English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For May 06/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Bible Quotations For today
The loaves and two fish Miracle
John 06/01-15: “After this Jesus went to the other side of the Sea of Galilee, also called the Sea of Tiberias. A large crowd kept following him, because they saw the signs that he was doing for the sick. Jesus went up the mountain and sat down there with his disciples. Now the Passover, the festival of the Jews, was near. When he looked up and saw a large crowd coming towards him, Jesus said to Philip, ‘Where are we to buy bread for these people to eat?’He said this to test him, for he himself knew what he was going to do.Philip answered him, ‘Six months’ wages would not buy enough bread for each of them to get a little.’One of his disciples, Andrew, Simon Peter’s brother, said to him, ‘There is a boy here who has five barley loaves and two fish. But what are they among so many people?’ Jesus said, ‘Make the people sit down.’ Now there was a great deal of grass in the place; so they sat down, about five thousand in all. Then Jesus took the loaves, and when he had given thanks, he distributed them to those who were seated; so also the fish, as much as they wanted. When they were satisfied, he told his disciples, ‘Gather up the fragments left over, so that nothing may be lost.’So they gathered them up, and from the fragments of the five barley loaves, left by those who had eaten, they filled twelve baskets. When the people saw the sign that he had done, they began to say, ‘This is indeed the prophet who is to come into the world.’When Jesus realized that they were about to come and take him by force to make him king, he withdrew again to the mountain by himself.

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on May 05-06/2020
MoPH: Six Sierra Leone passengers have tested positive for coronavirus
6 Virus Cases among Sierra Leone Evacuees as Lebanese Return from Syria
Lebanese Expat Tests Positive for Coronavirus
Hassan Says Vigilance is Key to Counter Second Wave of COVID-19
U.N. Backs Lebanon in Economic Crisis, Call for Global Help
UN Security Council calls for international support for Lebanon after IMF bail-out request/Sunniva Rose/The National/May 05/2020
Higher Defense Council Recommends Lockdown Extension
Govt. Extends 'Mobilization' to May 24, State to Assume Management of Mobile Carriers
Aoun: Quick Measures Must Be Taken to Stop Fast-Rising Prices
Hitti summons German ambassador over Hezbollah ban
Diab Says Berri Ties 'Excellent', Denies Seeking 'Orthodox Post'
Diab chairs meeting to discuss financial plan in presence of ambassadors: We look forward to your active support for our efforts
Development and Liberation bloc meets under Berri's chairmanship, highlights government's responsibility in stopping deterioration in living conditions
Msharrafieh: We will not allow exploitation of people
Strong Lebanon welcomes president's consultations with Heads of blocs, stresses government should focus on stimulating economy
Mikati apologizes for not participating in Baabda’s meeting on Wednesday
Lebanese living in Syria return through Al-Masnaa point
COVID-19 shall be regarded as force majeure: Judiciary
IMF Chief Says Talks with Lebanon on Reforms to Begin Soon
Bassil Meets with Berri in Ain el-Tineh
10 Oil Firms Sued as 4 Arrest Warrants Issued in Counterfeit Fuel Case
AUB announces potential decisions for institution’s continuity amid collapsing economy/Christy-Belle Geha/Annahar/May 05/ 2020
Lebanese PM and IMF head discuss country's worst economic crisis in three decades/Massoud A Derhally/The National/May 05/2020
Lebanon simply cannot afford to watch its two main pillars of stability to crumble/Michael Young/The National/May 05/2020
On Hassan Diab Being the Sunni Emile Lahoud/Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
Lebanon’s latest reform-for-support plan: Intentions and implementation may diverge significantly/Jeffrey Feltman/Brookings/May 05/2020
Hezbollah versus Lebanon’s Central Bank governor/James Wilson/eureporter/May 05/2020
Salvation Army?/Aram Nerguizian/Carnegie MEC/May 05/2020
Banning Hezbollah: A welcome and overdue step/Jerusalem Post Editorial/May 05/2020
Israeli Ambassador to the UN Danny Danon: No need for a UNIFIL paralyzed by Hezbollah/Lahav Harkov/Jerusalem Post/May 05/2020
Hezbollah Takes Aim at Lebanon’s Central Bank and Telecom Sector/Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/May 04/2020

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on May 05-06/2020
Israeli missiles target Syrian military bases and 'chemical research lab'
Israeli officials claim Iran pulling out of Syria amid intensified airstrike
Iran's Mahan Air accused of defying travel bans, 'spreading coronavirus' in the Middle East
Human rights lawyers call for arrest of Assad’s cousin following reports he fled to UAE
The day after annexation: Israel, Palestine and the one-state reality/Hugh Lovatt/The New Arab/May 05/2020

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on May 05-06/2020
Iran Is Airlifting Supplies to Venezuela. The Trump Administration Should Move to Block It./Emanuele Ottolenghi/FDD/May 04/2020
A Large Majority Of US House Members Call For Extension Of Iran Arms Embargo/Radio Farda/May 05/2020
Iran Changes the Rules of the Game with Satellite Launch/Munqith Dagher/ the Washington Institute/May 04/2020
The U.S.-Iraqi Relationship Is Coming to a Head—and That’s a Good Thing/John Hannah & Maseh Zarif/FDD/May 05/2020
Chinese Trade With Persian Gulf Region Grows Despite Pandemic/Saeed Ghasseminejad/FDD/May 05/2020
What Russia is up to in Syria/Lamont Colucci/The Hill/May 05/2020
Europe Prepares for More Lockdown Easing as Virus Hopes Rise/Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 05/2020
Updated UK Virus Toll Becomes World's Second Highest/Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 05/2020
COVID-19 and Living with Canada's PM Trudeau 'Not Easy,' Says Wife/Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 05/2020
Defense officials: Iran pulling out of Syria as Israel pummels its forces there/Judahari Gross/Times Of Israel/May 05/2020
Egypt: Missing Christian Mother Reappears as Pious Muslim in Video/Raymond Ibrahim/Coptic Solidarity/May 05/2020
Trump Finds Time to Start Wooing Putin Again/Eli Lake/Bloomberg/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
Dinner at the Makhloufs/Robert Ford/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
A Solution to the COVID-19 Liability Problem/Noah Feldman/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on May 05-06/2020
MoPH: Six Sierra Leone passengers have tested positive for coronavirus
NNA/May 05/2020
The Ministry of Public Health said in a statement that "six COVID-19 cases have been confirmed among the passengers on board the flight that arrived from Sierra Leone on Monday evening.""Accordingly, the infected returnees will be admitted to the hospital, while strict home quarantine measures will be imposed on the remaining passengers, knowing that they will be followed up on daily by the ministry, and whoever shows any symptoms will be sent straight to the hospital for re-testing," according to the ministry's statement. As for the flights that arrived yesterday from Yerevan, Riyadh, Kiev, Warsaw, London, and the flight that arrived the day Sunday from Dubai, no infections were recorded aboard those planes, and the results of all passengers came negative.

6 Virus Cases among Sierra Leone Evacuees as Lebanese Return from Syria
Naharnet/May 05/2020
Six of the Lebanese evacuated Monday from Sierra Leone have tested positive for coronavirus, the Health Ministry said on Tuesday. “The infected cases will be transferred to hospital while strict home quarantine will be imposed on those who tested negative, knowing that they will be followed up by the Ministry on daily basis and those who show any symptoms will be referred to hospital to repeat the test,” the Ministry said in a statement. The expats who arrived from Yerevan, Riyadh, Kiev, Warsaw, London and Dubai over the past two days have all tested negative, the Ministry added. Lebanese expats in Syria meanwhile started returning Tuesday to Lebanon via the al-Masnaa border crossing. “According to the mechanism in place, the names of those seeking to return are being registered at the Lebanese embassy under the supervision of the Lebanese General Security directorate,” the National News Agency said. A team from the Lebanese Health Ministry is examining the returnees and any person with symptoms will be referred to the President Elias Hrawi Hospital, NNA added. “All returnees will meanwhile be distributed on hotels in central Bekaa pending the release of the results of PCR tests,” the agency said. A new batch of Lebanese returnees will meanwhile arrive from Syria on Thursday. Earlier in the day, the Health Ministry said a Lebanese who returned from Guinea tested positive for coronavirus. Tuesday's seven confirmed cases among the evacuated expats raise the country's overall tally to 747 – among them 25 deaths and 206 recoveries.

Lebanese Expat Tests Positive for Coronavirus
Naharnet/May 05/2020
A Lebanese national repatriated two days ago from Guinea tested positive for coronavirus on Tuesday, media reports said. The total number of cases rose to 741 in Lebanon with Tuesday’s case. The Health Ministry said no fatalities were recorded.Lebanon has been on lockdown since mid-March to rein in the COVID-19 respiratory illness, which has infected 740 and killed 25 people in the Mediterranean country, according to official figures.

Hassan Says Vigilance is Key to Counter Second Wave of COVID-19
Naharnet/May 05/2020
Amid concerns of a second wave of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic in Lebanon, Health Minister Hamad Hassan on Tuesday urged vigilance telling people to maintain precautionary measures as key to prevent spread of the virus. “A safe return to normal life is in our hands,” said Hassan in a tweet. “Despite the many catastrophic scenarios about the coronavirus pandemic in its beginning, there is a lot of talk about the second wave. I assure you that just like we won the first battle through awareness and cooperation, we will pass the next challenge through commitment and gradual easing of the general mobilization restrictions, God willing,” stressed Hassan. It is up to the people to decide whether it is a safe return to normal life or not. “A safe return is in our hands,” he emphasized. On Monday, three cases of coronavirus were recorded in Lebanon raising the tally to 740, while the death toll remained at 25. The country has been on lockdown with its air, land and sea ports of entry closed since March 15 as part of a so-called state of general mobilization aimed at confronting the pandemic. Many institutions such as schools and restaurants had been closed prior to that date. The government approved a five-stage plan to reopen the country easing lockdown measures.

U.N. Backs Lebanon in Economic Crisis, Call for Global Help
Associated Press/Naharnet/May 05/2020
The U.N. Security Council on Monday backed Lebanon's efforts to end the country's economic crisis and tackle other challenges including the impact of COVID-19 and called on the international community to help.
The U.N.'s most powerful body took note in a statement after a closed meeting of the "urgent need for the Lebanese authorities to respond to the aspirations of the Lebanese people by implementing meaningful economic reforms" and addressing security, humanitarian and COVID-19 challenges.
Lebanon, one of the most indebted nations in the world, defaulted for the first time in March on its sovereign debt. Anti-government protests that erupted in October subsided during a nationwide lock-down since mid-March to blunt the spread of the coronavirus. Those restrictions are starting to ease.
Last Thursday, the prime minister said he will seek a rescue program from the International Monetary Fund, but protesters rallied again Friday, criticizing the government's handling of the unprecedented crisis that saw the local currency crash, people's savings devastated, and prices and inflation soar.
The Security Council was meeting to discuss implementation of a 2004 resolution that called for the Lebanese government to extend its authority throughout the country and all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to disband. In a report to the council circulated Monday on the resolution's implementation, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also addressed Lebanon's current economic crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.
"As the dire economic and financial situation in Lebanon is now compounded by the adverse impact of COVID-19 on the country's economy, it is all the more urgent that the country's leaders develop and implement the required reforms," he said. The U.N. chief stressed that "measures to prevent, limit and mitigate the impact of the pandemic have to be taken in parallel to the provision of financial and food support to the rapidly increasing numbers of the most vulnerable groups of the population facing dire poverty." Lebanon was engulfed in civil war from 1975-1990, and a U.N. peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL has been in Lebanon since 1978 after Israel invaded parts of southern Lebanon. Since then, there have been major wars in 1982 and in 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah militants which claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people on both sides.
The Security Council statement "recognized the additional challenges posed by the global COVID pandemic, also on the Lebanese economy, and commended the preventive measures taken by UNIFIL in that regard." Guterres' report said Lebanon's government continued efforts to extend the authority of the state throughout the country but Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continue to operate outside government control in violation of the 2004 resolution and the Taif Accords that ended the country's civil war. "Several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control," the U.N. chief said, and "Hezbollah is the most heavily armed militia in the country." Guterres said he continues to urge Lebanon's government and armed forces "to take all measures necessary to prohibit Hezbollah and other armed groups from acquiring weapons and building paramilitary capacity outside the authority of the state." He also urged countries with close times to Hezbollah "to encourage the transformation of the group into a solely civilian political party, as well as its disarmament." The secretary-general warned that Iranian-backed Hezbollah's continued involvement in Syria where it supports President Bashar Assad's government, "carries the risk of entangling Lebanon in regional conflicts and undermining the stability of Lebanon and the region." Guterres and the Security Council expressed concern at recent incidents across the U.N.-drawn Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel.
Germany's deputy U.N. ambassador Jürgen Schulz told the council that "Lebanon is facing an unprecedented challenge" to its political leadership and the country's stability, according to the text of his statement to the closed meeting. He said it was "very good" that the government has adopted a comprehensive economic reform plan and that the its response to the COVID-19 crisis "has been a major achievement in the last two months." "At the same time, many challenges remain and we continue to remain very worried that there is a real risk that the country could drift towards economic and financial collapse and see a prolonged political crisis," Schulz said.

UN Security Council calls for international support for Lebanon after IMF bail-out request
Sunniva Rose/The National/May 05/2020
UN statement came as Hezbollah said it backed the government’s decision to request international help
The UN Security Council has called on the international community to help Lebanon tackle its worst-ever social and economic crisis, days after the government announced it would request an aid package from the IMF. A statement published on Monday followed a Security Council briefing on Lebanon by UN Special Co-ordinator Jan Kubis and Under-Secretary General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix. “The Members of the Security Council expressed support to Lebanon to help it exit the current crisis … and called the international community, including international organisations, to do so,” the statement read. Lebanon officially requested IMF help on Friday, one day after Prime Minister Hassan Diab said his country needed $10 billion (Dh36.7bn) in international support. He said he hoped to find that cash in the $11 billion in soft loans and grants promised two years ago by the international community, including the World Bank, Saudi Arabia, the US and France, at a conference in Paris in April 2018.The funds were never disbursed as the previous government failed to implement the necessary reforms.
In its recovery plan, the government wrote that IMF support would provide “strong backing to the difficult decisions” that it would have to take, which include recovering $10 billion worth of public assets embezzled by officials over 5 years and restructuring the banking sector which has estimated losses of 154 trillion Lebanese pounds, or $44 billion at parallel market exchange rates.
Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio is among the highest in the world, at 176 per cent, while inflation is expected to spike at 53 per cent this year, according to the government’s plan. The crisis has pushed nearly half of the Lebanese people into poverty and caused violent protests across the country since October.
Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanon’s influential Hezbollah party, said in a speech on Monday evening that he was not against Lebanon’s request for IMF assistance as long as the government controlled its implementation.
“We are not in principle against seeking assistance from any party in the world … but we refuse to surrender completely to conditions of the IMF,” he said. In previous speeches, Mr Nasrallah has warned against the influence the US, which considers Hezbollah a terrorist organisation, has over the IMF. He fears the Trump administration through the IMF could try to impose conditions that would go against the party’s interests. The government’s rescue plan, which has caused public friction between the banking sector and Mr Diab, will be discussed by MPs on Wednesday. They will not meet in Parliament as usual but at the presidential palace outside Beirut. Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s Future Movement said it would boycott the meeting after weeks of hostility between his party and the government, which has criticised him and his father, late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, for their bad management of the country’s finances since the end of the civil war in 1990.

Higher Defense Council Recommends Lockdown Extension
Naharnet/May 05/2020
The Higher Defense Council convened at Baabda Palace on Tuesday to tackle the general situation in the country, including an extension of the so-called general mobilization period aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. The meeting was chaired by President Michel Aoun.
The Council recommended extending Lebanon’s lockdown for another two weeks. The Cabinet is set to take the decision in a session Tuesday. The government announced late in April a five-phase plan to reopen the country that has been on lockdown since March 15. The plan to reopen the country on the following days: April 28; May 4, May 11, May 25 and June 6. Physical distancing, precautions and wearing masks in public will be required throughout all stages.Lebanon has been on lockdown since mid-March to rein in the COVID-19 respiratory illness, which has infected 740 and killed 25 people in the Mediterranean country, according to official figures.

Govt. Extends 'Mobilization' to May 24, State to Assume Management of Mobile Carriers
Naharnet/May 05/2020
The government on Tuesday extended the so-called state of general mobilization over coronavirus to May 24, Information Minister Manal Abdul Samad said. “The economic activities that have been allowed to resume can still carry on within the imposed restrictions,” Abdul Samad added after a cabinet session in Baabda. “Prime Minister Hassan Diab stressed that the coronavirus pandemic has not ended until today and that there are fears of an outbreak,” she said. “Should the pandemic spread anew, the rate of infections will be higher and the government will maintain the state of mobilization,” Abdul Samad quoted Diab as saying. Interior Minister Mohammed Fahmi meanwhile announced that the decision to ration the movement of vehicles according to the last digit of their plate numbers (odd/even will still apply during the general mobilization period.
Separately, Cabinet agreed to task the Telecom Ministry with the management of the two mobile carriers and to end cooperation with the Zain and Orascom firms. Economy Minister Raoul Nehme meanwhile announced that Cabinet will hold a session Thursday to discuss the rise in prices, the economic and social crisis and means to alleviate the burdens of firms and institutions.

Aoun: Quick Measures Must Be Taken to Stop Fast-Rising Prices
Naharnet/May 05/2020
President Michel Aoun on Tuesday stressed the need for “quick” and urgent measures to stop the big hike in prices of food commodities. Aoun said the prices of all kinds of goods have gone beyond acceptable, stressing that “urgent and quick measures must be taken to restore order and activate supervision.”His remarks came during a Cabinet session held at Baabda. He said: “Special attention should be paid to proposals submitted to assist the Lebanese in the current difficult circumstances, especially those related to social assistance, exemptions and demands of various kinds of institutions.”
Prices of basic goods have increased massively in some cases by over 60% in Lebanon. In recent days, and in defiance of the ongoing lockdown, Lebanese demonstrators have hit the streets again, railing against a sharp devaluation and stinging price hikes. The exchange rate, long pegged at 1,507 Lebanese pounds to the dollar, has soared to more than 4,000 pounds in recent days. Prices have risen by 55 percent, while 45 percent of the population now lives below the poverty line, according to government estimates.

