LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 26.2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

The Bulletin's Link on the lccc Site
http://data.eliasbejjaninews.com/eliasnews19/english.january26.20.htm

News Bulletin Achieves Since 2006
Click Here to enter the LCCC Arabic/English news bulletins Achieves since 2006

Bible Quotations For today
I tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail against it
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 16/13-20/:’When Jesus came into the district of Caesarea Philippi, he asked his disciples, ‘Who do people say that the Son of Man is?’And they said, ‘Some say John the Baptist, but others Elijah, and still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets.’He said to them, ‘But who do you say that I am?’Simon Peter answered, ‘You are the Messiah, the Son of the living God.’And Jesus answered him, ‘Blessed are you, Simon son of Jonah! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven. And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven.’Then he sternly ordered the disciples not to tell anyone that he was the Messiah.”

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on January 25-26/2020
Maronite Blinded and Escariotic leaders With idol-Derailed Worshipers/Elias Bejjani/January 24/2020
Protesters Hit Beirut Streets to Mark 100 Days of Demos
Lebanese protesters rally downtown despite enhanced security
Lebanese Security Fire Water Cannons at Protesters Breaching Barricade
Revolution Fist’ in Nabatieh Set Ablaze
Schenker Says US ‘Watching’ Govt. Performance
Report: U.S. Assistance for Lebanon Conditional for Reform
Lebanon central bank reassures foreign investors about deposits
Finance Minister Meets IMF Official
Macron congratulates Aoun on Lebanon's new government: We hope it will work to achieve the aspirations of the Lebanese
Presidency Information Office calls on media outlets to refer to it when circulating Aoun's statements
Diab chairs meeting of ministerial statement drafting committee
Abdel Samad: Ministerial Statement Committee will intensify its sessions to finalize statement soon
Sami Gemayel: Early parliamentary elections are the solution for the people to regain their decision
Health Minister at Beirut Airport to follow up on Corona virus preventive measures
Dar el-Fatwa Did Not Ask Fahmi to 'Reject' Portfolio
Lebanon: Hariri Reminds Aoun of his ‘Protectorates’
Lebanon has 28 days to present rescue plan/Najia Houssari/Arab News/January 25/2020
Breaking down a Lebanese haircut/Leila El Sayed/Annahar/January 25/2020
AMCD Supports Withholding US Aid to Lebanon/January 25/2020
Hezbollah-backed Lebanon government should beware of the US/Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/January 25/2020
Hezbollah will find the urgent Lebanese priorities are clashing with its regional loyalties/Michael Young/The National/January 25/2020
Lebanon at a turning point/Dr. Nasser Saidi/Al Arabiya/January 25/2020
Hezbollah gets its way with new Lebanese government/Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya/January 25/2020

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on January 25-26/2020
Pope Francis backs Iraqi call for its sovereignty to be respected
Trump's Anticipated Middle East Peace Plan May Be Short on Peace
US builds up Mid-East strength against rising tension over “Deal of the Century and Iran/DEBKAfile/January 25/2020
Iran has capacity to enrich uranium ‘at any percentage’: Official
Iran’s foreign minister says Tehran still willing to negotiate with Washington
Three Iraqi protesters killed in Baghdad, south
Iraq Protest Tents Set Ablaze after Cleric Withdraws Support
Kuwait summons Iran envoy over Soleimani killing claim
French extremist recruiter sentenced to 22 years in prison
Powerful earthquake shakes eastern Turkey, killing 22
Gaps in Bezos ‘hack’ story widen as media outlets change their tune

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on January 25-26/2020
Libya, Erdogan and the Mercenaries/Dr. Jebril Elabidi/Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
Tehran and its Three Fantasies/Amir Taherii/Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
Russia Succeeds the US in the Middle East/Radwan al-Sayyedi/Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
Boris goes to Washington/Andrew Hammond/Arab News/January 25/2020
Erdogan beware: In the Med, you have been warned/Henri Barkey//Arab News/January 25/2020
The judgment of Paris found wanting in the Sahel/Hafed Al-Ghwell/Arab News/January 25/2020
The White House Peace Plan Meeting: U.S. Goals, Israeli Repercussions/David Makovsky//The Washington Institute/January 24/2020
Russia’s Growing Interests in Libya/Anna Borshchevskaya/The Washington Institute/January 25/2020

Details Of The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorial published on January 25-26/2020
Maronite Blinded and Escariotic leaders With idol-Derailed Worshipers
Elias Bejjani/January 24/2020
Leadership wise, we, the Maronites, are currently orphans in both religious and political domains. Our childish and marginalized present leaders are totally detached from every thing that is a requirement and gifts for leadership, Lebanese identity, faith, self respect, planning, vision, conscience, principles, and self-respect. Sadly they are a bunch of greedy , self-centred, narcissistic and iscariot creatures blinded by their earthly hunger for power and money. No hopes what so ever for our people at any level in their presence and influence...replacing them is an urgent obligation and a must.

Protesters Hit Beirut Streets to Mark 100 Days of Demos
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/January 25/2020
Hundreds of people hit the streets of the Lebanese capital on Saturday to mark 100 days of anti-government demonstrations and denounce a new cabinet line-up. Protests demanding the removal of politicians deemed incompetent and corrupt have gripped Lebanon since October 17 and forced the resignation of the government. A new cabinet was announced on Tuesday after a three-month vacuum. But protesters say the ministers were chosen along sectarian lines and that the line-up does not satisfy their demands for a government of independents and technocrats.
On Saturday, several marches were held in Beirut under the slogan "No trust", with protesters converging on the city centre. Demonstrators chanted "Revolution, Revolution" under the watchful gaze of security forces, who were deployed in high numbers. The protest movement has largely been peaceful since it began more than three months ago, but has turned violent in recent weeks. "The government (formed on Tuesday) is not the one we have been seeking," demonstrator Perla Maalouli said in central Beirut. "We demand a salvation government... not one whose members are selected according to (sectarian) quotas", which the protest movement had mobilised against, she said. Apportioning positions between Lebanon's main Christian, Sunni and Shiite communities has been key to forming governments since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war. Maalouli said politicians had failed to heed the protest campaign. "After 100 days (of demonstrations), they continue to do as they please, as if the people have not spoken," she said. The new government, headed by academic Hassan Diab, faces huge economic and political challenges. Lebanon has one of the world's highest debt-to-GDP ratios and economists have argued it is hard to see how the near-bankrupt country could repay its creditors. The Lebanese pound has lost over a third of its value against the dollar in the parallel market and banks are tightening restrictions on dollar transactions amid a liquidity crunch. The economic downturn has raised questions over whether Lebanon will turn to the International Monetary Fund for a bailout, an option the government has yet to comment on, but which some officials regard as inevitable. Earlier Saturday, the new Finance Minister Ghazi Wazni met with a senior IMF official in Beirut, a day after holding talks with a World Bank delegation. The new premier Diab on Wednesday warned that Lebanon faces an economic "catastrophe", but has pledged that his government will strive to meet the protesters' demands.

Lebanese protesters rally downtown despite enhanced security
Associated Press/January 25/2020
After more than 100 days of nationwide protesting against the country’s political class, Lebanese are divided over whether to continue protesting or give the new Cabinet a chance as the country faces its most dire economic crisis in decades.
BEIRUT: Hundreds of Lebanese gathered outside Beirut’s central government building Saturday to reject the newly formed Cabinet. Protesters breached tight security around the building, removing a metal gate and barbed wire and prompting security forces to respond with water cannon and tear gas. The protesters say the new Cabinet formed this week represents a corrupt long-serving political class they have been protesting against since October. Dozens pulled at barbed wire and a metal gate erected between them and security forces guarding the central government building, known as the Serail. They hurled stones and firecrackers at security forces, who used water cannon and tear gas to push rioters back. Hundreds of other protesters filled the street leading to the building. Blast walls and large cement blocks had been erected behind the barbed wire and soldiers stood on alert a few meters (yards) away. Some protesters scaled those walls and taunted the soldiers. One waved a large Lebanese flag.After nearly an hour of clashes, protesters managed to breach the metal gate further. Security forces fired tear gas and then chased the protesters out of the area with intense volleys of tear gas.
A man carrying a toddler stood in front of security forces with a raised hand, screaming at security and protesters alike to stop. But he was sprayed with a stream of water, spurring a journalist to run and grab the shaken little girl from his arms and sprint away. The clashes stopped briefly.
Central Beirut has metamorphosed into a security zone as riot police and soldiers have been heavily deployed, barricades and checkpoints erected. Security measures prevented protesters from reaching the parliament area down the street, which has become a flash point in recent days for confrontations between protesters and security. Many shops in the area were installing metal sheets over their windows after clashes left some damaged.
The crowd congregated in central Beirut after a day of peaceful marches through different areas of the capital dubbed “No Confidence.” Hundreds of protesters urged people to join their rallies. After a new government was formed Tuesday, security forces installed new barriers and metal gates around official buildings and beefed up their presence. After more than 100 days of nationwide protesting against the country’s political class, Lebanese are divided over whether to continue protesting or give the new Cabinet a chance as the country faces its most dire economic crisis in decades.
Protesters on Saturday said the new government is a continuation of the old system. Although it is made up of experts, it still reflects the powerful political class that has dominated the country since the 1975-1990 civil war. “They are the same people,” one man shouted to a local TV station.
The new government is backed by the militant Hezbollah group and its allies who dominate the current parliament, elected in 2018. But other powerful parties, including that of resigned prime minister Saad Hariri and two Christian parties, are not represented.
The peaceful, jubilant protests that characterized the first three months of the uprising have turned violent and a worsening financial crisis is taking its toll. Many protesters Saturday sought to distance themselves from the violence, some chanting: “Our protest is peaceful.”
More than 400 protesters and 100 security forces were injured over two nights of clashes last weekend outside the parliament building. Protesters hurled stones, firecrackers and flares at security forces who responded with rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannon.

Lebanese Security Fire Water Cannons at Protesters Breaching Barricade
Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 25 January, 2020
Hundreds of Lebanese gathered outside Beirut's central government building Saturday to reject the newly formed cabinet. Protesters breached tight security around the building, removing a metal gate and barbed wire and prompting security forces to respond with water cannon and tear gas.
The protesters say the new cabinet formed this week represents a corrupt long-serving political class they have been protesting against since October. Dozens pulled at barbed wire and a metal gate erected between them and security forces guarding the central government building, known as the Grand Serail. They hurled stones and firecrackers at security forces, who used water cannon and tear gas to push rioters back. Hundreds of other protesters filled the street leading to the building. Blast walls and large cement blocks had been erected behind the barbed wire and soldiers stood on alert a few meters away. Some protesters scaled those walls and taunted the soldiers. One waved a large Lebanese flag. After nearly an hour of clashes, protesters managed to breach the metal gate further. Security forces fired tear gas and then chased the protesters out of the area with intense volleys of tear gas. A man carrying a toddler stood in front of security forces with a raised hand, screaming at security and protesters alike to stop. But he was sprayed with a stream of water, spurring a journalist to run and grab the shaken little girl from his arms and sprint away. The clashes stopped briefly.
Central Beirut has metamorphosed into a security zone as riot police and soldiers have been heavily deployed, barricades and checkpoints erected. Security measures prevented protesters from reaching the parliament area down the street, which has become a flashpoint in recent days for confrontations between protesters and security. Many shops in the area were installing metal sheets over their windows after clashes left some damaged.
The crowd congregated in central Beirut after a day of peaceful marches through different areas of the capital dubbed “No Confidence.” Hundreds of protesters urged people to join their rallies. After a new government was formed Tuesday, security forces installed new barriers and metal gates around official buildings and beefed up their presence. After more than 100 days of nationwide protesting against the country's political class, Lebanese are divided over whether to continue protesting or give the new cabinet a chance as the country faces its most dire economic crisis in decades.
Protesters on Saturday said the new government is a continuation of the old system. Although it is made up of experts, it still reflects the powerful political class that has dominated the country since the 1975-1990 civil war. “They are the same people,” one man shouted to a local TV station.
The new government is backed by the Hezbollah party and its allies who dominate the current parliament, elected in 2018. But other powerful parties, including that of resigned prime minister Saad Hariri, the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb parties, are not represented.
The peaceful, jubilant protests that characterized the first three months of the uprising have turned violent and a worsening financial crisis is taking its toll. Many protesters Saturday sought to distance themselves from the violence, some chanting: “Our protest is peaceful.”
More than 400 protesters and 100 security forces were injured over two nights of clashes last weekend outside the parliament building. Protesters hurled stones, firecrackers and flares at security forces who responded with rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannon.

Revolution Fist’ in Nabatieh Set Ablaze
Naharnet/January 25/2020
A “fist of the revolution” unveiled on Friday in the southern town of Nabatieh was set on fire on Saturday, the National News Agency said. NNA said unknown assailants torched it at midnight. Anti-government protesters unveiled the statue during a ceremony to commemorate 100 days since the beginning of the October 17 popular uprising. The ceremony was held amid tight security measures taken by the army and Internal Security Forces, as supporters of Hizbullah and the AMAL Movement staged a rival demo at the location, chanting slogans supportive of Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Speaker Nabih Berri. A representative of the Hizbullah and AMAL supporters said their demo was not aimed at “stirring a problem with the protest movement or anyone else.” “But these people are provoking us by raising this fist in Nabatieh. This city only raises the fist of Imam Hussein and Nabatieh expelled the occupiers and offered martyrs and will not accept such a symbol, a symbol of the international masonic movement. It should be removed and we will not accept that it stays in its place,” the spokesman said.

Schenker Says US ‘Watching’ Govt. Performance
Naharnet/January 25/2020
The United States is closely “monitoring” the work of the new government in Lebanon, formed after three months of jubilant protests and a worsening financial crisis, United States-based satellite TV channel Alhurra reported on Saturday. In an interview on Alhurra, David Shencker, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs said: “The US is going to closely observe whether the new government in Lebanon is committed to eradicate corruption and lead the country out of its financial crisis.”The US official did not elaborate. A new government was formed in Lebanon on Tuesday, and protesters -- even though they've rejected it as a rubber stamp for traditional political parties -- are now split over whether to continue protesting or withdraw from the streets to give the new Cabinet a chance. Another point of division among the Lebanese protesters has been over tactics. Many are frustrated with the frequent roadblocks that have occurred throughout the country. For the past week, a few hundred protesters have engaged in some of the most violent confrontations with security forces in the capital. More than 500 people, including over 100 security forces, were injured in nightly clashes outside the parliament building. Protesters hurled stones, firecrackers, flares and a few Molotov cocktails at security forces who responded with rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannons. Several protesters were hit in their eyes and at least two protesters were partially blinded.

