LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
February 10/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Latest LCCC Bulletin analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 09-10/18
Do We Allow Air India’s Request?
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Asharq Al Awsat/February 09/18
Air India’s request to operate flights headed to the West to fly over Saudi Arabia and have a layover in Israel has been fodder for “enemy” media. The media accused Saudi Arabia of allowing the Indians to cross over to the old “enemy” Israel. The concerned side, the Saudi General Authority of Civil Aviation, denied the claims and said that it has not approved the decision. Let us observe the situation with some pragmatism from the perspective of international interests and relations. The truth is, there is no strong motivation or political reasoning that would prevent all airlines from around the world, except those from Israel, Qatar and Iran, to fly over Saudi Arabia. The carriers of these countries should be barred from flying over the Kingdom until the dispute with them is resolved. Preserving sovereignty rights includes barring travel through an airspace or averting other forms of potential security disputes that may result from allowing an airline to travel over a country. Our ties with the rest of the countries of the world are good and their civil airlines should be allowed to fly over Saudi Arabia regardless of their destination. If Indian trips were headed to Athens, New York or elsewhere and wanted to stop at an Israeli airport, then why should we punish them with a ban? Israel, not another airline, will meanwhile be forced to shoulder the burden of the added two-hour flight time to take the convoluted route between India and Israel should the airspace ban be imposed..
At any rate, the dispute with Israel is very clear. A country, such as Qatar, which enjoys almost full ties with Israel, should not be dictating to us, through its propaganda machine, how to manage our airspace or territorial waters.
Arab countries have debated at length over the concept of boycott and their concerned institutions have agreed to distinguish between a boycott that harms Israel and a boycott that harms the Arabs. The old concept of a boycott is not limited to besieging Israel. Those who spoke of it were of the Arab left and they also partly advocated banning trade with the West. They had prevented us from importing a majority of electronics, such as Apple and Xerox products. The banned list was compiled by the boycott office in Damascus, which had control over trade in the Gulf. Corruption was rife in those procedures whereby negotiations in the past were limited to governments and institutions that had often abused their power for their own interests. A major campaign was recently successful in redefining the concepts of a boycott and refining blacklists.
When assessing Air India’s request, we should look at the issue as a whole. The Israeli carrier will benefit from the situation and the boycott, even if it will have to fly an additional 2,000 kilometers. No other international airline is willing to go the extra distance. In addition, political work that serves the Palestinians and their cause, loses its tools when it does not have anything to compromise in the crisis. Amid the disputes, wars and enmities, a certain logic always determines how relations and punishments should transpire. Why shouldn’t we therefore tackle each case separately instead of allowing the dogmatic and spiteful sides manipulate us?

Iran: Speaking Swedish, Acting North Korean
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al Awsat/February 09/18
For the past decade February, part of which coincides with the month of Bahman on the Iranian calendar, has been marked by febrile political activities in Iran under the Khomeinist regime. February 1 marks the anniversary of the late ayatollah’s return to Tehran after 16 years in exile. And February 11, regarded as the crescendo of the Iranian Revolution, marks the day that Shapour Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister to be named by the Shah, went into hiding, leaving a vacuum quickly filled by Khomeini’s supporters visibly surprised by the ease with which they had won power.There were no revolutionary battles, no dramatic ups-and-downs, and, on a personal level, no opportunity for heroic shenanigans. The Khomeinist revolution took around four months to achieve victory, not long enough to allow a lot of people to conjure a heroic biography for themselves. Just a year before the “final victory” on 11 February some of the mullahs who emerged as grandees of the revolution, among them Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati who now heads the all-powerful Council of Guardians of the Islamic Constitution, were kissing the Shah’s hands during audiences for clerics. Other grandees of the revolution like Hojat al-Islam Morteza Motahari were on Empress Farah’s payroll as members of the “philosophical” boutique she had set up as solace from boredom.
The revolution had not lasted long enough to establish its ideological colors.