Hitti summons German ambassador over Hezbollah ban
NNA/May 05/2020
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Nassif Hitti, on Tuesday summoned Germany’s Ambassador to Lebanon, George Berglin, to seek further clarification on the fresh German parliament’s decision to ban Hezbollah activity on its soil.
The German diplomat made clear that Germany’s decision was taken a while ago, “but it has only recently come into force.”“Germany did not classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, but rather prohibited its activities on German territories,” Berglin said. For his part, Minister Hitti capitalized on Lebanon's unwavering stance that Hezbollah comprised an essential political component it Lebanon. “Hezbollah represents a wide segment of the Lebanese people and Parliament,” Hitti added.

Diab Says Berri Ties 'Excellent', Denies Seeking 'Orthodox Post'
Naharnet/May 05/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab announced Tuesday that his relation with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri “has been and will remain excellent,” a day after he met with him in Ain el-Tineh following tensions. Separately, Diab said “better late than never” when asked whether President Michel Aoun's talks with parliamentary leaders over the government's financial plan should have happened prior to its approval in Cabinet. Asked whether he was seeking to “seize control of a Greek Orthodox post,” in reference to the Beirut governor post, the premier said: “Not at all. This is not true.”

Diab chairs meeting to discuss financial plan in presence of ambassadors: We look forward to your active support for our efforts
NNA/May 05/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab chaired a meeting this Tuesday dedicated to presenting the government's comprehensive financial plan that extends over five years. The meeting was attended by high-ranking diplomats and ambassadors of different countries to Lebanon.
PM Diab delivered the following speech:
"Excellences, ladies and gentlemen,
It is my pleasure to welcome you today, now that the government of Lebanon has approved its financial recovery plan, based on which I have sent a request to the IMF, together with the Minister of Finance, to start negotiations and to quickly develop a detailed program to get Lebanon out of the very difficult situation that its people are suffering from.
The Lebanese, as you know, have been deprived from accessing their deposits, and faced with a much appreciated dollar on the parallel market which is eating up their wealth. They are calling for the end of corruption, more efficient public services, a good business environment, and hope for better times in the foreseeable future. Their voices are being heard by the government, and we have pledged to provide them with the necessary reforms as quickly as possible.
The choice in front of us was very simple: Keep doing the same things and see our financial sector collapse, taking with it our people’s money, and killing their hopes in our country as it would be unable to recover from such heavy losses, or put our acts together and come up with a work plan backed by the largest majority, because strong support for reforms is critical internally, but also when dealing with international institutions and bilateral friends. My government immediately decided to quickly put a financial recovery plan as a first milestone on the path of recovery.
The government’s plan provides a clear diagnostic of the situation, and it was publicly welcomed by the multilateral and many bilateral partners. It was also commended by various private financial institutions in the world because of the seriousness of the diagnostic, and of course, something that bold can trigger tough reactions. However, clearly, even the loudest voices did not question the validity of the findings. The plan also integrates long-awaited structural and fiscal reforms, in addition to new suggestions that have to do with recent developments. It intends to provide the Lebanese with a new growth trajectory boosted by the reduction of losses, and to protect Lebanon from potential future shocks, while securing the necessary financing and engaging in a productive economy that secures well-being and quality jobs. It also emphasizes the importance of solid safety nets on the short term to alleviate the burden on the poor and the unemployed. The plan takes into consideration the financing needs, but also the social, the economy, the currency, and critical structural issues for a better work environment.
Of course, the financial recovery plan remains only a plan. And it was designed by everybody around the table of the council of ministers in an effort to secure the strongest support. As you know, consensus has a price, and we know that down the road, we will have to negotiate the details, but we managed to lower this price as much as possible. And our plan integrates many items that have been pending for a very long time, as we did not hesitate to take what was in the pipes on top of new initiatives from our ministers. This should increase popular and political adherence to our program. But again, a plan remains an abstraction if we do not start the implementation of its various components as quickly as possible, and I hereby announce that I have asked all ministers to come up with the texts and projects related to each item in the few coming weeks as we will strive to pass most of the components even before a potential IMF agreement, as we are aware that it will be key in optimizing the support to Lebanon. The plan has already served its purpose, and now is the time for implementation.
Excellences, ladies and gentlemen,
Lebanon is in a critical situation and more than ever in bad need for its friends. In this regard, we look forward to your active participation on the international institutions’ boards to support our efforts. We are only asking for a fair treatment for a country that is facing many devastating crises at the same time, on top of being the largest host for refugees per capita ever, and of facing the COVID-19 consequences. We welcome your suggestions, and we accept to be treated according to the amount of deliverables in terms of reforms, but we need your engagement in securing the right level of funding to efficiently face the crises, and your continued commitment with regards to financing Lebanon’s needs in the context of a program and in the context of CEDRE.
Our goal is not to move from one program to another, and to keep going toward you for never-ending support. Our goal is rather to finally unleash the potential of our people and our economy to build a strong and prosperous Lebanon. This is why we are also calling on you today to support us through foreign direct investments, and to engage with the authorities and the private sector to jointly develop businesses in Lebanon, and also to reach new agreements to secure the proper markets for a new productive Lebanese economy. Our people have the know-how, and we are committed to create the proper environment. It is time for us to build new partnerships in the context of our recovery program." -- Presidency of the Council of Ministers

Development and Liberation bloc meets under Berri's chairmanship, highlights government's responsibility in stopping deterioration in living conditions
NNA/May 05/2020
Speaker of the House, Nabih Berri, welcomed this Tuesday in Ain el-Tineh, Free Patriotic Movement president, MP Gebran Bassil, with whom he tackled the the current political juncture and the latest financial and economic developments. Bassil left Ain el-Tineh without any statement, only assuring that "the meeting was excellent."Berri later chaired a meeting for the Development and Liberation parliamentary bloc, with talks touching on the economic and financial developments and the current living situation. In a statement read in the wake of the meeting, the bloc confirmed its readiness and openness to discussing any reformist economic plan that paves the way for efforts aimed at removing Lebanon from the circle of danger that threatens it on the financial and economic levels, away from any political, sectarian or malicious alignments. The bloc also stressed its rejection of any tampering with the bank deposits of the Lebanese and of any step made at the expense of their livelihood and their social, health or pension guarantees. It also indicated that the government's financial and economic plan -- which is regarded as important -- still would not spare it any responsibilities, "especially towards taking practical and deterrent measures that halt the horrific deterioration in living conditions and the insane rise in prices of consumer goods."

Msharrafieh: We will not allow exploitation of people
NNA/May 05/2020
Minister of Tourism, Ramzi Msharrafieh, said via Twitter: "With the circulation of a photograph showing a bill issued by one of Beirut's restaurants, it became clear to us that the price adjustment in it does not match the prices licensed by the Ministry of Tourism. Therefore, the necessary legal action was taken by the Tourism Police, and the restaurant in question was fined.""We will not allow the exploitation of people under the pretext of dollar black market," he stressed.

Strong Lebanon welcomes president's consultations with Heads of blocs, stresses government should focus on stimulating economy
NNA/May 05/2020
The "Strong Lebanon" parliamentary bloc welcomed this Tuesday the step made by His Excellency General Michel Aoun to consult with the Heads of blocs in Baabda on the reformist government plan, considering that "serious dialogue and building around this plan, especially at the parliament’s Finance and Budget Committee with the aim of developing, amending and converging on common denominators between the various parties in the public and private sectors, would fortify the Lebanese negotiating position, both locally and internationally, and qualify it to obtain the required financing."The bloc reaffirmed its "consistent position on the protection of depositors and the equitable distribution of burdens between the State, the Central Bank of Lebanon, and the banks, in whatever plan to follow, at present or in the future." Conferees stressed that "the government must focus on stimulating the economy and empowering the social safety net through immediate and rapid measures, as well as by initiating reforms that require executive decisions."

Mikati apologizes for not participating in Baabda’s meeting on Wednesday
NNA/May 05/2020
Former Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced Tuesday in a statement his apology for not participating in the meeting called for by President Michel Aoun at Baabda Presidential Palace tomorrow [Wednesday], to present the government's reform program. Mikati said in his statement: "We have received an invitation from President Aoun to attend the meeting with the parliamentary blocs tomorrow to be informed of the government reform plan… Given that the dangerous stage that Lebanon is enduring economically and financially necessitates cooperation among all to seek solutions. (...) We therefore decided that our parliamentary bloc would participate in the Baabda meeting, through the Parliamentary Finance Committee Secretary, MP Nicolas Nahas, to present our observations on the plan in question… We informed the Presidency departments of this decision.. However, I was told today that the invitation to the meeting was personal, so I apologized for not attending," said Mikati Mikati also expressed concern in his statement that the approved plan will constitute a coup against all economic foundations upon which Lebanon was founded.

Lebanese living in Syria return through Al-Masnaa point
NNA/May 05/2020
Lebanese nationals residing in Syria and wishing to return to Lebanon have started arriving to the Al-Masnaa point at the Lebanese-Syrian border, in preparation for their entry into the Lebanese territory, under state-approved mechanisms. A team from the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health is taking precautionary measures in the assigned section at the Al-Masnaa point, so that all the returnees undergo PCR testing. Returnees will be accommodated in several hotels in the Central Bekaa region, pending the results of laboratory tests.
A new batch is also expected to arrive on Thursday, subject to the same procedures.

COVID-19 shall be regarded as force majeure: Judiciary
NNA/May 05/2020
Judge Dany Al-Zeenni issued this Tuesday a judicial decision according to which the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) shall be regarded as a force majeure "as it exposes citizens, including prison inmates, to the risk of fatal infection," stating that this force majeure shall allow the judge, based on his own assessment, to take the appropriate preventive measures, by applying the text of Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and freeing detainees despite the incomplete deadlines stipulated in the said article.

IMF Chief Says Talks with Lebanon on Reforms to Begin Soon
Associated Press/Naharnet/May 05/2020
An economic recovery plan recently adopted by the Lebanese government is "an important step forward" to address Lebanon's economic challenges, the International Monetary Fund's chief said. Kristalina Georgieva's remarks come as tens of thousands of Lebanese have been thrown further into poverty and unemployment amid a lockdown because of coronavirus. Georgieva added in her tweets that she had a productive call with Prime Minister Hassan Diab, and that the IMF teams will start discussions in the near future with Lebanese officials on reforms in the tiny country.
The country's severe economic and financial crisis -- the worst since the end of the 1975-90 civil war -- is rooted in decades of corruption and mismanagement. Financial woes deepened after nationwide protests against the political class erupted in October, after which banks imposed crippling, informal capital controls, limiting withdrawal and transfer of dollars. In March, the government defaulted on paying back its debt to local and international Eurobond holders for the first time in history. Last week, Diab's government presented a long-awaited five-year economic rescue plan based on which it would seek financial assistance from the IMF. Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah threw his support behind Diab's move, despite previous opposition to an IMF role. In a speech Monday, Nasrallah warned, however, that the terms should be negotiated carefully. In recent weeks, the local currency has crashed, losing more than half of its value after being pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1997. This in turn led to price hikes in consumer goods, triggering protests last week that left one protester dead and others wounded. International donors have long demanded that Lebanon institute major economic reforms and anti-corruption measures, including in 2018, when they pledged 11 billion dollars. That money has yet to be released and there are hopes by Lebanese officials that an IMF program would help release the badly needed money. Late last month, the government adopted a 53-page Financial Recovery Plan that said its economy is in a "free fall" and that an international financial rescue package is "urgently needed to backstop the recession and create the conditions for a rebound." The Lebanese plan vows to fight widespread corruption and restructure the massive debt that is one of the highest in the world. It also vows to reform infrastructure including waste management and the state-run electricity company that has been one of the main burdens on state coffers over the past years. "We agreed that our teams will soon start discussions on much needed reforms to restore sustainability and growth for the benefit of the Lebanese people," Georgieva tweeted.

Bassil Meets with Berri in Ain el-Tineh
Naharnet/May 05/2020
Free Patriotic Movement chief Jebran Bassil held talks Tuesday with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri at the Ain el-Tineh palace. The meeting comes on the eve of President Michel Aoun's talks in Baabda with the heads of parliamentary blocs. Both Berri and Bassil will take part in the meeting. The Berri-Bassil talks also follow a meeting Monday between Aoun and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat and another between Berri and Prime Minister Hassan Diab.

10 Oil Firms Sued as 4 Arrest Warrants Issued in Counterfeit Fuel Case
Naharnet/May 05/2020
Financial Prosecutor Ali Ibrahim on Tuesday filed a lawsuit against ten oil companies on charges of embezzling public funds and illicit enrichment, the state-run National News Agency said. “He referred the files to Beirut's acting examining magistrate Charbel Bou Samra,” the agency added.
Mount Lebanon First Examining Magistrate Nicolas Mansour meanwhile issued arrest warrants against the representative of the Algerian firm Sonatrach, the director of the oil control company and two employees of the PST firm after a four-hour interrogation session. He will later interrogate the head of the oil facilities department Sarkis Hleis, the owner of the ZR Energie firm Teddy Rahme, its CEO Ibrahim al-Zouk and director of the bids department George al-Saneh. On Wednesday Mansour is scheduled to interrogate former energy ministers Mohammed Fneish and Nada Bustani, Electricite du Liban director general Kamal al-Hayek and the engineer Yahya Mawloud. He will on Thursday question Energy Ministry director general Aurore Feghali and the head of the labs department at the oil facilities unit Dima Haidar.The Energy Ministry had accused Sonatrach of delivering a counterfeit fuel shipment to EDL on March 25.

AUB announces potential decisions for institution’s continuity amid collapsing economy
Christy-Belle Geha/Annahar/May 05/ 2020
The finalized budget by early June, which will emphasize the savings underpinning the budget, is expected to be sent to the entire AUB community on June 15.
BEIRUT: President of the American University of Beirut (AUB) Dr. Fadlo Khuri announced upcoming inevitable decisions to be made including decisions concerning student tuitions and AUB’s growth amid Lebanon’s economic meltdown accentuated by the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact, in a letter sent to the AUB community Tuesday. “There are many critical matters to be addressed with the various constituencies before the Board and senior university leadership render their final budget and decisions,” said Khuri. “These include where we set student tuition, what resources we can leverage to restore buying power, how to enhance our global fundraising efforts and secure new institutional scholarships, how to leverage telemedicine and other avenues to restore some of the lost revenues to AUBMC, the degree to which it is possible to borrow money, and what portion of our endowment, more than 85% of which is restricted, will be used and over what period of time.” Khuri also noted in his letter, in which he intended to share transparently, as he said, the university’s potential future plans facing the aftermath of the pandemic on the country’s economy, that “projections for the next year are based on the optimistic assumption that the Lebanese pound will stabilize at 3,000 to the dollar in that period, but they do not take into account a possible haircut imposed on AUB’s bank deposits in Lebanon.”
AUB’s president added that 60-percent shortfall in revenues has caused immense losses, which triggered an expectation of the “closure of an as-yet-undetermined number of programs and departments, the departure of a number of our community members, furloughs, a halt to capital expenditures, a near-complete cancellation of university-sponsored travels, leaves, and conferences for the foreseeable future, and a review of the current benefits system.”
Dany Rasheed, president of the AUB Secular Club, explained that “tuition dollarization means we will pay more in LBP because the Lira's exchange rate is at risk. Tuition dollarization means that once again, the most vulnerable will pay the price of an economic crisis created by the country's ruling class: a core part of the policies is the transformation of basic human rights to commodities through excessive privatization, including that of our education.”Rasheed added that “other vulnerable groups have also made significant sacrifices, most recently the AUB daily-wage workers, and our message is clear: students and the most vulnerable and marginalized will not pay the price of the elites' failures anymore.” Marwa Batlouni, biology junior, told Annahar that “what dr. Fadlo said today isn't a newly born statement,” and that “students have been talking and protesting against the dollarisation of tuition fees since last year and calling for an immediate student contract that protects our rights as students and yet what we were given is still very vague and unclear.”She specified that “what is coming is of great disadvantage for the students and will threaten and terminate many's education. Students shouldn't be sacrificing anything for the sake of them to keep on maintaining their surpluses.” Dima El-Ayache, architecture student and member of the AUB Secular Club, thinks that “it's ironic how AUB's president is emotionally appealing to students, faculty, and staff to work hand in hand in order to save this institution in light of the economic collapse and the pandemic while calling students, who expressed concern regarding the tuition dollarization, ‘alarmists’ earlier in summer 2019.”The finalized budget by early June, which will emphasize the savings underpinning the budget, is expected to be sent to the entire AUB community on June 15.
“Consultations during this coming month will include, but will not be limited to, more than a dozen meetings with the Board of Trustees, meetings with our Employee Benefits Committee, our Financial Planning Committee [...], presentations to the University Senate, and to faculty, students, and staff,” noted Khuri.

Lebanese PM and IMF head discuss country's worst economic crisis in three decades
Massoud A Derhally/The National/May 05/2020
Teams from the International Monetary Fund and Lebanon will meet to explore
reforms needed to restore stability to the country's economy.
Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab and International Monetary Fund managing director Kristalina Georgieva discussed the government’s plan to rescue the economy from its worst crisis in three decades.
“I had a productive call with Lebanon’s PM @Hassan_B_Diab today to discuss the government’s Recovery Plan, which is an important step forward to address #Lebanon’s economic challenges,” Ms Georgieva said in a tweet on Monday.
“We agreed that our teams will soon start discussions on much-needed reforms to restore sustainability and growth for the benefit of the Lebanese people.”
Lebanon formally asked the IMF for a loan of at least $10 billion (Dh36.7bn) on Thursday. The economy has buckled under the weight of mounting debt that forced the country to default on eurobonds in March.
Lebanon's gross domestic product is set to contract 12 per cent this year, according to IMF projections. The country's debt ballooned to $92 billion at the end of January, making it one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios worldwide.
In total, Lebanon has about $31bn in bond maturities and the bulk of that is held by local financial institutions, with lenders and the central bank accounting for 33.4 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively.
Deposit flows, which financed the country’s deficits and shored up its banking system, have dried up while credit has been frozen and the Lebanese pound has lost more than half of its value against the US dollar.
Long-running political disputes and successive changes of government have prevented Lebanon from carrying out structural reforms needed to unlock pledges worth $11bn by international donors.
The Association of Banks in Lebanon rejected the government's rescue plan and said it was "not consulted" by Mr Diab's administration.
“The association is an essential part of any solution, as the economy requires a strong banking sector capable of playing its role as a means of social integration and growth by granting credit to individuals and companies,” ABL said, a day after the government submitted its request to the fund.
The government’s recovery plan is comprised of measures to adjust the exchange rate regime and restructure public debt and the financial sector.
It also intends to bring about fiscal consolidation and structural, social and environmental reforms while seeking international financial aid.
The programme assumes an exchange rate that fixes the pound at 3,500 to the US dollar – more than double the peg that has existed since 1997.
There are plans to move to a flexible system in the future through a float or a crawling peg, where the rate is frequently adjusted in line with market conditions.
Furthermore, the plan assumes that the country will receive external financial support and the government will successfully execute the reforms in full.
It also assumes that the government will reach a debt restructuring agreement with creditors this year.
The government’s programme envisages the restructuring of the central bank and commercial lenders.
It estimates the central bank’s losses at 117 trillion pounds ($77.6bn/Dh285bn) and impaired liabilities at 121tn pounds.
Commercial bank losses incurred as a result of the crisis and restructuring of public debt are estimated at 186tn pounds.
ABL, however, said that "the local restructuring process, as outlined in the plan, would further undermine confidence in Lebanon, domestically and internationally”.
“At the same time, the plan cited key elements for restoring and strengthening investor confidence, such as an effective anti-corruption strategy, but not being detailed – raising questions about the timing of implementation," it said.
"In fact, the plan is likely to hinder investment in the economy, and therefore the prospects for recovery.”
ABL said the government’s plan does not address inflationary pressures, and may lead to high inflation.
It also said “the social inclusion component of the plan ... requires further explanation and detail, particularly on the following three priorities: job retention, poverty alleviation and inequality reduction.”
ABL said there was an urgent call "for a constructive dialogue" and promised to play its part in supporting the country while adhering to its “fiduciary duties as we have done in the past”. It also called for concrete action and consensus among all concerned parties.
“Every day that passes without reform exacerbates the situation,” ABL said.
It said it intends to present to the government a plan to mitigate the effects of the recession and pave the way for sustainable growth.

