LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
August 01/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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On Iran, Trump speaks loudly, but reserves the big stick
Ellen R. Wald/Arab News/July 31/18
Those who were surprised to hear on Monday that US President Donald Trump offered to meet with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani have not been paying enough attention to Trump’s tactics. After the two traded particularly vitriolic barbs last week, Trump appeared to open the door to negotiating with Iran. This does not indicate that the United States is taking a softer position on Iran or that the Trump administration will loosen the sanctions that are about to be reinstated. This is simply the way Trump negotiates.
In the early 20th century, American president Theodore Roosevelt famously characterized his own diplomatic style with the phrase, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Roosevelt, a somewhat bellicose former soldier, felt that his manliness and the strength of the United States (which was only on its way to becoming a military power at the time) would accomplish anything he needed on the international stage. President Trump, on the other hand, works in the opposite way. He figures he will speak loudly, threaten his opponents with America’s big stick, but only use that stick when he has to.
In the first few months of Trump’s term in office it became clear he was facing a problem with North Korea’s nuclear threats. North Korea was launching test missiles in the direction of Japan and threatening Guam, a US territory in the Pacific Ocean. In response, the president increased the economic pressure on North Korea. He brought Chinese President Xi Jinping on board with his plans, because China is North Korea’s economic lifeline. He also spoke about North Korea’s rogue actions in front of the United Nations and derisively called North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, “little rocket man.”
When Kim said that he had a nuclear button, Trump responded on Twitter as follows: “North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the ‘Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”
Ultimately, North Korea stopped testing its nuclear-capable missiles and arranged a meeting with Trump in Singapore. Before the meeting took place, North Korea returned three Americans who were being held captive there. When they met in June, Trump could not have been more gracious to Kim, and they came away from their day together with several tangible accomplishments. Missile tests are still halted, and there are reports that North Korea is dismantling some nuclear sites. The remains of American soldiers killed in Korea more than 60 years ago were recently returned to the United States. Most importantly, the belligerent talk on both sides has receded while negotiations continue.
President Trump uses the tactics of harsh rhetoric followed by extreme friendliness in issues as basic as trade negotiation with China, Europe and even close allies like Canada
North Korea and Iran are global hotspots that could potentially erupt into outright conflict. However, Trump also uses the tactics of harsh rhetoric followed by extreme friendliness in issues as basic as trade negotiation with China, Europe and even close allies like Canada.
When it comes to Iran, Trump seeks to halt its regional belligerence and permanently end Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Another important objective is the release of American and British captives who are being held in Iran. It is clear that he does not intend to pay ransoms, as his predecessor did.
With Iran, Trump is using similar tactics as he did with North Korea. He is taking a hard stance with the renewed sanctions. He is presenting himself as a tough opponent, using harsh rhetoric and refusing to be flexible on sanctions. He is asking for complete capitulation by the Iranian regime. He is asking for everything and acting like he will get it. That is his opening bid in the negotiations.
In other words, Trump is driving a very hard bargain. He is willing to meet with Rouhani without preconditions because he realizes he should not and cannot bargain until he is at the bargaining table. Trump often boasts that he wrote a bestselling book called “The Art of the Deal.” The book is about negotiation. Everything for him is a negotiation –especially international diplomacy. He establishes his position and he pursues his goals. He knows he probably will not get everything he wants, but the objective is to get everything he needs and maybe more. When a deal is struck, even if it is not exactly what he wanted, he praises both sides for a successful negotiation.
What we saw on Monday is President Trump’s tactic playing out. It is not a sign that he is pivoting his strategy or weakening his position when he offers to meet with the Iranians. Nor is this a signal that the United States is abandoning its Middle East allies. This is how he works.
**Ellen R. Wald, Ph.D. is a historian and author of “Saudi, Inc.” She is the president of Transversal Consulting and also teaches Middle East history and policy at Jacksonville University. Twitter: @EnergzdEconomy
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point-of-view

Sweida massacre deserves the same attention as attacks in the West
تستحق مجزرة السويداء نفس الإهتمام الذي يعطى للهجمات الإرهابية في الغرب
Chris Doyle/Arab News/July 31/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/66416/chris-doyle-sweida-massacre-deserves-the-same-attention-as-attacks-in-the-west-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%86/
Imagine if around four in the morning, in the center of Miami or Sheffield, a mob of hard-line members of Daesh stormed into homes, butchered entire families and massacred around 250 people in cold blood in a 12-hour killing spree that included four suicide bombings. Imagine if dozens of others had been kidnapped and many were missing, fate unknown. Imagine then the reaction of the White House or Downing Street. It is a fair bet Donald Trump would have tapped out a few semi-intelligible tweets in angry CAPS. War would probably be declared again, and enemies would be found to sate the appetite for revenge. The media would have devoted inordinate hours of coverage to the attacks.
Except for those who have been following the news in Syria, the majority in the West might well have missed this massacre in Sweida in the country’s south-west. It was not front page. The Eiffel Tower did not go dark as it had done after attacks in Europe. No hashtags circulated saying the people were standing with Sweida.