Pro-Soviet Communists along with kindred Maoists, Castroists, Trotskyites, and Titoists believed that this was their revolution, as did veteran Mossadeqists, westernized Third-Worldists, and mullahs of all shapes and sizes. For the first year the ideological vacuum was filled with the drama around the seizing of American diplomats as hostages. Once the embassy hostage drama had become as a boring as a second-rate TV soap opera, Iraqi despot Saddam Hussein rode to the rescue by invading Iran, helping fill the new Khomeinist regime’s ideological emptiness. In the first two years, the new regime kept the revolutionary temperature up by mass executions, purges of the military and civil service, the squandering of human lives in ineffective maneuvers on the battlefields of Iraq, and the assassination of men that Khomeini regarded as potential threats to his hold on power. Using the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah to seize Western hostages added spice to the bland dish the mullahs served.
With the end of the war and Khomeini’s death, the new regime found itself ideologically naked. Then “Jihad” against the United States was formally adopted as the regime’s core ideology. In that context, adopting an anti-Israeli position was inevitable, if only tangentially. The mullahs forgot that Israel had smuggled arms to them to fight Saddam Hussein, and, in an act of gargantuan ingratitude, called for the “elimination of the Zionist entity.” Once the anti-American and anti-Israel themes were established the regime tried to weave a cobweb of ideological mumbo-jumbo around them. Under Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic launched annual seminars with such titles as “The End of America” and “A World Without Israel.”
It also provided an annual platform, always in February, for Holocaust deniers from all over the world. Special prizes were offered for anti-Semitic cartoons, posters, photos, and sculpture. By 2013 Foreign Minister Muhammad-Javad Zarif could claim that the Islamic Republic was scoring one success after another in “exporting” its culture, whatever that meant. The new administration of President Hassan Rouhani felt confident that, thanks to support from US President Barack Obama, the Khomeinist regime could talk like Sweden but act like North Korea. However, it seems that the arrival on the scene of an unknown quantity named Donald J Trump has confused the mullahs, forcing them to ponder whether it is still possible to hoodwink the Americans and the rest of the world while pursuing repression in Iran and destabilizing policies abroad. Strictly speaking Trump hasn’t yet done anything concrete against the mullahs apart from expressing sympathy with recent mass protests in Iran.
However, the fact that Trump has kept the mullahs guessing about his intentions has already impacted their behavior. To start with Tehran has ended provocative naval acts in the Strait of Hormuz and its environs, winning praise from the Pentagon. Throughout the Obama presidency the Iranian navy operated “swarming sorties” against US naval units in the region with small speedboats approaching American battleships like so many gnats trying to sting an elephant.
Under Trump, however, the “gnats” are keeping away from the American elephant.
In another register, Tehran has also shelved its annual “End of America” and “A World Without Israel” shows.
Zarif has issued a few dozen visas for professional Holocaust deniers and anti-Americans, mostly from Europe and the US, but their comings-and-goings is to be kept away from the limelight. More importantly, perhaps, the Khomeinist regime, which has not passed a single day without holding some foreign hostages, has not seized any new American hostages. The most high-profile hostages still held are dual nationals who had lobbied in the US for the Islamic Republic under the control of Obama’s special adviser Ben Rhodes. In a bid to counter Trump’s chest-beating about human rights in Iran, the mullahs acted out of character when they chose not to massacre people in the streets during the recent nationwide uprising. More interestingly, all regime grandees, including Khamenei himself, dwelling on the “benefits of protest and criticism in Islam,” have donned their fake Swedish mask, hiding the North Korean face behind it. At regional level, too, the mullahs are trying to talk Swedish. They muse on reducing their footprint in Syria, claiming that they have already won the war for their protégé Bashar al-Assad. And last Sunday, Defense Minister General Amir Hatami even offered to give Afghanistan military aid to fight ISIS and its groups installed there. The next issue on which I expect Tehran to start singing Swedish concerns Trump’s demand for renegotiating the nuclear “deal”, concocted by Obama. The initial tune from Tehran was a “No! No! Nannette” number! with a harsh North Korean accent. Recently, however, I hear a “May be baby!” number with a soft Swedish accent.

