LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
February 22.2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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Bible Quotations For today
Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also
Luke 12/33-40: 33 Sell your possessions, and give to the needy. Provide yourselves with moneybags that do not grow old, with a treasure in the heavens that does not fail, where no thief approaches and no moth destroys. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. "Stay dressed for action and keep your lamps burning, and be like men who are waiting for their master to come home from the wedding feast, so that they may open the door to him at once when he comes and knocks. Blessed are those servants whom the master finds awake when he comes. Truly, I say to you, he will dress himself for service and have them recline at table, and he will come and serve them. If he comes in the second watch, or in the third, and finds them awake, blessed are those servants! But know this, that if the master of the house had known at what hour the thief was coming, he would not have left his house to be broken into. You also must be ready, for the Son of Man is coming at an hour you do not expect.

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on February 21-22/2020
First Coronavirus Case Confirmed in Lebanon
Lebanon Confirms First Coronavirus Case in Plane from Iran
Lebanon Begins Drilling for Oil Next Week
Aoun Meets Kubis in Baabda
President Aoun to UN Special Coordinator: The most important battles is fighting corruption
Aoun contacts Hassan over first Coronavirus case in Lebanon
Nasri Khoury visits Diab: We hope to revitalize bilateral relations
Berri meets Ministers of Economy, Interior, and Industry
Moody’s downgrades Lebanon’s rating amid financial crisis
Wazni Meets IMF Delegation on Economic Crisis
Lebanon, IMF discuss all possible options for overcoming crisis: finance minister
Israel Threatens to Strike Beirut, Southern Villages
Elie Ferzli: Ghazi Kenaan Was Once Lebanon’s Most Powerful Authority
Ghosn Postpones Suit Seeking Retirement Pay from Renault
Kattar tackles general situation with UN's Kubis
Hitti meets Richard, Zasypkin
Interior Minister meets World Bank delegation
Ghajar tackles electricity issue with Norwegian, Swiss ambassadors
Education Minister denies closure of schools due to coronavirus
Bakeries' Union announces open strike as of Monday if demands not met
Protesters rally outside Central Bank in Sidon
Akar tackles overall situation with Diplomats
Minister of Justice receives petition on prisoners' rights for humane treatment
Othman tackles overall situation with US Ambassador
Does Hezbollah pay electricity bills?/Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab News/February 21/2020
Iran makes empty promises to Lebanon/Hanin Ghaddar/Al Arabiya/February 21/2020
German gunman who killed 9 called for 'complete extermination' of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt/Associated Press/Ynetnews|/February 21/2020
The Inevitable Middle East War/Robert G. Rabil/Eurasiareview/February 22/2020

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on February 21-22/2020
Iran… And The Policies of Domination In Iraq
Coronavirus Spreads in Iran
New Virus Cases Soar in S.Korea and Chinese Prisons, More Die in Iran
Iraqi Panic Shuts Down Border Crossing with Iran
Russia Studying Possible Summit on Syria With Erdogan, Merkel and Macron
Libyan Tribes Vow to Sue Turkey Before International Courts
Tebboune Promises 'Radical Changes' in Algeria
Algeria's President Says Capable of Bringing Peace to Libya
Fatah: Hamas Favors Calm over Reconciliation
Russia Resorts to Military Power to Enforce Syrian Regime Deployment in Idlib
Saudi Intercepts Yemen Rebel Missiles Targeting Cities

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 21-22/2020
Iran’s Stacked Elections and Radicalization/Charles Elias Chartouni/February 21/2020
The rise of Trump’s new pro-Israel and anti-Iran intel director - analysis/Benjamin Weinthal/Jerusalem Post/February 21/2020
Iran’s hardliners look to consolidate control in parliamentary election/Behnam Ben Taleblu/FDD/February 21/2020
Iraq Needs Regime Change Again/John Hannah/Foreign Policy/February 21/2020
France: Macron Vows Crackdown on Political Islam/Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute/February 21/2020
Palestinians Condemn US for Offering to Help/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/February 21/2020
Iran: the Masks of Jefferson and Attila/Amir Taheri/Asharq Al-Awsat/February 21/2020
The Limits of Relying on Disagreements Between Moscow, Ankara/Akram Bunni/Asharq Al-Awsat/February 21/2020
The Economic Hit from the Coronavirus is All in Your Mind/Daniel Moss/Bloomberg/February 21/2020
Making sense of Turkey’s ever-changing foreign policy/Sinem Cengiz/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
Macron’s Mideast diplomacy has its limits/Randa Takieddine/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
Johnson bolsters power as foreign policy storm clouds gather/Andrew Hammond/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
Iranians’ desire for true democracy should be supported/Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
 

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on February 21-22/2020
First Coronavirus Case Confirmed in Lebanon
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
The first case of coronavirus was confirmed in Lebanon on Friday after a woman arrived from Iran was found to be positive. The 45-year-old woman had arrived from Iran's Qom and was being quarantined, a source at a Beirut hospital said. Lebanon's Health Minister Hamad Hassan held a news conference on Friday to address the case. Two other suspected cases were being followed and authorities were taking all necessary precautions in line with recommendations of the World Health Organization, he confirmed.

Lebanon Confirms First Coronavirus Case in Plane from Iran
Naharnet/February 21/2020
Lebanon confirmed its first case of new coronavirus on Friday, in a citizen who flew home from Iran. One of the passengers who returned home from Iran tested positive in a checkup by the health ministry's central laboratory, reports said. The passenger was quarantined at Rafik Hariri University Hospital.
Lebanon's health minister is expected to announce the country's first case in a press conference. Earlier on Friday, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport said that no coronavirus cases were caught on board the plane that flew to Beirut earlier coming from Iran.
The authority issued a statement saying that “Iranian Mahen-Air flight number W5115 flying from Iran to Beirut was subject to thorough examination and no cases of coronavirus were caught by airport temperature checks.” The Authority added: “According to the health ministry, no cases of coronavirus were caught in Lebanon. A single flu case was transported to hospital as a precautionary measure. The ministry is following up closely on that.”

Lebanon Begins Drilling for Oil Next Week
Naharnet/February 21/2020
Lebanon is expected to start drilling offshore for oil and gas on February 27, Culture and Agriculture Minister Abbas Mortada told VDL (93.3) radio station on Friday. During its meeting yesterday, “not only did the Cabinet approve the Kuwaiti housing loan bill, but it also discussed and gave the green light for drilling for oil at sea in bloc 4 starting Thursday,” said Mortada. The minister pointed to a technical problem that could have delayed the decision to launch drilling. “To start work, we realized that a license from the environment ministry is required to define environmental standards to prevent pollution, which takes between one month to 90 days to finalize,” said the Minister. “But, the drilling ship is ready and can not be delayed because if it leaves Lebanon’s waters it may not return before a year. So in order not to waste time, the Cabinet took the responsibility and gave permission to start drilling on Thursday,” added Mortada. But he pointed out that "efforts are underway to prepare the license as soon as possible." Last year, Lebanon signed its first contract to drill for oil and gas in its waters. A consortium comprising energy giants Total, ENI and Novatek took the first two of its 10 blocks, including one disputed by neighbouring Israel with which Lebanon has fought several wars.

Aoun Meets Kubis in Baabda
Naharnet/February 21/2020
President Michel Aoun held talks at Baabda Palace with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Jan Kubis and discussed the latest regional developments, the National News Agency reported Friday. NNA said the meeting was held in the presence of former minister Salim Jreissati and other figures. Kubis affirmed that "the United Nations supports implementation of reforms intended by the Lebanese government." For his part, Aoun stressed “the most important government battle is its battle against corruption,” noting that several “measures will be taken to protect the monetary situation and rights of Lebanese.”The meeting comes as Lebanon awaits advice from international lenders on dealing with the country's crippling economic and financial crisis. The UN envoy to Lebanon had earlier openly criticized Lebanese officials urging strict steps to mitigate the economic crisis before any outside help. He said Lebanon will not benefit from any outside help if it’s government fails to implement “reforms and come with a clear action plan with deadlines.”

President Aoun to UN Special Coordinator: The most important battles is fighting corruption
NNA/February 21/2020
President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun, on Friday told UN Special Coordinator, Jan Kubic, that “Addressing the economic and financial conditions in the country will be one of the Government’s priorities, after gaining confidence from the Parliament”, especially since the Government, which makes up one solidarity working group, is determined to achieve what is required in these delicate conditions, that Lebanon is going through.
President Aoun met Kubic, who was accompanied by a delegation, in the presence on Former Minister, Salim Jreisatti, today at Baabda Palace.
The President stressed that “One of the most important battles, which the Government will fight, is that against corruption”, noting that this will coincide with the formations in institutions and agencies concerned, which contributes to achieving the desired reform.
Moreover, the President assured the UN coordinator that treatments are in place for the current financial and economic conditions, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund delegation, to take the appropriate measures, pointing out that measures to be taken are aiming to protect the monetary conditions, and preserving the rights and interests of Lebanese citizens.
President Aoun also expressed hope that the Syrian refugee issue, will be among the files that will be mentioned in the Quarterly report, on the implementation of Resolution 1701, at the Security Council’s next session, next March. The President stressed that stability in the South is continuous, despite recent developments in Syria and Iraq.
From his side, Mr. Kubic congratulated President Aoun on forming the new Government, and its gaining confidence. Kubic also affirmed UN support for the reforms which the Government intends to take, indicating that he would report the reality of Resolution 1701, to the Security Council. Kubic also said that he would visit numerous countries concerned with the Lebanese situation.
President Michel Aoun met MP, Elias Abou Saab, and deliberated with him recent political developments.
The meeting also tackled latest economic and financial developments, in the country.—Presidency Press Office

Aoun contacts Hassan over first Coronavirus case in Lebanon
NNA/February 21/2020
President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun, on Friday contacted by phone the Minister of Public Health, Dr. Hamad Hasan, who briefed him on the latest regarding the Coronavirus case in Lebanon.
President Aoun inquired about the measures taken to treat the diagnosed case, stressing the need to take the appropriate measures at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport in order to ensure the wellbeing of passengers arriving in Lebanon. Minister Hasan assured the President that the novel coronavirus case is currently under treatment in accordance with the adopted health standards.

Nasri Khoury visits Diab: We hope to revitalize bilateral relations
NNA/February 21/2020
Prime Minister Hassan Diab welcomed this Friday at the Grand Serail the Secretary-General of the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council, Nasri Khoury, who congratulated the Lebanese government on gaining confidence, and presented his host with a detailed report on pending matters touching on the Lebanese-Syrian relations, based on treaties and agreements signed between the two countries.
"We have discussed urgent matters, and we will be holding follow-up contacts in a bid to find appropriate solutions to certain issues. We hope we can reactivate relations between the two countries," Khoury said in the wake of the meeting.
PM Diab also met with the British Ambassador to Lebanon, Chris Rampling, and an accompanying delegation, with talks touching on the economic situation in Lebanon.
Also visiting the Premier was the Minister of Displaced, Ghada Shraim, who reportedly reviewed the funds allocated to the Central Fund for the Displaced, and reiterated the intention to finally close this file.

Berri meets Ministers of Economy, Interior, and Industry
NNA/February 21/2020
Speaker of the House, Nabih Berri, held talks Friday at his Ain-el-Tineh residence, with Minister of Economy, Raoul Nehme.
During the meeting, Berri upped calls upon the monitoring apparatuses inside the Ministry of Economy for strict law enforcement against those tampering with the exchange rates and product prices. Berri later met with Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Mohammad Fahmi, over the current security situation on the local scene.
He also received Minister Imad Hoballah (Industry) and Hamad Hassan (Public Health).

Moody’s downgrades Lebanon’s rating amid financial crisis
Associated Press/February 21/2020
Moody’s said that at the end of December, bank deposits had declined by $15.7 billion, or 30% of the GDP from a year before.
BEIRUT: Credit rating agency Moody’s downgraded Lebanon’s government issuer ratings Friday to Ca from Caa2 and changed the outlook to stable amid concerns the tiny Arab country might be forced to restructure its massive debt. Lebanon is experiencing its worst economic and financial crisis since the end of the 1975-90 civil war. The situation deteriorated after nationwide protests broke out in mid-October against the ruling elite blamed for decades of corruption and mismanagement. In recent months, the local currency that had been pegged to the dollar since 1997 lost some 60% of its value on the black market. An International Monetary Fund delegation began meetings Thursday in Lebanon to provide advice on dealing with the crippling economic and financial crisis amid concerns the country might default on its Eurobond debt payment for the first time. The agency said the Ca rating reflects Moody’s expectation that domestic and external private creditors will likely incur substantial losses in “what seems to be an all but inevitable near-term government debt restructuring in light of rapidly deteriorating economic and financial conditions.” It added that the situation “increasingly threatens the sustainability of the government’s debt and currency peg.” Moody’s said Lebanon’s long-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings have both been lowered to Ca from Caa1 and Caa3, respectively. The long-term local-currency bond and deposit ceilings have been lowered to Caa1 from B2, while the short-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain Not Prime. Lebanon massive debt, standing at $87 billion — 150% more than the country’s GDP. Amid a severe liquidity crunch, banks have imposed informal capital controls, limiting withdrawals to a few hundred dollars a month. The country’s economy has depended heavily on the U.S. dollars since the country’s 15-year civil war ended in 1990. A new government headed by former American University of Beirut professor Hassan Diab won a vote of confidence earlier this month and has vowed to work on getting Lebanon out of its economic and financial crisis.
Moody’s said that at the end of December, bank deposits had declined by $15.7 billion, or 30% of the GDP from a year before.

Wazni Meets IMF Delegation on Economic Crisis
Naharnet/February 21/2020
Finance Minister Ghazi Wazni held talks on Friday with an IMF delegation, led by Martin Cerisola, where discussions focused on the technical advice the fund can provide Lebanon with in order to finalize an emergency plan, media reports said. The International Monetary Fund delegation began meetings Thursday in Lebanon to provide advice on dealing with the country's crippling economic and financial crisis amid concerns the country might default on its Eurobond debt payment for the first time. The IMF experts met on Thursday with Prime Minister Hassan Diab. Lebanon is going through its worst economic crisis since the 1975-90 civil war. Since then, the country has been marred by widespread corruption and mismanagement in which billions of dollars were spent on infrastructure, which remains mostly dysfunctional. The meetings come amid concerns that Lebanon might default for the first time on paying back Eurobonds due next month.

Lebanon, IMF discuss all possible options for overcoming crisis: finance minister
NNA/Reuters/February 21/2020
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team discussed on Friday all possible options with Lebanese officials seeking technical advice for the country's crippling financial crisis, a finance ministry statement said. An IMF team is meeting with officials from heavily indebted Lebanon until Feb. 23 to offer broad advice on tackling the crisis as Beirut mulls a plan for dealing with fast-approaching debt payments, including a ê1.2 billion Eurobond on March 9. "All available data and possible options were discussed based on the delegation's vision and its assessment of the situation in the country...to build a vision for how to overcome the current situation," Finance Minister Ghazi Wazni said in a statement. Since protests erupted in October, Lebanon's currency has slumped by roughly 60% on a parallel market, dollars have become scarce, prices have been hiked and thousands of jobs have been shed. The government is expected on Friday to review proposals from companies bidding to provide financial and legal advice on options for a potential debt restructuring, a source familiar with the matter said on Thursday. Lebanon has not requested financial assistance from the IMF and Western and Sunni-led Gulf Arab states that helped in the past insist that Beirut must first implement long-delayed reforms on core issues such as state corruption and bad governance.

Israel Threatens to Strike Beirut, Southern Villages
Tel Aviv - Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
The head of the Israeli army’s Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Amir Baram, has warned Hezbollah that it would pay a heavy price for its provocations against Israel. Speaking at a conference hosted by the Tel-Hai Academic College in northern Israel, Baram threatened to hit Iran, the Lebanese capital, Beirut, and villages in southern Lebanon, which is a Hezbollah stronghold. His threats came after Hezbollah was accused of violating UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that set out the ceasefire terms between Israel and Lebanon following the 2006 war. The general said Hezbollah continues to violate UN resolutions through its actions along the border with Israel in a manner that puts the lives of Lebanese civilians in danger. He called on Lebanon and its leaders to act and prevent the party from violating Resolution 1701. “Despite Lebanon's immense economic challenges, Hezbollah is persisting with its efforts to procure and arm itself with precision weapons with which to hit the Israeli home front, and it continues to prepare south of the Litani River to attack communities and roads in our territory,” Baram said. The Israeli Commander lashed out at Lebanese President Michel Aoun and the new government, in which, he said, the Shiite group is deeply embedded to protect its interests by presenting a “false impression” of reforms. Baram said that although Aoun told the French press that Hezbollah is not involved in the decision-making process of the new Lebanese government and that he personally guarantees that the party will honor Resolution 1701, “what they say in French isn't what is happening on the ground in Arabic.”"If we are bound to fight, we will exact a heavy price from this organization [Hezbollah] and from those who afford it protection,” he warned.

Elie Ferzli: Ghazi Kenaan Was Once Lebanon’s Most Powerful Authority
Beirut - Nazeer Rida/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Parliament Deputy Speaker Elie Ferzli highlighted the Syrian era in Lebanon, pointing to the role of former Syrian Security and Reconnaissance Commander Ghazi Kenaan in the country. “Kenaan understood the Lebanese, but failed to understand Lebanon,” Ferzli said, stressing that the man could not resist the temptations that Beirut had offered him, which led many Lebanese politicians and influential figures to resort to him to achieve their ambitions. According to Ferzli, former President Emile Lahoud criticized Kenaan’s role at that time saying: “The situation cannot be fixed with two presidents in Lebanon; one of them must go.”Ferzli highlighted the Syrian hegemony over Lebanon in his new book, “Ajmal al-Tarikh Kana Ghadan" (The best of history was tomorrow). He presents details about Kenaan’s slipping into the Lebanese temptations that changed him from an officer, who sought to impose the prestige of Damascus on the Bekaa region following the Zahle war in 1981, to “the strongest center of power in the country” at that time. Ferzli even says that Kenaan “was hiding an extremely complex and multifaceted personality.” “Ghazi Kenaan had an uncommon maneuvering method; he could act as if he had never knew you at any point, whatever that emotion he had for you or the interest that brought you together,” he recounts. According to the recently published book, the Syrian official, who was known for achieving Christian reconciliation in Homs and protecting the Christians in the governorate during the Syrian war against the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, was striving to use force in many events in Zahle, which was then under the control of the Kataeb and Lebanese Forces parties. Kenaan soon became a very influential person in the Lebanese political life and decision-making, Ferzli says. He could nominate presidents of the Republic, and veto others. He did so with MP Jean Obeid, before extending the term of Lahoud in 2004. Ferzli also talks about his relationship with Syrian officials, including differences over election laws and electoral coalitions in the Bekaa, the formation of governments, and the nomination of presidents of the Republic, and emphasizes in this regard Lahoud’s accession to the presidency. After President Bashar al-Assad came to power, Abdel-Halim Khaddam’s influence diminished, and General Hikmat al-Shihabi was sent to retirement. This is when, according to the book, the Lebanese file became in the sole hands of Ghazi Kenaan. *Ferzli notes that his relation with Kenaan deteriorated since the election of Lahoud. He says that he was a staunch supporter of the latter as he was working against the Syrian hegemony.“The Syrian forces are present in Lebanon... that’s ok, but Ghazi Kenaan’s presence is not... The country does not bear two presidents,” Lahoud said to Hafez al-Assad in 1999, as the book reports.

