LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
October 06/2019
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Bible Quotations For today
We speak, not to please mortals, but to please God who tests our hearts

First Letter to the Thessalonians 02/01-13/:”You yourselves know, brothers and sisters, that our coming to you was not in vain, but though we had already suffered and been shamefully maltreated at Philippi, as you know, we had courage in our God to declare to you the gospel of God in spite of great opposition. For our appeal does not spring from deceit or impure motives or trickery, but just as we have been approved by God to be entrusted with the message of the gospel, even so we speak, not to please mortals, but to please God who tests our hearts. As you know and as God is our witness, we never came with words of flattery or with a pretext for greed; nor did we seek praise from mortals, whether from you or from others, though we might have made demands as apostles of Christ. But we were gentle among you, like a nurse tenderly caring for her own children. So deeply do we care for you that we are determined to share with you not only the gospel of God but also our own selves, because you have become very dear to us. You remember our labour and toil, brothers and sisters; we worked night and day, so that we might not burden any of you while we proclaimed to you the gospel of God. You are witnesses, and God also, how pure, upright, and blameless our conduct was towards you believers. As you know, we dealt with each one of you like a father with his children, urging and encouraging you and pleading that you should lead a life worthy of God, who calls you into his own kingdom and glory. We also constantly give thanks to God for this, that when you received the word of God that you heard from us, you accepted it not as a human word but as what it really is, God’s word, which is also at work in you believers.”.

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News published on October 05- 06/2019
Lebanon Besieged By Bread, Medicine, Fuel Crises
Report: Hariri ‘Not Resigning’
Hariri to Visit UAE Sunday
Lebanese Army Says Syrian Who 'Phoned' Israel Arrested
Lebanon Hails Court Verdict on 1999 Killing of 4 Judges
Hariri, Bassil Hold 'Very Good' Meeting after Rift Reports
Money Changers suspend their strike in wake of scheduled meeting with President Aoun upcoming Tuesday
'Liberty in Lebanon is sacred' says Sami Gemayel
Bou Saab begins his Akkar tour from Chadra, inspects mechanisms to close smuggling channels
Hasbani says budget adoption is necessary but insufficient, priority is for actual reform
Jarrah says Financial Prosecutor's summoning is 'illegal'
Traboulsi says what is required is activating the economy, not changing the government
Jumblatt: We are destined to always regretfully reminisce the past...!
Lakkis on Apple Day in Jezzine: There is serious determination to raise and support the Lebanese economy
Lebanese doctor receives first prize in the European Cancer Commission's examination
Hezbollah Prioritizes Its Own Interests, Putting Lebanon at Risk
Bigoted Populism May Spell the End of Lebanon as a Modern State
How Lebanon Stopped Being a Country – and Turned Into a Bankrupt Corporation

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 05- 06/2019

Iraq protests death toll nears 100: Rights panel
Baghdad Curfew Lifted but Iraq on Alert for New Protests
Australian couple released in Iran after 3 months
Muslim Brotherhood Demands Kuwait to Stop Handing over its Members to Egypt
Exclusive - ‘Lost Generation’ of Syrians Looms as Education in Idlib on Verge of Collapse
Nine extremists killed in Russian strikes on Syria’s Idlib: Monitor
Erdogan Says Turkey to Launch Operation East of Euphrates in Syria
Erdogan Renews Syria 'Air and Ground' Operation Threat
Greece Urges Pompeo to Defuse Turkish-Stoked Tensions in E. Mediterranean
Palestinians to Receive $430 Million Israeli Transfer
Shin Bet Says it Thwarted Many West Bank Attacks in 2015
Hong Kong Suspends Trains, Appeals to Public after Rioting

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 05- 06/2019
Hezbollah Prioritizes Its Own Interests, Putting Lebanon at Risk/Matthew Levitt/The Washington Institute/October 05/2019
Bigoted Populism May Spell the End of Lebanon as a Modern State/Hassan Mneimneh/Fikra Forum/October 05/2019
Analysis/How Lebanon Stopped Being a Country – and Turned Into a Bankrupt Corporation/Zvi Bar'el/Haaretz/October 05/2019
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Is One Despot Trump Might Not Win Over/Karim Sadjadpour/Time/October 05/2019
As Protests Explode, Iraq Must Get Serious About Reform/Bilal Wahab/The Washington Institute/October 05/2019
Iran’s Supreme Leader Putting ‘Heroic Flexibility’ Aside/Omer Carmi/The Washington Institute/October 05/2019
Turkey: Ergodan Has Badly Overplayed His Hand in the Khashoggi Affair/Con Coughlin/Gatestone Institute/October 05/2019
Who's Afraid of Scandinavia's Crime Statistics/Judith Bergman/Gatestone Institute/October 05/2019
If Iraq descends into chaos, Iran could seize its chance to take control/Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Arab News/October 05/2019

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News published on October 05- 06/2019
Lebanon Besieged By Bread, Medicine, Fuel Crises
Beirut- Youssef Diab/Asharq Al Awsat/October 05/2019
While three decades have passed since the end of the civil war in Lebanon, the country still suffers major crises resulting from the lack of proper infrastructure for electricity, communications, water, waste, and transport.
But the current severe financial and economic deterioration has put Lebanon on the edge of an abyss. As usual, the state resorts to temporary and “patchwork” solutions, which anesthetize the situation for a few months, before a new problem emerges elsewhere. Today, three major crises are menacing the Lebanese people’s living conditions. The fuel, with calls for an open-ended strike by owners of fuel stations as of next week; the possible halt of operation at bakeries, and a very dangerous problem threatening the import of medicine. The crises are all linked to the rise in the value of the US dollar against the national currency, because traders buy the goods in USD and sell them to the consumers in Lebanese pounds, amid the Central Bank’s inability to control the game. The union for fuel distributors and gas stations in Lebanon decided to hold an open-ended strike as of next Monday unless the ongoing communications result in solutions that satisfy the sector. The Union members met on Friday in Beirut and decided to give the government a deadline of 48 hours, ahead of a warning strike on Monday.
In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sami Brax, the head of the Syndicates of Gas Station Owners, said: “Companies will stop Monday distributing fuel to gas stations, which will deprive them of a single drop of gasoline.”
“The union exerted mighty efforts with Prime Minister Saad Hariri to reach a solution, and to convince the distributing companies to pay the price of fuel in Lebanese pounds,” he noted. “We will not accept to continue to buy fuel in dollars and sell it to consumers in Lebanese pounds at the fixed price determined by the Ministry of Energy.”The curse of the dollar exchange rate against the Lebanese pound was not only limited to fuel but also reached bakeries, portending a bread crisis. “The current economic situation, especially the monetary situation, has negatively affected the work of bakeries. It has become difficult for the owners of these institutions to pay their dues in US dollars because of the lack of this currency in the markets,” Kazem Ibrahim, the head of the Union of Bakeries, complained.
In a statement, he said that bakeries were selling bread and its derivatives in the Lebanese pound, while they must pay for the flour and other substances in USD. “Importers deal with foreign currency only, which causes major losses incurred by owners of bakeries due to the conversion from LBP to USD,” he explained. “The Union warns all officials that the bakeries’ owners might be compelled to cease work,” he affirmed. Economic Expert Dr. Elie Yachoui said that the circular issued by the Governor of the Banque du Liban, Riad Salameh, in terms of securing financing in dollars for three basic commodities - fuel, medicine, and flour - was not commensurate with the nature of the work of importers. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the circular “requires the importer to declare all the goods he wants to import, while the importer secures his orders from abroad in installments.”“The circular of the central bank is an explicit recognition of the fall of the lira exchange rate” against the USD, he remarked. The ongoing crisis was the focus of a recent meeting between Industry Minister Wael Bou Faour and the head of Beirut Traders Association Nicolas Chammas. “The way out of the crisis is through economic dialogue… The current economic approach cannot be sustained. We need a radical change in the approach,” Bou Faour said.

Report: Hariri ‘Not Resigning’
Naharnet/October 05/2019
In light of a worsening economic situation grappling Lebanon, Prime Minister Saad Hariri seeks to “overcome” the obstacles with “hard work” without any intention to step back, al-Joumhouria daily reported on Saturday. Sources close to Hariri assured in remarks to the daily that “Hariri is not resigning, this option is not on his agenda,” they said replying to rumors. They said the PM plans to confront the problem “simply through hard work, more production and activation of the state institutions.”The PM believes that the attempts of some to hamper his work are merely harming the country and delaying its progress. “Some are trying to drag the country into a dangerous situation shall the pressure pursue,” they said.

Hariri to Visit UAE Sunday
Naharnet/October 05/2019
Prime Minister Saad Hariri is scheduled to start a two-day visit on Sunday to the UAE where he is set to meet Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the Emirates News Agency (WAM) reported on Saturday. Hariri is also set to participate in the UAE-Lebanon Investment Conference to be held in Abu Dhabi on Monday in the presence of Minister of Economy Sultan bin Saeed Al Mansouri, and a number of ministers and state officials. The PM will lead a high-level delegation comprising six ministers in addition to the Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, and 50 bankers and economists. The conference aims to exchange expertise and open new horizons for cooperation in several primary sectors.

Lebanese Army Says Syrian Who 'Phoned' Israel Arrested
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/October 05/2019
Lebanese authorities have arrested a Syrian national accused of having made phone calls to neighbouring Israel, with which Lebanon remains technically at war, the army said. An army statement said the suspect, who was not identified, was referred to court for "contacting Israeli phone numbers and communicating with Israelis present in the occupied Palestinian territories". It did not elaborate. Lebanon is home to tens of thousands of Syrian refugees who fled the war raging in their country. In August, tensions spiked between Lebanon and Israel after two drones packed with explosives were sent into the Beirut bastion of the Shiite movement Hizbullah. Iran-backed Hizbullah and the Lebanese army accused Israel of being behind the drone launch. Lebanon's government and Hizbullah chief Hassan Nasrallah both described the apparently botched operation as an act of aggression.
A few days after the August 25 drone incident in Beirut, the army opened fire on Israeli drones flying over southern Lebanon. In 2006, Hizbullah fought a month-long war with Israel that devastated parts of Lebanon. The conflict killed more than 1,200 people in Lebanon, mostly civilians, and around 160 Israelis, most of them soldiers. In 2017, Lebanon detained for questioning French-Lebanese director Ziad Doueiri for partly filming his movie "The Attack" in Israel. The movie was banned in Lebanon which also bans its citizens from visiting Israel.

Lebanon Hails Court Verdict on 1999 Killing of 4 Judges
Naharnet/October 05/2019
Lebanese officials hailed on Saturday a court verdict indicting the accused in the 1999 assassination of four judges in the southern city of Sidon. President Michel Aoun said: “Justice has been served even if it is late,” said Aoun, as he called for amendments in the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to prevent any delay in future proceedings. In 1999, four judges were assassinated inside the South Lebanon Criminal Court at the old Justice Palace in Sidon. “Justice is served even after a while. A salute to the Judicial Council which issued its verdict in the assassination case of the four judges. Our sincere solidarity today is with the families of the martyrs,” said Prime Minister Saad Hariri in a tweet. Justice Minister Albert Serhan said: “Justice is taking its course... the decision of the Judicial Council is good news for all, judges and citizens.”On Friday, the Judicial Council led by Judge Jean Fahed inflicted the death penalty on Ahmed Abdulkarim aka Abu Mehjen. Five of his companions were sentenced to death in absentia for hiding in the southern Palestinian camp of Ain al-Hilweh camp, the National News Agency said. Wissam Hussein Tuhaibesh, Palestinian, was acquitted for insufficient evidence and released immediately unless convicted of another crime, NNA added.

Hariri, Bassil Hold 'Very Good' Meeting after Rift Reports

Naharnet/October 05/2019
Prime Minister Saad Hariri and Free Patriotic Movement chief and Foreign Minister Jebran Bassil held talks Friday at the Center House, following tensions between their two parties. Describing the meeting with Bassil as “very good,” Hariri told reporters that his relation with the FPM chief remained intact despite the tensions between the FPM and al-Mustaqbal Movement. Earlier in the day, informed sources told LBCI TV that the meeting between the two men was “excellent.”“The meeting confirmed once again that there is no problem between the two sides and it involved ordinary coordination on several files,” the sources added. “The meeting kickstarts a series of contacts that the head of the bloc (Bassil) will carry out to invigorate governmental work with the aim of finalizing the 2020 state budget based on the needed reformist principles and implementing the electricity plan,” the sources said.
They added: “The meeting with Hariri was fruitful and the atmosphere is more than excellent and there was an exchange of ideas in order to push things in the right direction.”A meeting between Bassil and cadres of Hariri’s al-Mustaqbal Movement was called off Tuesday amid tensions between the two parties.
MP George Atallah of the FPM’s Strong Lebanon bloc said “Mustaqbal officials asked Prime Minister Saad Hariri to call off the seminar following tweets by Strong Lebanon bloc MP Ziad Aswad. “Hariri agreed to their request,” Atallah added, in remarks to MTV. “According to our information, the Mustaqbal officials demanded a clarification about Aswad’s tweets in order to reconsider the meeting with Bassil,” Atallah added.

