LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
April 26/2018
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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The ISIS triangle which allows militants to disappear calls for a joint operation between Iraq, Syria and the US
Hassan Hassan/The National/April 25, 2018
The critical point where the river, deserts and Syrian-Iraq border meet is being exploited by lurking sleeper cells, writes Hassan Hassan
A delicate security triangle is forming along the Syrian-Iraqi borders. Operational lines of separation have prevented the United States, Iraq and Syria from joining forces with its Russia and Iranian allies to fight ISIS. But new complications have forced a fresh dynamic that effectively enables the US to target ISIS outside its established jurisdiction by proxy, through the Iraqis.
The new dynamic, while still nascent, is a product of improvised arrangements between Washington and Moscow to prevent aerial collision and to demarcate areas of operation during the fight against the extremist group. The two sides agreed to have the Euphrates river as the “deconflict” line, despite obvious flaws more apparent now than a few months ago.
ISIS has already started to exploit these flaws and gaps, forcing presumed rivals to engage in backdoor measures to address emerging problems.
This turn of events began in March after Kurdish fighters in Syria shifted their focus to the Turkish operation in Afrin away from the war against ISIS and while the Syrian regime started to focus on rebel strongholds near Damascus. The US-led coalition then announced an “operational pause” in the remaining villages still under ISIS control east of the Euphrates. The villages, around five in total, are part of the administrative region of Abu Kamal near the Syrian-Iraqi borders, where the regime controls the other side of the river.
In a conversation in mid-March, American officials told me of an awkward situation along the western side of the river, specifically in the villages situated between the regime-held city of Abu Kamal and the Iraqi city of Al Qaim. The Syrian regime claimed to have liberated those small villages in November with the help of Iranian-backed militias. But according to American officials, that was not the case.
Since the US was not allowed to strike against ISIS in supposedly regime-held areas, the situation allowed the militants to operate with impunity in that area. ISIS fighters moved freely along and across the river. Similarly, the operational pause allowed ISIS into the non-liberated villages east of the river to refocus its attacks on the regime side. According to residents from Deir Ezzor at the time, ISIS fighters would cross the river and connect with other members operating in the Syrian Desert west of Abu Kamal, a possible factor in recent successful attacks by ISIS, deep in regime areas near Palmyra.
Not long after the US officials expressed their growing concerns about ISIS's presence near the borders, Baghdad announced it would conduct attacks against the group inside Syria. “The real danger is the presence of ISIS in Syria,” Haider Al Abadi, the Iraqi Prime Minister, said in a press conference this month. “We heard that they got rid of ISIS. Lies.”
The statement was in response to US concerns about ISIS activities outside its operational purview. Iraq was able to use its friendly ties with the Syrian regime and Iran to target ISIS in regime-held areas.
“The majority of the support that the coalition provided was intelligence support on the target,” colonel Ryan Dillon, the anti-ISIS coalition’s spokesman, said, referring to an Iraqi strike against ISIS headquarters inside Syria. “We also provided some other assets in the air nearby that were also a part of the support package. But it really was the Iraqis who planned this all the way through. It was their commitment and their coordination with their neighbours in the Syrian government, before they conducted these strikes.”
Mr Al Abadi referred to these pockets, in which ISIS still operates despite regime claims, as “deserted” by Syria. For this reason, he said, his government found it vital to take the fight against ISIS to Syria. He said while his armed forces control all the borderline from the Iraqi side, ISIS individuals still manage to cross it to conduct attacks inside the country either through border gaps or bribery.
Such de facto three-way operations are poised to continue, if not intensify. As I wrote last week, ISIS is pushing its sleeper cells to become active again. The push appears to be part of a broader effort to rekindle its insurgency after the loss of territory and comes at the backdrop of increased attacks in much of Iraq and Syria. The effort to reignite the insurgency culminated with a fiery speech on Sunday by the group’s spokesman, Abu Al Hassan Al Muhajir, the first by one of its senior leaders since September, urging members to intensify their campaign.
Using the river as a deconflict line is likely to remain a nuisance for the US, Iraq and the pro-Syrian camp. ISIS has a history of using rivers and areas adjacent to them as hideouts and for mobility, even when the US was heavily present inside Iraq after 2007. The villages that the US complained about in regime areas contain, more than the rest of Abu Kamal, lush river reeds and palm orchards that make it easier for militants to hide and survive.
Another factor that might complicate the situation for ISIS enemies is that in Abu Kamal specifically, the river passes through the Syrian-Iraqi borders. At that confluence point, three items favourable to ISIS converge: the river, the Syrian and Anbar deserts and the borders.
Ideally, this area should have been controlled by a force or a group of forces that closely work with each other, as one senior US official conceded. Instead, different countries that supposedly operate under different jurisdictions control different parts of a critical terrain. In this context, ISIS will no doubt find gaps, as it already has, that cannot be plugged by tactical strikes on occasions.
A few months ago, such a complexity was not anticipated. Each side was racing to carve out areas of control as they battled ISIS. They rushed to agree on demarcated lines to avoid accidents. But the latest developments only demonstrate, once again, that the US-led coalition is still improvising as it goes – hardly a reassuring sign for a lasting defeat of ISIS.