Report: U.S. Assistance for Lebanon Conditional for Reform
Naharnet/January 25/2020
A U.S. official in Lebanon reportedly said “no one wants to see the country fall” and that assistance for the crisis-hit nation is closely related to its implementation of the needed reforms, al-Joumhouria daily reported on Saturday. “No one in the world wants to bring down Lebanon or wants to see this nation fall, but we rather want to extend help which depends on the reforms that must be taken and a clear plan in this context, as well as a clear economic vision,” the daily quoted a US official as telling a group of lawmakers in Lebanon. Similarly, the representative of the World Bank had earlier expressed willingness to assist Lebanon, provided that the required and urgent reforms are undertaken, which were also emphasized by the United Nations Representative in Lebanon, Jan Kubis, stated the daily. Kubis had stressed in a statement that Lebanon’s “government needs to implement a meaningful reform package, to break with the corrupt practices of the past, to promote justice, transparency, and accountability. “Only following such approach would make it possible to gain confidence of the people, that is currently wanting. It is important to give the government a chance. He further observed that “if the government’s actions are attuned to the thinking, the demands and the aspirations of the people, that would be helpful, also to mobilize international support.”

Lebanon central bank reassures foreign investors about deposits
Arab News/January 25/2020
Khalaf Ahmad Al-Habtoor asked if there was any risk to dollar deposits/The heavily indebted country’s crisis has shaken confidence in banks
BEIRUT: Lebanon’s central bank said on Saturday there would be no “haircut” on deposits at banks due to the country’s financial crisis, responding to concerns voiced by a UAE businessman about risks to foreign investments there. Emirati Khalaf Ahmad Al-Habtoor, founder of the Al-Habtoor Group that has two hotels in Beirut, posted a video of himself on his official Twitter account asking Lebanon’s central bank governor if there was any risk to dollar deposits of foreign investors and whether there could be any such haircut.“The declared policy of the Central Bank of Lebanon is not to bankrupt any bank thus preserving the depositors. Also the law in Lebanon doesn’t allow haircut,” the Banque Du Liban (BDL) said in a Twitter post addressed to Al-Habtoor, from Governor Riad Salameh. “BDL is providing the liquidity needed by banks in both Lebanese pound and dollars, but under one condition that the dollars lent by BDL won’t be transferred abroad.” “All funds received by Lebanese banks from abroad after November 17th are free to be transferred out,” it added on its official Twitter account. The heavily indebted country’s crisis has shaken confidence in banks and raised concerns over its ability to repay one of the world’s highest levels of public debt. Seeking to prevent capital flight as hard currency inflows slowed and anti-government protests erupted, banks have been imposing informal controls on access to cash and transfers abroad since last October. A new government was formed this week, and its main task is to tackle the dire financial crisis that has seen the Lebanese pound weaken against the dollar. Al-Habtoor had asked Salameh for clarity for Arab investors concerned about the crisis and those thinking of transferring funds to Lebanon to try to “help the brotherly Lebanese.”

Finance Minister Meets IMF Official
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/January 25/2020
The new finance minister of debt-saddled Lebanon met on Saturday with an official from the International Monetary Fund for what he said was a "courtesy visit" and not bailout talks. Ghazi Wazni's meeting with IMF alternative executive director Sami Geadah came as Lebanon grapples with its worst economic crisis since the 1975-1990 civil war. The meeting served to "congratulate Lebanon on the formation of a new government," Wazni said on Twitter afterwards. He had told AFP earlier that it was "a courtesy visit... to get to know the IMF team". "The discussions will not focus on an economic rescue plan, which is being prepared (separately) inside government," he added.  It follows a meeting on Friday between Wazni and a delegation from the World Bank led by its regional director Saroj Kumar Jha. Wazni assumed the post of finance minister on Tuesday with the formation of a long-awaited cabinet that faces huge economic and political challenges. The previous government resigned on October 29, two weeks into a nationwide protest movement demanding the removal of politicians deemed incompetent and corrupt. Wazni comes into the post at a time when the plummeting Lebanon pound has lost over a third of its value against the dollar in the parallel market. Lebanese banks are tightening restrictions on dollar transactions amid a liquidity crunch. The economic downturn has raised questions over whether Lebanon will turn to the IMF for a bailout -- an option the government has yet to comment on but which some officials regard as inevitable. Last month, former prime minister Saad Hariri discussed a possible economic rescue plan with the heads of the IMF and the World Bank, further fuelling speculation of a bailout. If Lebanon does turn to the IMF it may have to increase its value-added tax, slash subsidies to the state-owned electricity company, tackle rampant corruption and enact a raft of structural reforms, according to previous IMF recommendations.

Macron congratulates Aoun on Lebanon's new government: We hope it will work to achieve the aspirations of the Lebanese
NNA/January 25/2020
President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun, received a phone call this afternoon from French President Emmanuel Macron, congratulating him on the new government formation and stressing his country's support for Lebanon in preserving its unity and stability. President Macron expressed his hope that the new government will work to fulfill the aspirations of the Lebanese, to implement the reforms that Lebanon had previously pledged to undertake at the Cedar Conference. In turn, President Aoun thanked his French counterpart for the interest he showed towards Lebanon, briefing him on the country's current conditions and stressing that work is underway to address these conditions in a way that would serve the interest of the Lebanese people and their unity, and revive the country's economy. The phone call between both Presidents was also a chance to dwell on the general situation prevailing in Lebanon and the region, and the French efforts made to assist Lebanon in all fields.

Presidency Information Office calls on media outlets to refer to it when circulating Aoun's statements
NNA/January 25/2020
The Lebanese Presidency Information Office issued a press release on Saturday, stressing the need to refer to it when circulating any statements pertaining to President Michel Aoun. "The Press Office urges the media to return to it to verify any position attributed to the President to preserve the credibility and accuracy of the news, as leaks, rumors and fabricated news abound for reasons that are not hidden to anyone," the statement said. "Any statement that is not issued by the President directly or through the Presidency Information Office, cannot be taken into account or relied upon and promoted," the statement emphasized.

Diab chairs meeting of ministerial statement drafting committee
NNA/January 25/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab, chaired Saturday afternoon at the Grand Serail the third meeting by the committee tasked to draft the ministerial statement.

Abdel Samad: Ministerial Statement Committee will intensify its sessions to finalize statement soon
NNA/January 25/2020
Minister of Information, Manal Abdel Samad, announced this afternoon that the ministerial committee tasked with drafting the ministerial statement will continue its work next week and intensify its sessions to finalize the cabinet's statement. "The Ministerial Committee tasked with drafting the ministerial statement resumed its meetings, headed by Prime Minister Hassan Diab, in its third session on Saturday, after holding two consecutive sessions yesterday that extended until 8:00 p.m.," said Abdel Samad. "In today's meeting, PM Diab commended the spirit prevailing among the Committee members, the vitality of the discussions and the substantive suggestions made during the sessions, while calling for intensifying the sessions to complete the statement as soon as possible," she added. Abdel Samad indicated that the Committee heard a briefing at the beginning of today's session by Finance Ministry Director General Alain Bifani on the country's financial status, after which it continued with discussing the ministerial statement's content and approved the structure of a number of items. In response to a question, the Information Minister said: "We are currently in the process of developing the first draft of the ministerial statement, which relates to the economy and other issues, and it is certain that this is one of the priorities of the government's work." Asked whether the government's statement will differ from the statements of previous cabinets on challenging political issues, the Minister reiterated that the Committee is still in the discussion stage, "and therefore we cannot discuss the final decision as long as it has not yet been taken." She added: "We are still in the first proposal phase, but as a matter of fact we give priority to these issues."Abdel Samad disclosed that the Committee members will continue to work till a late hour today, and will resume their meeting upcoming Monday. "At this speed, the statement is supposed to be issued soon," she asserted.

Sami Gemayel: Early parliamentary elections are the solution for the people to regain their decision
NNA/January 25/2020
Kataeb Party Chief, MP Sami Gemayel, wrote on Twitter this evening, saying: "The previous government was one of allocated quotas, the current government is one of quotas as well...The previous government set a budget of oddities, the current government is adopting the budget of oddities...The Parliament Council is staging behind the wall of shame, the wall of shame is rising and Lebanon is rebelling...!""Early parliamentary elections are the sole solution to get back the people's decision and initiative across institutions," Gemayel underlined.

Health Minister at Beirut Airport to follow up on Corona virus preventive measures
NNA/January 25/2020
Minister of Public Health, Hamad Hassan, will visit Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport at 9:00 o'clock this evening, to follow up on the procedures adopted for the prevention of the "Corona" virus.

Dar el-Fatwa Did Not Ask Fahmi to 'Reject' Portfolio
Naharnet/January 25/2020
Interior Minister Mohammed Fahmi denied reports claiming that Dar el-Fatwa, the highest Sunni authority in Lebanon, has urged him to renounce the interior ministry portfolio, his media office said in a statement released on Saturday. The statement said that Fahmi “denies reports circulated on social media that the Minister received a phone call before the government was lined-up from Dar el-Fatwa asking him to reject the ministerial seat.” However, the statement stressed that “Minister Fahmi is keen on the national and Islamic role of Dar Al-Fatwa, led by Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, Sheikh Abdul Latif Deryan, whom he highly respects.

Lebanon: Hariri Reminds Aoun of his ‘Protectorates’
Beirut - Asharq Al-Awsat/Saturday, 25 January, 2020
Lebanon’s former prime minister, Saad Hariri, has snapped back at President Michel Aoun over accusations of granting “immunity” to some personalities. Hariri’s visitors said Friday that the former PM “does not distribute immunity to anyone and rejects becoming a barricade to any assault on public funds.”
He made his remarks after Aoun was quoted as saying by Asharq Al-Awsat that the former premier was seeking to grant “immunity” to certain figures. “Anyone who is proven to be linked to any violations or negligence in protecting public money, shall be held accountable,” the president told his visitors. But Hariri responded in remarks published by Mustaqbal Web news site by saying that Aoun should recall his “protectorates” before launching his accusations. Hariri cited “electricity, customs, corruption in the judiciary and others.”In his remarks to his visitors, Aoun also lashed out at the finance ministry and the central bank, saying they were responsible for the country’s financial crisis that helped spur an anti-government protest on Oct. 17. But former Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil issued a statement saying the ministry has regulated public finances after 13 years of failure to approve public budgets. He said the electricity plan had forced the state to spend more than its treasury can handle. The energy ministry had been led in the past years by ministers belonging to the Free Patriotic Movement that is founded by Aoun.

Lebanon has 28 days to present rescue plan
Najia Houssari/Arab News/January 25/2020
UN special coordinator for Lebanon tells PM Diab: ‘Most important step to take is reforms, reforms, and reforms’
Lebanon has 28 days to prepare a statement showing how it will resolve its crises following a meeting Friday between the UN’s special coordinator for the country and Prime Minister Hassan Diab.
The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jan Kubis met Diab and reiterated that the most important step that should be taken was “reforms, reforms, and reforms, break up with previous corruption practices, adopt transparency, reestablish trust, and listen to the demands of people demonstrating in the streets in order to win their confidence.”
The government has 28 days to prepare its statement, which includes a plan to address the turmoil coursing through Lebanon.
The formation of a new government earlier this week ended months of political deadlock following Saad Hariri’s resignation as prime minister in October in response to mass protests over corruption and mismanagement.
Information Minister Manal Abdel Samad said the ministerial committee tasked with drafting the statement intended to promptly issue it as there were “pressing internal and external situations, and the crisis is getting more aggravated.”Hundreds of people were injured in Beirut last weekend after security personnel fired tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets at demonstrators who threw stones, attempted to invade the Parliament building, and attacked bank offices and shops.
There were also recent clashes between activists and supporters of the Amal Movement, which is associated with the country’s Shiite community. People wanting to protest corruption outside a public institution in the southern part of the capital were targeted by knife and stick-wielding men.
“Young men attacked us and accused us of being spies and agents, then started beating women and men alike,” said one activist. “We fled in every direction and the guards of a major store denied us entry to hide, for they feared being attacked by the aggressors.”
Amal’s leadership said the attack was perpetrated without its knowledge and was a “mere improvised reaction” by inhabitants of the area.
But newly appointed Interior Minister Mohammed Fahmy condemned the “brutal attack.” “Security services will not hesitate to pursue the aggressors and unveil their identities,” he warned. “We will no longer accept that those who tamper with security continue to violate the rights and dignity of any citizen under any circumstances or pretext, for demonstrations, sit-ins are legitimate rights protected by law.”There is also anger at the makeup of the new Cabinet, with senior political figures saying it showed that Hezbollah’s takeover of the Lebanese state was complete. Former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said Hezbollah had become the party with the most authority in Lebanon as it was able to extend its influence, authority and control to the head and members of the government.
“What happened so far will have negative repercussions on the government and its approach to a large number of problems, which have become aggravated since Michel Aoun became president and led to a significant decline in the confidence of citizens in the government and the political class as a whole,” he told Arab News. The new government did not bring independent ministers as promised, he added. Earlier this week former minister Marwan Hamade told Arab News that Hezbollah regained a parliamentary majority in 2018 thanks to an electoral law designed to benefit the pro-Iranian party.
“Now Hezbollah completes its takeover through the new government where we find the fingerprints of the Syrian regime. The majority of the new ministers in key positions depend either on Hezbollah or on the former security chief, the pro-Syrian Jamil Sayyed, or on Gebran Bassil, their ally,” Hamade said.