Money Changers suspend their strike in wake of scheduled meeting with President Aoun upcoming Tuesday

NNA -Sat 05 Oct 2019
The Syndicate of Money Changers announced, in a statement today, its decision to suspend its strike scheduled for Monday, after receiving a call from the Lebanese Presidency Director-General informing them that President Michel Aoun will be meeting with members of the Syndicate Council upcoming Tuesday, and that money changers will not be exposed to any persecution or summoning by the judicial and security authorities.

'Liberty in Lebanon is sacred' says Sami Gemayel
NNA - Sat 05 Oct 2019
Lebanese Kataeb Party Chief, MP Sami Gemayel, highlighted the sacredness of liberty and freedom of expression in Lebanon, saying: "Freedom of expression comes first. Without freedom, Lebanon does not exist and there is no meaning to it. Freedom is sacred, and if we were to choose between it and anything else, we will choose freedom." Gemayel disclosed that "Voice of Lebanon 100.3-100.5" Radio Station will open its air to all Lebanese to express their opinions freely, so that people can hear the voice of liberty and officials can hear the voice of the people freely. "Those who are not pleased with this, let them imprison us all, if jails were to accommodate everyone!" he exclaimed. Gemayel's words came during an honoring ceremony organized by the Kataeb Party to pay tribute to the late Lebanese poet, Maurice Awad, held at the Municipal Palace in Jdeideh on Friday evening. Gemayel recalled the late poet's belief in the cause of liberty and his life-time efforts to preserve the nation's principles and values and to defend freedom in Lebanon and its sovereignty and independence, stressing that this ought not to be in poetry alone but part of people's daily true practices.

Bou Saab begins his Akkar tour from Chadra, inspects mechanisms to close smuggling channels
NNA - Sat 05 Oct 2019
National Defense Minister Elias Bou Saab kicked off his tour in the region of Akkar today by visiting the army barracks of Martyr Simon Shaheen, the site of the first land border regiment and the joint security force in the town of Chadra, where he was received by Regiment Commander, Brigadier General Joey Haddad. In his meeting with the commanding officers of the site, Bou Saab was briefed on the regiment's tasks, its work mechanisms, the geography of the border area and the regiment's responsibility of maintaining security and preventing smuggling and bridging the gaps in this border area, which extends along 110 kilometers from Arida to Ruwaymeh in Beit Jaafar, far-reaching Wadi Khaled and Akrum.Brigadier Haddad explained the steps and measures adopted to ensure stricter control of the border area to monitor and prevent any smuggling operation.
In inquiring about several border points that were considered illegal crossings for smuggling, Bou Saab was reassured by Haddad that they have all been completely closed. Bou Saab then inspected a number of border crossings and points within the vicinity, accompanied by the Regiment's Commander and Officers.

Hasbani says budget adoption is necessary but insufficient, priority is for actual reform

NNA - Sat 05 Oct 2019
Deputy Prime Minister Ghassan Hasbani said Saturday that "the current stage is delicate and requires actions from the government, not reactions."He pointed out that "there is a roadmap within the cabinet," and called for "taking immediate decisions to prove to the Lebanese citizen, before the international community, that we are able to introduce change."Speaking in an interview with "Voice of Lebanon - Dbayeh" Radio Channel earlier today, Hasbani said that we have reached a phase that is beyond normal, which requires necessary action. He, thus, called on officials "to be aware that the provision of ordinary solutions and the adoption of the budget at the constitutional date - despite their importance and necessity - are no longer enough to stop the accumulated challenges."Hasbani stressed the citizen's right to raise his voice and express his pain and daily suffering, adding that is the duty of the official to act responsibly in addressing citizens' concerns. He highlighted the urgent need to begin with actual reforms right away, which ought to be a government priority at this stage.

Jarrah says Financial Prosecutor's summoning is 'illegal'
NNA - Sat 05 Oct 2019
Minister of Information Jamal Al-Jarrah explained in an interview with Radio Lebanon today that his refusal, along with his colleague Minister Mohammad Choucair, to respond to the summoning of Financial Attorney General, Judge Ali Ibrahim, is due to its "illegal" nature since "the law does not allow the Prosecutor to hear or summon a minister, for there is a different legal mechanism to hear a minister or deputy which has not been honored."Additionally, Jarrah pointed to "leaking the news through the media, which is contrary to the law, whereby the Prosecutor is not allowed to appear on media and say that I summoned so-so ministers, which is why we did not and will not respond to the call because it is illegal, especially since there were media leaks, and legal norms were not followed." He added: "In a previous period, I went to Judge Ali Ibrahim, with whom I have a personal friendship, and I answered to some questions that were ambiguous to him, in a natural way...But this time, in wake of the targeting attempt and maliciousness by the Tele-Communications and Media Committee, we preferred to take this position and opt for an open parliamentary investigating committee with the presence of the media to put an end to the lies, slander and maliciousness before the Lebanese public opinion...So we can tell all the Lebanese, through the media and publicly, who is the real corrupt in this country and claims chastity while accusing others!"In response to a question, Jarrah said: "Things are managed by Jamil al-Sayyid (deputy) with all malevolence and hatred towards our political team; a matter that will not pass unnoticed and we will have clear positions on this issue, and the way the session is conducted and how it exceeds the law authority limits."The Information Minister continued to emphasize that "who represents the Ministry is the Tele-Communications Minister, who speaks for the Ministry and attends in its name through the legal mechanisms allowed for the Tele-Communications Committee in its limited powers."
Jarrah stressed that any malevolent side will not be tolerated in the future. "The leniency that was before and led to exploitation by the vindictive and spiteful will be stopped," he assured. On the issue of media liberties, the Information Minister said: "Freedom of information and expression is preserved in Lebanon and we are keen on safeguarding it. This is part of our thinking, existence and political education at the Rafic Hariri School, which amended the Publications Law and banned the imprisonment of any journalist."However, Jarrah quoted President Michel Aoun as saying that resorting to offensive language and insults does not constitute freedom of expression. "Whenever anyone insults the President and the Presidential entity, that cannot be perceived as freedom of the media or the press," he corroborated. "There are parties that use the media to spread devastating rumors to our economy and to the Lebanese currency," Jarrah went on, adding that the media is the first to reject such attempts. Over the relationship between the Future Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement, Minister Jarrah explained that "the settlement has not shaken and it did save the situation in Lebanon...but we are two large teams in the country and it is only natural that we have our differences on some dossiers. There are different points of view that are resolved through dialogue because the stage is very difficult and we have no luxury of disagreeing and wasting time."
"Things are positive between the two sides," Jarrah reassured.

Traboulsi says what is required is activating the economy, not changing the government
NNA - Sat 05 Oct 2019
"Strong Lebanon" Parliamentary Bloc Member, MP Edgar Traboulsi, considered Saturday that what is required at the current stage is not to change the government, but rather to activate the economy. "We have serious work and there are deliberate steps proposed to get out of the crisis," said Traboulsi, stressing on accomplishing the electricity plan and adding that "there is no budget without electricity." "The relationship of President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Saad Hariri is good and we are not working to change the government or dispersing it," he asserted, adding that "some are involved in the obstruction, both at home and abroad." Traboulsi concluded by indicating that FPM partisans and supporters will mark the occasion of October 13 as they do every year, in which politics and the national notion will be evidently present.

Jumblatt: We are destined to always regretfully reminisce the past...!
Sat 05 Oct 2019
NNA - Progressive Socialist Party Chief, former MP Walid Jumblatt, tweeted today saying: "Who decided to turn Kfarnabrakh into a landfill for wastes from the Coast and Bekaa? Who is behind that the so-called company, City Blue, and how did the Municipality of Kfarnabralh allow for this crime? It seems that in this country we are destined to always reminiscently regret the past days, in politics and non-politics. The days of Sukleen were much better...!"

Lakkis on Apple Day in Jezzine: There is serious determination to raise and support the Lebanese economy

NNA - Sat 05 Oct 2019
Marking the Lebanese Apple Day, Agriculture Minister Hassan Lakkis visited today the Municipal Palace of Jezzine, where he was received by MP's Ibrahim Azar and Salim Khoury, and Jezzine Municipalities Union Head Khalil Harfoush, alongside other dignitaries from the region.
Addressing the attendees, Lakkis said: "Under the patronage of the President of the Republic, we celebrate this 'Lebanese Apple Day'...On this day we reassure the Lebanese farmer that there is a serious will to contribute to raising and supporting the Lebanese economy and marketing the Lebanese products both internally and externally."Following the encounter, Harfoush presented Lakkis with a shield of Jezzine's manufactures as a token of appreciation for his visit, after which the Agriculture Minister toured the exhibition of the products of Jezzine's apples and its packaging plant. It is to note that a peace checkpoint was also set up for the occasion at the entrance to Jezzine in the South, distributing the apples of Jezzine to passengers under the slogan of the Lebanese Apple Day Campaign: "Apples of your country, for you and your children."

Lebanese doctor receives first prize in the European Cancer Commission's examination

NNA -Sat 05 Oct 2019
A new remarkable achievement for Lebanon was reaped by Dr. Tarek Salah Assi (who hails from the southern town of Dweir) by receiving the first place award in the European Commission on Cancer's Examination for 2018, during its annual conference this year which was held in Barcelona, Spain, between September 27 and October 1, 2019. More than 400 oncologists from across the world usually undertake the examination, which is considered part of the recognition of tumor competence in some European countries. The doctor is also accredited by the European Cancer Committee for five years.

Hezbollah Prioritizes Its Own Interests, Putting Lebanon at Risk
Matthew Levitt/The Washington Institute/October 05/2019
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/79148/%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%ab%d9%8a%d9%88-%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%aa-%d8%ad%d8%b2%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%84%d9%87-%d9%8a%d8%b9%d8%b7%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%84%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b5/
As demonstrators rail against economic problems, corruption, and sectarianism, the group’s role in undermining the public’s financial and physical security is coming under greater scrutiny.
Lebanese citizens took to the streets this weekend to protest the country’s acute financial crisis, which has been marked by one of the highest debt ratios in the world, a new currency crisis, and fears that a strike will close gas stations indefinitely. Many believe that deep-rooted corruption and sectarianism got them into this mess, and may now complicate efforts to get them out.
Against this backdrop, more criticism is being directed at Hezbollah, the widely designated terrorist organization that is simultaneously the most powerful party in Lebanon’s government and an aggressively sectarian movement that keeps its activities and weapons outside the government’s control. As the Treasury Department recently noted, developments over the past few weeks have underscored the extent to which the group’s actions “prioritize its interests, and those of its chief sponsor, Iran, over the welfare of Lebanese citizens and Lebanon’s economy.”
ASSASSINATING LEBANESE POLITICIANS
On September 16, the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon released details on a new indictment charging Salim Ayyash with helping Hezbollah carry out assassination plots against Lebanese politicians in 2004-2005. The tribunal tied these plots to its core investigation into the February 2005 murder of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
Specifically, the new indictment charges Hezbollah operatives with the October 2004 attempted murder of parliamentarian and Hariri ally Marwan Hamadeh, and the killing of his bodyguard, Ghazi Abou Karroum; the July 2005 murder of Khaled Moura, who worked as a driver for the attack’s primary target, Defense Minister Elias Murr; and the October 2005 murder of former Lebanese Communist Party chief George Hawi. For his role in the plots, Ayyash has been charged with homicide and committing terrorist acts. According to the tribunal, “at all times relevant to the indictment, [Ayyash] was a supporter of Hezbollah,” a relationship that included direct ties with the late operational commander Mustafa Badreddine.
PUTTING CIVILIANS AT RISK FOR ITS MISSILE PROJECT
On August 29, Israel revealed that Iranian operatives were working to give Hezbollah the equipment and know-how necessary for building its own precision missiles and retrofitting old missiles in Lebanese facilities. The revelations were no surprise given the September 2018 exposure of three such underground facilities, which the group had constructed in urban neighborhoods of Beirut unbeknownst to the Lebanese government or the local population it put at risk.
The August announcement came just days after Israel reportedly deployed drones to Beirut to destroy missile-related equipment that Iran had sent there. The message was clear: the Israel Defense Forces will not allow a terrorist group to use a neighboring country as a safe haven for developing game-changing weapons, and if the Lebanese state does not deal with the problem, the IDF will.
The strikes occurred against a backdrop of renewed Hezbollah threats. In a July interview, group leader Hassan Nasrallah emphasized the vulnerability of Israel’s population centers and critical infrastructure. Displaying maps showing the range of Hezbollah rockets, he told the group’s al-Manar television network that they “can target this entire region,” pointing to the southern city of Eilat and its environs. “We shall see who will turn the other into the Stone Age,” he concluded. The outrageous nature of such rhetoric becomes clear when one recalls what Nasrallah represents: a militia leader with no position in the Lebanese government, elected or otherwise, who repeatedly threatens a neighboring state and makes decisions that end the lives of Israeli and Lebanese citizens alike.
ATTACKING UN FORCES
The same day that Israel exposed Iran’s role in Hezbollah’s missile program, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to extend the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, the peacekeeping entity whose mission includes helping the elected government reestablish “effective authority” in the south. The council did so amid ample evidence that Hezbollah maintains independent military zones in wide swaths of the country and has intimidated and obstructed UN military and civilian personnel over and over again. In addition to attacking a UNIFIL convoy last year, Hezbollah continues to deny the force access to sites along the southern border, despite the discovery earlier this year that the group had built a series of attack tunnels into Israeli territory.
In renewing UNIFIL’s mandate, the Security Council “urged all parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and the Force’s access to the Blue Line in all its parts is fully respected and unimpeded.” The UN specifically called out the Lebanese government, demanding that it “facilitate the mission’s access in line with Resolution 1701 (2006).”
UNDERMINING FINANCIAL STABILITY
Not to be outdone, the U.S. Treasury Department announced two actions on August 29 that underscored the extent of Hezbollah’s illicit financial activities in Lebanon. One action exposed Mohammad Sarur, a Beirut-based financial operative who is linked to Hezbollah and “is in charge of transferring tens of millions of dollars per year” from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force to the military wing of the Palestinian group Hamas. The second action targeted Jammal Trust Bank SAL, a midsize Lebanese institution accused of knowingly facilitating Hezbollah financial activities.
A few days prior to Treasury’s move, Fitch Ratings downgraded Lebanon’s long-term currency issuer default ranking, while Standard & Poor reissued its low ratings for the country and noted that the outlook remained negative. Hezbollah’s role in fostering these problems becomes all the more galling when one recalls what the IMF concluded in its January 2017 report on Lebanon: “The banking system has thus far proven resilient to domestic shocks and regional turmoil, but the materialization of severe shocks could expose vulnerabilities.” Hezbollah actions since then have increased the country’s exposure to shocks dramatically, whether by drawing heavy international sanctions, inviting Israeli military action, or scaring off investors.
The Jammal Trust case is particularly instructive. According to the Treasury Department, the bank provided financial services for Hezbollah’s Executive Council, its Martyr’s Foundation, and al-Qard al-Hassan, its de facto finance firm. Bank employees knowingly engaged in illicit practices to conceal such activities. For example, Hezbollah parliamentarian Amin Sherri is accused of coordinating the group’s financial activity with Jammal Trust management. And when Sherri himself was designated several weeks earlier, Treasury noted that he “threatened Lebanese bank officials and their family members” after one institution froze the accounts of a designated Hezbollah member. Such efforts “demonstrate the extreme steps” Sherri was willing to take in order to further Hezbollah’s violent agenda, even “at the cost of a legitimate sector that is the backbone of the Lebanese economy.” According to one senior U.S. official, these coercive practices extended as far as the Central Bank.
Hezbollah’s “deep coordination” with Jammal Trust reportedly dates back “to at least the mid-2000s,” with the Treasury Department describing in detail how their mutual schemes violated both basic anti-money laundering principles and U.S. designations. For instance, “when opening purportedly ‘personal accounts’ at Jammal Trust, al-Qard al-Hassan officials clearly identified themselves ...as senior members of the terrorist group. Jammal Trust then facilitated these accounts to be used to conduct business on al-Qard al-Hassan’s behalf.”
A MOMENT OF DECISION IN BEIRUT
Max Weber famously said that monopoly over the legitimate use of force is the core of the modern state. The question for Lebanon is whether its government is willing and able to assert that prerogative, since that would mean stopping Hezbollah from stockpiling military weapons, threatening neighboring states, or engaging in illicit financial activities with impunity. Some argue that Hezbollah has so penetrated the government that the two are one and the same. Tellingly, however, Washington, the UN Security Council, and Israel all caveated their recent actions with calls for Beirut to intervene, indicating there are concrete steps the government can still take to reassert control over Lebanon’s national and financial security.
Indeed, Lebanese officials must act now to protect the banking system from abuse and prevent Hezbollah from using the country as a military platform against Israel. Failure to act now would enable the group to hold Lebanon hostage to its own narrow interests. This is a decisive moment for Beirut, since the consequences of inaction—namely, war, a collapsed economy, or both—would be devastating.
*Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute.