Hassan Hassan is co-author of the New York Times bestseller ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror and a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Washington DC
https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/the-isis-triangle-which-allows-militants-to-disappear-calls-for-a-joint-operation-between-iraq-syria-and-the-us-1.724641

Iran attempting to reappear on the regional scene by co-opting elections
Sawsan Al Shaer/Al Arabiya/April 25/18
This year’s Lebanese, Iraqi and even Bahraini elections may offer space for Iranian interference once again.
With upcoming elections in Bahrain, the emergence of a new line of candidates linked to dissolved political parties, which were either serving Iran’s agenda or following Iran, looms as these groups plan to reappear on the scene again.
Bahrain elections
Parliamentary members and the Shura Council are preparing to vote on a law seeking to prevent members of dissolved associations and those who have been sentenced to final verdicts from getting on the ballot box. Therefore, thee associations backed by Iran are working to prepare a new line of candidates in order to return to the political scene.
What is noticeable is that the faces of those who were not politically burned do not have the acumen or experience to enter the political scene on their own. The associations are thus trying to introduce their names by asking known writers or famous accounts on social media to rake up debates with them so they emerge victorious during these fabricated conflicts, hence becoming popular in a few months to compete in the electoral race. What is important to them is that their names are mentioned by playing up their opposition credentials on social media, especially now after the Bahrainis have forgotten these associations.
Bahrain has been considered a success story in its ability to confront Iranian violations both on the political and security levels. Bahrain has on its own rejected anything and anyone that has links with Iran and exposed them.
We strongly welcome strong voices and bold political activists, and we also welcome institutionalizing the political arena and the establishment of new associations that criticize the executive authority and have the capability and bravery to monitor it via constitutional tools and within the established framework of freedom. However, followers of Iran or the followers of Iran’s followers have no place in our political arena.
Thank God, Bahrain has been considered a success story in its ability to confront Iranian violations both on the political and security levels. Bahrain has on its own rejected anything and anyone that has links with Iran and exposed them.
Bahrain has also prohibited the presence of armed militias that would threaten us, blackmail us and force us to submit to certain parties which are mere political proxies for Iran.
Hezbollah’s threat to candidates
Bahrain is one of the countries whose people courageously stood with their leaders and the political regime thus preventing a disaster, which Lebanon and Iraq suffer from today due to the presence of political parties which serve Iran within their legislative institutions. These political parties are imposed on Lebanon and Iraq via their militias whose only concern is to harness their countries’ resources to serve Iran.
Look at what’s happening in Lebanon these days ahead of the elections and what will happen in Iraq after few weeks. Lebanese Shiite candidates who run for the elections in a district where Hezbollah has imposed its authority through the power of its arms confront threats that may go as far as death threats.
Two days ago, Shiite candidate Ali al-Amin, who is running against a Hezbollah candidate, appeared in a video showing his bruised face. Amin, who also suffered from a broken tooth, was trying to catch breath as he talked and explained how Hezbollah’s ‘thugs’ had beaten him up to frighten him and force him to withdraw from the elections.
The video was published by Hezbollah dissident Rami Ollaik, who is also running for the elections in a district that has been dominated by Hezbollah for years. This is indeed a dirty war led by Iran against the Lebanese people. Iran’s servants are thus imposing their will on the Lebanese people via bullying, beatings, intimidation and threats. This is Hezbollah’s approach to guarantee that its candidates win seats in the legislative authority against the people’s will, so it can later harness Lebanese resources and exploit Lebanon’s geographic location to serve Iranian interests.
Iran’s legalized swindling of Iraq
The scene will be repeated in Iraq next month, with its preparations starting right now. Pro-Iranian parties are imposing themselves on the Iraqis by the force of militias whom Iran armed. The legislative institution is also harnessing Iraq’s resources to serve Iran by passing trade contracts and agreements that exhaust Iraqi resources based on unfair conditions and in favor of Tehran. Such agreements have been signed and voted on by the Iraqi parliament. An example is the energy contracts, wherein Iran sells gas to Iraq at double the price. Meanwhile, the Iraqi market is packed with Iranian food products and Iraqi farmers have complained of unfair competition. The balance of trade between Iraq and Iran is in Iran’s favor as Iraqi imports from Iran amount to $6 billion, while Iraqi exports to Iran are no more than $60 million a year. Iran is doing the same in Yemen where Houthis control Yemeni decision-making via the power of their arms which are smuggled to them by Tehran.
This is how Iran uses its servants and those affiliated with them to serve its agenda and turn a whole country into a follower that serves its interests. Groups that help Iran fulfill these goals have nothing to do with national privileges and are not concerned in any reform or development within their country where nothing but destruction and corruption reign as it is now evident in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria. Bahrain, which has confronted previous Iranian schemes and where Iranian dreams collapsed, is capable of identifying and exposing the new Iranian attempt at subjugation.

Why sanctions against Russia do not work?