Invention of the term ‘preacher’ in Muslim societies
Salah al-Sayer/Al Arabiya/February 09/18
Islam did not forbid slavery. According to Islamic law, a Muslim can own slaves, buy them and sell them as he wishes. Despite this fact, Muslim societies have stopped practicing slavery and the slave market has been banned for a long time. This is natural and logical progress, as human beings naturally respond to social and cultural development. Other nations and peoples have similarly given up many old practices because many of them are no longer in keeping with the times. One of the most important evidence is that Muslim societies stopped Sharia punishments such as hand cutting or stoning, as well as criminalizing the narrow understanding of jihad because it contradicts humanitarian principles. What about “religious institutions”, which continue to actively propagate in other countries? Is propagation suitable abroad in today’s age, which requires non-interference in the affairs of other countries? Despite the proliferation of “preachers” around us, our societies did not know the concept of a “preacher" before the rise of Sahwa movement
Stereotypical image
Does this activity fit the stereotypical image of Islam, which unfortunately has been tarnished and associated with terrorism, especially as aspersions have been cast against the funding of seminaries, which are believed to be promoting terrorism. We may all recall here the ‘preachers’ who incited the youth to join ISIS or those who flaunted their sins, their crimes and the killing of innocent people in Syria. Despite the proliferation of “preachers” around us, our societies did not know the concept of a “preacher" before the rise of the Sahwa movement as the title was coined for political purposes, particularly to promote divisiveness and intolerance. “Muslim” society does not need anyone to remind it about Islam. A few days ago, I witnessed a charity advertisement encouraging people to donate money to convert non-Muslims in China. Despite our “very, very, very” small size compared to China, which is a great nation, we seek to change the faith of its people, as if it is our legitimate responsibility to undertake this religious duties on behalf of Muslims in China. We might end up inviting the wrath of the Chinese dragon.

Tehran’s view of Turkey’s Afrin campaign
Giorgio Cafiero/Al Arabiya/February 09/18
The Middle East’s sectarian divisions have challenged Iran to overcome perceptions that it is inherently and exclusively committed to empowering Shi’ites at the Sunnis’ expense. Given that Shi’ites are minorities in most Arab countries, Iranian officials have long recognized the necessity of engaging Sunnis in the region to heighten Tehran’s influence beyond areas of Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and northern Yemen. By investing in closer relations with Sunni-majority Arab countries such as Algeria, Egypt (mainly during Mohammed Morsi’s presidency), Kuwait, and Qatar, and non-state actors such as Hamas, Iran has sought to garner support for its anti-status quo foreign policy agenda from political figures on both sides of the Arab world. Bringing Turkey into closer geopolitical alignment with Iran has been an important dimension of Tehran’s quest to enhance its set of alliances and partnerships with Sunni actors in the Middle East. As the failed coup plot of 2016 served to add new layers of friction to Ankara’s tense relationship with Washington, Iran most welcomed Turkey’s outreach to Tehran and Moscow amid the political fallout. Having long sought to capitalize on anti-American sentiments in Turkey to increase Iran’s influence in NATO’s only Muslim-majority member state, the rage felt by many Turks directed against US President Donald Trump following his controversial recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital late last year offered Iran further opportunity to exploit friction in US-Turkey relations.
Such an interest in taking advantage of Ankara and Washington’s conflicts of interest would suggest that Iran would have embraced the crisis in US-Turkey relations stemming from Operation Olive Branch.
Tehran’s interest in preserving the territorial integrity of Syria – in no small part due to the implications for Iranian Kurdistan of an autonomous Kurdish region, if not independent state, in northern Syria – might also imply that Iran would be keen to back Turkish efforts to deliver a blow to the forces of militant Kurdish nationalism that both Ankara and the Iranian-backed Damascus regime see as threatening the Syrian nation-state. Nonetheless, despite Iranian early efforts to avoid appearing too critical of Turkey’s military intervention in Afrin, Operation Olive Branch has raised major concerns in Tehran. By February 5, Iran’s President Rouhani called on Ankara to end its military operation in Afrin “at the earliest time”, citing risks of violence escalating and the fact that Damascus did not authorize Operation Olive Branch. Interestingly, Iranian diplomats’ expressed fears of the risks of Turkey’s military campaign offering Islamic State (ISIS or IS) and other Salafist-jihadists opportunities to regain territory in Syria have also been voiced by their counterparts in Washington.
Having invested much blood and treasure in the Syrian conflict, Iran has been seeking to promote a settlement to the crisis within the framework of the Iran-Turkey-Russian tripartite relationship
Operation Olive Branch
Part of Tehran’s position against Operation Olive Branch might be due to Iran’s interest in keeping the door open to better relations with certain elements of Syria’s Kurdish minority when the conflict winds down.