Bigoted Populism May Spell the End of Lebanon as a Modern State
Hassan Mneimneh/Fikra Forum/October 05/2019
An existential battle is raging in Lebanon regarding the country’s national character, identity, and prospects, with nothing less at stake than the success or failure of Lebanon as a modern project. Given that the country occupies a unique place in the wider Arab consciousness, the implications of its failure have the potential to reverberate regionally, especially since Lebanon’s path has often foreshadowed later developments in the region.
Lebanon’s pluralist composition was and remains a test case in the shaping of an Arab self-identity distinct from religious delineation. When the first meeting of the Arab League convened in 1945, Lebanon’s presence as a founding member prompted one participant to wonder loudly “so, why have we not invited the Jews?”. The Christian face of Lebanon continues to challenge some Arab perspectives while serving as a welcome departure from oppressive homogeneity for others.
Lebanon’s acceptance of a quasi-Western lifestyle as a national norm also continues to place it as an exception in a region that can still view modernity—beyond the immersion in its material gadgets—as an affront to its religiously framed social order. Lebanon’s multiple communities have—albeit unevenly—developed patterns of culture and consumption more in line with the Southern European model than with its regional neighbors, providing for the latter as a result an alternative model away from the posited conflict between modernity and authenticity.
Today, the unique features of Lebanon are under threat.
The success of mid-century Lebanon was in good part due to its agility in leveraging regional afflictions to its advantage. Capital flight and elite migration from Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad—all then suffering recurrent and inconclusive turmoil—provided Lebanon with funds and talent for a cosmopolitan prosperity. Alas, with the PLO’s leadership, as well as its rank and file, benefiting from comparable accommodation, Lebanon’s classical liberal order attracted the catalyst of its own demise.
And after being salvaged from a devastating series of wars in the latter half of the 20th century, Lebanon gave signs in the 1990s and early 2000s that it might be able to restore its status as a pioneer in the region. Two factors, however, have proved to be serious, maybe terminal, obstacles to such a restoration.
The first is the carefully crafted Iranian control of Lebanon as a state and society, achieved through both open political, social, and economic quasi-total stranglehold of Lebanon’s Shi’i community and the covert penetration of other communities.
Yet the second factor, more subtle but equally if not more powerful, is the increasing abandonment within Lebanon of its founding project of political innovation.
Lebanon was created close to a century ago amidst a conviction shared by France, as the Mandate power, the Maronite patriarchate, and a Lebanese socio-cultural elite — predominantly but not exclusively Christian — that the trajectory of history is towards modernization. Instead of a mono-religious enclave that may have offered the Christians of the Levant a precarious refuge, the idea of a “Greater Lebanon” sought to manage the expected demographic shift, which was readily understood to be numerically detrimental to the Christians, by a process of integration of non-Christians (Muslims and Druze) into a political commonwealth informed by modernity and the values of the enlightenment.
Thus, in the course of its century of its modern existence, Lebanon provided a harbinger and a microcosm of the problématique that is coming to the fore of global civilization today. It experienced two separate potent trends: (1) a cultural-civilizational expansion of universal values and modern norms, albeit along an imperfect and fragmented pattern, and (2) a demographic shift that challenged the demographic dominance of the core population whose predispositions are supportive of the cultural ascending trend.
The communitarian arrangement initially adopted as a basis for political life in Lebanon, while providing the Christians with a slight edge, was proclaimed to be temporary. It was assumed—perhaps over-optimistically—that this arrangement would be replaced by an unqualified democratic system. Yet a
century later, Lebanon is objectively farther from the goal of liberal democracy than at its inception.
However, the case can be made that the current failure of Lebanon as a project of modernity should not be viewed as final and intrinsic, but ought to be attributed to incidental and tangential factors, both internal and external—from the deficiency in modern political organization and the perpetuation of feudal patterns, to the heavy burdens imposed by regional conflicts. Patterns of horizontal integration—across communities, on cultural, economic, and political premises—challenging Lebanese neo-feudalism and pointing to the emergence of a shared national cycle abounded at all periods of modern Lebanese history—Mandate, independence, civil war, and Second Republic. It is also possible to point to political leaders who sought to break the neo-feudal mold, such as former President Fouad Chéhab and former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
The strength of the neo-feudal system, with its elements of kleptocracy, patronage, clientelism, and widespread complicity seems on its own daunting to the fragile resistance offered by horizontal interests. The added burden of the “Satrapy”, Iran’s camouflaged occupation of a large political space in Lebanon, may indeed be responsible for the sense of despair in a modern Lebanon.
The real knock-out punch to the prospects of success of the project of modernity in Lebanon may however be in the deliberate abandonment of the original formula of an integrated pluralistic Lebanon in favor of the “confederation of communities” model—one that effectively declare the failure of the idea of “Greater Lebanon” while seeking untenable remedies.
President Michel Aoun and his son-in-law and putative successor Gebran Basil—despite occasional nationalist rhetoric—have both demonstrated an unwavering adherence to the idea of a “confederated” Lebanon. This is particularly visible in their repeated insistence of the need to “safeguard the rights of the Christians.” With Christians now a minority of the total population, Lebanon’s equal political sharing system between Christians and Muslims has resulted in many Christian Members of Parliament owing their seats to Muslim votes. Aoun and others have suggested this situation amounts to a denial of Christian rights, and should be remedied by each community electing its representatives, a system that would weight Christian votes over Muslim ones.
Aoun and Basil have flaunted successive power grabs for their associates as acts of championing the rights of their community—to over-representation. In his current pursuit of the presidency, Basil has embraced the provocative and bigoted rhetoric of his father-in-law, specifically targeting Syrian and Palestinian refugees.
This rhetoric is setting the tone for an escalation in Lebanese public discourse and eventual policy, which could easily develop into blatant racism. For example, the mayor of a majority-Christian town has recently declared that non-Christians will not be allowed to rent or buy property in his town and experienced no public backlash. Meanwhile, an entertainer, objecting to protests in refugee camps by Palestinians against new labor regulation measures, has called for them to be burned, openly invoking the Nazi “final solution” with no meaningful repercussions.
Bigoted populism has proven to be contagious. The damage to political culture in Lebanon is tangible, with Christian political rivals of Aoun and Basil driven to overbidding, setting in motion a vicious cycle of animosity, radicalization, and attrition of the common national discourse.
The new Lebanese Christian populists’ sense of empowerment is in harmony with Iran’s tactical interest in segmenting the Lebanese population along communitarian lines—both to strengthen its grip on the Shi‘i community and to prevent Lebanese unity across community lines from challenging its control. While Iran’s intentions are compatible with the immediate political interests of Aoun and Basil, all parties must recognize that feeding into them will severely damage Lebanon as a modern state and, ultimately, will deny a continuing meaningful Christian presence in it.
By retreating from the promise of an integrated pluralistic Lebanon, as contemplated by its founding parties, the promoters of identity politics and bigoted populism abandon the most effective antidote to the potentially damaging cultural effects of the inevitable demographic shift—that of creating a community of values that welcomes all citizens, irrespective of religion and community. Populism is summoning tropes of supremacism and a recasting of the history of Lebanon and the region as a civilizational duel between Christianity and Islam. This “clash of civilizations” model may arouse passions and indeed secure the Christian electoral base for its promoters. But, while not reflective of the complex history of the region, it will amplify animosity and inter-community tensions in the Lebanese here and now, and will leave the Christian community isolated and vulnerable.
The existential conflict in Lebanon is not between “Christians” and “Muslims”. It is within the Christian community, between those who have despaired of the concept of “Greater Lebanon” and seek the questionable proposition in which untenable privileges are claimed to be permanent rights, and those who realize that safeguarding the rights of the Christians, and all Lebanese, is through the ascension towards a genuinely modern and enlightened Lebanese identity accepting of pluralism and universal values.
In an international climate that has normalized populism and is awash with bigoted and racist discourse, bigoted populism confidently advances in Lebanon, sliding the country away from the path chosen by its founders. To the detriment of all Lebanese, Christians and otherwise, and to the chagrin of enlightened citizens of Arab countries from whom Lebanon may have been the canary in the mine, the prospects of genuine modernity in the region may be receding.
*Hassan Mneimneh is a contributing editor with Fikra Forum and a principal at Middle East Alternatives in Washington.
*Fikra Forum is an initiative of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The views expressed by Fikra Forum contributors are the personal views of the individual authors, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Institute, its staff, Board of Directors, or Board of Advisors.​​

Analysis/How Lebanon Stopped Being a Country – and Turned Into a Bankrupt Corporation
زفي بارئيل/هآرتس: كيف لم يعد لبنان دولة وتحول إلى مؤسسة فاشلة
Zvi Bar'el/Haaretz/October 05/2019
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/79159/%d8%b2%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d9%84-%d9%87%d8%a2%d8%b1%d8%aa%d8%b3-%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81-%d9%84%d9%85-%d9%8a%d8%b9%d8%af-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9/