Shehab Al-Makahleh/Al Arabiya/April 25/18
Economic and financial sanctions have become a major policy tool nowadays against countries that are deemed militarily powerful. Thus, any use of military force would lead to regional or world war such as in the case of North Korea and Russia.
The targeted sanctions aim to cripple the regimes that do not abide by international laws. The United States has managed to turn many of these sanctions into international ones by using its influence at the UN Security Council. Will these sanctions on Russia be effective? The answer would be disappointing for many as this will not change Putin or his regime and will not weaken his hold on power. The proof is the March 2018 elections which he won. At present, a debate is going on within NATO on whether these measures work or not or whether they should be upgraded or cancelled. All depends on the target country and its potential. In the case of the Russian Federation, it has been under tough measures since 2014; however, Moscow has not given up and is still competing with the West in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe to protect its national security. On March 15, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on individuals and companies whom special counsel Robert Mueller reported as agents of American presidential election meddling. Then, the US expelled 60 Russian diplomats and ordered the closure of the Russian consulate in Seattle. Donald Trump has promised before he was elected to improve relations with Russia; however, bilateral relations under his reign are at their lowest point since Cold War not only with Russia but also with the EU members.
The targeted sanctions have affected the Russian economy to some extent; however, the mega deals between Russia and China have compensated for the big losses
Smart sanctions
Historically speaking, sanctions against Russia have taken various forms, starting from diplomatic expulsions, to freezing trade and economic relations. Such measures are reckoned both strategic and punitive measures. The other type of sanctions is “smart” sanctions to undermine the Russian government, mainly President Putin from within, by targeting his elites and influential businessmen to demise the whole economy in order to stir a rebellion against the leadership similar to the case of former Yugoslavia. To assess the impact, one should start with the restrictions in place which include amongst others: asset freezing, visa bans, diplomat expulsion, and penalties against Russian major oil and gas companies and officials. The EU has suspended loans offered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to Russia at preferential economic development rates. The European states and the US also imposed ban on trading bonds and equity as well as related other brokering services for products. Russian energy companies, including Rosneft and Gazprom, are under American sanctions. The list also entails three Russian defence companies and a number of Russian state-owned banks. The banning also includes specific technologies which are used for energy projects to explore for oil and gas in the Arctic deep-water. The question is: Have these sanctions been effective enough to change Russia’s conduct and attitude?
The China factor
The targeted sanctions have affected the Russian economy to some extent; however, the mega deals between Russia and China have compensated for the big losses incurred due to these sanctions as both have signed a $400 billion gas deal in May 2014. Thus, the impact varies from province to another in Russia and from sector to another as well. Those in Siberia have been less affected as they have started depending on their own natural resources to produce their daily needs instead of importing most of their goods from Europe. However, the major cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg have been affected mostly because of inflation and due to low exchange rate of the Ruble against major world currencies. Yet, this has not affected Russian government’s behavior and could not coerce President Putin to listen to western calls and demands to change his approach towards international issues.
What has curbed sanctions from being crippling is that the level of nationalism in Russia, or the “Russian soul” and identity have been quite much more effective to counter sanctions. High degrees of nationalism have contributed to the ineptitude of these sanctions. It is apparent that national sentiment aligns with Russian government goals. Sanctions effect has been reversed in a way or another as nationalism has hiked because of sanctions, affecting the EU states which export many products to Russia. The nationalist sentiment has been behind people’s blame and suffer, not because of Russian government and leadership, but because of external forces. This has driven people to band together as they share the same enemies, threats and identity.
It is true sanctions incurred discomfort and suffering in Russia. However, the Russian Dusha (Soul) has solidified public backing to their government regardless of who is the leader. What makes sanctions almost fail is that Russia is the biggest country in the world and it has huge natural resources.
This has driven its citizens to depend on their potentials to produce their agricultural products instead of importing them from the EU, mainly Germany, Italy and France. In addition, Russians started to rehabilitate their old Soviet factories which have been active in the 1980s and then stopped production since the demise of the union. To sum up, Russian know that there is an upper limit to actions the West in general and the US in particular would take. The suffering of the Russian citizens will not last long as Putinism remains a phenomenon and Russian soul is back to the country’s body with hiking sentiment of nationalism. Sanctions are effective on some countries but they are less effective on others as in the case of Russia.

The war on Gaza: Western Media’s misrepresentation of Palestine and Palestinians
Ramzy Baroud/Al Arabiya/April 25/18
Western media’s relationship with the subject of Palestine and Israel, and the ongoing turmoil, violence and seemingly perpetual conflict, has been marred by inaccuracies, strange perceptions and incongruities.
It is true that the verdict on Western media’s success or failures in conveying an accurate account of the situation in Palestine and Israel is, ultimately, subjective. Even Israelis who support the occupation of Palestine and the rightwing policies of their government often complain of media bias.
However, we can say with certainty that Western corporate mainstream media is failing, not because of the pro-Israel attitude held by most Americans – and to a lesser degree of Europeans – but because of their sheer ignorance of the uncontested facts thereof.
For example, an IRmep poll fielded by Google Consumer Surveys, concluded two years ago that majority of Americans are under the misconception that Palestinians occupy Israeli land, instead of the other way around.
