree. Khamenei made a lame comment claiming that Iran’s progress in nuclear research had made that inevitable.
On that both Rouhani and Khamenei are wrong, albeit for different reasons.
The right to enrich uranium if recognized for all nations in the world and, thus, there is no need to secure permission from an informal group such as the so-called P5+1 which has no legal basis and no authority on any issue. Right now 34 countries have uranium enrichment programs of various dimensions without the endorsement of the P5+1 posse that Obama assembled.
Thus, asking a group of powers operating outside international law to “recognize” a nation’s already universally recognized right is the lowest depth of humiliation.
Rouhani’s fibs reminds me of an episode in 1919 when the British tried to impose a light version of their imperial tutelage on Iran through a treaty which began by declaring that the United Kingdom recognized Iran's independence. The same British had prevented Iran from obtaining a seat at the Versailles Conference at the end of the First World War.
An Iranian delegation, headed by the incomparable scholar Muhammad-Ali Forughi, had to hang around Versailles for months in the forlorn hope of getting a say. Forughi and his team ran out of money and the government in Tehran, being bankrupt, couldn’t help. Some Tehran bazaaris agreed to pay the bills.
In Versailles, the British argued that Iran lacked enough authority as an independent nation to take part. In the treaty they proposed they said they honored Iran’s independence.
The proposed British treaty of 1919 was instantly opposed by the Iranian Majlis (parliament) and one of the best speeches made against it came from Hassan Mudarress, a cleric who later opposed Reza Khan’s plan for turning Iran into a republic.
“Iran has been around and independent for centuries, “he said. “ Why do we need the British or anyone else to recognize a right that we have always had?”
The argument was that if you get your right from someone, that someone could also make it away from you.
That kind of lesson, of course, isn’t taught at Caledonian College in Glasgow.

Iran’s Influence in Syria Far Broader Than Commonly Understood
النفوذ الإيراني في سوريا هو أكثر وأعمق بكثير مما هو  معلن ومعروف
Ilan Berman/The Tablet web site/June 01/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/65060/ilan-berman-irans-influence-in-syria-far-broader-than-commonly-understood-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1/
More than just providing Assad with military support, the Islamic Republic supplies Syria with anything from blood drives to sporting events
Just how deep does Iran’s influence run in Syria? After a half decade of overt and covert Iranian military assistance to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the Iranian regime is widely understood to be playing a key role in the Syrian theater. But, according to a new study from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, an Istanbul-based think tank focused on the Syrian conflict, this backing is far broader than commonly understood, and encompasses not just military assistance but also an extensive web of economic and political contacts that are designed to give the Iranian regime a lasting presence on the territory of its top regional ally.
“Iranian influence in Syria is often reduced to its military support,” the study notes. However, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its auxiliary institutions not only provided military and financial support to the Syrian regime but have expanded their administrative and economic activities in Syria by infusing their institutions within the Armed Forces, service-delivery ministries, local political and armed bodies, and non-governmental organizations.”
The results, the Omran Center report outlines, are extensive–and dramatic.
By the end of last year, Iran’s military efforts included the large-scale recruitment of Shi’a fighters from places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and had forged a massive auxiliary force–one that the center estimates now encompasses some 50,000 irregular troops. The Islamic Republic has continued to deploy these assorted forces, as well as those affiliated with Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, into the Syrian theater in support of the Assad regime. It has also succeeded in erecting a new military base south of Damascus, near the Golan Heights and Israeli territory. Based upon aerial photographs of the site, that facility is believed to be able to hold as many as 500 soldiers if fully staffed.
Economically, meanwhile, the Iranian regime signed a raft of new agreements over the past year on everything from power generation to the distribution of humanitarian aid. Iran has even facilitated the creation of a tripartite electric power scheme that closely links its economy and infrastructure with those of both Syria and Iraq. Cumulatively, the Omran study makes clear, these deals have helped to make Tehran a key player in Syria’s future economy.
Tehran’s sway is expanding on a number of societal fronts as well. Iranian-affiliated entities have helped build schools and hospitals throughout Syrian territory over the past year, and become deeply enmeshed in everything from “rubble clearing to blood drives, sporting events, city beautification projects, and children’s camps” in assorted Syrian cities. Among the most prominent fixtures of this cultural offensive has been the establishment of a branch of Iran’s Islamic Azad University in Aleppo.
This activity is a good reflection of what Tehran is actually seeking to accomplish in Syria. True, military support from Tehran has helped to shift the balance of power in Syria’s civil war back toward the Assad regime in recent months–and reinforced the latter’s dependence on the Islamic Republic in the process. But Iran’s overt presence in Syria now faces new problems, including the possibility of repeat Israeli military action and the likelihood of renewed economic pressure on the part of the United States, now that the Trump administration has formally abandoned the JCPOA. In response, Tehran has been working overtime to expand its influence within Syria in other ways.
Iran’s successes in doing so represent a serious problem for the United States. In his May 21st speech outlining the Trump administration’s new Iran policy, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made clear that the White House views an Iranian exit from Syria as a top regional priority. Among the 12 demands outlined by the secretary in his address was the requirement that “Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.”
Yet, even if Tehran does acquiesce to Washington’s demands and draws down its military presence in Syria, the economic and political links established there to date by Iran’s ayatollahs will ensure that Syria and its regime remain firmly in Iran’s orbit. That, in turn, virtually guarantees that they will remain an enduring problem for the West.
**Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