Ghosn Postpones Suit Seeking Retirement Pay from Renault
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/February 21/2020
Lawyers for Carlos Ghosn on Friday delayed a lawsuit seeking a hefty retirement payout from his former employer Renault, saying the French carmaker had not given them enough time to prepare arguments. The court in Boulogne-Billancourt, near Renault's headquarters outside Paris, granted the request for more time, setting a new hearing date for April 17. "We received Renault's arguments only on Monday, and having just four days to respond to 20 pages of arguments is clearly not enough," Ghosn's lawyer Laetitia Ternisien told reporters after the hearing. Ghosn is seeking a 250,000 ($270,000) retirement payout, which Renault refuses to pay because it says the former CEO was forced to quit after his shock November 2018 arrest in Japan on charges of financial misconduct. The former industry titan claims he retired in due form on his own accord. He also seeks a much bigger prize -- a supplementary pension of 774,774 euros per year for the rest of his life, as well as 380,000 shares granted for reaching performance targets. At current prices, that stock grant would be worth over 12 million euros. Meanwhile, Ghosn also faces a French inquiry over two parties he threw at the Palace of Versailles, including his opulent 2016 wedding, allegedly financed in part by Renault funds. He is also being investigated by France's tax fraud office over suspicious financial transactions between Renault and its distributor in the Gulf state of Oman, and over contracts signed by Renault and Nissan's Dutch subsidiary RNBV. In Japan, he still faces multiple charges claiming he under-reported millions of dollars in salary as chairman of Renault's alliance partner Nissan. He has denied all the charges, but fled to his native Lebanon late last year before he could face trial.

Kattar tackles general situation with UN's Kubis
NNA/February 21/2020
State Minister for Administrative Development Affairs, Damianos Kattar, met Friday in his office at the Ministry with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jan Kubis, with whom he discussed the Country's general situation amid the current crisis and the challenges ahead. Kubis expressed UN's support for the efforts undertaken to address these challenges that Lebanon is currently passing through.

Hitti meets Richard, Zasypkin
NNA/February 21/2020
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Nassif Hitti, welcomed Friday respectively US Ambassador to Lebanon, Elizabeth Richard, and Russian Amabssador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin. Discussions reportedly touched on means of assisting Lebanon economically and issues of common concern, especially regarding internal affairs and international dossiers.

Interior Minister meets World Bank delegation
NNA/February 21/2020
Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Mohammed Fahmi, welcomed in his office at the Ministry a delegation of the World Bank, chaired by Sateh Arnaout. Discussions reportedly touched on the joint projects between the Ministry and the World Bank particularly on municipalities.

Ghajar tackles electricity issue with Norwegian, Swiss ambassadors
NNA/February 21/2020
Water and Energy Minister, Raymond Ghajar, met Friday respectively with Norwegian Ambassador to Lebanon, Leni Stenseth, and Swiss Ambassador to Lebanon, Monica Schutzz Kergoz.
Discussions reportedly touched on the issue of electricity, especially in terms of needed reforms and the implementation of the electricity plan in the foreseeable future. The Norwegian Ambassador expressed her Country's readiness to continue to assist Lebanon in the oil sector. The Swiss Ambassador highlighted the importance of the water sector, expressing her Country's ongoing assistance in this domain, especially in the Bekaa region.

Education Minister denies closure of schools due to coronavirus
NNA/February 21/2020
Minister of Education and Higher Learning, Tarek Majzoub, on Friday denied that his ministry had issued a statement announcing the closure of schools due to coronavirus. "There is nothing to panic about," Majzoub said.

Bakeries' Union announces open strike as of Monday if demands not met
NNA/February 21/2020
The general assembly of the Bakeries Union in Lebanon on Friday announced an open-ended strike as of next Monday, if the demands of Bakery owners are not met

Protesters rally outside Central Bank in Sidon
NNA/February 21/2020
Demonstrators have staged a sit-in outside the Central Bank in the City of Sidon, in protest against the banking monetary policies and the high cost of living. Protesters chanted slogans deploring the measures adopted by the banks against depositors.

Akar tackles overall situation with Diplomats
NNA/February 21/2020
Vice Prime Minister, National Defense Minister Zeina Akar Adra, on Friday welcomed in her office at the Ministry Japan's Ambassador to Lebanon, Takeshi Okubo, accompanied by the Embassy's Military Atatche.
Talks reportedly touched on the general situation in Lebanon and the broad region, as well as cooperation programs between the two sides.
Minister Akar also met with Russian Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, accompanied by a delegation, with whom she discussed the latest developments on the local and regional arena.
The Minister also welcomed in her office Qatar's Ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammed Hasan Jaber Al Jaber, with the bilateral relations between the two countries featuring high on their talks. Ambassador Al Jaber affirmed his Country's ongoing support to Lebanon. Cooperation relations between Lebanon and China and most recent developments also topped discussions today between Minister Akar and Chinese Ambassador to Lebanon Wang Kejian, who came in the company of the Embassy's Military Attaché and his Aide.

Minister of Justice receives petition on prisoners' rights for humane treatment
NNA/February 21/2020
Justice Minister, Marie Claude Najm, on Friday received a petition entitled, "So that he who does know his rights to humane treatment does not remain prisoner" from lawyer Rafik Hajj, the organizer of this initiative, in cooperation with the Prison Committee of Beirut Bar Association.
The initiative includes the following list of rights:
-The right to life and integrity of individuals.
-The right not to be subjected to torture or ill-treatment.
-The right to health.
-The right to respect human dignity.
-The right to fair implementation of laws.
-The right to be free from discrimination.
-The right to be free from slavery.
-The right to freedom of opinion and thought.
-The right to freedom of religion.
-The right to respect for family life.
-The right to self-development.

Othman tackles overall situation with US Ambassador
NNA/February 21/2020
Internal Security Forces (ISF) Chief Imad Othman, met Friday in his office with US Ambassador to Lebanon, Elizabeth Richard, with whom he discussed the general situation in the country.

Does Hezbollah pay electricity bills?
Khaled Abou Zahr/Arab News/February 21/2020
خالد ابو ظهر: ترى هل يدفع حزب الله فواتيره الكهربائية أو أية ضرائب على اعماله واستيراداته من إيران وتجارته ومعاشات افراد ميليشياته؟
I often wonder, does Hezbollah pay electricity bills?
Does it pay social security contributions on the salaries it pays in cash?
Does it pay customs duty on the weapons it imports from Tehran?
Does it pay the required fees for its construction works?
Did it get authorization from the government and pay the appropriate fees to build a statue of Qassem Soleimani last week?
Finally, to whom do government utilities representatives complain when Hezbollah does not pay its bills?
To be fair, this applies to most of the political formations and centers of power in Lebanon, not only Hezbollah. The country’s administration has been built to reflect the narrow political representation and the way the factions negotiate with each other. The same focus one notices in negotiations for the formation of a coalition government applies to the rest of the administration of the country.
This means that politicians control hiring and spending but are not focused on proper governance and serving their constituents; instead their focus is on ensuring they grab a share of the pie for themselves and their allies. One could easily imagine that a random discussion along the lines of “If you name one person to be appointed, or get this from that state institution, then my share is this” is common during political deals in Lebanon.
As the country begins discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a rescue plan, given that more than $7 billion in debt and interest payments is due to be repaid this year, not much can be expected. Not only are the banks in negative equity, the entire country is. The banking sector, which was a depicted as a key factor in the success of the economy, will have to pay a hefty price.The question is who will bear the cost? Will it be the banks, which are mostly owned by politically affiliated businessmen, or will it be the small depositors who have not been able to access their accounts, have seen their life savings disappear and are going bankrupt? I think we all know the answer to that and therefore understand why the Lebanese protests are not about to end but are about to get worse.
This will, unfortunately, not be enough. Lebanon might manage to pay back some of the debts that are due this year, or negotiate a temporary moratorium, but it will not be able to honor its commitments without a bailout or financial support. However, after getting the proper advice from the IMF about the reforms that are needed, in the current political situation nothing will really change because the root cause of the nation’s crisis will remain. Therefore, Lebanon will not be able to convince any international financial institution that it will implement the strong program of reforms necessary to get a bailout. Regionally, given the situations in Syria and Iraq, Lebanon has lost its strategic relevance and Gulf countries have already sunk billions into the country at a loss.
In trying to predict what happens next and what will trigger a deterioration of the situation in the country, therefore, one can compare Lebanon with other countries that went through similar situations. Comparisons with Greece do not really apply as it benefited from the support of the EU, but it is worth noting that the country still experienced pensions losses and a rise in unemployment, which led to social instability. Political and sectarian groups that have acted as parasites, feeding on national institutions, will do what parasites do when one host dies: Move on to another.
The closest benchmark comparison to Lebanon seems to be a combination of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the current situation in Venezuela, which has a weak centralized government located in a highly volatile region. In short, we can say that it seems likely that the situation is about to get extremely difficult and dangerous, on all levels, for the people of Lebanon.
The protests will continue and might become more socially and financially motivated when pensioners do not get their checks, depositors lose all or part of their savings and employees go unpaid. This will put the country’s security and sovereign institutions under extreme pressure; one might say enough to create divisions and splits from within. As the security situation deteriorates, government services will cease functioning, medicine will be hard to find, and food will become scarce. The government will break down and so sectarian political leaders will once again become the last resort for people in a territory — not a country — ruled by chaos and non-state actors.
Political and sectarian groups that have acted as parasites, feeding on national institutions, will do what parasites do when one host dies: Move on to another. Therefore, the only solution is for the army to step in and force change by supporting the protesters and establishing a new committee, which excludes all existing political formations, to govern the country and create a new constitution. The future of all in the country will be much bleaker if they persist in their inaction.
*Khaled Abou Zahr is CEO of Eurabia, a media and tech company. He is also the editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.

Iran makes empty promises to Lebanon
Hanin Ghaddar/Al Arabiya/February 21/2020
حنين غدار/وعود فارغة من إيران للبنان
While Lebanon was preparing itself for the International Monetary Fund’s visit – Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani flew to Lebanon to meet with Hezbollah’s Chief Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, he held talks with President Michel Aoun in Baabda Palace and relayed to him a message from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. According to media reports, the message included means to enhance Lebanese-Iranian relations and involved an invitation to President Aoun to visit Tehran. Larijani also expressed Iran’s willingness to help improve the economic situation in Lebanon.
Between Larijani’s visit and the IMF meeting, Lebanon seems to be at a crossroads where its leadership has to choose between opening up again to the international community, and getting the help it needs to revive its crumbling economy, or move further under Iran’s umbrella and turn into a failed state that would be the Middle Eastern version of Venezuela. This crossroads is clearly visible by the wide gap between the Lebanese people who have been expressing their frustration in the streets for four months, and the Lebanese political class that still hopes its allegiance to Iran won’t be too costly. It is this same gap that draws the difference between the people who have realized that Iran only brought instability and isolation to Lebanon, and a political class that has not yet realized the repercussions of Hezbollah’s control over Lebanon’s state institutions.
Between Iran and the West, Lebanon cannot chose Iran at this point, for two main reasons. First, Iran has its own financial crisis, and Larijani’s promises are empty promises that will never be translated into a real program that could save Lebanon from collapse. Iran has already cut its funding to Hezbollah by half, and now relies on Iraq’s resources and economy to fund Hezbollah and its other operations in the region.
Hezbollah was forced to fund its own alternative funding resources and has been relying more heavily on smuggling and illegitimate business deals to survive its own crisis. Hezbollah has cut salaries, fired contractual and unnecessary employees, and has also shrunk its social services network to cater to a much smaller circle of beneficiaries. If Iran can’t help Hezbollah, then Iran can never help Lebanon. Second, Iran has always benefited, and will continue to benefit from Lebanon’s resources, not vice versa. Iran used Lebanon’s resources to fund the corruption networks of its allies, mainly the Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement. Iran isolated Lebanon from its Arab depth and the international community when it decided that Hezbollah should go to Syria and have a larger role in the region. Iran wants Lebanon to be the core of its regional operations, and when it had the financial means – before the US sanctions – only Hezbollah benefited, never Lebanon. Iran wants Lebanon to pay the price for its regional hegemony but will not help Lebanon, economically or diplomatically. Yet, Larijani expects the Lebanese to believe that this time around – and in the midst of the Iranian financial crisis – things will be different.
Of course, the IMF plan to salvage Lebanon is not going to be easy or painless. But at least it will push Lebanon to implement much needed reforms and anti-corruption measures. Western and Gulf Arab states that helped Lebanon in the past have made clear that any future financial assistance depends on Lebanon implementing serious reforms to address root causes of the crisis such as state corruption and bad governance.Interestingly, Hezbollah hasn’t commented on the IMF visit, and its milieu still insists that it is only an advisory mission that will not involve practical steps. But while the Lebanese people – including Hezbollah’s constituency are feeling the hardship and the increased unemployment due to the failing economy – Hezbollah launched a widespread campaign to boycott American products, in response to the US policy against Iran and the assassination of the Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. As this campaign takes to the social media and a few local shops and consumers, Hezbollah will eventually realize that all its efforts to salvage its image as the protector of Lebanon and the father-figure of the Shia community will eventually backfire. The Lebanese – including the Shia – have finally realized that Iran’s resistance economy and policies did not put more food on the table. Instead, it pushed the Shia to regional wars, isolated Lebanon, and led to the collapse of Lebanon’s fragile economy. Lebanon’s protests have been about the aspiration to citizenship, not sectarian identities, and ultimately, everyone in Lebanon – including Hezbollah’s own constituency – are very much aware only the West and the Gulf States – not Iran – can help Lebanon.
*Hanin Ghaddar is the inaugural Friedmann Visiting Fellow at The Washington Institute's Geduld Program on Arab Politics, where she focuses on Shia politics throughout the Levant. She tweets @haningdr.

German gunman who killed 9 called for 'complete extermination' of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt
Associated Press/Ynetnews|/February 21/2020
Rambling manifesto now taken down decries 'ethnic groups, races or cultures in our midst that are destructive in every respect'; Merkel says shootings exposed 'poison' of racism in Germany, pledges to stand up against those who seek to divide the country
The 43-year-old German gunman who killed nine people late Wednesday had posted a manifesto calling for the "complete extermination" of many "races or cultures in our midst," including Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon and other countries across Asia.
Among the documents posted to the man's website, which has since been taken down, was a 24-page, rambling manifesto in German detailing, among other things, fears that he has been under government surveillance for years.
He blamed the surveillance for his inability to have a relationship with a woman. He also called for genocide.
"We now have ethnic groups, races or cultures in our midst that are destructive in every respect," he wrote. He said he envisioned first a "rough cleaning" and then a "fine cleaning" that could halve the world's population.
He wrote: "The following people must be completely exterminated: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the complete Arabian Peninsula, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the Philippines."
The attack was quickly condemned by many organizations, including the Central Council of Muslims, the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Germany, and the Central Council of Jews.
The victims were nine people of foreign background, most of them Turkish, who were shot dead in an attack on a hookah bar and other sites in a Frankfurt suburb, authorities said.
The gunman was later found dead at his home along with his mother, and authorities said they were treating the rampage as an act of domestic terrorism.
The gunman first attacked the hookah bar and a neighboring cafe in Hanau at about 10 p.m. Wednesday, killing several people, then traveled about 2.5 kilometers (1.5 miles) and opened fire again, first on a car and then a sports bar, claiming more victims.
The bloodshed came amid growing concerns about far-right violence in Germany and stepped-up efforts from authorities to crack down on it, including last week's detention of a dozen men on suspicion they were planning attacks against politicians and minorities.
Chancellor Angela Merkel said the shootings exposed the "poison" of racism in Germany, and she pledged to stand up against those who seek to divide the country.
"There is much to indicate that the perpetrator acted out of far-right extremist, racist motives," she said. "Out of hatred for people with other origins, other faiths or a different appearance."
Hookah lounges are places where people gather to smoke flavored tobacco from Middle Eastern water pipes, and Metin Kan, who knew many of the victims, said it was obvious why the gunman chose the neighborhood.
"Look, a hookah bar there, a gaming parlor there, a doner kebab place there -- it's a place frequented by immigrants," he said. "Why this hatred of foreigners? We all get along here."
People of Turkish background make up Germany's single largest minority, and Turkey's ambassador said five of the people killed in the attack were Turkish citizens.
Germany's federal prosecutor, Peter Frank, said that all nine people killed were of foreign backgrounds and that six others were injured, one seriously.
Investigators said it appeared the gunman acted alone, but Frank said the "goal of the investigation is to find out whether there were, or are, people who knew of, or supported" the attacks. He added that his office was looking into any contacts the killer may have had inside Germany and abroad.
Kadir Kose, who ran over from a cafe he runs nearby after hearing the first shots, said he was shocked at the extent of the violence. While fights or stabbings aren't unheard of, he said, "this is a whole other level, something we hear about from America."
Witnesses and surveillance videos of the getaway car led authorities quickly to the gunman's home, said Peter Beuth, interior minister for the state of Hesse. Both the attacker and his 72-year-old mother had gunshot wounds, and the weapon was found on him, Beuth said.
Frank identified the gunman only as Tobias R., in line with German privacy laws, and confirmed he had posted extremist videos and a manifesto with "confused ideas and far-fetched conspiracy theories" on his website.
The man identified himself as Tobias Rathjen on the website, which has now been taken down, with a mailing address matching that where the bodies of the killer and his mother were found.
In the manifesto, Rathjen claimed to have approached police several times with conspiracy theories, but Beuth said it does not appear the gunman had a criminal record or was on the radar of Germany's domestic intelligence agency.
"Everything will be done to investigate the circumstances of these terrible murders," Merkel pledged, declaring: "Racism is a poison. Hatred is a poison."
"This poison exists in our society and its is responsible for far too many crimes," she added, citing the killings committed by a far-right gang known as the NSU, the fatal shooting last year of a regional politician from her party, and the attack on a synagogue in Halle on Yom Kippur last year, in which two people were killed. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called it a "heinous attack" and expressed confidence that German authorities "will exert all kinds of effort to shed light on all aspects of this attack."
German police were examining a video the gunman may have posted online several days before the attack in which he detailed a conspiracy theory about child abuse in the United States, Germany's dpa reported. The authenticity of the video couldn't immediately be verified, but the YouTube account was under the same name as the website containing the gunman's manifesto.
In the video, the speaker said he was delivering a "personal message to all Americans" that "your country is under control of invisible secret societies." In a slow and deliberate voice in accented English, he said there are "deep underground military bases" in which "they abuse, torture and kill little children."
He made no reference to the far-right fringe QAnon movement in the U.S., but the message was similar to the movement's central, baseless belief that U.S. President Donald Trump is waging a secret campaign against enemies in the "deep state" and a child sex trafficking ring run by satanists and cannibals.
In his manifesto, he made one reference to Trump, writing: "I doubt that Donald Trump knowingly implements my recommendations." He suggested that "mind control" might be at work.
On the website, Rathjen wrote that he was born in Hanau in 1977 and grew up in the city, later training with a bank and earning a business degree in 2007.