Breaking down a Lebanese haircut
Leila El Sayed/Annahar/January 25/2020
The shortage of physical dollars in the country is already forcing a Liralization haircut.
With the looming financial failure in Lebanon, several new terms emerged in the average citizen’s daily conversation such as Haircut, Capital Control, Liralization, etc. Haircut, or a forced decrease in deposits, is widely debated and most dreaded by the public. However, these debates come with little rigorous and scientific analysis. This is due to the absence of data on deposit concentration in different balance brackets (as a result of Lebanon’s Banking Secrecy Law), coupled with the lack of reliable information on the sizes of BDL monetary reserves. In short, we are in a crisis, but we have no idea when the curtain will drop. An article by Dan Azzi on November 8th, 2019 suggested that a banking capital control (back then was still not widely imposed) would only stanch a bleeding while more drastic measures are needed such as a haircut on all accounts above 1 mill $. Others anticipate an immanent haircut affecting all deposits above 100K $. In this article, I examine the different “discussed” haircut scenarios, using realistic approximations to overcome the problem of data shortage. It is worth mentioning that this is an effort to explore the different scenarios and their consequences and is by no means a suggestion that a deposit haircut is the best solution for banking recapitalization. The main scenarios analyzed here are haircut on deposits, haircut on net deposits, and indirect haircut through Liralization. Under each scenario, a fixed rate of haircut (30%) can be applied to all deposits, a progressive rate is simulated depending on deposit size (30%, 40%, 50%), and then a more aggressive rate (40%, 50%, 60%).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its 2016 Article IV on Lebanon, showed Lebanese deposit concentration based on three bucket sizes: 100K $, 1 mill $ and 100 mill $. The numbers published by the IMF are utilized to calculate total haircut amount that can be generated to recapitalize banks under the three scenarios. The assumption is made that these different bucket sizes are still valid today.
Scenario 1 below assumes a haircut on deposits ($ and LBP) independent of loan amounts. In the fixed rate case, this can generate 44bn$ (1A), in the medium progressive rate case it generates 54bn$ (1B) and in the most progressive rate case, it generates 68bn$ (1C).
A less likely scenario, Scenario 2, assumes a haircut on deposits net of loans. The assumption here is that each depositor holds an equal loan-to-deposit ratio as the total in the banking sector (30%). This scenario can generate between 18bn$ and 30bn$ in the most progressive rate case (2C).
The third scenario has been recently discussed on social media platforms and newly termed as the Liralization haircut. In this scenario, all dollar deposits (and loans) would be converted forcefully to LBP. This is therefore an indirect haircut of at least 40% (at current exchange rates) on all deposits across all buckets. This scenario can yield 35bn$.
Note that the shortage of physical dollars in the country is already forcing a Liralization haircut of this kind. This is where half of the interest on dollar accounts are being paid in Lebanese Lira (some banks are paying full in Liras) while other depositors with urgent liquidity needs are converting their accounts to Lebanese Lira to avoid the stricter limits on dollar accounts.
With an estimated 2bn$ outflow of total banking deposits per month, at least a ten-fold amount of banking recapitalization is needed to stop banks from moving from their current illiquidity status into insolvency. The source of this recapitalization will continue to be hotly debated in the coming months, as each solution will cause several grievous social, economic and financial consequences. *Leila El Sayed holds a BA in Economics from the American University of Beirut, an MA in Financial Economics from the University of Leeds and an MSc in Decision Sciences from the London School of Economics. She worked as a research analyst in the banking sector in Lebanon for several years and later as an Economist at the United Nations Development Program.

التحالف الأميركي الشرق أوسطي للديموقراطية يدعم حجب المساعدات الأمريكية للبنان
AMCD Supports Withholding US Aid to Lebanon
WASHINGTON, DC, USA, January 25, 2020
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/82617/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%83%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82-%d8%a3%d9%88%d8%b3%d8%b7%d9%8a-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82-4/
INPresswire.com/ — The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy strongly supports Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the US government’s position on withholding aid to the recently-formed, Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon.
“The test of Lebanon’s new government will be its actions and its responsiveness to the demands of the Lebanese people to implement reforms and to fight corruption,” said Secretary Pompeo. “Only a government that is capable of and committed to undertaking real and tangible reforms will restore investor confidence and unlock international assistance for Lebanon.”
As demonstrations continued across the country, it is clear that the new government formed by the Iranian terrorist proxy Hezbollah and its allies will not satisfy the people’s demand for clean government.
“The new government formed in Lebanon this week lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the Lebanese Revolution and is still beholden to the mullahs in Iran and their proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon,” said AMCD co-chair, John Hajjar. “Secretary Pompeo is to be congratulated for his lack of endorsement, but he and the Trump Administration need to go further in supporting the Revolution. Sanctions and travel bans need to be implemented against those in the former government and those in the new. Nothing but a wholesale clean-up of all the clans, militias and hereditary politicians will be able to restore the confidence of the long suffering people of Lebanon. Absent that, Lebanese in each region should install their own organic governing structures and shake off the noose placed around their necks by the mullahs, Hezbollah and their ilk.”
“The US should demand that the newly formed Lebanese government declare the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 which would force Hezbollah to disarm and disband.” added AMCD co-chair, Tom Harb. “Members of Parliament should consider giving votes of confidence based on progress toward that goal.”
AMCD strongly supports Secretary Pompeo’s strong stance in opposition to Hezbollah’s continued domination of Lebanese politics and its corrupt suffocation of the Lebanese economy. Hezbollah must be expelled from the government. Then, and only then, should aid and investment be resumed.
Rebecca Bynum
The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy
+1 615 775 6801

Hezbollah-backed Lebanon government should beware of the US
Raghida Dergham/Al Arabiya/January 25/2020
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/82612/%d8%af-%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%ba%d8%af%d9%87-%d8%af%d8%b1%d8%ba%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%84%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%ad%d9%88%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84/
Washington will not tolerate Hassan Diab’s administration so long as it is a puppet of the Iranian proxy
Lebanon’s new government, headed by Hassan Diab, was last week weaved together by Jamil Al Sayyed – a man known for his loyalty to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, Lebanese political party Hezbollah and the Iranian regime. In other words, the new government is part of Tehran’s so-called Axis of Resistance. However, most of the powers vested in the region have preferred to wait and watch to see how this government is getting on.
The Europeans have sent misleading diplomatic messages at a time when they need to be clear and firm. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has been guilty of the same. For now, Russia has focused on its interests in Syria and Libya.
The US meanwhile has determined not to tolerate Hezbollah’s role as a puppet master controlling the strings of what is essentially a weak government. The Donald Trump administration’s policy with regard to Iran and its proxies in the Middle East has always been to exert maximum pressure, including the deployment of sanctions.
While the Lebanese state has not been targeted by sanctions thus far, the imposition of a Hezbollah-backed government will have consequences in Washington. And anyone who assumes that the Trump administration will accept the status quo will be in for a surprise.
For now, though, the US is biding its time – not because it thinks it might get on with Mr Diab, who has denied his administration is the work of Hezbollah. Nor is it doing so to test the government’s ability to enact serious reforms – a condition for giving Lebanon aid to stave off collapse. The US is essentially ensuring that the Lebanese army does not slip into a bloody confrontation with peaceful protesters, and guarantee donor countries do not rush to offer aid before reforms are put into execution – for that would mean sparing Lebanon’s ruling elite of accountability.
European diplomats have spoken in a language that betray the Lebanese people and their demands. They have suggested that the mere formation of a government, even if three months too late, is an achievement and that there should be no prejudgment before its performance is evaluated. This stance is even more remarkable given that it has coincided with the UK’s decision to stop differentiating between Hezbollah’s military and political wings and designate the entity as a terrorist group. Yet we see now the UK implicitly deciding to live with a government formed by Hezbollah.
Such a stance will hasten Lebanon’s economic collapse. Firstly, giving the government a grace period of a month or two – which the Europeans are considering as an option – might delay an implosion in the short term, when what is needed is to force rapid reforms to prevent collapse over the long term. Secondly, the European stance will be seen as a betrayal of the popular uprising, which has demanded the formation of a government of technocrats and independents.
French diplomacy, meanwhile, needs a skillful translator to interpret its meanings, having linked aid to reforms; welcomed the formation of the government; and criticised Hezbollah’s regional positions while calling for its “self-dissociation”.
More remarkable still is Hezbollah’s position, as described by those close to the party. In Hezbollah-aligned Al Akhbar newspaper, its editor-in-chief Ibrahim Al Amin wrote: “Hezbollah will dissociate itself from everything but will not allow anyone in the government to threaten the interests of the resistance whatever the cost.” He added that defeating what he called the US-Israeli project is the priority, and that “every setback for America will mitigate the internal crises of Lebanon and other countries in the region”.
This clarity comes in the wake of some ambiguity expressed by Mike Pompeo, the US secretary of state. Speaking to Bloomberg about the US position on the Lebanese government, he said: “We’ll have to take a look at it. I don’t know the answer to that yet.” In reality, however, the Trump administration’s position is crystal clear, with Mr Pompeo having attached conditions before providing assistance to Lebanon to save it from a “terrible financial crisis that lays in front of it just in the weeks ahead”, as he put it. Those conditions included the state meeting the demands for freedom and sovereignty.
Interestingly, those close to Hezbollah’s thinking are speaking in a manner that suggests they are disapproving of Mr Diab’s government. Criticism emerged after Mr Diab ruled out dismissing Central Bank governor Riad Salameh, announced his first foreign visit would be to the Arabian Gulf, and refrained from promising to uphold the trinity of the “army, the people, and the resistance” enshrined in all previous government manifestos.
So, the question we must ask here is this: is Hezbollah’s distancing from the Diab government an attempt at deflection, or is it to distance itself from a disaster it knows is coming – precisely because of its insistence on forming a weak government and thereby ignoring the people’s demands? Ultimately, what matters to Hezbollah is not what happens to Lebanon but how Lebanon can be used in the battle between Iran and the US.
However, Tehran is in a bind – both in economic and military terms. It has also fallen victim to its own regional and nuclear ambitions. The Trump administration will therefore continue to impose sanctions on the regime and its proxies. It has stepped up efforts to target Hezbollah’s funding sources in South America and Africa. And if necessary, it might even impose sanctions on Beirut.
In other words, those rushing to conclude that the uprising in Lebanon is over should hold their horses.
*Raghida Dergham is the founder and executive chairwoman of the Beirut Institute

Hezbollah will find the urgent Lebanese priorities are clashing with its regional loyalties
Michael Young/The National/January 25/2020
If the party opts for repression to silence the domestic scene, it might cause a social explosion and foreign condemnation that it would regret
In discussing the popular protests in Lebanon, many people have tended to focus on internal dynamics and public disgust with the political class. That is certainly legitimate, given that some of Lebanon’s politicians are the personification of incompetence and corruption, individuals who in any normal country would be in prison.
However, it might be that the biggest factor affecting developments in the country – and how the Lebanese address their ongoing economic collapse – is regional politics. Specifically, Hezbollah, Lebanon’s most dominant party, will seek to shape the politics of the country in line with its interpretation of events in the wider Middle East and their impact on its patron Iran.
The recent assassination of Qassem Suleimani was a watershed moment for Iran. The country’s leadership interpreted the move as an attempt by the US to challenge the Iranian regional agenda, and this will almost certainly have repercussions on Hezbollah’s behaviour in Lebanon in the coming phase.
For the party, the US challenge mandates two things: first, not allowing Lebanon’s protest movement to undermine a political system that has provided cover for Hezbollah; and second, reinforcing the party’s hold over the Lebanese system so as to hold the country hostage in any regional power struggle.
The first imperative pushed Hezbollah to subtly oppose the protest movement when it began last October. The party variously sought to cajole, intimidate and demobilise the protesters, before focusing its efforts on forming a government that would preserve the stakes of the major political parties that are aligned with it. It has now put together a government that will aim to neutralise and, possibly, suppress popular demonstrations.
More worrisome is what this would mean for Lebanon’s economic status. It is almost certain that the country will need some form of international assistance as its financial system falls apart. The process is already well advanced as Lebanon’s banking sector buys time while awaiting a rescue plan. Yet Hezbollah might consider intervention by the International Momentary Fund, or some other outside group of states, as an infringement on its margin of manoeuvre.
Donor countries will not help Lebanon unless it engages in serious economic reform. Such a process would be painful and essentially be imposed upon a reluctant political class, thereby weakening its credibility. This could represent a red line for Hezbollah, which would not only see the political class lose its control over economic decisions, but might also have to face conditions for assistance that are directed against it.
Yet saying "no" would not be that simple. If Lebanon goes bankrupt and banks close, the pain the Lebanese feel will reach new heights. In such a context the party cannot be seen as an obstacle to outside aid. It would face a dilemma of either obstructing foreign assistance, provoking popular rage or opening the door to outside help and influence that could undermine Hezbollah’s lock on the system.
That is why the party might have no option but to push for real reform to keep foreign funders away, even if this is improbable. Hezbollah and its allies have created a vast and systemic form of corruption that is difficult to alter. Even with the best of intentions, any push for reforms by the party could lead to tensions with its allies. Worse, if Hezbollah regards preservation of the system as vital today, why would it accept reforms that transform the system tomorrow?
The party is looking warily not only at the US. It is equally uneasy about Russia’s moves in the region. A few days after the US assassinated Suleimani, Russia's President Vladimir Putin flew to Damascus to meet with President Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The very clear message in his visit, compounded by the fact that Mr Al Assad had to suffer the humiliation of going to a Russian command post to meet Mr Putin, was that the Syrian regime ultimately answers to Moscow, not Tehran.
Mr Putin’s actions carried an implicit statement that even if the US and Iran went to war, Russia would protect its stakes in the region. Coming in the wake of Russia’s decision on countless occasions not to fire its anti-aircraft missiles at Israeli planes bombing Iranian and pro-Iranian proxy forces in Syria, such an attitude cannot reassure Tehran. To the Iranians, Syria provides Hezbollah with strategic depth in any war with Israel but that is no longer necessarily true if Russia controls the country.
That is why, just as Mr Putin effectively made his position clear in Syria after the Suleimani killing, Hezbollah will be keen to affirm that Lebanon is Iran’s. And it will ignore as much as it can the national protest movement, hoping perhaps that a mixture of threats and patronage power will allow it to weather the crisis. That, however, might be an unrealistic expectation given that Lebanon’s economic disintegration will hit Hezbollah’s constituency, and its wider community, very hard as well.
At some point Hezbollah will find that its regional loyalties are clashing with urgent Lebanese priorities. If the party opts for repression to silence the domestic scene, it might cause a social explosion, and foreign condemnation, that Hezbollah would regret. Lebanon is not Iran. Resorting to violence could potentially bring with it a civil war that draws Hezbollah into a maelstrom from which it will not soon exit.
*Michael Young is editor of Diwan, the blog of the Carnegie Middle East programme, in Beirut