How to forge a favorable, long-term American policy towards the Middle East
Walid Jawad/Al Arabiya/June 01/18
The Republican leadership in Congress killed, last week, a proposed measure spearheaded by Rep. Ron DeSantis, the Florida Republican, to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights of Syria. A media report suggests the Trump administration signaled a lack of enthusiasm for the measure to House Republican leadership. In turn, the measure was allowed to die an unceremonious death. The White House, according to reports, referenced the soon to be revealed comprehensive Middle East peace plan, which it claimed will include a provision for dealing with disputed territories.
The report did not garner much media interest allowing the administration a reprieve from a public scrutiny. If the bill were to have advanced, it would have compromised the US standing within a global community averse to fanning the flames of anger in an already unstable Mideast. The global community would be outraged, not to mention the potentially destructive reaction of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Such an outrage would be built on top of the latest global consternation following US embassy move from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in a tacit recognition of the holy city as Israel’s capital.
The Pyramid and the funnel
Years of disappointment with America’s decisions toward the Mideast can only be understood as a symptom of structural issues plaguing the US-Mideast relations. Arab governments deal with the US in a style that mirrors their own political structure, a hierarchical one. While this doesn’t preclude it from having a healthy and dynamic partnership, it makes adjusting the emphasis of the diplomatic effort a necessity. Governments dealing with the US need to devise more effective strategies as they account for internal balance of powers. The power is held at the top of the political pyramid in the Arab world, while the political structure in the US is a funnel-like structure (an upside-down pyramid).
On the top of this American funnel reside the people. As a result, the “people” affect the trajectory of US decisions, especially in the long run, more truthfully than that of the occupant of the White House. It must be understood that the power of the people is delegated to their Representatives in Congress to run the daily legislative affairs of the nation. This reality gives Congress, as the representatives of the people, elevated influence and authority to hold the Oval Office accountable for its decisions. They keep the President honest as they collectively, through their representatives on Capitol Hill, pose a balancing power to that of the President.
Iran’s “malign” activities in the Middle East are facilitating an additional aspect toward a stronger alliance of convenience between the US and friendly Arab governments. Those Arab governments are riding an American wave of opposition against the Iranian regime. Again, this is a government-to-government alliance, but more importantly, it offers an opening to establish a deeper partnership
Indeed, the US President is considered to be the most powerful man in the world (relative to other heads of state), but his powers are not absolute. Far from it, there is the balance between his office as the head of the Executive branch and that of the Legislative (Congress) and the Judicial (Courts) branches. This balance is only one aspect of the checks on the White House; the other is the election cycle where the people voice their opinion every four years. The stakes are higher in reelection bids for a presidential second term. People cast their ballots in what amounts to a referendum on the job performance of the President.
In reality, the American people don't have to wait that long to voice their dissatisfaction with the performance of the President; midterm elections are opportune. Case in point, the upcoming midterm elections to be held in November 2018 that will serve as a referendum on Trump and his Republican party. Members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years. This short tenure forces them to be sensitive to the wishes of their constituency if they wish to win another two years in Washington. Senators, on the other hand, are more deliberative as they have to shift their focus to the elections every six years. Senators balance the emotions of the day against longer-term objectives within the margins of the prevailing will of voters. It is precisely here that Middle East governments can gain or lose the most. Israel understands the game. Presidents and legislators come and go, but the will of American people outlasts them all and Israel has won the American people over. Jewish Americans recognized the power of the role they can play, and they’ve played it well.
Of course, Jewish-American successes made the political environment less conducive to Arab causes. Members of the Arab-American community are not driven by the Israeli-Palestinian state of affairs, or by much of what is going on in the Arab world. The exception being those new immigrants who are still fighting for the people they left behind. In general, politically active Arab-Americans are as fragmented as the Arab world itself. Jewish-Americans in comparison, view the survival and well-being of the Israeli state as an existential issue. Arabs are operating from a deficit dealing with this specific conflict. But there are other conflicts that may unify the Arab cause better.
The Iranian foe
Iran’s “malign” activities in the Middle East are facilitating an additional aspect toward a stronger alliance of convenience between the US and friendly Arab governments. Those Arab governments are riding an American wave of opposition against the Iranian regime. Again, this is a government-to-government alliance, but more importantly, it offers an opening to establish a deeper partnership. If Arab governments are unable to find ways to seize on this opportunity to forge a political friendship with the American people, they will continue to be at the mercy of the morphing marriage of convenience; energy and security. Now is the time to work on a partnership with the America people and not only with their Republican Party representatives or just with a specific president.
The upcoming midterm elections should serve as a reality check realizing that the party of president historically loses in midterm elections; playing a political roulette whenever US elections come around is never a reassuring political strategy.
Saudi Arabia seems to understand this dynamic. The three-week-long visit by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and his TV interviews were a good start. Now that a door has been opened, it's time to cross that threshold and commit to the hard and long work that is required; connecting with the American people on a personal/human level and with congress on a functional level to advance shared values and mutually beneficial outcomes.