The Inevitable Middle East War
Robert G. Rabil/Eurasiareview/February 22/2020
روبرت رابيل: الحرب في الشرق الأوسط حتمية
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/83394/%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%a8%d8%b1%d8%aa-%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d8%b3%d8%b7-%d8%ad%d8%aa%d9%85%d9%8a/
The assassination of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani, unlike what the Trump administration and the media expounded, is a logical extension to the heightening asymmetrical warfare between the US and Israel, on one side, and Iran and Hezbollah, on the other. Arguably, it is also the outcome of American and Israeli intelligence cooperation, whereupon the two countries deemed the assassination of Suleimani critical to their national security. Whereas some hailed the murder of Suleimani, along with his colleague a leader of the Iraqi Mobilization Forces Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as a successful operation that thwarted potential terror attacks against U.S. national interests, some criticized the murder as hastening the march to war with Iran. To be sure, there is already a war and the prospects of terror attacks have increased. The killing of Suleimani has changed the dynamics of this ongoing asymmetrical war by expanding the theater of operations and substituting overt and covert operations for proxy warfare. This has increased the prospect of regional war, regardless of the attitude of concerned countries to rule out a war.
The asymmetrical warfare between Tehran and Washington began when Iranian revolutionaries held American hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran from November 1979 until January 1981. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the theocracy in Iran, who split the world between oppressors and oppressed, depicted the U.S. as the great Satan for being the great oppressor in the world. Before long, the tension between the two countries intensified. Whereas Washington supported Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-1988), Tehran called on its revolutionary proxies to kidnap Western hostages in Beirut. The botched Carter administration’s attempt to rescue the hostages led the incoming Reagan administration to pursue a multi-pronged policy vis-à-vis Iran. The administration pursued a covert deal with Iran, the Iran-Contra affair, according to which Israel, at the behest of the U.S., would supply Iran with missiles. In turn, Iran would release the hostages and pay cash for the missiles, which would be transferred to the Contras fighting the socialist Nicaraguan government. At the same time, the administration engaged President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria to help free the hostages since his troops controlled Lebanese territories, while maintaining its support of Iraq’s war efforts against Iran.
Meanwhile, Tehran sent its Islamist revolutionaries to Lebanon to indoctrinate the Shi’a community there and help wage a militant campaign against both Israel, which invaded Lebanon in 1982, and against American and Western troops, which were sent to Beirut as an international force to supervise the withdrawal of PLO fighters from the country. Iranian Islamist proxies, which later on amalgamated into Hezbollah, bombed the American Embassy (twice) and the U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut in which 241 marines were killed. No less significant, in November 1982, a young Shi’a Ahmad Qassir drove his explosive-laden Peugeot into Israel Defense Forces’s headquarters in Tyre. These terror attacks were devastating. Hundreds of American and Israeli soldiers and innocent civilians were killed.
Apparently, American and Israeli intelligence had failed to notice the emerging signs of militant Shi’ism whereby the cult of suicide bombing, historicized by Khomeini as a battle against injustice, spread to the Levant. Consequently, the U.S. and Israel’s intelligence agencies, the CIA and Mossad respectively, cooperated in Lebanon and established that Islamic Jihad, a precursor faction of Hezbollah was responsible and that Imad Mughniyah was behind the terror bombings.
Reportedly, this cooperation led to couple of retaliatory attempts. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, an Iranian considered a founder of Hezbollah, was targeted by a mailed booby-trapped Koran, whereupon he lost his right eye. And, in 1985, a car bomb attempt on the life of Hezbollah spiritual leader Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah resulted in 80 killed and scores injured in Beirut, including the brother of Mughniyah, Jihad. Reportedly, Lebanese Christian militia members and army officers and Saudi intelligence coordinated the attack.
Similarly, as Hezbollah increased its attacks on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) occupying southern Lebanon, Israel targeted two of the Islamist party’s leaders, Ragheb Harb and Abbas Moussawi. Apparently, Hezbollah retaliated by bombing both Israel’s Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina on March 17, 1992, murdering 29 people; and the AMIA Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, murdering 87 people.
Following Hezbollah’s constant attacks on the IDF in southern Lebanon, Israel withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000. From late 1990s to 2006, Israel maintained espionage cells in Lebanon whose contributions were at best mixed. The inconclusive 2006 Summer War between Israel and Hezbollah betrayed the failure of United States and Israel’s intelligence to gauge the power of Hezbollah. General Qassem Suleimani, head of al-Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), supported by Mughniyah, oversaw Hezbollah’s military operations against Israel’s offensive in Lebanon.
Consequently, Washington and Jerusalem harnessed their collaborative efforts to curb the power of Hezbollah. After so many years on the run, in February 2008, the head of Hezbollah’s jihad apparatus Mughniyah was killed in Damascus. As it turned out, the assassination operation was the product of close cooperation between the CIA and the Mossad. In response, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah declared an Open War against Israel, focusing on enhancing the global militant reach of Hezbollah. This marked a new stage in the asymmetrical warfare.
Unflustered by Hezbollah’s threat, and committed to curb the power of Hezbollah and its patron Iran, including disrupting Tehran’s nuclear program, on August 1, 2008, a daring team of Israel’s commandos swam the Mediterranean waters towards the vicinity of Tartus and killed Syrian Brigadier General Muhammad Suleiman, a top aide of Syrian president Bashar al-Asad and the liaison officer in charge of the military Syria-Hezbollah-Iran relationship. Concurrently, couples of IRGC Generals were murdered under hazy circumstances in various locations.
At this juncture, cyberwarfare entered the fray of proxy war between Iran and its proxy allies, on one side, and United States and Israel, on the other. In 2009, Stuxnet, a malicious computer program considered then as the most sophisticated cyber weapon ever deployed, sent Iran’s nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control. Reportedly, it wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges.
Concurrently, the Mossad reportedly pursued a wide-ranging operational policy to eliminate Iranian nuclear scientists, physicists, computer and cyber scientists involved in the country’s nuclear program, cyber program, and missile development.
In January 2010, a prominent nuclear physicist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was killed by a remotely detonated bomb fitted on a motorcycle next to his car. In November 2010, Majid Shahriari, a professor of nuclear physics, who specialized in the relevant bomb making neutron transport, was assassinated while driving his car. Two motorcyclists attached to his car a bomb and sped away. On the same day on November 29, professor of nuclear physics and reportedly a member of the IRGC Fereidoun Abbasi narrowly survived an assassination attempt in Tehran by jumping out of his car when he noticed a speeding motorcyclist affixing a bomb to his car. He was subsequently appointed as the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (2011-2013). In July 2011, scientist Darioush Rezaei was shot in the throat in front of his daughter’s kindergarten in east Tehran by gunmen on motorcycles.
Similarly, on November 17, 2011, bombs exploded at the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Shahab-missile base in Bidganeh, about 25 miles from Tehran. General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, a leading figure in Iran’s efforts to construct long-range missiles, along with 16 fellow members of the IRGC, was killed in the explosions.
In October 2013, the head of Iran’s cyber warfare program, Mojtaba Ahmadi, was found in a wooded area north-west of the capital shot dead. In January 2014, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a chemist who worked in the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, was killed when his car exploded. By the end of 2014, five Iranian nuclear scientists, the head of the country’s ballistic missile program, and the head of Iran’s cyber warfare program had been killed. The Iranian regime accused the Mossad of carrying out these assassinations, with support from American intelligence.
In the meantime, Hezbollah worked hard to reconstruct Shiite areas damaged by Israel in the 2006 war. Most importantly, Hezbollah put a great and systematic effort to rebuild and enhance its military capabilities, especially its missile arsenal. By February 2010, thanks to General Suleimani’s military support, Nasrallah redrew the parameters of its conflict with Israel. In a speech commemorating Hezbollah’s “martyrs” on February 16, 2010, Nasrallah drew the qualifying framework for any future confrontation with Israel. He introduced the deterrent-by terror equation where Hezbollah would retaliate proportionally to any Israeli aggression: “Tel Aviv for Beirut, and Ben Gurion international airport for Beirut international airport”. This marked another advanced stage of the asymmetrical warfare whereby Hezbollah sought to achieve a strategic terror parity with Israel. It’s noteworthy that a similar strategic parity policy, heavily reliant on missiles, had been pursued by late President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria to contain Israel.
Simultaneously, Hezbollah, acting on its Open War threat against Israel, tried to attack Israeli national interests overseas, while at the same time continuing to enhance its military capabilities. In February 2012, a bomb was found and defused at Israel’s Embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia. In the same month also an Israeli diplomat’s car was bombed in the vicinity of the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi, India. In late March 2012, Azerbaijan arrested two dozen terrorists trained in Iran, who had been planning attacks on Israeli and U.S. Embassies in Baku. In July 2012, a Hezbollah suicide bomber carried out a terror attack on a bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, carrying Israeli tourists. Five Israelis and the bus driver were killed. This marked a significant escalation in the ongoing Hezbollah (and Iran)-Israel warfare. In October 2012, Israel shot down a Hezbollah drone near the country’s Dimona nuclear plant in the Negev. In 2013, Thai and Cypriot authorities pursued and arrested Hezbollah operatives charged with tracking Israeli tourists.
Clearly, both Israel and Hezbollah expanded their overseas operations, which were comparatively better executed by the Mossad. In fact, Hezbollah’s operations, excluding those anonymously foiled by Israel, would have been devastating had it not been for Jerusalem’s intelligence. The Mossad has been able not only to improve their human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) but also to penetrate Hezbollah’s inner Jihadi circle, which analysts thought as impregnable. By 2012, notwithstanding Israel flooding Lebanon with technical intelligence gathering capabilities (SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT), approximately 100 Lebanese spying for Israel had been arrested by Hezbollah and central authorities. Some of those arrested included senior army and intelligence officials such as a) Haitham al-Sahmarani, a Shi’a Internal Security officer who provided the IDF with coordinates of Hezbollah leaders’ houses, places of meetings, and addresses of social and religious gatherings; b) General Mansour Habib Diab, a Christian and Director of School of Special Operations, who delivered to the IDF highly sensitive information on the army and Hezbollah-Army relations; and c) Colonel Gouzwan Eid Chahine, who the Mossad gave him sophisticated equipment to photograph and eavesdrop on army officers close to Hezbollah leaders. Colonel Chahine’s arrest led to a number of arrests in the Ministry of Communications and private communications companies.
In the meantime, Hezbollah became militarily involved in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Asad regime, which heightened Israeli concerns about the Islamist party acquiring both military experience and sophisticated weapons. Before long, on December 4, 2013, the Mossad reportedly assassinated Hezbollah’s senior commander Hassan al-Laqis in Beirut, who had played a key role in enhancing the group’s extensive telecommunications network. In February 2014, Israel carried out air attacks on Hezbollah’s positions along Lebanon-Syria border, reportedly destroying a drone base and killing senior party members.
Clearly, Israel had an intelligence advantage over Hezbollah’s plans and plots in the ongoing tug-of-war. As it turned out, the Mossad had scored big with the recruitment of the head of Hezbollah’s Jihad External Operations unit 910, Muhammad Shawraba , charged with overseas operations against Jerusalem. This constituted a serious breach of Hezbollah’s security that almost brought the Mossad to the deadly reach of Secretary General Nasrallah, let alone feeding the Mossad important information that foiled a number of assassination attempts abroad.
Reports circulated that it was none other than General Suleimani who scurried to Lebanon upon the discovery of Israel’s mole within the higher echelons of Hezbollah’s military leadership. Suleimani handled the dismantling of unit 910 and the organizing of a new secret unit in its stead.
It goes without saying that Israel’s intelligence edge over that of Hezbollah did not parry the party’s attempts at developing its military capabilities and extending its militant reach. Following a meeting in December 2014 with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdadov, who handled the Syrian file, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah asserted that in a “future war with Israel, Hezbollah will fight in Galilee and Israel will be surprised by the party’s missiles.” Before long, on January 18, 2015, Israel attacked an Iranian-Hezbollah military convoy apparently reconnoitering the Syrian Golan Heights. Six senior Hezbollah members and six senior IRGC members were killed, including the son of slain jihadi commander Imad Mughniyah and IRGC General Mohammad Ali Allah Dadi. This marked a new phase in the asymmetrical warfare reflected by Hezbollah’s plan to build a military infrastructure in Syria, thereby extending its front with Israel along the Lebanon-Syria border.
In response to Israel’s attack, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah delivered a speech entitled “En Route to Jerusalem” in which he asserted: “We will no longer observe the rules of engagement and will strike anywhere and at any time.” Soon enough, on January 28, Hezbollah launched six anti-tank missiles towards an Israeli convoy en route to Ghajar, a village saddling the Lebanon-Israel border, instantly killing Captain Yohai Kalangel, 25, and Sergeant Dor Nini, 20.
Undaunted by Israel, Hezbollah continued its attempt to expand its activities to the Golan Heights and southern Syria, including the enlistment of Druze fighters into a joint Hezbollah-Syrian regime force. Samir Kuntar and Wiam Wahab led the enlistment efforts. Whereas Wahab, a Druze and former Lebanese cabinet member, focused his efforts on persuading Druze leaders to support Asad and cooperate with Hezbollah, Kuntar, also a Druze, was charged with organizing Hezbollah’s military and intelligence operations in Southern Syria. It’s noteworthy that Israel had captured Kuntar in 1979 following the brutal murder of four Israelis in Nahariya. He was subsequently released in a prisoner exchange with Hezbollah in 2008.
Consequently, in December 2015, Israel assassinated Kuntar in an air raid on his residence in Jaramana, southeast of Damascus. At the same time, Israel increased its intelligence activities in Syria, and pursued a systematic policy of air raiding Iranian and Hezbollah members and bases to prevent smuggling game-changing sophisticated missiles to Lebanon and pre-positioning of precision-guided missiles in Syria.
Although Russia entered the fray of Syria’s civil war in support of the Asad regime and came to control Syria’s airspace by deploying its most sophisticated S-400 Surface-to-Air (SAM) missile batteries in the country, Israel continued its air strikes. Obviously, Israel reached a broad understanding with Russia that allowed Jerusalem to strike at its enemies if they posed a threat to its national security, so long as Israel’s actions did not destabilize the Syrian regime. On the margins of the UN Climate Change Summit on November 30, 2015, Russian leader Vladimir Putin said to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:
We are satisfied with the way our bilateral relations are developing. I note that the coordination mechanism between our militaries that we established on your initiative in response to the escalating situation in the region is functioning, and functioning well.
Despite its coordination with Russia, Israel steadily grew concerned about Hezbollah and Iran’s growing military cooperation with the Syrian regime and Russia. It was no surprise that Hezbollah in fighting the Syrian opposition, including Salafi-jihadis, came to acquire military experience and a large arsenal of weapons, especially missiles. This became doubly concerning for Israel when the Islamic State established a so-called Caliphate in both Iraq and Syria, which led United States to create an international alliance to defeat the Islamic State. With the international focus shifting towards fighting the Islamic State, Tehran, Damascus, and Baghdad, which coordinated closely with Washington, established a formal and informal close military strategic partnership, headed by Suleimani, to fight IS. This close partnership birthed a strong Iranian proxy alliance comprising the IRGC, Hezbollah and the Iraqi Mobilization Forces (MPF), which included various pro-Iranian Islamist militias. Israeli fears of Iran forging an overland military route connecting Tehran to Beirut became all but confirmed.
This led Israel to increase its air strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah bases and convoys suspected of smuggling weapons to Lebanon. This became a high priority for Israel as Iran doubled its efforts to enhance and entrench its military presence in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq in response to President Donald Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” against Iran following his withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement. In essence, Suleimani tried to establish a network of powerful proxy forces not only to deter but also to contain Israel.
In addition to increasing the frequency and reach of its air strikes, Israel concluded an agreement with Russia whereby the latter would not allow Iran to establish any military bases in southern Syria all the way up to 80 KM from the Golan Heights. Nevertheless, despite incurring heavy losses in men and material in Syria, Hezbollah’s attitude grew bolder. In a speech on February 17, 2017 Nasrallah warned Israel: “I call upon Israel not only to evacuate the Ammonia tank from Haifa, but also to dismantle Dimona nuclear facility.” And he added that “the Israeli nuclear weapon that represents a threat to the entire region, we will turn it into a threat to Israel.” This audacious warning to target Dimona’s nuclear facility reflected both Hezbollah’s growing arsenal of missiles and boldness in underscoring its deterrent-by terror strategy against Israel.
Conversely, Israel beefed up its military drills focusing not only on Hezbollah’s northern front but also on Syria’s eastern front, assuming that a potential conflagration with Hezbollah would extend to Syria’s Golan Heights. Its drills included the scenario of destroying the complete infrastructure of Lebanon and invading southern Lebanon. It also improved the effectiveness of its Iron Dome anti-missile batteries. Yet, Israel has remained concerned about Hezbollah acquiring precision-guided missiles and about Hezbollah simultaneously firing a large number of missiles at Israel that could overwhelm the Iron Dome. Prime Minister Netanyahu consistently emphasized the danger of Hezbollah acquiring precision-guided missiles and members of his government implicitly and explicitly threatened to take Lebanon back to the stone age in a future conflagration.
Undaunted by Israel’s warning, Nasrallah, in an exclusive interview with al-Manar TV station in July 2019, warned Israeli officials not to brag about “returning Lebanon to stone age.” He asserted that “Hezbollah at minimum is capable of inflicting huge destruction upon the Zionist entity,” and added that although a war with Israel is ruled out, “such a war will put Israelis on the verge of vanishing.”
Acting on its threat not to allow Hezbollah to acquire precision-guided missiles, Israel launched in August 2019 a drone attack on a Hezbollah facility in West Beirut housing what Israel’s media called a “planetary mixer,” a large industrial machine critical to making missiles. Nasrallah responded by confirming that although Hezbollah does not have factories to produce missiles, the party “has enough precision-guided missiles in Lebanon for any confrontation with Israel.”
It was against this background that both Washington and Jerusalem apparently began to single out Suleimani as the Iranian official who uniquely created a militant Shi’a regional axis, providing Iran with strategic depth. One could safely argue that the authors of Washington’s “Maximum Pressure” policy shared Israel’s concerns about Iran not only entrenching its presence in Lebanon and Syria but also in Iraq. Israeli fears of Iran’s apparent strategy to acquire strategic depth grounded in deterring and containing Jerusalem were all but confirmed. Soon enough, reports circulated that Israel on multiple occasions struck weapons depots in Iraq, controlled by the pro-Iranian Iraqi Mobilization Forces. Israel has been concerned about Iran moving precision-guided missiles to Iraq, whence some of which would be smuggled to Syria and Lebanon. US officials confirmed Israel’s latest air strike on weapons storage facilities in Iraq in August 2019. In an interview with a Russian-language TV station, Netanyahu implied that Israel carried out the strikes in Iraq. He remarked that “I don’t give Iran immunity anywhere,” accusing the Iranians of trying to establish bases “against us everywhere,” including Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
PMF officials harshly criticized and threatened the U.S. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy Chairman of the PMF, accused the U.S. of allowing four Israeli drones into Iraq (via Azerbaijan) to target Iraqi military headquarters and declared that “the first and last responsible for what happened are the American forces.”
Clearly, Washington was at one with Israel in trying to curb Iranian power in Iraq, downplaying the fact that the PMF are integral part of Iraq’s armed forces. Moreover, attacking the PMF headquarters and weapons facilities did not entail dealing with Russia which did not control Iraq’s airspace like that of Syria. Following an attack on an Iraqi military base in Kirkuk that housed American soldiers, in which an American contractor was killed, American jets struck PMF headquarters in al-Qaim. In response, on December 31, protesters stormed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. On January 3, 2020, President Trump ordered the assassination of General Suleimani and his companions at Baghdad International Airport.
The assassination, unlike what the media and the Trump administration reported, bore the hallmark of American-Israeli cooperation involving the assassination of Mughniyah in Damascus. It was carried out against the background of intensified asymmetrical warfare between Iran and Hezbollah, on one side, and Israel and U.S., on the other. Both Washington and Jerusalem unmistakably frowned upon General Suleimani’s strategy that provided Iran with strategic depth. He managed not only to enhance the deadly firepower of Iran’s proxies but also to harness their power into a militant regional network with the potential of deterring and containing Israel. Neither Jerusalem, which has faced thousands of missiles near and far from its borders, nor Washington, which has seen its maximum pressure policy falter due to Iranian gradual military escalation, could have afforded General Suleimani’s stewardship of Iranian military defiance. His elimination was essential to disrupt, even temporarily, Iran’s regional enhancement and realignment of its proxy forces and by extension Iran’s strategic depth.
Logistically, one could argue that his assassination was the outcome of the U.S.-Israel intelligence cooperation. Immediately following his arrival to Damascus International Airport on the morning of January 2, Suleimani was driven to Beirut where he met Hezbollah leader Nasrallah. Hezbollah intelligence provided his security. Reportedly, the two discussed how to confront Washington and Jerusalem’s plan to disrupt Iran’s design of strategic depth by striking at Iran’s power bases across the region. Later that evening, Suleimani, accompanied again by Hezbollah security, returned to Damascus where he boarded a regular passenger Cham Wings flight to Baghdad. The scheduled flight departure was delayed from 20:20 to 22:28. It was clearly there that Israeli and/or American intelligence knew about his whereabouts and destination. Had they known about his itinerary to Beirut, Suleimani and Nasrallah would have been primary targets. Arguably, American and Israeli intelligence cooperated to assassinate Suleimani in the same manner they did when they assassinated Mughniyah in Damascus. Both have intelligence presence in Damascus and both shared the strategic threat posed by Suleimani’s plans, and if the past and present cooperation between the two are a guide, Washington and Jerusalem definitely shared intelligence and cooperated to bring down what they deemed an essential target. Armed with credible intelligence, American drones were ready to eliminate Suleimani and his trusted companion al-Muhandis in Baghdad.
No doubt, the assassination was successful on the tactical level by removing the strategic puppeteer’s hand that moved the proxy strings of Iran; but it was a failure on the strategic level by rallying enough Iraqi forces to call for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and rally enough Iranians behind the regime. Though largely symbolical, Iranian retaliatory attack on al-Asad Iraqi military base that housed American forces was carried out directly and not by proxy. This not only expanded the theater of operations of but also transformed the asymmetrical warfare into a vicious cycle of overt and covert operations, one of which whether or not by design could lead to a regional war. This warfare that initially originated in Lebanon has steadily spread across borders and led the involved parties to steadily increase their fire power potentially spelling disaster, regardless of the victor, for a region already suffering social, economic and political tribulations.
At the time of this writing, whereas Washington and Jerusalem seek to curb the power of Iran (and its proxies) and prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon, Tehran (and its proxies) seeks the eviction of Washington from the region while deepening Tehran’s regional deterrent-by-terror strategy. These new dynamics of the transformed context of this warfare are prone to provoke a conflagration despite all the parties’ desire to avoid a regional war. Put simply, unless all parties prioritize military restraint and sober diplomatic engagement a regional war is inevitable.
*Robert G. Rabil is a professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. He can be followed @robertgrabil.
https://www.eurasiareview.com/21022020-the-inevitable-middle-east-war-oped/?fbclid=IwAR1KORrNTqsphpaYtKhafNA9ZHNqmaoHUn0QjxTu27RvY0OSFYc_vHD8kao