This devastating lack of knowledge, considering the amount of time spent discussing Israel on US television channels and in newspapers, is indicative of a horrific failure. It has created the kind of intellectual vacuum that allowed such twisted ideas as ‘Palestinian mothers hate their children’ to perpetuate for far too long. Alas, the above line was in fact a media staple in major American TV networks during the Second Palestinian Intifada between 2000-2005. Such dark judgement was not founded in any rational claim to support it, but on Zionist ideals of the past.
The idea originated in a statement attributed to Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, who allegedly said that “Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us.” Regardless of the authenticity of the statement, many of Israel’s supporters have indeed eternalized the notion and perpetuated its racist undertone ever since. Unfair media coverage is not fueled by the simplistic notion of “clever Israel, imprudent Arabs”. Western media is actively involved in shielding Israel and enhancing its diminishing brand, while painstakingly demolishing the image of Israel’s enemies
Moral crisis
The moral crisis is compounded when US media uses such heinous logic as a point of departure in the way they frame their understanding, and subsequently their readers’ perceptions of the unlawful Israeli occupation of Palestine,’ and of the brutal ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people which began 70 years ago and has continued to date. But can all of this be archived under the one-size-fits-all’ notion of ‘media bias’? Hardly. The term ‘media bias’ does not do justice to the western corporate media’s relationship with Israel and Palestine. The relationship is, indeed, far more profound than mere partiality. It is not ignorance, either. It is a calculated and long-term campaign, aimed at guarding Israel and demonizing Palestinians. The current biased coverage of Gaza’s popular protests indicates that the media’s position aims at suppressing the truth on Palestine, at any cost and by any means.
Political symbiosis, cultural affinity, Hollywood, and the far-reaching influence of pro-Israel and Zionist groups within the political and media circles, are some of the explanations many of us have offered as to why Israel is often viewed with sympathetic eyes, and Palestinians and Arabs condemned.
But such explanations should hardly suffice. Nowadays, there are numerous media outlets that are trying to offset some of the imbalance, many of them emanating from the Middle East, but also other parts of the world. Palestinian and Arab journalists, intellectuals and cultural representatives are more present on a global stage than ever before and are more than capable of facing off, if not defeating, the pro-Israeli media discourse.
However, they are largely invisible to western media; it is the Israeli spokesperson who continues to occupy the center stage, speaking, shouting, theorizing and demonizing as he pleases. It is, then, not a matter of media ignorance, but policy.
Even before March 30, when scores of Palestinians in Gaza were killed and thousands wounded, the US and British media, for example, should have, at least, questioned why hundreds of Israeli snipers and army tanks were ordered to deploy at the Gaza border to face-off Palestinian protesters.
Instead, the media referred to ‘clashes’ between Gaza youth and Israeli snipers as if they are equal forces in an equivalent battle. The maxim that official Israeli propaganda or ‘hasbara’ is too savvy no longer suffices. In fact, this is hardly true. Where is the ingenuity in the way the Israeli army explained the killing of unarmed Palestinians in Gaza? “Yesterday we saw 30,000 people,” the Israeli army tweeted on March 31. “We arrived prepared and with precise reinforcements. Nothing was carried out uncontrolled; everything was accurate and measured, and we know where every bullet landed.”
Self-indictment
If that is not bad enough, Israel’s ultra-nationalist Minister of Defense, Avigdor Lieberman, followed that self-indictment by declaring that there are “no innocent people in Gaza”, thus legitimizing the targeting of any Gazan within the besieged Strip.
Unfair media coverage is not fueled by the simplistic notion of “clever Israel, imprudent Arabs”. Western media is actively involved in shielding Israel and enhancing its diminishing brand, while painstakingly demolishing the image of Israel’s enemies.
Take, for example, Israel’s unfounded propaganda that Yasser Murtaja, the Gaza journalist who was killed in cold blood by an Israeli sniper while covering the Great March of Return protests at the Gaza border, was a member of Hamas.
First, ‘unnamed officials’ in Israel claimed that Yasser is ‘a member of the Hamas security apparatus.’ Then, Lieberman offered more (fabricated) details that Yasser was on Hamas’ payroll since 2011 and ‘held a rank similar to a captain.’ Many journalists took these statements and ran with them, fuelling a false media view.
It turned out that, according to the US State Department, Yasser’s start-up media company in Gaza had actually received a small grant from USAID, which subjected Yasser’s company to a rigorous vetting process. Furthermore, a report by the International Federation of Journalists claimed that Yasser was actually detained and beaten by the Gaza police in 2015, and that Israel’s Defense Minister is engineering a cover-up.
Judging by this, Israel’s media apparatus is as erratic and self-defeating as North Korea’s; but this is hardly the image conveyed by western media, because it insists on placing Israel on a moral pedestal while misrepresenting Palestinians, regardless of the circumstances.
Media spin will continue to provide Israel with the needed margins to carry out its violent policies against the Palestinian people, with no moral accountability. It will remain loyal to Israel, creating a buffer between the truth and its audiences.