Is Russia waging war with ‘autonomous patriotic volunteers’ to deny responsibility?
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim/Al Arabiya/June 01/18
One of the nightmare scenarios of the Syrian Civil War has been the prospect of direct military clashes between Russian and American forces.
Now we know that this has happened at least once, with as many as 200 Russian citizens killed by American airstrikes. The good news: WW3 has not started as a consequence. The bad news: we can expect such clashes to become more common in the future, with the possibility that things between the two countries may yet escalate out of control.
On 7 February this year, about 500 hundred pro-Assad forces attacked a US-held position near the oil fields of Deir ez-Zor, defended by 30 elite American soldiers later backed up by another 16 from another nearby position.
The result of the clash was what one might expect: no US casualties, but 2-300 of the attackers dead, mostly from US air support. The twist: the majority of the attackers, as well as the majority of their casualties, were Russian citizens.
The US and Russia maintain active channels of communication in Syria in order to prevent just this kind of scenario. But according to the Russian military command in the region at the time, the attack had nothing to do with them, and they could not order the Russians to stop their assault on the American position.
That Russian citizens are involved in testing American positions and capacity in Syria without the knowledge or involvement of the Russian government at some level is hard to believe.
Russia has figured that using military strength to pursue its strategic interests while denying responsibility is a winning strategy
Circumstantial evidence
But we must concede that the evidence is only circumstantial: the Russians in question are members of a private military operator known as the Wagner group whose leader, Dmitry Utkin, last served in a special forces brigade of the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU.
And the mercenaries themselves are trained at the Russian Defence Ministry’s bases. And they purportedly receive military awards from the Kremlin, on occasion. Regardless, this brings us to an interesting point in the geopolitical arena: the two most-powerful nuclear states in the world can kill each other’s citizens in direct warfare without nuclear consequences – at least so far. And this is likely to alter quite a few strategic calculations for all global and regional powers.
For one, Russia has figured that using military strength to pursue its strategic interests while denying responsibility is a winning strategy. It has worked well enough in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, why not extend that to Syria. Or, indeed, to Libya, Sudan or the Central African Republic.
Acting in self-defense
For another, if Russia denies ownership of these troops and their actions, it would seem that they also cannot complain if mishaps were to befall these troops. At the Deir ez-Zor debacle, the Americans acted purely in self-defence.
But now that the taboo is broken, there is no obvious reason why American, Western, Iranian or any other regional power could not proactively target and kill Russian “shadow military” troops and operations, when they become a nuisance. If Wagner group troops move around Libya, we must assume that the Kremlin would not mind if a French jet would drop a bomb or two on them.
What is more, if Russia can have “autonomous patriotic volunteers” waving weapons around all over the world, why would other countries not expect to find that they too have a considerable pool of patriotically minded, violent and well armed people around? And surely the Kremlin would not falsely accuse Washington, Paris or London if some of these “rogue groups” were to actively engage official Russian military personnel.
In a sense, these developments are to be welcome. We are now at a point in human history where the big nuclear players can do their conflicts and their wars without the risk of nuclear escalation. In an odd way, this is a sign of geopolitical maturity.
The downside, however, is that this model of conflict risks proliferating all over the Middle East and the Sahel, and further destabilise the region, exacerbating already tragic levels of human suffering, and accelerating global migration trends. Though a positive development from the point of view of nuclear risk, in the end it is still the world’s poorest and most vulnerable who will pay the price. As always.

