English LCCC Newsbulletin For Lebanese, Lebanese Related, Global News & Editorials
For August 26/2020
Compiled & Prepared by: Elias Bejjani

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http://data.eliasbejjaninews.com/eliasnews19/english.august26.20.htm

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Bible Quotations For today
Who exalt themselves will be humbled, and those who humble themselves will be exalted
Luke 14/07-11/”When he noticed how the guests chose the places of honour, he told them a parable. ‘When you are invited by someone to a wedding banquet, do not sit down at the place of honour, in case someone more distinguished than you has been invited by your host; and the host who invited both of you may come and say to you, “Give this person your place”, and then in disgrace you would start to take the lowest place. But when you are invited, go and sit down at the lowest place, so that when your host comes, he may say to you, “Friend, move up higher”; then you will be honoured in the presence of all who sit at the table with you. For all who exalt themselves will be humbled, and those who humble themselves will be exalted.’

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on August 25-26/2020

Lebanon Sees Record Number of Daily COVID-19 Deaths
Lebanon Rejects Israeli Call for Modifying UNIFIL Mission
Lebanon explosion no pretext to avoid change, says France’s Le Drian
A More Forceful France?/Ghida Tayar/Carnegie MEC/August 25/2020
Salameh Says BDL May Stop Supporting Basic Subsidies
Lebanon Service Sector Says Will Rebel against Lockdown
Arrest Warrants Issued for 3 Port Employees after Interrogation
British Foreign Secretary: Hizbullah Poses Threat to Lebanon's Security
Report: Aoun Likely to Call for Govt. Consultations this Week
Qatari Minister Affirms No Qatari Deposit for Lebanon, Only Aid and Support
Fahmi Warns Businesses against Defying Lockdown
Hariri Says Doesn't Want to Return as Premier
Strong Lebanon Bloc Says Govt. Program Has Top Priority
President Aoun discusses ‘Francophonie of Tomorrow’ project with his personal representative to the organization
Aoun meets Qatari Foreign Minister: Lebanon welcomes any assistance which Qatar can provide in rebuilding damaged neighborhoods
Berri meets Qatari Foreign Minister, Lebanon’s Ambassador to Vatican
Geagea welcomes Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jumblatt reviews political developments with Egyptian ambassador
Jumblatt receives Qatari Foreign Minister
Hariri receives Qatari Foreign Minister
Diab chairs meeting dedicated to supporting commodities
Hariri: Renewed international interest in Lebanon represents an opportunity not to be missed and I am not a candidate
UNICEF delivers critical supplies to support children and families affected by Beirut explosions
Suicide Bomber Revives Fears of Terrorist Sleeper Cells in Lebanon
Beirut Blast: News Series of Arrests, Judicial Investigator Meets FBI Team
Riad Salameh: In Lebanon, depositors’ money is still available/Randa Takieddine/Arab News/August 25/2020
Lebanon’s new start needs to be locally led/Javier Solana/Arab News/August 25/2020
In fifteen years between Hariri’s assassination and the Beirut explosion what did we learn?/Dr Amira Abo el-Fetouh/Middle East Monitor/August 25, 2020
Making Sense Of The Next Round Of Turmoil In Iraq And Lebanon/Alberto M. Fernandez/MEMRI Daily Brief /August 25/2020 |
The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy (AMCD) Praises Trump Administration's Historic Peace Deal between Israel and the UAE
Weeks after blast, Lebanon patronage system immune to reform/Samya Kullab/AP/August 25/2020
It's time for Europe to follow Germany's lead and ban Hezbollah/Jerusalem Post Editorial/August 25/2020
City of Beginnings: Poetic Modernism in Beirut/Robyn Creswell/Reviewed by Franck Salameh
Syrians Lose Children, Homes and Jobs in Beirut Blast/Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 25/2020

Titles For The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 25-26/2020

Iran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad call for 'uprising' after UAE-Israel deal
Iran, IAEA Chief Say Talks in Tehran Were 'Constructive'
Canada Demands Answers from Iran over Ukraine Jet
Russia Says Armored Vehicle Attacked during Patrol in Syria
Sudan PM Says Talked With Pompeo About Removal From Terror List
Tehran Seeks Strategic Dialogue With Baghdad
Parachutist Makes World's First Jump from Solar-Powered Plane
Israel Bombs Gaza Militants in Response to Fire Balloons
Turkish-Greek gas row boils up as each plan rival exercises in E. Mediterranean
US blasts Turkey’s Erdogan for meeting with Hamas leaders

Titles For The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 25-26/2020

Iraq government must choose between US and Iran — its people already have/Michael Pregent/Arab News/August 25/2020
Will the Israel-UAE deal be a catalyst for peace?/Yossi Mekelberg/Arab News/August 25/2020
Arabs and Muslims to Turkey's Erdogan: "Why Don't You Protest Against Yourself?"/Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/August 25/2020
Are Turkey and Greece Heading for War?/Uzay Bulut/Gatestone Institute/August 25/2020
United Nations not thrilled about Middle Eastern nations uniting/David May/FDD/August 25/2020
Will We Ever Handshake Again?/New York- Alex Williams/Asharq Al Awsat/August 25/2020
Report Implicates Iran in 2011 Attacks on US Consulate in Benghazi/Hiba al-Qudsi/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Is the Lockdown Making You Depressed, or Are You Just Bored?/Richard A. Friedman/The New York Times/August 25/2020
Boris Johnson's Toxic Inheritance From Margaret Thatcher/Martin Ivens/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Biden’s Loose Lips Could Sink His Chances/Bret Stephens/The New York Times/August, 25/2020
The Greater Middle East: From the “Arab Spring” to the “Axis of Failed States”/Anthony H. Cordesman/Centre For Strategic & International Studies /CSIS)/August 24/2020

The Latest English LCCC Lebanese & Lebanese Related News & Editorials published on August 25-26/2020

Lebanon Sees Record Number of Daily COVID-19 Deaths
Naharnet/August 25/2020
Lebanon on Tuesday announced twelve COVID-19 deaths, the highest daily toll so far for the small country since the first infection was detected on February 21. In its daily statement, the Health Ministry said 532 virus cases were confirmed over the past 24 hours -- 525 among residents and only seven among people coming from abroad. The new cases raise the overall tally to 13,687 while the fatalities take the death toll to 138. The country has meanwhile recorded 3,815 recoveries. Thirteen of the cases announced on Tuesday were recorded among health workers. Hospitals meanwhile admitted 266 patients into coronavirus sections over the past 24 hours, including 75 into intensive care units. According to the Health Ministry statement, 8,557 PCR tests were carried out over the past 24 hours, among them 1,134 at Beirut airport. Eighty-four of the new cases were recorded in Beirut, 48 in Baabda district, 47 in Tripoli, 46 in Northern Metn, 43 in Aley district, 24 in Keserwan and 20 in Chouf.

Lebanon Rejects Israeli Call for Modifying UNIFIL Mission
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 25/2020
Lebanon Tuesday rejected an Israeli call to change the missions of a U.N. peacekeeping force patrolling the Lebanese-Israeli border before a U.N. Security Council vote to renew its mandate. Lebanon and Israel are still technically at war, and the United Nations force, UNIFIL, is tasked with monitoring a ceasefire between the two sides. Lebanon's caretaker Foreign Minister Charbel Wehbe separately received the ambassadors of the council's five permanent members ahead of Friday's vote, Lebanon's National News Agency said. He handed them a memorandum stressing that "Lebanon is attached to renewing (the mission of) UNIFIL, without modifying its mandate or its numbers," it added. Hizbullah has also rejected any change to the nature of the force's mission. Set up in 1978, UNIFIL was beefed up after a devastating month-long war in 2006 between Israel and Hizbullah. Israel accuses UNIFIL, whose latest mandate expires at the end of August, of not being active enough against Hizbullah. It accuses the group of stockpiling weapons at the border, and is pushing for the U.N. force to be allowed to inspect private property. U.N. chief Antonio Guterres in June called for an improved surveillance capacity for the force, including thermal-imaging cameras, hi-tech binoculars and drones. The U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Kelly Craft, in May called for the Security Council to empower UNIFIL or alter its staffing and resources to better fulfill its mandate. Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah later the same month rejected any change to the nature of the peacekeeping mission, and lashed out at U.S. pressure over the issue.
 

Lebanon explosion no pretext to avoid change, says France’s Le Drian
Reuters/August 25/2020
Le Drian said Emmanuel Macron would soon return to Beirut to reiterate a message that Lebanese officials should not shirk their responsibilities and press ahead with vital reforms PARIS: Lebanon’s leaders should not use the explosion that destroyed parts of Beirut earlier this month as an excuse to hide the reality that the country was on the edge of a precipice, France’s foreign minister said on Tuesday.Speaking in Marseille before a cargo of 2,500 tons of aid headed for Lebanon, Jean-Yves Le Drian said French President Emmanuel Macron would soon return to Beirut to reiterate a message that Lebanese officials should not shirk their responsibilities and press ahead with vital reforms.

A More Forceful France?
Ghida Tayar/Carnegie MEC/August 25/2020
https://youtu.be/65dq2vwwMYE

In an interview, Joseph Bahout discusses French policy toward the Levant and Mediterranean, and what we should watch for.
Joseph Bahout is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program. He is also the incoming director of the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut (AUB), where he is also an associate professor of political science. Until 2019, Bahout taught Middle Eastern politics at Sciences-Po in Paris, where he was an associate professor. He worked as a permanent consultant for the policy panning unit of the French Foreign Ministry from 2008 until 2014, and again from 2018 until 2020. There, he was in charge of the Levant as well as U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Bahout was also a consultant on the Middle East in the presidential campaign of Emmanuel Macron. Diwan interviewed Bahout in late August to discuss French policy toward the Levant and the Mediterranean, particularly following Macron’s visit to Lebanon in the aftermath of the devastating explosion in Beirut Port on August 4.

Salameh Says BDL May Stop Supporting Basic Subsidies
Associated Press/Naharnet/August 25/2020
Lebanon's central bank governor warned in an interview published Tuesday that the bank cannot continue using its foreign currency reserves to finance trade, signaling he may soon be unable to sustain subsidies on basic goods. In an interview with the French edition of the Saudi-owned Arab News, Riad Salameh said the central bank "is not the state" and cannot be blamed for everything. "We have laid out the situation well in advance. Let those in charge take the necessary measures," he said in the interview. Salameh said once the bank reaches the minimum threshold of these reserves, it will be forced to stop funding subsidies. The bank is believed to have around $18 billion in foreign currency reserves -- down from $20 billion in April -- which it has been using to support basic imports of fuel, wheat and medicine at a stable price after the currency collapse. Reports have suggested Salameh informed the government it would need to stop this support when reserves reach $17.5 billion. Salameh, who has held the post since 1993, has come under scathing criticism by many who hold him -- along with the country's ruling class -- responsible for Lebanon's severe financial crisis and collapse of the national currency which started late last year. The currency has lost about 70% of its value on the black market since the beginning of the year, with the rapid devaluation fueling inflation and plunging tens of thousands of people into unemployment and poverty. Salameh has deflected blame and said he did what he had to do to maintain Lebanon's monetary stability in the face of various crises over the past years. He blames politicians for reneging on repeated promises of reform. The government has resigned in the wake of the Aug. 4 catastrophic explosion at Beirut port that killed and wounded thousands of people and caused widespread damage to the facility and parts of the capital estimated to be between $10-$15 billion.

Lebanon Service Sector Says Will Rebel against Lockdown
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 25/2020
A representative of Lebanon's hospitality sector said on Tuesday that service and tourism businesses would defy a newly reinstated coronavirus lockdown that has compounded the blast-hit country's economic woes. "From tomorrow, we will open our doors," said Tony Ramy, head of the syndicate of owners of restaurants, cafes, nightclubs and pastry shops. "The arbitrary and demagogic decision to close down, whether partially or fully, does not concern us anymore," he said in a televised statement from a Beirut street heavily affected by the August 4 explosion. An AFP photographer said dozens of people gathered in support of the announcement, some holding signs that read "Tourism is the pulse of Lebanon" and "For us, the state vanished with the blast." The declaration, made on behalf of a wider tourism body also representing hotels and seaside resorts, came four days after authorities imposed a two-week coronavirus lockdown to stem a string of record daily infections. Lebanon has registered 13,155 novel coronavirus cases, including 126 deaths. Under the latest rules, malls, nightclubs, gyms, swimming pools, restaurants and coffee shops have been ordered to close. Restaurants, coffee shops and pastry shops can deliver and offer takeaway services, but with a night-time curfew in place, are only allowed to operate between 6 am and 6 pm (0300 GMT to 1500 GMT). Ramy blamed the government for the devastating explosion at Beirut's port and the huge losses it has caused the tourism industry, which he estimated at around $1 billion, of which $315 million for restaurants alone. He called on the sector to engage in "civil disobedience" against the state by severing commercial ties with the government and depriving it of tax money. "We will not pay a single penny until we have a new state," he said. The coronavirus-related restrictions have dealt a fresh blow to a private sector already reeling from a series of crises. Even before the explosion of a huge stockpile of ammonium nitrate at the port that killed more than 180 people, Lebanon was grappling with its worst economic downturn in decades. Poverty rates have doubled to more than half of the population, according to U.N. estimates, and tens of thousands of people have lost their jobs or a large part of their income as a result of the crisis. The Beirut traders' association this week also said businesses wanted to re-open from Wednesday. Authorities fear Lebanon's fragile health sector would struggle to cope with a further spike in novel coronavirus cases, especially after some hospitals near the port were damaged or taken out of commission in the explosion. Caretaker Health Minister Hamad Hassan warned this month that hospitals were reaching maximum capacity to treat coronavirus patients after the blast overwhelmed clinics and triggered a spike in COVID-19 cases.

Arrest Warrants Issued for 3 Port Employees after Interrogation
Naharnet/August 25/2020
Judicial investigator into the Beirut port blast Judge Fadi Sawwan on Tuesday interrogated three port employees and issued arrest warrants for them, which raises the number of those held according to judicial warrants to 12 detainees.
The National News Agency identified the three employees as Mustafa Farshoukh, Michel Nahoul and Wajdi Qarqafi. Sawwan had on Monday questioned former Customs chief Shafiq Merhi, the contractor Youssef Chebli and port employee Mikhail Murr before issuing arrest warrants for them. Chebli is the contractor of the welding works that were carried out at the port’s Hangar 12 shortly before the catastrophic explosion which killed around 200 people, wounded around 6,000 and devastated swathes of Beirut. Around 2,700 tons of the highly volatile ammonium nitrate substance had been left languishing at the hangar unsecured for nearly seven years.

British Foreign Secretary: Hizbullah Poses Threat to Lebanon's Security
Naharnet/August 25/2020
British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said on Tuesday that “Hizbullah poses a threat to security in Lebanon,” pointing out that the region is in need of several peace treaties. Raab said in a joint press conference with his Israeli counterpart during a visit to Jerusalem that “Hizbullah poses a threat to security in Lebanon and Iran poses a threat to the region because of its nuclear program and the arms that support it,” according to Sky News Arabia. The British Foreign Secretary indicated that the region needs several peace treaties, and declared his welcome to the peace treaty between the UAE and Israel. Raab arrived Monday evening in Jerusalem, where he met with Pompeo. He also met Netanyahu and is set o go to Ramallah to talk to Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas.

Report: Aoun Likely to Call for Govt. Consultations this Week
Naharnet/August 25/2020
President Michel Aoun will likely call this week for binding parliamentary consultations to choose a new premier, amid same old divisions between political parties on the candidate despite the country’s multiple crises necessitating swift action. Al-Joumhouria daily on Tuesday quoted “well-informed” sources as saying that "in the coming hours" Aoun will call the parliamentary blocs for consultations to choose a premier this week. “The president is preparing for this step because several parliamentary blocs have expressed reluctance to name a premier to be assigned and tasked with the formation of a new government,” said the sources.They said that Speaker Nabih Berri was the only one to frankly declare support for ex-PM Saad Hariri for the post, while other parliamentary blocs preferred not to name any candidate until the date of consultations is set. In addition to leading candidates for the PM post Saad Hariri and Nawaf Salam, ex-minister Khaled Qabbani emerged over the past hours as a potential nominee. The Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement are opposed to Hariri’s return as premier to lead the new government. MTV reporter said that PSP leader ex-MP Walid Jumblat had met with Hariri a day earlier, and that Jumblat had expressed concern for Hariri not to lead a new government under the mandate of Aoun. Hizbullah and the AMAL Movement are pushing for his return. Hariri himself has declared that he did not want to be prime minister of a new government.

Qatari Minister Affirms No Qatari Deposit for Lebanon, Only Aid and Support
Naharnet/August 25/2020
Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani reiterated solidarity with the Lebanese people and affirmed continued support after the devastating Beirut blast, but noted that Qatar did not vow to deposit any funds at Lebanese banks. The devastating port “blast in Beirut and the lives lost was a serious shock,” said al-Thani, affirming Qatar’s "firm position to support efforts aiming to steer Lebanon out of this crisis,” he told reporters from Baabda Palace where he met President Michel Aoun leading a Qatari delegation. To a reporter’s question whether Qatar intends to deposit funds in Lebanese banks, he clarified saying that “Qatar did not mention anything about a deposit. The issue was mainly about providing support. We seek to have investment projects that support the economy and benefit the two peoples.”However the Minister stated: “We are about to finish a study for rebuilding damaged schools. We have visions that will be discussed with the government to steer out of the economic crisis. No doubt that work on political stability and reforms away from any external pressure is needed,” he added. The Minister voiced hopes that Lebanon’s officials embark on solving the government formation problem “internally” and for the government to prioritize the demands of its people. He later held talks with ex-PM Saad Hariri and Progressive Socialist Party chief Walid Jumblat before inspecting the damage at the blast-hit Beirut port.