Lebanon at a turning point
Dr. Nasser Saidi/Al Arabiya/January 25/2020
Endemic and persistent corruption, mismanagement, gross mal-governance, and failure to address Lebanon’s economic, social, and environmental challenges have driven protestors to throng the streets amidst bank closures, payment restrictions, and foreign exchange controls. Protesters had called for a cabinet of professionals, “technocrats,” politically independent, experienced persons, divorced from sectarian politics. The new government formed under duress is a mix of professionals and politically affiliated members. Significantly, it is comprised of 20 non-parliamentarians promising better accountability and has six female members (including the Middle East’s first female defense minister). However, the stark reality, as Prime Minister Hassan Diab clearly identified, is that the country is at a “financial, economic, and social dead end.” Indeed, Lebanon has become a failed state. Will the new government have the political courage to undertake deep and unpopular reforms? Will it be willing to commit political suicide?
The new government has a gargantuan task ahead: It must immediately address the interlinked economic, banking and financial, and currency crises, not to mention a deadly environmental crisis. The accumulated difficulties have ballooned over the past three months due to a series of policy mistakes and inaction including the panic-inducing closure of the banks, informal capital controls, restrictions on domestic and external payments, a rapid depreciation of over 40 percent of the Lebanese pound in the parallel market and effective inconvertibility of deposits. In turn, the pound’s depreciation and the liquidity crunch have led to a sharp acceleration of inflation (some 30 percent), a sharp drop in economic activity (e.g. car registrations dropped by 79 percent year-on-year in November), leading to growing layoffs and unemployment, business closures/bankruptcies, and falling incomes, resulting in a collapse of investment, a sharp curtailment of household consumption, and more than a 50 percent fall in government revenue. The forecast is that real gross domestic product could decline by 10 percent, a great depression, not a recession.
Time is running out for Lebanon. Sovereign debt has risen to 160 percent of GDP, with a projected debt service of $10 billion, equivalent to 22 percent of GDP and over 60 percent of government revenue. The fiscal deficit jumped to about 15 percent of GDP last year (from a budgeted 7.5 percent) and is likely to rise again this year. The debt dynamics and fiscal deficit are on an unsustainable path, with central bank monetary financing of the deficit heralding rapidly increasing inflation and accompanying depreciation of the Lebanese pound. Lebanon’s external accounts are also in crisis, with the current account deficit (some 26 percent of GDP), aggravated by falling remittances and a surge in capital outflows, despite the illegal and unofficial capital controls.
What should the policy imperatives be of the new government? Fundamentally, the Diab government needs to develop and implement a series of economic and structural reforms that aim to restore trust in the government and its institutions, notably through an anti-corruption strategy and stolen assets recovery program, and addressing the fiscal, banking, financial, monetary, and currency crises to avoid a lost decade of economic depression, poverty, deep social unrest, and political chaos. The immediate priorities include the following reforms.
Establish an emergency cabinet committee for immediately implementing economic and financial policy reform measures.
An economic recovery and liquidity reform program is required and must be prepared and agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Lebanon needs a multilaterally funded package of some $20-25 billion for economic and social stabilization, budgetary and balance of payments support, and a redesigned CEDRE program. In 2018, more than $11 billion was pledged in soft loans at the CEDRE conference in Paris, funding from which being unlocked is dependent on reforms made in the country. Prime Minister Diab’s announcement of potential visits to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations would be a propitious opportunity to discuss participation in the reform program.
A credible fiscal reform should top the list of policy priorities.
Starting with the 2020 budget, the aim should be to achieve a 5-6 percent primary budget surplus over the next two years through expenditure and revenue measures. These would include the removal of subsidies on electricity and fuel, which are major drains on the budget, revisiting public sector salaries and pensions, in addition to public procurement laws and procedures, and improved tax compliance. But medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability requires imposing permanent constraints on fiscal policy through two fiscal rules: a budget balance rule (e.g. budget deficits not to exceed 2 percent of GDP) and a debt rule (e.g. debt-to-GDP should not exceed 80 percent of GDP).
Public debt restructuring is key.
Given the Eurobond maturing in March 2020, another initial pain point is initiating negotiations on restructuring and re-profiling Lebanon’s public debt, including the debt of Lebanon’s central bank. So far, the absence of an empowered government haa constrained any negotiations on restructuring its debt. Lebanon’s crisis-hit bonds have been flashing warning signs of a sovereign debt distress if not default ahead. Yields on the government’s $1.2 billion of notes maturing in March were close to 200 percent on January 22 (versus at 13 percent just before the start of protests), while the price of other Lebanese Eurobonds plummeted to historic lows. The new government should immediately initiate debt restructuring negotiations within the comprehensive economic stabilization and liquidity program. A successful restructuring could reduce the net present value of debt by some 50 percent, substantially lowering the debt burden and its servicing.
The banking sector must be restructured.
Given that 70 percent of Lebanese banks’ assets are invested in sovereign debt and central bank paper, a restructuring of public debt will necessitate an extensive reform of the banking system, including a bail-in of the banks through a $20-25 billion recapitalization by existing and new shareholders, a capitalization of reserves, a sale of assets, – such as real estate, investments, and foreign subsidiaries – and a consolidation of banks to downsize the sector.
Lebanon needs to change its monetary policy and move to a managed flexible exchange rate regime.
The high interest rates required to maintain the overvalued official dollar peg generated structural current account deficits, created a domestic liquidity squeeze, crowded out the private sector, and increased the cost of public borrowing. Reform starts with admitting the failure of the pegged regime, recognizing the de facto depreciated parallel market rate, and instituting formal capital controls through legislation during the economic transition period. A social safety net must be implemented to protect the vulnerable.
Importantly, given the need for painful reform measures and rising extreme poverty levels, a targeted and well-funded social safety net, to the tune of some $800 million, needs to be put in place to protect the poor and vulnerable. This is a historical turning point. Either Lebanon will choose a path that leads to the economy’s stabilization and a gradual recovery over a three- to five-year transition period, or it will avoid necessary reforms, confirming the country as a failed nation and dooming it to a decade of desolation.

Hezbollah gets its way with new Lebanese government
Makram Rabah/Al Arabiya/January 25/2020
Almost a month after being designated Prime Minister by Hezbollah and its allies, Hassan Diab unveiled his 20-member cabinet; to the majority of Lebanese, Diab is an utter disappointment.
Since October 17, the Lebanese, and the Lebanese diaspora, have taken to the streets across Lebanon to demand a transitional and independent government, one that can carry out a series of political reforms and thus pave the way for the country’s economic resurgence. Instead, Diab’s lineup of ostensibly capable men and women are satellites of their respective parties, each reporting to, and committed to, the instructions of their political patron.
This public perception is not only enforced by the selection and background of the respective ministers, but rather by the process which brought them to power. Hezbollah’s main Christian ally, Lebanon Foreign Minister and President Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil, was given a freehand to carve out his share of the cabinet, confirming Diab as merely a pawn. Joining Bassil as kingmaker was member of parliament Jamil Sayyid, one of the most prominent security chiefs during the Syrian occupation of Lebanon (1990 to 2005), whose active and visible involvement in forming the Diab government further exposed it and framed it as merely a Trojan horse for Iran and its allies.
Disregarding the flagrant transgression on the cabinet formation and the fact that Hezbollah is fully in control of this government, Diab also failed to fulfill his promise of appointing qualified and capable ministers to address Lebanon’s dangerous economic downfall. While some of the cabinet have impressive and elaborate credentials, their skills are simply in the wrong place, as their sectarian and party affiliation dictates which ministry they occupy. Despite including six female ministers in Diab’s cabinet, a record high for any Lebanese government, most of them have no experience in their appointed position.
Minister of the Displaced Ghada Shreim, who holds a PhD in French literature and was former director of the Faculty of Letters at the Lebanese University, should be appointed as minister of education rather than to the defunct and corrupt Ministry of the Displaced. Manal Abdul Samad, another impressive female professional and the head of the value added tax legislation and tax policies department at the Ministry of Finance was appointed as Minister of Information, something in which she has no prior experience. Amusingly tragic perhaps, is the fact the minister of defense is a pharmacist who only got her post because her husband, a tycoon and shady artifact collector, could not meet the sectarian criteria.
Farcically, Diab saw it fit to hand two portfolios, culture and agriculture, which are in no way related, to Abbas Mortada, a member of Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri’s Amal Movement. Mortada’s mediocre credentials and the organic disjunction of his portfolios, coupled by the fact that the Amal Movement is not famed to be a champion of either, has unleashed a gale of mockery over social media platforms, has spread doubt further, and has discredited Diab and his supposed commitment for change.
These facts aside, in Diab’s first speech after announcing his cabinet, he pledged to lobby the international community as well as the Arab Gulf states to help Lebanon out of its economic pickle, but by doing so, he might have already doomed his cabinet. For the international community, mainly the US and its Arab allies, to inject money into Lebanon’s economy, it has to be certain that these funds are not funneled into the empty coffers of Hezbollah, something that Diab is incapable or unwilling to do.
Diab has perhaps surprised many by initially accepting to do Hezbollah’s bidding and agree to be designated as prime minister, but his insistence on bending completely to Hezbollah’s regional master plan by fielding such a disappointing cabinet, is nothing short of suicidal. Further, it does nothing to confront the demands of ordinary Lebanese. Anyone looking at the formation of the Lebanese cabinet, both regionally and internally, comes out with a number of conclusions. Most importantly, Iran, and consequently Hezbollah, has dug itself into a deep hole. Rather than compromising and seeking to exit its predicament, it has decided to confront and drag the countries it has held hostage even further into unsalvageable depth. Second, the Diab cabinet, and any other desperate attempt by the ruling elite to prolong this corpse of a system has simply ran its course, and will eventually fall on the streets, by force if necessary.

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on January 25-26/2020
Pope Francis backs Iraqi call for its sovereignty to be respected
Reuters, Vatican City/Saturday, 25 January 2020
Pope Francis met Iraq’s president on Saturday and the two agreed that the country’s sovereignty must be respected, following attacks on Iraqi territory this month by the United States and Iran.President Barham Salih held private talks for about 30 minutes with the pope and then met the Vatican’s two top diplomats, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin and Archbishop Paul Gallagher, its foreign minister. The talks “focused on the challenges the country currently faces and on the importance of promoting stability and the reconstruction process, encouraging the path of dialogue and the search for suitable solutions in favor of citizens and with respect for national sovereignty,” a Vatican statement said. On January 8, Iranian forces fired missiles at two military bases in Iraq housing US troops in retaliation for Washington’s killing of Iranian General Qassim Soleimani in a drone strike at Baghdad airport on January 3. The Iraqi parliament has passed a resolution ordering the 5,000 US troops stationed in Iraq to leave the country. Soon after the Iranian attack, Francis urged the United States and Iran to avoid escalation and pursue “dialogue and self-restraint” to avert a wider conflict in the Middle East. The pope discussed the Middle East with US Vice President Mike Pence on Friday. The recent tensions in Iraq could make it impossible for Francis to visit the country, which he has said he would like to do this year. The Vatican said the pope and Salih also discussed “the importance of preserving the historical presence of Christians in the country.”The Christian presence in Iraq and some other countries in the Middle East has been depleted by wars and conflicts. Iraq’s several hundred thousand Christians suffered particular hardships when ISIS controlled large parts of the country, but have recovered freedoms since the extremists were pushed out.

Trump's Anticipated Middle East Peace Plan May Be Short on Peace
Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
A peace plan with no chance of achieving peace: that's the paradox of Washington's proposal for an Israeli-Palestinian accord expected to be released by Tuesday. A major obstacle to any such plan is that President Donald Trump has aligned himself so strongly with Israel, while repeatedly undercutting the Palestinian side who feel the US has lost its status as an honest broker, said AFP. The plan, described by Trump as "the ultimate deal," seeks to bridge major gaps between the Israeli and Palestinian sides, a goal that has eluded previous administrations reaching back for decades. Trump's son-in-law and advisor Jared Kushner began working on the proposal in 2017 in a largely secretive process.
Its rollout has been repeatedly postponed, caught in the political headwinds around Israel's recurring elections and its prolonged struggle to form a government.
Why now?
So why should the plan be released now, just over a month before the next scheduled Israeli ballot? Because it's "not about making peace," said Dennis Ross, a US point man on the peace process under several previous administrations.
Added Aaron David Miller, who held similar positions in past administrations: "This is the first peace initiative that I'm aware of where the objective has nothing to do with Israelis or Palestinians, nothing to do with the advancement of the peace process, nothing to do with launching negotiations."The staging of the presentation is itself surprising. Rather than bringing together the Israeli and Palestinian leaders to seek their backing of his plan, Trump summoned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Oval Office, along with his Israeli rival in the March 2 elections, Benny Gantz. The Palestinian Authority cut off ties with US officials in late 2017, after the Trump administration recognized Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. That US move, which reversed decades of policy, sent shockwaves through the region and was followed by other moves seen as favoring Israel. Since then, Palestinians have said, Washington lost any claim to being an honest broker.
A helping hand
But other factors may explain the timing of the announcement. First of all, said Miller, who is now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Kushner's team wants to "finally, basically demonstrate that they have a plan" -- and to do so ahead of the US presidential election in November, which could result in the plan being permanently shelved. In the short term, said Ross, "anything that can divert attention away from what's going on" is welcome. The US Senate is hearing Trump's impeachment trial, and Netanyahu faces corruption charges and an effort to remove him from office. Trump may also be acting with evangelical Christian voters in mind -- they tend to strongly support the Israeli cause -- while also giving a helpful boost to Trump's friend "Bibi" as the Israeli leader struggles for political survival. Netanyahu "probably thinks this will put him in a much stronger position to stay as prime minister of a national unity government," said Ross, who is now with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Over the long term, Kushner and US ambassador to Jerusalem David Friedman, both seen as strongly pro-Israeli, want to leave a lasting impact on American policy.
They have already begun doing so: Washington has recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in the Six-Day War of 1967; it stopped referring to the West Bank as "occupied" territory; and it no longer considers Israeli settlements there as inconsistent with international law.
Two states?
Each of those moves was seen as a blow to the international consensus forged through decades of diplomacy, but which the Trump administration dismissed as ineffective. While few of the plan's details are known, numerous observers, including Ross and Miller, expect that approach to be reaffirmed. The plan could thus give an endorsement to Israel's annexation of part of the West Bank, making the Jordan Valley the eastern border of Israel.
While certain neighborhoods of East Jerusalem might be placed under Palestinian control, the status of that part of the holy city as capital of a future Palestinian state remains highly uncertain. Will the American proposal even include a Palestinian state, long a central focus of attempts to achieve peace? Both Trump and Kushner have refused to use the term, in a break with the traditional position of the international community that has long favored a "two-state solution." If the plan does include a Palestinian state, it will be a "demilitarized" state, "a state at least in name," falling far below the demands of Palestinians, who want to recover all the territories annexed by Israel in 1967, Ross said, according to AFP.

US builds up Mid-East strength against rising tension over “Deal of the Century and Iran
DEBKAfile/January 25/2020
The USS Bataan strike group and the 2,400-strong 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit are being deployed to the Mid-East ready for unexpected trouble arising from spiraling tension with Iran and potential reactions to the release of Donald Trump’s “Deal of the Century” – a plan for an Israel-Palestinian peace – early next week. On Friday, Jan. 24, the USS Bataan amphibious assault ship, escorted by two other battleships, had reached the Red Sea opposite the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. They had taken part in a naval exercise with Morocco, which was interrupted for their new mission.
US intelligence watchers believe that Iran is getting ready to expand its assaults on US and allied targets, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, in escalating payback for the US assassination of Al Qods chief Gen. Qassem Soleimani on Jan. 3.
On Friday, the Pentagon revealed that 34 US servicemen had suffered “traumatic brain injury” from Iran’s missile strikes on the US Ain al-Asad air base in Iraq on Jan. 8. Earlier, only 11 were reported injured, while President Trump had stated initially that no US troops had been hurt in the attack.
Gen. Frank McKenzie, head of the US Central Command in the Middle East, speaking from the deck of the Bataan, said, “Although the Soleimani killing was a deterrent, Iran continues to pose a very real threat.”
DEBKAfile’s military sources additionally attribute the latest American military movements to a reassessment of the tasks assigned to the US forces stationed in Iraq. Their new focus has moved to the semiautonomous Kurdish Republic (KRG) in northern Iraq. The three US airbases in other parts of the country, Ain al Asad, Balad and Taiji, will remain in place. However, three new American bases are under construction in Kurdistan.