Time and time again bloody massacres in Syria, or indeed Iraq, register far lower on the political and media Richter scale than far smaller atrocities in the West. The indifference rings loudly across the Middle East. Still invariably people outside the Islamic world imagine that Daesh is chiefly in a war with the West as opposed to a war within Islam, unaware that far, far more Muslims and people from the Middle East have been killed by both Al-Qaeda and Daesh than in Europe and North America.
This is one of the key lessons that the attacks in Suwaida highlights. The second lesson is as vital. Daesh and Al-Qaeda are far from finished. Their capability of committing such mass murder is still very much alive. US President Trump had promised to “extinguish ISIS from the face of the earth.” In this year’s State of the Union address, he was “proud to report that the coalition to defeat ISIS has liberated very close to 100 percent of the territory just recently held by these killers in Iraq and in Syria.” The way in which he airbrushes out any role of his predecessor in this endeavour, whose policy he had broadly followed, is typical. Daesh may have lost territorial control, but this was always comparatively the easier bit. Daesh-controlled towns and their buildings could be targeted, but now its forces have dissipated, going back to what it successfully did for years, becoming like a shadow in the desert and border areas.
Another lesson, which may well not be learnt, is that the Syrian regime is incapable of defending its own population against Daesh and in many ways is still at ease with its actions if it reinforces the fear the regime depends on. The “it’s us or Daesh” dichotomy has been one of its most effective tools in preventing further defections and rebellions in its loyalist ranks. The largely Druze population will understand the message, but how many will also ask whether the regime did enough to try to stop this?
The Eiffel Tower did not go dark as it had done after attacks in Europe. No hashtags circulated saying the people were standing with Sweida
The Syrian opposition claims this was a regime-designed operation, asserting that the Syrian army only arrived after the massacres were finished. They believe the regime is meting out punishment for the Druze of Sweida that had never been truly loyal especially as the Druze lobbied successfully to be excused from military service. One loyalist remarked: “The Druze won’t help us to defend our families; why should we defend theirs?” The argument goes that Daesh fighters evacuated from south Damascus were transferred to the semi-desert close to Sweida. A power cut ensued on the night of the massacre and Daesh four-by-fours roamed freely. Rumours abound that in the days prior to the attacks, regime forces had started confiscating weapons from villagers in the region. What is for sure is that many in Sweida were terrified of Daesh’s menacing presence on their borders.
Yet this might serve the regime’s purposes in reinforcing the engrained belief that the regime is all powerful, when actually it is remarkably weak. Daesh is able to hit targets, and knew the Sweida region well, given its deeply entrenched trading and smuggling networks. The regime’s political legitimacy, such as it was, is in shreds. It failed to protect Sweida; its people feel betrayed. A regime delegation was turned back at the funerals. Increasingly it is seen akin to an occupying power, acting as a proxy for Russia and to a lesser extent, Iran. Israel has bombed Syria at will, and the regime can only play the role of spectator. But perhaps above all, the regime, like Daesh and other actors, can only rule with the tools of fear and violence, as it has no trust and it has failed in its role as a protector. It has also served to strengthen those who look for a federal or more local solution to Syria’s future governance, something which is anathema to Damascus.
Daesh now has a hold over the regime as it negotiates prisoner swaps, the women it has kidnapped for its own fighters in regime hands. Residents of Sweida still fear further Daesh massacres. The regime has failed them, but then again so too has the anti-Daesh coalition. Will the international powers do anything? Probably not. Sadly, the only way forward is to find a political solution that brings legitimate and credible government in Syria with broad support that will truly shrink the space for extremists like Daesh in a way bombs never will.
**Chris Doyle is director of the London-based Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU). He has worked with the council since 1993 after graduating with a first class honors degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies at Exeter University. He has organized and accompanied numerous British parliamentary delegations to Arab countries. Twitter: @Doylech

Is there hope for the Iranian regime?!
Mohammed Al-Hammadi/Al Arabiya/July 31/18
The upcoming year will mark 40 years of the Iranian regime’s existence, which represents four decades of failure to achieve its unrealistic goals of controlling the region and exporting the revolution. It has neither succeeded in exporting its revolution, nor been able to protect it at home.
In fact, the Iranian people want to dispose of it, now more than ever, as it has become a heavy burden on Iran and the Iranians. This regime has only brought hostility to the country, in addition to economic and political sanctions. Iran does not have a single friend among the civilized countries as all the regime’s friends and allies are those who are singing outside the global flock who mostly suffer from economic crises of their own or of civilizational and human regression. The time for slogans, propaganda and deceit has ended. Instead of threatening the Iranian people with the fate suffered by the people of Syria, Iran should focus on change, and the regime must itself start to change, reform and revert to reality .Tehran needs to reconsider its political and strategic calculations due to the people’s indignation and external pressures. Instead of threatening the United States and the superpowers and not complying with international laws, charters and ethics, Tehran must look at itself impartially and with clarity and admit that its ideological project has failed and has no prospect of recovery.