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on February 21-22/2020
Iran… And The Policies of Domination In Iraq
Farhad Alaaldin/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
After a painful and agonizing eight-year war with Iraq, Iran worked to rebuild its industrial, economic, scientific, and military infrastructure, which the war heavily destroyed, and to engage in formulating a new strategy throughout the region, based on deterring threats from neighboring countries or the Middle East. In other words, the Persian state sought relentlessly and thoughtfully to expand its influence in several directions, in order to prevent the recurrence of any scenario that would endanger the Islamic revolution and its ruling regime.
The country was lucky enough in 2003 when its interests converged with Washington’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Here, Iran had a golden opportunity to interfere in Iraqi affairs and work to consolidate Shiite influence in it.
Iran began expanding the base of the Shiite political forces inside Iraq and devoted all its political, security and financial efforts to achieving this goal. It drove on several parallel axes to influence and try to control the Iraqi decision, by engaging directly with the new Iraqi leaders who supported it when they were in the opposition.When ISIS came out in 2014, occupied about a third of Iraq’s area and tightened its control over major cities in the north, west, and central Iraq, Tehran was quick to provide the country with weapons, equipment, experts, and advisers. Led by General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, the war against ISIS was fought by the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are mostly armed factions loyal to Tehran. Soleimani was the spiritual father and the military and ideological commander of these factions.
When the war ended, some of these factions turned into political movements, with the aim to expand the base of Shiite sympathizers with Tehran. Those participated in the 2018 elections and won, as expected, due to two factors: the Iraqi street acknowledging their role in eliminating the threat of ISIS, and the unlimited Iranian support they received during the electoral race. The new movement enjoyed a wide and influential representation in the Iraqi parliament, and it was not satisfied with that; rather, it hurried to form a strong coalition gathering about 45 seats. This coalition was the nucleus of a larger alliance – Al-Binaa, which is now leading the Iraqi political scene. Obviously, Al-Binaa Alliance had a great role in choosing the speaker of parliament and naming the prime minister. It also worked on enacting a new law for a new military institution - the Popular Mobilization Authority – to which it earmarked a large budget as of 2019.The components and factions within Al-Binaa also acquired an abundant share of ministerial seats, positions, and senior ranks in the country. This contributed greatly to strengthening economic ties with Tehran, and the volume of Iranian exports to Iraq reached about $15 billion.
When the dispute between the US and Iran intensified following the missile attack that targeted Qassem Soleimani and Vice President of the Popular Mobilization Authority, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, near Baghdad International Airport, Al-Binaa Alliance adopted a parliamentary resolution calling for the exit of foreign forces from Iraq, specifically intended for US forces.
It is noteworthy that Iran has strong relations with other components, such as the Sunnis and the Kurds, and has close ties to some of the Sunni political forces and the ruling Kurdish parties. This allows it to serve its interests at the local and regional levels.
The Iranian influence equation changed after two important events: First, the unprecedented mass demonstrations erupting in Baghdad and the cities of central and southern Iraq in October 2019; second, the assassination of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis and their absence from the scene.
The repercussions of the first event reached the point of hearing loud chants from Iraqi youth in Shiite cities, foremost of which are both Najaf and Karbala, denouncing the Iranian presence and calling for its ousting.
On the other hand, the assassination of the two leaders greatly affected the strength of the Iranian presence inside the Iraqi arena, and it seemed difficult to find other figures to replace them and compensate for the significant influence they had in the Shiite and popular political circles.
Moreover, there is a difference of visions about the future of politics in Iraq, as Iran is based on the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih”- while the authority in Najaf does not agree with this approach. Sayyed Ali Al-Sistani had previously opposed Iraq’s commitment to “Wilayat al-Faqih.” He worked hard to curb Iranian influence in Najaf and cut the way for Iraq to be implicated in Iran’s regional and international conflicts, through Friday sermons delivered by his representatives.There is no doubt that Iran is now in the process of reviewing its regional policy, by drawing roles, identifying tools and creating new influencing factors... More importantly, Tehran is studying how to deal with the Iraqi interior and the region in light of the ongoing conflict with the US, not to mention that the Iranian economy has become weaker than ever, and the people are suffering from both the regime policies and the repercussions of the US sanctions.
Therefore, the Iranian leadership is now reviewing its calculations - in Iraq in particular – which was reflected in its non-interference in the formation of the expected government of Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi, while its fingerprints were long seen in all successive Iraqi governments.

Coronavirus Spreads in Iran
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Iran's health ministry Friday reported two more deaths among 13 new cases of coronavirus in the country, bringing the total number of deaths to four and infections to 18. The announcement came as a health ministry official said the virus has spread to several Iranian cities. "Based on existing reports, the spread of coronavirus started in Qom and with attention to people's travels has now reached several cities in the country including Tehran, Babol, Arak, Isfahan, Rasht and other cities and it's possible that it exists in all cities in Iran," Minou Mohrez said. "Thirteen new cases have been confirmed," ministry spokesman Kianoush Jahanpour said earlier on Twitter. "Unfortunately two of them have lost their lives."The COVID-19 outbreak first appeared in Iran on Wednesday, when officials said it killed two elderly people in Qom. The newly reported cases included "seven in Qom, four in Tehran, and two in Gilan,” Jahanpour tweeted. "Most of the cases are still either Qom residents" or were people who had come from Qom to other provinces "in recent days and weeks", he added. The official did not say anything about the suspected source of the outbreak. He added that Iran had so far received from the World Health Organization four shipments of medical kits used to detect COVID-19. A government official said the first two people who died of the disease had not left Iran.

New Virus Cases Soar in S.Korea and Chinese Prisons, More Die in Iran
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/February 21/2020
Two more people died from the new coronavirus in Iran, infections nearly doubled in South Korea and clusters surfaced in Chinese prisons on Friday, rekindling concerns about an epidemic that has killed more than 2,200 people in China. The World Health Organization warned nations could face a serious problem if they fail to "hit hard now" against the virus, which has infected more than 75,000 in China and over 1,100 abroad. China has pointed to official figures showing new cases slowing this week as evidence that its drastic containment measures are working, but fresh infections emerged at two Beijing hospitals, and more than 500 others were reported in prisons across the country. Chinese authorities have placed tens of millions of people under quarantine in hard-hit central Hubei province, restricted movements in other cities far from the epicentre, and closed schools nationwide. Many nations have banned travellers from China and airlines have suspended flights to and from the country.But clusters and outbreaks continue to emerge, and 13 people have now died outside mainland China.
South Korean sect
Iran's health ministry reported two more deaths among 13 new cases of coronavirus in the Islamic republic, bringing the total number of fatalities to four and infections to 18. Earlier cases had already prompted Iraq to ban travel to and from its neighbour and Kuwait's national air carrier to suspend flights.
Seven of the new cases were in the Shiite holy city of Qom, four in Tehran and two in Gilan, health ministry spokesman Kianoush Jahanpour said on Twitter. He did not say anything about the suspected source of the outbreak in Iran. In South Korea, the number of cases nearly doubled to 204, making it the hardest-hit country outside China. More than 120 members of Shincheonji Church of Jesus, a religious sect in the southern city of Daegu, have now been infected. It started with a 61-year-old woman who developed a fever on February 10 but attended at least four church services before being diagnosed.
The mayor of Daegu -- South Korea's fourth-biggest city, with a population of over 2.5 million -- has advised residents to stay indoors. Most people on the streets were wearing masks Friday, but many businesses were closed and workers sprayed disinfectant outside the church. "With so many confirmed cases here I'm worried that Daegu will become the second Wuhan," said Seo Dong-min, 24, referring to Hubei's capital, where the virus first emerged. Two Australians evacuated from the Diamond Princess cruise ship, meanwhile, tested positive for coronavirus on their return home despite being cleared in Japan. An Israeli also tested positive upon returning home -- becoming his country's first COVID-19 case. The cases will fuel questions about Tokyo's policy of allowing former Diamond Princess passengers to return home after testing negative. Two former passengers, both Japanese and in their 80s, died in Japan on Thursday. "If we don't hit hard now using the window of opportunity we might be faced with a serious problem," WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said Thursday.
Prisons and hospitals
China reported 118 more deaths on Friday, raising the toll to 2,236, most of them in Hubei. The National Health Commission also said in its daily update that China tallied 889 new cases, up from the previous day when it reported the lowest number of new infections in nearly a month, fuelling hopes that the epidemic is nearing its peak. Among those, 258 were outside Hubei, ending a 16-day streak of new infections falling in the rest of the country. Hubei's figures have raised questions, however, as officials have changed methods of counting cases twice and amended their figures. Tu Yuanchao, deputy director of Hubei's health commission, said previously removed cases would be reinserted in the tally, acknowledging that the modifications had "created a certain amount of doubt" in society. A 29-year-old Wuhan doctor died on Thursday, making him one of the youngest known fatalities of the epidemic and the eighth among medical workers. New hotspots were found in prisons and hospitals. Seven guards and 200 inmates tested positive for the virus at Rencheng prison in eastern Shandong province. Eight officials were fired over the issue. In Hubei, 230 cases were reported at the Wuhan Women's Prison, whose warden was also dismissed, and 41 others were reported at a penitentiary in Shayan county. One suspected infection was found at a juvenile detention centre. Another 34 cases have been found at a prison in eastern Zhejiang province, leading to the ouster of its director and another official.
In Beijing, health officials said 36 people, including medical staff, patients and their families, have tested positive for the virus at Fuxing hospital. At Peking University People's Hospital, a patient became infected after a visit from two relatives who tested positive for the virus.

Iraqi Panic Shuts Down Border Crossing with Iran
Baghdad - Fadhel al-Nashmi/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
There were growing fears among Iraqis on Friday after four people infected with coronavirus died in Iran, raising calls for shutting down the border with Iran. Calls for closing the border come amid Iraq’s fragile healthcare system coupled with fears that the authorities would fail to take measures to prevent coronavirus cases in the country. Local authorities in Basra directed border crossings and health departments in the province to ban Iraqis or Iranians from entering through Shalamcheh to Basra before undergoing health checks. Shalamcheh border crossing announced strict measures regarding the entry of Iraqis and Iranians to Basra and other provinces through the crossing. Yet, some protesters on Thursday shut down the border.The Iraqi News Agency said a crisis cell held an emergency meeting chaired by the minister of health to discuss the developments in Iran after a number of coronavirus cases were announced. In a terse statement on Thursday, the ministry said news on calls to shut down the border crossings with Iran is false. The ministry called for accuracy in releasing information. The Iraq Civil Aviation Authority also denied suspending Iranian flights to Iraq. Earlier, Interior Ministry spokesman Brig. Gen. Khaled al-Muhanna expressed willingness to shut down the border with Iran if the Ministry of Health requests such a measure. Najaf's Governor Luay al-Yassiri advised people in Najaf to abstain from traveling outside the province and country especially after coronavirus cases were detected in Qom, Iran. In a statement, he reassured that there are advanced equipment in Najaf’s international airport to test passengers. Yassiri noted that a crisis cell has been formed inside the province. An operations room was formed in Najaf and a health center inaugurated at the international airport. There’s also full coordination with passports control to direct the arrivals from China and the Far East to the medical section for testing.

Russia Studying Possible Summit on Syria With Erdogan, Merkel and Macron
Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Russia is studying the possibility of holding a summit on Syria with the presidents of Turkey, France and Germany, a Kremlin spokesman said on Friday. Dmitry Peskov made the announcement after the leaders of Germany and France called Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday to express their concern about the humanitarian situation in Syria's Idlib region, urging an end to the conflict there. "The possibility of holding a summit is being discussed. There any no firm decisions about it yet," he said. However, if all the four leaders "deem it necessary, we do not rule out the possibility of such a meeting," Peskov told reporters on a conference call. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron spoke together by phone with the Russian leader while at a European Union summit in Brussels, Reuters reported. “Both made clear how much they are concerned by the catastrophic humanitarian situation of the people in the Syrian province Idlib,” a German spokesman said on Thursday. “Both demanded an instant end of the fighting and the possibility of humanitarian aid for the people,” a German spokesman said. For his part, as he arrived at the EU summit, Macron said: "For several weeks now, one of the worst humanitarian dramas has been unfolding.”Earlier, Ankara urged Syria's regime ally, Moscow, to stop the attacks in Idlib, saying the offensive was causing a migrant wave toward Turkey, which currently hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees. According to Reuters, the Turkish president has previously said Turkey may use military force to drive back Syrian forces unless they pull back by the end of the month. The UN humanitarian affairs agency OCHA said the crisis had reached a horrifying level, with displaced people crammed into a small pocket of Idlib. “Places previously considered safe by civilians are now coming under fire,” it said in a report. The agency reiterated its appeal on Friday for a halt to the hostilities in the area, saying it feared that the "relentless" violence "may end in a bloodbath". Some 60% of the 900,000 people who have fled but are trapped in a shrinking space are children, OCHA spokesman Jens Laerke told a Geneva news briefing.

Libyan Tribes Vow to Sue Turkey Before International Courts
Cairo - Jamal Jawhar/Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Libyan tribes' sheikhs and notables have called for resisting all forms of foreign intervention in the country, namely the Turkish invasion and its supporters. During their talks in Tarhuna, west Libya, they vowed to sue Turkey and Qatar before international courts. Concluding the meeting, they called on the United Nations to withdraw its recognition of the Presidential Council and the High Council of State, and not acknowledge any entity that the House of Representatives doesn't endorse. Further, they urged the Security Council to lift the arms’ embargo and reiterated their rejection to any dialogue or truce before all mercenaries leave the county. Libya is an independent sovereign state that respects cultural and ethical diversity as well as historic ties among Libyans, the meeting stressed. The attendees affirmed that the political isolation law should be annulled. Lawsuits will be filed against all countries involved in aggravation of the Libyan crisis, namely Turkey and Qatar, they asserted. As for oil ports, they stated that they will remain shut until Libyans manage to form a unified government. They urged quick relocation of state institutes outside the capital, especially the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Foreign Investment Company. Moreover, they called for prompt procedures against representatives of the Presidential Council in Libyan embassies abroad. They also decided to form a council of Libyan sheikhs and notables to represent the Libyan society as a whole and maintain social peace in the county.