Lebanon simply cannot afford to watch its two main pillars of stability to crumble
Michael Young/The National/May 05/2020
With the banking sector on the verge of breakdown and the military under immense pressure, ordinary Lebanese fear a return of the civil war years.
As Lebanon continues to suffer from the pain of an economic collapse, events last week raised the prospect of a worrisome scenario in the country, which the country’s political leadership cannot afford to ignore. If they do, what could ensue is a situation ominously reminiscent of the civil war years.
Even before the end of confinement imposed by coronavirus, violent protests had resumed in Lebanon against economic conditions, particularly in the northern city of Tripoli. The Lebanese army was deployed to contain the demonstrators, many of whom had escalated their actions by setting fire to banks. A young protester was killed in one of the melees, while dozens of soldiers were injured.
Two of the main pillars of Lebanon’s stability are the banking system and the military. What happened last week underlined that the first is on the verge of a breakdown, threatening Lebanon’s finances, while the second is under mounting pressure. Unless there is a rapid injection of dollar liquidity into the banking sector, it will not survive. And unless relief is given to an increasingly impoverished Lebanese society, the army cannot forever be relied upon to curb the protests.
That is not to say that the military will stage a coup. Rather, as the Lebanese pound loses its value – which has already dramatically eroded the salaries of state employees, including soldiers – the willingness of officers and troops to back the politicians against the people will decline. It is conceivable that if the situation deteriorates further, the military will quietly begin to resist repressing social unrest, insisting that this is the job of the security forces.
If that were to happen, two things could ensue. Protesters, sensing that the tide is turning in their favour, could become even more brazen in their attacks against leading politicians and their interests; and, in response, the politicians could resort to playing on sectarian sensibilities to portray any attack against them as an attack against their religious community. That could push them to resort to autonomous security means to protect their interests, and themselves.
Autonomous security is a polite way of saying that sectarian militias could emerge to do what the army is unwilling to do, namely control the streets. With the financial system no longer functioning and the army increasingly failing to protect state officials, the very notion of a state would lose whatever meaning it still has as security institutions are replaced by sectarian armed gangs.
Some politicians would prefer to resist such a development on the grounds that they need the state as a facade for the corrupt oligarchy they have put in place; and to avoid a slide into civil war that would devastate the lucrative edifice they have exploited since the end of the war in 1990. The reality is that while many politicians became prominent during the war years, they are not keen to take Lebanon back to that time, seeing little to gain from it.
Moreover, Hezbollah, Lebanon’s most powerful party, would regard a new civil war as a threatening sideshow to its main task of advancing Iranian interests regionally. That is why some of the party’s foes abroad fantasise about a new civil war in Lebanon, believing it would sink Hezbollah in a debilitating conflict, just as the war in 1975 did to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
With this in mind, Hezbollah and the rest of the political class have accepted a step that they previously would have preferred to avoid. They have asked for assistance from the International Monetary Fund. While their intentions are certainly mercenary, once they are locked into a bailout programme, the politicians’ ability to ignore IMF conditions would be relatively limited.
That even Hezbollah has accepted the necessity of an IMF bailout, if the fund itself agrees to one, is a testament to the desire of Lebanon’s politicians and parties to salvage what remains of the state. That is why the political class will try to do two things in the weeks and months ahead: save the banking sector, even if it means they have to put their hands on bank deposits; and ensure that the army is spared the worst consequences of widening protests.
In this context, Hezbollah may be in control of the political system, but it is also a system that is rapidly disintegrating. Prime Minister Hassan Diab has made mistakes, is increasingly vulnerable as he has lately alienated influential Maronite and Greek Orthodox representatives, and continues to be challenged by the main Sunni representative, Saad Hariri.
This suggests that Hezbollah may in the future be tempted to replace Mr Diab’s government with a so-called national unity government, which alone would be able to reach a broad political consensus on an economic plan to address the dire financial situation.
Hezbollah is militarily strong, but today that is hardly enough. The party does not want a new civil war, it seeks an economic revival to assuage an angry population, which only the IMF can provide, and it is willing to make concessions to secure its long-term security. All this will force Hezbollah into making difficult choices in the coming weeks. The party’s domestic rivals will be looking for ways to exploit this to narrow its margin of manoeuvre, while increasing their own.
*Michael Young is editor of Diwan, the blog of the Carnegie Middle East programme, in Beirut

On Hassan Diab Being the Sunni Emile Lahoud
Hazem Saghieh/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
Before consociational democracy’s degeneration in Lebanon, there was a convention almost tantamount to a law: religious sects do not come together under one leadership. In the fifties, for example, Hamid Frangieh stood, as his brother Suleiman did after him, against Camille Chamoun, whom most of the other Christians gathered around. Sami Solh also stood against the Sunni consensus to oppose Chamoun. Neither was Frangieh considered a nobody by his sect, nor was Solh.
This was a manifestation of a broader state of affairs. Shiite leadership was divided between a southern leader and another from the Bekaa, and each of them had competitors in his region. Similarly, Druze leadership was split between Jumblatt and Arslan, and the leaders of the Eastern Orthodox (Roum) community were scattered between Ashrafieh, North Metn, and Koura.
This situation made it possible for the state to rise and to have relative independence from the sects, allowing it to manage the game they played amongst themselves. Emile Lahoud's ascension to presidency in 1998 put an end to this equation, though the coup against it had begun before that. What had been required at the time was a constitutional cover for the actual decision-makers, who were the figures of Syria's hegemony. Thus, appointing someone weak who would not be affected in the least by any community’s sentiments became the most suitable course of action.
Lahoud was the most suitable: he did not represent anyone. He became the commander of the army in 1989, when settling the score with Michelle Aoun on Hafez Assad's behalf had been the order of the day. He was appointed based on the fact that he had been commander of the Lebanese Navy. That day, newspapers published a picture or two of a few boats that were promoted as the Lebanese Armada; the Lebanese Nelson, then, awaited us.
Since attributing some qualities to him was unavoidable, Lahoud was made out to be a famous swimmer, diver, and athlete who never stopped running; he was always in a t-shirt, even when it was freezing cold. The occasions on which he spoke reduced his already poor standing, adding nothing but phrases that contradicted with one another or phrases that were inherently contradictory themselves.
Renewing this president's term was the order of the day in 2004. Why? Because he was the only Maronite who was not concerned with the developments in the region subsequent to the Iraq War in 2003. His defenders said: He is the man to confront the conspiracy. The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese responded: his appointment itself is the conspiracy.
The Lahoud scenario was repeated a few months ago with the appointment of the current Prime Minister Hassan Diab. There are two differences between them: the first lacked any Maronite support, the second lacks any Sunni support. Neither is Lahoud a Hamid Franjieh nor is Diab a Sami Solh; but even Lahoud, because of his family's political history, possessed something that the rising figure does not.
Hezbollah and the Aounists wanted to appoint a prime minister during a period of difficult and awkward circumstances, and they found him ready. His history and heritage were conjured up: He was Minister of Education (2011-2014) and he is the "Vice President of the American University of Beirut." Graduate degrees, journal publications, participation in international conferences, and his founding of new colleges were highlighted, giving him a CV full of hot air.
A plethora of social media posts and a few newspaper articles were published to correct the depiction of him. Many of the students whom he had taught wrote things about him that do not “demonstrate veneration”. Employees in the Ministry of Education described him as his students had. The major action taken by the ministry during his tenure was the publication of that expensive two volumes book, which dealt with his inflated ego and "accomplishments". He described himself as "one of the rare technocrat ministers appointed since Lebanon's independence." He also changed the name of a school to his mother's name.
His title of “Vice President” of the American University conceals the reality of the job. He was indeed a Vice President, but for ''Regional and external Programs.'' This vague term refers to nothing more than being tasked with particular responsibilities by the university president. At one point, there were seven vice presidents of the American University of Beirut.
In any case, some news reports refer to Diab’s recent request that the AUB pay him "his dues" and transfer them abroad! Sources at the university were cited as being surprised at his request to have dues paid for services that he had not provided; for the prime minister requested the wages of years during which he had not been working his position, on what is called a sabbatical, meaning that he could return to his teaching position in a year.
The few and general opinions Diab expresses are of little significance. For example, he says: “I am certain that the solution to most of our economic, unemployment, social, financial and even political challenges, lies in education in all its forms”. Recently, he lamented the fact that "we do not have what is called a "deep state" that represents the concept of statehood". It seems that when he mentions a "deep state", he is referring to something different than the generally accepted definition of the term. Fortunately, his general opinions are few.
Hassan Diab is, after all, obedient. He reads his morbid speeches to the letter, barely even raising his head, like a student afraid of losing control, and thus deciding to freeze the expressions of his face. What is important, for the student, is that he passes. As for the professor of professors, we should be looking somewhere else

Lebanon’s latest reform-for-support plan: Intentions and implementation may diverge significantly
السفير جبفري فيلتمان: خطة الإصلاح الأخيرة للدعم في لبنان: قد تتباعد فيها النوايا والتنفيذ بشكل ملحوظ
Jeffrey Feltman/Brookings/May 05/2020
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/85827/jeffrey-feltmanlebanons-latest-reform-for-support-plan-intentions-and-implementation-may-diverge-significantly-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%ac%d8%a8%d9%81%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%81/
The emergency rescue program revealed by Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab on April 30 purports to address comprehensively Lebanon’s economic collapse. While tabled in more desperate times made even worse by the impact of the coronavirus, the program dusts off the essential deal of earlier Lebanese attempts to attract external support: Lebanon would enact extensive internal reforms and fight corruption, and outside actors would in response open the financial spigots.
What distinguishes this plan from previous reform pitches is the fact that this government rests on the support of only one side of Lebanon’s political spectrum — Hezbollah and its allies. Previous proposed support packages for Lebanon were implicitly (and often not-so-implicitly) designed to strengthen the legitimate state institutions relative to non-state actors, especially Hezbollah. As this government relies exclusively on Hezbollah and its allies for its parliamentary support, that traditional justification for external assistance no longer works. The challenge for Diab will be to persuade donors that this plan does not solidify Hezbollah’s dominance in an increasingly fractured and dysfunctional, if not non-existent, state.
A WISHFUL APPROACH
This plan is more ambitious than its never-implemented predecessors. It calls for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program that previous governments had ruled out, fearful that IMF intrusiveness would reveal the true extent of Lebanon’s underlying rot. The document outlining the government plan includes bracing statistics demonstrating just how bad things have gotten: 53% inflation this year, 48% of the population already impoverished, $28 billion in external balance of payments financing needed by 2024, and an industrial base accounting for only 8% of GDP, for instance.
In an everything-but-the-kitchen sink approach, it touches on issues ranging from the external debt burden to the dysfunctional power generation to agricultural production and environmental protection. In dry and technocratic language, the document makes clear that all Lebanese should expect some kind of economic and financial “haircut” to achieve a turn-around. “Limiting domestic demand through cutting government spending and reducing wages and benefits will have an impact on private consumption and investment and thus will reduce the demand for imports” is a particularly sobering sentence in light of the belt-tightening that is already provoking violent protests.
But the proposal, despite detailed and sensible analysis, rests on wishful thinking regarding the willingness of Lebanon’s traditional external partners to step in when their attention is focused on their own coronavirus mitigation and economic recovery strategies. Moreover, even if the plan’s authors (reportedly advised by consultants from the international firm Lazard Freres) are given an initial benefit of the doubt for a good-faith declaration of intentions, the question remains whether even the technocrats in this “one-color” Lebanese government — backed only by Hezbollah and its allies — are capable of cleaning house in a transparent and nonpartisan way to promote a sustainable, private-sector led economic revival in a state that exists mostly in name only.
One fears that, in a déjà vu sense, this reform plan will face one of two unpalatable fates: Either it, like its many predecessors in Lebanon, will never be implemented, or — given the unprecedented dominance of Hezbollah and its allies — it will be implemented in a distorted, partisan way, even if that is not what Diab and his ministers intend. In either case, any interest by outside donors to help evaporates.
It is striking how often the need for expansive external assistance is repeated. Two quotes are illustrative: “International financial assistance at favorable terms to close the large external financing gap and finance the development of the infrastructures … are necessary to support the growth of the economy”; and “Extensive social safety nets will be created with the assistance of development partners to provide income support, until Lebanon returns to solid growth and most of its population rises above the poverty line.” In part, this emphasis on outside actors may be aimed at Lebanese skeptics — looking at you, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah — about the IMF. But, in case the foreign assistance is not forthcoming in the geysers envisioned, the heavy reliance on large amounts of external support also provides a ready-made excuse for the government to claim “not our fault,” if the donors don’t come through.
The heavy reliance on large amounts of external support also provides a ready-made excuse for the government to claim ‘not our fault,’ if the donors don’t come through.
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
Using language that is surely designed to appeal to last year’s street protesters, the document addresses problems in Lebanon’s private-sector dominated banking sector head-on.
As capital inflows to Lebanon slowed, even the unsustainable high interest rates on foreign currency paid by the banks proved unable to prevent capital flight. In late 2019, in the absence of national regulations, the banks started to impose what the document calls “de facto” or “informal” capital controls. According to the government’s program, in a visually arresting description, the government will “claw back sums which have unlawfully escaped the country,” and excessive interest rates on dollar accounts will also be “clawed back.”
But this raises a question: Given that Lebanon’s central bank had not imposed nationwide, uniform capital controls, was sending funds abroad in late 2019 really a crime, or just unpatriotic? Did bank depositors — including foreign commercial and individual depositors seizing what was a then perfectly legal opportunity — commit a crime in retrospect in accepting the high interest rates on offer? The potential for political score-settling by going after only certain clients may be irresistible for a government as one-sided in its political support as this one.
The document also talks about voluntary or forced consolidation, mergers, and sales of equity in Lebanon’s banks to foreign partners. While banking reform and consolidation is undoubtedly needed, the process could be distorted. Whatever their irresponsible and clubby practices, the banks had largely, under U.S. pressure, cleansed their books of Hezbollah accounts to avoid U.S. sanctions. The private-sector dominated banks provided something of a counterweight to Hezbollah inside the Lebanese system, since no one wanted to see a collective banking failure.
The forces behind the current government have no interest in preserving the banking sector’s independence. Even with the envisioned participation of international experts, state oversight of essential financial reform can evolve into Hezbollah-dominated state control of a once proud sector of Lebanon’s economy. International supervisors will be powerless to prevent Hezbollah encroachment on the financial sector, should Hezbollah — now that the banks, reviled by an enraged public unable to access their accounts, are no longer sacrosanct — be determined to force the banks to learn a lesson on Hezbollah’s terms.
*Jeffrey Feltman, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution

Hezbollah versus Lebanon’s Central Bank governor
جيمس ولسن يو ريبوتر: حزب الله في مواجهة بنك لبنان المركزي
James Wilson/eureporter/May 05/2020
Last week, Prime Minister Hassan Diab of Lebanon launched an extraordinary attack on Riad Salameh (pictured), the governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank. On Wednesday (29 April), Salameh hit back and highlighted the sustained campaign against him. The Financial Times characterized the dispute as a “feud” and a “public fight”. But the truth is that the campaign against Salameh runs much deeper. Behind it is a sinister attempt by Iran-backed Shi’ite group Hezbollah to oust Salameh, using their ally Prime Minister Hassan Diab as their mouthpiece, writes James Wilson.
Salameh spoke up this week to remind the prime minister of the bank’s transparency and also the need for the bank to retain its independence. Salemeh is one of the world’s longest serving bank governors and has been credited with keeping Lebanese currency stable in the two decades leading up to the current crisis and also praised for shoring up Lebanon’s banking sector using his “financial engineering” techniques.
French economist Nicolas Bouzou, writing recently in the newspaper Les Echos , praised Salameh’s leadership at the bank during what is a undoubtedly a challenging time for the country: “As for the Central Bank of Lebanon, it is the stable point in a country in convulsion. Led by the serious Riad Salameh, the bank was at the heart of the tumult and managed to maintain the fixed parity of the currency with the dollar and its measures made it possible to ensure that the incoming financial flows to the country were not interrupted, which is essential to finance the current account deficit and the public deficit.”
To understand why the attack by Diab on Salameh was quite so vehement, it is important to see the political context in Lebanon. Diab’s premiership is backed by the militant group Hezbollah and their ally Gebran Bassil, the former Foreign Minister and President of the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). With Hezbollah-backed Diab’s attacks on the Central Bank’s governor, it is clear that Hezbollah are also extending their reach into the economic and financial zone, no longer content with their influence having a stranglehold on Lebanese politics.
Mona Alami, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, explains: “Hezbollah has been working for years on integrating itself into the Lebanese state… Traditionally, Hezbollah members have shied away from sensitive government positions, with its members handling agriculture, youth, industry, and more recently, health. Despite its political caution, the group has direct influence on essential institutions from security to foreign policy.”
A tell-tale sign that the attacks on Salameh are initiated by Hezbollah is that the Hezbollah-affiliated newspaper Al-Akbar immediately had negative headlines about the governor on their website and their ally Gebran Bassil also echoed much of Mr Diab’s criticism of Mr Salameh, a sure sign for many Lebanon observers that the Bassil-Hezbollah alliance is behind the attacks on the governor of the Central Bank.
There is also international concern that the attacks on Salameh are likely motivated by his unwillingness to let Hezbollah evade the international sanctions against them. He is known, according to an insider at one Western embassy, to have “played things by the book as far as sanctions against Hezbollah are concerned. He did not let them get away with anything. The international community appreciates his steadfastness on that, but we can be sure Hezbollah does not. Of course they want him out, so they can get somebody into that role who is a little more sympathetic to them.” Hezbollah’s irritation over Mr Salameh’s cooperation with the international community and USA on the sanctions and anti-money-laundering initiatives is very likely to have been a factor.
The fact remains that Lebanon is floundering under its worst economic crisis in decades. The financial pain is compounded now by the coronavirus lockdown measures. The country is at a critical crossroads, having defaulted on $90 billion of debt in March. It is therefore a time when the Central Bank needs to be allowed to do its job without fear of politicized attack. It is also a moment for Lebanon to consider how long it wishes to have its chances of recovery impeded by the influence of Hezbollah.