Time to 'shape up'
The time for slogans, propaganda and deceit has ended. Instead of threatening the Iranian people with the fate suffered by the people of Syria, Iran should focus on change, and the regime must itself start to change, reform and revert to reality so that Iran becomes a disciplined and responsible state, and a real partner in maintaining the security and stability of the region, and a hand that builds along with its neighbors. It should stop creating chaos in the region and disturbing the security and stability of its neighbors by supporting and financing terrorism and jeopardizing global interests by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz or carrying out acts of aggression. The Iranian officials' quarrel with America is not in Tehran's favor. The American president’s response to Rouhani's recent remarks was clear, and Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ recent condemnation of Iran's actions in the Middle East, including its support of Assad and the Houthis, must be taken seriously. Moreover, every country in the region agrees with Mattis’ statement that: “It’s time for Iran to shape up and show responsibility as a responsible nation. It cannot continue to show irresponsibility as some revolutionary organization that is intent on exporting terrorism, exporting disruption across the region.”This is what all countries, the countries of the region in general and the Arab states in particular want. The suffering witnessed by Iran's neighbors due to the Iranian regime has never ceased over the last four decades. Once a crisis ends, this regime engulfs the countries of the region into another crisis thus causing problems for these nations as well as for the Iranian people. After all these years and in light of recent events, one wonders: Is there hope that this regime will change its behavior? Is there hope that Iran will again become a state and not a revolutionary organization with a terrorist and extremist ideology?

The Secret Reason Arabs Reject the Jewish Nation-State Law
Bassam Tawil/Gatestone Institute/July 31, 2018/
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12785/israel-arabs-nation-state-law
Some Israeli Arab leaders speak disparagingly about Israel for publicity. They know that no newspaper would ever mention them if they were dealing with issues such as sewage or a shortage of classrooms in Arab schools. If they say something bad about Israel or provoke the Jews, however, they will certainly receive a headline in the press.
Israeli Arab leaders can incite against Israel as much as they wish. Their slander will not change the reality that Israel is the only thriving democracy in the Middle East, and treats its minorities with respect. While minorities are being persecuted and murdered in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and other Arab and Islamic countries, the Arab citizens of Israel are being integrated into the state. They hold high positions in the Supreme Court, the Foreign Ministry, the health sector and even the Israel Police. The majority of the Arabs in Israel can work anywhere they wish, they can travel anywhere in the country, and they will continue to enjoy all the privileges, benefits and freedoms that Jewish citizens do.
Some Israeli Arab leaders want Israel to give up its wish to be a Jewish homeland because they are hoping that one day Jews will become a minority in their own country. For far too long, they have been inciting their constituents against Israel and Jews. If these leaders are so unhappy in Israel, perhaps they would consider moving to Ramallah or the Gaza Strip or any Arab country. Perhaps they would care to resign from the Knesset. Why do they refrain from doing so? Because it is in the Jewish homeland, supposedly so harmful to them, that they and their children can live and thrive.
The hypocrisy of the leaders of the Arab citizens of Israel, who are now crying foul over the new Jewish Nation-State Law, has, in the past few days, reached new heights.
These are the same leaders whose words and actions for the past two decades have caused serious damage to relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, and to the interests of their own constituents, the Arab citizens of Israel.
Israeli Arab leaders, specifically the Knesset members, say they are outraged not only because the law defines Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, but also because the new legislation does not include words about full equality of rights for all citizens.
If there ever was a tempest in a teapot, this is it. It would have been redundant to add those words: the new law does not rescind any previous law or Israel's Declaration of Independence, which already encompass all that. In Israel, there are also other Basic Laws that guarantee equal rights to all. For example, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, passed in 1992, stipulates:
"The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state."
"Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel."
Israel's Declaration of Independence from 1948, which obviously is not affected by the new Jewish Nation-State Law, also promises equality to all citizens, irrespective of their religion or color or race. It states:
"The State of Israel will foster the development of the country for all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
So, as Israel's pre-existing laws and its Declaration of Independence remain unchanged and guarantee equal rights to all citizens, what exactly is behind the Israeli Arab leaders' fierce attack on the Nation-State Law? Is it really because they are worried about equality or is it something else? The answer can be found in their own statements: they are basically opposed to the idea of Israel being the homeland for the Jewish people. They know very well that the Nation-State Law does not affect the Arab citizens' status and rights as equal citizens of Israel.
Take, for example, the case of Arab Member of Knesset Zouheir Bahloul (Zionist Union), who announced this week his intention to resign from parliament in protest over the Nation-State Law. He complained that the Knesset had become a "rubber stamp for racist legislation."
First, Bahloul is the last Arab citizen of Israel who is entitled to complain about discrimination. For decades, he was one of Israel's most popular sports journalists, revered by Arabs and Jews alike. As such, he has always enjoyed a comfortable life in Israel -- one he could never have dreamed of experiencing in any Arab country.
Second, if Bahloul has a problem with a law that defines Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, what is he doing in a party called the Zionist Union? Once you agree to join a Zionist party, you cannot later complain when Israel says it wants to be the homeland of the Jewish people. Does anyone seriously believe that this Arab parliamentarian did not know all these years that Zionism is the national movement of the Jewish people that supports the re-establishment of a Jewish homeland in the territory defined as the historic Land of Israel?