Rockets are not the only threat to Israel from its northern neighbor: The country is in a deep economic crisis that could lead to its collapse and civil revolt.
“The people want to topple the regime;” “The cabinet and the parliament are all thieves;” “We have nothing to live on.” The famous placards from the Arab Spring have been dusted off, waved in the streets of Beirut, Tripoli and other Lebanese cities.
We are not witnessing mass demonstrations. They’re a few hundreds, holding signs in front of the parliament building or government offices to rouse the country’s decision makers from their late-summer slumber.
Lebanon is in the midst of a deep financial crisis that could lead to its collapse unless it quickly finds new sources of funding for its massive, $86 billion public debt - around 150 percent of gross domestic product. It must also persuade investors to build new factories that could hire the tens of thousands that are unemployed and boost its exports. Above all, it must eradicate the deep-seated governmental corruption, which swallows billions from the country’s revenues.
Lebanon’s ruined economy is the overarching theme of the demonstrations, but this week, the immediate spark was fear of a shortage of dollars. The government insists there is no such thing, but that isn’t how things look in the marketplace. People who tried to withdraw the U.S. currency weren’t able to do so. Merchants, gas stations and flour mills couldn't get the dollars they need to pay their suppliers.
To compensate for the lack of dollars at the official exchange rate – 1,507 Lebanese pounds to the dollar – importers turned to money changers and gray-market lenders, to whom they pay 1,550 to 1,600 pounds per dollar. They then pass the higher costs onto their consumers.
At least for a while. Even the black-market money changers cannot supply the demand.
Gas station owners had to issue threats for the government to finally agree for them to buy fuel in Lebanese pounds. But this is a temporary solution, and it also eats into the central bank’s foreign currency reserves, which have already plunged by 15 percent since the start of the year.
The urgent need for transparency
A short-term solution is within reach, as Lebanon has already received commitments from donor states for $11 billion in loans. But that injection is stuck until a major and long-awaited reform program gets under way.
The government’s budget was only approved in June, after months of debate. It calls for reducing the number of government employees, a freeze on filling vacant positions and a three percent cut in pension payments to retired civil servants and soldiers. It also requires members of parliament to pay customs duties on their cars and imposes higher taxes on interest earned from bank deposits. But public opposition to these steps and political considerations have so far delayed implementation of this program.
This week, Beirut's Al-Akhbar newspaper reported on the findings of the council for transparency in the public sector, which stated that in 2017 the government paid tens of millions of dollars to cronies, unsupervised organizations and for projects that were never carried out.
For example, salaries for the oversight committee of the southern council, the body that was set up in part to examine the damage caused by the Second Lebanon War, was $4.7 million – 14 times the entire salary costs for all the members of the council. Consultants in a government organization examining the status of women in society received salaries of $160,000 – 26 percent of the group’s total expenditures. Six employees of the supreme council for privatization received $295,000 in salaries, without any of these bodies ever undergoing an audit.
These are just a few examples from the report – which notes that only 33 public organizations out of 140 responded to the transparency council’s request to provide data on their spending.
No decision is worse than a bad decision
Another example of Lebanon's broken decision-making process is the country’s electricity supply. Lebanon’s electricity comes mostly from private generators and the public electric company, the largest of all government companies, which suffers from a serious deficit.
The government has still not decided how to deal with the shortage of electricity, with the latest debates revolving around whether to go for a permanent solution that will take a long time to implement – or for temporary measures until a permanent solution can be agreed on. Even the quick fixes under consideration are controversial.
One of the questions is whether to procure electricity through the use of large ships carrying generators, or to install generators on land. The Free Patriotic Movement, the party of President Michel Aoun, and the Future Movement of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, both favor the ships, and have even “fixed” a tender so it would perfectly fit Turkish-made ships. But the tenders' authority opposes this bidding process because it does not provide equal conditions to land-based electricity production projects.
Ships do not need to pay rent for their anchorages, but the owners of land-based generators will be required to buy or lease land. Someone needs to make a decision as to whether the government will agree to bear those costs to make for fairer conditions. Until then, Lebanese citizens will continue to pay for, and enjoy irregular electricity supply.
This is evidence that Lebanon is on the dangerous road from being a country to becoming a bankrupt corporation. Lebanon’s ability to handle a civil revolt over poor economic conditions that could then be exploited for political and military purposes are under question. Anyone worried about Hezbollah’s powerful arsenal should be even more scared by the deep economic crisis that could very well strengthen the movement's ability to rule Lebanon.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on October 05- 06/2019
Iraq protests death toll nears 100: Rights panel
AFP, Baghdad/Saturday, 5 October 2019
The death toll from mass protests in Baghdad and cities across southern Iraq neared 100 on Saturday as the unrest entered its fifth day, a rights panel said. Iraqi officials say one protester was killed in Baghdad in renewed rallies, the first after a two-day curfew has been lifted. More than 3,000 people have also been injured since the protests against chronic unemployment, poor public services, and widespread corruption erupted in the capital on Tuesday, the parliament’s human rights commission said. A total of 540 demonstrators have been arrested, of whom nearly 200 remain in custody, the panel added. The Iraqi government lifted the daytime curfew in Baghdad on Saturday, but access to roads leading to major squares remained blocked for fear of further deadly protests, AFP correspondents reported. Iraqi security forces Friday opened fire on dozens of protesters gathering in Baghdad for a fourth day of demonstrations against corruption, unemployment, and poor public services, an AFP correspondent reported. Tensions have been exacerbated by a near-total internet blackout as the authorities seek to prevent protesters communicating with each other or posting footage of the chaotic demonstrations. The demonstrations are the biggest challenge yet to Prime Minister Adel Abdel Mahdi, who has imposed curfews in Baghdad and other cities to try to stop the protests gathering steam.

Baghdad Curfew Lifted but Iraq on Alert for New Protests
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/October 05/2019
The Iraq government lifted the daytime curfew in Baghdad on Saturday but access roads to major squares remained blocked for fear of further deadly protests, AFP correspondents reported. The death toll from mass protests in Baghdad and cities across southern Iraq rose to 73 as the unrest entered its fifth day, parliament's human rights commission said. More than 3,000 people have also been wounded since the protests against chronic unemployment, poor public services and widespread corruption erupted in the capital on Tuesday, the commission said. A total of 540 demonstrators have been arrested, of whom nearly 200 remain in custody, the panel added. Prime Minister Adel Abdel Mahdi ordered the curfew in the capital lifted from 5 am (0200 GMT) although an internet blackout remained in force. Shoppers trickled back onto the streets to buy vegetables and other perishable goods the price of which had doubled since the deadly protests started. Municipal street cleaners set about clearing the detritus of the four days of running clashes between protesters and riot police, which has seen breeze blocks and burning tyres strewn across major thoroughfares. Riot police blocked traffic between Tahrir (Liberation) Square and other gathering points as authorities waited to see whether a call from firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr for the government to quit would bring his supporters out on to the streets. The well-organised Sadrists have been a mainstay of most of the major protest movements of recent years. As parliament prepared to convene later on Saturday, an onlooker who ventured out, Abu Salah, 70, was not convinced the protests were over. "If living conditions don't improve, the protesters will be back," he said.

Australian couple released in Iran after 3 months
The Associated Press, Melbourne/Saturday, 5 October 2019
The Australian foreign minister says an Australian-British blogger and her finance have been released in Iran after three months of detention. Foreign Minister Marise Payne said on Saturday the couple, Jolie King and Mark Firkin, have been released following “very sensitive negotiations” and are on their way home in “good health and in good spirits.”She says all charges against them have been dropped. Payne says: “For Jolie and for Mark, the ordeal they have been through is now over, they are being reunited with their loved ones, which is a source of great relief and joy to everyone.”They were held in Tehran for almost three months after being arrested for reportedly flying a drone without a permit.University of Melbourne academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert is still imprisoned in Iran after being charged with spying.

Muslim Brotherhood Demands Kuwait to Stop Handing over its Members to Egypt
Cairo - Walid Abul Rahman/Asharq Al Awsat/October 05/2019
The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait demanded on Friday local authorities to cease handing over its detained members to Egypt. The party urged Kuwait to instead to allow the them to “safely depart Kuwait to any other country”. The statement was issued days after Kuwait handed over to Cairo Khaled al-Mahdi, a member of the youth leadership in the Brotherhood. He has been sentenced to ten years in jail by Egypt for his involvement in violent acts and financing the group. The Muslim Brotherhood is banned by Egypt and designated as a terrorist organization. A security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Brotherhood fugitives wanted by Egypt and residing in Kuwait are handed over to Cairo based on an agreement signed by the two countries. Mahdi, he revealed, attempted to recruit Egyptian expatriates in Kuwait and to set up electronic militias in the Gulf country in order to attack Egypt.
In a statement on Friday, the Brotherhood acknowledged the existence of its cell in Kuwait. It was arrested by authorities and its members turned over to Egypt. The statement said the detainees were members of the Brotherhood and that they had verdicts issued against them by Egypt. Kuwait has the right to determine their fate. It accused Kuwait of abandoning the policy of neutrality on divisive regional issues, claimed the statement. Moreover, it alleged that the Brotherhood was an “important part of the Kuwaiti political scene.”

Exclusive - ‘Lost Generation’ of Syrians Looms as Education in Idlib on Verge of Collapse

Idlib – Aya al-Omar/Asharq Al Awsat/October 05/2019
The education system in the Syrian northwestern province of Idlib is on the brink of collapse after years of war that have destroyed schools and left tens of thousands of students out of the classrooms. According to opposition figures, Idlib and the Hama and Aleppo countrysides boast more than 840 schools. Some 3 million people, half of them displaced, live in these regions. Schools have been targeted by airstrikes and they were also used in clashes between regime and opposition fighters. Even after the regime withdrew from the region local authorities have been unable to renovate the schools.
An expert said that the vast majority of the schools lack windows, doors and seats and other basic necessities. Books are also in short supply. Only some 100 schools have been renovated be various agencies. Recent air raids on the region have destroyed 115 academic establishments. The displaced have also led to a sharp rise in the number of students, accounting for 40 percent of primary and 20 percent of secondary school students. A European-British grant had in 2015 covered the salaries of teachers in schools in northern Syria outside regime control. In 2018, they received a raise of 20 dollars, bringing their salary to 120 dollars. The low wages have led to a sense of disgruntlement among the faculty, which in turn has negatively affected teaching. The European-British grant came to a halt after four years, bringing an end to the financing of 70 percent of schools. The halt could lead to a drop in teachers and an increased number of student drop-outs. Some 350,000 students are on the verge of missing out on school and their right to an education, which may lead to a whole lost generation of Syrians. Officials in the education sector have therefore been pleading with humanitarian agencies in Syria and abroad to immediately resolve the crisis before it becomes worse. Save the Children had warned that tens of thousands of children may miss the new academic year in northwestern Syria in wake of the ongoing military escalation in the region. Relative calm had pervaded after a ceasefire was reached in August between Russia, the regime and local factions. Out of 1,193 schools, 635 remain in service, said Save the Children. Some 353 have been damaged and evacuated due to airstrikes. More than 200 schools are used as shelters for refugees. The remaining schools can take in 300,000 out of 650,000 children.

Nine extremists killed in Russian strikes on Syria’s Idlib: Monitor
AFP, Beirut/Saturday, 5 October 2019
Nine extremists were killed on Saturday in Russian airstrikes on Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, a monitoring group said.“Russian strikes this morning targeted the Hurras al-Deen group and Ansar al-Tahwid in eastern Idlib ... killing nine,” said the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, adding that eight others were wounded.

Erdogan Says Turkey to Launch Operation East of Euphrates in Syria

Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 5 October, 2019
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Saturday that Ankara will carry out an air and ground military operation east of the Euphrates River in Syria "as soon as today or tomorrow". Speaking at the opening of his AK Party's annual camp, he said Turkey aimed to "water the east of Euphrates with fountains of peace" and settle refugees there. His remarks were the most direct indication of an incursion since Ankara and Washington decided to establish a "safe zone" in the area. "We gave all warnings to our interlocutors regarding the east of Euphrates and we have acted with sufficient patience," Erdogan said.
The operation could start as soon as Saturday or Sunday, he said. The US-backed force which controls the region, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), said it wanted stability but vowed to respond to any attack. "We will not hesitate to turn any unprovoked attack by Turkey into an all-out war on the entire border to defend ourselves and our people," SDF spokesman Mustafa Bali said. NATO allies, Washington and Ankara, have agreed to establish a zone on the Syrian border that Turkey says should stretch 30 km (19 miles) into Syria and be cleared of the YPG, which it considers a terrorist organization. Turkey has accused the United States, which supports the YPG-led force that defeated ISIS in Syria, of moving too slowly to set up the zone. The two countries are also at odds over how far it should extend into Syria and who should control it
Turkey says it wants to settle up to 2 million Syrian refugees in the zone, and has repeatedly warned of unilateral military action if it is not satisfied with progress. The SDF, which has said it will pull back up to 14 km (8.7 miles) on some parts of the border, is committed to the agreements under US-Turkish talks and will remain so if "dangerous threats" stop, its spokesman Bali said. Kurdish commanders have warned that a Turkish border attack would lead to a resurgence of ISIS. "Simply, there will be a big gap in the towns that our forces will withdraw from to go to defend the border, and this will give ISIS the opportunity to return," Bali said. Turkey-backed Syrian opposition factions pledged on Friday to back a potential cross-border offensive that Ankara has threatened to mount against Kurdish fighters in northeast Syria. Turkey has twice launched military offensives with the factions in northern Syria in recent years. A Turkish military operation in northeastern Syria would carry a larger risk, bringing troops into a zone where at least 1,000 US soldiers are deployed.