Salvation Army?
Aram Nerguizian/Carnegie MEC/May 05/2020
The Lebanese armed forces’ Covid-19 response has been a success, but potential problems remain.
For more than a month, Lebanon’s national security institutions have been enforcing a March 21 government stay-at-home order to limit, contain, and reverse the spread of the novel coronavirus. On the day of the announcement, the government’s Disaster Risk Management Unit reported 206 confirmed cases in Lebanon. More than a month later, on May 4, Lebanon’s official cumulative number of cases was 740, including 205 recoveries and 25 deaths.
It would be easy to characterize the country’s reaction to the coronavirus and the military’s public order mission as relative successes. Official data show a tentative slowdown and flattening of the national Covid-19 caseload, while the Lebanese military and military families had recorded less than 30 cases by April 28.
Nonetheless, the mitigation challenges of Lebanon’s initial lockdown may pale by comparison to the real mix of risks and critical uncertainties with which the military may have to contend in the future. In the short to medium term, these include the uncertain effects of a breakdown in social and physical distancing and the need to prepare for the possible effects of a second wave of infections and associated public order missions. In the longer term, the challenge will shift to how the military will plan and resource for public health crises in 2021 and beyond, without compromising its preference to remain focused on traditional priorities tied to national defense.
The “general mobilization” directive to maintain public order was rolled out with minimal prior coordination with the armed forces. Senior officers described being issued an order from the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab with little meaningful preplanning tied to Covid-19 risk mitigation and containment protocols. They were given only limited visibility on the availability of personal protection equipment for troops tasked with maintaining order.
The military needed to quickly pivot to dealing with the crisis. Given the importance of silo-breaking and cross-departmental cooperation, senior military decisionmakers were presented with several options to structure internal coordination. The military established a focused Covid-19 crisis response committee, composed of four officers from each of the military’s personnel, operations, military intelligence, and medical services branches.
Rather than opting for senior officers, the committee is composed of mid-level officers ranging from the ranks of major to colonel. They are empowered to deconflict as a team, coordinate quickly up the chain of command to the Office of the Commander, and communicate vertically within their discreet military lines of effort. The sourcing of medical supplies and donations is directed through the military’s medical services branch, not its logistics branch.
No less than 40,000 troops—half of Lebanon’s total national military manpower—took part in the public order mission. To mitigate community spread and preserve force readiness, a “fourteen days duty, fourteen days off duty” rotation system was adopted. Nonessential personnel at Lebanese military headquarters were scaled back, with 70 percent of officers and 50 percent of noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel reporting for duty. A floor of the military hospital was reserved solely for Covid-19 cases and currently counts 20 intensive care unit beds.
To offset the limited supply of facemasks and other types of personal protection equipment, no less than two major units were tasked with producing masks at an initial rate of 200 to 250 units per day. By April 4, the armed forces’ senior officers felt more confident that the force possessed the basics of short-term protection for approximately 20,000 active duty personnel.
The net result of these measures, combined with a civilian stay-at-home compliance rate that the military estimated at 80 percent, was that as of May 3 the military reported no more than six Covid-19 cases within its active duty ranks and no more than 20 cases among military families and retired personnel. Meanwhile, some 700 members of the armed forces remain on fourteen days of mandatory leave to protect their units due to exposure to potentially at-risk communities, or because they appeared to be symptomatic.
Although these results seem encouraging, military planners and decisionmakers fear that the lockdown through the end of April might have been the easy part. The loss of economic activity during confinement, the continued decline of vital socioeconomic metrics, and the resumption of popular protests seem to herald the collapse of social distancing. In parallel, a noticeable number of personnel have shown increasing lapses in enforcing social distancing within the armed forces. As a result, military planners are asking themselves not if but when a second wave of infections might hit Lebanon.
In the short term the military will have to take two risk-mitigating actions. It will have to consolidate, strengthen, and properly integrate protocols and standard operating procedures to contain future infections from the level of small units up to headquarters. It will also have to build up a stockpile of protective medical equipment to deal with a possible second wave of infections. This will include coordinating donations and additional deliveries of equipment from Lebanon’s military partners, including the United States.
The Covid-19 pandemic also has longer-term implications. Like militaries in the West and NATO, past and current Lebanese military planning guidance under the 2013–2017 and the 2018–2022 Capabilities Development Plans has prioritized the continued development of highly specialized units to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. However, it has not focused on an effort to maximize protection of the bulk of the Lebanese military under pandemic conditions, while enforcing a nationwide public order mission.
The military has shown significant agility in its Covid-19 response. However, it has not been relieved of its pre-pandemic national security missions. These include maintaining stability along the border with Syria, living up to international commitments in the south of the country tied to United Nations resolutions, and maintaining adequate force readiness to defend Lebanon’s territorial integrity. That the Lebanese government may also see the armed forces as an instrument to maintain public order at a time of social and economic unrest in the country is a poisoned chalice that could undermine a military that has fought hard to be taken seriously as Lebanon’s sole legitimate national security institution.

Banning Hezbollah: A welcome and overdue step
Jerusalem Post Editorial/May 05/2020
 الجيروساليم بوست: حظر حزب الله في ألماني خطوة مرحب بها ومتأخرة
Hezbollah’s record as the perpetrator of major terrorist atrocities around the world has been known for decades.
In a welcome step, Germany last week banned all activities of the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah. Announcing the move, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer declared that Hezbollah’s activities “violate criminal law, and the organization opposes the concept of international understanding.”
The ban was long overdue. Hezbollah’s record as the perpetrator of major terrorist atrocities around the world has been known for decades: Its history includes the bombings, orchestrated by Imad Mughniyeh, of the US Embassy and the military barracks in Beirut in 1983; the bombing attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the AMIA Jewish center there in 1994; the bombing attack against US military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1996; the murder of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri; the bombing of a tour bus carrying Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, in 2012; not to mention the myriad attacks against and kidnappings of Israelis, Europeans and Americans; its role in provoking the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and its part in the Syrian civil war, where it helped Iran create a corridor of terror from Tehran to Beirut.
Hezbollah’s ongoing efforts to obtain precision-guided missiles and the discovery of a warren of terrorist attack tunnels crossing from Lebanon into Israel are yet more indications that it has not given up its dreams of death and destruction.
The US and Israel for years urged Europe to ban Hezbollah, but it was only after Hezbollah carried out the attack in Burgas that the European Union was moved to act. In July 2013, EU governments agreed to partially blacklist Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, but they made an artificial and dangerous distinction between the “military” arm of Hezbollah and the “political” arm. This is a distinction that the terrorist organization itself does not make. It is ridiculous and counterproductive to pretend there is a difference between the “political” and “military” activities of an organization whose terrorists have caused such high death tolls and suffering globally.
As The Jerusalem Post’s Benjamin Weinthal noted on Sunday, in an analysis of the long-overdue nature of the German decision, this newspaper has reported on hundreds of Hezbollah’s activities in Europe, including a Hezbollah member declaring last year in a Hezbollah-controlled mosque in the German city of Münster: “We belong to the party of Ruhollah [Khomeini].... We are proud of terrorism.”
The US, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, the Arab League and now Germany have all taken the step to ban Hezbollah.
As Weinthal noted, a major change in attitude in Germany occurred with the appointment of Richard Grenell as US ambassador in 2018. Last week, Grenell welcomed the German measure, saying: “The world is a little bit safer with this German government ban of Hezbollah. The entire US Embassy in Berlin has worked with the German government and the Bundestag for two years to push for this ban. It’s an incredible diplomatic success that we hope will motivate many officials in Brussels to follow suit with an EU-wide ban.”
The Post’s Yonah Jeremy Bob, in an analysis published on Monday, noted the role of the Mossad in supplying European countries with intelligence that has helped prevent attacks by Hezbollah and its Shi’ite allies (as well as Sunni ISIS). This includes intel on warehouses in southern Germany belonging to Hezbollah operatives, where hundreds of kilograms of ammonium nitrate – used to make explosives – were stored. Mossad chief Yossi Cohen has revealed that an Iranian diplomat in Vienna headed a bomb plot in France, and was nabbed presumably with the help of Israeli intelligence.
It is absurd to tolerate terrorism for fear of upsetting Hezbollah’s patron – the Islamic Republic of Iran. And it should be remembered that – like ISIS and other Sunni jihadists – many of the victims of the Shi’ite terrorist organization have been Muslims.
Hezbollah cannot be considered a legitimate political movement. Its record shows that it is a terrorist organization that shamelessly targets innocent civilians. Hundreds have died as a result. It needs to be clearly acknowledged that Hezbollah’s terrorist activities are not a “Middle Eastern” issue, but a threat that knows no borders, aimed against the international community. As long as the political wing is considered legal, Hezbollah will be able to continue fundraising and recruiting freely in Europe and elsewhere. This financial pipeline and recruitment system is the oxygen that keeps Hezbollah alive.
When tackling terrorism, you can’t do things by half. It is time for all countries that believe in peace and security to ban both Hezbollah’s political and military wings. There can be no shades of gray in blacklisting Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

Israeli Ambassador to the UN Danny Danon: No need for a UNIFIL paralyzed by Hezbollah
السفير الإسرائيلي في مجلس الأمن: لا حاجة لقوات يونيفل مشلولة من حزب الله
Lahav Harkov/Jerusalem Post/May 05/2020
The UN Security Council plans to hold further meetings to discuss a necessary change to UNIFIL’s mandate, ahead of its renewal in August.
Israel may change its mind about the need for a UN Interim Force in Lebanon if it continues to let Hezbollah run rampant in southern Lebanon, Ambassador to the UN Danny Danon said at a UN Security Council meeting on Monday.
“If Hezbollah continues to paralyze UNIFIL’s actions and reinforce its terrorist positions in the area, there will be no choice but to draw conclusions about the necessity of the forces in its current format,” Danon warned.
UNIFIL is a UN peacekeeping mission on the border of Israel and Lebanon, established in 1978 after Operation Litani, when the IDF responded to the Coastal Road massacre in which a Palestinian terrorist killed 38 Israelis, including 13 children, by attacking PLO positions in southern Lebanon, attempting to push them away from the border with Israel.
Since the 2006 Second Lebanon War and UN Security Council Resolution 1701– the topic of Monday's meeting – UNIFIL’s mandate has been to help the Lebanese Armed Forces maintain the Lebanese government's sovereignty in the area.
Danon’s comments come in light of Hezbollah’s attempts in recent weeks to breach the fence on the Israel-Lebanon border and infiltrate Israel.
The UN Security Council plans to hold further meetings to discuss a necessary change to UNIFIL’s mandate, ahead of its renewal in August.
Danon called on the Security Council to take action to “significantly improve UNIFIL’s effectiveness, especially when it comes to limiting access and freedom of movement for the forces in southern Lebanon.”UN Secretary-General reports on the implementation of Resolution 1701 repeatedly show that UNIFIL has difficulty accessing areas with a connection to Hezbollah terror activities.
Sarit Zehavi, founder of the Alma Research and Education Center, whose expertise is in security along Israel’s northern borders, said of Danon’s declaration: “It’s about time. This is the first time I’ve heard an Israeli official consider whether the [UNIFIL] force is necessary.
“We have been saying for a long time that we need to examine the force’s missions, and if they cannot fulfil them, they should be smaller or new expectations should be set,” Zehavi continued. “There are about 10,000 soldiers there who aren’t managing to prevent Hezbollah’s spread in southern Lebanon.”
Zehavi pointed to the incident last month in which Hezbollah cut holes in the border fence in three locations: “Where was UNIFIL in this story?”
“They aren’t managing to stop Hezbollah’s military activity,” she warned.
In February, the Alma Center reported Hezbollah blocked UNIFIL’s access to Baraachit, a pro-Hezbollah Shi’ite town in southern Lebanon.
Residents of the village blocked French UNIFIL forces from entering to conduct a mapping and photography assignment, and Hezbollah confiscated the soldiers’ cameras. The UNIFIL force’s commander sought assistance, as women and children threw stones at the soldiers. Residents accused UNIFIL of “doing Israel's work,” saying “the Israeli enemy mobilizes them against the residents of the south and the resistance.”

Hezbollah Takes Aim at Lebanon’s Central Bank and Telecom Sector
Hanin Ghaddar/The Washington Institute/May 04/2020
حنين غدار/معهد واشنطن/ حزب الله يستهدف البنك المركزي وقطاع الاتصالات في لبنان
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/85816/hanin-ghaddar-hezbollah-takes-aim-at-lebanons-central-bank-and-telecom-sector-%d8%ad%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%ba%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%87%d8%af-%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b4%d9%86%d8%b7%d9%86/
By exploiting the public’s anti-corruption sentiment, the group's leaders are looking for an excuse to seize control of additional sectors and replace the country’s financial system with their own corrupt, cash-based economy.
As Lebanese protestors return to the streets, another conflict is being waged in the background—a financial battle between Hezbollah and Banque du Liban, the country’s central bank. On April 30, the pro-Hezbollah cabinet announced that it would be seeking billions of dollars in assistance from the IMF as part of a wider economic “rescue plan.” At the same time, however, the group has been attempting to establish full control over the country’s remaining hard currency, using the financial crisis to strengthen its parallel economy at a time when Lebanese banks are suffering a serious currency shortage.
THE STAKES
For years now, many ordinary economic transactions in Lebanon have been conducted in U.S. dollars. Recently, local banks stopped providing dollars to depositors after months of setting withdrawal limits; the central bank then ordered lenders to allow withdrawals from foreign currency accounts in Lebanese pounds only. But to stop the pound’s slide on the parallel market, the central bank set a cap of 3,200 pounds to the dollar for money exchange firms, according to Reuters and other media outlets. Despite these measures, the currency continued its freefall, selling as low as 4,000 pounds to the dollar—far less than the fixed peg of 1,500 pounds to the dollar that had been in place for decades. Apparently, money exchangers had been selling dollars at prices higher than the one specified by the central bank. Reuters reported that several of these dealers were arrested on April 27 for violating the cap; in response, exchange firms decided to shut down until the dealers were released.
The clash is part of a wider war between Hezbollah, which supports the parallel economy of exchangers, and Riad Salameh, the central bank governor who supports the banking sector. The winning camp will likely gain full control over Lebanon’s hard currency and financial system.
HEZBOLLAH’S PLAN UNFOLDS
The first signs of this struggle were seen in early April when Hezbollah tried to appoint some of its allies to key financial posts: namely, four open vice governor positions at the central bank, and top spots on the Banking Control Commission, which oversees the daily operations of private lenders. Hezbollah’s camp already holds the Finance Ministry and Interior Ministry, so infiltrating these banking institutions would strengthen its financial position. Yet the plan was disrupted when former prime minister Saad Hariri—apparently under pressure from new U.S. ambassador Dorothy Shea—threatened to pull his allies from parliament if the cabinet approved the appointments.
Since then, Hezbollah has orchestrated a public campaign against Salameh, accusing him of stealing money and protecting corrupt political elites. Likewise, Prime Minister Hassan Diab publicly blamed Salameh for the deteriorating economic conditions. “There are gaps in the central bank’s performance, strategies, clarity, and monetary policy, and [its] losses have reached USD 7 billion this year,” he stated in an April 24 speech, adding that the bank “is either incapable, absent, or directly inciting this dramatic depreciation.” Free Patriotic Movement leader Gebran Bassil reportedly joined the chorus, blaming Salameh for the loss of currency reserves and urging the state to “correct” these mistakes. And according to Reuters, deputy Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem “criticised the central bank over the pound’s drop,” declaring that Salameh “was partly responsible” and that an “appropriate decision” must be made to put the “country’s interest ahead of all else.”
Both the anti-Salameh campaign and the government’s new request for an IMF bailout are richly ironic given that the pro-Hezbollah cabinet has done nothing to weed out corruption or implement urgently needed reforms itself. Even so, Hezbollah will likely double down on its rhetoric against the banks as the poverty-stricken populace commences another wave of mass protests.
WHAT DOES HEZBOLLAH NEED?
The group is well aware that Salameh has been implementing the financial policies of consecutive governments since he was first appointed to head the central bank in 1993. In that capacity, he has facilitated the transfer of private bank funds to each of these governments and, by extension, to the corrupt political elite they represent—a tactic that went largely unchallenged for years until all of the depositors’ money was squandered. Hezbollah and its allies are part of this elite and share much of the blame, despite their attempts to deflect it.
What the group wants now is to replace the teetering financial and banking system with its own parallel system based on a cash economy. That would enable Hezbollah to control all of the cash currently in the hands of the Lebanese people, estimated at 6 billion U.S. dollars plus 7 billion Lebanese pounds. It would also help the group become Lebanon’s main importer of goods, mostly from Iran and Syria.
Moreover, Hezbollah is well aware that the central bank controls substantial assets besides currency. The bank still owns two potentially lucrative companies (Middle East Airlines and Casino Du Liban) and vast amounts of land. It also controls the country’s foreign exchange reserves, including the $13 billion in gold stored at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The idea of selling this gold has been anathema in Lebanon for decades, but it has resurfaced amid the country’s currency crisis and looming default on $33 billion in foreign debt. If the central bank sells the gold, that would obviously create enormous opportunities to divert some of the money to Hezbollah and the wider elite.
The telecom sector has been another lucrative target for the group. Now that Hezbollah controls the Ministry of Telecommunications, it has placed management of the sector under direct ministry control, ousting the two private companies (Alpha and Touch) that once filled that role on the state’s behalf. Annual profits from this sector could total around $1 billion, making it a particularly valuable prize. Under the watchful eye of Hezbollah official Hussein Hajj Hassan, head of the Parliamentary Committee for Information and Communications, the group is reportedly preparing a comprehensive state telecommunications strategy that aligns with its goals.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Lebanon’s entire system, including its banking sector, is in serious need of fundamental reforms, many of which would need to be implemented before—not after—the international community offers a proper bailout. Short of these reforms, true renovation will be impossible unless the system collapses.
Even so, some useful measures can be adopted in the interim to contain Hezbollah’s financial takeover plans and inform the narrative surrounding the latest wave of protests. Hezbollah and its allies have been taking advantage of public anger to power their campaign against the banks, and this campaign needs to be exposed. While maintaining pressure on the central bank is important, Lebanon’s corrupt elite and Hezbollah’s allies should not be allowed to avoid blame for the financial crash. To strike this balance, the United States and the wider international community should take three crucial steps:
Counter Hezbollah’s rhetoric against the banks. This means exposing its behind-the-scenes plans to replace the banking sector and explaining why its parallel economy cannot solve Lebanon’s crisis. A strategic communication strategy would help in this regard, including outreach to certain independent Lebanese media outlets.
Issue new sanctions against a corrupt, high-profile Hezbollah political ally. Targeting such a figure (e.g., an official or businessperson affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement or Amal) would serve multiple purposes: sending a message of support for the people’s demands; reminding protestors that they should hold the entire political elite responsible for corruption, not just the banks; and reminding the banks that caving to Hezbollah’s demands will force the international financial system to cut them off. Lebanese banks have generally done a good job of respecting U.S. restrictions on barring Hezbollah-linked individuals and institutions from accessing U.S. dollars. But they may be tempted to give in if the group continues its anti-bank rhetoric or resorts to violence as it has done in the past (e.g., detonating explosives in front of Blom Bank’s Beirut headquarters in 2016).
Build communication channels with the street. U.S. and international officials need to start talking to protestors and political activists. When Lebanon’s system eventually falls apart—as now seems inevitable—a new political class might take the fore. Hezbollah is already assembling its own group of activists to fill this void, so Washington and its allies would be wise to establish ties with alternative leaders, and sooner rather than later.
The instinct among European governments will be to send financial assistance to Lebanon as soon as possible in order to maintain stability during the coronavirus pandemic. Without serious reforms, however, any such assistance would quickly be engorged by Hezbollah and the rest of the corruption machine. For the Lebanese people who have just gone back into the streets despite the risks of COVID-19, political reform is clearly more important than stability.
*Hanin Ghaddar is the Friedmann Visiting Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Geduld Program on Arab Politics.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on May 05-06/2020
Israeli missiles target Syrian military bases and 'chemical research lab'
The New Arab/May 05/2020
Israel has reportedly carried out large-scale strikes on Iranian military positions in Syria, including the targeting of an alleged chemical weapons research laboratory. Suspected Israeli missiles hit targets in Aleppo, in northern Syria, and Deir az-Zour, in the east of the country, in a wave of strikes on Monday night. A Tehran-led militia base was targeted in Deir az-Zour, with 14 Iranian and Iraqi fighters killed, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.Intense strikes also took place in Safira, eastern Aleppo countryside, which was acknowledged by the Syrian regime who said a military base and research centre were targeted by Israel. Western intelligence believe that Syria is working with Iranian scientists on developing chemical weapons, including at the Scientific Studies and Research Center, which was targeted on Monday night. The Syrian regime are believed to have carried out scores of chemical attacks on opposition areas, including the use of the deadly sarin nerve agent.  The centre is believed to be responsible for developing chemical weapons - banned under international law. Israel is most concerned with the spread of Iranian militias in Syria and research on missile technology, which might enable Hezbollah in Lebanon to develop a more sophisticated and deadly arsenal of rockets. Its air force has stepped up attacks on Syria in recent weeks, as the world's focus has been on the coronavirus epidemic. Israel's Defence Minister Naftali Bennett said last week that his forces would intensify strikes on Iranian positions in Syria. The inability of Syria to prevent the Israeli strikes have led some regime supporters to criticise the performance of Russian air defences, which include the S-300.Syria is meanwhile embroiled in a dispute between business tycoon Rami Makhlouf and President Bashar Al-Assad, two of the country's most important figures.