Fahmi Warns Businesses against Defying Lockdown
Naharnet/August 25/2020
Caretaker Interior Minister Mohammed Fahmi on Tuesday warned that any private businesses and institutions that defy the coronavirus lockdown would face fines and judicial prosecution. “The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities warns that it will not be lenient in enforcing the law against the violators,” Fahmi said in a statement, noting that “the issue is related to public safety and the health of all citizens amid the alarming increase in the number of pandemic cases and deaths.” A representative of Lebanon's hospitality sector said earlier on Tuesday that service and tourism businesses would defy the newly reinstated coronavirus lockdown that has compounded the blast-hit country's economic woes. "From tomorrow, we will open our doors," said Tony Ramy, head of the syndicate of owners of restaurants, cafes, nightclubs and pastry shops. "The arbitrary and demagogic decision to close down, whether partially or fully, does not concern us anymore," he said in a televised statement from a Beirut street heavily affected by the August 4 explosion. An AFP photographer said dozens of people gathered in support of the announcement, some holding signs that read "Tourism is the pulse of Lebanon" and "For us, the state vanished with the blast." The declaration, made on behalf of a wider tourism body also representing hotels and seaside resorts, came four days after authorities imposed a two-week coronavirus lockdown to stem a string of record daily infections.

Hariri Says Doesn't Want to Return as Premier
Naharnet/August 25/2020
Ex-PM Saad Hariri declared Tuesday that he is not a candidate for the PM post and called on all political forces to withdraw his name from any deliberations in this regard. Hariri issued his statement following separate talks with Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani and Lebanese General Security chief Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim. Below is the full text of an English-language statement distributed by Hariri’s press office: “I had committed not to take a political position before the pronouncement of the judgment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the assassination of the martyr Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and before having completed contacts with friendly countries, the international community and Lebanese political forces regarding the initiative that President Emmanuel Macron presented during his recent visit to Lebanon. In reality, I consider that the renewed international interest in our country, and especially the initiative of President Macron and the visits of a certain number of international and Arab officials, represent an opportunity which could be the last and cannot be failed, to rebuild our beloved capital Beirut, and to achieve a series of reforms that the Lebanese have demanded and that we have been trying to implement for many years. This is an opportunity to break the economic and financial isolation that Lebanon suffers from, with external resources that would first allow to stop the frightening collapse and then gradually shift to resuming growth.
With my sincere thanks to all those who proposed my name as a candidate to form a government that would undertake this national task, that is noble and difficult at the same time, I noticed, like all other Lebanese, that certain political forces are still in a state of severe denial of the reality of Lebanon and the Lebanese, and only see this as a new opportunity for blackmail, with the sole aim of keeping small power gains or even realizing personal dreams of later power. Unfortunately, it is a blackmail that goes beyond their political partners, to become a blackmail of the entire country, of the renewed international attention and of the livelihood and dignity of the Lebanese. Therefore, based on my firm belief that the most important thing at this point is to preserve the opportunity for Lebanon and the Lebanese to rebuild their capital and implement the well-known reforms that are long overdue, and to pave the way for the commitment of friends of the international community to help face the crisis and then invest in the return of growth, I declare that I am not a candidate to head the new government and I call on everyone to withdraw my name from the deliberations in this regard.‎ The only starting point is for the President of the Republic to respect the constitution and immediately call for binding parliamentary consultations in accordance with Article 53, and that the heresy of composing the government before designating the Prime Minister ceases once and for all. Of course, with the Future parliamentary bloc, and in the parliamentary consultations that the constitution imposes without delay and that the Lebanese are impatiently awaiting, we will name the candidate that we consider competent and capable of forming a government guaranteeing the success of this unique and last opportunity for our country. We will also bet that this government is capable in form and substance of carrying out this mission, so that we cooperate with it in Parliament in order to carry out the reconstruction of Beirut, implement the necessary reforms and pave the way for our friends of the international community to support Lebanon at the humanitarian, economic, financial and investment levels.”

Strong Lebanon Bloc Says Govt. Program Has Top Priority
Naharnet/August 25/2020
The Free Patriotic Movement-led Strong Lebanon bloc on Tuesday stressed that the new government’s program should have the top priority in the formation process. “The bloc considers that the the top priority is for the formation of a reformist, productive and active government that would commit to the reform program whose points have become known to all domestic and foreign parties,” the bloc said in a statement issued after its weekly meeting. “This program is the goal and the government is the means to implement it, and nothing is more important than this goal in the details related to the formation process,” the bloc added. “The bloc assures all Lebanese that it does not have conditions and that it is doing everything in its capacity to facilitate the formation of the government, regardless whether or not it takes part in it,” Strong Lebanon said. “In any case, it will participate in the reform process through parliament,” the bloc went on to say. It also described the French initiative and the renewed international interest in Lebanon as “a chance for Lebanon’s assistance.” “The Lebanese must meet that through common efforts and open dialogue without complexes and they should give up selfishness and political interests in order to find the necessary agreements for the formation of the government and for committing to its reform program,” Strong Lebanon added.

President Aoun discusses ‘Francophonie of Tomorrow’ project with his personal representative to the organization
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
President Michel Aoun met his personal representative to the International Francophonie Organization, Professor Jarjoura Hardan, Chairman of the French Literature Department at Saint Jospeh University in Beirut, Professor Karl Akiki, and Ambassador of the "Francophonie of Tomorrow" project in Lebanon for the Organization, Ms. Valerie Zgheib, today at Baabda Palace. During the meeting, the summary of the project, its results and the demands of the French-speaking youth were deliberated, in addition to the visit of the Secretary-General of the Organization in early September, to support Lebanon and announce the "Urgent Francophonie project to support teachers and students in teaching and learning the French language by digital means". ------Presidency Press Office

Aoun meets Qatari Foreign Minister: Lebanon welcomes any assistance which Qatar can provide in rebuilding damaged neighborhoods
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
President of the Republic, General Michel Aoun expressed Lebanon’s gratitude for the State of Qatar for standing by Lebanon’s side in the ordeal that befell after the Beirut Port explosion, indicating that this position is not strange from the state of Qatar and its Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, who stressed on all occasions that he is with Lebanon and its people in all circumstances, latest of which is his personal participation in the international conference, called for by French President Emmanuel Macron, which was devoted to supporting Lebanon and the Lebanese.
President Aoun’s stances came while receiving the Deputy Prime Minister, and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdul Rahman Al-Thani on the head of a delegation, who conveyed to the President the condolences of the Qatari Emir for the victims of the explosion which took place at Beirut Port, and his wished for a fast recovery for the injured. The Qatari Minister expressed his country’s support for Lebanon and its solidarity with the Lebanese in these difficult circumstances, indicating that the relations between the Qatari and Lebanese peoples are brotherly, and it is natural that the Qataris stand by their Lebanese brothers. The Qatari Foreign Minister also pointed out that his visit indicated the importance of what links the two brotherly countries, and asserted that Qatar will help Lebanon to overcome this ordeal, contribute to raising the damage and meet the urgent needs of the affected families in light of the plan devised to support Lebanon and its people, revealing the existence of a short-term plan to deal with immediate damages and long term ones.
President Aoun responded thanking the Emir, Government and Qatari people for sending immediate aid via an air bridge that included a search and rescue team. The President expressed his appreciation for Qatar granting the Lebanese residents the priority for an exceptional entry permit, and presented the damages of the Beirut Port, the vital artery of the Lebanese economy, from residential buildings and offices, not to mention the ancient buildings that were destroyed. President Aoun then welcomed any assistance that Qatar can provide in the field of rebuilding the damaged neighborhoods.
On the Qatari side, the meeting was attended by: Chief of State Security Agency, Abdullah Mohammed Al-Khulaifi, Qatari Ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammed Bin Hassan Jaber Al-Jaber, Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Minister, Saad Bin Ali Al-Kharji, Mr. Hamad Al-Koubaissi and Mr. Abdullah Al-Sulaiti.
On the Lebanese side: Former Minister, Salim Jreisatti, Director General of the Presidency, Dr. Antoine Choucair, Director General of General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, and advisors: Brigadier General, Paul Matar, Mr. Rafic Chelala, Engineer Antoine Saeed, and Engineer Ibrahim Berbery.
Statement of the Qatari Foreign Minister:
“Our visit comes today while the brotherly Lebanon is in a critical situation. I have to come to convey the condolences of the Emir of the State of Qatar and the Qatari people to the families of the victims of this explosion and this great event that shook us all. We wish for the fast recovery for all the injured and those affected, so that things will return back to normal, God willing. We affirm the solidarity of the state of Qatar, the Government and the people, with the brotherly Lebanese people.
What happened in Beirut shocked us in the depths, especially facing human losses, the loss of life, and the humanitarian and economic effects that this explosion caused, amidst various crises before it. Qatar has a firm stance towards solidarity with the Lebanese, and that is why it sought to be among the first to come to Lebanon to support the efforts to emerge from this crisis, by sending rescue teams, field hospitals and assistance that could contribute to relieving the brotherly Lebanese people.
The directives of his Highness the Emir, are clear to study the projects affected by this explosion. We are about to complete the study of rebuilding public schools in partnership with UNICEF, and rehabilitating some damaged hospitals. There was of course a plan by the State of Qatar before this event to consider the possibility of helping our brothers the Lebanese to overcome the economic crisis. We have concepts that will be discussed with the Lebanese Government. There is no doubt that there is a need for political and social stability in Lebanon in order to support the reform process, and we look to all political and social forces in Lebanon to place the interest of the Lebanese at the core of these reforms, so that these reforms stem from the needs of the Lebanese people, away from all external pressures.
I am happy to be in Lebanon today among our Lebanese friends, and we look forward to the meetings that will follow the meeting of His Excellency President Aoun, to discuss the ways of cooperation between the two countries”.
Questions & Answers:
Question: Is there a Qatari deposit, as it was said?
Answer: “There was no official statement from the State of Qatar that there will be a deposit for Lebanon. There were talks about how to support Lebanon to emerge from the economic crisis, and it is certain that this support requires cooperation from all parties in the field of legislation necessary for it, and we are still in the framework of the talks. However, the explosion that occurred delayed these talks, and we look forward to resuming them once stability is achieved”.
Question: What kind of aid will you provide to Lebanon?
Answer: “The program is not yet defined in detail, but the State of Qatar, within the framework of its economic programs, always seeks to have investment projects that support the economy, especially in the areas required by the Lebanese economy and benefit the two peoples, and it is important that they tackle the basic needs of the Lebanese people”.
Question: Will Qatar play a role in solving the political crisis in Lebanon?
Answer: “We hope that the political crisis between the Lebanese parties will be resolved, and the State of Qatar will support any efforts towards national unity. As I mentioned earlier, we hope that our brothers in Lebanon and the various political parties put the interest of the Lebanese people at the core of the understandings, and that it will be far from all external pressures”.-- Presidency Press Office

Berri meets Qatari Foreign Minister, Lebanon’s Ambassador to Vatican
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
House Speaker, Nabih Berri, on Tuesday welcomed at his Ain El Tineh residence Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, and his accompanying delegation.
Talks reportedly touched on the general situation in Lebanon and the broader region, in addition to the bilateral relations between the two countries.
Speaker Berri also met with Lebanon’s Ambassador to the Vatican, Farid Al Khazen.

Geagea welcomes Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Lebanese Forces party leader, Samir Geagea, is meeting in Maarab with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, accompanied by a delegation.

Jumblatt reviews political developments with Egyptian ambassador
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, received this evening in Clemenceau the Egyptian ambassador to Lebanon, Yasser Alawi, where political developments were discussed.

Jumblatt receives Qatari Foreign Minister
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Progressive Socialist Party head, Walid Jumblatt, on Tuesday received at his Clemenceau residence, Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, and his accompanying delegation, in the presence of Qatari Ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammed Hassan Jaber Al-Jaber. Also attending had been MPs Hadi Abou el-Hessen and Wael Abu Faour. Talks reportedly touched on the latest political developments on the Lebanese arena, in addition to the bilateral relations between Lebanon and Qatar..

Hariri receives Qatari Foreign Minister
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri received this afternoon at the Center House the Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani and the accompanying delegation. The Qatari ambassador to Lebanon Mohammed bin Hassan Al-Jaber, former Minister Ghattas Khoury, and Hariri's advisor for diplomatic affairs, Dr. Basem Shabb attended. The meeting focused on the situation in Lebanon, the latest political developments and bilateral relations between the 2 countries.

Diab chairs meeting dedicated to supporting commodities
NNANNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Caretaker Prime Minister, Dr. Hassan Diab, on Tuesday chaired a meeting attended by Ministers Zeina Akar, Raoul Nehme, Imad Hoballah, and Abbas Mortada, in addition to Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, in the presence of Premier Diab’s Advisor, Khodor Taleb.The meeting was dedicated to discussing the support of food commodities, medicines, petroleum products, as well as agricultural and industrial raw materials.--Presidency of Council of Ministers Press office

Hariri: Renewed international interest in Lebanon represents an opportunity not to be missed and I am not a candidate
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri made the following statement:
“I had committed not to take a political position before the pronouncement of the judgment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the assassination of the martyr Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and before having completed contacts with friendly countries, the international community and Lebanese political forces regarding the initiative that President Emmanuel Macron presented during his recent visit to Lebanon. In reality, I consider that the renewed international interest in our country, and especially the initiative of President Macron and the visits of a certain number of international and Arab officials, represent an opportunity which could be the last and cannot be failed, to rebuild our beloved capital Beirut, and to achieve a series of reforms that the Lebanese have demanded and that we have been trying to implement for many years.
This is an opportunity to break the economic and financial isolation that Lebanon suffers from, with external resources that would first allow to stop the frightening collapse and then gradually shift to resuming growth.
With my sincere thanks to all those who proposed my name as a candidate to form a government that would undertake this national task, that is noble and difficult at the same time, I noticed, like all other Lebanese, that certain political forces are still in a state of severe denial of the reality of Lebanon and the Lebanese, and only see this as a new opportunity for blackmail, with the sole aim of keeping small power gains or even realizing personal dreams of later power. Unfortunately, it is a blackmail that goes beyond their political partners, to become a blackmail of the entire country, of the renewed international attention and of the livelihood and dignity of the Lebanese.
Therefore, based on my firm belief that the most important thing at this point is to preserve the opportunity for Lebanon and the Lebanese to rebuild their capital and implement the well-known reforms that are long overdue, and to pave the way for the commitment of friends of the international community to help face the crisis and then invest in the return of growth, I declare that I am not a candidate to head the new government and I call on everyone to withdraw my name from the deliberations in this regard.‎
The only starting point is for the President of the Republic to respect the constitution and immediately call for binding parliamentary consultations in accordance with Article 53, and that the heresy of composing the government before designating the Prime Minister ceases once and for all.
Of course, with the Future parliamentary bloc, and in the parliamentary consultations that the constitution imposes without delay and that the Lebanese are impatiently awaiting, we will name the candidate that we consider competent and capable of forming a government guaranteeing the success of this unique and last opportunity for our country. We will also bet that this government is capable in form and substance of carrying out this mission, so that we cooperate with it in Parliament in order to carry out the reconstruction of Beirut, implement the necessary reforms and pave the way for our friends of the international community to support Lebanon at the humanitarian, economic, financial and investment levels”.--Hariri Press office

UNICEF delivers critical supplies to support children and families affected by Beirut explosions
NNA/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
UNICEF was able to respond immediately following the explosion, distributing pre-positioned supplies that were in stock in the immediate aftermath. At the same time, UNICEF worked to procure additional humanitarian supplies locally, wherever possible, including personal protective equipment (PPE), infection prevention and control (IPC) kits and other hygiene items, as well as supplies to support psycho-social assistance to children affected. To compliment the locally procured supplies, additional supplies were sent from UNICEF’s global supply hub in Copenhagen to Beirut, with further shipments planned in the coming days and weeks. “Before the dust had begun to settle, UNICEF teams were working to ensure that urgently needed humanitarian supplies could reach children and families affected as soon as possible,” said UNICEF Lebanon Representative Yukie Mokuo. “Children have had their lives turned upside-down. Making sure that families have their basic needs met will allow them to start rebuilding their lives and look to the future,” she added. As the number of COVID-19 cases in the country continues to surge, UNICEF was also able to deliver more than US$3.5 million worth of critical PPE and IPC kits - especially critical as 10 containers of PPE were destroyed in the explosions. “As families fight to rebuild after the chaos of the explosions, coupled with the ongoing economic crisis and the added threat of COVID-19, the support of our donors and partners has been absolutely critical, but much more is still needed,” said Mokuo. “Now is the time for the international community to stand with the people of Lebanon and ensure that they receive the help and assistance required.”
The humanitarian supplies were delivered with the assistance of the European Union’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and the Government of Belgium and through a donation from the Sanofi Foundation.
UNICEF requires US$46.7 million to respond to the immediate needs of children and families over the next three months. The response focuses on keeping children safe; rehabilitating basic essential services; and equipping adolescents and young people with skills they need to be part of the effort to rebuild their country – all while limiting the spread of COVID-19.
hygiene and nutrition supplies.
UNICEF was able to respond immediately following the explosion, distributing pre-positioned supplies that were in stock in the immediate aftermath. At the same time, UNICEF worked to procure additional humanitarian supplies locally, wherever possible, including personal protective equipment (PPE), infection prevention and control (IPC) kits and other hygiene items, as well as supplies to support psycho-social assistance to children affected. To compliment the locally procured supplies, additional supplies were sent from UNICEF’s global supply hub in Copenhagen to Beirut, with further shipments planned in the coming days and weeks. “Before the dust had begun to settle, UNICEF teams were working to ensure that urgently needed humanitarian supplies could reach children and families affected as soon as possible,” said UNICEF Lebanon Representative Yukie Mokuo. “Children have had their lives turned upside-down. Making sure that families have their basic needs met will allow them to start rebuilding their lives and look to the future,” she added. As the number of COVID-19 cases in the country continues to surge, UNICEF was also able to deliver more than US$3.5 million worth of critical PPE and IPC kits - especially critical as 10 containers of PPE were destroyed in the explosions. “As families fight to rebuild after the chaos of the explosions, coupled with the ongoing economic crisis and the added threat of COVID-19, the support of our donors and partners has been absolutely critical, but much more is still needed,” said Mokuo. “Now is the time for the international community to stand with the people of Lebanon and ensure that they receive the help and assistance required.”
The humanitarian supplies were delivered with the assistance of the European Union’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and the Government of Belgium and through a donation from the Sanofi Foundation.
UNICEF requires US$46.7 million to respond to the immediate needs of children and families over the next three months. The response focuses on keeping children safe; rehabilitating basic essential services; and equipping adolescents and young people with skills they need to be part of the effort to rebuild their country – all while limiting the spread of COVID-19.--UNICEF Lebanon
 

Suicide Bomber Revives Fears of Terrorist Sleeper Cells in Lebanon
Beirut - Nazeer Rida/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
A suicide bombing carried out by a suspect in a security incident that killed three people in the town of Kaftoun in northern Lebanon last week renewed fears of sleeper cells belonging to extremist organizations that could exploit the tense situation in the country to revive their activities.
Those fears, however, are rejected by security sources, who stressed that the “success achieved by the Lebanese authorities in terms of proactive security is still effective and possesses the full ability to maintain stability.” On the night of Aug. 21, four people driving a car without a license plate opened fire at three members of the municipal guard in the northern town of Kaftoun, killing them instantly, before fleeing to an unknown destination. Subsequently, the joint security force in the Beddawi Palestinian refugee in northern Lebanon handed over one of the wanted people to the Lebanese authorities at dawn on Sunday. On Monday, a force from the Intelligence Bureau of the Internal Security Forces raided an apartment occupied by displaced Syrians in an area in the North, with the aim to arrest a suspect in the crime. But the wanted man detonated himself with explosives before the forces could arrest him. The National News Agency (NNA) reported that the ISF cordoned off the area and confiscated two laptop computers from the apartment. It added that a number of people were arrested during raids in several refugee camps across the North. Judicial sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the wanted person who blew himself up was a 40-year-old Syrian, who had previously served a prison sentence on charges of belonging to ISIS. “The other suspect, who was handed over to the Lebanese authorities at dawn on Sunday, also had extremist tendencies,” according to the sources. They added that the investigations into the Kaftoun crime showed the presence of two other vehicles that accompanied the suspects’ car. One of those cars transported the perpetrators to a safe place. The sources asserted that they “were planning to carry out a terrorist act before they clashed with the municipal guards, who prevented them from executing their operation.”Head of the Middle East Center for Studies, Dr. Hisham Jaber, said sleeper cells were usually “present, and they wake up when they find opportunity or a security vacuum.” But he asserted that these factors “are not available in Lebanon, due to the constant vigilance of the services.”Jaber, a retired Lebanese Army brigadier general, noted that Lebanon “has succeeded since 2014 in proactive security,” referring to the concerted efforts by “the security services to exchange information in an integrated manner.”