It is incumbent on us to expose this sinister relationship and hold mainstream media accountable for covering up Israel’s crimes, as well as Israel, for committing and perpetuating these crimes in the first place.

British ambassador attests to Saudi counter-terrorism efforts in Awamiya
Salman al-Dosary/Al Arabiya/April 25/18
The years between 2011 and 2018 have witnessed the spark of terrorism in Awamiya village, east of Saudi Arabia, where crimes, drug trafficking, arms selling, killing, acts of terrorism and intimidation were carried out.
Later on, Iran’s foreign intervention led to the rise of “activists,” “human rights activists” and human rights organizations, yet Saudi government alone was capable of imposing security and stability for its citizens, confronting all campaigns of distortion and falsification, calling things by their proper names, gradually imposing the same logic and validating the premise of the state that it declared from the beginning. It proved that what happened had nothing to do with rights or duties.
What happened from the beginning was not related to people’s demands, but to terrorism.
Of course, with time and the return of tranquility to the village many positions have changed. Governments, organizations and international organizations were initially deceived and swept away by a wave of confusion as all those who raised arms against the state were seen as if they were practicing their rights even if they were terrorists.
Last Thursday, the British government attested to Saudi Arabia’s efforts in fighting terrorism. British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Simon Collis published a video on his Twitter account saying that Saudi authorities defeated terrorists in Awamiya village.
“This is the place where Saudi authorities defeated terrorists and where they have begun to rebuild the community,” Collis said. “There have been problems in the past, but now there is a drive to renew the community based on the return of security to Awamiya,” Collis added.
What the Arab world witnessed during the Arab Spring created a state of Western enthusiasm and support, innocent and malignant, in order to spread this “spring” to all those who took up arms against the state
Development project
This official British talk came during the ambassador’s visit to a development project implemented in the center of the village that would transform it into a tourist attraction.
Perhaps the most significant part of Collis’s statement is that it proved what the Saudi government has said and been doing since the first day about seven years ago. The government said back then that the incidents that took place were neither protests nor “Arab spring” demonstrations as they were promoted at the time.
In fact, they were a riot during which civilians and residents were killed and wounded. The incident included attacks on judges, diplomats, banks, shops and security headquarters and sought to destabilize security and stability in the region.
The story was not in the position of the state, and with it the vast majority of the citizens of the town, in the face of tampering, riot and terrorism; it is the role of States and their duties to provide security for their citizens.
However, the real issue was the chaos that accompanied the riot, supported by states, organizations and international organizations, and caused to prolong terrorist acts promoted as “demonstrations” for citizens and “legitimate claims.”
Years have passed and the Kingdom has succeeded in proving its credibility, supported by testimonies from officials, showing that what happened was terrorism.
There is no doubt that what the Arab world witnessed during the Arab Spring created a state of Western enthusiasm and support, innocent and malignant, in order to spread this “spring” to all those who took up arms against the state.
It did not matter whether it was a regime that killed its people, like that of Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad, or a stable and secure country that protected its citizens from criminals and saboteurs, as in Saudi Arabia.
And today, after the skies have cleared and the Kingdom has proved its credibility against the flood of allegations and accusations, will the countries and parties proven wrong apologize for supporting a terrorism disguised in an “Arab Spring”?!

How Hamas Exploits the People of Gaza: Protests Clarify Their Cynical Tactics
Dennis Ross/New York Daily News/April 25/18
It is time to create a stark public choice for Hamas: stop escalating tensions, and important rebuilding work will begin.
Hamas has never put the people of Gaza first. Hamas rejects Israel’s existence and treats all of the land as an Islamic trust. The Palestinian people are instruments in the struggle to reclaim it. For the struggle, for the cause, the people can be sacrificed.
Why else would Hamas build tunnels to protect its weapons and its fighters but not its people during conflict with Israel? Why else, when Gazans desperately needed reconstruction, would its leaders divert short supplies of cement, electric wiring, and iron away from badly needed housing construction to build the tunnels?
Why else would it store, deploy, and fire its rockets in or next to schools, mosques, and hospitals? In conflicts with Israel, Hamas seeks to maximize Palestinian civilian casualties—preferably women and children. That brings international opprobrium on Israel and makes it harder to engage in its self-defense.
Recent mass marches on the border fence with Israel are a case in point. The Hamas leadership in Gaza announced that starting March 30 and continuing every Friday until what they call Nakba (catastrophe) day, demonstrations at the Israel border fence would take place. The symbolism was lined up perfectly for mobilizing public passions.
But, of course, that was not the real story. Life in Gaza is terrible, and Israel is not to blame: There are four hours a day of electricity, insufficient to power sewage treatment plants. Roughly 96% of the water is undrinkable. Unemployment runs close to 50%, medicines in the hospitals are consistently in short supply, and people cannot leave and feel imprisoned. With little money to pay for anything, trucks from Israel carrying material goods and humanitarian supplies are down from 1,000 a day to less than 200.
True, Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, has deepened the economic deprivation by no longer paying Israel to provide electricity to Gaza and cutting payments to former PA employees there. His purpose was to pressure Hamas, and he did—so much so that Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader in Gaza—sought to hand governing responsibility back to the PA. While reconciliation talks resumed, Abbas saw them as a trap because Hamas refused to disband its Qassam brigades or disarm its fighters—and with the recent assassination attempt on the PA’s prime minister, Rami Hamdallah, he is threatening further economic sanctions on Hamas.
For the Hamas leadership, with popular dissatisfaction growing, the only thing to be done was divert attention to Israel and, thereby, pressure Abbas, who cannot appear indifferent to Palestinians being killed by Israelis. As one European diplomat told me, Hamas leaders acknowledge privately that Abbas is the source of their current difficulties, but shifting the focus to Israel is a proven, if cynical, tactic.
Hamas knows that the world will see Palestinian casualties and tie them to the wretched conditions in Gaza—conditions that are blamed on Israel’s blockade of the Strip. Of course, it is Israel and Egypt that control what can go into and out of Gaza. Unlike Israel, Egypt keeps its border closed to the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza except on rare occasions. Hamas leaders have little interest in breaching the Egyptian border, knowing the casualties would be high and the international response minimal.
The risk now is escalation and another conflict between Hamas and Israel, leaving Gaza even more devastated. With its leaders believing they have little to lose, just one thing could change the Hamas calculus: the prospect of real change on the ground in Gaza.
The Trump administration needs to translate its recent pledging conference for projects in Gaza into a plan of action and a public challenge. Since it lacks credibility with Palestinians, it would be smart to get Europeans and Arabs to issue a joint public statement declaring that they are ready, immediately, to implement projects on electricity generation, water and sewage treatment, and reconstruction, provided there is no risk of escalation with Israel. No one is going to fund infrastructure projects that will be destroyed in another conflict.
It is time to create a stark public choice for Hamas: stop escalating tensions, and important rebuilding work will begin. Hamas leaders may treat the Palestinian public as pawns, but they are not indifferent to public pressure. It is time to create it.
**Dennis Ross is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute.

Iran’s many adversaries must agree a common strategy
Sir John Jenkins/Arab News/April 25/18
United States President Donald Trump must decide by May 12 whether to continue to waive economic sanctions against Iran — a call that has to be made every 120 days and that will ultimately determine the fate of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Each time we approach this point, there is speculation about the president’s intentions. This time it is more feverish than ever.
There have been reports that American, British, French and German officials (the US plus the EU3 in JCPOA terms) are engaged in intense negotiations to agree a new package of measures designed to meet Trump’s concerns about the deal without fracturing it. But there is also a new and perhaps more hawkish national security team in Washington, with John Bolton and Mike Pompeo replacing H.R. McMaster and Rex Tillerson as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State respectively. And recent events in Syria and Yemen have highlighted again the dangers of an expansionary Iranian role in the region and its apparently continued ability to provide a supportive environment (with Russia) for the use of chemical weapons, establish military bases, and develop and spread ballistic and naval missile technologies, which are used to threaten its neighbors and international shipping.
What should we make of all this?
The first step is to acknowledge the imperfections of the JCPOA. I highly recommend the 2016 Washington Quarterly account of the final negotiations by the former French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, one of the key participants. Among other things, he describes the skillful manipulation of some of the key actors by the Iranians — and the apparent willingness of those actors to be played. Jay Solomon’s “The Iran Wars” and Mark Landler’s “Alter Egos” provide further contextual detail of the evolving relationship between the US and Iran that conditioned the final shape of the deal.
In practice, it gave the Iranians a way to partially reintegrate, on their terms, into the global economy and in particular into global financial and energy networks in return for promises to abandon, freeze or suspend elements of their nuclear program for a specified number of years. It essentially bought the international community time. It also watered down existing UN restrictions on Iranian ballistic missile development. And it said nothing about Iran’s non-nuclear activities in the region, which most of its neighbors and indeed Western policymakers regarded as malign and destructive.
Could we have got a better deal? At various points before 2016, yes. Iran felt under huge pressure in 2003 and again when it was effectively denied access to the international banking system — through the blocking of SWIFT — after 2012. But it also exploited US policy failures in Iraq, the Obama administration’s determination to cut its losses in the region more widely, its apparent aim to secure a deal with Iran on almost any terms, and ambiguity among Washington’s regional partners about whether the nuclear deal should or should not address other issues of relevance to them.
The West put so much energy into JCPOA that it neglected Iran's malign and destructive non-nuclear activities.
The question has always been about how any nuclear deal fits into wider US, Western or Arab strategy in the Middle East. As far back as 2008, I remember remarking to British ministers that the ultimate issue was how we shaped, contained and deterred Iran’s expansionist ambitions over the long term: A nuclear deal was only one component of this. And the problem has long been that we put so much energy into securing such a deal that we collectively neglected Iran’s non-nuclear activities, which, in my view, represent the real threat to the stability of the region.