Erdogan Renews Syria 'Air and Ground' Operation Threat
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/October 05/2019
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Saturday renewed Turkey's threat to launch an "air and ground" operation in Syria against a Kurdish militia viewed as terrorists by Ankara. The president previously said that Turkey's patience was wearing thin after Turkish and American officials agreed in August to establish a buffer zone in northern Syria. "We've made our preparations, completed our operation plans, given the necessary instructions," Erdogan said during a televised speech, adding that the offensive could start "as soon as today, tomorrow". "We will conduct this (operation) on the ground and in the air," he added, saying it would be east of the Euphrates river. Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to launch a cross-border offensive and recently suggested that progress on the zone with the US was not developing as Ankara wanted. While there have been joint US-Turkey patrols, Turkey wants to urgently establish a "safe zone" for the return of up to two million Syrian refugees. Turkey is home to more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees but there has been a growing public backlash against their presence. Ankara wants to push the US-backed Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militia from its border, saying that the group is a "terrorist" offshoot of Kurdish insurgents in Turkey. But the YPG has worked closely with American troops in the fight against the Islamic State extremist group, recapturing territory in northern Syria. The Turkish military has twice launched offensives in Syria against IS in 2016 and against the YPG in 2018.

Greece Urges Pompeo to Defuse Turkish-Stoked Tensions in E. Mediterranean
Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 5 October, 2019
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Saturday urged the United States to use its influence to defuse tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Cyprus and Turkey are locked in a dispute over offshore rights. The demand was made shortly before Turkey’s Energy Minister Fatih Donmez announced that one of his country’s oil and gas exploration ships will soon begin drilling southwest of Cyprus. Mitsotakis told visiting US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that Turkish moves south of the island in recent days were a “flagrant violation” of Cyprus' sovereign rights. Tensions between Cyprus and Turkey over offshore drilling have intensified after Ankara sent a drilling ship to an area already licensed by Nicosia to Italian and French energy companies. "The United States have a particular interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Cyprus is only asking for the self-evident, the implementation of international law," Mitsotakis told Pompeo, who is visiting Greece on the last leg of a trip to southern Europe. "I anticipate the positive contribution of the United States to lead to the creation finally of a more constructive and fruitful climate of cooperation in the region," he said. Ankara says some of the areas where Cyprus is exploring are either on its own continental shelf or in zones where Turkish Cypriots have equal rights over any finds with Greek Cypriots. The US Secretary of State was due to hold talks on Saturday with his Greek counterpart and the defense minister. Responding to Mitsotakis, Pompeo did not refer to Cyprus. "Today the relationship between (our) two countries has truly never been stronger," Pompeo said, praising the efforts of Greece on its path to economic recovery. "We are very confident that together we can work to ensure Greece can be a pillar for stability in this region."A Turkish drill ship, the Yavuz, is currently 50 nautical miles off Cyprus and plans to start drilling work on Monday. Turkey has already drilled two wells in waters to the east and west of the island, triggering strong protests from Nicosia and the European Union in recent months, including EU sanctions."Our Yavuz drilling ship has reached the Guzelyurt-1 location. Our ship... will hopefully begin drilling as soon as possible after completing all its preparations," Donmez said on Twitter. The ship's location was unchanged from Friday, Refinitiv Eikon ship tracking data shows. Turkey's second drill ship, Fatih, has been operating off the west coast of the Cyprus. The island of Cyprus was split after a Turkish invasion in 1974 triggered by a brief Greek-inspired coup. The internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government represents Cyprus in the European Union, while a breakaway Turkish Cypriot state in the north is recognized only by Ankara. Ankara says some of the areas where Cyprus is exploring are either on its own continental shelf or in zones where Turkish Cypriots have equal rights over any finds with Greek Cypriots. Nicosia rejects the claim, saying that assertion is not only inconsistent with international law, but that Turkey would not accept any international dispute settlement mechanism where its claims could be put to the test.

Palestinians to Receive $430 Million Israeli Transfer
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/October 05/2019
The Palestinian Authority will receive a transfer of 1.5 billion shekels ($430 million) from Israel, officials from the two governments said Friday, in a step towards resolving a months-long standoff between them. Israel will continue to deduct money from the transfers to account for the PA's payments to prisoners, a decision that sparked the row, but the two sides have agreed to further talks to resolve that issue, Palestinian civil affair minister Hussein al-Sheikh said. Shai Babad, director general of Israel's finance ministry, told AFP the transfer would be made on Sunday to the PA government, which is facing a crippling financial crisis caused by the dispute. Sheikh confirmed they would receive the funds. In February, Israel decided to withhold about $10 million a month from revenues of some $190 million it collects on the PA's behalf, prompting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to refuse all payments -- saying he would accept all or nothing. The money comes from customs duties levied on goods destined for Palestinian markets that transit through Israeli ports and constitutes more than 50 percent of the PA's revenues. The deduction corresponds to what Israel says the PA paid Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, or their families.
Prisoners who have carried out attacks on Israelis are among those receiving the payments, and Israel says the policy encourages further violence. Palestinians view prisoners as fighting against Israel's occupation and say the money supports families that have lost their main breadwinners. Sheikh said the two sides had agreed to form a committee to resolve remaining issues, including the money withheld over prisoner payments. "This is a step towards resolving the crisis but the crisis didn't end," he told AFP. The financial shortfall had been so severe the PA has been forced to halve salaries to its tens of thousands of civil servants.

Shin Bet Says it Thwarted Many West Bank Attacks in 2015

Tel Aviv - Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 5 October, 2019
By the end of 2015, there was nearly a hundred attacks and attempted attacks by Palestinians in the West Bank, Israel’s Shin Bet domestic security agency has said. That period witnessed stabbings, car rammings and limited shootings carried out by Palestinians. Before the violence abated, more or less, a year later, about 50 Israelis and more than 200 Palestinians had been killed in what was called “the knife intifada.”Arik Barbing, who headed the Shin Bet’s Cyber Directorate before the events began, says that the human profile of the perpetrators differs significantly. Their average age was 16 to 20. The participation of women, mostly young and from difficult family backgrounds, also increased substantially. Besides not being connected to terror groups, most of the perpetrators didn’t espouse extremist ideology, and some pursued a fairly secular way of life. Even when they operated in cells, these were small. They obtained guns by themselves. And they didn’t abide by any organizational hierarchy. In many cases, they carried out “inspiration attacks” – they tried to emulate previous attacks by other young people that were highly publicized. So the Shin Bet had to revise its traditional patterns of operation “and adopt working methods and intelligence gathering relating to individuals.” Barbing stresses the role of technology, especially social media, in disseminating the messages of revolt, and by the same token the Israeli preventive and preemptive actions. In some cases, he notes, assailants hinted at their intentions on Facebook and elsewhere; in some cases they also posted a “last will.” After putting many suspects under surveillance, dozens were arrested. During their questioning, many admitted to plotting attacks or thinking seriously about such moves.

Hong Kong Suspends Trains, Appeals to Public after Rioting
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/October 05/2019
All subway and train services were suspended and lines formed at the cash machines of shuttered banks as Hong Kong dusted itself off and braced for more protests Saturday after another night of rampaging violence that a new ban on face masks failed to quell. The closure of the entire MTR network that handles more than 4 million trips a day, including the express line to the Hong Kong international airport, was a major and quite exceptional disruption for the usually never-resting but now edgy and restive territory of 7.5 million people. "From MTR to EmptyR," tweeted activist Joshua Wong, a key player in 2014 protests that foreshadowed the past four months of demonstrations. Snowballing into a sustained outburst of anti-government and anti-China fury, the youth-led protests have plunged the international hub for trade and finance into its deepest crisis since the territory reverted from British to Chinese rule in 1997. "Can't go anywhere," said Kevin Cui, a tourist from mainland China who'd planned to visit Disneyland only to discover at a shuttered subway station in central Hong Kong that the network was suspended. "This is very troublesome." After widespread overnight arson attacks, looting, fighting with police and beatings, the government on Saturday appealed for a public shift in attitude against rioting. John Lee, the government's security secretary, said by not condemning violence, people are stoking it. "What is adding oil to violence is people's support for these acts," he said. "What is important is that everybody comes out to say, 'No, society will not accept violence.'"But even many peaceful protesters say violence has become a means to an end, the only way for young masked protesters to force the government to bend. As a group of black-clad youths in protective gear rushed past him, many carrying bamboo sticks, a property industry worker who came out with his wife Friday night to show his opposition to the mask ban expressed his admiration for those confronting police. "I know they have done terrible things" he said. "Can you believe how brave they are?" He gave only his first name, Alex. He and his wife, Pauline, both donned masks that covered their mouths to hit streets in central Hong Kong where clouds of police tear gas to disperse protesters also caused spluttering tourists and Friday night revelers to flee, eyes stinging. Embattled Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam insisted that criminalizing the wearing of masks at rallies and her use of rarely deployed emergency powers to introduce the ban without legislative approval were not a move toward authoritarian rule or at the behest of the Chinese government. International observers worried, however, that her resort to the Emergency Ordinance that had lain dormant since last used to quell riots in 1967 could be a harbinger of harsher measures in the semi-autonomous Chinese territory deeply attached to its special freedoms and fearful of becoming a tightly controlled city like all the others in China. The mask ban went into effect Saturday. Two activists filed legal challenges late Friday on grounds it would instill fear and curtail freedom of assembly, but a court denied their request for an injunction. Lam announced the measure Friday afternoon as thousands of masked protesters crammed streets in the central business district, with some offices closing early and spilling workers into the demonstrations. Protesters shouted "Hong Kong people, resist!" Under the cover of darkness, masked protesters rampaged, setting fires, setting up makeshift road blocks that backed up traffic and vandalizing subway stations, China-linked business and other property. An officer fired a single shot from his gun in self-defense after he was attacked by protesters in the northern Yuen Long district, said police spokeswoman Yolanda Yu. She said a man was wounded, but police didn't know exactly how he got shot. A police official, who requested anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak to the news media, said the victim is 14. A Hospital Authority spokesman said the teen was in serious but not critical condition. The teen became the second victim of gunfire in the protests that began in June. An 18-year-old protester was also shot at close range by a riot police officer on Tuesday.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on October 05- 06/2019
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Is One Despot Trump Might Not Win Over
Karim Sadjadpour/Time/October 05/2019
صورة الخامنئي على غلاف مجلة التايمز مع تقرير مفصل عنه من اعداد كريم
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/79151/%d8%b5%d9%88%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ae%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%86%d8%a6%d9%8a-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%ba%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%81-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%a7%d9%8a%d9%85%d8%b2-%d9%85%d8%b9/?preview_id=79151&preview_nonce=b2ccb668df&preview=true&_thumbnail_id=79152
https://time.com/5691642/iran-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei-trump/