Iran has capacity to enrich uranium ‘at any percentage’: Official
Reuters/Saturday, 25 January 2020
If Iranian authorities make the decision, Iran’s nuclear agency has the capacity to enrich uranium at any percentage, the deputy head of Iran’s nuclear agency said in a report that the agency posted on its official website on Saturday. “At the moment, if (Iranian authorities) make the decision, the Atomic Energy Organization, as the executor, will be able to enrich uranium at any percentage,” Ali Asghar Zarean said. Last Wednesday, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that his country will never seek nuclear weapons, with or without nuclear deal, calling on the European powers to avoid Washington’s mistake of violating Tehran’s 2015 nuclear deal with major powers. In reaction to Washington withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions, Iran has gradually rolled back on its commitments. Rouhani said Iran remained committed to the deal and could reverse its steps away from compliance if other parties fulfilled their obligations.

Iran’s foreign minister says Tehran still willing to negotiate with Washington
The Associated Press/Saturday, 25 January 2020
Iran is not ruling out negotiations with the United States even after an American drone strike that killed a top Iranian general, the country’s foreign minister said in an interview released Sunday. Mohammed Javad Zarif told Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine that he would “never rule out the possibility that people will change their approach and recognize the realities,” in an interview conducted Saturday in Tehran. There has been growing tension between Washington and Tehran since in 2018, when President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the nuclear deal with Iran. The US has since re-imposed tough sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy. But Zarif suggested Iran was still willing to talk, though reiterated his country’s previous demand that first the US would have to lift sanctions.“For us, it doesn’t matter who is sitting in the White House, what matters is how they behave,” he said, according to Der Spiegel. “The Trump administration can correct its past, lift the sanctions and come back to the negotiating table. We’re still at the negotiating table. They’re the ones who left.”Trump has maintained that the 2015 nuclear deal needs to be renegotiated because it didn’t address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its involvement in regional conflicts. The other signatories to the nuclear deal - Germany, France, Britain, China and Russia - have been struggling to keep it alive. Following the US drone strike on January 3 that killed Gen. Qassim Soleimani, the head of Iran’s elite Quds Force, Tehran announced it would no longer abide by any of the deal’s limitations to its enrichment activities. It then retaliated January 8, launching ballistic missiles at two bases in Iraq housing American troops, causing injuries but no fatalities among soldiers there. Zarif did suggest Iran was also still prepared for conflict with the US, though was not specific. “The US has inflicted great harm on the Iranian people,” he said. “The day will come when they will have to compensate for that. We have a lot of patience.”

Three Iraqi protesters killed in Baghdad, south
Reuters, AFP/Saturday, 25 January 2020
Three protesters were shot dead on Saturday in Iraq’s capital and south, medics told AFP, as demonstrators clashed with security forces clearing streets and squares occupied for months by protesters. One demonstrator was killed in the capital Baghdad and two others were shot in the southern flashpoint city of Nassiriya, medics in each city said. The deaths came a day after firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr withdrew his support for the anti-government campaign, prompting fears of a crackdown by security forces. Earlier on Saturday, clashes erupted after authorities began removing concrete barriers near Tahrir Square, where anti-government demonstrators have camped out for months, and across at least one main bridge over the Tigris River in the capital. Supporters of populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr had begun to leave protest camps overnight after he announced he would no longer be involved in the anti-government demonstrations. In the southern city of Basra, security forces raided the main anti-government sit-in overnight and deployed in force to stop protesters gathering there again, security sources said. Police arrested at least 16 protesters in the city, they said. At least 34 people were injured in the clashes between police and protesters in Baghdad, and another six in the southern city of Nassiriya, security sources and medics said. The actions of the security forces appeared to be an attempt to fully clear anti-government sit-ins and end months of demonstrations calling for the removal of Iraq’s ruling elite. The raids began hours after al-Sadr said he would halt the involvement of his supporters in the anti-government unrest. Al-Sadr had supported the demands of protesters for the removal of corrupt politicians and for the provision of services and jobs soon after the demonstrations began in October, but stopped short of calling all his followers to join in. Many of al-Sadr’s millions of supporters many hailing from Baghdad’s slums have however been involved in the protests. Al-Sadr’s followers held a march on Friday calling for the removal of US troops from the country in a rally separate from the anti-government protests. The march dissipated after several hours. Al-Sadr wrote on Twitter late on Friday he would “try not to interfere in the issue (of protesters), either negatively or positively, so that they can shepherd the fate of Iraq.” He did not elaborate.
In Basra, protesters urged Sadr to reconsider what they said was a withdrawal of support for popular demonstrations. In a letter circulated on social media, they called for the support of Sadrists, without whom they feared attacks by security forces.

Iraq Protest Tents Set Ablaze after Cleric Withdraws Support
Associated Press/Naharnet/January 25/2020
Iraq's anti-government protests were dealt a blow after a powerful Shiite cleric withdrew his support from the movement, leading security forces to set fire to protesters' tents overnight Saturday in the country's south, as well as re-open key public squares in Baghdad that had been occupied by the demonstrators. The presence of Muqtada al-Sadr's followers and his militia group had shielded the protesters from security forces and unknown groups looking to harm and suppress them, activists said. With that cover gone, many in the four-month-old movement feared the worst.
The demonstrations since October have been critical of government corruption, high unemployment and Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. Crackdowns by security forces have killed at least 500 protesters. But many of the protesters are worried that the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, which is playing out in part on Iraqi soil, is killing their momentum. In a tweet Friday evening, al-Sadr indicated his "disappointment" toward anti-government protesters in Baghdad's Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the anti-government protests. Al-Sadr's tweet came just hours after tens of thousands of his followers staged a separate anti-U.S. rally in a nearby Baghdad neighborhood, which most demonstrators in the square steered clear of. At around around 2 a.m. local time Saturday, riot police set fire to a protest encampment in a central square in the oil-rich southern city of Basra, two activists said. The crackdown came after al-Sadr's followers packed up their tents and left. In Baghdad, key squares and roads that had previously been a focal point of protest violence were re-opened for vehicle access, according to a statement from the Baghdad Operations Command. Protesters said they were fearful that security forces would next come to root them out of Tahrir Square. At least eight tents occupied by al-Sadr's supporters were removed, said one activist. "(Al-Sadr's statement) gave the green light for the government to suppress the demonstrations," said Husanien Ali, a 35-year-old protester. "We consider this a betrayal of the blood of the martyrs and the sacrifices made by the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr."In Baghdad, the vital Mohammed al-Qasim highway, Tayaran Square and al-Nidhal Street were all reopened. Ahrar Bridge, which had been partly occupied by protesters in a stand-off with security forces, was also reopened, according to Baghdad Operations Command. Concrete blocs were removed to re-open al-Khilani Square, the statement said. Concrete blocs were removed from the street and cleaning crews were sweeping Ahrar Bridge, one activist said. Protesters continued to occupy Jumhuriya and Sinak bridges, which lead to

Kuwait summons Iran envoy over Soleimani killing claim
AFP, Kuwait/Saturday, 25 January 2020
Kuwait’s foreign ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador Friday after a high-level Iranian official implicated the emirate in the US drone attack that killed top general Qassem Soleimani, official news agency KUNA reported.
Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled al-Jarallah expressed Kuwait’s “amazement” at the claim that one of its air bases had been among those used to carry out the January 3 attack, KUNA said. It said he was referring to a statement by Brigadier-General Amirali Hajizadeh, aerospace commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. “MQ-9 UAVs (drones) were flying in the region (at the time of the attack) that had mostly taken off from Kuwait’s Ali al-Salem” base, Hajizadeh told Iranian state television Thursday. Jarallah told the ambassador, Mohammed Irani, that Kuwait had already denied any role in the deadly attack in Baghdad. He said such a claim “risks damaging relations” between Kuwait and Iran. Soleimani had been at the center of power-broking in the region for two decades as chief of Iran’s external operations Quds Force of the elite Revolutionary Guards.

French extremist recruiter sentenced to 22 years in prison
AFP, Paris/Saturday, 25 January 2020
A Frenchman has been sentenced to 22 years in prison for seeking to recruit dozens of youths to fight as extremists in Syria and for leading a brigade of French-speaking extremists in the war-torn country. Mourad Fares, 35, fled Syria in 2014, and was arrested in Turkey and handed over to French authorities the same year. Prosecutors said he played a “crucial” role in the recruiting of young people to fight as extremists in Syria, and noted a lack of any “real regret” for his actions. Fares appeared unmoved as the verdict was read out at a special court on Friday evening. He admitted to the court he “indirectly” recruited youths to fight as extremists via his propaganda videos and “facilitated” the entry of a number of people into Syria. He denied taking part in combat operations in Syria, where he travelled in 2014. But prosecutors said he “participated in armed actions” with ISIS, later known as the Islamic State group, before leaving to a join a cell of French-speaking extremists affiliated with the Al-Nusra front. The court also found Fares guilty of leading this cell. France has been on high alert since a wave of extremist attacks that began in 2015 which have killed more than 250 people. Dozens of French citizens left to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq before US-led coalition forces dislodged the insurgents from their so-called “caliphate” last year. ISIS leaders also urged followers in France to stage attacks on their own, often targeting security forces, and officials have said the threat of further ISIS-inspired attacks remains high.

Powerful earthquake shakes eastern Turkey, killing 22
Agencies/Friday, 24 January 2020
The death toll from a powerful earthquake in eastern Turkey reached 22, as rescuers searched for an estimated 22 more people trapped under the rubble of collapsed buildings. Thirteen people died in Elazig province and five more were killed in the neighbouring province of Malatya, the disaster and emergency management agency (AFAD). The earthquake of magnitude 6.9 struck eastern Turkey on Friday, the European-Mediterranean Seismological Centre (EMSC) said. The quake had a depth of 10 kilometers, according to EMSC. Rescuers are seen in outside a collapsed building after an earthquake in Elazig, Turkey, January 24, 2020. (Ihlas News Agency via Reuters) State media in neighboring Syria reported the earthquake was felt in several areas of the country. Local media in Lebanon reported the same in the cities of Beirut and Tripoli. State broadcaster TRT showed footage of police and emergency workers searching a partly collapsed building in Elazig. Windows were smashed and balconies had crashed to the ground.