Zouheir Bahloul, an Arab Member of Knesset, is the last Arab citizen of Israel who is entitled to complain about discrimination. For decades, he was one of Israel's most popular sports journalists, revered by Arabs and Jews alike. He has always enjoyed a comfortable life in Israel -- one he could never have dreamed of experiencing in any Arab country. (Photo: Knesset Spokesperson)
Third, it is also worth noting that his Zionist Union party was fed up with Bahloul anyhow, and planning to get rid of him, especially after his decision last year to boycott a Knesset ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Ironically, the second part of the Balfour Declaration stipulated that the establishment of a Jewish homeland must not "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."
The current controversy over the Nation-State law, then, is not about equal rights. Instead, it is about accepting the existence of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. Bahloul boycotted the Balfour Declaration ceremony in the Knesset apparently because he is opposed to the very idea of a Jewish homeland. Otherwise, why would any Arab living in Israel oppose a declaration that openly states that a Jewish homeland must not "prejudice" the rights of non-Jews?
Zionist Union Chairman Avi Gabbay had criticized Bahloul's decision as "extremist."
Bahloul presumably knew he was going to be thrown out of his party, and seems to have decided to use the Nation-State Law as an excuse to quit, and to smear Israel by inaccurately calling it "a state with symptoms of apartheid," and the Knesset a "rubber stamp for racist legislation."
Fourth, note that Bahloul did not immediately submit his resignation from the Knesset. Instead, he said that he will submit his resignation letter when the Knesset returns from its extended summer recess in mid-October. In other words, Bahloul evidently wants to spend a few more months in the Knesset, probably so that he can continue receiving a fine salary and other privileges granted to members of parliament. By postponing his resignation, he is also most likely hoping that someone will come begging him to rescind his decision -- as if he is saying, 'Please hold me back from leaving the Knesset!' Well, Mr. Bahloul, if you are so upset about the law and do not want to be part of the Israeli political system, why don't you just get up and leave now? Why would you want to stay for a few more months in a parliament you accuse of being "racist" against Arabs?
The "dirty little secret" is that even if the words about equality for all citizens were added to the new law, Bahloul and some of his Arab colleagues in the Knesset would still have opposed it. They are simply vehemently opposed to the very idea of Israel being a Jewish state.
Some of them, such as Ahmed Tibi, have consistently called for the transformation of Israel from a "Jewish state" into a "state for all its citizens" or a "state of all its national (ethnic) groups."
Another Arab Knesset member, Jamal Zahalka, recently mocked Jewish symbols and said, "I would rather die than sing the Israeli national anthem." Many Arab Members of Knesset have never accepted Israel's national anthem or its flag, which carries the symbol of the six-pointed Star of David. About the Israeli flag, Zahalka said, "Any flag for me is a rag. It's a piece of cloth. It's a lot worse than a rag."
Arab Knesset member Hanin Zoabi was nothing if not straightforward in voicing her opposition to the definition of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. The Jewish people do not have the right to self-determination, she said in October 2017.
"The Jews are not a nationality, so we cannot talk about self-determination for the Jewish people... The Israelis, they can have self-determination, but not as a Jewish State, within a secular democratic state."
It is worth noting here that Zoabi, who hails from a large clan from Nazareth, was suspended from the Knesset in 2014 for incitement after she justified Hamas firing rockets at Israel and the abduction (and subsequent murder) of three Israeli teens by Palestinian terrorists.
It is the likes of Zoabi who have -- and continue to -- cause grave damage to relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Their vicious anti-Israel rhetoric and actions are the main reason why a growing number of Jews are beginning to look at the Arab citizens of Israel as if they were a "fifth column" or an "enemy from within."
Some Israeli Arab leaders speak disparagingly about Israel for publicity. They know that no newspaper would ever mention them if they were dealing with issues such as sewage or a shortage of classrooms in Arab schools. However, if they say something bad about Israel or provoke the Jews, they will certainly receive a headline in the press.
The number one priority of Israel's Arab citizens is lowering the high rate of unemployment among Arab university graduates. Israel's Arab citizens want to be fully integrated into Israel. They are fighting for better government services, especially with regards to infrastructure in their towns and villages. But instead of representing the real interests of their constituents, Tibi, Zoabi, Zahalka and others spend their time condemning Israel and identifying with its enemies. The actions and words of these Arab Knesset members have only served to deepen the rift between Jews and Arabs, at a time when serious efforts are being made by the Israeli government to improve the lives of Arab citizens. For instance, an Israeli parliamentary committee last April announced a decision to allocate 20 million shekels ($5.6 million) to a new program designed to increase the number of Israeli Arabs with jobs in the tech sector. The committee said that the Israeli government has already invested $1.2 billion out of the $4.2 billion allocated to the economic development of Arabs and other minorities as part of a 2015 cabinet decision.
The Arabs in Israel are equal citizens, and the rights they enjoy are far more than what they would enjoy in any other Middle Eastern country. In a poll published in 2016, 55% of Israel's Arab citizens said they were proud to be Israeli citizens. Another poll, published in 2017, found that 60% of the Arab citizens of Israel have positive attitudes towards the state.