Beirut Blast: News Series of Arrests, Judicial Investigator Meets FBI Team
Beirut- Youssef Diab/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Judge Fadi Sawan, the judicial investigator in the Beirut port blast case, met on Monday with the FBI team that was dispatched to Lebanon to assess the latest findings into the massive explosion that rocked the city of Beirut on Aug. 4. A senior judicial source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sawan has assigned the US team with new tasks and requested technical answers to be sent to him “as soon as possible” to make new decisions accordingly. While the investigator did not yet receive any report from the French and Russian experts, who are assisting the Lebanese security and judicial services, the judicial sources noted that successive meetings would be held between these experts and Sawan to evaluate the latest studies on the causes of the explosion. On Monday, the judicial investigator questioned the former director-general of the Lebanese Customs, Shafiq Merhi, in the presence of his attorney, in addition to Youssef Shebli, the contractor of welding works at warehouse No. 12, where the explosion took place. He also questioned an employee at the port, Mekhail Murr, and issued arrest warrants against the three of them. The interrogations took place in the presence of lawyer Youssef Lahoud, representing the Beirut Bar Association, which is working on behalf of all the families of the victims, the injured, and those affected by the explosion.
Nine people have been so far arrested in the case, including the Customs Director General Badri Daher.

Riad Salameh: In Lebanon, depositors’ money is still available
Randa Takieddine/Arab News/August 25/2020
Riad Salameh told Arab News en Français he was in favor of the audit of the
Central Bank chief says he supports IMF involvement in Lebanon, Macron’s proposal for audit of BDL by Bank of France experts. Governor working on other means of financing, reassures depositors they ‘will get their money back, even if it takes time’
Riad Salameh has long been perceived as the strongman of Lebanon, the guardian of an economic model that has been the envy of many throughout the region. A skilled financier, he guaranteed the stability of the Lebanese pound for nearly 30 years and was awarded by the largest financial institutions. The banker saw his life change, however, with the October 2019 uprising and the economic collapse, which have mired the Land of the Cedars in turmoil. Since then, Salameh has come under fire. He is accused of having misused the money of Lebanon’s citizens by granting funds to the government, which have been wrongly managed by a political class corrupt to the bone.
Bank of France experts
In an exclusive interview with Arab News en Français, Salameh defended himself against these accusations, which he considers “unfair.” He claims to be in favor of the audit of the Banque du Liban (BDL) by experts from the Bank of France in order to advance negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The audit was proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who is visiting Lebanon after the explosion at the port of Beirut on Aug. 4. “An audit of the BDL, going back to 1993, was conducted by two international firms,” recalls Salameh. “The latest reports of this audit were sent to the IMF at the beginning of the negotiations. It is therefore important to acknowledge that this international audit exists, to dismiss any doubts about the way the BDL is managed. We welcome the proposal of the Bank of France to audit the BDL. The decision is the responsibility of the Bank of France, but we are ready to welcome their experts at their convenience.”  On April 30, the government announced an economic recovery plan and requested assistance from the IMF, from which Beirut hopes to secure about $10 billion in aid. Lebanon initiated negotiations with the fund, but nearly three months later, the process stalled.

Lebanon’s new start needs to be locally led
Javier Solana/Arab News/August 25/2020
The writer Amin Maalouf, one of Beirut’s most celebrated sons, described the city as it was in the 1960s as “the intellectual capital of the Arab East,” and “the ideal place for maximum flowering and pluralism.” In his latest work, “The Shipwreck of Civilizations,” Maalouf charts the decline of that vibrant and resplendent Lebanon after it was razed by the same sectarianism that robbed so many countries in the Middle East of a promising future.
At the beginning of August, much of the Lebanese capital was literally razed by a huge explosion at its port. All indications suggest that the tragedy was the result of repeated negligence directly linked to the country’s political sclerosis. On the eve of the disaster, the Lebanese foreign minister had resigned, warning that narrow party interests threatened to turn Lebanon into a failed state. The explosion in Beirut is just the tip of the iceberg. Lebanon was already experiencing a deep economic and financial crisis that prompted a wave of protests last October against political deadlock, systemic corruption, and the continued interference of foreign powers. Since then, things have gone from bad to worse.
The UN World Food Program estimates that the price of food in Lebanon rose by 109 percent between October 2019 and June 2020. To this must be added the effects of the coronavirus disease, which have been aggravated by the chaos resulting from the explosion. Moreover, this troubled country has the highest number of refugees per capita in the world: Today, displaced Syrians make up 30 percent of the population. Lebanon is mired in its most serious crisis since the 1975-90 civil war, although in fact the country has never succeeded in closing the door on that bloody chapter. Its recent trajectory represents a paradigmatic case of what the British academic Mary Kaldor calls “new wars.” In this type of conflict, opposing factions seek to encourage extremist identities and perpetuate hostilities, because doing so gives them free rein to pursue extractive policies.
Lebanon’s situation demands that the West listen with humility and firmly support the demands of the local population.
Furthermore, factional leaders tend to use peace agreements to consolidate their positions of power and patronage networks, as was the case with the 1989 Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon’s civil war. This pact slightly modified the confessional quota system that has prevailed in the country’s public bodies since independence, hindering effective governance and the construction of a national identity. As Kaldor points out, peace agreements often don’t even end the violence. The emergence of Hezbollah during Lebanon’s post-civil war period attests to that.
In short, Lebanon has been adrift for many years and the international community simply cannot look the other way. Let us not forget that the predecessor of the current Lebanese state was conceived precisely a century ago by the victorious powers of the First World War, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The League of Nations placed Lebanon under a French mandate that lasted until 1943, and France maintains close relations with the country. French President Emmanuel Macron visited Beirut two days after the explosion and subsequently hosted a UN-backed virtual donor conference.
But the West has a broader historic responsibility that includes encouraging effective governance systems in Lebanon and the rest of the region. All too often, it has not been up to this task, resorting to interventionist excesses and paternalistic attitudes in its desire to assert control. The case of Libya, for example, shows how Western arrogance in backing regime change without viable reconstruction plans can contribute to state failure. Above all, any policy initiative undertaken on humanitarian grounds should respect a basic maxim of medicine: “First, do no harm.”
Lebanon’s situation demands that the West listen with humility and firmly support the demands of the local population, which is displaying a greater degree of cohesion than that sought by their leaders. Popular outrage following the explosion has already brought about the Lebanese government’s resignation, but that is not enough. Protesters are calling for a complete overhaul of the system, even by adopting slogans associated with the Arab Spring, although such an undertaking seems very complicated.
Neither Lebanon’s ruling class nor the country’s more influential neighbors will accept fundamental reform willingly, and the experience of the Arab Spring is far from encouraging. Only the Tunisian revolution led to democracy, and even that success has not been a panacea for the country’s problems. Nevertheless, any hope that Lebanon might have of rising from its ashes will lie, as in Tunisia, in allowing local voices to ring loud and dynamic social movements to develop from the bottom up.
*Javier Solana, a former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Secretary-General of NATO, and Foreign Minister of Spain, is currently President of the EsadeGeo Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics and Distinguished Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Copyright: Project Syndicate

In fifteen years between Hariri’s assassination and the Beirut explosion what did we learn?
Dr Amira Abo el-Fetouh/Middle East Monitor/August 25, 2020
There is no doubt that the verdict of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon regarding the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the former Prime Minister, shocked those searching for the truth. The court’s ruling was a disappointment, because it acquitted the leaders of the criminal Syrian regime and Hezbollah, and only convicted one of the four defendants who were brought to trial. Salim Ayyash, the former Hezbollah leader, was convicted in absentia of organising and carrying out the attack, when a suicide bomber killed Hariri and 21 others on 14 February 2005. Nobody knows Ayyash’s whereabouts, whether he is still alive or if Hezbollah killed him to destroy any evidence and conceal the truth.
The court did not close the case, which has left its mark on the Lebanese political system and almost led to civil war, with the Lebanese people split into two alliances, one represented by Hezbollah and its aides who are loyal to the Syrian regime, known as the March 8 Alliance, and the March 14 Alliance, consisting of the Future Movement and its fellow Maronites, the enemies of Syria such as the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, and the Aoun movement when General (now President) Michel Aoun returned from Paris and before his transformation into an ally of Hezbollah and Damascus.
This tribunal cost the Lebanese treasury nearly $1 billion, but it did not answer the most important question: who gave the order for Hariri’s assassination? Is it realistic to believe that Ayyash decided to act on his own volition? Logic dictates that someone else tasked him with this operation, and that this someone, whether a state, a movement or an individual, had a direct interest in killing the Lebanese Prime Minister. The political circumstances of the assassination were noted by the tribunal, which pointed out that Syria and Hezbollah may have had motives to eliminate Hariri and some of his political allies who were against them; in other words, that Syria and Hezbollah would benefit from killing Hariri. However, there is no physical evidence against either Syria or Hezbollah. This is often the case with political crimes that are tried in criminal courts, as if they were criminal offences, but there is a huge difference.
I was disappointed by the verdict, as I believed that the tribunal was the first stage of stripping away the immunity enjoyed by killers in Lebanon for too long; political assassinations have been taking place there for decades. This verdict was for a crime committed 15 years ago, and several similar crimes have since been committed in Beirut. Israel’s siege of the capital in 1982 killed more than 1,000 civilians, then Hezbollah invaded Beirut neighbourhoods in 2008, killing dozens. More recently we saw the terrible explosion that destroyed Beirut Port and a number of surrounding neighbourhoods, killing, wounding and displacing thousands. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is involved in the ongoing war in Syria. Waiting for the verdict brought to mind the struggle during which many people have paid the price for seeking justice.
Fifteen years have passed between the assassination of Hariri and the tribunal’s verdict; these years were full of change in both Lebanon and Syria. In July 2006 a war led to tremendous destruction in Lebanon, deemed necessary for Hezbollah and the Syrian regime to move beyond the repercussions of Hariri’s assassination and erase the remaining effects of the “Damascus Spring”. The outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in late 2010 and 2011, and the fall of the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, as well as the arrival of the revolutionary wave in Syria in March 2011, put the Assad regime, Hezbollah and the entire Iranian axis back into defensive mode. It is possible that the massive explosion in Beirut at the beginning of August was an operation similar to the assassination of Hariri, with the same people behind it hoping to terrorise the Lebanese people just before the tribunal issued its verdict. It seems to me that those responsible in both cases have become known to everyone near and far.
 

Making Sense Of The Next Round Of Turmoil In Iraq And Lebanon
Alberto M. Fernandez/MEMRI Daily Brief /August 25/2020 |
Both Lebanon and Iraq have caught, beyond the usual routine of Middle East turmoil, the attention of the West in recent months. Lebanon, beset by Great Depression-level economic collapse, suffered the still-not-fully-explained Beirut Port explosion on August 4 that killed several hundred, injured 6,000, and destroyed part of the country's capital city and principal port. As a result of the crisis, Lebanon's government formally resigned and is in caretaker mode, awaiting the outcome of jockeying for ministerial seats by different factions. In Iraq, the year opened with the liquidation of Iranian terror master Qassim Soleimani in Baghdad, and in May 2020 the caretaker government of Adel Abdel Mahdi was finally replaced by a new government headed by Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, who visited Washington in August 2020 (his first foreign visit was to Iran in July).
Despite the reality that the governments of both countries are heavily influenced by Iran and its local proxies, the West has engaged. French President Emmanuel Macron visited Beirut in the immediate aftermath of the port explosion and has promised enhanced French engagement. Al-Kadhmi was warmly received in Washington, and his government signed agreements worth billions of dollars with American companies in the fields of oil, gas, and electricity.
The subtext in both situations – in two very different Middle East countries facing some superficially common issues – is of Western governments making good faith efforts to engage with counterparts. While Washington is more upbeat about the new Iraqi prime minister than about a new Lebanese government, in both cases the hope is that engagement and encouragement by the West can produce better results, for the local people and for Western interests, than past governments in Beirut and Baghdad have been able to deliver. But how realistic are these hopes for reform, and what are the immediate challenges to change?
On the surface, prospects seem better in Iraq. The economic situation is terrible, but nowhere near as catastrophic as Lebanon's. Iraq has some money, while Lebanon has none. Al-Kadhimi is at least a fresh face on the scene, and has said some very good things about bringing perpetrators in the killing of activists to justice. Whether or not he can deliver is another question.
For Lebanon, sadly, the way forward seems to consist of forging a "national unity government" completely beholden to Hizbullah, or a more narrowly based "technocratic" government also beholden to Hizbullah. The Lebanese political cartel on which Hizbullah relies to implement its will seems confident that it can weather the disastrous social, economic, environmental, and political situation that it has engendered.
One similarity between the two countries is that despite the continued hegemony of Iran and its local minions, the disgust that led to constant demonstrations in both, from October 2019 and into 2020, by tens of thousands of people, especially young people, has not dissipated. These rallies were enduring enough to bring about the fall of the puppet government of the day, but not strong enough to bring about real change. As weak as the eventual result was, the demonstrations did represent an inchoate challenge to the Iran-controlled political order.
The Iran-led response to even weak challenges has come and will continued to manifest itself in three ways: through violence, through political penetration, and through economic manipulation.
As Iraq's new prime minister at least tries to make public efforts towards reform, Iran's many proxies inside Iraq have escalated their activity, with targeted killings of activists, opinion makers, and journalists. The July 7 assassination of Hisham Al-Hashemi, who advised the government on terrorism, including on Iran-controlled death squads, was a direct message to Al-Kadhimi. Assassinations have continued into August 2020, aided and abetted by a massive pro-Iran militia/political party media apparatus inside Iraq built up over the past decade. Al-Kadhimi will be forced to either accommodate the death squads or confront them. There is a real public appetite in Iraq for a political leader that puts Iraq's interests and sovereignty first, but it is still unclear if Al-Kadhimi can be that man, and, if he actually tries to do so, whether he will survive.
In Lebanon, the trend towards violence and coercion is headed in a similar direction. There has been an increase in heavy-handed repression, assaults on journalists and demonstrators, and efforts to silence critical media voices such as Beirut's MTV (Murr Television). The repression reached a new level of malevolent ridiculousness when Lebanese security forces hunted down, blindfolded, and extracted a confession and apology from one demonstrator, ironically a Lebanese Christian, who had disrespected a framed photo of Lebanon's Christian President Michel Aoun during demonstrations. Some Lebanese fear that as Hizbullah becomes concerned that the people are losing their fear, another wave of assassinations of Hizbullah critics may come, as happened from 2004 to 2013 when prominent politicians, journalists, and security officials were targeted.
The threat of violence is always implicit. But Iran and its proxies rule in Lebanon and Iraq through their manipulation of politics and the electoral process. Particularly useful, especially in Lebanon, are non-Shia politicians who serve the interests of Iran. These Christian and Sunni enablers extend and disguise Iran's reach into the political process. Any early elections that happen in either country – a demand by many earnest reformers – will be susceptible to manipulation by these corrupt political cartels in sync with Iran, to game an already skewed system in their favor.
As for economic manipulation, both Lebanon and Iraq are places where Iran and Hizbullah launder their money and also use ill-gotten gains and local government corruption to maintain their hegemony. What better way to care for an Iranian mole than to have him on the payroll of the state he is sent to infiltrate? The avarice of local elites works hand in glove to enrich themselves in the service of Iran's larger objectives.
In the face of this Iranian straitjacket, what is the West to do? Is it better to walk away and cut our losses? Should the West, in this case France and the U.S., aggressively work towards reform? Are newer figures like Al-Kadhimi or wasted ones like Lebanon's Saad Al-Hariri able to deliver anything of real value? Some voices in these countries criticize outsiders who call for an impossibly tough hardline in Lebanon and Iraq from far away, even though these same voices don't seem to look askance at Western funding as long as there are few strings attached.
In my view, the West can and must engage, but needs to be much more cynical and transactional in its objectives. Too much "institution building," "economic development," and "process for the sake of process" can easily becloud our perspectives. Our main goal should be to deny Iran and its proxies the resources they need to rule, to raise the price of their hegemony. This could mean propping up elements of local society – independent media is one obvious sector – that can make useful contributions to making the price of hegemony higher. Putting pressure on enablers, those who provide convenient fig leaves for Iranian proxy rule, is another obvious gambit.
Absent a successful popular and violent uprising in Lebanon or Iraq against the Iranian satrapy – an outcome that seems very unlikely – the key to ending Iranian control of those states lies inside Iran itself, with the fall of that regime. In the meantime, keeping our objectives as hardnosed and tangible as possible seems the best choice.
*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.