Tebboune Promises 'Radical Changes' in Algeria
Algiers - Paris - Boualem Goumrassa and Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who succeeded longtime leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika in December, asked in the face of his country's insistent protest movement for time to implement "radical changes", in an interview published Thursday. The interview with French daily Le Figaro was Tebboune's first since his election in December 12 polls that were rejected by the year-old "Hirak" protest movement that forced out Bouteflika and marked by a record 60-percent abstention rate. "We cannot reform, repair and restore that which was destroyed over a decade in two months," Tebboune told Le Figaro. Tebboune has been slammed by protesters as representing the ruling elite they want removed, having served several times as minister and once briefly as prime minister during Bouteflika's two-decade rule. Tebboune, who after his election "extended a hand" to the Hirak movement to build a "new Algeria", said he has prioritized "political reforms". "I am determined to go far in making radical changes to break with bad practices, clean up the political sphere and change the approach to governing." Revising the constitution is the "priority of priorities", he said. "The limits", he added, are those elements "relating in particular to national identity and national unity.
 "Everything else is negotiable".
"The second area of work will be that of the electoral law", to give legitimacy to parliament, "which will have to play a larger role", he said, underscoring the need to "separate money from politics". He said "things are starting to calm" in the streets and that "the Hirak got almost everything it wanted", including the departure of Bouteflika last April and figures from the "old regime" as well as the arrests of officials and businessmen suspected of corruption. Even as the unprecedented popular movement has thinned in numbers since December, protesters still turn out in droves every Friday, keeping up demands for a complete overhaul of the system. In his interview, Tebboune dismissed any notion that he -- like his predecessors -- was a president chosen by the army, a pillar of the regime.  "I feel indebted only to the people who elected me freely and openly. The army supported and accompanied the electoral process, but it never determined who would be president." Tebboune is, however, considered to have been close to the late General Ahmed Gaid Salah, powerful army chief for 15 years until his death on December 23. The “Hirak” blasted the authorities on Thursday for failing to grant it a permit to hold a conference in Algiers on the occasion of the protest movement’s first anniversary. It rejected the “unjustified” move of the Interior Ministry, which came after Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad pledged a week ago to cancel issuance of such licenses. A group of activists said they will release a document which will determine the objectives and the spirit of the protest movement.

Algeria's President Says Capable of Bringing Peace to Libya
Algeria - Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Algeria's President Abdelmadjid Tebboune said his country is capable of quickly bringing peace to Libya if he receives a mandate by the UN Security Council. In an interview with French newspaper Le Figaro, Tebboune confirmed that Algeria is ready to act as a mediator in any Libya ceasefire talks. "If we are given a mandate by the UN Security Council, we are capable of quickly bringing peace to Libya since Algeria is a sincere and credible mediator, and one that is accepted by all Libyan tribes,” he said.
"Proxy wars, mercenaries' recruitment and sales of arms should all end. Algeria provides Libyans with food and medicine, not with weapons so they kill one another," he noted. Tebboune also warned from what he described as the "new Somalia" scenario which would definitely affect the stability and security of European countries and the Mediterranean basin if the Libyan crisis continues for another year or a year and a half. “It is in Libya's favor today that its major tribes did not arm-up. They are all ready to come to Algeria to form a joint future."He added: "We are the only ones who offered serious solutions and we ask nothing in return. However, they do not want us to do that, even though Algeria has no intentions to dominate or target the fortunes of its brotherly country which opened its doors for us during times of war."

Fatah: Hamas Favors Calm over Reconciliation
Ramallah - Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Fatah movement, which believes that Hamas prefers agreements with Israel over inter-Palestinian reconciliation, blasted on Thursday the rulers of the Gaza Strip. Secretary of Fatah's Revolutionary Council Majed al-Fityani likened recent understandings between Gaza ruler Hamas and Israel to ‘Tom and Jerry’ cartoon episodes. He told Voice of Palestine radio that it is a repugnant game that started after Israel waged its destructive war through US backing. Since then, there have been talks on calm in exchange for money and cheap bribes, or extending the fishing zone in Gaza, which come against the backdrop of strong efforts exerted by the Palestinian leadership to end the siege imposed on the Strip, said al-Fityani. The purpose behind the understandings between Hamas and Israel is to maintain the division among Palestinians to serve the Zionist-US project, he warned. While Fatah speaks about resisting Israel’s annexation and expansion plans, and putting mechanisms for unity, Hamas sticks to discussions with Israel on calm in Gaza, he said. Member of the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee Azzam al-Ahmad also slammed Hamas for not reacting positively to a visit by a delegation of Palestinian factions to Gaza. Hamas is hindering the arrival of PLO’s delegation to the territory despite the approval of the movement’s head of political bureau Ismail Haniyeh. Fatah has said on several occasions that Hamas hasn’t approved a visit by the delegation to Gaza despite Hamas’ denial. It was Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ idea for a delegation to visit Gaza to end the division. He agreed on the matter with Haniyeh during a phone conversation after US President Donald Trump announced his peace plan last month. The Palestinian leadership was mulling for Abbas to head to Gaza. Yet, Ahmad clarified that the president’s visit to the territory is off the table. He said Abbas shouldn’t visit Gaza before the division is over. The Fatah-Hamas dispute goes back to 2007 when Hamas seized the Gaza Strip.

Russia Resorts to Military Power to Enforce Syrian Regime Deployment in Idlib
Moscow - Raed Jaber/ Asharq Al-Awsat/Friday, 21 February, 2020
Russia began on Thursday to use its military power to “enforce” the deployment of Syrian regime forces in the northwestern province of Idlib, and to halt an attack by Turkish-backed Syrian factions, which plan to advance towards the town of Nerab. The Russian Defense Ministry said pro-Ankara militants, backed by Turkish artillery fire, breached the defenses of the Syrian army near the villages of Qmenas and Nerab in Idlib. “Russian Su-24 attack aircraft were fired at Turkey-backed militants, helping the army repel the advancing fighters to Nerab and the nearby town of Saraqeb,” the ministry said. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova expressed concerns “over such support for militants from the Turkish armed forces.”She said the incident is seen as a violation of the Russian-Turkish agreements on separating the armed opposition from terrorists, and creating a demilitarized zone, and it may provoke a further escalation in the conflict in that part of Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 27 fighters were killed in the Idlib fighting. The Observatory confirmed the pullout of opposition factions from Nerab. For its part, the Turkish Defense Ministry said two Turkish soldiers were killed and five injured in an airstrike in Idlib, adding that over 50 Syrians died in a retaliatory fire. On Thursday, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma (lower house) Defense Committee Andrei Krasov told the Russian Izvestia newspaper that Moscow is calling on Ankara to resolve the situation in Idlib by diplomatic means, stressing that a military scenario would only worsen things. According to him, only the terrorists would benefit from a direct clash between the Syrian and Turkish armies. The Kremlin announced on Thursday that arrangements were made to prepare for a summit between Turkey, Russia and Iran in Tehran next month to discuss the situation in Idlib. In September 2018, Turkey and Russia agreed to establish a de-escalation zone in the province. However, the two sides failed to respect the deal.

Saudi Intercepts Yemen Rebel Missiles Targeting Cities
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/February 21/2020
Yemeni rebel missiles targeting cities in Saudi Arabia have been intercepted, the region's Riyadh-led military coalition said, in the latest cross-border attack by insurgents. The missiles were fired by the Iran-aligned Huthi militant group, the coalition said in a statement released Thursday by the official Saudi Press Agency (SPA)."They were launched in a systematic, deliberate manner to target cities and civilians, which is a flagrant defiance of international humanitarian law," coalition spokesman Turki al-Maliki said, according to SPA. "The capital (Sanaa) has become a Huthi militia assembly, installation and launching hub for ballistic missiles that target the kingdom," he added. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly accused Iran of supplying sophisticated weapons to the Huthis, a charge Tehran denies. The coalition intervened in support of the Yemeni government in 2015 when President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi fled into Saudi exile as the rebels closed in on his last remaining territory in and around Aden. Since then, the conflict has killed tens of thousands of people, many of them civilians, relief agencies say. The fighting has triggered what the United Nations describes as the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with millions displaced and in need of aid.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on February 21-22/2020
Iran’s Stacked Elections and Radicalization
Charles Elias Chartouni/February 21/2020
شارل الياس شرتوني/الانتخابات الإيرانية: غش وتطرف
http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/83377/83377/
The outcomes of Iranian elections are already anticipated with the elimination of 7000 candidates from the electoral contest, and as a completion of the repression cycle ushered by the regime’s radicals. It seems that the Iranian dictatorship is steeling itself for a long hauled confrontation policy with the US, the pursuit of a collision course all along the Middle Eastern geopolitical spectrums, and the fierce clampdown on internal oppositions. This turn of events is no radical departure from earlier patterns of conduct, since the regime has always demonstrated its unwillingness to normalize at the international level and liberalize internally, in spite of the forceful liberalizing trends and popular pressure towards normalization and diplomatic overtures.The double bind between normalization and liberalization accounts for the deliberate spiking of international negotiations, strategic waffling, pursuit of aggressive political expansionism in the larger Middle East, and the politics of systematic repression homeward. As a matter of fact, this is a variant of a well established repertoire along which this dictatorship has always operated, and with no major tampering with the script and its operational modulations.
The US, the EU and the international community have to reckon with this new couse of open confrontation and adjust its responses to the challenges it elicits around a series of strategic issues: the future of the nuclear accords, the relevance of the mitigated European response, the next stage of the US repressive measures and the coordination of regional responses, and their impacts on the fortunes of internal oppositions. The internal radicalization course is far from being a self contained phenomenon, and any counter-strategy should be predicated and coordinated on the very basis of its ideological purview and subversive political aims, with no second guessing and stifling mental restrictions. Those who are betting on moderating courses through everlasting diplomatic simulations, with no true engagements and straightforward policy options, are fooling themselves once again with elusive cooptation scenarios. Those who are ascribing the actual regressive course to the Trump administration containment policy, omit the fact that the nuclear accords were adeptly manipulated to conceal the murky engagement in this regard, dismiss the bolting destabilization strategy throughout the Middle East and its multiple hazards, and the enhanced repression inside Iran.
Totalitarian dictatorships are obstinate and hard coarse, sanctions are inevitably going to double down and the internal oppositions are taking the brunt of these convoluted courses of repression, deterioration of basic life standards and perpetuated international isolation. The question to be raised at this stage, is for how long the interlocking actors, each in his or her own right, are likely to cope with the enduring foreclosures and preempt the destructive courses of open ended conflicts and discretionary subversion? Hezbollah strategic equivocations and security gambling are eliciting harsh feedbacks on the Israeli side, its double speak insofar as normalization and systemic reforms in Lebanon are concerned, and the harsh repression on the Iraqi Shiite oppositions, are quite illustrative of the meandering and destructive courses that loom in the horizon of an already imploded Middle East, and deepen its strategic hazards and structural volatility, Caveat emptor.
Iran’s leaders disqualified more than 7,000 candidates, including most moderates and centrists, paving the way for tougher domestic and foreign policies.

The rise of Trump’s new pro-Israel and anti-Iran intel director - analysis
Benjamin Weinthal/Jerusalem Post/February 21/2020
Richard Grenell took the lead in Europe by highlighting Iran’s genocidal antisemitism targeting Israel.
US President Donald Trump’s Wednesday appointment of Richard Grenell, the American ambassador to Germany, to acting director of national intelligence should not ambush foreign policy specialists.
Grenell’s meteoric rise within the US government was based on high-intensity diligence, tough diplomacy and a rapid –fire analytical assimilation of vast amounts of data to bring about brilliant policy-making changes. This troika marked his tenure as ambassador to Germany since 2018.
Just this week, Grenell tweeted that “I’ve watched as Germany has ignored long-standing US requests on NATO spending, NS2 [Nord Stream 2], a Hezbollah ban, the return of a Nazi guard, etc. Happy to debate the tactics of our shared goal - anytime. Our style is working.”
Grenell has pushed Germany to meet its NATO requirement to increase its military budget and exerted pressure on Germany not to create dependency on Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas system. Germany has drifted away from Western values over the years.
The ambassador cajoled and twisted arms in German Chancellor Angela Merkel's government to secure her country's acceptance of the Nazi camp guard Jakiw Palij from Queens, New York, to Germany.
Prior US ambassadors to Germany were not able to influence a change in German government resistance to allow Palij into the federal republic. Grenell did it.
Grenell blocked Merkel’s government from sending more than $400 million in cash to Iran’s regime – the worst state-sponsor of terrorism – to circumvent American sanctions. That type of money could have been used by Iran’s regime to finance its war against Syrian civilians, Yemenites and Israelis.
He succeeded in convincing Germany’s government to ban Iran’s Mahan Air, “the airline of choice for terrorists.”
His unstoppable advocacy for Germany to outlaw the entire Hezbollah movement in the federal republic, where 1,050 Hezbollah operatives raise funds and recruit new members, helped play a critical role in a Bundestag resolution to outlaw the activities of the Lebanese Shi’ite terrorist organization in Germany.
Grenell, The Jerusalem Post first learned last year, raises a full ban of Hezbollah in conversations with all German officials. US President Trump clearly took notice of Grenell’s achievements.
The Jewish News Syndicate (JNS) reporter Orit Arfa reported on Wednesday that: “One of the reasons I wanted to be US Ambassador to Germany was because I wanted to deepen and broaden the German-US relationship to the point where the German government didn’t have to think about whose side they would be on when a global crisis or situation arose—that they would innately be with the West,” said Grenell. He added that“I believe this [German President] letter of congratulations to the murderous regime in Iran should never have been drafted, thereby eliminating the chance it would be mistakenly sent.”
Grenell took Germany’s president Frank-Walter Steinmeier to task for “mistakenly” sending a letter this month to Iran’s clerical regime to honor its Islamic revolution last week.
The US ambassador was the first American envoy calling on banks to not provide accounts to Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions organizations targeting Israel.
Grenell took the lead in Europe by highlighting Iran’s genocidal antisemitism targeting Israel.
Iranian regime threats to obliterate Israel have long been played down by the Merkel administration. Merkel’s consistently defines Iran’s threats to wipe Israel off the map as merely “anti-Israel rhetoric.”
“Threatening the destruction of Israel is something that should not be dismissed, especially when the threats come from Iranian regime officials who regularly use terrorism as a weapon of intimidation. When someone shows you who they are, believe them,” told Fox News in October. Grenell said Iran’s threats are “antisemitic.”
Mojtaba Zonnour, chairman of National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in Iran’s Majlis legislature, said in October: “If Israel or America make a mistake, Israel won’t live for longer than 20 or 30 minutes.”
Last year, Major General Hossein Salami, the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), delivered a call to obliterate the Jewish state that was publicized by the state-funded IRNA agency as well as other Iranian regime outlets.
Salami, speaking to an audience of IRGC leaders, announced, “This sinister regime [Israel] must be wiped off the map and this is no longer… a dream [but] it is an achievable goal.”
For Israel’s security and defense establishment, Grenell’s hawkish views towards Iran’s regime will be welcomed with open arms. Grenell has long been admired by Israeli diplomats and security officials for his efforts in combating all forms of terrorism.
Trump tweeted on Wednesday that "I am pleased to announce that our highly respected Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, will become the Acting Director of National Intelligence. Rick has represented our Country exceedingly well and I look forward to working with him.”
Grenell will now oversee America’s 17 intelligence agencies in the new role.
The White House said on Wednesday that “Ambassador Grenell was confirmed to his role as Ambassador by the Senate in April 2018, and he has years of experience working with our Intelligence Community in a number of additional positions, including as Special Envoy for Serbia-Kosovo Negotiations and as United States spokesman to the United Nations. “
The statement added that” He is committed to a non-political, non-partisan approach as head of the Intelligence Community, on which our safety and security depend. The President has every confidence that Ambassador Grenell will perform his new duties with distinction.”
Some critics assert Grenell lacks intelligence credentials. Grenell, however, has been immersed in intelligence and counter-terrorism matters for years. He is a veteran diplomat and foreign policy expert.
His years as ambassador to Germany coupled with his time as the longest serving US spokesman at the UN have equipped him to confront threats to the US and its allies.
Writing in the Washington Examiner, Tom Rogan, said, "In Grenell, Trump now has a smart, loyal voice to guide him on matters of national security. But the intelligence community also gets something: a leader with Trump's ear, and someone who is keen to impress. Both sides, then, can forge common ground in America's interest.”
Grenell will become the first openly gay cabinet member in the history of the US. Last year, the new intelligence director launched an international campaign to decriminalize homosexuality across the world.
Rogan, the political journalist, said that “appointing Richard Grenell as the new acting director of national intelligence. It's bad news for Iran, Huawei.”
Grenell will continue as US ambassador to Germany. That means the political camp – and it is not minor – that supports communist China’s Huawei network for Germany, Iran’s totalitarian regime, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia Nord Stream 2 energy project for the federal republic will not be pleased.