If the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), can reach an understanding with Iran whereby Tehran does not perceive the force as a threat to Iran’s fundamental interests in the Levant, there is potential for the US-backed Kurdish faction and the Islamic Republic to reach an accommodative relationship. Not lost in the equation is the possibility of Operation Olive Branch adding momentum to pan-Kurdish causes beyond Syria, giving Iran incentive to avoid supporting Turkey’s military operations against the PYD/YPG based on concerns about violence in Iran’s Kurdish territories manifesting consequently. Iran is alarmed by the prospects for Turkey expanding Operation Olive Branch beyond Afrin to carry to the campaign eastward to Manbij. Such a move on Ankara’s part would suggest that Turkey is seeking grander strategic gains beyond crushing the PYD/YPG.
The possibility of Turkey building on its military intervention in Afrin to establish a zone of influence stretching across territories south of the Turkish-Syrian border raises questions about Iran’s interests in these areas and how Tehran would respond to such an assertion of Turkey’s hard power.
Having invested much blood and treasure in the Syrian conflict, Iran has been seeking to promote a settlement to the crisis within the framework of the Iran-Turkey-Russian tripartite relationship. For all of Tehran and Ankara’s conflicting agendas in Syria, Iran understands that Turkey must be on board and behind all diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the Syrian crisis. At this juncture, Iran is unsettled by the potential for further Turkish-Kurdish and Arab-Kurdish violence in Afrin and other parts of northern Syria to weaken Tehran, Ankara, and Moscow’s ability to build on their common interests in resolving the conflict while preserving the Syrian state’s territorial integrity. While calling on Turkey to end Operation Olive Branch yet also seeking to continue driving a greater wedge between Ankara and Washington, Iran finds itself in a difficult position vis-à-vis Afrin. With much at stake in northern Syria as well as in the future of Ankara-Tehran relations, Iranian diplomats must tread carefully when addressing Turkey’s military intervention against Syria’s armed Kurds, especially if Operation Olive Branch extends eastward.

Germany: Merkel Pays High Price for Fourth Term .. "This will not be long."
Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute/February 09/2018
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/11871/merkel-fourth-term
Merkel will govern...but her government will be under the heading 'this will not be long.' This refers to Merkel, and also to the fact that in many parts of the country there is the feeling that 'this' should not continue." — Kurt Kister, Editor-in-Chief, Süddeutsche Zeitung.
"The CDU retains control of the beautiful-sounding, but in fact powerless, Ministry of Economy, the unpopular Ministry of Health, the crisis-prone Ministry of Defense and the shadowy existence of ministerial posts in the Chancellery, for education and agriculture. That is little for the strongest faction in the Bundestag." — Editorial, Münchner Merkur.
"The CDU was transformed into Merkel's own personal political party. On the way, though, the competition of political ideas—the policy conflicts that are the lifeblood of democracy and which provide voters with direction—was lost." — René Pfister, head of the Berlin bureau, Der Spiegel.
Negotiators from Chancellor Angela Merkel's center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), their Bavarian partners, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) have agreed in principle on a deal for a new "grand coalition" government—one that, in fact, is the same as the one that governed prior to the last election in September 2017.
The deal, if formally ratified by the SPD's rank and file members at a special party congress on March 4, would ensure that Germany has a new government by Easter—and that Merkel, already in power for 12 years, will remain in office for a fourth tenure as chancellor, albeit in a much-weakened position.
Unusually, the 177-page agreement, reached on February 7, is subject to review in two years, when the parties will reassess the coalition. Analysts have speculated that it may be an opportunity for Merkel finally to step down.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel (center), stands with Martin Schulz (right), the leader of the Social Democratic Party, and Horst Seehofer (left), Governor of Bavaria and leader of the Christian Social Union, after government coalition negotiations on February 7, 2018 in Berlin, Germany.
To ensure the deal, the three parties made concessions to each other, all in an effort to prevent fresh elections, in which the anti-immigration party Alternative for Germany (AfD), riding high in the polls, would almost strengthen its position in the German parliament, where it already is the main opposition party.
Merkel's greatest concessions involved the allocation of cabinet positions. Her CDU relinquished control over the influential Interior and Finance ministries. The SPD will now control the three top ministries: finance, foreign affairs and labor. The CSU, which advocates a harder line on immigration than Merkel, will take over the Interior Ministry.