The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy (AMCD) Praises Trump Administration's Historic Peace Deal between Israel and the UAE
التحالف الأمريكي الشرق أوسطي من أجل الديمقراطية يشيد بصفقة السلام التاريخية التي أبرمتها إدارة ترامب بين إسرائيل والإمارات

http://eliasbejjaninews.com/archives/89792/the-american-mideast-coalition-for-democracy-amcd-praises-trump-administrations-historic-peace-deal-between-israel-and-the-uae-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85/
WASHINGTON, DC, USA, August 25/2020 / EINPresswire.com
The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy unequivocally supports President Trump's bold and historic peace initiative to normalize relations between our two allies in the Middle East, Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
Though our advisor, Dr. Walid Phares, was not standing behind the President when the deal was announced, he played a critical role in the development of its concept with the major actors going back to December 2015, when he and then-candidate Trump discussed the possibility of creating an Arab coalition to counter Iran along with Israel. In September, 2016, Dr. Phares then met with UAE's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and then in November of that year, he met with the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Later, he met with American Jewish leaders and Israeli scholars, as well as advisors to the Palestinian Authority visiting Washington. Always, Dr. Phares endeavored to advance the vision that he and President Trump developed back in 2015.
'This agreement is destined to change the history of the Middle East,' said AMCD co-chair Tom Harb. 'After Obama signed that disastrous Iran deal, which betrayed all of our long-time allies in the region, it took some time to re-build the trust and confidence of the moderate Sunni states.'
'Now that the UAE has come to the table, others will follow,' continued AMCD co-chair John Hajjar. 'A new strategic set of alliances in the Middle East will create the necessary peace and stability so that the people of the Middle East can begin to thrive and prosper. They have had enough of the death and destruction that radicalism brings. Young people are looking for a new direction. The people of the region are way ahead of their regimes and are ready for peace with Israel and a rejection of sectarianism. The UAE-Israel pact, although extremely important and historic, merely reflects this reality. Our communities will reflect this fact when we show our support at the signing ceremony in DC."
'This deal is historic on many levels,' declared Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, President and founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy. 'You know it's real when the imams inside the UAE are now giving sermons about the need for Arab and Muslim friendship with the Jewish community and with the state of Israel. Without that deep ideological shift and reform, similar deals would be meaningless. Mark today in history as a time when a tectonic shift happened in Arab-Israeli relations. Many with political agendas will try to minimize the relationship, yet other Arab states including Bahrain, Oman, Morocco, and even Saudi Arabia may be next. Naysayers need to be asked one question: If this is not a big deal, why has it not happened in the past? The fact that the Arab world's greatest radicalizing influence on Muslims, the Islamist political movements from the Muslim Brotherhood, to Erdogan's AKP to the Jama'at in Pakistan are upset speaks volumes to the long lasting impact of this deal.'
'The death-dealing Iranian regime has been trying to export the revolution all over the Middle East by supporting radical Islamists of all stripes,' added AMCD vice-chair Hossein Khorram. 'They want to dominate the Middle East and to do that, they sew chaos and destruction at every opportunity. A stable coalition of moderate Arab states will eventually force them to become another nation among nations.'
'The people of Iran are seeking peace and prosperity,' said Sheikh Mohammad Al Hajj Hassan, who leads the Free Shia Movement and is chairman of the American Muslim Coalition. 'They are furious that the Mullahs support terrorism to the tune of some $16 billion a year. This is money taken directly from the people of Iran where it is needed most. The people don't want their money going to Hezbollah and Hamas, especially when the country is hurting so much economically.'
'The deal with the UAE is a step in a broader process of Arab political recognition of Israel's strategic, technological, and economic importance in the Persian Gulf zone, and across the Middle East,' added Dr. Mordechai Nisan of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 'Israel is rising to new heights in the historic saga of the re-constituted Jewish state.'
AMCD is planning to hold a demonstration to support peace in the Middle East in Washington DC when the UAE's Crown Prince comes to the White House to sign this historic agreement sometime in September.
Rebecca Bynum
The American Mideast Coalition for Democracy
+1 615-775-6801

Weeks after blast, Lebanon patronage system immune to reform
Samya Kullab/AP/August 25/2020
FILE - In this Aug. 6, 2020 file photo, French President Emmanuel Macron, second left, meets with Lebanese President Michel Aoun, second right, Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab, right, and Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, left, at the presidential palace, in Baabda east of Beirut. Beirut's massive explosion fueled widespread anger at Lebanon's ruling elite, whose corruption and negligence many blame for the disaster. Yet, three weeks later, the change many hoped for is nowhere in sight. The same politicians are negotiating among themselves over a new government.
Three weeks after a catastrophic explosion ripped through Beirut, killing nearly 200 people and rendering thousands homeless, the change many hoped for is nowhere in sight. Instead, activists said they are back to square one.
The same politicians whose corruption and negligence the public blames for the disaster are negotiating among themselves over forming a new government. Calls for early elections have petered out. To devastated Beirutis, still sweeping shards of glass and fixing broken homes, the blast revealed the extent to which an entrenched system of patronage remains impervious to reform.
In fact, the tools that the ruling elite have used to ensure a lock on power the past 30 years are only more powerful.
Rising poverty amid a severe economic crisis gives them greater leverage, with more people desperate for the income their patronage provides. Their grip on electoral politics was made tighter by an election law they passed in 2017, making it harder for independents to win seats. And there are armed groups affiliated with political parties.
“Basically, we have no way to force them out,” said Nizar Hassan, a civil activist and an organizer with LiHaqqi, a political movement active in the October mass anti-government protests.
Lebanon’s political parties are strictly sectarian, each rooted in one of the country’s multiple religious or ethnic communities. Most are headed by sectarian warlords from Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war — or their families — who stand at the top of powerful local business holdings. The factions pass out positions in government ministries and public institutions to their followers or carve out business sectors for them, ensuring their backing.
Opposition parties that cross sectarian lines with a reform agenda struggle to break that barrier. They are divided and lack grassroots support. They have also increasingly been met with brute force by security agencies.
Street protests have been dramatic. But the array of anti-government movements were not sizable enough to push for sea-change reforms, Hassan said.
“To seize the moment, you need people on grassroots level that are ready to announce they support it, and this doesn’t really exist in Lebanon,” he said.
Civic movements like LiHaqqi are not well-financed, face intimidation and can hardly afford to book airtime on mainstream channels, where elites are regular talking heads.
A sliver of hope is found in growing support from businessmen who once financed elites but have become increasingly frustrated, Hassan and other activists said.
Business owners began having a change of heart around the beginning of the year, as the economy deteriorated, hyperinflation flared and many people fell into poverty, said Paul Abi Nasr, a member of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists.
“The business community used to stay out of this from fear of retribution on their businesses,” he said. “But with the situation so dire already, a lot are now much more forthcoming.”
That has translated into a small stream of money to civil groups, though limited to covering organization and lobbying.
Industrialists and businessmen have helped prop up the patronage system, but most “were forced to play along,” Abi Nasr said. Politicians helped businesses in return for kickbacks and political support when needed.
Those in government who have witnessed the system from the inside maintain it cannot reform itself.
“People like me, after years in the world of government, basically feel that the system is immune to reform,” said Khalil Gebara, who left his job as an adviser to the Interior Ministry.
“But at the same point, the total collapse of the system will unleash a Pandora’s box of all kinds of sectarian conflicts,” said Gebara, now a consultant to the World Bank. “I don’t know what I should hope for.”
The wake-up call for Lebanon’s activists came not during the October uprising, when tens of thousands took to the streets in protest against the corrupt political class, but four years ago when Beirut held municipal elections.
It was the first time that a candidate slate emerging from a protest movement, Beirut Madinati, won in an electoral district. The small victory emboldened activists to look to polls to bring change.
It also spooked elites. The following year, they passed a new electoral law. It created a proportional representation system that ostensibly aimed to address demands of civil society and improve representation for minority sects.
But they “gerrymandered every aspect of the law in order to ensure that all political parties in power will be re-elected and none of the voices in the opposition could be,” said elections expert Amal Hamdan.
Under the law, a special formula determines the minimum threshold of votes for candidates to win seats. The factions worked to ensure those thresholds were high — ranging from 8% to 20% — and difficult for independents to gain, lawmakers and advisers with knowledge of the drafting of the law said.
In the south, for example. Shiite Hezbollah rejected proposals for a 5% threshold and arranged one as high as 20%, said Chantal Sarkis, an expert in political affairs and former adviser to Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces throughout negotiations over the law.
Activists like Hassan said the core problem lies with lack of grassroots support to initiate real political change. “When it comes to actual political dominance over the social fabric — everything is really manifest on local level.”
In his home district in the Chouf, where former warlord and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is dominant, LiHaqqi supporters faced intimidation on the ground during the 2018 general election, Hassan said.
The father of one activist was sacked from his government job; mothers begged their activist children to stop canvassing in case powerful politicians got wind; others said they would vote for establishment parties because they wanted jobs. Not a single village allowed them to hold public events.
In the wake of the Aug. 4 explosion, when nearly 3,000 tons of improperly stored ammonium nitrate ignited at the Beirut port, political parties have set up field offices offering humanitarian and other assistance to victims.
Now with the falling Lebanese lira, Hassan fears establishment parties have more clout than before.
“It’s even cheaper for them to buy people.”

It's time for Europe to follow Germany's lead and ban Hezbollah
Jerusalem Post Editorial/August 25/2020
Germany justified the decision to ban the terrorist movement because of its call for armed struggle and rejection of Israel’s right to exist.
The Jerusalem Post’s Benjamin Weinthal reported Sunday that Switzerland might follow the decision made in April by its neighbor Germany and ban all Hezbollah activities within its territory.
Last week, the Swiss Federal Council agreed to review a “Report on the activities of the Shi’ite Islamist Hezbollah in Switzerland.” The initiative was launched by Marianne Binder of the Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland in June.
The proposed anti-Hezbollah legislation notes that Germany justified the decision to ban the terrorist movement because of its call for armed struggle and rejection of Israel’s right to exist.
The initiative reads: “The EU previously banned the [military] arm that engaged in terrorist activities. It is not known which activities Hezbollah is developing in Switzerland. In view of the neutrality of Switzerland, however, the activities of Hezbollah cannot be legitimized and a report is also advisable for reasons of security policy.”This highlights the ridiculous European Union approach to the terrorist organization, whose deadly tentacles have reached around the world. In July 2013, EU governments agreed to partially blacklist Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, but they made an artificial and dangerous distinction. The EU outlawed Hezbollah’s “military arm” but allowed its “political arm” to continue to operate, raise funds and recruit members. This financial pipeline and recruitment system keeps Hezbollah alive. It is absurd to promote the illusion that there is a difference between the “political” and “military” activities of an organization whose terrorists have caused hundreds of deaths and vast suffering globally. The terrorist organization itself does not make a distinction between its political and military operations.
As we noted after the welcome German decision in April, Hezbollah’s record as the perpetrator of major terrorist atrocities around the world has been known for decades. Its deadly acts include the bombings, orchestrated by Imad Mughniyeh, of the US Embassy and the military barracks in Beirut in 1983; the bombing attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the AMIA Jewish center there in 1994; the bombing attack against US military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1996; the murder of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri; the bombing of a tour bus carrying Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria, in 2012; not to mention the myriad attacks against, and kidnappings of, Israelis, Europeans and Americans; its role in provoking the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and its part in the Syrian civil war, where it helped Iran – its sponsor – create a corridor of terrorism from Tehran to Beirut.
The devastating explosion that destroyed the Port of Beirut earlier this month – killing at least 180 people and leaving a quarter of a million homeless – can also be pinned on Hezbollah. Although the exact cause is not yet certain, it is clear that Hezbollah is responsible either through negligence, corruption or stockpiling of explosive material with malevolent intent, or a combination of all these factors.
Hezbollah’s efforts to obtain precision-guided missiles and the discovery of the warren of terrorist attack tunnels crossing from Lebanon into Israel are additional indications that it has not given up its deadly goals.
For years, the US and Israel urged Europe to ban Hezbollah, but it was only after Hezbollah carried out the attack in Burgas that the EU moved to partially ban the organization. This newspaper has reported on many Hezbollah activities in Europe and its open support of terrorism. It has also been reported that the Mossad provided intelligence that helped thwart attacks on European soil.
In Europe, apart from Germany, the UK, Lithuania and the Netherlands have also outlawed Hezbollah in its entirety. Elsewhere, the Arab League, Israel, the US, Canada and many Latin American countries have designated Hezbollah’s entire entity a terrorist movement.
We hope that Switzerland follows suit. A full ban on Hezbollah everywhere is long overdue. It is not only Israel that is at risk. Hezbollah’s terrorism – funded by its Iranian sponsors – affects the whole world. This is not just an Israeli concern. Terrorism cannot be tackled in halves, with artificial distinctions between “military” and “political” wings. The only way to stop Hezbollah is to universally recognize that it is a terrorist organization whose heinous acts cannot be tolerated anywhere in the world.

City of Beginnings: Poetic Modernism in Beirut
Robyn Creswell/Reviewed by Franck Salameh
Middle East Quarterly/Summer 2020
Writing in 1968 of a city of "varied vertigos," Franco-Lebanese poet Nadia Tuéni described her native Beirut as both a courtesan sophist and sainted,[1] "A pink merchant city, like a fleet of ships adrift, scanning the horizons for the warmth of a seaport." Tuéni's Beirut was the "Orient's very last shrine, where mankind could still adorn its kind with a mantle of light,"[2] burning away regional obscurantism and gloom.
Creswell's City of Beginnings is a story of that irreverent, incandescent Beirut, of a coterie of young Arabophone writers, cosmopolitan iconoclasts who made that Beirut of multiple identities home. Beirut was a crucible for their cultural and political rivalries, a shrine for impieties suppressed elsewhere in the Middle East but given sanctuary in a Levantine city stalled between World War II and the beginnings of the 1975 Lebanese civil war. In that sense, City of Beginnings is a book of mutiny and mutineers, who shunned the Arab world's conformist proclivities in mores, language, cultural rituals, and intellectual production.
With an intellectual historian's sensitivity and a firm grasp of mid-twentieth century Lebanon's languages and worldviews, Creswell's focus is the "modernism" emanating from Beirut's Arabic-language literary journal Shi'r and its luminaries: Greek Orthodox Lebanese Youssef al-Khal (1917-87) and Syrian heterodox Adonis (b. 1930.)
Like many of their contemporaries, whether Shi'r collaborators or Francophone Lebanese nationalists apprehensive of Arabism, Adonis and Khal spurned Arab national orthodoxies, espoused cosmopolitanisms, and called for "Eastern," "Oriental," and "Levantine" rebirth and renewal rather than then-normative allegiance to Arabism. They valorized pagan, pre-Arab, pre-Muslim progenitors—including Canaanite-Phoenician seafarers of classical antiquity—and spoke of the extinction of Arab civilization even as they sought to restore its belles lettres.
Arabism's tyranny had staying power, and the iconoclasts of Shi'r ran out of breath.
But Arabism's tyranny had staying power, and the iconoclasts of Shi'r ran out of breath. This resignation played out in early 1970s Beirut, in the self-immolation of Shi'r's vaunted "learned republic," that had once married cultural and communal pluralism to political exceptionalism, irreverence, and a turbulent, pedigreed oriental Christendom, naturally predisposed to peculiarities, unlike those of the Arab hinterland.[3]
In the view of Kamal Jumblatt, founder of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party, the Beirut of Shi'r had a natural vocation: transmitting to the West the faintest pulsations of the East. This was the city's immemorial calling, to "interpret the life ripples of the Mediterranean ... to the Muslim realms of sands and mosques and sun."[4] But there comes a time when a city and its people can no longer give. In Beirut's chaotic clash of ideas, and later, orgies of violence, Adonis watched all the grand ideas emanating from Arabism, Syrianism, and Lebanese nationalism end up in bloodshed and wars of extermination. In the mid-1980s, the writers of Shi'r, adopted sons of Beirut, no longer recognized the city that had once nurtured them.
And yet, Shi'r predicted its adoptive parent's demise. Adonis in the late 1960s prophesied an apocalyptic end resembling Beirut of a decade or two later. He even depicted a self-immolating Beirut as harbinger of things to come elsewhere in the Middle East: Syria for instance, in these sad decades of the twenty-first century, child of an "Arab Spring" that never was. In his "Elegies for the Times at Hand," one of his most haunting poems written in the late 1950s, Adonis spoke of tyranny, silence, destruction, and exile as renditions of the Arabs' nightmares and realities.
Speaking of Syria's own slide into war in 2011, Adonis indicted Arabism as a desecration of the Middle East's diversity, surrendering its richness "to a single, one-dimensional linguistic, cultural, racial, and religious Arabism."[5] More nuanced in his charges against Arabism, Amin Maalouf, a Franco-Lebanese novelist, spoke of his Parisian neighbor Adonis's Beiruti cosmopolitanism as a notion
that brings a scornful smile to the lips of the ignorant ... partisans of triumphalist barbarity ... children of arrogant tribes who make battle in the name of the one and only God, and who know no worse enemy than our subtle, fluid identities.[6]
Creswell's City of Beginnings is about those ideas of a capacious, Levantine port-city, a Beirut that once condensed the dreams of a generation of intellectuals and laymen, offered a crossroads of ideas, identities, and influences, and provided a laboratory of diversity, rebirths, and renewals—ultimately aborted—but which deserve being revisited. It is a snapshot of "another Middle East" that once was and a blueprint of a "Middle East yet to come," seldom recalled by area specialists, students, scholars, and policy makers still smitten by Arabist uniformity.
To the student of the Middle East, Arabic literature, literary modernism, or Near Eastern intellectual history, this book is a learned, nuanced, and deeply searching guide.
Franck Salameh is a professor of Near Eastern Studies at Boston College where he teaches in the Department of Slavic and Eastern Languages and Literatures. He is the author, most recently, of The Other Middle East (Yale, 2017) and Lebanon's Jewish Community (Palgrave, 2019).
[1] Nadia Tuéni, Liban: Vingt poèmes pour un amour (1979) in Œuvres poétiques complètes (Beirut, Leb.: Dar al-Nahar, 1986), p. 278.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Samir Kassir, Histoire de Beyrouth (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2003), p. 610.
[4] Quoted by Camille Abousouan in "Présentation," Les Cahiers de l'Est (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1945), p. 3.
[5] Adonis, "Risala maftuha ila ar-Ra'is Bashar al-Asad: al-insan, huquqihi wa hurriyatihi, aw al-hawiya," as-Safir (Beirut), June 14, 2011.
[6] Amin Maalouf, Les désorientés (Paris: Grasset, 2012), p. 36.