Iran’s hardliners look to consolidate control in parliamentary election
Behnam Ben Taleblu/FDD/February 21/2020
The narrowing of Iran’s political spectrum will be demonstrated on Friday in parliamentary elections dominated by hardline candidates.
Driving the news
An estimated one-third of sitting parliamentarians were disqualified from participating, reformists were barred en masse, and boycotts are expected from portions of the increasingly disenfranchised population.
Why it matters
For Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, having more hardliners at the helm of different institutions as he enters the eighth decade of his life is an insurance policy against change from within.
For hardline politicians, the conservative consolidation will make capturing the presidency in 2021 even easier.
For Hassan Rouhani, the current president, it will confirm his lame-duck status
For the Iranian people, who have been increasingly willing to protest since 2017, it is proof that change will not come through a highly-controlled “ballot-box.”
For Washington, although the parliament does not decide foreign policy, more hardliners will likely mean a more confrontational approach, especially on the nuclear issue.
Where things stand
Iran’s unelected Guardian Council, which vets candidates for elected office, disqualified just over half of the over 15,000 people who registered to run for the 290 seat Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis, in Persian).
Should some seats remain vacant, a second round of voting will be held in the spring.
This will be Iran’s 11th parliament since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
What they’re saying
Khamenei has played to both Islamist and nationalist sentiment in a bid to get out the vote, going so far as to call voting a “religious duty.” He told Iranians to vote even if they don’t like him.
Others have talked about voting as a way to secure Iran and deflect foreign pressure.
Conversely, reformist intellectuals and activists outside the country who have traditionally favored participation are now calling for an election boycott.
Flashback
The Islamic Republic also used the 2012 parliamentary vote — which followed a disputed presidential contest — to consolidate power and spin participation as a show of support during a critical time.
The bottom line
Faced with increasing domestic unrest and Washington’s ongoing maximum pressure campaign, Iranian authorities are looking to use the election to signal strength abroad by alleging popularity at home. If turnout is as low as expected, that will send the opposite message.
*Behnam Ben Taleblu is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Iraq Needs Regime Change Again
John Hannah/Foreign Policy/February 21/2020
Musical chairs in the Iraqi parliament can no longer solve the country's problems.
The United States faces an increasingly urgent set of first-order policy questions in Iraq. Spoiler alert: The answer is not Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi, Iraq’s newly designated prime minister. A popular uprising might be.
Allawi’s recent nomination to be Iraq’s next leader is a dead end, for Iraq and the United States alike. He has no chance of resolving the two fundamental crises now plaguing the country: first, the collapse of legitimacy of Iraq’s post-2003 political class, and second, Iraq’s ever-expanding subjugation by Iran and its local Shiite Islamist proxies. The United States would be well advised to keep its distance from Allawi’s candidacy and instead focus its energies on supporting the extraordinary protest movement that has upended Iraq’s politics since late last year, and whose demands for sovereignty, independence, and clean government represent the last best hope for salvaging not just Iraq, but the future of U.S.-Iraqi relations as well.
It is hard to overstate the importance of the mass demonstrations that erupted in Baghdad on Oct. 1, 2019, and rapidly spread to every major city in southern Iraq. Dominated by young people (close to 60 percent of Iraq’s population is now under 25), the protesters are overwhelmingly Shiites—Iraq’s largest religious sect. But from the beginning, they have called for a complete overhaul of the Shiite-dominated regime that has ruled them since the fall of Saddam Hussein, charging it with being irredeemably corrupt, incompetent, and fatally infected by sectarianism, Islamism, and Iranian penetration.
Whether or not the protesters’ anger could have been assuaged by a rapid and sincere effort to engage their demands, we’ll never know. Instead, the government almost immediately chose the path of brutal repression—killing, maiming, and terrorizing its own citizens with a vengeance and on a scale that made Hong Kong’s protests seem like child’s play. In waves of violence over the past four months, hundreds of people have been killed, abducted, tortured or disappeared. Around 20,000 have been injured.
In the process, an insular and out-of-touch political class that for the better part of two decades had systematically looted the nation’s enormous patrimony to line its own pockets was exposed in all its venality, cruelty, and criminality. Confronted in a moment of acute crisis with the stark choice of siding with its people or protecting its own power and privilege, the post-2003 governing establishment opted to go down the path of killing and brutalizing its youth, or at best standing by mutely and watching while others did the dirty work. A few politicians ineffectually tut-tutted from the sidelines, expressed concern, urged restraint. But no one resigned in protest. No one joined the demonstrators. No one called out the assassins by name. No one was held to account.
Making matters worse, the government’s decision to kill was so clearly orchestrated by a foreign power, Iran, and in large part executed by its Iraqi proxies, including a group of powerful Shiite militias known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF. Before he was killed by an American Hellfire missile last month, Qassem Suleimani—the Iranian general in charge of the Quds Force, the special operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—was widely known to be chairing meetings in Baghdad to map out the government’s battle plan for repressing the protests, imperially usurping the authority of Iraq’s elected leaders. And when Suleimani was not in town, his power was dutifully delegated to his most trusted Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the operational commander of the PMF who (before dying in the same missile strike that killed Suleimani) had for years unabashedly made clear that his primary loyalties ran not to Iraq but to Suleimani and the Iranian revolution.
The protests laid bare for all to see the unholy alliance that now exists between the post-2003 Iraqi governing class and the regime in Iran. Years in the making, it rapidly accelerated with the rise of the PMF during the war against the Islamic State and the wholesale integration of Shiite militias, de facto foreign legions of the IRGC, into Iraq’s security forces as well as the highest echelons of the government.
The so-called Hezbollah-ization of Iraq was already well down the road to completion when the protests first broke out. With the government’s decision to kill rather than reform, to succumb with varying degrees of enthusiasm to the plots of Iran and its loyalists to crush a popular movement grounded in Iraqi nationalism, the process now seems nearly irreversible. A Rubicon of sorts has been crossed. Too much innocent blood has been spilled for the Iraqi political class to go back now. Whether out of ideological fealty, intimidation, bribery, greed or other reasons too numerous to mention, its members have collectively made their bed with the Iranian regime.
For all its myriad failings, including not delivering minimally competent governance and not protecting Iraqi sovereignty from foreign predators, Iraq’s political class has been unambiguously rejected en masse by the protesters. Week after week, month after month, they have without deviation made clear that there can be no solution to the current crisis that leaves any of those from the post-2003 order in charge of the system’s overhaul.
What they appear to want instead is the creation of some kind of transitional authority, blessed by the protesters and composed of well-regarded people without ties to the existing governing elite, that will work on a rapid timeline to implement sweeping emergency measures that pave the way for truly free and fair elections (perhaps with coordination and oversight from the United Nations), while banishing Iraq’s current crop of corrupt rulers, Islamist parties, and Iranian toadies to the political margins.
That is a very tall order. What it means in practice or how it can be achieved in ways consistent with the rule of law is far from clear. But what it almost certainly doesn’t mean is Mohammed Tawfiq Allawi’s designation as Iraq’s next prime minister.
Allawi is an Islamist-leaning Shiite and former member of parliament who served two stints as Iraq’s minister of communications. In cabinets filled with thieves and hacks, he was reputedly less corrupt and incompetent than most of his colleagues. Like the man he would now replace, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Allawi is reportedly more of a longtime bureaucrat than a political power broker, claiming no party affiliation and lacking any independent base of support. But also like Abdul-Mahdi, he is inescapably a man of the post-2003 system, not outside it. Which is why, from the moment Allawi’s potential nomination surfaced, the protesters have loudly and consistently rejected it out of hand.
Not helping Allawi’s cause was the fact that his candidacy so brazenly emerged out of a backroom deal cut—where else?—in Iran between Hadi al-Amiri and Muqtada al-Sadr, two pillars of Iraq’s dysfunctional system of Islamist spoils and militias run wild. Amiri, who fought for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, heads both a major faction in Iraq’s parliament as well as the IRGC-backed Badr militia, which has controlled Iraq’s Interior Ministry for years and has played a leading role in repressing the current protests. Sadr, a populist anti-American cleric, while a more mercurial figure, has been no less a staple of Iraq’s increasingly toxic post-2003 order, milking government ministries and wielding a murderous militia to bolster the wealth and power of his own political movement and cult of personality. The protesters fully comprehend that, with a provenance so clearly dependent on the likes of Amiri and Sadr, Allawi’s appointment was concocted in sin, not for the purpose of transforming Iraq’s broken system, but to save it.
It didn’t take long for the sordid reality surrounding Allawi’s nomination on Feb. 1 to be exposed. While Allawi issued a conciliatory statement praising the protesters and promising to hold their oppressors to account, Sadr at that very moment was dispatching his militia to attack the demonstrations, shut them down, and crack the heads of those speaking out against Allawi’s designation. In Baghdad and protest centers across southern Iraq, Sadr’s thugs went on a weeklong rampage of beatings, arsons, and killings. After a particular bloody day in Najaf on Feb. 5, Allawi called on Abdul-Mahdi’s caretaker government to protect the protests until he could form a new cabinet that would fulfill the people’s demands. But there was not a word against the Sadrists openly perpetrating the atrocities in the name of his appointment. Not a word demanding that his political patron, Sadr, call off his assault and deliver those in his ranks responsible for the mayhem to the authorities for punishment. Quite predictably, Sadr’s forces were back at it the following day in Karbala, leaving more death and destruction in their wake.
Hard as it might be given the United States’ pivotal role in establishing Iraq’s post-2003 order, the Trump administration now needs to come to grips with the challenging reality that the Iraqi regime as currently constituted is increasingly not a viable partner for advancing U.S. interests. While the situation was deeply worrisome even before the onset of the protests, events since this past October have left little room for doubt. For the first time since 2003, the Iraqi government has systematically unleashed widespread violence against its own unarmed citizens whose demands for democratic change and Iraqi sovereignty largely align with U.S. interests and values. The government’s legitimacy, already a rapidly wasting asset, has now been shattered in the eyes of the Iraqi people, probably irreparably. Its efforts to preserve its prerogatives at all costs by waging a bloody war of attrition against its own citizenry is a prescription for chronic instability and conflict.
Even more directly threatening to U.S. interests has been the government’s ever-deepening submission to its eastern neighbor. The dominating role that Iran and its militia proxies have played in directing and executing the violence against the protests has been disturbing enough. But it has been simultaneously coupled with the government’s abject acquiescence in an escalating Iranian campaign to attack the U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Iraq.
In the final weeks of 2019, Iran’s militia allies conducted at least 11 increasingly dangerous rocket attacks against facilities hosting U.S. forces that have been supporting the Iraqi Army’s fight against the Islamic State. After each incident, U.S. officials implored Iraqi authorities to condemn the attacks and take action against them. The government did nothing. U.S. pleas went ignored. But when an attack on Dec. 27 killed an American contractor (crossing an unambiguous red line repeatedly articulated by the Trump administration) and the United States retaliated against Kataib Hezbollah, one of Iran’s most powerful Shiite proxies under Muhandis’s command, senior Iraqi officials rushed to publicly condemn the United States for its dangerous and unacceptable violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
More shocking still was the assault on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad days later. On Dec. 31, Iraqi security forces opened the gates of the Green Zone (the heavily guarded area housing government offices and diplomatic compounds) to allow a mob of thousands of pro-Iranian militia members to lay siege to the embassy’s perimeter, breaching external walls, laying waste to guardhouses, and setting fires. Embassy personnel retreated to safe rooms while heavily armed but outnumbered U.S. Marines steeled themselves to repel a potential assault à la Tehran in 1979 or Benghazi in 2012. Rather than taking any action to prevent a potential catastrophe and uphold its international obligations to protect diplomatic facilities, the Iraqi government sat on its hands for hours while many of its most powerful officials, including Muhandis and Amiri, openly joined the mob to egg on the rioters.
While the militias eventually withdrew and the nightmare scenario was averted, it was a near-miss thing and no thanks to the Iraqi government. Quite the contrary. Instead, what transpired was an astonishing real-time display of how deep the rot of Iranian penetration had set in among Iraq’s governing elite, as it appeared to cross a fateful line from pathetic passivity in the face of Iran’s incessant assaults on U.S. interests to something much more resembling active complicity.
Needless to say, that is an intolerable situation. A policy premised on partnering with the Iraqi state is simply not sustainable when, at its highest political and security echelons, that government’s payroll and power structures are increasingly dominated by U.S.-designated individuals and armed groups whose primary allegiances are to an Iranian regime that is systematically working to inflict great harm on the United States. Nor is it sustainable when, necessary as it might have been, the United States is forced into the position of droning convoys on major Baghdad highways carrying senior Iraqi and Iranian military commanders openly conspiring to attack US interests.
What an alternative U.S. policy should be is, of course, a much harder question. It’s certainly worthy of an urgent review by President Donald Trump’s national security team. One hopes that’s being done. The new situation triggered by the protests requires deep analysis, questioning old assumptions, and the development of new policy options.
As a general proposition, a good starting point would probably be to invest less in the Iraqi government and more in the protest movement. Within the deeply flawed confines of the post-2003 order, the game of musical chairs in Baghdad to get this prime minister or that group of cabinet officials appointed has proved over the long term to be a losing proposition for the United States. That’s Iran’s favored turf, and its clear result has been both the slow-motion discrediting of Iraqi democracy and the accelerating Hezbollah-ization of the Iraqi state. Allawi’s nomination and whatever cabinet Iran and its loyalists permit him to cobble together will likely do nothing to change that trajectory, and the United States should act accordingly.
The protest movement, in contrast, is an historic challenge to all that Iran has perpetrated in Iraq. It’s true that the protesters have no love lost for an America that they blame for saddling them after 2003 with a botched occupation and a failed political system. But watch videos of the demonstrations closely and it wasn’t posters of Donald Trump that they were trampling day in and day out. It was pictures of Qassem Suleimani and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. They weren’t burning down U.S. and British diplomatic facilities across the Shiite heartland but Iranian consulates and the headquarters of Iran’s most important Iraqi allies. Yes, especially after the targeted killings of Suleimani and Muhandis, the protesters did make a point of coupling their standard chant of “No, no Iran” with “No, no America.” But talk to them confidentially and they will admit that including the United States is largely a means of reducing the risk of being attacked by Iran’s unforgiving proxies.
The fact is that at their core, in addition to being an uprising against corrupt and inept governance, the protests are quite clearly a mass movement of Iraqi nationalism targeting Iranian malign interference, not American.
How to engage and support the protest movement, leaderless and inchoate as it is, without inadvertently tainting and endangering it is a genuinely difficult policy challenge. But that is increasingly where the energies and attention of U.S. policymakers should be focused. There should be a concerted campaign to keep the eyes of the world on the protests and the Iranian-backed attacks against them. Together with allied governments, Washington should sponsor statements and resolutions in the U.N. Security Council and other multilateral forums expressing solidarity and concern for the Iraqi people; find ways to assist Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations that are working discreetly with the protesters to channel their movement and demands into a practical political program; help the protesters gain access to secure communications technologies for defeating internet shutdowns by the government; and accelerate the sanctioning of the protesters’ oppressors—including not just militia leaders but also major politicians such as Amiri, Sadr, and their key lieutenants, whose destabilizing actions had heretofore gotten a U.S. pass—for transgressions that mirror the movement’s main complaints, particularly corruption, human rights abuses, and facilitating Iranian malign influence. Finally, discreetly and in cooperation with its most reliable Iraqi and international partners, the U.S. government should make necessary adjustments now to its troop deployments in Iraq to limit their exposure during the country’s present upheaval while maintaining maximum flexibility to fulfill essential counterterrorism missions and respond aggressively to Iranian provocations.
Acknowledging that a longtime policy may have passed its sell-by date is rarely easy. Policy inertia is a powerful force, and large bureaucracies are almost always resistant to major changes in direction—especially when it comes to things like Iraq’s post-2003 political order that the United States did so much to create. But major events are afoot now in Iraq that cry out for serious reevaluation. Not only are important U.S. interests are at stake, but, as we’ve seen repeatedly in recent weeks, the lives of U.S. troops and diplomats are increasingly at risk as well. Recognizing the need for a significant shift in approach is the critical first step toward building a more sustainable and effective long-term Iraq policy, even if comes at the expense of acknowledging that Washington’s approach since 2003 has largely been a failure.
*Portions of this article previously appeared on the website of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
*John Hannah is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on U.S. strategy. During the presidency of George W. Bush, he served for eight years on the staff of Vice President Cheney, including as the vice president's national security advisor.

France: Macron Vows Crackdown on Political Islam
Soeren Kern/Gatestone Institute/February 21/2020
"The problem is when, in the name of a religion, some people want to separate themselves from the Republic and therefore not respect its laws." — French President Emmanuel Macron, February 18, 2020.
"Turkey today can make the choice to follow that path with us or not, but I will not allow any foreign country feed a cultural, religious or identity-related separatism on our Republic's territory. We cannot have Turkey's laws on France's soil. No way." — French President Emmanuel Macron, February 18, 2020.
"What we must put in place is not, as I have sometimes heard from some people, 'a plan against Islam.' That would be a profound mistake. What we must fight is the separatism...." — French President Emmanuel Macron, February 18, 2020.
French President Emmanuel Macron has announced new measures aimed at countering political Islam in France. The changes would limit the role that foreign governments have in France in training imams, financing mosques and educating children. Pictured: Macron speaks to the media in Mulhouse, on February 18, 2020, shortly before making the major policy speech in which he vowed to fight what he called "Islamist separatism." (Photo by Sebastien Bozon/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
French President Emmanuel Macron has announced new measures aimed at countering political Islam in France. The changes would limit the role that foreign governments have in France in training imams, financing mosques and educating children.
Macron also vowed to fight what he called "Islamist separatism" and to lead what he described as a "Republican reconquest" aimed at reasserting state control over Muslim ghettoes — so-called no-go zones (zones urbaines sensibles, sensitive urban zones) — in France.
In a much-anticipated policy speech, Macron, during a visit to the eastern French city of Mulhouse on February 18, said that his government would seek to combat "foreign interference" in how Islam is practiced, and the way that Muslim religious institutions are organized in France. "The problem is when, in the name of a religion, some people want to separate themselves from the Republic and therefore not respect its laws," he said. "Here in France, there is no place for political Islam."
Macron outlined a four-pronged strategy to combat Islamism in the country: 1) fight against foreign influences in schools and places of worship; 2) reorganize Muslim worship in France in accordance with the principles of secularism and French law; 3) fight against all manifestations of Islamist separatism and communitarianism; and 4) reassert state control over all parts of France.
Macron said that, among other measures, he plans to terminate a decades-old teacher exchange program called Teaching Language and Culture of Origin (L'Enseignement Langue et Culture d'origine, ELCO), which allows nine countries — Algeria, Croatia, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey — to send teachers to France to provide foreign language and culture courses without oversight by French authorities.
Four majority-Muslim countries — Algeria, Morocco Tunisia and Turkey — are involved in ELCO, which serves approximately 80,000 students each year. These countries also send several hundred imams to France every year. Foreign imams, Macron said, were often linked to Salafism or the Muslim Brothers and "preach against the Republic." He stressed: "This end to the consular Islam system is extremely important to curb foreign influence and make sure everybody respects the laws of the Republic."
Macron said that ELCO will be replaced with bilateral agreements to ensure that the French state has control over the courses and their content, as of September 2020. Macron added that Turkey was the only country that had refused to sign a new bilateral agreement.
The Turkish government operates a large network of mosques in France and elsewhere in Europe under the auspices of Diyanet, or Directorate of Religious Affairs, which spent more than $2 billion on promoting Islam in 2019 and is controlled by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been accused of using Diyanet to prevent the integration of Muslims in Europe.
"Turkey today can make the choice to follow that path with us or not, but I will not allow any foreign country feed a cultural, religious or identity-related separatism on our Republic's territory," Macron said. "We cannot have Turkey's laws on France's soil. No way."
Macron also said that a new law is being drafted to allow for transparency in how mosques are financed. "Mosques financed with transparency with imams trained in France and respectful of the Republican values and principles, that's how we will create the conditions so that Muslims in France can freely practice their religion," he said.
Macron added that he would ask the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman, CFCM), the body representing Islam in France, to help the government find solutions to train imams on French soil and ensure they can speak French and not spread Islamism.
Macron also called for better integration of Muslims in French society and warned of the dangers of communitarianism — the practice of communities governing themselves in France:
"We are here for a reason that we share with Muslims — that is the struggle against communitarianism. What we must put in place is not, as I have sometimes heard from some people, 'a plan against Islam.' That would be a profound mistake. What we must fight is the separatism, because when the Republic does not keep its promises, others will try to replace it."
Macron's speech, which comes just weeks before municipal elections set for March 15 and 22, is part of an effort to elicit support from conservative voters. The government has faced criticism over its lackluster efforts to promote Muslim integration in France, which is home to Europe's largest Muslim population, estimated to number around 6 million, or 8 percent of the population.
Marine Le Pen, leader of the French nationalist party National Rally, has repeatedly argued that France has failed to assimilate its Muslim community — thus jeopardizing laïcité, or state secularism, a 1905 legal principle that separates church and state and requires the state's neutrality on religion. Le Pen, who is neck and neck with Macron in public opinion polls, speaks for many voters who are concerned about the spread of radical Islam in France.
Macron, who took office in May 2017 and has focused most of his presidency on economic reform, has had mixed results on keeping promises regarding Islamism and mass migration.
October 2017. Macron signed a new counter-terrorism law — Law to Strengthen Internal Security and the Fight Against Terrorism (Loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme) — which gives prefects, police and security forces wide-ranging powers, without the need to seek prior approval from a judge, to search homes, place people under house arrest and close places of worship. The measure also authorizes police to perform identity checks at French borders.
February 2018. Macron pledged to "lay the groundwork for the entire reorganization of Islam in France." He said that the plan would be announced within six months and would limit the role that foreign governments have in training imams, financing mosques and educating children in France — the very same objectives that Macron announced two years later in his speech in Mulhouse in February 2020.
Le Pen noted that Macron's latest plan mirrors her own report — "Le Pen Plan for the Suburbs" (Plan Le Pen pour les banlieues) — published in May 2018.
September 2018. French Interior Minister Gérard Collomb launched the "Republican Reconquest" (Reconquête Républicaine) aimed at retaking control of 60 so-called no-go zones in France by sending in extra police and improving public services.
September 2019. Macron, arguing that the government must stop voters from drifting to populist parties, hinted at a tougher line on immigration. "France cannot host everyone if it wants to host them well," Macron told French radio station Europe 1.
Macron's comments caused a backlash from left-leaning members of his own party. They penned two open letters warning against "fueling hatred against all Muslim citizens." Lawmaker Jean-François Cesarini accused Macron of "co-opting Le Pen's talking points."
Meanwhile, in a new book — "The Emirates of the Republic: How Islamists are Taking Control of the Suburbs" — François Pupponi, who for 20 years was the Socialist mayor of Sarcelles, a commune in the northern suburbs of Paris, recounts how supporters of political Islam have upset the balance in his community, where Arabs, Christians, Jews and Turks had lived together in peace for many decades.
Pupponi describes a landscape in which entire districts are being infiltrated by Islamists in order to "make a takeover bid on this community." He added: "It is the fruit of my experience, what I live and what I observe."
*Soeren Kern is a Senior Fellow at the New York-based Gatestone Institute.