Israeli Arab leaders can incite against Israel as much as they wish. Their slander will not change the reality that Israel is the only thriving democracy in the Middle East, and treats its minorities with respect. While minorities are being persecuted and murdered in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and other Arab and Islamic countries, the Arab citizens of Israel are being integrated into the state. They hold high positions in the Supreme Court, the Foreign Ministry, the health sector and even the Israel Police. The new law has not changed this reality; in fact, most Arab citizens do not even seem to be that bothered about the new law. The majority of the Arabs in Israel continue to wake up in the morning and get on with their lives. They can work anywhere they wish, they can travel anywhere in the country and they will continue to enjoy all the privileges, benefits and freedoms that Jewish citizens do.
Some of the leaders of Israel's Arab citizens, however, have something very different in mind. They want Israelis to give up their wish for Israel to be a Jewish homeland, because they are hoping that one day Jews will become a minority in their own country. For far too long, these leaders have been inciting their constituents against Israel and Jews. If these leaders are so unhappy in Israel, perhaps they should consider moving to Ramallah or the Gaza Strip or any Arab country. Perhaps they would like to resign from the Knesset. Why do they refrain from doing so? Because it is in the Jewish homeland, supposedly so harmful to them, that they and their children can live and thrive.
*Bassam Tawil, a Muslim Arab, is based in the Middle East.
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Child Brides in Turkey
Burak Bekdil/Gatestone Institute/July 31, 2018/
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12766/child-brides-turkey
40% of girls under the age of 18 in Turkey are forced into marriage, according to Turkish Philanthropy Funds.
In January 2018, a government body under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's jurisdiction suggested that, according to Islamic law, girls as young as 9 and boys as young as 12 could marry. "Low education" means almost all of Turkey: The average schooling in the country is a mere 6.5 years.
In Turkey you may abuse a 13-year-old and walk free, but you may not tease the president.
Where would you like your daughter to be when she is 13? In school, or in bed with a grown man? The answer to this question is largely beyond argument in much of the world. In Islamic societies, however -- including non-Arab and theoretically secular Turkey -- the answer is anyone's guess. Usually in such states, the police power of the government does not fight the patriarchal tradition; instead, it supports it.
Turkey's former president, Abdullah Gül, incumbent Islamist strongman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's former ally and co-founder of the party that has ruled Turkey since 2002, was a 30-year-old man when he married his wife Hayrünnisa when she was 15. Gül, nominated for the presidency by Erdoğan, was Turkey's first Islamist president.
Conservative Turks, instead of questioning Gül's marriage to a child, cheered his rise to the presidency. This author was privately -- but not politely -- warned several times by senior politicians against bringing up the issue in his column in another newspaper.
According to Turkish Philanthropy Funds (TPF), 40% of girls under the age of 18 in Turkey are forced into marriage. TPF found that the Turkish national average of female high school dropouts was 56%. It further found that early marriage is seen in families with a low education level. "Low education" means almost all of Turkey: The average schooling in the country is a mere 6.5 years. In 45 Turkish provinces, the schooling rate is below the national average.
The Islamist rule in the once secular country has added to the problem of child brides instead of combating it. In November 2017, President Erdoğan signed the "mufti law," which allows state-approved clerics (or simply imams) to conduct marriage ceremonies, "despite concerns from civil society that this could have an impact on child marriage."
In January 2018, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) -- a government body under Erdoğan's jurisdiction -- suggested that according to Islamic law, girls as young as 9 years old and boys as young as 12 could marry. Diyanet is responsible for administering religious institutions in Turkey. Its website reaffirmed that, according to Islamic law, whoever had reached the age of "adolescence" had the right to marry. This "fatwa" prompted the country's main opposition party, a secular group, to call for an investigation into child marriages.
The arrival of around three million Syrian refugees to Turkey since civil war broke out in the neighboring country has made things worse. For instance, a social worker at the Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Training and Research Hospital in Istanbul's Küçükçekmece district revealed that the hospital treated 115 pregnant underage girls, including 39 Syrian nationals, between Jan. 1 and May 9, 2017. The social worker complained to prosecutors that the hospital tried to cover up the pregnancies and did not notify the authorities, as is a legal requirement for the treatment of all pregnant girls younger than 18 in Turkey. Such examples are only the "tip of the iceberg," according to Canan Güllü, head of the Turkish Women Associations Federation.
A recent case of Syrian refugee-related child abuse is an embarrassment not only for the Turkish political culture that has nurtured the malady but also for the Turkish judiciary:
Fatma C., a Syrian child refugee arrived in Ankara, the Turkish capital, with her family four years ago. In 2017, according to an indictment, she was forced at the age of 13 to marry her relative, Abdulkerim J. The marriage was not civil but religious (made legal under Islam by an imam). Fatma C. got pregnant and was taken to a local health center where, because she was younger than 18, authorities informed law enforcement authorities.