Gaps in Bezos ‘hack’ story widen as media outlets change their tune
Tommy Hilton, Al Arabiya English/Saturday, 25 January 2020
The accusation that Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hacked into the cellphone of Amazon founder and Washington Post owner Jeff Bezos came under increased scrutiny by US media outlets on Saturday in the light of growing evidence that the breach of his privacy actually originated from his girlfriend. The claim of a Saudi phone hack, swiftly denied by the Saudi government, was made in a report by Washington-based consultancy FTI Consulting two months ago which concluded with “medium to high confidence” that Bezos’s iPhone X was compromised via malware they allege originated from a video sent by the Crown Prince to Bezos on May 1, 2018. The FTI report was picked up by two UN special rapporteurs who released a statement on Wednesday that they were “gravely concerned” by its findings, which formed the basis of an exclusive story published by the Guardian that was then embraced by US media outlets. But under scrutiny, the “hack” report story soon began to crumble. First, almost as soon as the UN report was issued, cyber security experts published comments on Twitter raising doubts about the accuracy of the report, pointing to the lack of actual evidence of malware in the report and raising concerns about FTI’s methodology. On Thursday, the Associated Press published a timeline of the claims, assessing that the report was “not at all” conclusive. Then CNN, which previously ran a report that called the hack a “revelation” and tied it to the Crown Prince’s reputation, acknowledged that “the criticism, including from several high-profile and respected researchers, highlights the limits of a report produced by FTI Consulting, the company Bezos hired to investigate the matter.”Even the Washington Post, which is owned by Bezos, acknowledged that security experts “have also questioned the forensics report upon which UN officials are basing their conclusions.” On Friday, the cracks in the “hack” claim story grew even wider.
In an exclusive article, the Wall Street Journal revealed that evidence from federal prosecutors in Manhattan challenged another central piece of evidence in the FTI Consulting report: that texts from the Crown Prince’s phone to Bezos revealed “private information that was not well known at the time.”The FTI Consulting report included a photograph of a woman who it claimed resembled Lauren Sanchez, the woman with who Bezos was then having a secret affair. According to FTI Consulting, this photograph was sent from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s phone to Bezos shortly after his phone was allegedly hacked – interpreted as evidence that the Crown Prince had hacked the phone, accessed Bezos’ private information, and sent the photograph to him to suggest he knew about the affair. Bezos’ affair was later exposed by the National Enquirer, prompting his security chief Gavin de Becker to write an article accusing the Enquirer of obtaining the information via illicit means – which he linked to the alleged Saudi hack of Bezos’ phones. But according to the WSJ, federal prosecutors in Manhattan have evidence which suggests Bezos’ girlfriend gave text messages to her brother – as the National Enquirer claims.
“The evidence gathered by federal prosecutors includes a May 10, 2018, text message sent from the phone of Lauren Sanchez, Mr. Bezos’ girlfriend, to her brother Michael Sanchez containing a flirtatious message from the Amazon chief,” the WSJ cited “people familiar with the matter” as saying.
“The text messages reviewed by the Journal, as well as a $200,000 payment Mr. Sanchez received from the Enquirer under an October 2018 contract the Journal also reviewed, supports American Media’s earlier statements that he was the source for the National Enquirer’s article,” it added.
While the information that Michael Sanchez gave the photographs to the Enquirer does not rule out the allegations that Bezos’ phone was hacked – security chief De Becker claimed that the Enquirer sought out Sanchez after acquiring the information from elsewhere – it has prompted questions over the coverage of the entire affair. “The Bezos report, compiled under Mr. de Becker by the digital security firm FTI Consulting, was so juicy that it overwhelmed traditional journalistic skepticism at some news outlets,” wrote the New York Times.
Others said that Bezos had used his influence to give the story coverage despite the lack of evidence. “Jeff Bezos, one of the world’s most powerful and richest men, is levelling severe allegations against the Saudis, and once again, he has nothing to show for them,” wrote Jordan Schachtel in The Federalist.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on January 25-26/2020
Libya, Erdogan and the Mercenaries
Dr. Jebril Elabidi/Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
Deporting the “mercenaries” was the pressure card that Erdogan chose to threaten Europe’s security. He had previously threatened Europe with deporting what was left of ISIS to the continent, as part a repeated attempt to blackmail them, and he had already transferred hundreds of Syrian fighters to Tripoli in Libya to save the Brotherhood Government from inevitable collapse.
The Turkish president, unfortunately, seeks to play the role of the Mediterranean pirate through a ridiculous attempt to mess with geography when he contrived that his country shares a border with Libya. While the two countries are separated by islands, countries, and thousands of kilometers, he turned Libya into the neighboring country through the bogus map drawn by Fayez al-Sarraj- the Prime Minister of the unconstitutional Accord Government.
Recruiting mercenaries is considered a crime by the UN issued International Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries, which means that Erdogan, as a recruiter, trainer, user and financer of mercenaries is subject to trial for violating international law.
Mahdi al-Harati, the Irish-Libyan former mayor of Tripoli, oversaw the training of Erdogan’s mercenaries and their transfer to Libya. His familiarity with the Syrian fighters, stemming from his fighting experience alongside them and overseeing their training, allowed him to play a central role in their recruitment.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitored the transfer of the mercenaries from Syria to Libyan territory. While the registration process continues, around 2,400 mercenaries have already arrived in Tripoli after agreeing to fight there, with each terrorist receiving 2,000 dollars. 1,700 recruits have arrived at the Turkish camps for training as recruitment from al-Mu'tasim Brigade, Sultan Murad Brigade, Northern Falcons Brigade, Hamzat, Legion of Levant, Suleiman Shah, and Samarkand Brigade continues in Afrin, the Euphrates Shield, and North-Eastern Syria.
Ahmad Kermo al-Chehabi, a high ranking official in the so-called Syrian Nation Army, loyal to Turkey, admitted to recruiting and transporting mercenaries, bragging “we are ready for Jihad anywhere; we won’t stop. We are willing to sacrifice our souls and our children for the Ottoman Caliphate”.
The agreement to gulp up the gas and wealth of the Mediterranean, plunder Libya's wealth and violate its sovereignty, and transfer hundreds of mercenaries to Libya, is equivalent to throwing firewood and gasoline on a fire to ensure that it continues to burn. It could also be considered a threat to Europe's security and its interests in Libya, since the presence of fighters of different nationalities in Tripoli, which is only 300 miles away from Southern Europe, inevitably poses a threat, whether or not Europe acknowledges it.
Libya and its war is not their final destination. From them, Libya is nothing but a transit stop that Erdogan took to help his men and those loyal to him, the Brotherhood and the Government of Reconciliation after it is about to fall. The Libyan army’s victory in the battle to liberate Tripoli from the grip of militias and mercenaries is inevitable.
During the debate over solutions to the Libyan crisis, the Libyan parties refused to sit at the same table, the crisis moved from a truce and an unwritten cease-fire in Moscow to the birth of the Military Committee (5 + 5) representing both sides to dismantle the militias in Berlin.
Meanwhile Ghassan Salameh, the international envoy, says: “I do not see blue hats in Libya anytime soon,” and concerning the Syrian mercenaries brought in by the Turkish president obsessed with a second Ottoman Caliphate, Salameh also said that: “Erdogan was invited because he is threatening to send Syrians to Libya, and he had pledged not to interfere or send mercenaries. Now, after signing of the agreement, Erdogan can be held accountable. ”
The Europeans ignoring the presence of mercenaries and Erdogan’s transport of extremists should wait the arrival of hoards of these mercenaries at their doorsteps. For most of them, Libya is nothing but a transit stop on their way to Rome and then to other Western countries.
There are no political groups in Libya, nor is there a political conflict. There is only a security crisis, with the Libyan people facing the international Brotherhood organization and its terroristic figures. The organizations brought in members from all parts of the world to help them attain victory, so they rushed to it and turned Libya into a cemetery of the multinational invaders.
Erdogan's mercenaries, whose coffins have begun returning to Idlib and Gaziantep from Tripoli, have no place in Libya, as the soil of Libya sizzles and does not accept them.

Tehran and its Three Fantasies
Amir Taherii/Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
“He died, so that Iran lives!’ this is the slogan attached to posters and T-shirts distributed in Tehran as the Islamic Republic prepares to mark the 40th day of General Qassem Soleimani’s “martyrdom” in accordance with religious mourning traditions.
Whoever invented the slogan may not have known about the Persian literary device known as “iham” or double-entendre that enables the poet or writer to say something that might sound as if he intended the opposite.
The Tehran slogan writer must have hoped to persuade the Iranians that Soleimani somehow sacrificed himself in order to ensure Iran’s continued existence. However, the slogan could also be read as a statement that for Iran to continue to live, it was imperative that Soleimani should die.
In that second reading the slogan makes much sense although it would be wrong to limit it to the person of the dead general. After all, Soleimani, though a talented political and public relations operator, was not the inventor of or chief decision-maker in strategy that has led Iran to the edge of precipice both at home and abroad.
Thus, for Iran to continue to live, and hopefully even prosper, one must hope and pray for the end of the strategy of which Soleimani was the poster-boy.
That strategy has been built on three big fantasies.
The first of these is that Iranians as a nation are united behind Khomeini’s messianic regime and ready to put up with poverty, injustice and even oppression in order to keep “The Revolution” alive. Over the past few years that fantasy has been punctured by almost continuous protests, strikes and socio-political turmoil at various levels throughout Iran. For the first time in its long history, Iran has experienced simultaneous revolts in over 100 towns and cities, involving people from all walks of life and all social and ideological backgrounds.
We don’t know the exact level of support that Khomeinism may still attract in Iran; that would only be possible if elections are held in an atmosphere of freedom and plurality. But even regime apologists now admit that the Khomeinist support base is in melting mode.
The second fantasy on which Tehran’s illusions are based relates to the claim, often peddled by the late Soleimani, that the Muslim world, even the world as a whole, is somehow thirsty for leadership, if not actual control, from Tehran and see the Islamic Republic’s “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei as a savior of mankind.
For years, that fantasy has been fed by foreign leaders and groups who have revived the ancient industry of flattery in a new form.
Islamic Republic media broadcast statements by people like Hassan Nasrallah, head of the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah, Ismail Haniyah of Hamas or Abdul-Malik al-Houthi of Sanaa, praising Khamenei in terms that would have made Haroun al-Rashid blush with embarrassment. Outside the Muslim world, Tehran media are constantly on the lookout for people who could be persuaded or bribed into feeding the monster that is Khamenei’s cult of personality.
However, that fantasy too may have reached its outer limits. Access to pluralist sources of information enables more and more people to form a judgment of their own on almost any subject of interest. The idea that a majority of Lebanese, Iraqis, Yemenis and Syrians love the Islamic Republic and adulate Khamenei may still deceive the "Supreme Guide”. But more and more Iranians now realize that Khamenei, and through him, the Islamic Republic as a whole, have been sold a bill of goods.
Ten years ago, more than half a million Iranian pilgrims went to Damascus for pilgrimage at the shrine of Sayyeda Zaynab. Today, however, would-be pilgrims are told to stay away from Syria where the majority of Syrians are supposed to be seething with love for Iranians. A similar situation exists in Iraq where Iranians are supposed to be loved for having saved the Iraqis from both Saddam Hussein and ISIS.
And, yet, the Tehran authorities have all but stopped pilgrims from going to Iraq and posted heavy security for Iranian businesses and government offices in Iraqi cities. In Yemen, too, virtually the entire Iranian “community” of some 600 people have been transferred from Sanaa to Muscat in Oman for “security reasons”, although Yemenis are supposed to be passionately in love with Iran and Khamenei. The handful of countries that still accepted visa-free travel by Iranian visitors are re-imposing visas one after another. In other words, our empire-building enterprise, which has cost us billions, much of it spent under Soleimani’s stewardship, has earned Iranians, nothing but suspicion, not say hatred, across the globe.
The third fantasy in the fable of which Soleimani is but the latest propagator-cum-victim, is that the Islamic Republic’s strategy of “exporting the revolution”, which in practice means madness and mayhem, is virtually cost free and that, shaking in fear, the rest of the world won’t dare oppose it.
That fantasy was generously fed by people like former US President Barack Obama and former European Union foreign policy tsarina Federica Mogherini who, perhaps with good intentions, treated the Islamic Republic like an unruly teenager who should be cajoled into more reasonable behavior through kind inducements rather than parental punishment.
Tehran’s state-controlled media are on the lookout for anything that might sustain their claim that the outside world, especially the United States, is “trembling” in front of the might Khomeinist revolution. That quest could produce surrealistic results. Earlier this month the daily Kayhan, reflecting Khamenei’s views, ran a front-page story about an American lady called Barbara Slavin announcing that she has decided to “unfollow’ President Donald Trump’s Twitter account to protest the killing of Gen. Soleimani. The “unfollowing event” was claimed to be a sign that “America’s thinking elites” are opposing Trump’s tough policy on Iran. However, few Iranians know who the lady in question is and whether or not she is a leader of America’s “intellectual” elites or whether her “unfollowing” really made Trump tremble.
When it comes to Tehran media they often cite a single Palestinian journalist in exile as “the leading intellectual of the Arab world”, praising the Islamic Republic and flattering Khamenei as “the greatest leader in recent Islamic history.” The 40th day, or “arba’een” of Soleimani’s death is designed to perpetuate those moribund fantasies. Reports we get indicate that the regime is mobilizing its maximum resources to put on a big show including the usual photoshop funerals. In other words, Khamenei’s entourage still refuse to abandon their fantasy world.
This means that news from the Islamic Republic is not as bad as sober heads in Tehran believe. It is much worse.

Russia Succeeds the US in the Middle East
Radwan al-Sayyedi/Asharq Al-Awsat/January 25/2020
This is neither a new nor a surprising conclusion. Since the beginning of Obama’s first term, there was talk of changing orientations and priorities.
Usually, Republicans are the ones who do not like the US government to expand both internally and externally. Obama, the Democrat, however, is the one who led the wave of changing priorities. This came after a significant affliction that Bush Jr.’s administration caused in the area and the Middle East by invading Afghanistan and then Iraq. If the invasion of Afghanistan had some sort of justification as a result of al-Qaeda, which attacked the US and its interests, being especially the notorious 9/11 attacks, there was no such justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Consequently, the isolationist Republicans are the ones who usually drag the US into invasions. Up until now, the US has failed to end the war and establish a democratic state in Afghanistan. Their failure in Iraq was evident in 2007, with regard to both the war on terror and the establishment a democratic state. As a result, after 2008, there has been a consensus among Americans to leave Iraq.
Obama delineated new strategic goals, mainly focusing on China and the Far East, considering the absence of a fight there, on several fronts, and on ending the strife with Iran by gradually withdrawing. Consequently: Securing the safety of Israel, reducing the threat against the Gulf, keeping in mind that the US is no longer in need of off-shore oil. How then, would the US end the strife with Iran and guarantee Israel’s safety? The strategy was to end nuclear development in Iran, and the US had lobbied Europe to join it, as the latter was also worried about Iranian ballistic missiles. Through their mode of negotiations, the Iranians succeeded in guaranteeing two things from the US and Europe: taking over Iraq and Lebanon, through the militias that support it. When they failed to take over Syria by themselves, they dragged in the Russians (with explicit American consent). The US, on the other hand, succeeded in the last seven years to negotiate and guarantee the safety of Israel, leaving Iraq, and putting the responsibility on the new Iraqi elite and Iran. Those following the developments disagree on the extent of the link between the failure of the Democrats’ interventions in the Middle East (such as the Benghazi incident which led to the death of the US consul) and Trump’s success in 2016. Trump, did however, put leaving Syria and Iraq while guaranteeing the safety of Israel on his electoral program. Israel’s safety is indeed guaranteed, as Hezbollah has not made a move against it since 2006. Iranian responses to Trump’s sanctions have always been against maritime traffic and Saudi Arabia, through Houthi militias. Also, they have responded by directly raiding oil facilities and even Mekkah.
The Russians did not directly intervene to an extent that changes the balance of powers until 2015. They had regretted leaving Gaddafi to meet his fate in 2011 - 2012. They had also guaranteed that there would be no big misunderstanding with the US by holding direct talks. There was military coordination between the two as well as meetings between the two presidents. The aim was for the Russians (and Iranians?) to replace the US in Syria after Iran had replaced them in Iraq.
Three problems remained without a solution, the Syrian Kurds, Iraqis, the Turks and their concerns and violent extremists that had risen to power. In 2015, something unexpected happened: ISIS took over North Syria and a third of Iraq. Russia was not prepared to carry the burden and was satisfied with Iran protecting the area that had remained under Assad’s control. The US then returned and led the international campaign against ISIS’s terrorism without implicating Russia or Iran. In fact, a sort of cooperation developed between the two, including with Soleimani!
With the US coming close to withdrawing from the area, the Russians began to think about how they could replace it. They did not only link it to the circumstances in the area (the presence of Iranians, Turks, Israel and Arabs) but with the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine, East Europe and South America as well! In the area, they considered themselves to be guarantors for Israel’s safety. They allied with Iran and Turkey while developing strategic interests with the latter and may start a campaign with China to protect Iran from the US.
Consequently, the Russians are doing what the US was doing when they replaced the French and British in the fifties. Even with Arabs, they make use of officers who do not want the Iranians and Turks to dominate them. Like the US, they undermine Europeans and consider them to be wealthy like Arabs, and consequently, they urge them to join them. Libya is an example of this. When the Arabs and Europeans failed for more than five years to contain the Libyan problem, Erdogan copied the Iranians when he tried to take over some of the Libyan wealth like Syria. Putin intervened at both the Moscow and Berlin conferences in order to force everyone to operate under his umbrella: the Arabs, Europeans and both Libyan sides. Explicitly, he supports the Government of National Accord but provides Field Marshal Haftar with arms and soldiers just like France used to.
There are two critical differences between Russia and the US. The US always has enough arms, money and programs, with an alleged moral superiority, while Russia only has weapons. Despite China supporting it, it has failed so far to help with finances, markets and construction! The other difference is that all peoples in the area have gotten used to the Americans, not only in terms of arms but also in hospitals, universities, development centers, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
A final note before coming to my conclusion: Among the four sides that the US, and now Russia, deals with, the Arabs are the most confusing and draining. Libya after Syria is an excellent example of this. For even if the Egyptians, Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians cooperated to contain the problem and there were no European presence or Turkish and Russian greed, the fighting and destruction would not have been alleviated! Therefore, while some Arabs created pragmatic links with Russia or China, they still long for the American era that is about to end. In conclusion, the Trump Administration suddenly decided to escalate the conflict with Iran and to hit the Revolutionary Guard Corps hard, both its heads and militias. Will they nullify their resolutions, and will Iran become a threat to Israel? Will statuses and domination play a role in delaying the American withdrawal for a third and fourth time?! All of that is possible. It seems, however, that this strategic transformation from both great nations has taken place, while regional powers try to step in according to their interests, “And these days we alternate between the people”!