Syrians Lose Children, Homes and Jobs in Beirut Blast
Agence France Presse/Naharnet/August 25/2020
Ahmad had saved his family from Syria's brutal war by bringing them to Lebanon, but then Beirut's massive blast ripped his wife and two of their daughters away forever. Weeks later, looking at the rubble of his former home near the port, he recounted how the explosion in one horrific moment upended his life.
"I feel like I've lost my mind. I closed my eyes, and when I opened them everything around me had changed," said the man, aged in his forties. "I lost everything in an instant. We were a family of six people, but now it's just me and my two daughters." Ahmad, from the Syrian province of Idlib, had worked hard in Lebanon for years, holding various jobs to send money home. Three years into Syria's war, as fighting intensified in 2014, he decided to bring his family to Lebanon. Then the August 4 disaster struck, Lebanon's worst peace-time disaster. After hundreds of tonnes of ammonium nitrate exploded at the Beirut port and sent shockwaves across the city, Ahmad rushed home to Beirut's Karantina neighbourhood. He was first to find the body of his 22-year-old daughter Latifa, who had been thrown against what remained of a wall. With the help of neighbours and civil defence workers, he also pulled from the rubble the bodies of his 13-year-old daughter Joud and 40-year-old wife Khalidiyeh. They managed to save another daughter, Diana, 17, after she had been trapped for 11 hours under the debris, screaming as both her legs were severely injured. Only 14-year-old Dima survived unscathed and now spends her days by Diana's hospital bedside.
- 'Somewhere safe' -
Ahmad says all he hopes for today is to leave. "I wouldn't dream of returning to Syria while it's not safe," he said. "I'm trying to find a way to travel abroad," he said. "I want to live somewhere safe with them."The working class neighbourhood of Karantina was one of the most damaged by the blast that killed more than 181 people, wounded thousands and ravaged large parts of the city. Twenty-year-old Syrian Uday Qattan and his extended family, most of whom have lived in Lebanon for years and worked at the port, also lost their home. In what remained of it, walls have cracked or collapsed, ceilings caved in, and most furniture has been destroyed except for the odd television or mirror. An adjacent shack shared by the bachelors in the family has been reduced to splintered wood. After the explosion, which the family says they survived by a "miracle", the married men sent their wives to other parts of Lebanon to live with relatives. Remaining family members now sleep in the courtyard in between the rubble, behind a washing line strung up with clothes. "We no longer have any work or home," Qattan said. "We sit here all day with nothing to do." They cannot return to Syria, where they lost their homes in Hama province in the war, and risk being detained over dodging military service.
- 'No food, no country' -
Qattan joined his relatives a year ago from Syria's Idlib, where a fragile ceasefire has barely stemmed a regime offensive on a rebel bastion. But he and his family say the Beirut blast was like nothing they even witnessed during the war. "In Syria, if we heard the sound of a war plane, we'd hide then stand back up after the strike, brush off the dust, and continue our lives," Qattan said. "Here a single explosion has wrecked everything around us."Syria's embassy has said 43 of its nationals were among those killed in the blast. The United Nations says 13 refugees lost their lives, while 59 are missing. It is not clear how many were Syrian. Syrians had long sought employment in Lebanon before the war started in 2011 and sent 1.5 million Syrians fleeing for shelter across the border. In Karantina, other Syrians, both those long-established and newcomers, recounted their experiences the day of the blast. With Syria's conflict, then the blast in already economically suffering Lebanon, "it's really been a double blow to the head," said one of them. As they talked, an aid truck pulled up, and they rushed out to receive their portions: pasta, biscuits, a few canned goods and water. Twenty-one-year-old Nasr said that Syrians had been denied emergency aid deliveries on some occasions, being told that the packages were only for Lebanese. "We used to work just enough to eat and drink, and pay rent," he said. "Now there is no food, drink or money, and no country -- in Syria or in Lebanon."

The Latest English LCCC Miscellaneous Reports And News published on August 25-26/2020

Iran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad call for 'uprising' after UAE-Israel deal
The Jerusalem Post/August 25/2020
A PIJ rep said that the “Zionist regime... will remain an enemy" and that its destiny "is destruction and decay, and whoever has a relationship with it will be transferred to the dustbin of history." The Middle East needs an uprising similar to the Islamic Revolution in Iran that will unite the “resistance” of the Islamic community against a “culture of defeat” that has affected Arab regimes, Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s representative to Iran recently said. Mehr News in Iran reported the discussion with Naser Abu Sharif of PIJ, which is backed by Tehran. Hamas representative Khalid al-Qaddumi was also present, the report said. The Mehr News discussion attacked the “betrayal of the UAE in the signing of the agreement to normalize relations with the Zionist enemy.” Qaddumi said the agreement has crossed a redline and Israel is now more secure than in the past. The extremists asserted that Israel was like a criminal running free without anyone to put it on trial. He pointed out that when Egypt had signed a peace deal with Israel, the Arab League had suspended Egypt and moved its headquarters temporarily from Cairo. Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989. Hamas is outraged, the representative told Iran. “Nations and our educated class have a great responsibility in questioning friendly countries for normalizing relations.” He said the “Zionist regime is an enemy and will remain an enemy. The destiny of the [Zionist] regime is destruction and decay, and whoever has a relationship with it will be transferred to the dustbin of history.” The PIJ representative connected the current state of affairs in the Arab world to the era of 1979 prior to the Islamic Revolution, adding that the region needs a revolution like the one brought by Muhammad’s grandson Imam Hussein, who is venerated by Shi’ites. PIJ is a Palestinian group but often acts as an Iranian proxy. Although it is made up of Sunnis, it has adopted Iran’s Shi’ite iconography in these statements. Today, the American project is a project of infidels,” said Abu Sharif. “Unfortunately, the Arab governments are being won over by the projects of the United States and the Zionist regime… the governments are corrupt without exception.” He called for a revolution in the region against the recent trend of normalization of ties. Overall, the comments appear to represent desperation on behalf of Iran and its allies among the Palestinians. The attempt to try to rekindle a revolutionary spirit like in 1979 or to encourage the Arab League to react as it did then is far-fetched.The interview nevertheless represents Iran’s attempt to spread slander against the UAE and also to encourage discord and protests in the region. So far there have been few protests against the UAE-Israel agreement.
 

Iran, IAEA Chief Say Talks in Tehran Were 'Constructive'
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Talks with the UN nuclear watchdog's chief were constructive, Iran's top nuclear official Ali Akbar Salehi was quoted as saying on Tuesday, after meeting Rafael Grossi during a visit to seek access for inspectors to two suspected former atomic sites. Grossi's trip comes after Washington last week pressed the UN Security Council to reimpose sanctions on Tehran that were lifted under Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, from which the United States has withdrawn. Iranian authorities said Grossi's visit was not related to US moves to reimpose sanctions. "Our conversation today was very constructive. It was agreed that the agency will carry out its independent and professional responsibilities and Iran will fulfil its legal commitments," said Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, according to the Students News Agency ISNA. "A new chapter of cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency will start." The IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution in June putting pressure on Iran to let inspectors into the sites because they could still host undeclared nuclear material, or traces of it. Grossi said on Saturday he would address "the outstanding questions, in particular, the issue of the access".
"There is no political approach towards Iran ... There are issues that need to be addressed ... this does not mean a political approach towards Iran," Grossi said after meeting Salehi. Tehran said on Monday that Grossi's visit would "strengthen ties and build trust" between Tehran and the IAEA, "as long as the IAEA moves based on impartiality, independence and distances itself from political pressure of another countries"."The IAEA will not let third countries impact its relations with any other country," Grossi said, according to Iranian media. Grossi will meet President Hassan Rouhani, the foreign minister and other senior officials during his visit.

Canada Demands Answers from Iran over Ukraine Jet
Asharq Al-Awsat/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Canada said it was demanding answers from Iran over the mistaken downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet after Tehran's "limited" initial report failed to explain why it fired missiles at the plane. Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 crashed shortly after taking off from Tehran's main airport on January 8. Iran admitted days later that its forces had accidentally shot down the Kiev-bound Boeing 737-800, killing all 176 people on board, including 55 Canadians. The Canadian government said Sunday it had received a copy of the Iranian report on the cockpit voice recorders.
"This preliminary report only provides limited and selected information regarding this tragic event," Foreign Minister Francois-Philippe Champagne and Transport Minister Marc Garneau said in a statement. "The report only mentions what transpired after the first missile strike but not the second and only confirms information that we already know." "We expect the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide an answer on important questions of why the missiles were launched in the first place and why the airspace was open," they added. "These are the questions that Canada, Canadians and most importantly, the families of the innocent victims need answered." Iranian officials on Sunday said the cockpit voice recorder showed the pilots were still alive after the first of two missiles hit the plane. Iran, which has no means of decoding the black boxes, sent them to France for analysis in mid-July, nearly six months after the disaster.

Russia Says Armored Vehicle Attacked during Patrol in Syria
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
A Russian armored vehicle was attacked during a joint Russian-Turkish patrol in Syria's northwestern Idlib province, Russia's Defense Ministry said, according to the Interfax news agency, adding that two servicemen had been injured.
Turkey's Defense Ministry said on Twitter a convoy vehicle had been lightly damaged due to an explosion during the patrol, adding the area was "immediately covered by fire." It said the operation was still underway. Russia and Turkey began the patrols in March after agreeing a ceasefire in the area following weeks of clashes that brought Ankara and Moscow close to direct confrontation and displaced nearly a million people. The two militaries have so far carried out 26 joint patrols. Earlier this month, Russia said joint military patrols in Idlib, carried out along the M4 highway linking Syria's east and west, had been suspended over increasing militant attacks in the area.

Sudan PM Says Talked With Pompeo About Removal From Terror List
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok said he held "direct and transparent" talks with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Khartoum on Tuesday, including over removing Sudan from a US state sponsors of terrorism list.
Pompeo landed in Sudan after flying non-stop from Israel on what he said was the first official non-stop flight between the two countries, as the United States promotes stronger Sudan-Israel ties. His visit is part of a regional tour following an accord between Israel and the UAE this month to forge full relations, and comes as Israel and the United States push more Arab countries to follow. The United States sanctioned Sudan over its alleged support for militant groups and the civil war in Darfur, during the rule of Omar al-Bashir Bashir, the long-time ruler ousted by the military in April 2019. Trade sanctions were lifted in 2017 but Sudan remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, which prevents it from accessing badly needed funding from international lenders. Hamdok also said in a tweet he and Pompeo discussed support for Sudan's civilian-led transitional government, and that he was looking forward to "positive tangible steps" to support Sudan's revolution. Pompeo said on Twitter after taking off from Tel Aviv: "Happy to announce that we are on the FIRST official NONSTOP flight from Israel to Sudan!"
The State Department said Pompeo's brief stopover in Khartoum was to discuss US support for the civilian-led government and for "deepening the Sudan-Israel relationship". Asked if Pompeo would announce a breakthrough in Sudan like normalization of ties with Israel or removal of US sanctions, a US official on board Pompeo's flight said: "It's possible that more history will be made." Ties with Israel are a sensitive issue in Sudan, which was among the hardline Muslim foes of Israel under Bashir. In February, ruling council head Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda, but cast doubt on any rapid normalization of relations. Sudan announced on Aug. 19 it had sacked its foreign ministry spokesman after he called the UAE decision to become the third Arab country to normalize relations with Israel "a brave and bold step".

Tehran Seeks Strategic Dialogue With Baghdad
Baghdad- Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
The new spokesman of Iran's Foreign Ministry Saeed Khatibzadeh said on Monday that Iraq is special to his country, adding that during the last visit of Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to Baghdad, the issue of a strategic document between the two countries was on the agenda.
During his first press conference after being appointed, the Iranian spokesman welcomed Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein's readiness to hold strategic talks with Iran and the countries of the region.
"Everyone is aware of the strategic relations between Iran and Iraq. Iraq has a special status for us, and during FM Zarif's visit, the issue of a strategic document between the two countries was on the agenda, and information will be provided as soon as it is finalized,” he said.
Khatibzadeh said his country welcomes this announcement and hope to hold strategic talks with Iraq as soon as possible.
The Iranian official’s statements come after last week’s visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi to Washington where he met with US President Donald Trump, describing their sit together as significant and successful.
They also come after Amman announced that a tripartite summit will be held between Jordanian King Abdullah II, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in Jordan’s capital within a few days to activate the “New Levant.”
The Iranian statements come with reports about Kadhimi’s delayed visit to Saudi Arabia in the coming days, in addition to talks about an electricity project between Iraq and the Gulf States in the coming year.
And while Iran spoke about its readiness to sign a strategic agreement with Iraq, the Iraqi Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture, Water, and Marshlands called for speedy government action to ensure a continuous flow of water from Iran. The Head of the Committee, Salam Al-Shammari, said in a press statement that the Ministry of Water Resources has indicated the great damage that will affect Iraq, especially in its center and south, from the low levels of the Zab and Sirwan rivers coming from Iranian territory.
He said the damage will first affect Diyala Governorate, especially the Diyala River, on which the province depends completely to irrigate millions of dunams of agricultural land. Concerning Kadhimi’s talks with the US administration and the New Levant plan, National Security Professor at al-Nahrain University Dr. Hussein Allawi told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper that the Iraqi PM’s visit to Washington achieved three important issues: it stressed national sovereignty through a timetable for the withdrawal of advisors and their redeployment outside Iraq in the coming three years, moved the Iraqi-US relations from the security-military level to the economic-advisory level, and finally separated Iraq from the US-Iranian conflict.

Parachutist Makes World's First Jump from Solar-Powered Plane
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
A parachutist completed the world’s first jump from a solar-powered aircraft on Tuesday after the plane soared to a height of 1,520 meters (nearly 5,000 ft) over western Switzerland, Swiss organizers said.
The two-seater prototype plane made the test flight in good weather and to promote renewable energy. Parachutist Raphael Domjan reached a speed of 150 kilometers per hour during his jump, landing near the project base in Payerne.
“Today there were many firsts but the most important is [this is] the first time ever that someone jumped from an electric aircraft. And this is something that is changing the future for this sport for sky divers,” said Domjan, the instigator of the SolarStratos project and who co-piloted the plane.
“It was the first time we did a solar skydive, I climbed with the energy coming from the solar cells of the plane,” he said.
In 2022, the team aims to carry out a high-altitude flight powered exclusively by solar energy, seeking to reach the stratosphere with an altitude of 20,000 meters.

Israel Bombs Gaza Militants in Response to Fire Balloons
Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Israel's military said it bombed militant positions in the Gaza Strip early on Tuesday in response to incendiary balloons launched into southern Israel farmlands a day earlier. It was the second night in a row that Israel bombed the coastal territory. Tensions between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza have intensified in recent weeks. Tuesday's strikes came as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was visiting the country as part of an effort to advance Mideast peace following the historic Aug. 13 announcement of a deal to establish ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. The army said in a statement that it bombed "military posts and an underground infrastructure" belonging to the Hamas militant group that rules the Palestinian enclave. There were no immediate reports of casualties or damage.
In recent weeks, Palestinian militants have launched scores of incendiary balloons into southern Israel that have burned large swaths of farmland. The increasing attacks appear aimed at pressuring Israel to ease the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip since Hamas took control of the territory in 2007.
Israel has responded to fire balloons and sporadic rocket fire with airstrikes on militant positions and says it holds Hamas accountable for all attacks coming from the territory. Israel and Hamas have fought three wars and numerous smaller skirmishes in the past 13 years. Last week Egyptian mediators tried to ease tensions and bolster the informal truce between Israel and Hamas that has largely held since the 2014 war in Gaza.

Turkish-Greek gas row boils up as each plan rival exercises in E. Mediterranean
DEBKAfile/August 25/2020
Old enemies Turkey and Greece have warned vessels to stay out of disputed parts of the eastern Mediterranean where both scheduled rival military exercises for Tuesday, Aug. 25. Germany has stepped in to defuse the row over gas and oil between the two NATO allies, before it explodes into open warfare, recalling the conflict that erupted in 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus. On August 13, President Recep Erdoğan warned of a heavy price for anyone attacking the Turkish drilling vessel Oruç Reis, which is exploring for oil and gas in waters claimed by both Turkey and Greece. The research, with naval escort, was extended up until Aug. 27 after a collision between Greek and Turkish navy frigates. Greece, which says the survey is unlawful, responded by announcing naval exercises in the area. Athens also said the United Arab Emirates would dispatch F-16 fighters to Crete this week for “joint training.”
The epic normalization agreement the UAE signed last with israel clearly has multiple layers. Israel’s offshore oil and gas rigs are visible on the E. Mediterranean skyline. In January, Israel, Greece and Cyprus signed a $6.86 billion deal to build a major 700km subsea pipeline from Israel’s offshore Leviathan and Cypriot gas fields to eastern Crete and on to Italy. This project and others may be overlapped and jeopardized by Turkey’s urgent drive for a stake in the E. Mediterranean energy bonanza. To prop up his claims, President Erdogan last year signed a bilateral agreement with the UN-recognized Libyan government of Tripoli for bringing parts of the E. Mediterranean under their bilateral control. More recently, Greece countered with a similar accord with Egypt. Turkey claims it owns exploitation rights within an area it terms “continental shelf.” Athens replies that all its inhabited islands are surrounded by a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. This claim is respected by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which Turkey is not a party. Although Greece belongs to the EU as well as NATO, Berlin appears more sympathetic to Turkey’s claims, while the EU has not agreed on new sanctions on top of those previously imposed for Turkey’s illegal drilling off Cyprus. France has pledged support for the Greek side of the argument. The conflict is also tightly woven into the Libyan civil war as well. There, the UAE backs the Haftar campaign against the Tripoli government, which Turkey is fighting for. And in this context, the Emirates’ peace deal with Israel may be seen as a blow not just to Iran but also to Turkey’s expansionist aspirations and support for Israel’s enemy, the Palestinian Hamas terrorists.