Israeli officials claim Iran pulling out of Syria amid intensified airstrike
The New Arab/May 05/2020
Iran is moving to close its military bases in Syria and could be looking to pull out of the country altogether, after an uptick in deadly strikes on Iranian-linked forces, Israeli defence officials have claimed. Israel has in recent months intensfied its strikes on Iranian-linked militias and bases in Syria, although Israel rarely claims responsibility for the attacks. The most recent strikes overnight on Monday reportedly killed 14 Iranian and Iraqi militia fighters in the country's east, as well as targeting a Syrian military base and research centre reportedly involved in chemical weapons development. Israeli defense officials told The Times of Israel that the recent uptick in strikes has forced Tehran to withdraw some of its forces from the war-torn country. Iranian forces have been evacuated from a small number of military bases in Syria, the anonymous officials claimed.The number of Iranian military cargo flight carrying munitions into the country have also dropped signficantly over the past six months, the officials added. They claimed the reduction in cargo flights are the result of Israeli strikes on airports where the flights would normally land. As well as targeting Iran-linked militant groups who fight alongside Bashar al-Assad's forces, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, Israeli strikes have also targeted regime air defence systems. Israel wants to send Syria a message that Iranian forces are a burden rather than an asset. "Syria is paying a growing price for the Iranian presence in its territory, for a war that isn't [Syria's]," the officials said. They added that the Israeli military intends to continue strikes on Iran-linked forces in Syria until they leave the country for good. The officials said the recent successes in countering Iran's presence in the country were also linked to the assassination of top Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani in a US drone strike earlier this year. Israel has launched hundreds of strikes in Syria since the start of the civil war in 2011, targeting regime troops, allied Iranian forces and Hezbollah fighters. Despite rarely acknowledging the strikes, Tel Aviv contends that the presence of Tehran-linked forces on its borders consitute a severe threat to Israel.

Iran's Mahan Air accused of defying travel bans, 'spreading coronavirus' in the Middle East
The New Arab/May 05/2020
Hundreds of Mahan Air planes carried passengers from Iran - after a major coronavirus outbreak - to countries in the Middle East contributed to spreading the disease in the region and defied a ban on flights from the Islamic Republic, a BBC report said on Tuesday. The first confirmed coronavirus cases in Lebanon and Iraq were passengers on outbound flights from Iran, operated by the privately-owned Iranian airline, according to the investigation carried out by BBC Arabic.
The airline continued to fly despite government flight bans from Iran and "contributed to the spread of Covid-19 in the Middle East", the report said. The BBC also claimed cabin crew and passengers flying with the airline at the time were not provided with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), necessary to stem the spread of the virus.  Mahan Air "put the lives of its passengers and cabin crew at risk", the report alleged. Iran, Iraq, the UAE and Syria gave the airline the green light to carry out flights between late January and the end of March, while they barred all other companies from flying in from Iran, according to the report. Citing unnamed sources employed by the airline, the BBC reported staff trying to raise concerns over the virus were threatened with getting sacked and "silenced". The US has imposed sanctions on Mahan Air citing ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard as well as accusations that it helped deliver Iranian arms and military personnel to Syria, to bolster Bashar Al-Assad's regime. Iran became the epicentre of the coronavirus outbreak in the Middle East last month, with confirmed cases nearing 100,000 as of Tuesday, resulting in over 6,000 deaths.In March, it was reported that the airline's flights between Iran and China played a "key role in starting and fuelling the coronavirus outbreak" in Iran.he airline company is also reportedly involved in recent shipments of gold bars from Iran to Venezuela, while Iran's government has denied the allegations.

Human rights lawyers call for arrest of Assad’s cousin following reports he fled to UAE
The New Arab/May 05/2020
A group of human rights lawyers has called for the arrest of Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of President Bashar al-Assad, for crimes against civilians after reports emerged that he is present in the UAE. The Guernica 37 International Justice Chambers, which was founded by British solicitor Toby Cadman, said in a statement on Monday that Makhlouf had "financially supported the Syrian regime and is alleged to be complicit in the crimes of the Syrian State Intelligence and Security Forces". He added that he had "bankrolled the brutal destruction of the pro-democracy revolution since 2011". The Syrian conflict began in 2011, when the Assad regime used military force, arrests and torture to suppress pro-democracy protests. Since then more than 500,000 people have been killed, over a million wounded and over 12 million have been displaced, either internally or externally, mostly as a result of attacks on civilian areas by the regime and its allies. Makhlouf was until recently a close confidant and advisor of Assad, owning Syria’s most prominent mobile communications provider, SyriaTel, as well as large sectors of the war-torn country’s banking, tourism, oil, and aviation sectors. His personal fortune was estimated at $5 billion and he was seen as a symbol of the regime's corruption and nepotism. However, the tycoon has fallen from grace recently. In August he was placed under house arrest by the Assad regime after reportedly refusing to contribute to servicing the regime's war debts. Last week, he posted two videos on Facebook saying he had been mistreated by elements in the regime. The Guernica 37 group used Makhlouf’s own words in the video as evidence against him. "Would someone have expected that the security apparatus would target the companies of Rami Makhlouf, who was their biggest supporter, their major servant, and their largest sponsor during the war?" it quoted him as saying. This, the human rights group said, was "a clear admission of support to the Regime’s State Intelligence and Security Sector, a sector which is responsible for a catalogue of war crimes, crimes against humanity, including systematic torture and mass execution of civilians". It addied that Makhlouf could be held responsible for the financing of strikes against schools and hospitals as well as chemical attacks. Guernica 37 said that it would "be considering the most appropriate legal action" against Makhlouf calling on UAE authorities to arrest him.
"We call on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with whom Makhlouf has long standing links, to honour its international treaty obligations and not to allow its territory to be used a safe haven for those persons accused of supporting the most egregious crimes known to man."
The UAE re-established diplomatic relations with the Assad regime last year and its strongman, Mohammed bin Zayed, recently held a telephone conference with Bashar al-Assad to discuss the coronavirus pandemic. Assad's sister, Bushra, moved to the UAE in 2012 and the country has been a haven for regime figures and their financial activities. The Syrian pound, which has lost most of its value during the country's conflict, declined sharply after Makhlouf made his two videos, with some observers predicting conflict between the tycoon's supporters and Assad’s.

The day after annexation: Israel, Palestine and the one-state reality
Hugh Lovatt/The New Arab/May 05/2020
Annexation will usher in a new one-state paradigm. [Getty]
The countdown to Israel's annexation of the West Bank has begun. The last major obstacle, the approval of the new 'unity' government between Benyamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz by Israel's High Court will likely be passed this week.
There will remain some additional formalities to fulfil, such as completing the work of the joint US-Israel committee tasked with mapping the territory to be annexed.
But Netanyahu, and the settler movement that backs him, will be within touching distance of the Israeli right-wing's cherished dream of creating a State of Greater Israel from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.
It is undoubtedly Palestinians that will suffer the most in the short term from the consequences of annexation and the proliferation of rights abuses against them. Over the longer term, though, it may be Israelis who will lose the most.
Annexation will cause a major political dislocation. It will put paid to what is left of the Oslo-configured Middle East Peace Process that has underpinned the quest for a two-state solution for nearly three decades. In its place, it will usher in a new, but as of yet still largely unsettled, one-state paradigm.
This new phase may play out over a generation. But it is already clear that the central dividing line will be the fight against apartheid and the demand for equal rights for Palestinians within a binational state.
In such a scenario Israelis will face an almost impossible choice from their perspective: either enforcing apartheid through military rule to safeguard Israel's Jewish characteristics or promote democracy through the extension of full rights to all Palestinians, including those in Gaza.
Arguably, the shift towards a one-state paradigm has been underway for some time. The senior Palestinian PLO leadership remains wedded to the concept of two states. But many other Palestinians – particularly amongst younger generations – have long ago reached the conclusion that a viable and truly sovereign Palestinian state has slipped through their grasp.
All, however, agree that Israel's unrelenting drive to settle the occupied West Bank, combined with international timidity, has led to the unravelling of the two-state project over the past years.
Today, beyond the Palestinian Joint List and Meretz, there is no political constituency in Israel that advocates the sort of policy positions and actions that would be needed to achieve an end-of-conflict agreement with the PLO in line with internationally accepted two-state parameters.
Much of this can be attributed to the success and assertiveness of the settler movement which has worked assiduously to mainstream the settlement enterprise at home and abroad.
To the chagrin of settlers, however, successive Israeli governments have avoided extending Israeli sovereignty to the West Bank until now – with the exception of East Jerusalem which was annexed in 1980.
The reasons for such reluctance are multiple and complex – but stem in large part from Israel's desire to preserve a degree of ambiguity concerning the status of the West Bank so as to avoid trapping itself in a binational state where Jews would be on demographic parity with Palestinians.
Thanks to a combination of domestic politics and concerted pressure from the Trump administration, Israel is now finally on the verge of making this formal shift from de facto to de jure annexation.
The Israeli government could decide to start with a limited annexation in order to test international reactions. But it will nevertheless create a precedent that will be seized upon by the settler movement, setting in motion the incremental absorption of all settlements into Israel, and making it almost impossible for any future government to ever contemplate withdrawing from them.
In the process, it will formalise the fragmentation of the Palestinian people and their territory into a series of disconnected Bantustans.
For the sake of ideological maximalism, Israel is sacrificing what has been a relatively sustainable occupation and settlement enterprise whose success is predicated on the vision that a two-state solution is almost, but never quite, within reach.
Without this convenient fig-leaf, the naked one-state reality of open-ended occupation and unequal rights for Palestinians would be visible for all to see. The disappearance of this fig-leaf, courtesy of the settler movement, will bring into stark relief the reality of apartheid that exists on the ground today.
The demise of the current two-state paradigm will offer the Palestinian national movement new opportunities, particularly when it comes to bringing Palestinian refugees (which would have been the main losers of a two-state solution) back into the national fold. But it will also throw up many immediate questions and challenges.
Pivoting towards a demand for equal rights will necessitate an overhaul of the Palestinian national movement, starting with reviving mechanisms for popular representation and mending the current Gaza-West Bank divide.
It will also raise thorny questions as to how the Palestinian movement should relate to the Israeli political system. From a tactical perspective, should Palestinians be demanding equal rights as Israeli citizens and a vote in Knesset elections?
Another immediate question will be the fate of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its institutions. Around half of Palestinians see the PA as a burden, and President Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly threatened to dismantle it.
Yet such a step would come with profound consequences for daily life if Israel is forced to resume direct control over Palestinians.
Such a move could also call into question Palestine's international standing and the hundreds of bilateral agreements signed with third states, and even undermine international measures to exclude Israeli settlements from agreements with Israel.
Last but not least, it could have an impact on proceedings against Israel at the International Criminal Court (ICC) where Palestinian statehood is a core consideration.
These are only some of the fundamental dilemmas that will need to be thought through in order to ensure that Palestinians enter the new paradigm in a stronger - not weaker - position. The burden of charting a way forward must fall first and foremost to Palestinians.
While such discussions are well under way in many parts of Palestinian society, articulating a new one-state strategy that can mobilise the full polity will be a complex, time-consuming – and likely messy – undertaking.
This does not mean that international actors, such as the EU, should wait on the side-lines. Developments over the coming months will create deep uncertainty and anxiety for all involved.
Now more than ever they must hold fast to the core tenets of the international rules-based order while setting down clear markers to guide international engagement going forward.
As Israel edges towards the cliff top, the first task of the international community should be to drive home warnings that annexation, and violation of the UN's Founding Charter, will come with a tangible cost to Israel's international standing and bilateral relations.
The EU and a number of its member states have already begun diplomatic demarches in this regard. Others must follow suit.
While the EU and its international partners are reluctant to call time on the two-state solution absent a clear signal from the PLO, they should be unequivocal in their rejection of open-ended occupation and apartheid.
In the absence of a realistic two-state solution, they should make clear that the only acceptable alternative for achieving equal rights for both peoples will be through a binational state.
*Hugh Lovatt is a policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations based in London