Prosecutors decided that the girl's husband and her mother, Emani B., should stand trial for forcing an underage girl into marriage. So, stand trial they did. But a court in Ankara ruled during the first hearing of the case to acquit them. The defendants maintained that they did not know the Turkish law on marriage and that the girl had married "under Syrian law." An unusually tolerant Turkish prosecutor ruled that the "marriage took place not with the intention of committing an offense."
"It is universal rule that not knowing the law is not an excuse when one offends," said Ceren Kalay Eken, a lawyer from the Ankara Bar Association. "The appropriate place for a 13-year-old girl is on the school bench, not tending to the cradle."
It is amazing how soft and tolerant Turkish law enforcement can be when the offenders act from motives derived from austere Islamic values and traditions. Around the same time as the child bride's abusers went free during their first hearing, another Ankara court arrested four university students for exhibiting at their graduation ceremony a placard that the court deemed insulting to President Erdoğan. In Turkey, you may abuse a 13-year-old and walk free, but you may not tease the president.
*Burak Bekdil, one of Turkey's leading journalists, was recently fired from Turkey's leading newspaper after 29 years, for writing what was taking place in Turkey for Gatestone. He is a Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
© 2018 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Can Imran Khan Create a New Pakistan?
Pankaj Mishra/Bloomberg/July 31/18
Four years ago, on the day Narendra Modi was elected prime minister, I wrote that India was entering its most sinister phase since independence. This was a well-grounded fear for anyone who had noted Modi’s steadfast commitment to Hindu supremacism and the fragile state of India’s economy. Today, with Modi failing to create jobs or eradicate corruption, his government has resorted to fueling violence against minorities and assorted “anti-nationals.” As Imran Khan prepares to become Pakistan’s new prime minister, it is not unreasonable to fear that South Asia is lurching into its most turbulent phase since 1947.
It is true that, unlike Modi, Khan has no tainted record of governance. Nor has he beaten the drums for a far-right ideology since his childhood. He came to politics in his 40s, after a career in sports and philanthropy; and, unlike Modi, he was known as a playboy of the Western world.
This broad experience — of upper-middle-class Lahore and plutocratic London, piety as well as hedonism — might incline one to give him the benefit of the doubt, and credit him with ideological flexibility rather than fanaticism. Indeed, Khan’s oft-expressed commitment to social justice is admirable in a society that routinely profanes this ideal. Yet, while waiting impatiently in the anteroom of power, he has manifested some disturbing tendencies.
Personality traits are hardly inconsequential in politics, as Donald Trump has revealed in his earth-shaking stint as the world’s most powerful man. In the case of Khan, another unproven outsider in mainstream politics, they’re a crucial clue to how he will comport himself in office.
It has long been clear that he has a Trump-sized ego, which success in sports and easy erotic conquests helped build. He entered politics in the 1990s with a sense of entitlement common among the political dynasties he scorns, and a series of setbacks seemed merely to harden his certainty that political power in Pakistan was his birthright.
Convinced that he is the divinely ordained agent of Pakistan’s transformation, Khan has in recent years cut a furious swathe through his country’s frail democratic institutions. He has injected a hysterically antagonistic tone into Pakistan’s politics, which decades of coups and assassinations had already degraded into a zero-sum affair. For someone claiming to be revolutionary, committed to destroying Pakistan’s venal dynastic elites, he has seemed overly eager to strike deals with the ancien regime — its sleazy politicians, fundamentalists on hire, murky spies and megalomaniacal army officers.
Professing to be a “real liberal” — as opposed to those he calls “Westoxified” liberals — Khan has vigorously defended Pakistan’s draconian anti-blasphemy law. He has also done little to restrain members of his personality cult from virulently attacking his detractors, especially women and Westoxified liberals, on social media.
The fanatical zeal of these trolls suggests that Khan has, like Modi, successfully transmitted his extravagant and long-thwarted dream of glory and power to many of his followers. Pakistan has one of the world’s youngest populations, with 64 percent of its people below the age of 30. Like their Indian counterparts, who bought Modi’s claim to possess a 56-inch chest, the young in Pakistan tend to vicariously identify themselves with a politician who radiates hyper-masculine virility rather than intellectual refinement or political skill.
But a tragic gap exists between their digitally stoked fantasies of individual empowerment and the harsh reality of their country — signified at present by a heavily indebted economy dependent on dodgy Chinese loans.
In a conciliatory acceptance speech, Khan invoked the intention with which he entered politics two decades ago: to redeem the unfulfilled potential of his country. He graciously reached out to his adversaries, and one can only hope at this juncture that he will work hard with them to create what he calls “Naya” (new) Pakistan.
Many of his own words and deeds, however, have helped ensure that Naya Pakistan will have more than a touch of Purana (old) Pakistan. Moreover, many of the challenges confronting his country are intractable. Expectations among his voters are so high, and his political capacity so limited and moral authority so depleted, that failure seems more likely than success at this point.
Defeats and setbacks, as Modi’s current maneuvers in India suggest, could make Khan desperate to consolidate political support by stoking fear and loathing of critics and dissenters. Khan has started well, with noble intentions and plenty of goodwill. But it isn’t premature to worry that the fate of India and Pakistan, or one-fifth of the human population, now lies in the hands of two macho men, who promise themselves and their followers the moon, and whom failure makes reckless.