The problem now is that we still have no collective policy understanding of how we manage these threats. And the clock is ticking. Iran has not — as some wishful thinkers insisted in 2016 — used sanctions relief to improve the state of its domestic economy; something Iranians have been quick to notice and one reason why the rial is under such pressure at the moment. It has instead doubled down on Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon, in all of which its position has, if anything, improved since 2016. Meanwhile, Trump says he wants to withdraw US forces from the region. And there is no collective willingness so far to push back materially against the growing Iranian garrisoning of Syria; its transfer of weapons to the Houthis; its quiet but forceful cultivation of Iraqi and indeed Syrian Kurds; and the continued strengthening of its position in Iraq more generally, where it now has a far greater range of clients than in 2011, when I left in disgust after Nouri Al-Maliki, with Iranian support, had been allowed to hijack the 2010 elections.
The only regional state actors that are evidently doing something serious to push back against Iranian expansionism are Israel in southern Syria (where, as I have consistently said, war is coming — and it may already be here), and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen. But all three countries need help. On their own in separate theaters they will not be able to fully contain or constrain Iran, which operates across the greater Levant, into Central Asia and down through the Gulf and the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea. Iran also benefits from the truly global political, terror and criminal networks of Hezbollah, which operates throughout the Middle East, in West Africa, South America, Australia, Europe and into North America itself.
That is the real challenge, not the nuclear deal. The issue with the latter is how we use the time — effectively some 15 years from the point of signature — we have been given. In my view, any abrogation, abandonment or undermining of the deal would only serve Iranian goals. They would use it to drive wedges between the signatories — the US, the EU3, China and Russia — and to gain international sympathy. It would also have an impact on negotiations with North Korea.
The real policy challenge is to agree a common strategy of renewed pressure on and containment of Iran in areas where it matters. These include the rigorous enforcement of inspections and snap-back sanctions; denying Iran the ability to establish permanent forward bases in Syria; supporting the emergence after the May elections of a truly independent and capable government in Iraq, with the aim of ending corruption and sectarian mobilization; and reaching an agreement to end the war in Yemen that binds all the combatants into a genuinely national system of governance, addresses Southern grievances, constrains the Houthis, and excludes illegitimate Iranian activity. The strategy must also confront provocative Iranian activity in the Gulf and its support for subversion in Bahrain, and target those figures, many associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, who act as the spearhead for most of these efforts.
This will require old-fashioned diplomacy, judicious use of military force, training and equipment, a willingness to establish and use escalation dominance (highly effective in the Gulf, as we saw in the 1980s), more explicit security guarantees, better intelligence coordination, a renewed effort to use targeted financial sanctions against those with clear links to terrorism, crime and weapons smuggling, and, above all, a willingness to convene, plan and coordinate in a sustained and resilient manner.
If we combined this with an effort to offer genuine reformists within Iran appropriately conditioned support for economic development and to communicate more effectively to the millions of Iranians who have shown by their protests their dissatisfaction with their government that a better way is on offer, then it would begin to look as if we had a plan.
**Sir John Jenkins is a senior fellow at Policy Exchange. Until December 2017, he was Corresponding Director (Middle East) at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), based in Manama, Bahrain and was a Senior Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. He was the British ambassador to Saudi Arabia until January 2015.

Conditions must be right before Syrian refugees can return
Kerry Boyd Anderson /Arab News/April 25/18
The EU and UN this week led a two-day conference of countries in Brussels designed to support “the future of Syria and the region,” including pledging assistance for Syrian refugees who have fled to neighboring countries. While such aid is badly needed, longer-term efforts to end the civil war and create conditions for refugees to return are also essential.
As the states that have taken in the most refugees struggle to cope with the logistical, fiscal, economic, social and political effects of absorbing so many Syrians, conditions for refugees in those countries are becoming increasingly difficult. This is especially true in Lebanon, where political leaders have started to call for Syrian refugees to return to their country. In March, for example, Lebanese President Michel Aoun reportedly called on the international community to help return refugees to “safe areas” in Syria even without a political resolution to the war. Upcoming Lebanese elections in May are increasing political incentives for anti-refugee rhetoric, while pressures for refugees to return to Syria are also increasing in Turkey and Jordan.
As of April 12, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has registered more than 5.6 million Syrian refugees — 63 percent of whom are in Turkey, 18 percent in Lebanon and 12 percent in Jordan. However, the actual number of refugees in these countries is much higher, as many are not formally registered with the UN. These host countries have very real challenges in managing the huge numbers of Syrian refugees they have received, and international support has been insufficient. It is understandable that leaders and communities in these countries would be anxious for Syrians to go home.
However, calls for Syrian refugees to return to their country are premature. Many areas remain profoundly insecure. While some politicians have called for Syrian refugees to return to “de-escalation zones,” such zones offer questionable security, with multiple reports of attacks within them. Anecdotally, there have been cases of refugees who returned to Syria and died in the conflict or otherwise regretted their decision.
Furthermore, the Assad regime’s policies of intentional population displacement and recent regulations regarding property claims reduce the ability of refugees to return to their areas of origin. The even larger number of internally displaced people within Syria complicates any plans for those outside the country to return. The lack of the most basic economic opportunities, housing and services in general makes it difficult for refugees to go home, even when considering the deeply challenging circumstances many refugees face in their host countries.