US blasts Turkey’s Erdogan for meeting with Hamas leaders
Joyce Karam/The National/August 25/2020
He hosted two of the group’s senior figures, both of whom the US has designated as terrorists.
The US State Department voiced its strong objection on Tuesday over Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to host a delegation from the Palestinian militant group Hamas last week. State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus denounced the meeting held in Ankara on Saturday and said it only served to harm Turkey’s relations with Washington and other western powers. “The United States strongly objects to Turkish President Erdogan hosting two Hamas leaders in Istanbul on August 22,” she said. The delegation was led by Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and included its deputy chief, Saleh Al Arouri; the group’s external head, Maher Salah; its head of Arab and Islamic affairs, Ezzat Al Rihiq; and its representative in Turkey, Jihad Yaghmor, a statement released by the group said. Masked militants from the Qassam Brigades, a military wing of Hamas, march with their rifles during a parade along the streets of Gaza City, Tuesday, July 25, 2017. The US State Department voiced its strong objection on Tuesday over Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to host a delegation from the Palestinian militant group Hamas last week.
State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus denounced the meeting held in Ankara on Saturday and said it only served to harm Turkey’s relations with Washington and other western powers. “The United States strongly objects to Turkish President Erdogan hosting two Hamas leaders in Istanbul on August 22,” she said. The delegation was led by Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and included its deputy chief, Saleh Al Arouri; the group’s external head, Maher Salah; its head of Arab and Islamic affairs, Ezzat Al Rihiq; and its representative in Turkey, Jihad Yaghmor, a statement released by the group said.
“Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation by the US and EU and both officials hosted by President Erdogan are Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” the State Department said. Ms Ortagus said the US would continue to raise its concerns at the highest levels about Ankara’s relationship with Hamas.
It is the second time President Erdogan has hosted Hamas leadership this year; a visit also took place on February 1. Hakan Fidan, the head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation, also attended the meeting on Saturday.
Those officials are Mr Haniyeh and Mr Arouri, each of whom has a $5 million bounty on their heads, issued by the US Rewards for Justice Programme. It accuses Mr Arouri of involvement in terrorist attacks, hijackings and kidnappings.
The State Department said the meeting undercuts efforts to counter terrorist attacks from Gaza. “President Erdogan’s continued outreach to this terrorist organisation only serves to isolate Turkey from the international community, harms the interests of the Palestinian people, and undercuts global efforts to prevent terrorist attacks launched from Gaza,” it said. The State Department statement represents a new development in the US approach towards Ankara on the issue of Hamas and the group's presence in Turkey. Hamas leaders have visited Qatar and Egypt in the last year but their meetings have not been met with such rebuke. Aaron Stein, the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, was not surprised by either the statement or the meeting itself. “This Turkish government does not view Hamas as a terrorist group, but as the party that won a majority in the 2006 election and was subsequently prevented from governing,” Mr Stein told The National. He also said it was an Islamist populist tendency that was driving Turkish actions. “There is Islamist populism underpinning Turkish rhetoric and propaganda. Those theatrics and propaganda are on display here, coming as they did on the heels of the UAE agreement [with Israel].” The US statement is validated, the expert argued, given Mr Erdogan’s tactic to hold this photo-op in light of regional developments. US President Donald Trump, however, continued to praise Mr Erdogan, telling former US hostage in Turkey Pastor Andrew Brunson on Monday about the good relationship the two have. “To me, President Erdogan was very good,” Mr Trump said.

The Latest LCCC English analysis & editorials from miscellaneous sources published on August 25-26/2020

Iraq government must choose between US and Iran — its people already have
Michael Pregent/Arab News/August 25/2020
U.S. President Donald Trump receives Iraq’s PM Mustafa Al-Kadhimi in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., Aug. 20, 2020. (Reuters)
The three things America wants Baghdad to know are: Iran is Washington’s focus, Daesh is bigger than the Baghdad pulse on the US presence, and the White House is prepared to deal with both Iran and Daesh at Baghdad’s expense and to its detriment if it continues its pro-Tehran position.
Why do I say Baghdad instead of Iraq? Because Baghdad is at odds with the rest of the country, it is the center of power, and 80 percent of the country wants this corrupt and loyal-to-Tehran system replaced in new elections. Elections that are free, fair and timely — as in, now. Elections that won’t happen without the consent of Tehran and to the benefit of parties tied to Tehran. Elections Iraqis demand.
Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s visit to the US last week was full of promises from both sides. Promises are easy, and this doesn’t mean the trip was a promising one. A “promising” description would mean that what transpired in Washington was highly likely to happen — but what was talked about and tentatively agreed to by Al-Kadhimi is something he will fail to sell to the Council of Representatives, which is dominated by pro-Tehran militia leaders in suits.
There were promises made to focus on the fight against Daesh; promises by the US to leave Iraq once Iraq can defend itself; promises to help Iraq’s economy; and promises to not mention, at least in public, the threat of Iraqi militias and Al-Kadhimi’s inability to take them on.
It was all public pleasantries and platitudes in Washington, but the message was clear: Iraq can benefit from a strong relationship with the US or it can be quickly abandoned if Baghdad continues to do nothing as security degradation continues to reveal the facade that is a sovereign and post-Daesh Iraq.
The militias tied to Tehran have primacy and Daesh is reconstituting where the US has pulled out along the Iraq-Syria border. The militias are taking over the bases the US is handing back over to the Iraqi government. Most analysts in Washington say Iraq is better than it has ever been, which is easily said, unless you are actually paying attention.
The US will remain in Iraq as long as Daesh is present and as long as the militias continue to threaten the region. The US is repositioning to areas where it has more support from Sunnis and Kurds; to areas distrustful of Baghdad and against Iran’s militias. This is what Nouri Al-Maliki and Hadi Al-Ameri believe, it is what the militias believe, and it is what they should worry about. Baghdad has a choice: Iraq can become like Syria, Yemen or Lebanon, or it can become one of the strongest economies in the region, with solid ties to the US, NATO and its Arab neighbors.
Security degradation will not allow for the economic incentives the US proposed during Al-Kadhimi’s visit. The message to Baghdad effectively was, “look what can be if you tilt away from Iran and look at what you will lose if you continue to let Iran dictate what Baghdad does.”
American companies are preparing to do things in Iraq that will move the country away from Iranian energy and forced dependence, which also happens to cost five times as much as the US rate. These contracts aren’t signed in isolation; they will complement the US moves to bring snapback sanctions on Iran and end the waivers for Iraq to use Iranian gas and electricity. Again, the wild cards — a Daesh resurgence and Iran’s militias — could derail international investment in Iraq. The proposed contracts will not happen while militias are attacking anything American with impunity and Daesh cells are active in previously cleared territory because the militias and the Iraqi security forces are not focused on them.
The government of Iraq has no interest in protecting its people from the militias, no willingness or capability to protect US and NATO forces from militia attacks, and no ability to protect opponents of the militias in government. How is Al-Kadhimi going to protect Americans working on these economic projects from a militia force that is paid and equipped by the Iraqi government yet answers to Tehran? Washington believes the UN will have to snapback sanctions on Iran next month. No member of the Security Council can stop a permanent member — in this case the US — from implementing snapback sanctions if Iran has breached its obligations under the nuclear deal. The International Atomic Energy Agency has stated Tehran is in violation and Iran has also stated its intention to violate the deal, meaning there really is no option to stop the US triggering snapback sanctions.
Snapback will mean the return of all sanctions on Iran that were lifted as a result of the 2015 nuclear deal. It means Iraq will become more important to Iran. It also means Baghdad will have to break ties with the pariah regime. There will be no more waivers, no carve-outs, as the US would be in violation of UN and its own sanctions if Iraqi violations went unpunished.
Iraq can benefit from a strong relationship with the US or it can be quickly abandoned if Baghdad continues to do nothing. It will also mean the militias tied to Tehran cannot be on the Iraqi government payroll without Baghdad being punished under US secondary sanctions. And political parties tied to Tehran will not be able to hold positions in Iraq’s parliament. The US cannot do business in an Iraq where Tehran’s parties and militias have primacy. It is a big deal and changes everything that is currently in place.
Iran and Baghdad may think they can wait out the Trump administration, but snapback sanctions will come into effect before the election and will hurt both. The regime in Tehran won’t have a say in the pain that is coming, while Baghdad has a say despite Tehran’s hold. If Baghdad chooses to distance itself from its subordinated relationship with Iran, then it will be insulated from the economic ramifications that will hit the regime hard ahead of the US election in November. If Baghdad chooses Iran — despite its population urging it to pull away from this toxic regime, which needs Iraq as a lifeline — then it will seal Iraq’s fate. That is until the protest movement becomes an armed revolution.
*Michael Pregent, a former intelligence officer, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Will the Israel-UAE deal be a catalyst for peace?
Yossi Mekelberg/Arab News/August 25/2020
There is much to celebrate about the unexpected announcement of the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, at least in terms of the timing.
The rejection of Israel as an integral part of the Middle East is no longer a realistic proposition, and is a view now held by only a small minority in the region. After all, the two countries with which Israel shares the longest stretches of its border, Egypt and Jordan, have already signed peace agreements with it, in 1979 and 1994 respectively.
In addition, the level of unofficial engagement by Israel with Gulf countries on an array of issues, from security and counter-terrorism to trade and technology, has increased considerably in recent years. This has become one of the region’s worst-kept secrets, mainly because those agreements have developed organically. In the current climate in the region, closer relations are a recognition of the fact that Israel and Gulf states have a number of common objectives, including regional stability and prosperity for their people, and that they equally face strategic threats originating mainly from Iran and extremism.
Although some of the hype surrounding the normalization agreement has described it as a peace agreement, Israel and the UAE have never been in a state of war with one another. By the time the UAE became independent in 1971, Israel had existed as an independent state for more than 20 years and, as such, there has never been a history of hostilities between the two nations — who do not share a border and are more than 1,500 miles apart.
On the other hand, the UAE’s solidarity with Arab countries that have been at war with Israel, and its sympathy with the plight of the Palestinian people living under oppressive Israeli occupation or forced to become refugees, dictated the absence of any official recognition and traditional diplomatic relations.
In recent times, however, conditions in the region have changed. A new generation has emerged and, with not only Egypt and Jordan signing peace agreements with Israel but also the Palestinians entering into a protracted, albeit unsuccessful, peace process with the Israelis and closely cooperating with them on security matters, the rationale for the avoidance of closer relations between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Israel has gradually eroded.
Yet there is a real danger that this development might lead to the marginalization of the Palestinian issue or, worse, to it being neglected altogether. Alternatively, one might hope that this change in the relationship between Israel and the UAE, a lead that could well be followed by other Gulf states, will create new opportunities if the Palestinians and, especially, Israel are prepared to take them.
While it is understandable that the Palestinians would be angry at an Arab country normalizing relations with Israel before there is a fair and just solution to their predicament, the UAE–Israel agreement could, and should, serve as a wake-up call for Palestinians that it is time for them to review and adapt their own strategy. While much sympathy and empathy remains throughout the Arab world for the plight of the Palestinians, it is no longer an overriding factor in relations between GCC countries and Israel. It is not only the cooperation between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities that has legitimized and served as a catalyst for the evolving relations between the GCC and Israel, but also a growing concern that the stalled peace agreement should not impede essential cooperation on, for example, containing the threat from Iran and its regional allies or other security challenges, and on developing trade, tourism and scientific opportunities. The Palestinian leadership should also see the bold move by the UAE as a signal that they should get their act together and unite their various factions with a common purpose. The deteriorating relations between Gaza and the West Bank, evidenced by the venomous animosity between Fatah and Hamas, is a source of exasperation for the Arab world, especially in the Gulf, and has consequently pushed Israeli-Palestinian relations further down the list of priorities.
Yet the UAE’s normalization with Israel represents a departure from the 2002 peace initiative presented by Saudi Arabia’s then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, and adopted by the Arab League in the Beirut Declaration. It stated that “Israel’s acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital” in return would result in “the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.”
The question that remains is whether we now have two different paradigms running in parallel, or a strategic rethinking of priorities whereby the UAE is leading the way for others to follow.
In other words, will other countries stick to the aims of the Beirut Declaration and not follow suit? Or will they choose to prioritize improved relations with Israel over the Palestinian cause, calculating that normalized relations will give them more leverage to persuade Israel to enter a genuine peace process?
Some might argue that instant evidence for the latter can be found in the fact that as part of its agreement with the UAE, Israel has abandoned its reckless plan to annex large swathes of land in the occupied West Bank.
This is a problematic argument, as it represents a further case in which a foreign country is preventing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from inflicting self-harm as well as harm to the Palestinians and the chances of peace with them. As much as one should welcome the removal of annexation from the agenda, it also leaves a bitter taste because it rewards Israel simply for agreeing not to violate international law, as it had been planning. The Palestinian leadership should also see also the bold move by the UAE as a signal that they should get their act together.
There is much to celebrate about the unexpected announcement of the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, at least in terms of the timing.
The rejection of Israel as an integral part of the Middle East is no longer a realistic proposition, and is a view now held by only a small minority in the region. After all, the two countries with which Israel shares the longest stretches of its border, Egypt and Jordan, have already signed peace agreements with it, in 1979 and 1994 respectively.
In addition, the level of unofficial engagement by Israel with Gulf countries on an array of issues, from security and counter-terrorism to trade and technology, has increased considerably in recent years. This has become one of the region’s worst-kept secrets, mainly because those agreements have developed organically. In the current climate in the region, closer relations are a recognition of the fact that Israel and Gulf states have a number of common objectives, including regional stability and prosperity for their people, and that they equally face strategic threats originating mainly from Iran and extremism.
Although some of the hype surrounding the normalization agreement has described it as a peace agreement, Israel and the UAE have never been in a state of war with one another. By the time the UAE became independent in 1971, Israel had existed as an independent state for more than 20 years and, as such, there has never been a history of hostilities between the two nations — who do not share a border and are more than 1,500 miles apart.
On the other hand, the UAE’s solidarity with Arab countries that have been at war with Israel, and its sympathy with the plight of the Palestinian people living under oppressive Israeli occupation or forced to become refugees, dictated the absence of any official recognition and traditional diplomatic relations.
In recent times, however, conditions in the region have changed. A new generation has emerged and, with not only Egypt and Jordan signing peace agreements with Israel but also the Palestinians entering into a protracted, albeit unsuccessful, peace process with the Israelis and closely cooperating with them on security matters, the rationale for the avoidance of closer relations between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Israel has gradually eroded.
Yet there is a real danger that this development might lead to the marginalization of the Palestinian issue or, worse, to it being neglected altogether. Alternatively, one might hope that this change in the relationship between Israel and the UAE, a lead that could well be followed by other Gulf states, will create new opportunities if the Palestinians and, especially, Israel are prepared to take them. While it is understandable that the Palestinians would be angry at an Arab country normalizing relations with Israel before there is a fair and just solution to their predicament, the UAE–Israel agreement could, and should, serve as a wake-up call for Palestinians that it is time for them to review and adapt their own strategy.
While much sympathy and empathy remains throughout the Arab world for the plight of the Palestinians, it is no longer an overriding factor in relations between GCC countries and Israel. It is not only the cooperation between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities that has legitimized and served as a catalyst for the evolving relations between the GCC and Israel, but also a growing concern that the stalled peace agreement should not impede essential cooperation on, for example, containing the threat from Iran and its regional allies or other security challenges, and on developing trade, tourism and scientific opportunities.
The Palestinian leadership should also see the bold move by the UAE as a signal that they should get their act together and unite their various factions with a common purpose. The deteriorating relations between Gaza and the West Bank, evidenced by the venomous animosity between Fatah and Hamas, is a source of exasperation for the Arab world, especially in the Gulf, and has consequently pushed Israeli-Palestinian relations further down the list of priorities.
Yet the UAE’s normalization with Israel represents a departure from the 2002 peace initiative presented by Saudi Arabia’s then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, and adopted by the Arab League in the Beirut Declaration. It stated that “Israel’s acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital” in return would result in “the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.”
The question that remains is whether we now have two different paradigms running in parallel, or a strategic rethinking of priorities whereby the UAE is leading the way for others to follow.
In other words, will other countries stick to the aims of the Beirut Declaration and not follow suit? Or will they choose to prioritize improved relations with Israel over the Palestinian cause, calculating that normalized relations will give them more leverage to persuade Israel to enter a genuine peace process?
Some might argue that instant evidence for the latter can be found in the fact that as part of its agreement with the UAE, Israel has abandoned its reckless plan to annex large swathes of land in the occupied West Bank.
This is a problematic argument, as it represents a further case in which a foreign country is preventing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from inflicting self-harm as well as harm to the Palestinians and the chances of peace with them. As much as one should welcome the removal of annexation from the agenda, it also leaves a bitter taste because it rewards Israel simply for agreeing not to violate international law, as it had been planning.
The Palestinian leadership should also see also the bold move by the UAE as a signal that they should get their act together.
There is also a tangible risk that the current Israeli government might reach the opposite conclusion: that improved relations with other states in the Middle East are not dependent on ending the occupation of the West Bank and the blockade on Gaza. As other countries establish normal bilateral relations, might Israeli authorities feel they can act with impunity in ways that further threaten the hopes for peace? Should this happen, it might be left to the Israeli electorate to realize what their government so intransigently refuses to see in the changing landscape of Israel’s geostrategic position in the region, as epitomized by the UAE normalization agreement, and at the next opportunity vote in a government that seeks genuine peace and integration in the region.
*Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations at Regent’s University London, where he is head of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program. He is also an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. Twitter: @YMekelberg
 