OPEC: Where are oil prices heading?
Dr. Mohamed A. Ramady/Al Arabiya/June 01/18
It has been a turbulent few weeks with oil prices reaching $80 a barrel and then falling back erasing around $ 4-5 gains with prospects of further falls due to headline news of impending oil production ramp up by several key oil producers.
This has left both speculators and energy dependent countries like China and India wondering whether the recent falls would continue, as India especially has raised concerns about the recent oil price rises, or an aberration and if oil prices would once again rise above the $80 benchmark.
A closer assessment reveals the central role that Saudi Arabia and Russia are once again playing in both helping oil prices to rally and now to moderate. The immediate falls were obvious and followed the headlines out of St Petersburg Economic Forum in late May from both the Saudi and Russian oil ministers and the follow up Gulf oil producers meeting in Kuwait.
It was made clear that adjustments to the 2016 oil output cuts, amounting to as much as 1 million bpd of additional crude supply, are under “active” discussion ahead of the June “OPEC Plus” meeting in Vienna. The expectations of the outcome of the June meeting is now even more crucial and some are expecting the June 22 OPEC/non-OPEC meeting to formally keep the 2016 oil output cuts in place, as Riyadh sees this hard-won Vienna framework as key to putting in a market floor by making future action on supply restraint more credible and quicker to decide and implement.
However, the new scenario is that there will be “flexibility” in the quotas by driving overall compliance down from the current 150% level closer to 100% with a lagged new output largely coming from Saudi Arabia and Russia, with additional barrels from Kuwait and the UAE, through the second half of this year. However, oil prices are likely to remain volatile in coming weeks, with geopolitical crosscurrents driving headline risk. A bearish supply of extra crude seems likely, and there are questions over just how much in oil exports Iran will lose under the US sanctions.
As always, Saudi Arabia is key to the OPEC/non-OPEC negotiations and to ensuring a reasonable degree of stability in oil prices
Output declines
There will be a built-in lagged response in raising actual output this year and there remains a risk of deeper output declines in Venezuela and Libya despite talk of new Libyan elections. Spare capacity will also thin considerably with new output using up most of OPEC’s spare capacity, leaving limited options in response to new supply disruptions.
As always, Saudi Arabia is key to the OPEC/non-OPEC negotiations and to ensuring a reasonable degree of stability in oil prices -- and if things work out, perhaps a gentle rise from current levels. To make this successful, Riyadh is as dependent as ever on a helping hand from Moscow as the OPEC plus agreement has been successful so far because of the new found energy strategic partnership between Saudi Arabia and Russia.
At the same time, however, oil producers are anxiously seeking to pre-empt further, more public pressure from the Trump White House to bring oil prices down with the famous Trump tweet about “unfair OPEC prices” and the US media has been highlighting the higher gasoline prices and how it is likely to fully or partially offset the intended gains to spending and demand in the tax cuts putting the Republicans on the defensive in the upcoming US Congressional elections.
The Saudi case is to argue the value in keeping the hard-won Vienna framework in place as a useful mechanism to put a floor under a future oil price decline, but at the same time, to allow the extra output to soften the hard edge of any further “excessive” oil price increases.
The means to do so is to maintain the Vienna framework but allowing additional output through the mechanism of seeking to lower the overall compliance of the participating member oil producers. That will primarily translate into higher output from Russia, which was essentially coming anyway, some from Kuwait and the UAE, but most of the additional supply coming from Saudi Arabia.
Controlled supply
An easing of the cuts would meet the political needs to respond to US political pressures. This will be done with the OPEC plus Joint Technical Committee monitoring the output and compliance levels, with the aim that there will be a lagged, more gradual and hopefully more controlled new supply of crude brought to the market. And what about the Russians? For Russia, the process may prove to be relatively straightforward, and in any case, puts it into a position of maximum leverage. Moscow itself has never been as wedded to the Vienna framework as Riyadh, even if the revenue windfall was prized, as is the promised Saudi investments in the Russian energy sector or the benefits of working with the Saudis, which consolidated Russia’s emergence in the Mideast as a key power broker.
Russia’s help may also be needed if Iran decides to respond to its impending isolation by trying to block the Saudi proposals within OPEC. Moscow has also been positioning to tie additional crude to temper oil price increases to the fate of the US withdrawal from JCPOA and the sanctions that could limit Iranian oil exports.
With so many imponderables, the oil market is in for a bumpy ride over the next few months with the next critical dates being after November when the market will assess how many barrels of Iranian oil are really lost after the sanctions start to bite. For the time being Riyadh and Moscow are doing their best to ease oil price rise concerns.