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on May 05-06/2020
Iran Is Airlifting Supplies to Venezuela. The Trump Administration Should Move to Block It.
Emanuele Ottolenghi/FDD/May 04/2020
The Islamic Republic can leverage the Maduro regime's ability to access sanctioned goods as payment for its services.
Amid the global COVID-19 pandemic, Iran has launched an airlift to salvage Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro regime from collapse. On April 22, after a 15-hour journey, a Mahan Air Airbus 340-642 landed at the Las Piedras Josefa Camejo International Airport. Mahan is sanctioned by the U.S. for its support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp. Officially, Iranian commercial planes are carrying desperately needed help for Venezuela’s largest—and the world’s third largest—refinery complex, located in the Paraguana peninsula. Venezuela’s beleaguered economy is running desperately low on gasoline—the result of the Maduro regime’s systematic plundering of the country’s oil economy. Iran has the know-how and the technology to help Venezuela—an ideological ally in its global struggle against the United States.
Yet the benefits for Tehran of having a regular direct flight with South America suggest this is also a pretext to establish a permanent new route, which Mahan Air already announced last year. Before April 22, 2020, Mahan had flown only once to Caracas, in 2019, purportedly to discuss the route. Since last week, there have been daily flights. Disrupting this airlift, and potentially a regular direct service, should be a key priority for the Trump administration.
First, what Iranian planes carry back to Tehran should concern the White House. The Venezuelan regime has all the accoutrements of a sovereign national government. In fact, it is a narco-terrorist state using the trappings of state institutions to plunder natural resources and enrich its self-proclaimed anti-imperialist stalwarts while starving the population of a once wealthy country.
The regime has depleted the country’s oil sector and embezzled its wealth while letting its infrastructure rot. It has precipitated an environmental catastrophe in the Orinoco Delta by allowing—and profiteering from—rampant illicit gold mining. It has turned its socialist government-controlled food and medicine programs into instruments of extortion and racketeering. It has turned the country and its ports into a thriving infrastructure for Latin American drug cartels. Collusion with the cartels includes Maduro and his newly minted minister of petroleum, Tareck El Aissami, the regime’s liaison with Iran and Hezbollah.
Iran is dedicated to its struggle against America, but unlikely to mount such an operation free of charge. As Bloomberg reported yesterday, those planes are carrying back gold bars from the depleted Venezuelan central bank reserves as payment for Iranian assistance—and could also be used to transport other ill-gotten gains, such as cocaine, which Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the real patron of Mahan Air, could quickly turn into much-needed hard currency for its nefarious activities.
Second, direct flights from Iran to Venezuela mean that Iran can also leverage Venezuela’s ability to access sanctioned goods as payment for its services. This type of cooperation is not new. Before 2016, when the Iran nuclear deal removed much of the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran, Caracas repeatedly helped Iran bypass financial sanctions: The two countries established joint ventures in the banking and automotive industry sectors, and large infrastructure projects in Venezuela were awarded to Iranian companies with regime ties. Between 2007 and 2010, the two countries operated a weekly flight between their capitals (with a stopover in Damascus), which was aptly nicknamed “aeroterror,” given that, despite being advertised as a commercial service, it was accessible only to regime-connected passengers on official business and rumored to ferry drugs and weapons.
Venezuela is now under its own significant sanctions pressure from the U.S. and offers diminishing returns to Tehran. Regardless, its geographic location makes it easier to transfer goods procured on Latin American markets to Iran by plane. Iran can rely on vast networks in Latin America, many of which are linked to local Hezbollah financiers. Over the years, these networks have become involved in numerous illicit activities, including money laundering for drug cartels and gunrunning.
The individuals comprising these networks are usually Lebanese or Iranian nationals holding a local passport from the Latin American country where they reside. Their companies are locally registered and not subject to any sanctions regime. They have no difficulty buying directly from the U.S., including, potentially, dual-use technology—such as commercial drones, some of whose components could be repurposed for military projects. A direct flight from Caracas would help deliver these goods to Iran.
Third and lastly, the credibility of U.S. sanctions is at stake. Mahan Air has been under U.S. sanctions since 2011. It has decades of experience evading sanctions on behalf of Iran’s regime. It helped transport military equipment to Syria’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, in the early stages of his ruthless repression of Syria’s initially peaceful Arab Spring. But by the summer of 2015, with Assad almost overrun by rebels, Mahan became the backbone of Iran’s airlift of military equipment and trained Shi’a militias to Damascus.
Had it not been for that airlift, it is doubtful the Assad regime would have won the civil war and reasserted itself. Assad was able to get away with gassing his citizens, murdering 500,000 people, and displacing half of his country. He owes much of that to Mahan Air.
Very much like with Assad, Iran does not want to see Maduro go—Caracas, after all, has become, since the early 2000s, Iran’s forward operating base in Latin America. Mahan, with its experience, can deliver this result.
That is especially the case because, alone among Iranian commercial airlines, Mahan has the long-range aircraft capable of flying the distance between Iran and Venezuela. Mahan Air procured the aircraft in May 2015, while the Obama administration was negotiating the Iran deal in Vienna with Iran’s regime. In a stunning undercover operation, Mahan arranged the simultaneous delivery of nine aircraft (including eight Airbus A340-642 planes) that month. U.S. sanctions designated only one of the deal’s mediators—a small Iraqi airline and its owner—and the aircraft. The planes kept flying, though, servicing European capitals until recently, when U.S. pressure led to the cancellation of those routes. (The aircraft still services China routes and may have been involved in bringing COVID-19 to Iran.)
To see these planes, five years later, crisscrossing the Atlantic on their way to Caracas, is proof-positive that U.S. sanctions bite only if properly enforced. The Obama administration sanctioned the aircraft procurement in May 2015 more because of the embarrassment it caused its negotiators than out of a real desire to wreak havoc to Mahan’s operations.
The Trump administration has already shown a willingness to reverse its predecessor’s inaction against Mahan Air, when it persuaded Germany, France, Italy, and Spain to cancel Mahan Air routes. It now has the opportunity to exert its leverage with allies and disrupt the Venezuela flights.
U.S. sanctions under Executive Order 13224—the legal vector utilized against Mahan Air—not only forbid U.S. persons from engaging in any type of transaction with and from providing assistance to the sanctioned airline. Non-U.S. persons too may incur penalties—such measures are referred to as secondary sanctions. Mahan aircraft traveling to and from Caracas fly over six countries—Armenia, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal—before they reach the Atlantic Ocean. Each time an aircraft transits a country’s airspace, it needs to pay overflight fees. In recent days, they have also stopped over in Algiers on their way to (but not back from) Venezuela.
In the specific case of Iran’s flights to Venezuela, payments go through EuroControl, a centralized agency in charge of collecting payments for 41 member states, including all six countries (minus Algeria) whose airspace Mahan transits on its way to Venezuela. Payments are in euros, once a month, by credit card or bank wire transfer. This type of service could arguably qualify as a violation of U.S. secondary sanctions.
To be sure, these are not large payments—fees may be in the range of a few thousand euros per round trip. Still, while the price tag is small, if EuroControl member states closed their airspace to Venezuela-bound Iranian aircraft, Mahan would likely be unable to reach its destination without a technical stopover.
Here is why. A Mahan Airbus 340-642’s maximum range is 14,450 kilometers, or 7,800 nautical miles. The distance between Tehran’s international airport and Caracas is 6,358 nautical miles. To get to Las Piedras airport, in Paraguana, Mahan Air needs to fly an extra 90 nautical miles. That leaves 1,400 miles in the fuel tanks. But if Mahan flight routes were stretched in order to bypass airspace restrictions, its planes cannot reach their destination.
With EuroControl member states’ airspace shut, Mahan aircraft would have to take a lengthy detour, which would put them out of range of Caracas. Its planes would have to find a midpoint—likely in West Africa—to make a refueling stopover. They would become vulnerable to U.S. forfeiture action and, especially on their way back, would likely risk inspection, making their mysterious cargo on the journey back vulnerable.
There is a lot at stake for the Trump administration if Iran’s airlift to Venezuela continues unimpeded. The president should remind allies and friends that letting Mahan aircraft slip through their airspace—much like letting their aircraft land in their airports—is not just a violation of U.S. sanctions subject to penalties. It is bad policy. Venezuela needs all the help the international community can muster—but not at the price of keeping a criminal regime in power. Washington should stop those flights.
Emanuele Ottolenghi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @eottolenghi. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

A Large Majority Of US House Members Call For Extension Of Iran Arms Embargo
Radio Farda/May 05/2020
A large majority of U.S. legislators on both sides of the aisle called on President Donald Trump's administration on Monday, May 4, to push for an extension of a United Nations arms embargo on Iran.
In a new letter to the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, 387 bipartisan members of the House of Representatives urged the State Department on Monday to apply "robust diplomacy" to renew the embargo as well as travel restrictions on people aiding in Iran’s proliferation activities.
The embargo expires on October 18.
"We are concerned that the ban’s expiration will lead to more states buying and selling weapons to and from Iran," the members wrote. "Additionally, states concerned about Iran’s malign activities may feel they do not have sufficient legal authority to stop transfers once the U.N. embargo expires."
They advised the department to work with "allies and like-minded partners" to rally support to extend the embargo and "make clear to the international community that U.S. sanctions on Iranian arms transfers remain in place and will be fully enforced."
United Nations Security Council members vote on the Iran resolution at the UN headquarters in New York on July 20, 2015. FILE PHOTO
SEE ALSO:
Iran Threatens Extending Arms Embargo Will Endanger Regional Security
The bipartisan group is led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel, New York Democrat, and ranking member Michael McCaul Rep-texas, as well as Stephanie Murphy Dem Florida, and Brian Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania Republican, and encompasses more than three-quarters of all House members.
The current arms embargo on Iran was adopted in 2015 in conjunction with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Tehran's nuclear deal with world powers, China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.S., and the U.K.
Under the deal, Iran agreed to halt its sensitive nuclear work in exchange for sanctions relief.
After extending the JCPOA for four consecutive times, Washington ultimately dropped the deal on May 8, 2018, and imposed batches of economic sanctions on the Shi'ite clergy-dominated Iran.
Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo has already said the United States may unilaterally trigger the "snapback" option in the JCPOA, which would restore a broad array of international sanctions because Iran is not complying with the deal. The snapback provisions apply to all parties to the deal once they are triggered by a single party.
Meanwhile, Pompeo has noted that he is also open to working with allies to extend the embargo through other means.
However, referring to Washington's withdrawal from the JCPOA, critics argue that the Trump administration is not a party to the deal; therefore, it is not in a position to exploit the trigger mechanism of the agreement to sanction Iran.
"The United States is not a member of the nuclear deal anymore ... Iran's reaction to America's illegal measures will be firm," the spokesman of the Islamic Republic Foreign Ministry, Abbas Mousavi said.
Furthermore, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, warned in a tweet last Sunday that the nuclear deal "will die forever" by "circumventing (UN Security Council) 2231 Resolution & continuing Iran's illegal weapons sanction".

Iran Changes the Rules of the Game with Satellite Launch
Munqith Dagher/ the Washington Institute/May 04/2020
Munqith Dagher is the CEO of the Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS).
On April 22, Iran announced the successful launch of its first Noor satellite into orbit by the IRGC after several previous failed attempts, a feat confirmed by NORAD. Despite the practical and scientific importance of this achievement, no less important is that the launch demonstrates Iran’s ability to manufacture the missile that carried this satellite into orbit using both liquid and solid fuel. Moreover, the demonstrated range of the satellite suggests that, in theory, Iran is now capable of launching a missile that can reach targets on U.S. soil.
Iran’s successful development of this type of intercontinental space missile has changed the rules of the military-political game it has been playing with the United States. Even with the many other factors currently at play in U.S.-Iran tensions, the satellite launch will have serious repercussions on future relations between the two countries—already at a nadir.
What remains to be seen, however, is how these repercussions will unfold, and who will be able to take advantage of this new situation. In response to the launch, Pompeo has stated that all countries of the world must condemn this glaring Iranian violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which states that “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Iran has responded by insisting that its missile activities are for peaceful purposes. It is true that the current launch featured a satellite rather than a warhead, but the technology is equivalent. The United States has unequivocally rejected this claim and is likely to call for a UN Security Council session to discuss potential responses.
Yet while the legalities of the launch can be debated, the immediate repercussions of this latest development will almost certainly escalate the U.S.-Iran conflict to a new and dangerous level. Concern over Iranian missile developments has characterized the Trump administration’s messaging and policy towards Iran. Back in March 2018, when Iranian missiles had much shorter demonstrated ranges, the U.S. administration via Pompeo insisted that a halt on Iranian ballistic missile activity served as one of its twelve conditions for lifting its heavy sanctions on Iran.
The crucial question now seems to be why Iran chose the current moment to stage this landmark launch, and whether Iranian officials erred in their timing. There are several factors already impacting recent U.S.-Iranian tensions. Aside from the recent targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, the devastating effects of coronavirus on both Iran and the United States have not stopped either from making statements against the other or, in the U.S. case, imposing new sanctions.
From the Iranian perspective, however, the upcoming U.S. elections are key for understanding the future trajectory of these tensions. Iranian officials appear to have been hoping for an electoral defeat of Trump in the upcoming U.S. elections in November. These officials see Democrats as likely being more flexible in dealing with the Iranian issue, especially given presidential candidate Joe Biden’s role in securing congressional approval for the JCPOA during the Obama administration. The idea of Iran possessing long-range missiles that threaten not only Israel and Saudi Arabia—longstanding U.S. allies—but America too, especially as those missiles have the ability to carry nuclear warheads, is a strategic game changer in the relationship between the United States and Iran.
As such, Iran’s decision to test the satellite launch capability now is somewhat puzzling. The move appears to provide a major justification for Trump’s policies vis-à-vis Iran. Although American foreign policy is not necessarily an important consideration for most American voters—especially given the country’s current domestic economic challenges—this latest development gives a window for the Trump team to bolster his image among his loyal base as a strong, resolute leader needed against a major challenge. Likewise, the concrete threat of a missile launch provides an easy way for Trump to stoke the fears of his base voters, which is an essential element of victory for a politician like Trump, who depends on such strategies for his electoral success.
The launch also appears to put the United States in a better position on the international stage. The world’s nations that have supported the Iranian position regarding the nuclear agreement so far will have difficulty taking the same stance now that Iran has revealed its new missile capability.
Because of how the missile launch may affect U.S. policy toward Iran, it is unclear whether the more moderate forces of Iran, such as the president and the foreign ministry, will welcome the timing of this missile launch. This is of particular importance since one of the current U.S. administration’s oft-repeated talking points when voicing its dissatisfaction with the nuclear agreement signed by the Obama administration is that this agreement did not address the issue of ballistic missiles, which represent a threat to global and regional security.
Moreover, the Iranian foreign ministry’s campaign to promote Iran’s position and to attack America’s always focuses on two basic elements: the legal element, wherein Iran is committed to international law, as well as the humanitarian cost of U.S. sanctions, based on Iran as a peaceful nation that does not pose a threat to regional or international peace. These two crucial elements of Iran’s defense now face a serious challenge because of the implications of the launch of its satellite.
Given all these factors, the satellite launch must be seen not as a policy supported by the entire Iranian state apparatus, but rather as a victory for the IRGC over other streams of Iranian authorities—the newest event in a years-long power struggle that can also be seen in the IRGC’s proactive approach to coronavirus relief efforts. In contrast to elements more interested in negotiations, the IRGC strategy has long built itself around threats, creating a type of brinksmanship used successfully during the Obama administration that prompted Western countries to sit and work out a good deal with Iran.
It is clear that the struggle for influence and power between the civilian authorities of Iran and the IRGC has been evolving over the last couple of years. The temporary resignation of Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif back in February, 2019 after IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani invited Syria’s Assad to visit Tehran without informing him was one very public indication of this rift. The targeted killing of Soleimani almost a year later has threatened to increase the power of the official, civilian Iranian institutions, such as the presidency, foreign ministry, national security ministry, and others. The designation of Mustafa Khadimi as prime minister in Iraq represents another loss for the IRGC parallel state as the latter views him as relatively close to the United States.
By launching this satellite by means of the ballistic missile, the IRGC has sent a clear message that it has no intention of losing ground to the official, civilian institutions of Iran. This struggle will likely continue to be a prominent feature of Iranian politics as the country works to rebuild after coronavirus, and is likely to gain more momentum if the powerful yet elderly supreme leader passes away.
Now that Iran has made a major change to the status quo, it is up to the United States for the next move. How, and whether the United States will respond to the satellite launch will dictate the direction of this new chapter in the tensions between the two countries.
As this new threat is likely to go through a thorough evaluation by the U.S. government, there should be an internal consensus within U.S. institutions that this missile launch represents a clear and present danger to U.S. security. The U.S. administration should also coordinate its reactions to this serious threat with its Western allies rather than unilaterally addressing the issue. While the United States and its allies have not necessarily agreed on an approach to Iran in the past, Iran’s most recent actions should be a clear sign that there is a serious threat developing. And in recognizing the different powers at play in Iran, the United States should also work to initiate communication channels with the civilian channels within the Iranian state while maintaining pressure on the IRGC. Encouraging relatively moderate forces during an internal power struggle is an advantageous alternative to escalating the current confrontation with the regime.
Whatever the solution, the rules of game in the showdown between the United States and Iran have changed. Just as the world after coronavirus will be different from what preceded it, so too will the realities of the US-Iranian relationship after the launch of the Noor satellite, and those differences must be acknowledged and understood.
*Fikra Forum is an initiative of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The views expressed by Fikra Forum contributors are the personal views of the individual authors, and are not necessarily endorsed by the Institute, its staff, Board of Directors, or Board of Advisors.​​

The U.S.-Iraqi Relationship Is Coming to a Head—and That’s a Good Thing
John Hannah & Maseh Zarif/FDD/May 05/2020
After 17 years, there is little love left between Washington and Baghdad. Upcoming talks may be the last opportunity to save their dysfunctional partnership.
n June, the United States and Iraq will launch a “strategic dialogue” that is supposed to address all issues in their bilateral relationship, including the presence of U.S. forces. With Iraq now serving as ground zero in the escalating confrontation between the United States and Iran, it’s hard not to feel like the U.S.-Iraqi relationship might be coming to a head. That is a good thing, and the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should make sure that it does.
It’s high time that Washington reassessed its Iraq policy. Over the past year, the relationship has grown increasingly dysfunctional from the standpoint of U.S. interests.Over the past year, the relationship has grown increasingly dysfunctional from the standpoint of U.S. interests. Iraqi security services have brutally killed hundreds of innocent civilians for peacefully protesting the government’s rampant failings. Iran has systematically exploited the Iraqi economy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Worst of all, Iranian-backed militias—some sanctioned by the United States, most on Baghdad’s payroll—have conducted several rocket attacks against U.S. troops, diplomats, and private-sector actors, with the Iraqi government holding no one to account.
This situation is not sustainable. Since 2003, year in and year out, the United States has provided Iraq with hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military assistance, as well as crucial diplomatic backing. That support was premised on the assumption that Iraq would emerge over time as a key partner in preserving stability and security in the Middle East. Instead, the Iraqi government today is headed increasingly in the opposite direction, visiting horrific levels of violence on its own people, while standing aside as its territory, institutions, and economy are subverted by the United States’ most dangerous foe in the region, Iran.
The upcoming strategic dialogue offers what could be the last chance to reverse this destructive trajectory and salvage a viable long-term U.S. partnership with Iraq. This opportunity should not be squandered.
At the heart of the Trump administration’s approach should be the introduction of much stricter conditionality of U.S. support. This is a matter of necessity as much as choice. The COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout will put unprecedented strains on the U.S. budget for years to come. Going forward, there will be no tolerance for foreign assistance programs that fail to pay visible dividends for U.S. interests—let alone those which appear to be strengthening enemies such as Iran. The time has come for some hard choices to be put before the Iraqi government. It needs to be brought to the full realization of how much it has to lose if it doesn’t begin demonstrating at least some minimal resolve to resist Iranian imperialism and fight for Iraqi sovereignty.
The Trump administration is seeking more than $600 million this fiscal year to help train and equip Iraqi security forces in the ongoing fight against the remnants of the Islamic State. That’s on top of the critical contributions that the U.S. military provides to Iraqi counterterrorism operations in terms of logistics, intelligence, and combat air power. The administration is also requesting more than $120 million to support the Iraqi economy and for other programs, including land mine removal. In addition, the United States has long served as Iraq’s key advocate in gaining access to billions of dollars of economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Perhaps most important, however, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York maintains a dollar account for Iraqi foreign reserves and annually ships the country billions of dollars’ worth of $100 bills to keep its cash-based economy afloat and functioning.
Needless to say, much of this assistance would be irreplaceable. Iran is certainly in no position to supply it. Absent U.S. support, Iraq’s economic and security situation, already dire, would slide ever closer to disaster. Especially in the context of the current collapse in world oil prices (the source of 90 percent of Iraq’s government revenues), the last thing Iraq can afford to lose is the political, economic, and military backing of its most powerful international benefactor.
That constitutes significant leverage for the U.S. going into the June discussions—if it’s prepared to use it. That leverage would be even higher if Washington let Baghdad know that its growing acquiescence to Iranian hegemony could increasingly put Iraq in the crosshairs of more punitive U.S. measures—from travel bans and asset freezes against senior political leaders to targeted strikes against sanctioned militia commanders. Even restrictions on Iraq’s ability to sell oil, similar to the sanctions against Iran, could be credibly put on the table, especially at a moment when global markets are massively oversupplied by as much as 20 million barrels of oil per day.
To further bolster the U.S. bargaining position, a serious contingency plan should also be developed to consolidate all U.S. forces in Iraq to the relative safety of the country’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Unlike the Iraqi political elite, the Kurdish government and security forces are universally supportive of the United States’ military presence and have gone out of their way to combat threats to U.S. troops and diplomats they host. From a secure foothold in a pro-U.S. Kurdistan, the United States would still be able to conduct essential counterterrorism missions against the Islamic State, including in Syria, but without the severe force protection concerns that currently constrain its operations elsewhere in Iraq. Having significantly reduced the vulnerability of its troops, the United States would arguably also have greater flexibility to take action, as needed, against the continued threat posed by Iran and its militia proxies.
In exchange for its continued support, the United States should keep its demands of the Iraqi government limited and realistic. No matter how much pressure Washington might apply, Iraq will not go to war with Iran.No matter how much pressure Washington might apply, Iraq will not go to war with Iran. Nor will it act to eradicate militias overnight. But the administration can legitimately insist that the Iraqi government start taking meaningful, but realistic steps that, first and foremost, stand up for Iraq’s sovereignty, while simultaneously addressing several core U.S. concerns.
Politically, the violent repression of peaceful protests should end. Elements of the security services and militias responsible for the worst atrocities must be held to account through a credible process of investigation, prosecution, and punishment. A serious national dialogue with the protest movement should be established.