How Facebook Went So Wrong So Fast
Shira Ovide/Bloomberg/July 31/18
That’s what many of Facebook Inc.’s investors — and I — have spent the last 18 hours wondering. On Wednesday, the company posted disappointing figures for second-quarter revenue, user growth and profits. Executives also warned that Facebook’s rapid rate of revenue growth would become relatively pedestrian the rest of this year and that a surge of spending would drastically drag down profit margins for the next several years. During a conference call with stock analysts, nearly every word out of executives’ mouths was more alarming than the last.
The reaction was utter panic. Facebook is on track to shed more than $100 billion in stock market value on Thursday. If that holds, it would be the biggest single-day loss of market value ever for a US public company.
Now the question is what went wrong, and how much Facebook, its stockholders and the rest of the technology industry need to worry about the company that has been the biggest success in tech in the last decade. Here are four possible explanations for what happened, and how bad it is for Facebook and beyond:
1) A communications breakdown. This idea, articulated by my Bloomberg colleague Jonathan Ferro, is that what happened on Wednesday was a failure to adequately flag warning signs to Facebook investors. The explanations Facebook gave for an expected slowdown in revenue growth later this year — a drag from fluctuations in foreign-currency rates, a shift in priorities to newer types of internet activity that generate relatively lower ad sales, and decisions to be less invasive in harnessing information about users — seemed to come mostly out of the blue.
Sure, Facebook had been saying it’s hitting the gas on Stories, the photo-and-video diary formats for the social network and Instagram. Currency swings aren’t necessarily predictable, and CEO Mark Zuckerberg had been saying that changes to limit the mindless use of Facebook could hurt business. But the company wasn’t explicit before on the possible scale of impact from the changes it is intentionally making to its internet hangouts. If the company could predict this, then management failed to properly set investors’ expectations.
2) Investors didn’t take Facebook’s hints. While investors could justifiably claim surprise at the forecast of a growth slowdown, perhaps they shouldn’t have been surprised about squeezed profit margins. The company has been saying for months that it was increasing spending drastically for a range of priorities, including hiring more people and devoting more technical resources to prevent its digital hangouts from being overrun by misinformation, politically motivated propaganda and incitements to violence. Facebook is also doubling down on programming for its web video services and for its global network of computer data centers.
The company forecast that its operating costs would increase by as much as 60 percent this year compared with 2017, although analysts tended to dismiss that forecast as too high. It now looks as though that estimate won’t be far off. To defend investors, however, perhaps the most alarming thing in Facebook’s litany of alarms was a prediction of a sharp pinch on profit margins for the foreseeable future. The company forecast operating profit margins somewhere near 35 percent over the next several years. That is a stunning deceleration both from recent history — that margin was 45 percent in the first half of 2018 — and from investors’ expectations of profit margins around 44 percent in 2019 and 2020. That was a stunner.
3) Facebook is being intentionally overcautious. Facebook is the boy who cried wolf on financial issues. Nearly two years ago, the company sparked a mini-panic when it cautioned that its revenue growth rate would “meaningfully” slow around mid-2017 because Facebook couldn’t keep shoving more advertisements into its social network. Investors worried for more than a year about those words. In the end, the growth rate barely ticked down by late 2017.
It’s possible that Facebook on Wednesday was again lowering the financial bar nearly all the way to the ground so it can easily surpass its own forecasts later. That doesn’t feel likely given the range of worrying financial and user metrics, but it’s possible. Michael Nathanson, a stock analyst with MoffettNathanson LLC, also raised the possibility that Facebook is talking down its prospects “to stave off further regulatory pressure.” The worse Facebook’s financial results look, the less likely it will be that all those mean politicians and regulatory authorities around the world will try to crack down on Facebook for being too successful and powerful.
4) Things are going unexpectedly wrong. I lean toward this explanation, with sprinkles of the first three. I tend to believe Facebook was caught off guard because of the simultaneous deterioration of user growth, particularly in the US and Canada, which generate most of its revenue; in its revenue growth rate and expectations for a further slowdown; and in its profit-margin forecast.
Facebook also said the split of ads compared with other types of information on Instagram was nearly the same as that on its main social network. To me, that signals that Facebook was worried about a slowdown it saw in usage or revenue growth on its social network and therefore significantly stepped up the number of ads on the young and promising photo-and-video app. That smells like fear.
Plus, Facebook warned about a possible second-quarter decline in the number of users in Europe after a significant change to privacy regulations in that market, but it didn’t predict the flatlining of user numbers in the US and Canada. That suggests Facebook didn’t see that user stagnation coming, and the company didn’t try to explain it away as the result of intentional decisions to focus on quality over quantity of people’s time on Facebook.
Maybe Facebook is doing exactly what it’s been telling us for many months: The company is spending more, and changing its priorities, to ensure its digital hangouts are happier and healthier places. Those decisions will be good for the world, and eventually for Facebook’s finances, too. But I can’t shake off the belief that Facebook saw all this coming, and its pledges about “time well spent” and cleaning up its act were defensive reactions to trends that weren’t obvious to the public until Wednesday: Facebook was running out of steam.