Iran’s President arrived in New York City in September and left, as usual, without meeting the American one. Both Hassan Rouhani and Donald Trump professed an appetite for sitting down and talking over the ever more treacherous rift between their nations. But as Rouhani has pointed out in private, Iran’s top elected official “has no authority in foreign policy.” That authority–and nearly every other strand of power in the Islamic Republic–resides with the elderly cleric who remained 6,000 miles away, in the country he has not left for decades.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 80 years of age, disabled by a saboteur’s bomb blast and lit by a righteous certainty, holds the title of Supreme Leader of Iran. But he has quietly emerged as the most powerful person in the Middle East, with uniformed military fighting in Syria and loyal proxies dominant in Lebanon, Yemen and (despite a U.S. investment of $1 trillion and thousands of lives) Iraq. Since the spring, behind a thin veil of denials, he has also presided over an audacious and escalating campaign to raise uncertainty and global oil prices, shooting down a $176 million U.S. drone, blowing holes in tankers and bombing the heart of Saudi Arabia’s oil production, all without drawing a U.S. military response.
Iran Shot Down a $176 Million U.S. Drone. Here's What to Know About the RQ-4 Global Hawk
Iran shooting down a U.S. surveillance drone in the politically sensitive Strait of Hormuz has created a dangerous new level of tension between the two countries
Khamenei, who has confounded every U.S. President he has faced since coming to power 30 years ago, harbors a particular animus for Trump. In June, he told the Prime Minister of Japan, who had come bearing a message from the White House, “I do not consider Trump as a person worth exchanging any message with.” A detonation on the hull of a Japanese oil tanker the same day might have been an exclamation point.
Perhaps no other foreign leader is working harder to put Trump out of office than Khamenei. And perhaps no other foreign leader differs in more ways. Trump, thrice married and irreligious, has lived a life of opulence and publicity. The deeply devout Khamenei has been married for over 55 years, and he openly disdains pomp and materialism. Trump, operating on impulse, exhibits no organizing principles. Khamenei has shown a lifelong commitment to his: resistance against “global arrogance”–his moniker for American imperialism–is both ideology and strategic doctrine for the theocracy. When Trump unilaterally withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 deal that had significantly curtailed Iran’s nuclear program, the move validated Khamenei’s view of the U.S. as “deceitful, untrustworthy and backstabbing.” The sanctions Trump then imposed have further debilitated Iran’s economy, sending it to 50% inflation. But they seemingly stiffened Khamenei’s resolve. “Resistance,” Khamenei said in a recent speech that included the word 70 times, “unlike surrender, leads to the retreat of the enemy.”
In Trump, Iran has an enemy who does not want to fight. After an Iranian missile shot down that massive U.S. drone in June, Trump at the last minute retracted his own order for military retaliation. Two days later, he thanked Iran for not shooting down a manned flight: “That’s something we really appreciate.” The vacillation seems to have only increased Khamenei’s appetite for risk, and on Sept. 14, Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facility was crippled by a missile and drone attack.
Iran denied involvement, but the game unfolding now is one Khamenei knows well. For years, he has carefully calibrated Iran’s reaction to U.S. pressure: an insufficient response might project weakness and invite more pressure. An excessive response, on the other hand, could trigger a serious U.S. retaliation and risk outright war. It’s a situation made even less predictable by two qualities the leaders do share: each harbors an appetite for conspiracy theories and a profound sense of victimization.
Khamenei is a geriatric cleric ruling over an increasingly secular population whose median age is 30. Aside from Syria’s Bashar Assad, he has no reliable friends in the world. And he goes to bed every night and wakes every morning believing that the U.S. government is actively trying to overthrow him. This paranoia–frequently reflected in official state media, which Khamenei controls–is also driven by political expediency. Mohammed Khatami, the reformist cleric who was Iran’s President for two terms (1997–2005), told me in a private meeting in Oslo in 2008 that when he was in office Khamenei used to tell him that Iran “needs enmity with the United States. The revolution needs enmity with the United States.”
Despite its distance and a military budget less than 3% of that of the U.S., Iran has loomed large in American domestic politics. The Iran hostage crisis ended Jimmy Carter’s presidency; Iran-contra tainted Ronald Reagan’s presidency; Iranian machinations in post-Saddam Iraq exhausted George W. Bush’s presidency. And the Iran nuclear program and negotiations engrossed the Obama presidency.
Trump inherited from Obama an Iran that resembled the late-stage USSR, powerful beyond its borders but hemorrhaging billions of dollars in foreign entanglements and mired by internal economic malaise and ideological fatigue. But instead of marshaling global unity against Tehran’s malign activities, Trump abandoned the nuclear agreement the U.N. reported Iran had been adhering to.
To this day, senior U.S. government officials confuse Khamenei with his charismatic predecessor: Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Although Khomeini died 30 years ago, his sinister daily presence on American TV sets through the 444-day hostage crisis left a lasting impression. “These economic sanctions are just a part of the U.S. government’s total effort to change the behavior of the Ayatollah Khomeini,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a November 2018 briefing. “The assets of Ayatollah Khomeini and his office,” President Trump followed up in June 2019, “will not be spared from the sanctions.”
The confusion–like so much the U.S. does–may serve Khamenei. He prefers to obscure his vast power behind the Islamic Republic’s byzantine array of institutions. The Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council, Expediency Council and Revolutionary Guards evoke a Game of Thrones–style drama. But in reality they are all led by individuals handpicked by Khamenei or unfailingly loyal to him. They serve to buttress rather than check his authority.
Khamenei is a reader. He has frequently said Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables is the greatest novel ever written, and his Instagram feed shows him smiling as he reads a Persian translation of Fire and Fury, Michael Wolff’s unflattering account of Trump’s first year in office. And though it’s unknown whether he’s read The Prince, he displays a Machiavellian genius in manipulating what Iranians call “the system.” Khamenei’s slyest feat: assuring that he has power without accountability, while Iran’s elected Presidents have accountability without power.
Iran makes a great show of its highly manipulated presidential elections, and their importance to the public became clear when the 2009 ballot was stolen. Millions took to the streets in what became known as the Green Movement, brutally quashed by the leader’s internal militia, the Basij. Marring the ballot was a dangerous miscalculation by Khamenei, and perhaps an unnecessary one. No matter the challenge brought by a President–the economic challenge of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997), the democratic challenge of Khatami, the populist challenge of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) or the pragmatic one of Rouhani (2013–present)–Khamenei emasculated each. In more than two decades researching Iran, both in Tehran and the U.S., I have learned the most important indicator of the regime’s behavior is in the speeches of the Supreme Leader.
Khamenei projects a life of piety and service. He hasn’t left the nation since 1989 and, apart from a small, trusted coterie of advisers, is largely inaccessible. His modest official residence in working-class central Tehran is hidden from the public, and his clothing usually consists of dull robes and cheap slippers. Visitors to Khamenei’s abode curry favor with him by publicly recounting its simple decor and plain dinner menu, often bread, cheese and eggs.
Among his two daughters and four sons (all of whom became clerics) only one, Mojtaba, has a public profile. And in contrast to Arab first ladies whose spendthrift ways have fueled popular anger, Mrs. Khamenei has never been seen in photographs. Still, the facade was pierced by a 2013 Reuters investigative report that revealed Khamenei controls a $95 billion financial conglomerate, which he uses as he wishes. The conglomerate was built on the seizure of property of Iranians, many of them religious minorities, and holds stakes in sectors as diverse as oil, telecommunications, the production of birth control pills and ostrich farming.
But if Khamenei controls more billions than Trump ever claimed to, his origin story is both humbler and bloodier. The second of eight children born to a Shi’ite cleric father in the shrine city of Mashhad, Khamenei has often romanticized his deprived but devout upbringing, saying he frequently ate “bread and raisins” for dinner. He was enrolled in religious education by age 5 and recalls entering “the arena of jihad” as a teenager, inspired by a radical Shi’ite cleric complicit in the assassination of several prominent Iranian secular intellectuals and government officials in the 1950s. While studying in Qom–the Shi’ite Vatican–in his early 20s, Khamenei came under the tutelage of Khomeini, who became his lifelong mentor.
At the time, Khomeini was largely unknown in Iran, but his opposition to the social reforms–particularly women’s enfranchisement–and modern pretensions of Iran’s ruling monarch, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, gained him a loyal following among deeply traditional seminary students. When the Shah exiled Khomeini in 1963, Khamenei remained in Iran disseminating his mentor’s unorthodox teachings about Islamic government. Because that theocratic doctrine cast the West as a foil to the virtue of fundamentalist Islam, it made common cause with Iran’s anti-imperialist liberal intelligentsia, who resented American meddling in Iran. Traumas in Khamenei’s personal history also shape his worldview. While working underground, he was repeatedly arrested for his antigovernment agitations by the Shah’s secret police (SAVAK) and endured torture and solitary confinement. Those who know Khamenei personally have speculated that the roots of his hatred toward Israel and the U.S. go back to this period, since SAVAK was widely believed to have received assistance from the CIA and Mossad.
When Grand Ayatollah Khomeini returned in triumph in 1979, having overthrown the Shah, his disciple was catapulted from anonymity. Khamenei was delivering a speech on June 27, 1981, in a Tehran mosque, when a bomb hidden in a tape recorder exploded. According to his official website, “The right side of his body was full of shrapnel and pieces of radio.” Khamenei’s right hand was no longer functional. “I won’t need the hand,” he claims to have replied. “It would suffice if my brain and tongue work.” Since then he has been forced to do everything, include write, with his left hand. An Islamic Republic political insider once told me Khamenei’s contempt for his opponents is refreshed every morning “when he struggles to wash his ass with one hand.”
The cultlike Marxist-Islamist organization that was blamed for the bomb, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, now promotes regime change from exile. It has minimal support but deep pockets and has together paid Trump associates John Bolton and Rudy Giuliani hundreds of thousands of dollars in speaking fees.
Khamenei became an Ayatollah by shortcut. When Khomeini died in 1989, shortly after agreeing to a cease-fire to end the brutal eight-year war with Iraq, there was no clear successor. Then speaker of the parliament Rafsanjani claimed that Khomeini’s dying wish was for Khamenei to succeed him, and made it happen. “I am an individual with many faults and shortcomings,” Khamenei said in his inaugural speech, “and truly a minor seminarian.” In the demanding hierarchy of Shi’ite Islam, he had the clerical equivalent of a master’s degree (hojjat al-Eslam).
He was made an Ayatollah overnight, but, lacking the respect of the seminary, instead sought the legitimacy of the barracks. Khamenei cultivated the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), selecting its top cadres, and shuffling them every several years to prevent them from establishing independent power bases. The checkered IRGC scarf Khamenei wears around his neck signals a symbiotic relationship: politically expedient for Khamenei and financially expedient for the Guards, who have become a dominant economic force in the theocracy they defend. Between banking, construction, smuggling and other nebulous enterprises, the IRGC, one study estimates, now accounts for one-third of the Iranian economy.
Iran, which is publicly edging toward resuming its nuclear program, will likely always want to be a screwdriver turn away from having atomic weapons. But for now it has been doing well without them. Khamenei is likely the only leader in today’s Middle East who can inspire people, many of whom are not even Iranian citizens, to go out and kill–and potentially die–for him. It’s a major reason Iran’s regional proxies have consistently outmatched their opponents, as the Islamic Republic moved to exploit the opportunities created by the U.S. in Iraq and the power vacuums created by the Arab uprisings. The Arab countries in which Tehran wields the most influence–Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen–are engulfed in civil strife and ruled by weak, embattled central governments.
At the same time, Iran is the only nation in the world simultaneously fighting three cold wars–with Israel, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Khamenei manages those conflicts with two crucial tools: Qasem Soleimani, the charismatic commander of IRGC operations abroad, is Khamenei’s sword. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in contrast, is his shield, deflecting Western economic and political pressure. Soleimani deals with foreign armies, Zarif with foreign ministries.
And the 80 million Iranians? Khamenei has shown himself willing to subject them to indefinite economic hardship rather than hold his nose, swallow his pride and do a deal with the U.S. His insensitivity–his own brother, a reformist cleric, was once beaten by a hard-liner mob–has allowed Khamenei to play a weak hand strongly. Trump, hypersensitive to his domestic political fortunes, has played a strong hand weakly.
Trump’s warm interactions with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un are understood by Tehran as evidence that pageantry and flattery are higher priorities for the U.S. President than nuclear nonproliferation and human rights. Yet Khamenei is too proud, and dogmatic, to flatter Trump. If Tehran ever does come to the table, another difference presents new obstacles. Trump prefers public spectacles about broad topics, while Khamenei favors covert discussions on narrow ones.
But then Trump faces re-election in 13 months. Khamenei serves for life. Once again, no successor is in sight. But the shape the Islamic Republic has assumed on his watch, morphing from a clerical autocracy into a military autocracy, suggests the IRGC will play a much more overt role in Iran’s politics, on the lines of Pakistan’s or Egypt’s militaries.
For now, however, the current game of chicken between the U.S. and Iran remains a test of wills between two proud, elderly men. The consequences of their actions will long outlive both.
Contact us at editors@time.com.
This appears in the October 14, 2019 issue of TIME.