A political resolution to Syria conflict and stable security are essential conditions to persuading refugees to voluntarily return.
In formulating plans for refugees’ futures, it is important to consider what the refugees themselves view as the basic conditions under which they would voluntarily return to their country. On April 16, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Center published a significant study looking at how Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan perceive the Syrian conflict and what they would require in order to return home.
The Carnegie study finds that most refugees in Lebanon and Jordan are not currently willing to return to Syria. A majority want to go home but only if they and their families would be safe. Most were reluctant to leave Syria in the first place and believed that their exile would last “only a few months.” However, today, as a group, they are pessimistic about the possibility of a voluntary return any time soon.
Most of the refugees that the Carnegie researchers interviewed opposed the Assad regime, and a majority of those say they would refuse to return to Syria as long as Bashar Assad remains in power. There is a complete lack of trust, and they have no confidence that they would be spared persecution or a renewal of conflict. While a “small number of anti-regime refugees indicated that they were resigned to the possibility of Assad’s presence” and would return if there were sufficient economic opportunities, most said they would not. Complicating matters, the study finds that the minority of refugees who were pro-regime said they would refuse to return unless Assad remained in power, meaning the two groups have directly conflicting preconditions.
The study finds that security and safety were the clear priority for most refugees. “Most focus group participants indicated that they would not go back unless political conditions were favorable, even if there were available jobs, services, and housing,” the study notes. Many refugees expressed a willingness to return and rebuild even without sufficient economic conditions, as long as safety was guaranteed.
Many refugees want to go back specifically to their places of origin within Syria. The Assad regime’s efforts to change the sectarian make-up of some parts of the country and its policies for refugees returning home and reclaiming property — such as requiring formal legal documents that many refugees lack and, according to media reports, destroying property records — further complicate potential returns. Additionally, many refugees no longer have a home to return to, as large amounts of housing have been destroyed in many areas.
Refugees’ concerns matter for many reasons, in addition to basic humanitarian interests. Governments that want refugees to go home — and countries, especially in Europe, that do not want future refugee flows — need to understand that a political resolution to the conflict and stable security are essential conditions to persuading Syrian refugees to voluntarily return. Without this, creating so-called safe zones or even providing more jobs and services inside Syria will be insufficient. If refugees are forced to return before the situation is safe, then neighboring states that might choose to deport refugees now will lay a foundation for instability and new refugee flows in the future.
**Kerry Boyd Anderson is a writer and political risk consultant with more than 14 years’ experience as a professional analyst of international security issues and Middle East political and business risks. Her previous positions include deputy director for advisory with Oxford Analytica and managing editor of Arms Control Today. Twitter: @KBAresearch
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point-of-view

Dr.Walid Phares: World War 3 THREAT: Iran regime's only intention is building long-range nuclear missiles
Darren Hunt/Express/April 25/18
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/64138
Dr.Walid Phares: One area is the issue of the long-range missiles that the Iranian’s are developing and Mr Trump argues that no regime will develop these missiles, really ICBM type, without having the intention of equipping them with weapons of mass destruction or nuclear capabilities.
IRAN’S only intention is to continue building long-range missiles which have a "capability of carrying weapons of mass destruction", a former Donald Trump former foreign policy advisor has claimed.
President Donald Trump has been critical of the Iran deal and warned Iran will face “bigger problems than they have ever had before” if Tehran decides to restart its nuclear programme.
Tensions in the Middle East have sparked World War 3 fears after Tehran vowed to ramp up its nuclear programme if the agreement collapses.
A decision to extend or cancel the Iran deal will be taken before May 12, which curbs Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for a stay on economic sanctions.
Donald Trump’s former foreign policy adviser Walid Phares warned the President would say the actions Iran has taken have not been defensive.
Speaking on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, Mr Phares said: “One area is the issue of the long-range missiles that the Iranian’s are developing and Mr Trump argues that no regime will develop these missiles, really ICBM type, without having the intention of equipping them with weapons of mass destruction or nuclear capabilities.
“Defence purposes would be anti-aircraft missiles, even long-range missiles or issiles that would be shot or fired across the border.
“But the missiles that they have developed really reaches Europe, North Africa, parts of India. That is not defensive in the view of the Trump team.”
When asked about the prospect of Iran walking away from the deal if the US pulled out, Mr Phares said: “It is less likely Iran would abandon a process that is getting them dozens and dozens of billions of dollars. Of course, they will have to make that statement.
“Of course, they will continue to trade with their European, Chinese and Russian partners around the world. I don’t think the Iranians will go as far as cancelling the agreement… that is what I think the Trump team are counting on.”
Mr Macron, along with Theresa May and Angela Merkel, has urged the US to honour its commitment to the deal.
But Donald Trump has hit out at what he describes as the pact’s “terrible flaws”.
Speaking today, he described the accord as “insane”, adding it was “a terrible deal that should have never been made”.
But after meeting with the French leader, Mr Trump suggested the Iran deal could survive.
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/950894/World-War-3-Iran-news-Donald-Trump-nuclear-missile-US-deal