Chinese Trade With Persian Gulf Region Grows Despite Pandemic
Saeed Ghasseminejad/FDD/May 05/2020
Chinese customs data for the first three months of 2020 show an increase in both exports to and imports from the Persian Gulf despite a 6.8 percent contraction of Beijing’s GDP brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. The resilience of China’s trade relations with the Persian Gulf states, despite pandemic-related disruptions, indicates the potential for Beijing to further enhance its influence in the region.
With ample currency reserves and a growing demand for oil, China can serve as a reliable customer for the crude exports on which regional economies depend. At a time when both parties in Washington are increasingly hesitant to defend America’s strategic position in the Gulf, China may be poised to benefit from this uncertainty.
The plunge in Chinese GDP represents the first contraction Beijing has reported since it began to publish growth figures in 1992. Likewise, the International Monetary Fund forecasts negative growth in 2020 for the eight countries in the region, although the Fund expects a strong recovery in 2021. (See Table 1)
The pandemic’s impact on Persian Gulf economies reflects a sharp decrease in the price of oil that has compounded the impact of restrictive public health measures. Foreign demand for oil has fallen sharply, but a Saudi decision to flood the market was also instrumental into bringing the price per barrel for Brent Crude down to roughly $20, or one-third of its price at the end of January.
While the contraction of Chinese GDP led to a 13.3 percent decline in exports and a 2.9 percent reduction in imports overall in the first quarter, Beijing’s exports to the Persian Gulf as well as its imports from the region both rose in that period. Imports rose 4.5 percent, mainly on the strength of a 14.2 increase by value in crude oil purchases. Exports to the region rose mainly because of increased purchases by Saudi Arabia and Iran, which offset falling numbers for the region’s other six countries.
Beijing’s trade relations with the Persian Gulf are lopsided; the region’s eight countries send twice as much to China in the form of exports as they buy in imports. In the first quarter of 2020, the region took $17.9 billion of Chinese imports, while sending back $37.1 billion of exports. Of that number, $27.9 billion, or three-quarters, consisted of crude oil. China imported $59 billion of crude during the first quarter, so Persian Gulf oil comprised nearly half of Chinese imports.
There is also unevenness in China’s relations with the eight countries that border Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates take in about two-thirds of Chinese goods, in keeping with the greater size of their economies compared to their neighbors. Meanwhile the Saudis sell more than one-third of the Persian Gulf oil that goes to China, with Iraq providing another fifth. (See Table 2 and Table 3)
Iran is an outlier because U.S. sanctions have had a dramatic impact on its exports of crude oil to China, even though Beijing refuses to abide fully Washington’s restrictions. Thus, sales of Iranian crude fell by more than half from the first quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of the current year – the U.S. imposed a total ban on Iranian oil exports in May 2019. Meanwhile, Iranian imports from China increased almost 16 percent, in contrast to declines registered by every other Persian Gulf country except Saudi Arabia. This change likely reflects the intensification of sanctions as well, since European firms have mostly severed ties to Iran.
As noted above, a sharp rise in spending on Persian Gulf oil drove the overall increase in Chinese imports from the region. China bought $27.9 billion of oil from the region, up from $24.4 billion in the first quarter of 2019, an increase of 14 percent by value. By volume, China imported 59 million tonnes of crude oil from Persian Gulf in the first quarter of this year, an 11.5 percent increase over the 53 million tonnes it imported in the first quarter of 2019.
Monthly data for 2020 show the dramatic impact of price fluctuations on the cost of oil purchases. Customs data show that China imported about 86 million tonnes (43 million tonnes on average per month) of crude oil at a cost of roughly $42.2 billion ($21.1 billion on average per month) in the first two months of 2020. Then in March, the data shows imports of 41 million tonnes at a cost of only $16.7 billion – a 20 percent decrease in value despite only a five percent decrease in volume.
Fluctuations in value likely do not explain why the Persian Gulf countries’ share of Chinese crude imports rose 47.2 percent in the first quarter, up from 43.8 percent in the same period in 2019. This increase is especially notable in light of an 83 percent decrease by value in Chinese imports from Iran, leaving Iran with less than 1 percent market share by value. The region as a whole more than made up for this loss thanks to sizable increase the value of crude sold to China by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Oman.
The resilience of Persian Gulf trade relations with China bears watching. If the Persian Gulf states sense that the U.S. lacks a commitment to the region, they may become more solicitous of Beijing’s interests, given their trade relations. Chinese ties to the region have deepened consistently over the past two decades, and Beijing has the ample currency reserves necessary to sustain its oil purchases. Its lack of scruple regarding human rights is also an advantage for almost all Persian Gulf States. Yet China does not appear eager to take sides in regional disputes; thus, given the likelihood that Iran’s clerical regime will persist in its efforts to destabilize its neighbors, the United States has much to offer if it does not retreat from the region.
**Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior Iran and financial economics advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP).

What Russia is up to in Syria
Lamont Colucci/The Hill/May 05/2020
Although the world has ground to a near-standstill as a result of COVID-19, America’s foreign policy problems have not disappeared. To the contrary, many are becoming much worse, as dictators across the globe forge ahead with their destructive plans.
Russia’s recent machinations in Syria are a case in point. The Kremlin’s 2015 decision to enter the Syrian civil war on the side of dictator Bashar al-Assad was informed by the “Putin Doctrine,” which had been laid out by Russia’s president in 2008 and the chief focus of which is blunting American influence globally while increasing Russia’s regional status and ability to project power. The subsequent Russian incursion was a prime example of a marriage of Tsarist imperialism and Soviet expansionism: Although Syria’s Ba’athist state does not border the old Soviet empire, it served as a critical piece to Soviet strategy during the decades of the Cold War — and today, of Russia’s, too.
Russia’s activities there over the past half-decade, in turn, have yielded concrete dividends for the Kremlin. Under the guise of an ongoing struggle against ISIS and other “wahhabists,” Moscow has transformed the country into a laboratory for the testing of weapons, technology, strategy, and tactics. In a reflection of this role, the Russian High Command has termed Syria a model for training and its operations there a “strategy of limited action.”
Today, some 5,000 Russian troops, primarily military advisors, special forces, and air support personnel are estimated to operate in Syria. Russia continues to supply Assad with weapons and gives the Syrian dictator much needed diplomatic backing on the international stage. Russian airstrikes, a critical component of the Assad regime’s continued survival, have been directed primarily against rebel forces fighting Assad rather than against ISIS.
These airstrikes, moreover, have indiscriminately targeted Syrian civilians; according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the total civilian death toll in Syria since March 2011 was 226,247, with at least 6,514 of them killed directly by the Russians. Other estimates put the number closer to 8,400. Further, the United Nations has accused Russia of engaging in war crimes through indiscriminate airstrikes against civilians that have terrorized the population and displaced large numbers of Syrian people.
Moscow has learned from its past military mistakes, however. Unlike the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Russia has been very measured in its commitment to the Syrian battlefield. The Russian government has prioritized the use of stand-off tactics (like aerial strikes) and military contractors. The results speak for themselves; as of last Spring, the Kremlin has officially confirmed just 116 Russian fatalities.
At the same time, Russia has put a premium on strengthening its military foothold in the country. It has reinforced its naval presence in the southern port city of Tartus, erected an airbase at Hmeimim, and created military encampments elsewhere in the country. For these facilities, Moscow has managed to secure long-term, open-ended leasing arrangements from the Assad government, which remains weak and is eager to see Russia stay and provide security protection.
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Economically, Russia has deftly exploited Syria’s precarious situation. Its energy conglomerate Stroytransgaz (which has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department) dominates the Syrian energy sector, developing gas fields whose revenue feeds Assad’s killing machine. The company has secured contracts for exploiting hydrocarbons in eastern Syria, completing pipelines linking Syria and Jordan, multiple gas processing plants, and is given preferential treatment by the Assad regime.
These activities, and Russia’s continued presence in Syria, represent a threat to American interests. They help to undermine U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. They have allowed the Kremlin to reemerge as a serious player in regional politics and begin to shape Middle Eastern affairs in its image. And they have helped to strengthen Russia’s long-standing ties to Iran, which is also aiding Syria, and which the Trump administration continues to seek to isolate and contain. As such, Moscow’s machinations should be understood for what they are, a serious national security concern for the United States, and should be treated as such by Washington.
*Lamont Colucci is senior fellow for national security affairs at the nonprofit American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.

Europe Prepares for More Lockdown Easing as Virus Hopes Rise
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 05/2020
Europe on Sunday prepared for a further cautious easing of coronavirus restrictions following signs the pandemic may be slowing, with hard-hit Italy set to follow Spain in allowing people outside.
More than 243,000 people have been killed and 3.4 million infected worldwide by the virus, which has left half of humanity under some form of lockdown and pushed the global economy towards its worst downturn since the Great Depression. With signs that the spread of the contagion has been brought under control, parts of Europe, Asia and the United States have begun to lift restrictions to try to inject life into economies crippled by weeks of closures and ease the pressure from populations wearying of confinement.
After a two-month lockdown in Italy -- with the second-highest number of virus deaths in the world -- people on Monday will be allowed to stroll in parks and visit relatives. Restaurants can open for takeaway and wholesale stores can resume business, but there was some confusion about the extent of the easing.
"I'm hoping this morning's paper will clear up some of the many questions about what we can and can't do," said Pietro Garlanti, a 53-year-old cleaner, as he queued at a kiosk. "I want to take my old mum to the sea-side, can I?"
Italian authorities have stressed that preventative measures are still needed.
"On the one hand, we're super excited for the reopening, we're already organizing various activities the kids will be able to do with their grandparents outdoors, workshops in the garden, that sort of thing. The kids can't wait to see them," said Marghe Lodoli, who has three children. "On the other hand, it's disorientating. The rules are not clear, and we're not sure if just using common sense will do." Elsewhere in Europe, Germany will continue its easing on Monday, while Slovenia, Poland and Hungary will allow public spaces and businesses to partially reopen. With health experts warning the disease could hit hard once again, governments are sticking to measures to control the spread of the virus and more testing to try to track infections even as they relax curbs on movement.
Face masks will be mandatory on public transport starting Monday in Spain, where people were allowed to go outdoors on Saturday after a 48-day lockdown.
Lockdowns ease in Asia
With pressure growing on governments worldwide to balance public health requirements with the need to ease intense economic pain, some nations in Asia announced similar measures. South Korea -- once the second worst-hit nation on the planet -- said Sunday it would ease a ban on some gatherings and events as long as they "follow disinfection measures". Thailand meanwhile allowed businesses such as restaurants, hair salons and outdoor markets to reopen on Sunday so long as social distancing was maintained and temperature checks carried out. Despite the reopenings, experts have cautioned that many countries are still not through the worst of their outbreaks yet. In the latest sign that the pandemic remains a serious threat, the Philippines suspended all flights into and out of the country for a week starting Sunday in a bid to ease the pressure on its congested quarantine facilities. And to boost morale in what many expect to be a long fight, the armed forces of India -- where the world's biggest lockdown is in force -- organised tributes to the nation's medical workers, including helicopters showering petals on hospitals. Elsewhere, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that mosques would reopen across large parts of the Islamic Republic, after they were closed in early March to try to contain the Middle East's deadliest COVID-19 outbreak. Rouhani warned, however, that while Iran would reopen "calmly and gradually", it should also prepare for "bad scenarios".
'Beyond breaking point'
Across the Pacific, the pressure to ease virus measures is intense on leaders in the United States, where the economy has been hammered with tens of millions left jobless. The United States has the most coronavirus deaths in the world and President Donald Trump is keen for a turnaround to help reduce the economic pain. Florida is set to ease its lockdown on Monday, as authorities in other states wrestle with pressure from demonstrators -- some armed -- who have protested against the lockdowns. There are signs that the pandemic is slowing down in some parts of the United States.
In New York City, the epicenter of the U.S. outbreak, an emergency field hospital erected in Central Park is set to close, the Christian charity running it said Saturday, as virus cases decline in the city. But authorities are wary of letting their guard down too fast, with fears the virus could wreak havoc in the most vulnerable communities in the United States. A massive wave of infections is sweeping through America's prison population -- the world's largest at 2.3 million -- with coronavirus deaths on the rise in jails and penitentiaries across the country. Riots over inadequate protection and slow responses by authorities have already taken place in prisons in Washington state and Kansas. "Things are beyond breaking point at this facility," said Brian Miller, an officer at the Marion prison in Ohio. "Right now it's hell."

Updated UK Virus Toll Becomes World's Second Highest
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 05/2020
Britain's death toll from the coronavirus has topped 32,000, according to an updated official count released Tuesday, pushing the country past Italy to become the second-most impacted after the United States. The new toll, from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and regional health bodies, has not yet been incorporated into the government's daily figures, which records the current number of deaths as 29,427. That is still higher than Italy, which on Tuesday said it has recorded 29,316 virus fatalities to date, but far short of the US where nearly 69,000 have died in the pandemic. However, British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab urged against trying to make reliable international comparisons. "There are different ways of counting deaths... we now publish data that includes all deaths in all settings and not all countries do that," he said at the daily Downing Street press conference.
"Can you reliably know that all countries are measuring in the same way? And it also depends on how good, frankly, countries are in gathering their statistics."
Raab called the lives lost "a massive tragedy" and "something in this country, on this scale, in this way, that we've never seen before". Tuesday's updated statistics, showing 32,313 total deaths by around April 24, means Britain has probably had the highest official death numbers in Europe for days.
'Real verdict'
The toll has jumped dramatically on several occasions as the ONS -- which tallies all deaths -- has regularly updated its count. The agency releases figures weekly, covers periods up to two weeks prior and includes coronavirus deaths in care homes and the community. Until late last month, the health ministry's daily tallies only counted those who died in hospital after having tested positive for COVID-19. Even after it began to include all fatalities with the virus listed on the death certificate, its totals have been far short of the later ONS totals.
They have risen dramatically as the extent of the pandemic's impact on care homes has emerged. Nearly 6,400 people with coronavirus have died in care homes in England alone, with numbers still rising even as the wider outbreak slows. More than 2,000 of those were reported in the last week of April -- when Prime Minister Boris Johnson said Britain was "past the peak".  Meanwhile the ONS has also recorded a total of around 42,000 "excess deaths" -- how many more people have died in total than would normally be expected -- in the past five weeks. It suggests Britain's true death toll from the virus may be even higher. "I don't think we'll get a real verdict on how well countries have done until the pandemic is over," Raab added. Britain, in its seventh week of an economically crippling lockdown, is trying to implement a new contact tracing strategy so it can ease the measures. Johnson is expected to set out his plan to lift the stringent social distancing regime next Sunday, according to media reports.

COVID-19 and Living with Canada's PM Trudeau 'Not Easy,' Says Wife
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/May 05/2020
Being sick with COVID-19 and living under the same roof as the prime minister of Canada and their three young children was "not easy," the wife of Justin Trudeau, who contracted the disease in March, said Tuesday.
"My husband worked from 7.00 am to 9.00 pm in his office, then I was the one with the children, so I had to be extremely careful," Sophie Gregoire-Trudeau told public broadcaster Radio-Canada.
"I was alone with the children, I had to distance myself, I had gloves, a mask and everything, but it was not easy," she said. Trudeau and his family self-isolated for weeks at Rideau Cottage -- the prime minister's official residence in Ottawa -- after his wife was diagnosed with coronavirus upon her return from a speaking engagement in London. The disease "struck hard for more than a week," said Gregoire-Trudeau, describing how she had "lost the sense of smell and taste" and had to deal with "headaches, body aches everywhere, indigestion, nausea."
She let out a laugh when asked if she was afraid of contaminating the prime minister of a G7 country, but quickly added: "I laugh but it is not funny. I think that in all families, we try to cope, then there's the social distancing."
"But after that, I got back on my feet. And then the children, I think they use up a lot of our energy," she said. Officially virus-free since March 28, she says she has recovered her sense of smell and taste, but finds that "it's not like it was before."
c has since moved with their children, aged 6 to 12, into the prime minister's summer residence at Harrington Lake in Quebec. She hailed health care workers on the front line as "heroes." "Let us be clear, these people demonstrate courage, perseverance, I would even say a vision of a society," said Gregoire-Trudeau, whose mother was a nurse.