The Season of the Tsar’s Gift Distribution
Ghassan Charbel/Asharq Al Awsat/July 31/18
In the Syrian tragedy, which is approaching a critical turning point, the Russian plan seems more ingenious and coherent. It is a political, diplomatic and security “kitchen” under the supervision of the Kremlin master, the head chef. It is not possible here to overlook the role of Sergei Lavrov, the assistant promoting a several-course meal, managing to run a long confrontation that stretched from the Middle East to the corridors of the Security Council, interspersing maneuvers, clashes and shocks.
There is no doubt that Vladimir Putin was looking for a golden opportunity for great revenge. Revenge against the unipolar world that prevailed the day after the suicide of the Soviet Union… Revenge against NATO, which moved its pawns near the borders of the Russian Federation… Revenge against the colorful revolutions that Putin believes are imported from Western “kitchens”… and revenge for the image of Soviet and Russian weapons being destroyed in Iraq, Serbia and Libya.
The Syrian tragedy provided this opportunity and Putin excelled in ripening the conditions of Russian military intervention in this country. The Russian president benefited from the confusion of decision-makers in Washington in the row over the heavy cost of military intervention in Iraq. He also benefited from Barack Obama’s desire to conclude a “historic agreement” with Iran on its nuclear program. In spite of the change of administrations in Washington, the fate of Syria did not appear to be considered a priority worthy of going to the extent of military intervention.
Those, who look at Syria today, realize that Russia has succeeded in taking the position of the first player in this country. It is the only team that can speak to all parties. It is the mandatory crossing point for any temporary or long-term settlement. Since the Syrian crisis is regional because of the country’s location and the spread of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, and since any solution must tackle the limits of Iran’s role and Israel’s security, it can be said that Russia has imposed itself as a major player in the Middle East.
It is clear that we are facing a new scene in the Syrian crisis. The US-Russian summit in Helsinki has reinforced this impression. The two presidents discussed the crisis under three headlines: Israel’s security, Iran’s intervention and the return of refugees. There was no reference at the press conference to the political transition or the Geneva process. The fate of President Bashar al-Assad is no longer on the table. After resolving the military confrontation in favor of the regime, Russia succeeded in getting Assad out of the talks.
Russia is now distributing guarantees and bandages. These are the gifts of the Tsar who grabbed the strings of the game and those of the solution. Israel has received the gift of reviving the disengagement agreement between the Syrian and Israeli armies, accompanied by a Russian promise to remove Iranian militias from Israel’s border. This means that the Syrian areas adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights will not be a threat to the Jewish state. This particular point may be one of the main reasons that facilitated the Helsinki Summit. Before that, Israel received another gift from Putin, who practically gave it the right to attack Iran’s positions and militias, despite the Russian umbrella over Syria.
Turkey also received a gift from the Tsar. He allowed it to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish “territory” on its border when it launched the “Euphrates Shield” in Jarablus and Al-Bab. He also allowed it to eliminate the dream of the Syrian Kurds to reach the Mediterranean through the “Olive Branch” operation, which was launched by the Turkish army in Afrin. Turkey can get an extra gift if Russia succeeds in returning some of the Syrians who have taken refuge in this country.
The official Lebanese delight was evident when Russia announced it would support the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians living in Lebanon. The same could be said of Jordan, whose economy has been further burdened by refugees.
Iran itself received a great gift from the Tsar, when his forces’ intervention in Syria prevented the fall of the Syrian circle from the “crescent” that its generals boast of.
The fall of the Syrian episode would have been a resounding defeat for the policies of Khamenei and the IRGC generals, because the interruption of Iranian ground contact with “Hezbollah” is not simple. Since the Tsar is not a charity organization, Iran is expected to respond with flexibility to Israel’s security file.
Getting away from the Golan is something, and getting out of Syria is another matter. This game is complex and will see a contest to attract the Syrian regime, which has received a precious gift from the Tsar that kept it alive. Iran’s adversaries also received a gift from the Tsar, which was the belief that Russia’s Syria had prevented the establishment of an Iranian Syria.
The Tsar is handling the Syrian refugee file as a gift that could draw Europe into participating in the reconstruction of Syria, even if it was on the basisof providing the adequate conditions for the return of as many refugees as possible. This matter is important to Europe and even tempts it. The Old Continent suffers from the burdens of the refugee file and is divided around it. Russia’s promise on the return of Syrian refugees to their country will reduce the number of boat arrivals. The European contribution, if achieved, will lead to a kind of system rehabilitation.
America itself may have received a gift from the Tsar. Ensuring Israel’s security through the Syrian front and preventing an Iranian military presence off the Golan parallel to the presence of “Hezbollah” in South Lebanon.
The head chef in the Kremlin has succeeded in finding the right recipe for Syria. He reserved his role and his seat and made himself a need and a guarantee. With the Tsar’s gifts distribution season, the Syrian crisis enters a new phase that is completely different from the previous one.