The usual US blame game against OPEC
Randa Takieddine/Al Arabiya/June 01/18
US members of Congress have once again started blaming OPEC for raising oil prices. In fact, Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer has asked President Donald Trump to send the secretary of energy to the OPEC conference in Vienna on June 22 to solve the issue of oil prices.
As usual, whenever there is even a slight rise in oil prices, the US starts blaming OPEC. Meanwhile, the US is the biggest consumption market and it produces enough oil for itself. This is in addition to the increase in American oil production, which the US discovered in recent years when oil prices increased. Large and small companies have thus rushed to explore more shale oil across the US.
In the late 90’s, then-US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson called then-OPEC’s president Abdullah Hamad al-Attiyah to reduce prices. The US now boasts of its oil independence, although it still imports a small amount of Saudi oil
The OPEC blame game
As the US tourism season kicks in leading to increased driving, the practice of blaming OPEC countries has resurfaced. Saudi Oil Minister Khalid al-Falih announced, with his Russian counterpart Alexander Novak, that an inventory surplus has been eliminated.
They said that the 24 OPEC members and non-OPEC oil producing countries, which had reduced their production by 1.8 million barrels per day, might gradually reconsider this decision to compensate for Iranian and Venezuelan oil quantities that the market will lose due to US sanctions. As soon as this hint was made by Falih, the price of a barrel of oil in the US market fell by about $2 and Brent prices in the London market dropped by more than $1.
Falih and his Russian counterpart announced in St. Petersburg that OPEC members and non-OPEC producing countries can reconsider increasing production in the second quarter of the year.
This was done knowing that the OPEC monitoring committee recommended at its meeting on May 25 that reducing current oil production by 1.8 million barrels per day will be extended to the coming six months which means until the end of the year. This was OPEC’s last decision at its last conference in December last year.
At that time, the US had not yet decided to withdraw from Iran’s nuclear agreement, to reinstate sanctions on Iran and to impose sanctions on Venezuela.
When OPEC and non-OPEC producing countries reduced their production, oil prices and producers’ earnings improved but did not reach unacceptable levels. It was between $70 and $78 per barrel. It also did not reach the levels that would negatively impact world economy.
Still, the US has reverted to its old habit of blaming OPEC countries as even Republican Congress member Lisa Murkowski, who is the leader of the energy committee, said that OPEC's reduced production raised prices and this should be addressed.
US interferences
OPEC’s history had witnessed several US interferences and blame of this kind. In the late 90’s, then-US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson called then-OPEC’s president Abdullah Hamad al-Attiyah to reduce prices. The US now boasts of its oil independence, although it still imports a small amount of Saudi oil. Thus the question is why the blame game?
The history of Saudi Arabia shows its continuous preservation of oil markets and global economy. OPEC did not and would not take any decisions except after thoroughly studying the market conditions and the situation of supply and demand.
It reduced production in 2017 because the international market had a huge oil surplus that should have been eliminated. OPEC succeeded in doing that by involving 13 countries from outside it, most important of which is Russia, until oil prices improved after the price of the barrel had reached $30s.
In fact, if the 24 countries increased their production, this will be in line with the principle to meet the demand for oil and avoid shortage that might increase oil prices to $100 dollar per barrel.
This will also accelerate the cycle of shale oil production in the US to compete with the oil of other producers and return the surplus to what it was when oil prices fell significantly. Thus, the group of 24 should carefully consider the market conditions to evaluate which productions must be increased so the revenues of the producing countries do not decrease.


Iran’s Influence in Syria Far Broader Than Commonly Understood
النفوذ الإيراني في سوريا هو أكثر وأعمق بكثير مما هو  معلن ومعروف
Ilan Berman/The Tablet web site/June 01/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/65060/ilan-berman-irans-influence-in-syria-far-broader-than-commonly-understood-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1/

The Mullahs and the Tale of a Betrayal/أمير طاهري/الملالي وقصة الخيانة
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al-Awsat/June 01/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/65066/amir-taheri-the-mullahs-and-the-tale-of-a-betrayal-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9

أمير طاهري/الملالي وقصة الخيانة

الشرق الأوسط/01 حزيران/18

http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/65066/amir-taheri-the-mullahs-and-the-tale-of-a-betrayal-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9/