Defense officials: Iran pulling out of Syria as Israel pummels its forces there
Judahari Gross/Times Of Israel/May 05/2020
Amid increased reports of IDF strikes on Tehran-linked bases, security officials say Israel wants to make clear to Damascus that Iran is a burden, not an ally
Iranian forces are pulling out of Syria and closing military bases there, Israeli defense officials said Tuesday, amid increasing reports of Israeli airstrikes on Iran-linked militias in the country in recent months, including two such incidents late Monday night in which 14 Iran-linked fighters were reported killed.
The Israeli officials refused to comment on these reported attacks, maintaining Israel’s policy of ambiguity, under which it generally acknowledges taking action against Iran in Syria without specifically confirming individual strikes, under the assumption that public confirmation increases the likelihood of retaliation.
Though Israel’s fight against Iran in Syria has been ongoing for nearly a decade, after Tehran began sending its troops and its proxies into Syria at the outbreak of the country’s civil war in 2011, recent months have seen an increase in the number of strikes against Iran-linked sites in the country, targeting locations across the country with the highest concentration around Syria’s capital Damascus.
The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that this effort appears to be bearing fruit as Iranian forces have begun leaving the country, evacuating a small number of military bases previously under their control in the process. Independently, there has also been a drop in the number of Shiite militias operating in Syria, though this decrease is because of the natural progression of the civil war and not because of Israel’s actions.
The officials said that while Israel does not believe the Iranians will accept these setbacks without responding in some way, an imminent retaliation does not appear to be in the offing.
“We are determined, more determined [than Iran], and I can tell you why — for Iran, Syria is an adventure happening 1,000 kilometers away from home. For us, it’s our lives,” Defense Minister Naftali Bennett said Tuesday.
“Iranian soldiers who come to Syria and operate there, their lives are in their hands. They are putting their lives at risk, they are paying that price and will continue to do so. We will not give up and we will not allow the establishment of an Iranian forward operating base in Syria,” Bennett said.
The number of transport flights from Iran to Syria, bringing advanced munitions into the country, have also dropped dramatically in the past half-year, apparently the result of Israeli strikes on the airports in Syria where these flights would land.
Alongside the uptick in the number of strikes on Iran-backed forces in Syria, Israel has also reportedly targeted a larger number of Syrian military air defense systems.
“Syria is paying a growing price for the Iranian presence in its territory, for a war that isn’t [Syria’s]. Iran has turned from an asset to Syria into a burden,” the defense officials told reporters.
They added that Israel plans to keep up its pressure on Iran until its military leaves Syria for good.
Though the officials boasted of Iran’s departure from Syria as a recent development, the Israel Defense Forces has been saying since at least 2018 that its operations against Iran have forced Tehran to radically change and scale back its plans for Syria.
Jerusalem has long maintained that Iran was working to establish a permanent military presence in Syria in order to use it as a springboard for attacks against Israel — similar to what Tehran accomplished by supporting its proxy Hezbollah. That organization began as a small terrorist group in southern Lebanon carrying out deadly but minor attacks on IDF troops, but has gone on to become one of the most powerful military forces in the region, with capabilities exceeding those of many sovereign nations.
In recent years, Israel has also warned that Iran was helping Hezbollah convert its massive arsenal of simple rockets into far more lethal precision-guided missiles, a project that the IDF has designated as the second-most significant threat to the country after Tehran’s nuclear program.
Indeed, one of the strikes attributed to Israel on Monday night targeted a Syrian military research center, which was reportedly involved in this precision project.
The defense officials partially credited the successes against Iran in Syria to the US strike on the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s expeditionary Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, earlier this year, which left Tehran without one of its most skilled generals.
For Israel, either path Iran decides to take in Syria — remain there or fully leave — is potentially beneficial. If Iran leaves, Israel will have successfully prevented the opening of another front against it. If Iran stays in Syria, where Israel maintains intelligence and aerial superiority, the IDF would be able to continue striking Iranian forces, exacting a heavy price from Tehran, while being able to defend against and thwart Iranian attacks.

Egypt: Missing Christian Mother Reappears as Pious Muslim in Video
Raymond Ibrahim/Coptic Solidarity/May 05/2020
After disappearing in Egypt, a Coptic Christian wife and mother appeared in a video, dressed in all black Islamic attire (niqab), saying that she had willingly converted to Islam and no longer wants anyone—her husband, children, family—to bother about her anymore.
Ranya Abd al-Masih (“servant of Christ”), 39, was a high school teacher of English in al-Minofiya, just north of Cairo. She has three daughters, the youngest about 9. On April 22, she disappeared. A few days after her family contacted state security, the aforementioned video, which is just over one minute, appeared.
In it, and in between tears, Ranya insists that she has finally and formally converted to Islam, which—“praise be to Allah”—she had been secretly following for nine years. She also adds that she took her jewelry and belongings the day she left home, and therefore it should be obvious that she disappeared of her own accord and was not kidnapped.
Her family argues that such claims are for public consumption—likely being made at gunpoint and/or even under the effects of drugs: she did not, they say, take her jewelry and belongings on the day she disappeared; moreover, it is clear in the video that she is surrounded by and getting cues from others.
On May 1, the Coptic Orthodox Christian Church in al-Minofiya added its voice to the family’s by issuing a statement asking President Sisi to intervene and prompt state security “to return our daughter Ranya Abd al-Masih, who suddenly disappeared from her home under unknown circumstances, and whose three young daughters are heartbroken at her absence, as is her husband and her entire family.”
“We’ve no problem for her to go [to Islam] of her own free will—based on conviction—but not as a person who is threatened and coerced into doing so,” her brother, Remon, said in a full length interview. “She was definitely kidnapped and forced to make that video, due to threats against her or her husband and children if she refused to comply.” He said the idea that she had “secretly” embraced Islam was ludicrous, citing the fact that up until her disappearance she was regularly attending church, visiting and praying in monasteries—even fasting 55 days in the lead up to Easter. “We are sure that Ranya, our beloved sister, whom we know so well, is not the one we saw on the video; that is a woman who is being threatened and coerced.”
Her Facebook and other social media accounts are also saturated with Christian images and messages. Several of the family’s Muslim acquaintances confirmed these points, saying they too find it hard to believe that such a piously Christian woman would willingly abandon her faith, husband and children in such a sudden manner.
Remon, her brother, insists that this seems to be an elaborate scheme perpetrated by the “Muslim Brotherhood”—the politically correct way of indicating any “Muslim radical” in Egypt, considering the government’s open conflict with the Brotherhood. In reality, and based on ample precedent, if any group is responsible, it is likely the Salafists, with implicit help from security organs.
Remon himself made this clear by lambasting state security, which, to date, has been unresponsive to the family’s pleas, citing the video as “proof” of no wrongdoing. “I am calling on President Sisi and every other official,” he said; “We need to see and speak with her; but nobody cares and nobody wants to help. Is she even alive?”
Incidentally and needless to say, if the situation was reversed—if a married Muslim woman had disappeared and then reappeared in a video saying she was Christian and not to bother over her—all of Egypt, particularly state security, would be on its feet investigating; and then, if true, both the apostate and her Christian “helpers” would likely be punished.
If Ranya had in fact converted of her own will, well and good, her brother and family emphasized; however, it is only right that they be allowed to independently confirm this on their own—not least since the abduction of Coptic Christian women and girls who later appear on video as converting to Islam of their own will is an ongoing phenomenon in Egypt; this is to say nothing of the straightforward kidnapping or luring of Coptic women (four in the same month that Ranya “converted”).
“We want to take care of our women and children. They will no longer be able to leave the house!” Ranya’s brother lamented, adding that this incident is establishing a bad precedent: “Whoever steps out can be kidnapped and no one will ever be able to reach them…. What will we do about our Coptic mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters? We are in an era when such things should not happen. ”
“If you can hear me, Ranya, know that we will never abandon you until we see you,” her brother concluded: “Because you are a victim of a terror.”

Trump Finds Time to Start Wooing Putin Again
Eli Lake/Bloomberg/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
For most of President Donald Trump’s tenure, his cabinet has tempered his instincts to appease his Russian counterpart. Despite the president’s baffling suck-ups to Vladimir Putin and his desire to improve the relationship, his administration has expanded sanctions against Moscow, expelled Russian spies and waged diplomatic and political warfare against Russian clients.
Sometimes, though, the president wins. It happened recently when the White House and the Kremlin released a joint statement marking the 75th anniversary of US and Soviet troops meeting at a bridge on the Elbe River, cutting Nazi Germany in half and setting the stage for the Allied victory in World War II.
For its first three paragraphs, the statement is a commemoration of the famous handshake between the two armies. But its final paragraph is a call for the two rivals to cooperate going forward. “The ‘Spirit of the Elbe’ is an example of how our countries can put aside differences, build trust, and cooperate in pursuit of a greater cause,” it says. “As we work today to confront the most important challenges of the 21st century, we pay tribute to the valor and courage of all those who fought together to defeat fascism.”
Trump administration officials tell me that senior Pentagon and State Department officials opposed that language. These officials say they worried that Trump was playing into the hands of Putin, who seeks to weaken America’s bond with its NATO allies and ultimately wants the US to recognize a Russian sphere of influence in the countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine and Georgia.
More troubling, Trump initially agreed in a phone call with Putin to travel to Moscow this month for the commemoration of the Allied victory against the Nazis. That commemoration has since been canceled because of the coronavirus. When it is rescheduled, the White House has agreed to send National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien.
As far the statement is concerned, it’s not as bad as Trump’s performance in 2018 with Putin at a one-day summit in Helsinki. There, he accepted the Russian line that Moscow did not interfere in the 2016 presidential campaign, despite his own intelligence community’s assessment that it certainly had. Nor is the Elbe commemoration statement as cringe-inducing as Trump’s meeting with Russia’s foreign minister and ambassador at the White House in 2017, a few hours he fired then-FBI director James Comey. In that meeting, Trump bragged about firing the man in charge of the bureau investigating Russia’s election interference.Also, the language in the Trump-Putin statement in 2020 echoes the commemoration statement issued in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Unlike Trump, Obama in 2010 had already implemented a reset with Russia, following Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.
Nonetheless, the Elbe commemoration statement sends the wrong message at a moment when Russia continues to challenge America’s position in the world. In February, Russian jets buzzed US Navy ships in the Black Sea. This month, the State Department published an internal government report that tracked Russian and Chinese propaganda during the pandemic and found that both countries were falsely claiming that the virus was a US-designed bio-weapon. Russia’s proxies continue to make war in eastern Ukraine and its forces continue to occupy Georgia.
The Trump-Putin statement also sends the wrong message to America’s allies in Eastern Europe. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the former president of Estonia, told me Tuesday that for him and others from countries that lived under the Iron Curtain, the river does not symbolize geopolitical cooperation. The Elbe, which formed part of the border between East and West Germany during the Cold War, “was the dividing line between freedom and oppression,” Ilves said. The Elbe statement would have been considered capitulation by cold warriors like Ronald Reagan, he said.
Trump’s Elbe commemoration statement is more in line with that of another former American president: Richard Nixon. At the end of his first term in office, Nixon conducted secret diplomacy with Communist China in part to strengthen the US negotiating position with the Soviet Union on détente and arms control. When Nixon finally did go to Beijing, he set in motion the trading partnership that now appears to be unraveling.
The problem with this thinking today is that Russia and China both have an interest in undermining an international system that — despite warnings from Chinese doctors, journalists and researchers — failed to alert the world about the coming pandemic. That’s why Trump would be wise to drop any plans to pursue better relations with Putin, unless and until the Russian president returns the territory he stole from Georgia and Ukraine and renounces his own dreams to reconstitute the 20th century’s evil empire.

Dinner at the Makhloufs
Robert Ford/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
Rami Makhlouf invited me and my wife to an usual dinner at one of his homes near Damascus in March 2011. His lands were so vast that it took five minutes driving 20 kilometers per hour to reach the house from the gate. The designer of the house created something like a California dream house there in the Damascus countryside.
Mrs. Makhlouf was elegant but did not say one word the entire evening. The father of Rami was there, he asked for my birthdate and my wife’s birthdate and made predictions about our futures based on the sequence of the numbers and how different sums of the numbers indicated particular future events. (He didn’t predict my criticism of the Syrian government’s oppression in the Syrian uprising.)
The food was excellent and very delicious, as is usual with Syrian cuisine but there was only one small plate and different from every other dinner I ever attended during my 30 years in the Arab World, the host did not offer more food. Rami was polite and didn’t ask about the American government sanctions against him since 2008 and I didn’t raise the issue either.
Two months later, Rami in an interview with the wonderful New York Times journalist Anthony Shadid warned the Syrian protesters and the West that the ruling elite in Damascus would fight rather than accept change. In early May while the street protests drew people from all the different communities in Syria, Makhlouf stressed the Syrian government was fighting a rebellion under the control of Salafists. His message was different from the message Walid al-Muallem and Buthaina Shaaban were giving me about President Assad’s commitment to reform and stopping the violence. Buthaina assured me that the president was unhappy with Rami Makhlouf, but in fact history shows that Rami’s words were accurate.
Now after the passing of nine years, Rami is talking again, this time on Facebook. He has discovered the security apparatus is assaulting people and violating their freedoms. It’s terrible! He discovered that the government detains and threatens loyal citizens. It’s inhumane! He discovered corruption in the Syrian government, saying that he was resisting paying taxes because he didn’t want the monies to go into others’ pockets. Imagine, thieves in Damascus! He acknowledged that his companies’ revenues had helped pay for the security apparatus, that he was the biggest patron of the security apparatus, and he was shocked that the intelligence agents are now arresting directors from his companies. He who sows the wind harvests the storm.
There are, of course, different opinions about the cause of the divisions inside the opaque Syrian regime. Some Russian analysts and companies also have discovered the presence of corruption in Damascus and so now they complain. Or another story is that they knew before but now they demand payment of loans from Assad’s bankrupt treasury and so Bashar has to take his cousin’s monies. According to one Syrian analyst, Asma Assad and Rami are fighting for control of the economy. We should remember that Asma was a manager for the American investment bank J P Morgan in London before she married Bashar, so she would understand Rami’s games. I have seen another Syrian analysis that businessman Khodr al-Taher, who is in the circle of the general
Maher Assad is now trying to compete with Rami Makhlouf in some economic sectors. A senior American official told Asharq Al-Awsat recently that American sanctions aim at hurting the Syrian elite in order to convince them to accept a political transition. Certainly the American and European sanctions are causing big problems for the Syrian ruling elite. The Syrian pound has collapsed to 1,300 to the dollar (it was 50 per dollar in 2011) and not only the Syrian elite are suffering. All the Syrian people are suffering too.
I don’t expect divisions between the Syrian ruling elite to help bring a political transition soon.
I was a student in Cairo in 1984 when Rifaat Assad attempted a coup against his brother Hafez. The Russians didn’t intervene then and Hafez kept the reigns of power. Rami’s brother Hafez Makhlouf was a senior official in General Security, but left the country in 2014 after a dispute with the Assads. Many think the 2012 bomb that killed senior Syrian officials, including the Defense Minister and Bashar’s brother-in-law Assef Shawqat was a plot by one group in the regime against Shawqet’s group. I don’t know the reality, but Shawqat’s widow Bashar’s sister Bushra fled to Dubai. Through all this, the Assad family has stayed in power. Most important, the security apparatus has remained loyal to Bashar. Rami’s Facebook talks indicate that Bashar understands he must keep those intelligence thugs satisfied.

A Solution to the COVID-19 Liability Problem
Noah Feldman/Asharq Al Awsat/May 05/2020
Whenever we’re ready to re-open COVID-closed businesses, we’ll have to resolve some important questions about how to do so safely. One of them: what kind of measures should businesses take to keep employees and customers safe, and how should business owners be held accountable if they play fast and loose with others’ health?
This debate over limiting liability has just begun, and it’s already taken a partisan turn. That’s unfortunate, because there’s a straightforward middle-ground solution available.
Republicans have called for federal legislation to render businesses immune from lawsuits; Democrats are skeptical of the whole idea. Both sides are on to something important. The risk of being sued — and having to pay outsize damages if people become sick — is real. But so is the risk that complete immunity from lawsuits would lead to lax safety standards that endanger public health.
Congress should direct the CDC to issue a specific protocol designed to keep workers and customers safe. Businesses that follow these federal rules should have a safe harbor from liability, even if some people get sick on their premises. Those who break the rules should be able to be sued for breaches that lead to infection.
This approach would follow the basic rule of tort law, which is that if you make “reasonable” efforts to avoid accidents, you shouldn’t be liable; if you don’t, you should pay the costs of damages that ensue.
At the same time, linking liability a clear federal guideline would solve the most serious problem associated with potential Covid lawsuits: uncertainty about which preventive measures would count as reasonable, creating disincentive for businesses to take the risk of reopening.
Ordinary tort liability won’t work very well here, because it relies on after-the-fact judgments by juries about what counts as reasonable precautions. The great Judge Learned Hand proposed that reasonableness should be quantified by measuring whether the cost of the burden of accident prevention (known as B) outweighs the expected value of the accident — the probability of the accident (P) multiplied by the gravity of the loss (L). That’s more predictable than a jury’s instinct. But it still relies on a business owner’s capacity to predict the probability of an accident and the magnitude of its costs. Doing so is inordinately difficult during a developing pandemic.
If business owners cannot know reliably how likely it is for employees to get infected and how costly their infections will be, then there’s no simple way for the business owners to set the correct level of prevention. Consequently, business owners might stay closed for weeks or months longer than they need to. Yet opponents of a complete liability waiver are also correct to worry that it would create the wrong incentives for businesses, allowing them to ignore even the most basic life-saving safety measures. Most workers shouldn’t be thought of as willingly assuming the risk of infection by coming to work. Most aren’t truly free to decide whether to come back to work; they’re constrained by the threat of losing their jobs, not to mention the imperative to feed their families. And anyway, modern tort law imposes a duty of reasonable care on employers when workers come to work even under ordinary, non-pandemic conditions.
The solution in this situation is to specify the content of reasonable care — in advance. The way to do that is not state by state (as tort law typically operates) but nationally, with a single standard that will apply everywhere. That way businesses won’t have to guess what reasonable precautions are. They will know the rules. So long as they follow the rules, they will be safe from liability. If they break the rules, they will have to pay.
Congress probably shouldn’t lay out the exact prevention rules itself, since members of Congress don’t have any special expertise in viral transmission. Congress should therefore do what it typically does when it needs expert judgment to become part of a law: delegate that part of the decision to an expert agency like the CDC.
The CDC protocol would have to have some specifics for what is safe in different kinds of workplaces, from factories to restaurants to offices to construction sites.
Once in place, however, the protocols could all be made to work the same way by a congressional mandate specifying that the new federal rules preempt state tort law. Congress could also specify what the damages would be for breaking the rules. They might not have to include all the costs of sickness and death; although the damages should certainly be high enough to deter rule breaking.