As Protests Explode, Iraq Must Get Serious About Reform
Bilal Wahab/The Washington Institute/October 05/2019
The public’s demands are just and their patience is all but gone, so Baghdad needs to get on with the hard work of opening up the economy and providing critical services before the violence spirals out of control.
While Washington focuses on getting Baghdad to rein in militias and end its dependency on Iranian energy, Iraqi citizens have been seething about other matters. Fueled by anger at the government’s rampant corruption and failure to deliver services or jobs, a series of spontaneous, leaderless protests erupted in Baghdad on October 1 and spread to a number of towns in central and southern Iraq. Initially nonviolent, the demonstrations quickly drew lethal fire from security forces, which only enraged the protestors and increased their numbers. By week’s end, casualties had reached sixty-five dead and over a thousand wounded, including security personnel. The government crackdown also included an Internet blackout and curfews, which protestors promptly defied. The unrest could escalate further unless Baghdad presents credible pathways to providing employment and cleaning up corruption, areas that the United States can help with.
SYSTEM FAILURE
Iraq seemingly cannot deliver good governance. With post-Saddam leaders putting a premium on ethnosectarian representation and leaving state institutions to wither, the government has become a fractured entity with as many as 263 registered political parties. Its revenue-sharing/patronage system is too rife with abuses to drive effective economic policy, creating a vicious cycle: parties who made it into government via early elections have used their power to grant jobs and contracts to their supporters, aiming to secure votes in the next election. Meanwhile, wealth remains concentrated within the government—Iraq’s sole major export is oil, which accounts for 92 percent of the budget.
Such a system, while good at doling out transactional perks to party elites, has failed to provide the rest of the population with services, infrastructure, or jobs. Take the 2019 budget of $111.8 billion, which represents a 45 percent increase over 2018—more than half of it will go to public wages and pensions, eating away at the non-oil investment spending needed to develop a private sector. After a parade of such governments since 2003, the system seems to have run its course. There are only so many government jobs, and Iraq’s public sector is already among the world’s most bloated. Hence the bleak cry of one protestor this week: “We don’t want parties, we want a country to live in.”
Iraq’s democratic system may be failing as well. Many citizens believe that the isolated political elites are rigging the electoral system to stay in power, using their media outlets, business interests, and foreign connections to ensure their indistinguishable candidates keep winning. One poll indicated that only one in five Iraqis believe their country is still a democracy. As a result, voter turnout has steadily decreased, from 80 percent in 2005 to 44.5 percent in 2018, while protests have become seasonal affairs.
The latest outburst of public outrage was also triggered by the nationalist sentiment that has grown since the defeat of the Islamic State. The younger post-Saddam generation is proud of the army’s victory over the terrorists and the subsequent return of calm to most cities. Thus, when Prime Minister Adil Abdulmahdi announced earlier this week that he had removed the war’s most popular military figure, Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, this sentiment boiled over. A fearless commander who spearheaded the battle for Mosul’s liberation and stayed on to help lead the elite Counter Terrorism Service, Saadi is the epitome of Iraqi national pride: he is Shia, but popular with Sunnis, and he rose through the ranks without relying on political patronage. His demotion brought all of the public’s simmering anger about the rigged system to the surface.
In addition, the younger, web-connected generation knows that it makes little sense for such a rich country to have so many poor people, shabby roads, dilapidated hospitals, and broken schools. Thus, when security personnel use water cannons to forcibly disperse a peaceful protest by jobseekers with graduate degrees, the resultant rage is hardly surprising. Many are also uneasy about the rise of certain militias within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which played a laudable role in saving the country from the Islamic State but are now becoming part of a new, more dangerous network that has accelerated corruption and openly challenged state authority.
Like his predecessors, the prime minister is more focused on pinpointing who to blame for the protests rather than fixing the problems that sparked them. Because the demonstrators are mainly young Shia fed up with the Shia representatives who failed them, Abdulmahdi seems inclined to fall back on contradictory conspiracy theories: one accusing Saudi Arabia and the United States of fomenting the protests, another blaming Iran and its local proxies. Such paranoia will only cripple his efforts to carry out the serious reforms his public is demanding.
HIGH STAKES
Unless the government reverses its heavy-handed approach, the protests will intensify, with potentially disquieting ramifications at home and abroad. For one thing, the domestic unrest could make it more difficult for Baghdad to do its part in warding off regional flare-ups that could draw Iraq into war. Keenly aware that Iran’s recent actions might spark conflict with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and/or the United States, Iraqi leaders have deployed energetic diplomacy to reassure the international community that they will do more to bring Iranian-backed Shia militias under control.
Also troubling is the fact that Iraq’s history offers ample precedent for a strongman or cabal to mount a coup in the face of public disorder. One theory is that Saadi was demoted in part to stymie such a possibility, given his outsize popularity. Yet much of the officer corps is still politicized and far from united. Moreover, potential coup leaders would either have to confront the PMF or partner with them, both of which would be problematic—the former option would cause a civil war, while the latter would further empower the militias. Many Iraqis yearn for decisive leadership even at the expense of democracy, but such a leader might revert to foreign adventurism in order to divert attention from domestic problems.
The PMF have stayed on the sidelines of the protests so far, leaving the riot police and SWAT teams to battle with protesters. The government’s response is causing it to lose hearts and minds with brutal efficiency. Some PMF factions might consider facing off against these security forces and presenting themselves as saviors. Traditionally, Iraq’s militias were armed wings of established political parties, but today’s most influential militias (e.g., Asaib Ahl al-Haq; Kataib Hezbollah) are free-floating entities that aspire for greater political and economic power of their own.
If the militias manage to woo the protest movement, they would notch a big win for Tehran’s goal of deepening Iranian influence and forcing the United States out of the country. This in turn would heighten the risks for Iraq’s neighbors. Iran has lost much of the Iraqi street, but it still has sway with the country’s political elite. Clearly, though, its proxies would have to grapple with Iraqi public discontent and politics at some point down the road.
THE NEED FOR REFORM
Even if the current protests fizzle, they are almost certain to return given the terrible state of Iraq’s governance and economy. Prime Minister Abdulmahdi’s task is obvious: to undertake serious reform efforts toward a clean, accountable government that delivers services and jobs. Iraqis are literally ready to die for good governance. Yet violence begets violence, and the situation could spiral beyond the government’s ability to remedy the crisis through reform. The current protests already appear to be the most serious since 2003.
So far, the prime minister has chosen to band-aid the problems with government benefits. Soon, however, he will need to channel the public’s demands, stand up to entrenched political interests, and take credible action on reforms. His cabinet is perhaps the best equipped yet to deliver on this front given its technocratic background. Shia leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani bought him some time earlier today by calling for reform rather than the government’s resignation. Muqtada al-Sadr, however, called for new elections.
Washington has limited means to shape events at this point, but it can still play a useful part by quietly advising the prime minister and other key leaders. Public messaging would be less useful. Instead, U.S. officials should privately but forcefully press Baghdad to exercise strict control over the security forces. The high number of casualties this week will only add to the government’s enormous trust deficit. One firm step in the right direction would be to announce punishments for any security personnel who ignore the prime minister’s orders for restraint, and to investigate the murders of activists involved in the Basra protests of summer 2018.
Iraq has received years of sound foreign advice on economic reform. The failure of successive governments to follow through stems not from a lack of good counsel, but from a lack of political will—and, often as not, corruption. The protestors’ demands are just, and their patience is all but gone. Iraq’s leadership needs to say, loud and clear, “We hear you,” and then get on with the hard work of assembling a viable agenda for opening up the economy, fostering a real private sector to generate job growth, and prioritizing critical services.
*Bilal Wahab is the Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Putting ‘Heroic Flexibility’ Aside
Omer Carmi/The Washington Institute/October 05/2019
Khamenei’s latest high-profile speech may indicate his growing confidence that Iran can cope with U.S. pressure and set a high bar for resuming talks.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s annual speech at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leadership gathering is closely analyzed by Iran watchers for good reason. As with his yearly Nowruz speech, he often uses the IRGC event as an occasion to signal domestic and foreign audiences about his approach to international affairs. Most famously, his 2013 speech—delivered just weeks before Tehran reached an interim nuclear agreement with the P5+1—noted that he was not against “proper and reasonable moves in diplomacy,” declaring that this type of “heroic flexibility” is “necessary and good in certain circumstances.” After months of inconsistent messages from the Supreme Leader, many in Iran and abroad saw this as his implicit thumbs-up for the government to negotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Six years have passed since that compromise, and the Supreme Leader had a more aggressive message to deliver this time around. Most of his October 2 speech focused on recounting the IRGC’s achievements and offering old and new ideas for increasing its potential—an ominous subject given the degree to which IRGC elements and their proxies have helped destabilize the Middle East so far. And when talking about the ongoing crisis with the United States and the prospects for new talks, Khamenei reiterated the view he has expressed in recent months—namely, that Washington’s “maximum pressure” policy is destined to fail. Far from bringing Iran to its knees, he argued, U.S. policy is only inflicting “problems” on America.
SCUTTLING ROUHANI AND MACRON’S UN INITIATIVE
The night before the Supreme Leader’s IRGC address, Politico reported that French president Emmanuel Macron had nearly brokered a compromise agreement between President Trump and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani during the recent UN General Assembly meetings, only for Tehran to pull out and refuse the offer. Rouhani referred to Macron’s plan in a cabinet meeting held shortly before Khamenei’s speech, explaining that the French proposal—which allegedly included the removal of all U.S. sanctions imposed since 2017—“was based on our principles,” which he described as eliminating U.S. sanctions and allowing “Iran’s commercial activities to happen freely.” He blamed Washington for the proposal’s failure, saying it fell apart because of inconsistencies in U.S. positions. He then promised he would be ready for “any kind of self-sacrifice” in order to preserve the nation’s rights—his version of Khamenei’s “heroic flexibility.”
During his own speech a few hours later, Khamenei claimed that Europe’s attempts to arrange a meeting between the presidents were part of a U.S. plot to create a “symbolic image of an Iranian surrender.” Indeed, despite their mutual criticism of Washington, it is not clear if Khamenei and Rouhani are on the same page regarding the timetable or terms for new talks. Ever since the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA last year, the Supreme Leader has repeatedly lashed out at Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, accusing them of being fooled by the Americans during the original nuclear talks and arguing that Iran should not have negotiated with the Obama administration in the first place. If Khamenei did order the government to reject Macron’s proposal, it would hardly be the first time—for example, witness his scuttling of a deal that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad bargained with the United States, France, and Russia in 2009, which would have shipped out most of Iran’s low-enriched uranium in exchange for reactor fuel.
RESISTANCE AS A NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
One thing Rouhani and Khamenei do seem to agree on is that Iranian “resistance” against the United States and Europe has improved the country’s leverage in negotiating the framework of future negotiations. As Rouhani recently put it, “nobody would have come to meet us in New York” if Iran had not taken confrontational measures such as shooting down a U.S. drone earlier this year and advancing the nuclear program.
Likewise, recent editorials in the weekly magazine published by Khamenei’s office have highlighted the need to further improve Tehran’s position before recommencing talks, explaining that it must not negotiate from a position of weakness. Accordingly, they argue, “today is not the time” to go back to the table.
Following this line of thought, Khamenei addressed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran during his October 2 speech, ordering AEOI officials to continue reducing the country’s commitment to the nuclear deal until “we reach the desired results.” Iran has already taken three steps that either threaten or violate the JCPOA: exceeding the amount of low-enriched uranium it is permitted to store; increasing its level of enrichment beyond 3.67 percent; and restarting some of its advanced centrifuge R&D. According to the AEOI, the regime will take a fourth step in early November, which may include resuming enrichment at the heavily protected Fordow mountain facility.
A similar mindset has been evident in the regime’s rhetoric about regional “resistance.” Earlier this week, Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani appeared on Khamenei’s website for his first-ever one-on-one video interview, where he glorified the “victories” Iran and its allies have achieved against Israel and the United States over the years. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was interviewed as well, and expounded the same themes. For their part, IRGC leaders used their annual gathering to emphasize the power of resistance and warn that any attack on Iran would be met with a fierce response, with no limit in magnitude or targets. Khamenei then urged them to carry resistance beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. “Sometimes the country’s strategic depth is even more important than the most urgent needs,” he said, lashing out at Iranians who chant “no to Gaza, no to Lebanon” when criticizing the regime’s foreign interventions.
A “NORMAL” COUNTRY OR A REVOLUTIONARY ONE?
As in the past, Khamenei’s greatest concern about engaging with the United States seems to lie in the implications that such outreach might hold for Iran’s identity and the nature of “the revolution.” According to his IRGC speech, Washington is adamant that Iran give up its revolutionary character and become a “normal state” that conforms with the American global order.
Perhaps aware of what it may take to keep resisting such change, Khamenei finished his speech on an optimistic note, seemingly hoping to convince the public that all will be well if they can just keep enduring U.S. pressure for a while longer. After claiming the economy is growing in a way that “will gradually impact the people’s lives,” he stated that Washington’s current policy is only a short-term tactical problem. He even argued that U.S. pressure will strategically help Iran in the end by breaking the country’s reliance on oil revenues—a goal that the government has never been able to meet on its own.
Tehran’s biggest source for optimism may be its belief that Washington and Europe are eager to resume negotiations. Rouhani highlighted this point in his cabinet speech, and Khamenei’s website has emphasized how President Trump keeps asking to open talks only to be rejected again and again by the Supreme Leader. This perception may lead Tehran to set a higher bar for reentering talks, and further convince it that the resistance strategy is working.
*Omer Carmi is vice president of intelligence at the Israeli cybersecurity firm Sixgill. Previously, he was a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute and led IDF analytical and research efforts pertaining to the Middle East.

Turkey: Ergodan Has Badly Overplayed His Hand in the Khashoggi Affair
Con Coughlin/Gatestone Institute/October 05/2019
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14956/turkey-ergodan-has-badly-overplayed-his-hand-in
Mr Erdogan, who has been the main driving force behind efforts to cause the Saudis maximum discomfort, now has an abundance of problems of his own, challenges which could spell the end of his 16-years in charge. After Mr Erdogan's Islamist AKP party lost badly in last April's mayoral election for control of Istanbul, the Turkish leader now finds himself trying desperately to salvage Turkey's battered economy, where the currency is in free fall, foreign debts remain vast, and inflation and joblessness are alarmingly high.
Many Turks blame their country's plight on Mr Erdogan's obsession with pursuing his radical Islamist agenda, which includes supporting groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Many prefer him to concentrate instead on addressing their domestic concerns, a view the Turkish president would be well-advised to take on board if he intends to remain in power.
If Mr Erdogan's aim throughout this process was to cause the Saudi Crown Prince maximum embarrassment, the ploy has failed miserably.
A year after the brutal murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi, attempts by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to exploit the controversy to boost his own political standing have back-fired.
Ever since Mr Khashoggi was murdered moments after entering the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul in October last year to obtain documentation for his forthcoming marriage, Mr Erdogan has skilfully exploited the incident to cause maximum embarrassment to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, whom he regards as one of his major regional rivals.
Ankara has been at loggerheads with Riyadh ever since the Muslim Brotherhood, a key ally of Mr Erdogan, came to power in Egypt in 2012, a move bitterly resisted by the Saudis, who regard the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation.
Indeed, one of the reasons the Saudis targeted Mr Khashoggi in the first place was because of his close links with the Brotherhood, as well as his close relationship with Qatar, the Gulf state that is bitterly opposed to the Saudi royal family and is one of the Brotherhood's most important backers.
Khashoggi's gruesome fate was very much the consequence of this complex web of bitter regional rivalries between prominent Muslim leaders, so that when a team of Saudi assassins carried out their plot to silence Khashoggi's high profile criticism of the Saudi regime -- his columns regularly appeared in the Washington Post, among other prominent publications -- Mr Erdogan responded by doing everything in his power to orchestrate an international campaign denouncing the Saudi crown prince.
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the Khashoggi killing, the Turkish authorities oversaw a steady drip-feed of revelations about the murder that were acquired as a result of numerous bugging devices that had been placed in the Saudi consulate by Turkish intelligence.
Turkish efforts to maintain their anti-Saudi public relations offensive have continued right up until the first anniversary of his death, which fell earlier this week, with new, even more graphic, details of how Mr Khashoggi met his end being made available to Western media organisations such as the BBC, which this week broadcast a programme claiming to have the "secret" tapes of Khashoggi's last moments.
If Mr Erdogan's aim throughout this process was to cause the Saudi Crown Prince maximum embarrassment, then, to judge by the way Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler is conducting himself, the ploy has failed miserably.
There was, of course, much speculation in the immediate aftermath of the affair that MbS, as the Saudi Crown Prince is universally known, might be removed from his position over claims that he was personally responsible for ordering the murder, which was very much the line being pushed by Mr Erdogan in the Western media.
A number of administrative changes were indeed made to the running of the Saudi royal court. But as no conclusive evidence has been produced to link MbS directly to the killing, his position as the key figure in the Saudi regime appears undiminished. Moreover, his candid acceptance, in an interview with the PBS network aired this week, that ultimate responsibility for the Khashoggi killing rests with him because the murder happened on "my watch" appears to have drawn a line under the affair so far as most Western governments are concerned, with the US, as well as most European countries, slowly adopting a "business as usual" approach to their dealings with the Saudis.
By contrast, Mr Erdogan, who has been the main driving force behind efforts to cause the Saudis maximum discomfort, now has an abundance of problems of his own, challenges which could spell the end of his 16-years in charge. After Mr Erdogan's Islamist AKP party lost badly in last April's mayoral election for control of Istanbul, the Turkish leader now finds himself trying desperately to salvage Turkey's battered economy, where the currency is in free fall, foreign debts remain vast, and inflation and joblessness are alarmingly high.
Many Turks blame their country's plight on Mr Erdogan's obsession with pursuing his radical Islamist agenda, which includes supporting groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Many prefer him to concentrate instead on addressing their domestic concerns, a view the Turkish president would be well-advised to take on board if he intends to remain in power.
*Con Coughlin is the Telegraph's Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2019 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