Boris goes to Washington
Andrew Hammond/Arab News/January 25/2020
Boris Johnson is finalizing plans with Donald Trump for a trip to Washington next month. While the visit will be designed to showcase personal warmth between the two, it comes at a tricky time.
Most immediately, the proposed UK digital tax is causing diplomatic waves. UK finance minister Sajid Javid last weekre-affirmed his intent to move ahead with the tax; France and other European countries are also seeking to ensure technology firms, most of them American, pay their fair share of tax in countries where they operate.
Many such tech companies argue that taxes should be payable not where they have their European headquarters, but where digital activity takes place. Both Trump and Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin have supported this, andMnuchin has threatened retaliation against the UK with tariffs on its cars imported into the US.
Security and defense have long been at the core of the US-UK relationship, but there are tensions there too. Washington has warned UK officials that it may limit intelligence sharing if London allows the Chinese company Huawei to build part of its 5G high speed mobile network. Johnson is expected to award the contract to Huawei in days, which would be a high-stakes diplomatic gamble for London given its desire to form closer post-Brexit economic ties with both Beijing and Washington.
Beyond security issues, there are also US-UK disagreements on wider foreign policy challenges, such as Iran, andclimate change. This year is the fifth anniversary of the 2015 Paris climate change agreement, and the Johnson government is chairing the annual UN climate meeting in November amid significant pressure to make major progress on implementing Paris commitments.
The two-week UN summit in Scotland is already being billed as the most important climate gathering since 2015, with about 200 world leaders attending. The meeting, just after the US presidential election, could therefore be a crossroads in the battle against global warming.
Following Trump’s cool relationship with Theresa May, it has been widely assumed that her more colorful replacement can rejuvenate the so-called special relationship.
With Trump in power until at least 2021, one of the key tasks will be seeking to bring the US president into, or neutralise his opposition to, any bold new action on climate change. This will not be easy, especially in light of his remarks last week about environmental “prophets of doom.”
It is in this context, with the UK leaving the EU in days, that Johnson’s visit is being planned for next month. Following Trump’s cool relationship with Theresa May, it has been widely assumed that her more colorful replacement can rejuvenate the so-called special relationship. But while Johnson and Trump appear to get on quite well, the prospects for the relationship are uncertain given the US president’s erratic nature, and key differences between the two sides over their post-Brexit relationship.
To be sure, it is clear that Trump and Johnson see a potential, post-Brexit, US-UK trade deal as the cornerstone of a renewed “special relationship,” and this could also be a boon for Trump personally given that he is criticized as an anti-globalization, protectionist president. From the standpoint of Brexiteers too, including Johnson, this would also represent a win in their own battle to show that the nation can swiftly secure trade deals with key non-European partners.
There are also key areas ripe for agreement here, such as lowering or eliminating tariffs on goods. Equally, however, possible icebergs lie on the horizon. They include the prospect that harmonising financial regulations, with the international dominance of Wall Street and the City of London, will not necessarily be straightforward. Securing agreement in other sectors, including agriculture, where there are divergences of views and strong interest groups, will also not be easy. As last month’s UK election campaign showed, there are also UK political concerns that the nation’s much cherished National Health Service could be part of the agenda here for US healthcare firms.
Given the multiple uncertainties ahead in the Trump presidency, Johnson is likely to continue to seek to play the role of a trusted friend in a bid to get close to the president to try to make the relationship work as smoothly as possible. This may provide some protection in what could be a rocky period of international relations in the early 2020s.
While this may be a sensible strategy, at least initially, it is not without risk, especially given Trump’s mercurial behavior and polarized standing in UK opinion. While seeking the upside in the new relationship, Johnson would do well not to overestimate the UK’s ability to shape US power, nor neglect the likelihood that when push comes to shove, Trump’s “America First” outlook may care little for core UK interests, whatever personal affinity they have for each other.
*Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics

Erdogan beware: In the Med, you have been warned
Henri Barkey//Arab News/January 25/2020
Saudi Arabia’s declaration last week that it supports the “the full sovereignty of Cyprus over its territories” may one day prove to have been the harbinger of a significant change in the strategic balance of the eastern Mediterranean, and even the Middle East.
It came amid a flurry of diplomatic activity that included a visit to Greece by the Saudi foreign minister and a visit to Riyadh by the Cypriot foreign minister. The Greek government even pledged the deployment of its Patriot missiles to Saudi Arabia to help boost air defenses. It is clear that what is driving all this is widespread regional unease with Turkey’s increasingly assertive role in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean.
Increasingly, the Saudis and the Turks find themselves on opposing sides of many current disputes and developments. These range from Egypt, where Turkey supported the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi while Saudi Arabia backed the current leadership of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi; to Libya, where the two countries are assisting different claimants to legitimacy; and to Qatar, the subject of a boycott by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states but supported by Ankara.
In both Qatar and Libya, Turkey has appeared to flex its muscles by deploying troops. Nor can its regional rivals be happy with Turkish attempts at building bases in Somalia and Sudan.
Moreover, Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord in Tripoli have agreed on an “exclusive economic zone” in the Mediterranean that flouts international law; Ankara is increasingly using its navy to protect its drilling ships in the Mediterranean and threaten those of other countries; and finally, Turkey intervened in the Syrian conflict despite the opposition of Washington and Brussels. All of this is seen not just by Riyadh but also by many in the region, including the UAE and Egypt, as an indication that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to elevate Turkey into a local dominant force, and perhaps the leader of the Muslim world.
Erdogan certainly intends to “make Turkey great again;” from the moment he became prime minister in 2003 he has articulated his belief that for far too long Turkey has been relegated to a secondary role in international politics, and that given its economic and military prowess and strategic location it deserved to be a rule maker and not just a consumer of rules. In addition, Erdogan’s vision for Turkey is part and parcel of his vision of his own historical role, domestically and internationally. Implementation of policy has been made much easier by the complete control Erdogan has achieved over politics at home.
In both Qatar and Libya, Turkey has appeared to flex its muscles by deploying troops. Nor can its regional rivals be happy with Turkish attempts at building bases in Somalia and Sudan.
Erdogan exploited the horrible murder in Istanbul of Jamal Khashoggi, which he viewed as the perfect tool with which to try to undermine Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — viewed by Erdogan as an ambitious leader both willing and able to stand up to him.
It is quite possible that the new Saudi discourse on Cyprus is a response to Erdogan’s aggression, and a way to target Turkey’s vulnerability. Cyprus, especially the Turkish-run Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), continues to represent a bitter disillusionment for Ankara. No one but Turkey recognizes the TRNC, an occupied enclave in the north of the island, and the Republic of Cyprus managed to be admitted into the European Union as the sole representative of Cypriots. One of the few groups that gave the TRNC support was the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with which it had secured observer status. As late as the May 2019 OIC summit, missed by Erdogan, the communique strongly supported the Turkish Cypriot position.
Saudi Arabia remains the most important OIC member. While it is unlikely that the OIC will vary its future pronouncements dramatically, the fact remains that Saudi support for Cyprus in general and its expressed concerns over eastern Mediterranean developments is a significant warning to Ankara. In effect, Riyadh has indirectly endorsed the Egyptian-Greek-Cypriot-Israeli position in the Mediterranean.
Saudi endorsement — albeit indirect — of Israeli positions against Turkey also demonstrate how differently Riyadh views those two countries. Understandably, the Saudis have always opposed Israel and Israeli policies over the Palestinian question. Yet they clearly are not threatened by Israel, while they are by Turkey. In the end, the enemy of my enemy is my friend … sort of.
*Henri Barkey is the Cohen professor of international relations at Lehigh University and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

The judgment of Paris found wanting in the Sahel
Hafed Al-Ghwell/Arab News/January 25/2020
Interventionism, once an emergent reality after the 9/11 attacks, is now a standard policy of Western powers in the name of rooting out militants. The deployment of munitions, manpower and money to troubled countries in a bid to confront extremism and quarantine its contagion is initially praised and welcomed. However, the trouble with interventions is that the urgency of the crises that prompt them leaves little or no time to plan for the aftermath. Worse, shifting political calculations at home caused by mounting casualties overseas become a stumbling block to counter-terrorism objectives, and persistent woes abroad prompt local citizens to become extremist themselves, or demand the swift withdrawal of the once-lauded “saviors.”
France is in the throes of this challenging situation in the Sahel. Paris is no stranger to overseas interventions, from leading the NATO offensive that deposed Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 to maintaining the largest, readiest Western military presence in Africa; about 4,500 troops, 500 armored vehicles, more than 20 helicopters, fighter jets and drones in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The justification for this significant French presence is primarily to protect vast economic interests such as iron ore deposits in Guinea and Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso’s cotton, Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa and Niger’s uranium. Beyond resources, 14 countries in West and Central Africa must have half of their currency reserves kept in the French treasury, giving Paris much geopolitical and geoeconomic heft, now under threat by Chinese and Russian interest in the region. Nonetheless, when militants threaten to carve out territory in Mali, or Al-Qaeda seeks to spread its wings right in the middle of Francafrique, the only France seems to have is military deployment.
The seeds of the diminishing returns with which France is now confronted were planted in 2011. The flawed Libyan intervention may have ousted Qaddafi but it also fueled both the rise of extremists and spreading anti-French feeling, and caused the proliferation of Qaddafi’s arsenal on black markets, and eventually into the hands of the extremists who have killed over 40 French soldiers since 2013. More recently, two attacks on Niger military bases by militants, one in December and another in early January, have claimed about 160 lives — fueling a surge in anti-French sentiments as a result of mounting death tolls reflecting apparent failures of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Anti-French sentiment is not limited to criticisms of a heavy French military presence. The francophone region’s currency, the CFA franc, has been a bone of contention since its inception in 1945, which has only worsened with today’s youth, given its colonial underpinnings. Last month’s announcement that the CFA franc will be renamed and its financial links to Paris severed was panned by critics for being a new iteration of neocolonialism. According to them, the new “eco” should not have been jointly announced to the world by French President Emmanuel Macron and Cote d’Ivoire President Alassane Outtara if Paris were truly distancing itself from its colonial past.
14 countries in West and Central Africa must have half of their currency reserves kept in the French treasury, giving Paris much geopolitical and geoeconomic heft, now under threat by Chinese and Russian interest in the region.
Paris’s answer to these seemingly intractable woes came this month at a summit of Sahel’s G5 in Pau, a small town in the south of France. It was prompted by the accidental deaths of 13 French personnel after a mid-air collision during a hunt for militants in northern Mali. Macron acknowledged that a military solution was not sufficient, a rare admission given that most interventions have followed the same playbook of “deploy first then quietly retreat” when public opinion turns. No questions are asked about the long term, and no answers or potential solutions are proffered either. Yet the key to ensuring that insurgents or militant extremists are defeated lies in a combination of military strength and the improvement of social, political and economic dynamics at the grassroots level.
It is no secret that poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities, rampant corruption, cronyism, waste, nepotism and resource theft have significantly disenfranchised large swaths of people across the Sahel. They have robbed many of the social mobility that can guarantee stability, internal security and stronger public institutions that are a bulwark against creeping militant extremism. The Sahel G5, like most of Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, can no longer afford to stall the crucial transformations that can, at the very least, begin to lay the foundations of insurgency-resistant nation states.
Few regions have the same access as Francafrique to a wealthy patron with a relatively advanced economy. It is disappointing that most countries in that region have demurred on the prospect of leveraging that proximity to bolster local institutions and the rule of law, and afford economic opportunities to the largest demographic, disaffected youth. Instead there is little to no political will to perform the painful yet absolutely necessary transformations, having been lulled into a false sense of security from a French military presence that has proved anything but effective.
If the Sahel G5 want further proof that the French are out of touch, purposely limited and sensitive only to political and economic considerations in Paris rather than the region’s humanitarian plight or growing militant threat — Macron’s remarks at Pau focused on demanding that Sahel nations deal with anti-French sentiment, in exchange for maintaining or expanding the French military presence there. Paris’s focus is on the optics of interventions that periodically drive public opinion closer to home than forging solutions designed to shore up the Sahel’s strengths and ensure individual nations can effectively confront or counter any threats, including those not specifically targeting French interests.
It is a shame that the Sahel G5 did not respond strongly to Macron’s chiding and colonial words, which basically solicited their silence in exchange for more troops. After all, Paris acknowledges that it is going to take more than just a military presence to confront insurgents in the region, not to mention its ugly colonial past. To that end, the rising tally of French failures, since 2013 and before, wear a familiar tinge of orchestrated incompetence and racist tendencies rather than a greater commitment to regional security, emphasizing the domestic reforms that are critical to ensuring long-term stability.
*Hafed Al-Ghwell is a non-resident senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Institute at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also senior adviser at the international economic consultancy Maxwell Stamp and at the geopolitical risk advisory firm Oxford Analytica, a member of the Strategic Advisory Solutions International Group in Washington DC and a former adviser to the board of the World Bank Group. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell

The White House Peace Plan Meeting: U.S. Goals, Israeli Repercussions
David Makovsky//The Washington Institute/January 24/2020
Whether they reveal a detailed plan or merely preview an aspirational document, U.S. officials still need to clarify their goals at a time when elections are looming and Palestinian participation seems highly unlikely.
In a dramatic move, President Trump has announced that Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his leading rival, Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz, will visit the White House on January 28 to be briefed on the administration’s long-awaited Middle East peace plan. Trump told reporters that the plan would likely be released before the summit. Predictably, no invitation was extended to the Palestinian Authority, which severed relations with Washington after the U.S. embassy was moved to Jerusalem in 2017. (A fuller discussion of Palestinian reactions to the meeting will be covered in a subsequent PolicyWatch.)
WHY NOW?
It is difficult to ignore the fact that the White House scheduled the summit for the very same day that Israel’s Knesset is slated to begin deliberations over whether to grant Netanyahu immunity from prosecution on corruption indictments until after he leaves office. Blue White officials have spearheaded parliamentary efforts on the matter so far, seemingly dooming the prospect of immunity. Accordingly, the Israeli public is coming to grips with the idea that if Netanyahu wins the unprecedented third-round election on March 2, he will be running the country while going to court at the same time. Given his well-known intimacy with Trump, there is widespread speculation that Netanyahu asked for the meeting in order to distract from the Knesset proceeding. Notably, the summit will also take place in the middle of Trump’s impeachment trial.
Shifting the focus of the March election from immunity to the U.S. peace plan is a sharp turn for Netanyahu. Until now, he has made the case that releasing the Trump plan during an election campaign would be disastrous because it risks fracturing his right-wing base. Indeed, immediately after Washington’s announcement, Netanyahu’s far-right rival Defense Minister Naftali Bennett issued a statement declaring that his Yamina (Rightward) party opposes giving up any more land for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Although the Trump plan is expected to fall considerably short of Palestinian expectations on that front, it would likely yield the majority of the West Bank to them over time, including Area C and large parts of Areas A (Palestinian urban control) and B (where Palestinians have control over public safety, but Israel has overriding authority).
Yet the timing suggests that Netanyahu has been rattled by the prospect of losing immunity and is willing to risk a right-wing fight. He is probably confident that he can navigate public expectations about the Trump plan—for example, he may indicate that he has some reservations about its specific territorial provisions while simultaneously emphasizing that it is closer to Israel’s requirements than any previous U.S. peace initiative. Netanyahu apparently believes that conservative Israeli pundits are focusing more on the plan’s historic nature rather than its potential territorial delineations, since in their view, the proposals are virtually certain to be rejected by the Palestinians anyway. In that sense, it will be important to note whether the White House issues a map now or waits until after Israel’s election, since such details are likely to inflame at least some portions of Netanyahu’s base.
WHAT DOES THE ADMINISTRATION WANT TO ACHIEVE?
In the most immediate sense, U.S. officials insist that inviting both Netanyahu and Gantz neutralizes the allegation that Washington is interfering in Israeli domestic politics. They also note that this third round of elections is hardly guaranteed to break the impasse seen last April and September, so they might as well act now. Yet these arguments assume that the two candidates will respond to the peace plan in similar fashion. Alternatively, some might argue that Netanyahu and Trump are prioritizing their potential electoral advantages even if it threatens the viability of a negotiated two-state solution.
These concerns, coupled with the realization that the PA is unlikely to end its boycott and suddenly engage in negotiations, lead to the most pressing question: what is the goal of the upcoming meeting and peace plan? Two potential explanations seem most feasible.
First, the administration may intend to release a “vision” that serves as a marker for future talks instead of a detailed plan. The president may see this approach as a way to establish a new reference point that shifts long-held U.S. positions on the core issues, thereby affecting all future initiatives. If Trump is reelected, the administration believes the PA would need to swallow its defiance and reconcile itself to this new political reality.
Alternatively, the administration may be counting on the PA to reject the plan outright. In this view, a hard Palestinian “no” could give Israel freedom of action to annex areas such as the Jordan Valley. The valley would likely fall under Israel’s control in any Trump peace initiative, so releasing the plan’s details now could provide Washington with a way to support such an Israeli move even before negotiations with the PA. On this point, Israel’s handling of a similar situation—the dispute with Syria over the Golan Heights—may be instructive. Israel applied its own laws over that territory in 1981, but later came to the table to negotiate its status under successive governments in the 1990s, and under Netanyahu’s leadership as well.
Whatever the case, PA rejection of the U.S. plan is a prerequisite for any Israeli annexation move, which may explain why one senior Arab leader has repeatedly urged President Mahmoud Abbas not to reject Trump’s ideas outright, fearing the potential territorial consequences. Yet this advice does not seem to be gaining traction so far—PA spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh recently warned that the U.S. plan will cross Palestinian “redlines” if it fails to treat the pre-1967 boundaries as a baseline for Israeli withdrawals, raising the possibility that the Washington summit might lead to violence in the territories.
Regarding Arab and European states, the administration has held quiet consultations with at least a few of them in advance of releasing the plan, though it may still reach out to them again before the meeting. Ideally, the administration hopes that Arab officials say there are elements of the plan worthy of further discussion, fully aware that such comments fall considerably short of support. Yet even this limited objective may not be achieved, and Arab leaders may instead choose to be silent or even openly critical if they deem the plan is imbalanced in favor of Israel. For example, Amman has reportedly threatened to suspend its peace treaty with Israel if Netanyahu annexes the Jordan Valley.
FUTURE OF THE SETTLEMENTS
Some have speculated that the Trump plan will yield around 80 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians, with Israel annexing not just the main settlement blocs near the West Bank security barrier, but also some or all of the outlying settlements and the Jordan Valley. A key question is whether the sovereignty of the resultant Palestinian territory is described in purely aspirational terms or linked to specific Palestinian actions down the road.
Other potential options vary in their feasibility. A peace plan that leaves several dozen non-bloc settlements as separate enclaves outside the security barrier, still attached to Israel, but inside a Palestinian state would raise serious doubts about viability given the territorial contortions and number of settlers involved (over 100,000 people). Calling for the removal of outposts deemed illegal under Israeli law seems like a more feasible and welcome move. As for the Palestinians, the U.S. plan may intend to establish a capital for them by merging some of their outer neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Yet declaring a Palestinian state would apparently come with prerequisites—namely, agreeing to demilitarization and accepting Israel’s identity as a Jewish state.
IS GANTZ BOXED IN?
It is unclear whether the Washington meeting will wind up politically constraining Gantz. The former military chief is believed to fear two possibilities in particular: (1) that the meeting will favor Netanyahu and allow him to divert attention from the immunity issue and his broader legal troubles; and (2) that Netanyahu will try to use the peace plan as a catalyst for either applying Israeli law to the Jordan Valley or annexing it outright. These concerns have led some to question whether he will cancel or postpone his visit, perhaps waiting until after the election instead. He is expected to announce his decision the night of January 25.
Although Gantz would be hard-pressed to refuse an invitation to the White House, he no doubt fears looking like a third wheel at the summit, since Netanyahu will probably use the media attention to claim that his personal relationship with Trump is what brought the peace plan so close to his vision. Gantz likely also fears being seen as falling to the left of a right-wing U.S. administration, since that could erode his support among the moderate right-of-center Israeli voters he has been courting so assiduously.
For now, Gantz appears to preparing for the possibility of a two-step sequence wherein the U.S. plan spurs Netanyahu toward annexing the Jordan Valley. Earlier this week, he stated that he favors such annexation, but only in “coordination with the international community.” In contrast, fellow Blue White leader Yair Lapid has said that annexing the valley must wait until after successful negotiations with the Palestinians. It is important to the Trump administration that Israel take no active steps toward annexation at this time, at least until the PA authoritatively rejects the plan. In this sense, Abbas could play into Netanyahu’s hands at the expense of Gantz, depending on his reaction to the summit.
*David Makovsky is the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute and creator of the new podcast Decision Points: The U.S.-Israel Relationship.

Russia’s Growing Interests in Libya
Anna Borshchevskaya/The Washington Institute/January 25/2020
As in other conflict zones, Moscow cares little about reaching a peace deal so long as it can outmaneuver the West strategically while securing port and energy access—with private contractors playing an increasingly important role.The Kremlin is now openly treating Libya as another focal point of its Middle East activities. After years of U.S. neglect, the country has turned into a proxy war playground, and President Vladimir Putin is vying to become the chief power broker. Earlier this month, he tried (but failed) to get Khalifa Haftar to sign a ceasefire agreement in Moscow with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Putin also participated in the January 19 Berlin conference aimed at getting the parties back on the path toward a political solution. And though the prospects for such a deal remain uncertain, Moscow’s involvement in Libya will continue either way.
“GREAT POWER” AMBITIONS, PORTS, AND ENERGY
Historically, accessing warm-water ports in the East Mediterranean has been of substantial import to Russian rulers as part of their effort to make the country a “great power” player in European politics. During the 1945 Potsdam Conference, Joseph Stalin unsuccessfully attempted to claim trusteeship over Libya’s Tripolitania province. Despite that failed bid, Libya emerged as an important arms client for the Soviet Union after World War II. In the 1970s, dictator Muammar Qadhafi further opened up to Moscow, which provided thousands of personnel and massive amounts of military hardware to boost his activities, including the construction of better missile bases.
The zero-sum struggle with the West over geostrategic positioning and access to energy resources and ports continues to guide the Kremlin’s thinking today. Putin began reviving ties with Libya soon after becoming president in 2000, and relations improved significantly after he met with Qadhafi in Tripoli in 2008. Soon afterward, Moscow wrote off most of Libya’s nearly $5 billion debt in exchange for contracts on oil, gas, weaponry, and railways. Qadhafi also gave the Russian fleet access to Benghazi port.
In 2011, the NATO-led campaign in Libya cost Russia its longstanding access to Libya and its billions in contracts. Yet Qadhafi’s grisly demise and the precedent of what the Kremlin perceived as a U.S.-led “color revolution” scared Moscow the most. In 2012, Putin began a concerted effort to regain access to Libya while simultaneously expanding Russia’s overall naval capabilities. In May 2013, two years before his intervention in Syria, Putin announced a permanent Russian Mediterranean task force.
If Moscow manages to strengthen its position in Libya for the long term, it would gain significant leverage over Europe and further access to the Middle East and Africa. Libya’s deep-water ports of Tobruk and Darnah would be useful for the Russian navy logistically and geostrategically, especially in combination with Syria’s Tartus. Leveraging the country’s extensive energy resources would be another prominent feather in Putin’s cap.
PUTIN’S LIBYA PLAY
Last October, a source familiar with the relationship between Haftar and Moscow told the independent Russian-language media outlet Meduza, “It was important to us back then [i.e., approximately 2015] that there wouldn’t be headlines like ‘Russia continues Middle East expansion: Libya is up next after Syria.’” Yet the signs of this exact scenario coming to fruition were legion.
Haftar reportedly reached out to Moscow for support sometime around 2015. In exchange, he promised to give Russia the energy deals and port access it coveted. Putin accepted the offer and began providing Haftar’s Tobruk government with military advice, diplomatic support at the UN, and even its own printed money. For his part, the commander has made several trips to Moscow since 2016. In January 2017, he was invited to tour Russia’s lone aircraft carrier as it returned home from Syrian waters; some observers believe he promised Moscow additional access during this trip. That same year, Moscow flew dozens of Haftar’s wounded soldiers to Russia for treatment. And in November 2018, the commander visited Moscow again.
Over this same period, press reports began to appear on the increasing presence of Russian trainers and shadowy private military companies (PMCs) in Libya, often to protect oil assets and provide advice. Most recently, the Moscow Times reported earlier this month that Russian contractors fighting in Libya and Syria had received treatment at an elite Moscow hospital owned by individuals close to Putin, including his daughter. And on the energy front, a joint Libyan-Russian oil and gas venture began operations in Benghazi last April.
Even as it tilted heavily toward Haftar, Moscow also built links with the Sarraj government. This two-headed approach is consistent with Putin’s regional strategy, which entails building contacts with all major players in order to position himself as a power broker. Haftar’s refusal to give up his American citizenship and his general reputation as a difficult partner have contributed to Moscow’s dual approach as well. For their part, Russian PMCs recently criticized the commander; at the same time, they conducted a public relations campaign on behalf of one of his domestic opponents, Qadhafi’s son Saif al-Islam, seeking to boost his image last year in the context of a Libyan political campaign.
USING THE PMC MODEL TO GAIN ACCESS
Increasingly relying on PMCs as an instrument of foreign policy has been a hallmark of Putin’s strategy in many arenas. Over the past few weeks, Russia has flown hundreds of these mercenaries to Libya, most likely via Cham Wings airlines from Damascus to Benghazi. They have reportedly appeared at al-Jufrah Air Base, among other locations.
In terms of specific capabilities, these forces include snipers whose presence on the frontlines has caused spikes in GNA casualties. Moscow has also likely provided them with drone jamming capabilities. According to Reuters, the U.S. military believes that either PMCs or Haftar loyalists used Russian air defense systems to shoot down an American drone, probably by mistake, outside Tripoli last November. That same month, Haftar loyalists confirmed that they shot down an Italian drone. Yet being able to operate a Russian air dense system is a high-end skill that not many PMCs have, so these incidents suggest a rapidly growing level of sophistication on the ground and raise questions about the full extent of Russia’s presence there.
Russian PMCs pose broader problems as well. For one, their behavior does not fit within standard Western military definitions. Their activities overlap between contractors, mercenaries, and other categories—there is no clear separation between military and private like one sees in the West. There is also no clear policy or legal framework for Moscow’s actions; technically, PMCs are illegal even under Russian law. Once Moscow reaches agreements on economic or military cooperation in a given country, it has a legitimate reason to send personnel there, for example to provide security for companies undertaking resource extraction. This gives Moscow a foothold, but it can—and often does—engage in other activities to expand its influence in said country and alter the regional balance of power.
One must also keep in mind that Russian PMCs are not entirely controlled by Putin—the interests of the various cronies and oligarchs in his circle can differ from his own, since they are chiefly interested in money. For instance, Yevgeny Prigozhin, owner of the Wagner PMC firm, is mainly focused on Libya’s energy resources, according to Russian military analyst Aleksandr Golts. This element adds a layer of complexity to Russian involvement, though Putin will still likely do whatever he can to ensure that PMCs in Libya advance his broader foreign policy goals.
CONCLUSION
During the Berlin conference, Kremlin-controlled press emphasized Putin’s power-broker position in Libya, circulating photos of European leaders huddling around him as if they were looking to him for guidance. In reality, Moscow’s ability to influence Haftar remains questionable. Even so, Moscow can derive benefits from the diplomatic process without a genuine breakthrough.
First, its involvement in peace talks boosts Putin’s image, especially absent a greater U.S. role. Second, Moscow is quite accustomed to muddling through unresolved conflicts in other countries while securing its foothold and gaining access to resources—or blocking others (chiefly Europe) from gaining said access. Third, it seeks to create dependence on the Kremlin, a strategy that includes using the prospect of refugee flows from and through Libya as leverage over Europe. These efforts—not genuine conflict resolution—are Moscow’s forte.
Moreover, whenever Libya stops producing oil, global prices go up, which benefits the Kremlin. Indeed, oil prices rose to $65 per barrel recently, in part because Haftar stopped production on the eve of the Berlin talks.
The conference also reaffirmed international commitment to an arms embargo on Libya. Yet it is difficult to believe that such declarations will prevent Russia or other actors from sending arms to their local allies there.
Finally, Putin’s position in Libya and Syria may give him additional leverage over Turkey. If Ankara gets too aggressive in Libya, he can pressure it in Syria, raising the prospect of further linkage between Russian activities on both fronts in the coming months.
In short, Moscow benefits from simply staying put in Libya and securing access via PMCs. The United States and its allies should therefore seek ways to curb Russia’s PMC activities. In the end, only Washington has enough clout to bring a genuine resolution to the latest Libyan conflict.
*Anna Borshchevskaya is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute and author of its 2019 paper “Shifting Landscape: Russia’s Military Role in the Middle East.”