Palestinians Condemn US for Offering to Help
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/February 21/2020
Palestinians, in short, are saying that they refuse to accept funding by any party that does not accept their conditions and demands.
It is as if someone applies for a loan from a bank but demands that the bank accept his or her demands, and not the other way around. Usually, those who offer the money have the right to set the conditions.
For the Palestinians, it seems, the opposite is true. They seem to believe that they are the ones entitled to set conditions to those who are offering to improve their living needs and help them march towards prosperity and a better future for their children.
Palestinian leaders know that their society is floundering in every possible way. Yet, rather than welcoming the proposed US programs, they are condemning the Americans and inciting their people against the US administration for even making such a generous offer. This is precisely the disastrous dynamic that decades ago landed the Palestinian people in their quagmire, and it is precisely the same dynamic that keeps them trapped in that morass.
The US Embassy in Israel (pictured) has a Palestinian Affairs Unit that regularly offers Palestinians grants and funding opportunities that include, for students, US higher education and scholarships. But in response to the US offer of grants and funding opportunities, some Palestinian officials have warned their people not to deal with the US Embassy.
Palestinian leaders have gone to great lengths to explain their opposition to US President Donald Trump's recently unveiled plan, "Peace to Prosperity," for Middle East peace.
While these leaders are entitled to oppose Trump's vision for peace, it is not clear why they are also rejecting US financial aid to Palestinians. By rejecting it, Palestinian leaders are denying their people the right to a better life and a strong economy.
The US Embassy in Israel has a Palestinian Affairs Unit that regularly offers Palestinians grants and funding opportunities that include, for students, US higher education and scholarships.
Recently, the Unit announced an open competition for grants to Palestinian individuals and not-for-profit organizations to implement activities that advance the organization's or individual's goals -- particularly if those goals include a comprehensive, lasting, negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians, a prosperous, stable, and transparent Palestinian society, economy and system of governance.
The program's main objectives are to provide students with the skills and experiences that will make them more competitive for higher education and work opportunities; build a culture of mentorship that cultivates leaders in Palestinian society, education and business; encourage citizens' engagement in participatory governance; foster entrepreneurship, critical thinking and problem-solving skills among the youth and between diverse communities, and to promote understanding, tolerance, pluralism and shared values.
The US Embassy's Palestinian Affairs Unit also announced a new funding opportunity to establish English-language summer camps for young Palestinians, and an open competition for Palestinian organizations to hold a conference on social media marketing for e-commerce.
These programs seem intended for the benefit of Palestinian youths. You would think that, notwithstanding political differences or controversy surrounding a peace plan, any leader who actually cared about the well-being of his or her people would welcome such an offer. You would be wrong.
Decisions, it seems, do not work that way when it comes to Palestinian political activists and leaders, who have been boycotting the US administration since December 2017, when President Trump announced that Washington recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital.
In response to the US offer of grants and funding opportunities, some Palestinian officials have warned their people not to deal with the US Embassy.
One official, Ra'fat Elayan, a senior representative of the Palestinian Authority's Fatah faction, headed by President Mahmoud Abbas, issued a warning to Palestinians not to accept any funding from the US. "The Palestinians," Elayan said, noting that Palestinians opposed moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, "consider the US Embassy as a new settlement in the heart of Jerusalem."
The programs announced by the US Embassy in Jerusalem, he added, "are aimed at passing the Deal of the Century, [the Trump peace plan] that depicts the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict as a humanitarian issue, and not a political one."
In 2018, the Palestinians had similarly condemned the Trump administration for its decision to halt funding for Arab hospitals in Jerusalem.
At the time, President Trump, as part of a review of foreign aid, had ordered $25 million, earmarked for the care of Palestinians in east Jerusalem hospitals, to be reallocated. "As a result of that review, at the direction of the President, we will be redirecting approximately $25 million originally planned for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network," a State Department official had said. "Those funds will go to high-priority projects elsewhere."
The Palestinian Foreign Ministry had immediately denounced the decision and said it was part of a US attempt to "liquidate the Palestinian cause."
The Palestinians were also angry the same year when the Trump administration announced that it would redirect $200 million in Palestinian economic support funds for programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and cut all funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)
Strangely, then, the Palestinians condemned the US administration for halting funds to hospitals and UNRWA, but now the leaders are condemning the US Embassy for offering grants and funding to Palestinian individuals and organizations.
According to the same Fatah official, Elayan, the US Embassy's latest offer to fund non-governmental organizations "comes at the expense of Palestinians' political rights." He added, "There is a clear decision by the Palestinian leadership to sever relations with the US administration. Palestinians must not deal with the announcements made by the US Embassy."
Even more strange is the response of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) to the US Embassy's projects supporting the Palestinian community, institutions and individuals. PNGO said in a statement:
"The [US Embassy] announcement involves an awful lot of insolence and surprise, especially in light of what was announced by US President Donald trump on January 28 in the White House under the title of the political aspect of the Deal of the Century, which aims to liquidate the Palestinian issue, legitimate rights guaranteed under international laws, self-determination, and national independence...
"PNGO views this stark announcement as a continuation of the frank conformity in the positions of the American administration and the Israeli occupation government towards the Palestinian people, which reflects the true intentions of the American administration to replace the legitimate rights of Palestinians with alleged economic peace. With these moves, the American administration ignores the efforts of the institutions of the Palestinian society which were blackmailed through USAID projects and its known conditions."
The strange part is that Palestinian NGOs are usually the main beneficiaries of the US financial aid.
This time, however, PNGO called on Palestinians to boycott the US projects and said it would continue to work with other Palestinian institutions to thwart the projects proposed by the US.
Palestinians, in short, are saying that they refuse to accept funding by any party that does not accept their conditions and demands.
It is as if someone applies for a loan from a bank but demands that the bank accept his or her demands, and not the other way around. Usually, those who offer the money have the right to set the conditions.
For the Palestinians, it seems, the opposite is true. They seem to believe that they are the ones entitled to set conditions to those who are offering to improve their living needs and help them march towards prosperity and a better future for their children.
By rejecting the Trump plan even before it was published, Palestinian leaders may have missed not only a chance to end the conflict with Israel, but also to bring better times for their people.
That is what happens when leaders put themselves leagues ahead of the well-being of their citizens. Palestinian leaders know that their society is floundering in every possible way. Yet, rather than welcoming the proposed US programs, they are condemning the Americans and inciting their people against the US administration, for even making such a generous offer. This is precisely the disastrous dynamic that decades ago landed the Palestinian people in their quagmire, and it is precisely the same dynamic that keeps them trapped in that morass.
*Khaled Abu Toameh, an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem, is a Shillman Journalism Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
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Iran: the Masks of Jefferson and Attila
Amir Taheri/Asharq Al-Awsat/February 21/2020
Iranians are supposed to go to the polls on Friday to elect a new Islamic Consultative Assembly, an ersatz parliament designed to give an autocratic regime a pseudo-democratic varnish. At the same time, voters are invited to participate in by-elections to fill vacancies in the Assembly of Experts, a grouping of mullahs supposed to supervise the performance of the “Supreme Guide”.
We said “supposed to go the polls” because it is not at all clear how many of the 60 million eligible to vote would bother to take part in an exercise that many regard as insulting and futile. A number of polls, including some conducted by the government, predict a turnout-no higher than 50 percent. A Ministry of the Interior poll puts the number of those who intend to vote in Tehran at 24 percent.
Some Middle East experts often ask me why a regime like the one in control of Iran needs any election specially when candidates are pre-selected by the authorities and those elected won’t be declared winners without the final approval by the office of the “Supreme Guide”.
The reason is that, in its initial phase, the Islamic Revolution was, in fact, a classical bourgeois revolution reflecting typical middle class dreams of democracy, nationalism, socialism or even communism. With rare, and at times important, exceptions, the mass of Iranian workers and peasants took no part in anti-Shah demonstrations. The difficulty was that the leadership of the revolution had no intention of creating a Western-style society in which economically and socially Westernized Iranian middle classes would feel at home. One way to deceive them was to continue with a tradition of elections dating back to 1907.
For decades later, a new middle class has emerged, President Hassan Rouhani refers to it as “the well-off 30 percent”, people who are prepared to live a double life in which economic comfort, not to say prosperity, is combined with lack of political freedoms and restrictive social norms.
In this double life, the new middle class passes part of the year abroad, mostly in Western Europe and North America, where it can wear what it likes, eat what it likes and live like its Western counterparts.
I was astonished to learn from an Islamic Majlis study that over 3,000 high-ranking officials have permanent resident permits for the United States and Canada. For example, six out of the 31 provincial governors in the Islamic Republic commute between Canada and Iran on a regular basis. Thousands of the children of this new middle class attend Western universities, mostly in the US and Canada. The new middle class, including some senior mullahs and their families, also uses several specialized hospitals in Germany, Switzerland and Britain. In many cases, as soon as a passenger aircraft leaves the Iranian airspace, the ladies cast off their hijab and the men queue up to shave or at least trim their beards. They look like a troupe of actors capable of playing different roles in accordance with the script at hand and the venue of the show.
The new middle class has also built egg-nests outside Iran, for a rainy day when one might be forced to flee. Iranians have bought an astonishing 70,000 properties in Turkey alone. Georgia recently stopped the sale of property to Iranians and Oman has just imposed restrictions on Iranians buying real estate in the sultanate. In Western Europe and North America tens of thousands of former Islamic officials and their associates own property and substantial investment portfolios.
The new middle class also has a network of propagandists abroad, peddling the yarn that the Islamic Republic, in the words of Noam Chomsky, is a “people-based” regime, a little lamb defying the American big bad wolf.
Interestingly, the new Islamic middle class often cites Western “Infidel” authorities to support its world vision. Last Tuesday, “Supreme Guide” Ali Khamenei, addressing an election rally in Tehran, quoted former US President Jimmy Carter and Senator Bernie Sanders to back the claim that the US is about to implode because of widening class divisions, mass poverty and spiraling national debt. Hardly a day passes without the daily Kayhan, echoing Khamenei’s views, quoting unknown or little known “American scholars” and think-tanks praising the Islamic Republic and demanding that US cease opposing Tehran’s regional ambitions.
That a new regime creates a new middle class isn’t something limited to Iran. Serbian writer Milovan Djilas has a whole book on the new middle class created by the Communist regime in Yugoslavia. In Communist China the new middle class began to take shape in the 1970s. Han Suyn depicted that new stratum of the Chinese society, consisting of people who could wear Western clothes and munch chop-suey, an American invention, when abroad but could also march, waving Mao Zedong’s Red Book in Beijing. Today, you would be astonished by the number of Chinese Communist officials who have attended American universities and have their offspring treading the same path. You may be even more astonished to learn the volume of Chinese investments in Europe and North America.
There is, however, a big difference between the Islamic Republic’s new middle class and its counterparts in Titoist Yugoslavia or Communist China. In Yugoslavia and China no section of the new middle class pretended to have democratic aspirations. The “moderates-vs-hardliners” show that has plagued Iranian politics for decades did not exist in Yugoslavia or China.
The least bad outcome of today’s polling would be the end of the “moderate-hardliner” duet. Since there was no campaigning worthy of the name and no major political issues were discussed by the candidates it is impossible to know exactly who is who. But some observers predict a low turnout and claim that the overwhelming majority of candidates likely to be declared as winners belong to the faction led by Khamenei and backed by the security-military apparatus.
In other words, next Majlis will have fewer “half-pregnant” members, those who want to appear like Jeffersonian democrats but acting more savagely than Attila. I am not sure that such predictions would become reality. But I sure hope they will. A Majlis reflecting the reality of a corrupt, incompetent and brutal regime in full is less harmful than one designed to hide the nature of the Islamic Republic and promote forlorn hopes of moderation and reform.

The Limits of Relying on Disagreements Between Moscow, Ankara
Akram Bunni/Asharq Al-Awsat/February 21/2020
There has been a lot of talk about the dispute between Moscow and Ankara over influence in Syria. This talk stems from the clashes between factions aligned to each of the two sides and their contestation over the most important sites and facilities in rural Idlib and Aleppo, marking a new level of tension and escalation as Turkish military observation points were bombed by Syrian forces, probably with Russian support and cover, killing and wounding several Turkish soldiers.
Ankara retaliated by targeting a group of Syrian forces, killing and wounding dozens. The Syrian army and the Iranian militias’ successful takeover of dozens of villages and towns make matters more severe. This while Ankara hardened its rhetoric and dragged thousands of troops to protect its military sites in an attempt to pressure the regime and its allies and hinder their advances on land and try to change the scene in the last de-escalation zone.
The two sides indeed have divergent reasons for their involvement in Syria, but it is also true that they have strong shared interests that compel them to put an end to what is happening or limit it to the greatest extent possible.
Firstly, they are both classical pragmatists, opening the door to mutual readiness to make concessions and solidify an agreement, thus preventing things from going as far as they potentially could or towards a bone-breaking battle. This explains the two sides’ repeated statements on their commitment to the agreements made in Sochi and Astana, including noteworthy commitments to maintain coordination and expanding channels of communication and dialogue to avoid surprises and keep developments under control, especially that both of them are aware of the importance of each of them to the other and the major losses that they would incur if the contention were to escalate.
Just as Russia wants to avoid drowning in the swamp of an endless war, Ankara wants to avoid dragging itself into a wide-ranging battle with the regime that could lead to a losing confrontation with its two allies Russia and Iran, in light of an ambiguous American position which will most likely be limited, as usual, to verbal support.
Naturally, neither eliminating nor challenging the Kremlin's presence and role in Syria or the Levant, is a priority for the government in Ankara so long as it receives several forms of support and protection from it. Rather, what it has in mind is cooperating with Russia to curb Kurdish expansion and limit the Kurds’ abilities and the threat that they pose, find a solution to the growing Syrian refugee crisis and expand the influence it has managed to garner or at least maintain it.
It is also not in Russia’s interest to lose its alliance with Ankara so long as it can employ this alliance in its contest for influence with the West over points of tension all over the world. This does not mean that Russia is not working to curtail the agreement’s significance and use it to maximize its influence and control the region's balance of power; this includes using the agreement to threaten the regime in Damascus and shape its positions. Russia also wants to use the agreement to control what remained of the opposition and its armed factions, ensure a degree of favorability for itself among the Sunni Muslim majority and, most importantly, to curtail Iran’s ideological and military presence, which is growing further and further in Syrian society and its economic, security, and military infrastructure. Russia also wants to prepare for the possibility of the west playing a new role in Syria, compelled by the war’s developments on the ground and the possibility of progress on the reconstruction front.
Secondly, there’s the pair’s strong political agreements, which have accumulated over the years preceding Erdogan’s major shift towards Moscow, which began with his apology for downing the Russian Sukhoi jet-plane. This deepened their relationship and shared interests and made them interlinked and intertwined to such a degree that it is difficult to imagine either of them taking a position that is antagonistic to the other’s presence in the region or either of them being ready to cut off his relationship with the other.
This was strengthened further by the emergence of their mutual need for solidarity and cooperation in the face of western economic sanctions imposed on them and the agreement the pair laid down in Sochi and Astana. Before that, Turkish complicity allowed Russia and the regime's forces to control Aleppo and led to opposition militants being transferred from rural Damascus, Homs and Daraa to Idlib after the deals and reconciliations that were made there. Russia returned the favor by turning a blind eye to Turkish forces’ incursion in Afrin, then in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad, its purge and murder of Kurds. Subsequently, last October, Russia signed a deal with Turkey agreeing to the establishment of a safe zone in the region north and east of the Euphrates.
Third, what makes the idea of reaching a mutual understanding more appealing is the depth of the shared economic interests between the two countries. The size of commercial exchange between them in 2019 reached around 30 billion dollars, while the number of Russian tourists in Turkey reached around 6 million. These numbers are very important to the stability of the relationship and on the Turkish economy that is currently facing difficulties that make cutting ties with Russia unbearable. Their relationship was made even more stable after they cooperated in the construction project of a nuclear power plant and Turkish gas pipelines to transport Russian gas to Turkey and Europe.
One should therefore not rely on a new Turkish position in confronting Russian presence only because Erdogan's tone has become sharper and more threatening. Probably, the strength of their shared interests will push them to reach a new understanding, that will be as usual at the expense of Syrian blood, interests and the suffering of refugees. This may culminate in Ankara settling for the outcome of the last battles and framing it under the Sochi Agreement of 2018 on accepting the spread of regime forces supported by Russia between Damascus and Aleppo, and between the M4 and M5 to secure the two international routes from Aleppo and Lattakia.
In the end, regardless of the nature of the struggle over influence between Russia and Turkey in Syria, its horizons are limited, which means that it is necessary to be cautious of building and relying on it. What we have observed in the last few years has shown us time and time again the bitterness of this bet, and that it is nothing more than a waste of efforts and opportunities, and has confirmed the readiness of both sides to overcome any dispute between them and that they are more often than not in agreement, and that they now see that the severity of the damage that would result from their competition and the radical divergence in interests and goals that comes with it.