Arabs and Muslims to Turkey's Erdogan: "Why Don't You Protest Against Yourself?"
Khaled Abu Toameh/Gatestone Institute/August 25/2020
"Erdogan's Turkey has been normalizing its relations with Israel since the establishment of Israel." — Rawaf al-Soain, Saudi writer, Twitter, August 14, 2020.
"Erdogan is trading in the Palestinian cause. Turkey has had relations with Israel for more than 70 years, but it has done nothing good for the Palestinians all these years." — Abdullah al-Bander, Saudi political activist, Twitter, August 18, 2020.
"The statement was actually issued by Erdogan, the official sponsor of terrorist groups in the region. He uses these groups to destabilize the Arab countries, including Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Egypt.... Only the terrorist groups see him as the Emir of the Faithful and Caliph of Muslims... Where is his support for the Palestinian cause when he directs all his support to Hamas and ignores the Palestinian Authority? He hosts wanted terrorists in Ankara and allows them to establish radio and television stations to preach the Muslim Brotherhood ideology." — Adel al-Sanhoury, Egyptian columnist, youm7.com, August 21, 2020.
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to suspend diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates, in response to the UAE's agreement to establish normal relations with Israel. Judging from the broader Arab response to Erdogan's threat, the Turkish leader, rather than being perceived as any kind of Caliph, is perceived as a demented demagogue and a sponsor of terrorism.
In a statement that has raised many eyebrows in the Arab world, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on August 14 that he is considering suspending diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and withdrawing the Turkish ambassador from Abu Dhabi.
Erdogan's threat came in response to the agreement ("Abraham Accord") between the UAE and Israel to establish normal relations between the two countries.
A joint statement issued by US President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed Ben Zayed read:
"This historic diplomatic breakthrough will advance peace in the Middle East region and is a testament to the bold diplomacy and vision of the three leaders and the courage of the United Arab Emirates and Israel to chart a new path that will unlock the great potential in the region."
Erdogan, in response, told reporters that the Israel-UAE deal is problematic and that Turkey stands in solidarity with the Palestinian people. "The move against Palestine is not a step that can be stomached," Erdogan said.
"I have given the necessary instructions to my foreign minister. I told him we may also take a step in the direction of suspending diplomatic ties with the Abu Dhabi leadership or pull back our ambassador."
The Turkish Foreign Ministry also condemned the UAE-Israel deal for betraying the Palestinian cause. The ministry said that history will never forgive the UAE. "History and the collective conscience of the region will not forget and never forgive this hypocritical behavior of the UAE," the ministry said.
Many Arabs, particularly citizens of the Gulf states, scoffed at Erdogan for his threats to sever ties with the UAE after its agreement with Israel.
They reminded Erdogan that Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize the State of Israel. They also reminded him of his official visit to Israel in 2005 and the decades of military, strategic and diplomatic cooperation between Turkey and Israel.
Egyptian columnist Abeer al-Adawi pointed out that Erdogan, who is now denouncing the Israel-UAE agreement, had previously spoken in favor of normalization between Turkey and Israel. "Erdogan has double standards," she said.
Noura al-Moteari, a Jordanian writer, asked:
"Does Erdogan have a mental illness and a dual personality, or does he know for sure that his followers from the oppressed Turkish people and the Muslim Brotherhood follow him with blind loyalty and do not see beyond the end of their noses? How does Erdogan threaten to withdraw his ambassador from Abu Dhabi because of the historic peace agreement with Israel, while the Israeli embassy in Turkey is active?"
Echoing the same concern about Erdogan's mental status, Saudi political activist Monther al-Sheikh Mubarak wrote:
"I am sure Erdogan needs a psychiatrist. It has been reported that Turkey will serve Israel by transporting Israelis to the UAE at a time when Erdogan is objecting to normalization [with Israel]. There is no cure for stupidity."
In another post on Twitter, Mubarak stated:
"This is not a joke. Erdogan says he will withdraw his ambassador from the United Arab Emirates in response to its decision to establish relations with Israel. Those who have no shame feel that they can do whatever they want. Erdogan's wakaha (effrontery) has no limits."
Dr. Ahmad al-Farraj, a Saudi academic and commentator on political affairs, wrote that Erdogan has "reached unprecedented stages of underestimating the Arabs." Addressing the Arabs, al-Farraj said:
"How do you allow anyone to manipulate you and underestimate your minds? Where is the dignity of the Arabs? I am not angry at Erdogan, but at you, Arabs, because you have turned off your minds."
Abdullah al-Bander, a Saudi political activist, said in a video he posted on social media that Erdogan is known for his words more than his actions. "What's funny is that Erdogan was also the first Muslim leader to visit the grave of [Zionism founder Theodor] Herzl in Israel and meet with [then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon," al-Bander remarked. "Erdogan is trading in the Palestinian cause. Turkey has had relations with Israel for more than 70 years, but it has done nothing good for the Palestinians all these years."
Mohammed al-Zaabi, a political activist from the UAE, wrote that the decision made by his country was none of Erdogan's business. "This is a purely sovereign decision taken by the United Arab Emirates," al-Zaabi argued. "It is time for the crazy mouths to shut up."
Saudi writer Rawaf al-Soain also posted a video on social media platforms in which he mocked Erdogan for threatening to cut Turkey's relations with the UAE. "I have just learned that Erdogan is considering withdrawing his ambassador from the UAE in protest of the normalization agreement with Israel," al-Soain said. "But Erdogan's Turkey has been normalizing its relations with Israel since the establishment of Israel. Instead of protesting against the United Arab Emirates, why don't you protest against yourself? Why don't you withdraw your ambassador from Tel Aviv and expel the Israeli ambassador in Turkey so that we can call you a hero and supporter of the Palestinian cause? By accusing the United Arab Emirates, Erdogan is being silly and despicable."
Egyptian columnist Adel al-Sanhoury wrote that, at first, he could not believe that Erdogan had threatened to cut diplomatic relations with the UAE in response to its normalization agreement with Israel. "The news is true, and the statement was actually issued by Erdogan, the official sponsor of terrorist groups in the region," al-Sanhoury said.
"He uses these groups to destabilize the Arab countries, including Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Egypt. It seems that Erdogan is suffering from schizophrenia that surprises and confuses even his supporters."
The Egyptian columnist derided Erdogan's apparent ambition to present himself as the Caliph of Muslims while he is known for his empty talk and lies. "Only the terrorist groups see him as the Emir of the Faithful and Caliph of Muslims and believe his lies and double standards," al-Sanhoury explained.
"Where is his support for the Palestinian cause when he directs all his support to Hamas and ignores the Palestinian Authority? He hosts wanted terrorists in Ankara and allows them to establish radio and television stations to preach the Muslim Brotherhood ideology."
Commenting on Erdogan's opposition to the Israel-UAE deal, the Saudi newspaper Okaz editorialized:
"Erdogan's regime does not miss an opportunity to trade in the Palestinian issue and deceive everyone. Despite Erdogan's hypocrisy, which has become exposed to Arab and Islamic public opinion, his regime continues to play on the feelings of Muslims. The Turkish president appears to be applying double standards by ignoring the presence of his ambassador in Tel Aviv."
The strong reactions of many Arabs to Erdogan's threat is a sign that they understand that he is a conniving opportunist playing the Arab and Muslim card in an attempt to revive an Islamic caliphate under his rule.
"It is no secret that he [Erdogan] sees himself as the rightful heir of Ottoman rulers, and as such, intends to extend anew Turkey's influence over countries and territories formerly part of the Ottoman Empire," noted Zvi Mazel, a veteran Israeli diplomat who specializes in Arab and Islamic affairs.
Judging from the broader Arab response to Erdogan's threat, the Turkish leader, rather than being perceived as any kind of Caliph, is perceived as a demented demagogue and a sponsor of terrorism.
*Khaled Abu Toameh, an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem, is a Shillman Journalism Fellow at Gatestone Institute.
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Are Turkey and Greece Heading for War?
Uzay Bulut/Gatestone Institute/August 25/2020
Turkey has threatened to invade the Greek islands in the Aegean since at least 2018. A recent Egyptian-Greek maritime deal appears to have escalated Turkey's regional aggression.
"Turkey's policy is part and parcel of a broader strategy to expand Turkey's influence in the Middle East, the Gulf, and Africa. The aim is to impose geopolitical dominion: an undisputed regional hegemonic regime whereby Turkey is be able to determine big and important developments.... It appears willing to use military force in order to impose its revisionist plans." — Dr. Giorgos Kentas, Associate Professor of International Politics and Governance at the University of Nicosia, in an interview with Gatestone.
"Turkey is currently attempting a similar policy of revisionism against Greece. The aim is to impose a hegemonic regime over Greece's maritime zones and/or maritime zones that Greece claims in Eastern Mediterranean." — Dr. Giorgos Kentas.
"The Turkish economy found itself on its knees last time US President Donald Trump cared to send Erdogan a message over the arrest of American Pastor Andrew Brunson. What is keeping President Trump from doing that now?" — Anna Koukkides-Procopiou, a Senior Fellow and Member of Advisory Board of the Center for European and International Affairs of the University of Nicosia, interview with Gatestone.
Turkey has threatened to invade Greek islands since at least 2018, and a recent Egyptian-Greek maritime deal appears to have escalated Turkey's regional aggression. On August 12, Greece's Prime Minister warned about the possibility of an "accident" in the Eastern Mediterranean, as Greek and Turkish naval forces deployed in the area after Ankara sent a vessel to conduct seismic research south of Greece's Kastellorizo island (pictured).
The Greek Armed Forces are on high alert on land, sea and air, closely monitoring Turkish movements in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Greek media. After Turkey last month restarted prospecting for oil and gas in an area overlapping Greece's continental shelf, Greece deployed warships between the islands of Cyprus and Crete. Since then, tensions have run high between Turkey and Greece.
On August 12, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis warned about the possibility of an "accident" in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek and Turkish naval forces deployed in the area after Ankara sent a vessel to conduct seismic research south of Kastellorizo.
"The risk of an accident lurks when so many naval forces gather in a limited area, and responsibility in such a case will be borne by the one who causes these conditions," Mitsotakis said in a televised address.
Turkey has threatened to invade the Greek islands in the Aegean since at least 2018. A recent Egyptian-Greek maritime deal appears to have escalated Turkey's regional aggression.
The maritime deal, which was signed on August 6, set the Mediterranean Sea boundary between Egypt and Greece. It also demarcated an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for oil and gas drilling rights. The Egyptian-Greek move was widely seen as a response to a disputed agreement between Turkey and Libya's Tripoli-based administration, according to the newspaper Kathimerini.
Meanwhile, Turkey has been systematically violating the territorial waters of Cyprus and Greece. In May, the foreign ministers of Egypt, France, Cyprus, Greece and the UAE issued a joint declaration "denouncing the ongoing Turkish illegal activities in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and its territorial waters, as they represent a clear violation of international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea."
On May 15, the European Union announced that it "condemned the escalation of Turkey's violations of Greek national airspace, including overflights of inhabited areas, and territorial sea, in violation of international law." But the condemnation has not stopped the violations by Turkey. On August 5, for instance, eight Turkish military airplanes carried out a total of 33 violations of Greece's national airspace over the course of one day, Greek military authorities said.
After the deal between Greece and Egypt, Turkey again deployed a seismic research vessel to prospect for potential oil and gas reserves within Greece's continental shelf. Greece has again placed its armed forces on high alert. Warships were sent to the spot between Crete and Cyprus, demanding the vessel's withdrawal.
Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, however, continues defying Greece and Cyprus. On August 14, referring to Greece and other Western states, Erdogan said:
"They sent all terrorist organizations against us. We gave our response to these attacks in the language they understand through our operations in northern Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean. We gave [an answer] today too! We told them, 'Look, don't attack our Oruç Reis vessel. If you attack it, you will pay a heavy price'. And today they got the first answer."
"No colonialist power," Erdogan said on August 19, "can deprive our country of the rich oil and gas resources estimated to exist in this region."
Turkey is a colonialist power that has been occupying Northern Cyprus since 1974. The Turkish government does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a state, and claims 44% of the Cypriot exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as its own. Another sizable section of that zone is claimed by the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in the island's occupied north -- recognized only by Turkey.
"Turkey has adopted a revisionist policy in the Eastern Mediterranean," Dr. Giorgos Kentas, Associate Professor of International Politics and Governance at the University of Nicosia, said in an interview with Gatestone.
"Turkey's policy is part and parcel of a broader strategy to expand Turkey's influence in the Middle East, the Gulf, and Africa. The aim is to impose geopolitical dominion: an undisputed regional hegemonic regime whereby Turkey is be able to determine big and important developments. That revisionist policy is pursued by a mixture of soft and hard power instruments.
"With regard to Greece and Cyprus, Turkey clearly maintains an offensive posture. It appears willing to use military force in order to impose its revisionist plans. For almost two decades now, Turkey (under the leadership of Erdogan) has been developing a strategy to dominate over large maritime zones. [This] strategy is known as the 'blue homeland'. It begins from the Black Sea and extends through the Aegean Sea towards the maritime zones of Libya, Egypt, Israel, and Syria. Turkey believes that Cyprus and Greece must voluntarily submit to the parameters of the blue homeland, otherwise they must face the consequences of its military might. Turkey plans against Greece and Cyprus under a strategic doctrine of a unified front.
"As of the early 2010s, Turkey started an illegitimate program of seismic surveys in the maritime zones of Cyprus, supported by considerable aeronautic forces. In May 2019, Turkey launched an offshore drilling program in Cyprus' EEZ. So far it started and/or completed 7 drillings, at least one in Cyprus' territorial waters. Turkey has actually de facto extended its military occupation of Cyprus from the land it occupies as of 1974 to island's maritime zones. All that went mostly unanswered with the exception of some statements by third states and some symbolic sanctions by the EU.
"Turkey is currently attempting a similar policy of revisionism against Greece. The aim is to impose a hegemonic regime over Greece's maritime zones and/or maritime zones that Greece claims in Eastern Mediterranean.
"Turkey has developed the military might, and acquired the means, to challenge and revise the geopolitical momentum created by a series of delimitation agreements between Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. [Turkey] also undermines the hydrocarbon program of Cyprus. Greece now tops the agenda of Ankara in the framework of the blue homeland dominium."
According to Harris Samaras, an expert on the Cypriot EEZ and chairman of the international investment banking firm Pytheas, Turkey's foreign policy in eastern Mediterranean is largely an extension of its Islamist domestic policies.
"Turkey is an authoritarian country increasingly shaped by ultranationalist and Islamist forces," Samaras told Gatestone.
"Inspired by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have pursued policies that furthered the Islamization of the country, promoting religion, fundamentalism, and limiting individual freedoms and rights. Turkey globally supports Islamism and jihadism as in the cases of ISIS, Hamas, Boko Haram, al Qaeda and the Iranian regime, among others. It is thus accurate to state that Turkey is today among the most anti-American and anti-European countries in the world. It operates as a polarized engine of religious radicalism with a global reach."
According to Samaras, there are three main causes of Turkey's aggression towards Greece and the general Turkish jingoistic behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean:
"1. Erdogan desires to lead the Islamic world, a project aimed at fulfilling his ambitions – and better regional supremacy complexes – to seize the Muslim world's political leadership legitimated by consciously assuming the mantle as successor of the 'glorious' history of the Ottoman empire. 'Turkey', as Erdogan has repetitively stated, 'is a continuation of the Ottoman Empire'. This infers that as its leader, Erdogan is analogous to the Caliph. Note here the similarities with statements by ISIS leaders.
"2. While the vast majority of European and US leaders from all parties, including the intelligence community and the Pentagon, recognize the reality of Turkey, certain EU leaders, US diplomats and appointees continue to apologize for and rationalize Turkish behavior. They dilute measures to hold Turkey to account. Their denial of evidence about Turkey's regional malfeasance not only weakens the West and its credibility, but also benefits Russia, Iran and terrorism.
"Furthermore, and over and above, those elements who intentionally turn a blind eye to Turkey's violations of the Rule of Law not only encourage Erdogan to intensify his bullying and jingoistic policies, but also pressurize Greece (like they do with Cyprus) to strike an energy and sovereignty 'sale' deal. This is contrary to international law and an attempt to delaying to convicting Turkey, eventually justifying its atrocities.
"3. Erdogan's (and his AKP) popularity has slumped to the lowest level ever since his autocratic reign. This is a result of his systematic power grabbing, nepotism and corruption. The economy for one is in dire straits. Theatrics like the one with Hagia Sophia and the gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as bursts about the 'tyrannical' EU and Israel, are 'required' to direct the interests of his polarized compatriots elsewhere and away from the misery his foul administration has inflicted. Wrapping himself in a cloak of patriotism is part of Erdogan's agenda and his regime's propaganda narrative.
"Erdogan, however, is now anticipating that Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, his best ally and in many ways his 'accomplice', will compel Greece into discussions. He is hoping that under Germany's pressure Greece will 'conform' to selling part of its sovereignty. However, the Western world has to face and address the Turkish reality, the strategic reality that any possibility of a Western-leaning Turkey is gone."
Meanwhile, the US State Department has issued a statement concerning Turkey's activities in the region. "The United States is aware that Turkey has issued a notification to other ships of survey activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. We urge Turkish authorities to halt any such plans for operations and to and to avoid steps that raise tensions in the region," a State Department spokesperson said on August 10.
"Turkish aggression against Greece is really nothing new," Anna Koukkides-Procopiou, a Senior Fellow and Member of Advisory Board of the Center for European and International Affairs of the University of Nicosia, told Gatestone.
"For example, there have been myriads of air space violations in recent years. Turkey is just taking everything to a different level nowadays. This gradual tension spiral, first, aimed at testing the waters, both literally and metaphorically. But Greece has proven it will not go quietly, despite Turkey trying hard to set a maximalist agenda on its own terms, before negotiations ensue at some point. Turkey considers her use of force both a carrot and a stick for Greece to succumb to its claims.
"Second, there is no doubt that all the neo-Ottoman, anti-Lausanne rhetoric which Erdogan and his ministers have been making good use of should be taken seriously. It is part and parcel of a hegemonic bid to master regional leadership, as well as an attempt to woo audiences at home. An authoritarian ruler reigns by bread and games. Bread seems to be running out in Turkey at the moment, so there also needs to be a focus on games."
As for what the Europe and the US should do in the face of continued Turkish aggression, Procopiou said:
"There has been enough talk and little action. If Europe and the US are serious about halting Turkey's aggression, they need to show that they mean business. Europe keeps feeding Erdogan money while he is making a spectacle of democracy, international law and human rights. [These are] fundamental values which the European Union supposedly stands for.
"In essence, Erdogan has been ridiculing the EU, NATO and the US with zero consequences. Why should he stop? If the only reaction he gets is a shamble of a sanctions list in Europe - with only two inconsequential individuals' names on that list - and no enforcement of the American CAATSA [The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act], he is taking everyone for a ride. So, we could begin at least with that. The Turkish economy found itself on its knees last time US President Donald Trump cared to send Erdogan a message over the arrest of American Pastor Andrew Brunson. What is keeping President Trump from doing that now?"
*Uzay Bulut, a Turkish journalist, is a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Gatestone Institute.
© 2020 Gatestone Institute. All rights reserved. The articles printed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editors or of Gatestone Institute. No part of the Gatestone website or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied or modified, without the prior written consent of Gatestone Institute.
 