Who's Afraid of Scandinavia's Crime Statistics?
Judith Bergman/Gatestone Institute/October 05/2019
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14911/scandinavia-crime
"Most immigrants are not criminals, but when the immigrant population is overrepresented in almost every crime category, then there is a problem that we must dare to talk about." — Jon Helgheim, immigration policy spokesman for the Norwegian party Fremskrittspartiet (FrP).
"In the more than thirty years that the surveys cover, one tendency is clearer than all others, namely that the proportion of the total amount of crimes committed by persons with a foreign background is steadily increasing...." — Det Goda Samhället ("The Good Society"), Invandring och brottslighet – ett trettioårsperspektiv ("Immigration and crime – a thirty-year perspective"). All statistics for the report were supplied by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention.
Unless Scandinavian political leaders begin actively to engage with the facts described by crime statistics, the problems are only going to become more intractable -- to the point where they might not be solvable at all.
In Sweden, discussing who is behind the current crime epidemic in the country has long been taboo. Such a statistic has only been published twice by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), in 1996 and in 2005. In 2005, when BRÅ published its last report on the subject, "Crime among people born in Sweden and abroad," it contained the following note:
"Critics have argued that new results can be inflated, taken out of context and misinterpreted and lead to reinforcing 'us and them' thinking. There is every reason to take such risks seriously. However, BRÅ's assessment is... that a knowledge-based picture of immigrant crime is better than one based on guesses and personal perceptions. The absence of current facts about the crime among the foreign-born and their children facilitates the creation and consolidation of myths. If crime is a problem in certain groups of the foreign-born, then the problems do not disappear unless you highlight them and speak openly about them. A correct picture of the extent and development of the problems should instead be the best basis for analyzing conditions and improving the ability of all residents to function well in Sweden, regardless of ethnic origin."
Back then, apparently, the authorities still appreciated facts.
Twelve years later, in January 2017, however, Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson flatly refused to publish statistics about the ethnic origins of criminals in Sweden. According to Johansson:
"[Studies] have been done both in Sweden in the past, and there are countless international studies that all show much the same thing: That minority groups are often overrepresented in crime statistics, but when you remove socio-economic factors, it [the overrepresentation] almost completely disappears. So the political conclusions that I need to make, I can already make with existing international and Swedish studies."
Johansson, who in addition to being Minister of Justice also serves as Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy, was not alone in his views. When Swedish Television asked the political parties in the Swedish parliament, the majority said that they did not think such a statistic was needed.
This summer, however, in the continued absence of any forthcoming public statistics on such an extremely important public issue, a private foundation, Det Goda Samhället ("The Good Society") took it upon itself to produce these statistics in a new report, Invandring och brottslighet – ett trettioårsperspektiv ("Immigration and crime – a thirty-year perspective"). All the raw data in it were ordered from and supplied by BRÅ. The raw data from BRÅ can be accessed here.
According to the new report by Det Goda Samhället:
"For the first time now, more crimes -- in absolute terms -- are committed by persons of foreign background than by persons of Swedish origin... The most crime-prone population subgroup are people born [in Sweden] to two foreign-born parents."
The report concludes:
"In the more than thirty years that the surveys cover, one tendency is clearer than all others, namely that the proportion of the total amount of crimes committed by persons with a foreign background is steadily increasing... During the first of the investigated periods, 1985-1989, persons with a foreign background accounted for 31 percent of all crimes. During the period 2013-2017, the figure had risen to 58 percent. Thus, people of Swedish origin now account for less than half, 42 per cent, of the total crime in Sweden, despite constituting 67 per cent of the population surveyed."
In 1996, in its first report on the issue, BRÅ disclosed (p. 40) that, "The general picture from foreign studies of immigrants' children's crime is that they have a higher crime rate than first-generation immigrants. That is not the case in Sweden". According to the new report, it is the case now, and that is perhaps the greatest indictment against Swedish integration policies of the past 30 years: the policies clearly do not work.
Another notable conclusion of the report is the increase in crimes committed by foreign-born non-registered persons in Sweden -- these include illegal immigrants, EU citizens and tourists. The crimes this group has committed have increased from 3% in the period 1985-89 to 13% in 2013-17.
The report has largely been ignored by the Swedish press and political echelons, apart from a few exceptions, such as the local newspapers Göteborgs-Posten and Norrköpings Tidningar.
In Norway, recently, a report about the overrepresentation of immigrants and their descendants in crime statistics was ordered from Statistics Norway, by Fremskrittspartiet (FrP), which forms part of the Norwegian government. "We had known that immigrants are overrepresented in these statistics, but not [by] so much" said FrP immigration policy spokesman Jon Helgheim.
"For example, if we use the unadjusted figures... Afghans and Somalis are charged five times more for violence and abuse than Norwegians. Adjusted for age and gender, the overrepresentation is almost triple... Most immigrants are not criminals, but when the immigrant population is overrepresented in almost every crime category, then there is a problem that we must dare to talk about".
According to Dagbladet, FrP has, for years, been calling for detailed statistics on crimes perpetrated by immigrants and children of immigrants. In 2015, the party commissioned data from Statistics Norway, but the agency refused to compile crime statistics based on immigrants' country of origin.
Two years later, Statistics Norway published research showing that immigrants were strongly overrepresented in the crime statistics, but the report was not detailed enough, according to FrP, which ordered a new report, now available. According to Dagbladet, the new statistics "show that immigrants from non-Western countries are overrepresented in 65 out of 80 crime categories. In 2017, 7.1 per cent of Norway's population were immigrants from a non-western country."
According to Dagbladet, the new statistics also show that, "The largest overrepresentation [is] in violence and abuse in close relationships."
"Non-Western immigrants and their descendants are charged with family violence eight times as often as the rest of the population. In total, 443 persons were charged per year on average during the period 2015-2017, [and] 35 per cent (155) of those charged were from a non-western country or had a non-Western background. Only half of those charged with abuse in close relationships were what SSB [the statistical bureau] calls the rest of the population... Africa, Asia, Latin America, Oceania except Australia and Europe outside the EU and the EEA are considered non-Western countries."
According to Dagbladet, men from the Palestinian Authority and Somalia are charged with violence and abuse three times more often than Norwegian men.
FrP has been accused by its political opponents of ordering these statistics specifically for municipal elections that took place in Norway on September 9, 2019. Dagbladet asked Helgheim whether using these statistics was "cynical." Helgheim responded:
"No, it's not cynical at all. This is very relevant for the citizens to know something about. It would be a failure of FrP not to do everything we can to inform voters of what are realities and facts. Our opponents constantly criticize us for pulling the immigration card... I can find no explanations other than that those who do not want this to be known also do not want to know about the consequences of immigration to Norway."
In Denmark, unlike Sweden and Norway, the publication of such statistics in itself is fairly uncontroversial. The Danish statistical bureau, Statistics Denmark, publishes them as a matter of fact every year and they are publicly available to everyone.
According to one of the latest such reports, "Immigrants in Denmark in 2018," as reported by Berlingske Tidende in April:
"The figures show that crime in 2017 was 60% higher among male immigrants and 234% higher in male non-Western descendants than the entire male population. If one takes into account, for example, that many of the descendants are young, and Statistics Denmark does so in the report, the figures are 44% for immigrants and 145% for descendants, respectively. If further corrected, for both age and income, of immigrants and descendants from non-western countries, the figures are 21% and 108%".
As for the nationality of the criminal migrants, Berlingske Tidende reported:
"At the top of the list are male Lebanese who, as far as [their] descendants are concerned, are almost four times as criminal as average men, when [the figures are] adjusted for age. [That is] sharply followed by male descendants from Somalia, Morocco and Syria. The violence index is 351 for descendants from non-western countries. They are 3.5 times more violent than the population as a whole. Descendants from Lebanon have an index of violent crimes of 668 when corrected for age."
Unless Scandinavian political leaders begin actively to engage with the facts that these statistics describe, the problems are only going to become more intractable -- to the point where they might not be solvable at all.
*Judith Bergman, a columnist, lawyer and political analyst, is a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
© 2019 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.

If Iraq descends into chaos, Iran could seize its chance to take control

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed/Arab News/October 05/2019
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/79161/%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%ad%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%ae%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%81-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82-%d9%88/
What is the common denominator between the current situation in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen? Simply put, it is intervention of Iran; which, in all three cases, has been brought about by the chaos that exists in those countries.
The political vacuum and civil war in Lebanon attracted the attention of Tehran, which founded Hezbollah. In Syria, Iran initially extended a helping hand when Bashar Assad’s regime was falling apart, and is now a partner in power. As for Yemen, when Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime collapsed amid the chaos of the Arab Spring, the Iranians pushed the Houthis, a sectarian community with which they were affiliated, to seize power in defiance of international accords about the governance of the country, and its desire to appoint a transitional government and hold elections.
It might now be Iraq’s turn to fall victim to the regime in Tehran. The protests of the past few days have paved the way for chaos, and Iranian forces have amassed in the border region. It is not unlikely that they will use any pretext to occupy the capital, Baghdad. If the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi refuses to let them in, or steps down, the Iranians can count on a majority of votes in the Iraqi Parliament, either from those loyal to or fearful of them.
But would Tehran dare to make this move? The Iranian regime has enough regional experience to know that no internal or external force will defy it. The US, which considers Iraq a strategically important country, has a limited military presence there and little appetite for a fight. Iran aims to use Iraq as leverage to put pressure on Washington, and the region, to lift the economic sanctions that have been imposed, in addition to using Iraqi oil resources to finance its fiscal deficit. On top of that, Iran’s ambitions in Iraq are long-standing; it considers the Arab country its geographical and religious extension and a greater prize than Syria, Lebanon and Yemen combined.
Iran aims to use Iraq as leverage to put pressure on Washington, and the region, to lift the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Tehran.
There is nothing that can scare Iran at the moment. International reactions are both easy to predict, and have been tested by the regime many times.
European countries did nothing about Iranian intelligence’s conspiracy to commit acts of terror on their soil. Germany continues to defend Iran and France is mediating attempts to lift the US sanctions.
Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump does not want to ruin his chances of winning re-election a year from now because of a conflict with Iran, and the Russians are hedging their bets and holding the stick in the middle. Almost all regional powers, including Egypt and Pakistan, are avoiding a confrontation with Iran. Turkey has been defeated in Syria and Saudi Arabia is besieged on multiple fronts.
Iran’s aggressive behavior will, of course, become an international problem in time — even for those trying to make peace with Tehran, such as the EU — but I fear it will be too late for Iraq by then. Iran wants to destroy the Iraqi political system, on the pretext that it was put in place by the US, and replace it by a sectarian theocracy that resembles its own and answers to its supreme leader.
The security and safety of Iraq are important for the stability of the region, and not a single neighboring country wants to sabotage this — except for Iran, which has a hegemony project on which it has been working for the past decade.
Unfortunately, however, Iran is not the only source of the problem. The performance of Iraqi state institutions is not as good as the Iraqi people, who have been anticipating better conditions for decades, wish it to be. The Americans, who bet on the establishment of democratic institutions and sowed the seeds of freedom, have failed to secure for the people a minimum standard of living and security. Instead, some clerics and clans have exploited these democratic institutions and used them to expand their dominance. As a result, corruption has become a widespread problem in the country.
Iraq now faces a difficult test because spontaneous demonstrations will not fix the problems the way the Iraqi people hope. In fact, they may jeopardize the stability of the state and provide an opportunity for forces lying in wait to take advantage and seize power.
• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel, and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.
Twitter: @aalrashed