The key points of the deal included agreements on healthcare and housing reform; a commitment to international climate goals; a "billion-euro program" to ensure that all Germans, including those in rural areas, have access to a high-speed internet connection by 2025; and restrictions on German arms exports to all countries taking part in the war in Yemen. The restrictions would include Saudi Arabia, a key market for German defense companies.
With respect to the European Union, the CDU/CSU and SPD agreed to grant more powers to the European Parliament and to create a European Monetary Fund—presumably funded in large measure by Germany—to help protect the eurozone against future financial crises. More significantly, the agreement promises "more investment" for the European Union. The SPD said this amounted to "an end to austerity measures"—cuts to public spending—imposed on the European Union by Germany after the eurozone crisis.
On the most contentious issue, namely that of immigration, the CDU/CSU and SPD agreed to cap the number of asylum seekers coming to Germany at between 180,000 and 220,000 per year. Merkel has long resisted an upper limit on asylum seekers, as demanded by the CSU, but after a million CDU voters defected to the AfD in the last election, she agreed.
The coalition deal also caps the number of migrants brought to Germany through family reunification (Familiennachzug) visas at 1,000 per month for those with so-called subsidiary protection, a temporary protection that falls short of full asylum. The category usually involves migrants fleeing war-torn countries but who cannot prove that they personally face any immediate danger. "Subsidiary protection applies when neither refugee protection nor an entitlement to asylum can be granted and serious harm [torture or death penalty] is threatened in the country of origin," according to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.
On closer examination, however, the compromise appears to be cosmetic: most of those under subsidiary protection in Germany are not married and do not have children; according to German law, they would not be allowed to bring extended family members in any case. Moreover, those under subsidiary protection involve a relatively small percentage of the migrants in Germany.
Only 200,000 of the more than two million migrants who have arrived in Germany since 2015 are under subsidiary protection, according to the Federal Employment Agency. Of those, between 50,000 and 60,000 have applied for family reunification.
In any event, the cap makes exceptions for "humanitarian grounds," prompting SPD leader Martin Schulz to describe the agreement as a "1,000-plus regulation."
In other words, the "compromise" that supposedly limits the number of family reunifications appears to be a public relations gimmick aimed at persuading German voters that the mainstream parties are taking a harder stance on migration, apparently in an effort to blunt voter appeal for the AfD.
The coalition deal was met with considerable skepticism from across Germany's political spectrum.
A poll conducted for Die Welt on February 8 found that 63%—almost two-thirds of voters—believe that Merkel was "weakened" or "clearly weakened" by the outcome of the coalition negotiations. Only 16% said the chancellor "strengthened" or "clearly strengthened" while 18% said she was neither strengthened nor weakened.
Many commentators said the agreement foreshadowed the beginning of the end of the Merkel era.
The Editor-in-Chief of Süddeutsche Zeitung, Kurt Kister, described Merkel's new cabinet as "a government with an expiry date." He wrote:
"Yes, there were no winners in these coalition negotiations—just as there was no clear winner in the Bundestag election. Maybe the CSU has done the best. Party leader Horst Seehofer, who has nothing left to lose, will be the most important minister [Interior Minister] of the CDU/CSU. Seehofer's upper limit for immigrants now stands as a corridor in the coalition paper: His party (and the CDU) will politically benefit from the upper limit, which corresponds to the ideas of a majority of Germans and also represents the limit of what important parts of the SPD will accept. The SPD has also achieved a lot in the short coalition negotiations, especially by gaining control over the major ministries.
"If a majority of SPD members do not oppose the coalition deal, Angela Merkel will have achieved her most important goal: there will be a (relatively) stable government. If the fourth Merkel cabinet comes about, it will be similar in some respects to the last cabinets of Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl. Merkel will govern...but her government will be under the heading 'this will not be long.' This refers to Merkel, and also to the fact that in many parts of the country there is the feeling that 'this' should not continue."
The Berlin correspondent for Deutsche Welle, Volker Witting, wrote:
"Merkel knows that her fourth chancellorship will probably be the last. Even before the federal election, it had taken her long time to decide on running for a fourth term. And not only the opposition is pushing for renewal. Some in the CDU are counting on Merkel leaving—better sooner than later; even if the critics say that only behind closed doors.