The Economic Hit from the Coronavirus is All in Your Mind
Daniel Moss/Bloomberg/February 21/2020
For all the stimulus measures that officials are rolling out to combat the economic impact of the coronavirus, lower interest rates and bigger budgets are unlikely to make people feel immune. And it's consumer behavior that will influence the magnitude of any hit. The gap between how people perceive the risk of becoming ill and the likelihood of actually contracting the virus can be vast, driven wider by feelings from past experiences, vivid images or simply fright.
A study by the Asian Development Bank, published in October, pins a lot of the economic damage from severe acute respiratory syndrome on psychology. At the height of the 2003 outbreak, 23 percent of respondents to a public-opinion survey in Hong Kong thought they were either very likely or somewhat likely to be infected. The number of cases wound up at 1,755, according to the World Health Organization, which would have been roughly 0.026 percent of the population. In Taipei, 74 percent rated the likelihood of death following contraction of Sars at four or five on a five-point scale compared with an actual mortality rate of 11 percent.
"Individuals, under prevailing circumstances of poor information and stress, can arrive at biased subjective assessments concerning the risk of disease contraction," Ilan Noy and Sharlan Shields of Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand wrote in the ADB paper. "This leads to panic and suboptimal decisions, which in turn result in an excessively high cost."
The setback from Sars was acute: China's gross domestic product growth slipped to 9.1 percent from 11.1 percent in the second quarter of 2003 while Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore all took a hit. The impact went beyond metrics such as lost working hours, mortality rates, treatment costs, consumer spending and aborted travel; there's the unquantifiable toll of generally avoiding social contact, too. Individual psychology also trickles up to affect companies. Investment and supply-chain decisions are governed by projections about demand during an epidemic and the recovery from it. Apple said on Tuesday that revenue will disappoint because component manufacturers are seeking to contain the virus, in addition to the effect on sales of store closures and reticent shoppers. A day earlier, Nintendo said it will struggle to get Switch consoles to US and European markets because of a production bottleneck stemming from the virus.
China's economy is more consequential than in 2003. Its citizens travel more widely and its companies are more intertwined in global capitalism. That restaurant visit forgone in Hong Kong may cost jobs in Hamburg. To limit the impact on growth, then, leaders need to think carefully about how to minimize our natural impulse to be afraid.
In Singapore, the government is urging citizens to carry on with life, taking extra precautions to stay healthy and avoid panic-buying. Officials have asked for public trust and, in return, have pledged to keep people informed. That's a far cry from Hong Kong, where businesses are on lockdown, schools are closed, basic amenities have been stripped from the shelves and public transportation is empty. We're a long way from knowing what the economic and psychological costs of the current epidemic will be, not to mention the number of lives lost. But if Singapore strikes the right tone, it may well become the model for crisis management.

Making sense of Turkey’s ever-changing foreign policy
Sinem Cengiz/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
In the 17th century, French philosopher Blaise Pascal included the following quote at the beginning of one of his books: “Vérité en-deçà des Pyrenées, erreur au-delà.” This translates as “There are truths on this side of the Pyrenees (the mountain range along the border between France and Spain) that are falsehoods on the other side.”
In other words, the quote — which was based on a statement by Michel de Montaigne, one of the most significant philosophers of the French Renaissance — is saying that what is good and right to some might be bad and wrong to the others.
When I listen to or read statements from the ruling and opposition parties in Turkey about the country’s foreign policy strategy, this famous quote comes to my mind; what is right for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is, indeed, wrong for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).
The wave of protests that began in Tunisia in 2010 created a knock-on effect in neighboring countries and resulted in the fall of regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya. And then there is Syria, which represents a massive challenge for the region and the world.
March 14 will mark the end of the ninth year of the Syrian conflict, which has resulted in the deaths of more than 380,000 people to date and displaced millions. It has also become AKP’s toughest test in its foreign and domestic policies, and a main focus of criticism by opposition parties against the government.
Last week, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu vowed to bring peace and stability to the Middle East by establishing a regional organization that would work to end the years of conflict in the area.
“We will establish the Organization for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East,” he said during a party meeting. “Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria will come together under this organization. It will say, ‘We don’t want proxy wars in our region. We will resolve our problems together.’”
Kilicdaroglu also strongly criticized the AKP government for damaging Turkey’s ties with neighboring countries and giving the major world powers room to expand their influence in the Middle East.
“This organization will manifest by saying, ‘We don’t want to be the tool of the major powers. We will build the peace through rational policies,’” he added.
This is not the first time the CHP leader has criticized the government or vowed to bring peace to the region under the motto “peace at home, peace in the world.” Nor is it the first time he has proposed the formation of such an organization. It is not a new idea. Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy was inaugurated by the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, whose policy for the region reached its zenith with the signing of a nonaggression agreement, known as Sadabad Pact, in 1937 between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Thus, the CHP proposal can trace its roots to this old regional agreement. Whether the CHP can bring peace to the region is not the question I want to consider in this article. The party’s recent criticisms have come at a time when Turkey is experiencing tough challenges in Idlib, and they coincided with statements by former AKP allies, including former President Abdullah Gul and former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, about the government’s foreign policy ideas.
Foreign policy has become one of the top priorities of all parties in Turkey. This is very much a result of the AKP era, a period in Turkish history during which domestic politics and foreign policy have been deeply intertwined. Turkey’s current foreign policy is not only determined by external factors, but often by internal circumstances as well. Domestic considerations therefore have significant foreign policy implications, and vice versa. Also, public opinion about foreign policy issues does play a crucial role in the foreign policy-making process.
According to the annual Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy survey by Kadir Has University in Istanbul, 42.1 percent of respondents believed that Turkey should pursue a hands-off policy in Syria and should not intervene, and only 13.3 percent said that Turkey should help refugees. When asked about Turkey’s current policy on refugees, 57.6 percent of those polled said the country should stop accepting them, while only 7 percent appeared happy about the Syrians already in Turkey.
Turkey hosts 3.6 million Syrians and the opposition parties criticize AKP refugee policies for creating a huge economic, social and security burden.
Turkey hosts 3.6 million Syrians and the opposition parties criticize AKP refugee policies for creating a huge economic, social and security burden.
AKP has been in power since 2002, so to accurately comment on its approach to foreign policy, which has significantly changed over that time, it is necessary to divide it into three eras. Between 2002 and 2010 the party espoused more pro-Western policies, promoting liberal policies to the Middle Eastern countries that enjoyed positive relations with Turkey.
With the start of the Arab uprisings in 2010, a second era began during which the government embraced policies that promoted political Islam. During an interview in 2015, former President Abdullah Gul argued that political Islam has collapsed in the region.
During the third era, beginning in 2015, Turkey embraced policies of hard power, particularly in Syria, rather than a soft power-only approach. All of these versions of foreign policy have attracted harsh criticisms.
Both the external circumstances that are increasing the pressures on Turkey and the domestic divisions within the country have played significant roles in shaping the current government’s foreign policy for almost two decades. While the opposition parties continue to criticize the government’s foreign policy, it seems to have entered a fourth era. It appears to be the toughest yet, as a result of the deteriorating situation on several fronts, including Idlib, Libya, Turkey’s relationships with the US and Russia, the refugee issue, and Cyprus.
*Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. Twitter: @SinemCngz

Macron’s Mideast diplomacy has its limits
Randa Takieddine/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
France’s desire to be an active player in the Middle East is generally welcomed in the region. With this in mind, French President Emmanuel Macron has been moving cautiously amid various crises in which those who violate international law — mainly Russia, Turkey, Iran and Israel — have an advantage on the ground. In Lebanon, Iran’s proxy Hezbollah is prevailing; in Syria and Libya, both Russia and Turkey are players; while in Palestine, Israel disregards international law in its dealing with the Palestinian people.
Nevertheless, in this Middle East quagmire, the French president keeps trying. When Macron called his Lebanese counterpart Michel Aoun just after the formation of the new Hassan Diab government, he told him that France will not let Lebanon down on condition that the new government implements drastic reforms needed to win support. It is typical for a French leader to feel a historical responsibility toward Lebanon, a country where Lebanese Christians, in particular, have looked to Paris for protection.
Macron, like his predecessors, tried at the outset of his leadership to do something for Lebanon. However, he is the only French leader who after almost three years of his term has still not visited the country as president because of the complexity of the situation there. Nevertheless, the French president has used all his political influence in Europe to stage the Cedre summit in Paris in April 2018, winning more than $11 billion in pledges to help Lebanon’s struggling economy.
The conference, which was attended by former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil (yesterday’s allies, today’s enemies), demanded drastic government reforms and more financial transparency. However, nothing was done since 2018 despite numerous French warnings to the Lebanese government. The popular uprising that began on Oct. 17 reflected the deep frustration of the Lebanese with its failed political class, its corruption and disregard of public needs.
After the uprising, Macron organized another meeting of the international support group for Lebanon. It was not an easy task since many countries and financial institutions doubt that Lebanon’s political leadership will implement the requested reforms.
Macron may not want to let Lebanon down — but he cannot save the country from financial collapse on his own. The Diab government is still debating whether to repay a Eurobond debt of $1.2 billion due in March. If Lebanon decides against paying, the French believe that Beirut can organize a default via an IMF program that will open the door to other financial institutions to help.
But Hezbollah does not want IMF help, and the pro-Iranian party has told France that an IMF program is like “financial colonialism.” The French believe that Lebanon has no alternative. A negotiated program with the IMF will be tough to implement, but will at least ensure strict transparency, which bothers Hezbollah whose underground economy and corruption will be left exposed. The offer to help Lebanon by Iran’s Ali Larijani during his recent visit to the country is an additional hurdle to any international or Gulf help to Lebanon.
France considers Turkey’s involvement in Libya a danger and fears a strengthening of Libyan institutions linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Recently Aoun told a French magazine: “France will not let us down.” But the Lebanese president neglected to say that France’s promise is conditional on reforms that the Lebanese who have so far failed to implement. Similar hopes are expressed by almost all in the international community. France can’t stop the Lebanese financial collapse on its own. It can help finance some Lebanese imports, but cannot step in to salvage Lebanon’s enormous debt. Macron has been actively trying to help Lebanon, but the Lebanese political class has failed to help itself.
In Syria, Macron’s priority is to stop the slaughter in Idlib and help displaced Syrians. But Idlib is now a Russian-Turkish problem. In Syria’s northeast, a Turkish offensive against the Kurds was carried out with Russian approval and support, while in the northwest, Turks are fighting a Syrian regime backed by the Russians. Macron tries hard to maintain a dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin over humanitarian assistance, but France knows Russia will support Assad’s reconquest of his country at any price.
In Libya, Macron wants a political solution to end the chaos. He was the first to push for a reconciliation between Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army, and the Tripoli government headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj. But Turkish interference in the war-torn country has destroyed all attempts at a cease-fire.
France considers Turkey’s involvement in Libya a danger and fears a strengthening of Libyan institutions linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
On the Israeli-Palestinian question, the French said diplomatically that they welcome US attempt to find a solution to the conflict, with Macron reconfirming his commitment to the two-state solution on the basis of international law. France’s weight on this conflict is limited by the historical US-Israeli alliance which has been made stronger by the Trump-Netanyahu “deal of the century.”
*Randa Takieddine is a Paris-based Lebanese journalist who headed Al-Hayat’s bureau in France for 30 years. She has covered France’s relations with the Middle East through the terms of four presidents.

Johnson bolsters power as foreign policy storm clouds gather
Andrew Hammond/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
Boris Johnson has postponed his planned trip to see Donald Trump from next week until the summer in the midst of UK-US policy spats ranging from Huawei to digital taxes. With Johnson fighting on several foreign fronts, including Brexit, he is therefore consolidating his power at home after December’s landmark election win.Indeed, the last week, which saw several big domestic policy announcements, has been the most important in UK politics since mid-December’s Conservative victory. And Johnson may now enjoy greater power today than any of his predecessors as prime minister since at least Margaret Thatcher, with his ambition being to occupy 10 Downing Street for much of the 2020s.
With the largest Tory majority in the House of Commons since Thatcher in the late 1980s, Johnson is likely to now be at the height of his powers. Unlike Tony Blair, for instance, there is no obvious big counterweight to him in government, like a Gordon Brown figure, so he dominates the political scene, for the immediate future at least. The latest step in Johnson’s consolidation of power came at the end of last week, when he produced a major ministerial reshuffle. This was billed as promoting the next generation of talent. However, it is no coincidence that the Cabinet ministers he sacked, including Business Secretary Andrea Leadsom and Northern Ireland Secretary Julian Smith, tended to be the ones who showed most independence. Moreover, the shock departure of Sajid Javid as chancellor came after he refused Johnson’s request to exert more control over him by firing all his special advisers. Javid is replaced as chancellor by another ex-banker, 39-year-old Rishi Sunak, who only entered the House of Commons in 2015 and, just a year ago, was the most junior minister in the Housing, Communities and Local Government Department.
Accompanying the changes in government personnel, the prime minister has begun to map out a multiyear governing agenda, including his “infrastructure revolution” aimed at “leveling up” the economy across England, with the Tories having won in December a significant number of previously longstanding Labour strongholds in the Midlands and North. This agenda includes the construction of a high-speed rail line from London to Birmingham, which could cost more than £100 billion, and ultimately be extended into Northern England.
Sunak’s first budget as chancellor is expected on March 11 and is likely to double down on the theme of the infrastructure revolution, with Johnson proposing the largest increase in day-to-day public spending in this Parliament, compared to the last one, in relative terms of any Tory prime minister since the late 1950s and early 1960s.
At the same time as Johnson is consolidating his power within the government, Shadow Brexit Secretary Keir Starmer has emerged as the early favorite to become the next Labour supremo and leader of the opposition, replacing Jeremy Corbyn. Starmer is seeking to play a “safety first” campaign and has made a series of key pledges to try to win support from the left of the party. On the economic front, he has proposed increases in income tax for the top 5 percent of earners, reversing the Tory cuts to corporation tax and clamping down on corporate tax avoidance, plus the nationalization of rail, mail, energy, and water. A standout foreign policy measure is his proposed introduction of a “Prevention of Military Intervention Act” to put “human rights at the heart of foreign policy,” while reviewing all UK arms sales to make the nation “a force for international peace and justice.” In terms of devolution from Whitehall, he wants regional investment banks and stronger control over regional industrial strategy. He also favors abolishing the House of Lords and creating an elected chamber of regions and nations.
It is no coincidence that the Cabinet ministers he sacked tended to be the ones who showed most independence. However, while Starmer is the early favorite, he is by no means guaranteed success in the face of challenges from Corbyn’s preferred successor, Rebecca Long-Bailey, and the “wild card” contender Lisa Nandy, who is the only candidate not in the shadow Cabinet. The election will not be decided until April, meaning that much of Labour’s attention will be focused internally for several weeks to come.
While Johnson consolidates power at home, it is not just the relationship with the US where storm clouds are gathering. Negotiations, for instance, will commence next month on a potential EU-UK trade deal. However, the 10-month period from March to December is not likely to be nearly long enough to agree more than what chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier has called a “bare bones” agreement. Yet few in London or Brussels have so far talked openly about the need for a transition extension, threatening a new Brexit crisis by the summer, at which time the two sides will need to decide if the transition period will be extended into 2021.This underlines that problems are brewing for the prime minister on the foreign policy front that could yet see his agenda stymied. While he seems politically impregnable for now, his good fortune will not last indefinitely.
*Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.

Iranians’ desire for true democracy should be supported
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh/Arab News/February 21/ 2020
So-called parliamentary elections will be held in Iran on Friday for the 290 seats of the country’s “Islamic Consultative Assembly.” Given the recent popular protests and uprisings, as well as the mounting crises the regime is facing, this year’s election is different and could be a prelude to greater changes, including the downfall of the regime itself.
Democratic and free elections do not exist in Iran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council that he controls hand-pick the candidates on the basis of their “heartfelt” and “practical” allegiance. All prospective candidates have to go through a rigid security and intelligence screening process to ensure they are adherents of the regime.
Four institutions are charged with approving the candidates: The Ministry of Interior, state security forces, the local branch of the judiciary, and the Ministry of Intelligence. These bodies examine every aspect of each individual’s background to ensure there are no links to banned opposition groups, for example.
The names of successful candidates are then submitted to the Guardian Council, which consists of 12 members: Six mullahs appointed by Khamenei and six jurists nominated by the head of the judiciary, who himself is directly appointed by and reports to the ayatollah.
The Majlis elections are seen as a barometer of the balance of power between vying factions in the regime’s internal structure. Although it has mainly financial motivations, the rivalry is often portrayed in Western media as a struggle of policy ideas between “moderates” and “hard-liners.” This narrative benefits Khamenei, who banks on the West’s appeasement and has amassed all sorts of concessions throughout the three decades he has been at the helm.
Both factions, the so-called moderates and the hard-liners, are equally committed to the regime’s survival. Both endorse human rights violations and the repression of protests, and support the Assad dictatorship in Syria and the Iranian-backed terrorist proxies and militia groups in the region.
Still, this year, Khamenei has decided to prevent the moderate faction’s members from controlling the assembly. Why?
The Iranian regime is facing unprecedented challenges. At home, major uprisings have shaken the mullahs’ dictatorship to its foundations, and the economy is in freefall. Regionally, Tehran lost Qassem Soleimani, their terror master and top general who was in charge of executing Khamenei’s regional plans, while protests continue in Iraq and Lebanon against the Iranian regime’s malign conduct and meddling.
And internationally, the West’s policy of appeasement has received some devastating blows. The regime is now being more firmly held to account for its destructive behavior, although additional steps need to be taken, including the referral of its human rights record to the UN Security Council.
The growing activities of the democratic opposition, particularly the “resistance units” of the main organized opposition movement, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), can be added to this potent mix. Young people are increasingly joining their ranks and hoping to topple the regime. Maryam Rajavi, the NCRI’s president-elect, has called for a wholesale boycott of the elections. She said the purge of the moderate faction’s candidates is a clear sign of the rulers’ retrenchment in the face of surging protests.
There is a growing campaign inside and outside Iran that is calling for the boycott of the so-called elections. In addition to posting on social media platforms, activists are spraying graffiti on walls and distributing pamphlets with slogans such as “My vote is the regime’s overthrow.”
The situation is so horrendous for the weakened regime that it cannot tolerate even the slightest degree of internal dissent. So Khamenei has embarked on a campaign to close ranks and unite his forces against the people. Ironically, to do that, he needs at least a veneer of the people's participation in his sham elections. But they know better than that. Even a semi-official poll indicated that 82 percent of respondents planned to boycott the elections. The regime panicked and removed the poll.
Young people are increasingly joining the opposition’s ranks and hoping to topple the regime.
The Iranian theocracy has reached its end. It is only a matter of time before the people overthrow the regime and establish freedom and democracy in Iran.
By chanting “Death to the oppressor, be it Shah or the Supreme Leader,” and “No to crown, no to turban, the mullahs’ time is over,” the people of Iran have demonstrated that they do not look to the past, but to the future. They are demanding a free republic based on the separation of religion and state, gender equality, and an end to all religious and ethnic discrimination.
It is time for the world to recognize the right of the Iranian people to regime change and to side with them and their true democratic aspirations.
*Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman and president of the International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh
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