"Above all, the right wing of her party cannot forgive Merkel for moving the once conservative CDU far in a liberal-social democratic direction. Conservatives have been grumbling for a long time, but few express their displeasure openly, even though they are thinking about an end to the Merkel era. For instance, Schleswig-Holstein Prime Minister Daniel Günther recently said: "A new government must include individuals who have a perspective for the post-Angela Merkel period."
The Münchner Merkur, in an article entitled, "CDU grumbles about Merkel: 'One could hardly have negotiated worse,'" wrote:
"The draft agreement could secure Merkel's political survival, but puts pressure on her internally. The price for the agreement with the SPD and CSU is relinquishing the most important ministries. Foreign affairs, finance, labor—all gone. The CDU retains control of the beautiful-sounding, but in fact powerless Ministry of Economy, the unpopular Ministry of Health, the crisis-prone Ministry of Defense and the shadowy existence of ministerial posts in the Chancellery, education and agriculture. That is little for the strongest faction in the Bundestag."
Germany's largest-circulation newspaper, Bild, in an article entitled, "Help, I have shrunk the CDU!," documented a growing rebellion against Merkel from within the CDU. Reaction to the coalition agreement included comments such as: "a political mistake," "completely unacceptable," "our own party is being wiped out," "it bears the handwriting of the SPD," "devastating," and "not good." Bild wrote: "The fact is: The CDU has lost more influence in the new government than it has gained. The Merkel critics in the CDU camp are getting louder."
In an essay entitled, "Why German Politics Can't Move Beyond Merkel," René Pfister, head of Der Spiegel's Berlin bureau, wrote:
"Ever since the German general election last September, there has been a whiff of farewell hovering over everything. In that vote, Merkel's conservatives suffered their worst result since 1949, and if indications aren't completely misleading, it looks as though Merkel is in the process of arranging for a successor to lead the Christian Democrats (CDU) once she's gone.
"Germans are strangely divided over the woman who has governed for so long; the younger generation can no longer remember a time when a male chancellor led the country. On the one hand, there is a desire for change, a Merkel fatigue that made itself apparent in the brief hype surrounding the launch of Martin Schulz's candidacy a year ago, but also in the rise of the anti-Merkel party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). On the other hand, Germans seem to be afraid of the very change they long for, with 51 percent of voters in favor of Merkel remaining chancellor. Behind Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, she is the most popular politician in Germany.
"But it is completely unclear what will come after Merkel. One of the characteristics of the later Merkel years has been that all political impetus is derived entirely from her. It begins with the AfD, whose name itself is a reference to Merkel's famous declaration that there was no alternative to saving the euro.
"Depending on your perspective, the AfD is either the ugly child of the Merkel era or an expression of a healthy democracy. But there can be no doubt that there would never have been an AfD without Merkel. For the right-wing populist party, she is both a mother figure and the focus of hatred. The party rejects nobody as vehemently as it does Merkel. Indeed, the emotion inherent in the party's repudiation of the chancellor is reminiscent of a family feud.
"A popular question these days is what, exactly, will remain from the Merkel era once she is gone. Adenauer is known for anchoring the country in the Western community of nations. Kohl's legacy is the introduction of the euro. But one can make the argument that with her political style, Merkel changed the country more fundamentally than any of her predecessors.
"The dominant trend these days is that of the political movement...the established big-tent parties seem strangely outmoded, trapped in a corset of rituals and ideological constraints. But it was likely Merkel herself who first realized how potent it could be if the party leader emancipated herself from her own party's doctrine.
"Merkel has never had the kind of charisma possessed by [France's President Emmanuel] Macron. And she certainly didn't transform the CDU into a vehicle of her own ambition with the vehemence and speed that Sebastian Kurz transformed the ÖVP [Austrian People's Party]. But the persistence with which she relieved the party of everything that once distinguished it from the political competition had a similar effect over time: What ultimately mattered was no longer the common convictions held by the party, but the party chair's determination to cling to power. The CDU was transformed into Merkel's own personal political party.
"On the way, though, the competition of political ideas—the policy conflicts that are the lifeblood of democracy and which provide voters with direction—was lost. As was the CDU's identity. The result is a battle over the party's direction that has been raging for quite some time, but has less to do with policy than with the question: 'Where do you stand on Merkel?'"
Writing for Der Spiegel, columnist Jan Fleischhauer warned that with the SPD controlling the Finance Ministry, the new coalition government would further increase runaway government spending:
"The next government knows how to spend money without stopping. If there ever was a willingness to be modest, then it was lost in the coalition negotiations. One should withhold numbers in columns, one does not want to bore readers. But it has to be here. 1,392 trillion euros: this is the number of expenditures the federal budget plan will provide for the current legislative period. Because this fabulous sum is not enough for the leaders of the grand coalition, they have agreed to spend another 46 billion euros, so that really every wish can be fulfilled.
"Even before the new cabinet is sworn in, Angela Merkel can claim to be the most expensive chancellor of all time.
"I respect the Chancellor, really. I admire the perseverance and the conscientiousness with which she accepts every problem that arises. I do not know anybody who works so hard for our country. She never sleeps for more than four or five hours, then she starts all over again. Yet she never complains.
"I only think that Angela Merkel has too light a relationship to other people's money. That's my problem with her.
"Deciding for oneself how one wants to spend what one has earned seems to her to be a strange thought. Every human being can notice the imprints of childhood. The older you get, the more it emerges. Merkel now combines the rectory [of her father who was a pastor] and the former Communist East Germany. They call it evangelical frugality when they find the reference to socialism too hard: it amounts to the same thing.
"You only have to look at the range of services offered by the modern welfare state. There is nothing that does not matter. It provides discounted opera tickets and language courses in Tuscany as well as free marriage counseling. You can think that's social. I think it is frivolous.
"Chancellery head Peter Altmaier had hopes to follow Wolfgang Schäuble as Finance Minister. Like his boss, Altmaier has a rather loose way of dealing with other people's money. Basically, he is convinced that every euro that the citizens spend themselves is a betrayal of the Chancellor, who knows a thousand times better what is good for the country. Now the Ministry of Finance goes to the SPD."
The Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, in a commentary article entitled, "Merkel IV," wrote:
"The result of the coalition negotiations can be summed up in one sentence: Angela Merkel saves her chancellorship, Schulz rescues himself into the Foreign Ministry, Seehofer saves himself to Berlin. It is an alliance of three politicians whose time has already expired."
On Tichys Einblick, a leading German liberal-conservative blog, Rainer Zitelmann argued:
"Actually, all opposition parties in the German Bundestag can be happy. From a broader perspective, the SPD is being crushed between the Left Party and the Greens and the CDU between [classical liberal] FDP and AfD. Merkel does not care. She knows that this is her last term."
In an essay entitled, "The Eternal Merkel," the Editor-in-Chief of the Westdeutschen Allgemeine Zeitung, Lutz Heuken, wrote:
"Angela Merkel has been chancellor since 2005—and has long since secured a place in the history books. For many citizens, the chancellor was a guarantor of stability for many years. But like so many real or supposedly great things in history, Angela Merkel made a crucial mistake: she missed the timely farewell with dignity.
"Maybe because she considers herself irreplaceable. Perhaps because no one in her environment dares to point out to her the obvious signs that she has long passed her zenith. Or perhaps because there really is no one in the CDU who could replace her in the short term because she did not allow anyone to, because of her drive for pure power.
"The SPD is now—forcibly—planning a change of leadership and generation from Martin Schulz to Andrea Nahles. At the CDU, such a change is currently unimaginable. This is not good for the Union and almost tragic for Angela Merkel."
If the SPD's 460,000 members fail to approve the coalition agreement, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier probably will call fresh elections. Polls indicate that the outcome would be largely the same as the elections held on September 24, 2017, when Merkel's CDU/CSU alliance won around 33% of the vote, its worst electoral result in nearly 70 years. Merkel's main challenger, Martin Schulz's SPD won 20.5%, the party's worst-ever showing.
According to the latest ARD poll "Germany Trend" (Deutschlandtrend) published on February 1, support for the CDU is at 33%, while support for the SDP fell to 18%, a record low, and only four points ahead of the AfD, which increased to 14%. Together, the two grand coalition parties barely scored 51%.
In the January 18 edition of the same poll, only 45% of voters said that another grand coalition was a good idea; 52% of respondents said it was not. The same poll showed that 53% of respondents think it would be very good or good if Merkel remains in office (a three-point decline compared to the previous month). Forty-nine percent of the respondents said that Merkel should complete a full term; 45% said she should leave prematurely.
**Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute.
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