United Nations not thrilled about Middle Eastern nations uniting
David May/FDD/August 25/2020
The United Arab Emirates and Israel took the historic step of normalizing diplomatic relations this month. But you would never know how positive this development is for regional peace based on the United Nations’ tepid response, which focused on the Palestinians. The U.N’s continued perseveration about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict underscores how the international organization, whose mission is to promote “international peace and security,” has become an overt champion of one side of a conflict and a detractor of another side. To uphold its mission fairly and justly, this must change.
This was not the first time the U.N. promoted the Palestinian agenda to the detriment of regional peace initiatives. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat shocked the Arab world in September 1978 when he became the first Middle Eastern leader to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Three months later, in resolution 33/28A, the U.N. General Assembly condemned Egypt for bypassing the U.N. and for not resolving the Palestinian issue. The General Assembly followed up in December 1979 with resolution 34/65, which again argued that regional security, somehow subordinate to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, would deteriorate with an Egyptian-Israeli deal. Both resolutions drew heavily from reports produced by the U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
That committee is part of an infrastructure of pro-Palestinian institutions within the U.N. system. To be sure, Palestinians deserve international support. Even while their situation today in part results from decades of rejectionism by failed leaders who have openly engaged in terrorism against Israel and others, Palestinians need humanitarian assistance. However, the U.N’s unconditional acceptance of the one-sided Palestinian narrative has served to unfairly malign Israel and harm prospects for peace.
The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People was created in 1975, in the same session as the infamous “Zionism is Racism” resolution, which vilified the movement for Jewish autonomy. When the resolution passed, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Daniel Patrick Moynihan proclaimed, “A great evil has been loosed upon the world.” To this day, the committee produces a steady stream of anti-Israel resolutions that the General Assembly rubber-stamps.
The U.N. created additional bodies to assist in the committee’s work. The Division for Palestinian Rights, with an annual budget of nearly $3 million under the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, serves as the committee’s secretariat. The U.N. Information System on the Question of Palestine operates under the Division for Palestinian Rights as a pro-Palestinian propaganda arm. Tellingly, the U.N. has no other similar network of bodies devoted to promoting one people’s narrative, or to refuting that of another.
But the U.N’s pervasive anti-Israel bias does not end there. In December 1968, the U.N. created the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People, whose mandate is to investigate alleged Israeli abuses.
That U.N. committee is reminiscent of the U.N. Human Rights Council’s commissions of inquiry following Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. These commissions presumed Israeli guilt and were directed to focus only on Israeli actions. Indeed, the U.N. Human Rights Council has a rapporteur whose mandate exclusively calls for exposing Israeli crimes and not Palestinian ones. Systematic bias is hard to deny, as this flawed forum has produced about as many resolutions criticizing Israel as resolutions criticizing every other country in the world combined.
The U.N. also operates the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, a refugee agency devoted exclusively to the Palestinians. The agency maintains a broader definition for refugees than that of the U.N’s actual refugee agency, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, allowing an initial refugee population in the hundreds of thousands to balloon to well over 5 million by allowing descendants of refugees to claim this status. The Relief and Works Agency also indulges a fictional Palestinian “right of return” to Israel, which has emerged as one of the primary obstacles to Israeli-Palestinian peace, particularly as it has encouraged Palestinian obstinacy at the negotiating table. Remarkably, the Relief and Works Agency has three times as many employees as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and spends considerably more per refugee.
In recent years, the United States has begun to push back against these biased U.N. bodies. The U.S. cut funding to the Relief and Works Agency and left the Human Rights Council. The U.S. can do more, however. It should reduce its contributions to the U.N. by an amount proportional to America’s share of the budgets for the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division for Palestinian Rights, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices, and any other Palestinian-specific body. For example, the U.S. should withhold some $600,000, its share of the Division for Palestinian Rights’ budget.
Other countries are beginning to express concern about the U.N’s Palestinian bias, too. In recent years, the United Kingdom has opposed all Human Rights Council resolutions presented under an agenda item dedicated to castigating Israel. And, recognizing the discriminatory nature of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices, Ukraine departed the committee in early 2020. To build on this, the U.S. should encourage committee members with close ties to Israel, such as India and Cyprus, to follow suit.
New possibilities are emerging in the Middle East. The UAE has broken the taboo of normalization with Israel, while other countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, and Morocco, may soon follow. The U.N. should encourage this instead of promoting the false notion that Palestinian grievances should supersede support for peace and security efforts. When the U.N. encourages maximalist Palestinian demands, it makes regional peace less likely. Systemwide changes are needed.
David May (@DavidSamuelMay) is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defe of Democracies.

Will We Ever Handshake Again?
New York- Alex Williams/Asharq Al Awsat/August 25/2020
Forged in antiquity, the preferred office greeting of the corporate era has survived the peace-sign-as-hello 1960s; the deal-clinching high-five 1990s; and the bro hug of the past decade (a manly-man micro-Heimlich ascending all the way from the playing fields to the Obama White House).
But will it survive the coronavirus? The short-term prospects do not look good.
“We’ve got to break that custom,” Dr. Anthony Fauci, the country’s top infectious disease specialist, said of the original glad-hand in April, “because as a matter of fact that is really one of the major ways you can transmit a respiratory-borne illness.”
Obituaries for the venerable business greeting began almost immediately, with Time, Wired, and BBC foretelling the hearty handshake’s inevitable doom. An international gesture of good will now seemed downright dangerous.
“The handshake traditionally was meant to show respect in business,” said Myka Meier, the founder of Beaumont Etiquette, a manners consultancy based in New York City. “But now, by extending your hand, you may actually be doing the opposite.”
Half a year into the lockdown era, however, it’s fair to ask: Is the handshake truly dead, or is it simply hibernating?
Sweeping predictions made at the height of any crisis often turn out to be unreliable (remember all the “death of irony” talk in the immediate wake of the Sept. 11 attacks?). And sweeping predictions made in the middle of an enduring global crisis with no clear end in sight are the epitome of hypothetical.
It’s worth noting that the handshake has endured at least since the days of “The Iliad,” when, scholars surmise, the gesture may have served as a demonstration of peace among the warlike — proof that they were not carrying, say, a dagger in their outstretched hand.
But the outlook for now is murky, particularly at a point in history where millions are working from home, and empty office districts are seemingly competing as sets for the next Hollywood zombie apocalypse film.
“Let’s face it,” wrote Thomas P. Farley, the etiquette guru behind the Ask Mister Manners column and a new podcast for pandemic era social mores called “What Manners Most,” in an email, “if the only individuals you are encountering in the course of your day are the members of your immediate household, your Yorkie and the occasional food-delivery person, chances are, you haven’t had much need to worry about a substitute for that millennia-old greeting.”
Even so, strangers at some point will have to encounter other strangers in a business context and in real life. Greetings will need to be exchanged.
And with that, will we return to the handshake or, having been scarred by the pandemic, something else altogether?
The briefly popular elbow bump, for example, which pops up, usually with maximum self-consciousness, in some business contexts, never feels quite right. It seems both stiffly formal and subtly aggressive at the same time, like a ritualized thrust-and-parry move from a children’s martial arts competition — not to mention epidemiologically suspect if we’re also being advised to cough and sneeze into our elbows.
Early on, the “footshake” — a gentle, mutual tap of the feet, like a soccer steal in slow motion — started popping up in international diplomatic circles. But it was hard to say if this absurd greeting was actually less or more ridiculous than Jimmy Kimmel’s knee-to-knee “Patella Hello” that the late-night host jokingly unveiled in March. Those options exhausted, the search is on for socially acceptable stand-ins for the handshake that don’t look like silent-film slapstick. But where to find them?
We could look to Capitol Hill, where Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, for example, has championed a serene hand-over-heart motion. Studies have shown such a literally heartfelt gesture, familiar in Muslim cultures, can convey honesty, Mr. Farley said: “This body language is both warm and humble at the same time.”
Ms. Meier has instructed her clients to try alternatives she calls a “grasp-and-greet” (hands clasped at chest level, combined with a polite nod) and the “stop, drop and nod” (hands clutched behind one’s lower back, with a nod).
We could also look to a higher plane of consciousness.
At a recent networking event for entrepreneurs in Carlsbad, Calif., Elaine Swann, the founder of the Swann School of Protocol, a manners consultancy with offices around the country, noticed many mask-wearing attendees observing social-distancing protocols with a namaste. “The absence of the handshake can feel quite distant when interacting with one another,” Ms. Swann said. “The hands-in-front-of-the-heart gesture can convey connection and warmth toward the other individual.”
Or we could look to sports. The fist bump, reputedly popularized by a high-energy N.B.A. swingman of the 1970s named Fred Carter, has already become a common greeting in industries that skew young and cool: tech, entertainment, and, yes, sports, Ms. Swann said. The gesture may prove a useful half-step back toward the relative intimacy of the handshake, since it offers a hint of touch (and implicitly, trust), without actual finger-to-finger contact which might spread pathogens to the face.
It’s an open question whether these alternatives will serve as a temporary pandemic stopgap, like masks and jumbo bottles of hand sanitizer, or a permanent feature of the corporate landscape.
A lot of that depends on whether professionals returning to the office — presuming they do return — still find modern utility in this centuries-old greeting, or carry over the casualness of remote work and come to see the handshake as another 9-to-5 anachronism, like the embossed business card.
By one view, the old-school Don Draper bone-crusher already started to seem a little OK Boomer — even, by some arguments, sexist — in increasingly millennial professional circles.
Etiquette professionals interviewed said they believe the handshake will return at some point, in some form, though perhaps after an extended delay. But if this traditional greeting fails to survive the coronavirus, something important might be lost. Even in the most formal settings, a handshake involves touch, and even fleeting moments of physical contact (when welcome) bestow subtle psychological benefits, said Francis McGlone, a professor of neuroscience at Liverpool John Moores University in England, who has researched the effects of such contact.
“The benefits of a handshake are significant,” Professor McGlone said. “The nerve fibers of the skin that are activated by touch all have a cascade of effects. Touch lowers the heart rate, releases oxytocin” — the so-called love hormone — “which has a knock-on effect with dopamine, the pleasure neurotransmitter. This drives more social behaviors and lowers a stress marker called cortisol, which helps establish bonding and trust.”
Also? Anything is better than a wave through a Zoom screen.

Report Implicates Iran in 2011 Attacks on US Consulate in Benghazi
Washington - Hiba al-Qudsi/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
US intelligence agencies are sitting on a treasure trove of documents that detail Iran’s direct, material involvement in the Sept. 11, 2012, attacks in Benghazi, Libya, that cost the lives of four Americans. But until now, deep state bureaucrats have buried them under layers of classification, often without reason, reported the New York Post.
From CIA officers, military contractors, and sources within US Special Forces, the writer of the report, Kenneth R. Timmerman, learned of the existence of at least 50 briefing documents that warned of Iranian intelligence operations in Benghazi. Some specifically predicted an Iranian attack on US diplomats and US facilities. Those documents have remained inaccessible, including to the Select Committee on Benghazi chaired by former US Representative Trey Gowdy.
The CIA, the NSA, and Joint Special Forces Operations Command operatives in Benghazi and in Tripoli were actively monitoring Iranian operations in Benghazi in the months leading up to the attacks. Indeed, according to a private military contractor who contacted Timmerman from Benghazi in February 2011, Quds Force operatives were openly walking the streets of Benghazi in the early days of the anti-Gaddafi uprising. At the time, their presence was an open secret.
By the summer of 2012, US intelligence and security officers in Benghazi and Tripoli warned their chain of command — including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that the Iranians were preparing a terrorist attack on the US compound in Benghazi. These increased Iranian preparations prompted the head of security for Stevens, Green Beret Colonel Andy Wood, to send a cable to his commanding officer in June 2012 that the Iranian-backed militia — Ansar al-Sharia — had received their funding from Iran and were now sending their wives and children to Benghazi. Until now, the government has released just a handful of heavily redacted documents relating to Iran’s Benghazi operations. Throughout the Obama administration, officials with knowledge of the Quds Force presence in Benghazi, including security contractors who defended the CIA Annex in a 13-hour battle with the extremists, were repeatedly threatened with prosecution if they revealed what they knew. Among them was the then-director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Gen. Michael Flynn.
But financial documents provided by an Iranian source, and thus not subject to US classification efforts, shed significant new light on the extent of Iranian government involvement in the attacks. The documents, which include a wire transfer for 1.9 million euros from a known Quds Force money-laundering operation in Malaysia, have never before been made public. Only recently did the Iranian source give Timmerman permission to release the documents, which clearly show how Iran used the international financial system to funnel money to its Benghazi operations.
The person the Iranians put in charge of recruiting, training and equipping the Ansar al-Sharia was a Lebanese man named Khalil Harb. He was a senior Hezbollah operative, well-known to Western intelligence agencies. Not long after the Benghazi attacks, the State Department issued a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture — not because of his role in Benghazi, but for what seemed like plain vanilla terrorist operations in Lebanon.
Early on, Harb set out to identify and recruit Libyan extremists. Timmerman’s Iranian source says that a courier arrived in Benghazi carrying the equivalent of $8 million to $10 million in 500 euro notes around three weeks before the attacks. The money came from Quds Force accounts in Malaysia at the First Islamic Investment Bank, an IRGC front proudly operated by Babak Zanjani, a 41-year-old billionaire who called himself a “financial bassiji” [militiaman].
In interviews with Iranian and Western reporters, Zanjani boasted that he was laundering oil money for the regime so they could slip the noose of international financial sanctions. He claimed to be worth $13.5 billion, and bragged that he was blending Iranian oil on the high seas with oil from Iraq then selling it as non-Iran origin.

Is the Lockdown Making You Depressed, or Are You Just Bored?
Richard A. Friedman/The New York Times/August 25/2020
There has been a lot of talk recently about how the coronavirus pandemic has unleashed a mental health epidemic of depression and anxiety.
That the pandemic has amped up our stress levels is certainly true. Indeed, there have been a few highly publicized surveys showing that levels of general psychological distress are on the rise. But I worry that calling this a wave of clinically significant depression or anxiety might be premature. What if we’re just bored out of our minds?
Many of my patients who have struggled with depression and anxiety have, surprisingly, not experienced flare-ups of their psychiatric illnesses over the course of the past few months. They do, however, say that they feel bored and frustrated. Lots of friends and colleagues, too, say that life has taken on a stultifying quality of sameness.
The truth is that we don’t know yet whether what we’re seeing in these surveys will bloom into a full-fledged mental health epidemic. The surveys are, after all, quick snapshots of how we feel during a relatively brief period in time. Their results need to be corroborated by follow-up studies.
And to be sure, little of what we’re experiencing now is pleasant. But it’s worth remembering that boredom is a normal emotional state that we shouldn’t conflate with a serious illness like depression. That doesn’t mean, however, that we shouldn’t address it.
Clinical depression is characterized by an inability to experience pleasure, insomnia, loss of self-esteem and suicidal thinking and behavior, among other symptoms. In boredom, the capacity for pleasure is totally intact, but it is thwarted by an internal or external obstacle — like being quarantined. (Boredom also produces none of the other symptoms of depression.)
While boredom isn’t depression, the mass experience of boredom isn’t something frivolous. In fact, boredom is an aversive and nearly universal psychological experience that can lead to trouble, which makes it worthy of our attention.
If you wanted to design an experiment to bring about boredom, you couldn’t do better than the pandemic. Cooped up in our homes and apartments, we’ve been stripped of our everyday routine and structure. And without distractions, we are left feeling under-stimulated. It is this state of restless desire to do something — anything! — without a way of achieving our goal (if we even know what it is) that is the essence of boredom.
People will go to remarkable lengths to escape these feelings. Consider the following experiment: Researchers asked a group of people to spend just 15 minutes in a room and instructed them to entertain themselves with their own thoughts. They were also given the opportunity to self-administer a negative stimulus in the form of a small electric shock. Strikingly, 67 percent of men and 25 percent of women found being alone with their own thoughts so unpleasant that they chose negative stimulation over no stimulation.
This suggests that self-reflection can be intrinsically aversive and that we have a near hysterical dread of boredom. Is it any surprise that we structure our lives to avoid it?
Apparently, this wasn’t always so. The very concept of boredom seems to be a modern invention. As Luke Fernandez and Susan J. Matt wrote recently in Salon, the word boredom did not enter the lexicon until the mid-19th century. Before that, tedium was an expected part of life. It was only with the rise of consumer culture in the 20th century that people were promised nearly continuous excitement; boredom was the inevitable consequence of such unrealistic expectations.
Mr. Fernandez and Ms. Matt posit that our modern intolerance of boredom might even be fueling the spread of the coronavirus, as novelty seekers who have had enough of the lockdown head to bars, beaches and amusement parks.
The fact is that humans crave, to a varying degree, stimulation, and a quarantine effectively prevents us from getting very much of it. Those who are more novelty and sensation seeking, like teenagers, are particularly prone to boredom.
Being bored might feel intolerable, but, unlike clinical depression, it will never seriously impair your function or kill you. While depression calls for treatment, boredom is a normal state. It doesn’t need medical treatment any more than everyday unhappiness requires an antidepressant.
But we can still do something about it. We can, perhaps, even take advantage of it. Sure, boredom is a signal that we’re underaroused, but if we sit long enough with our uncomfortable thoughts and feelings, boredom could provide us with an opportunity to rethink whether we are spending our lives in a way that is rewarding and meaningful to us. What things might we change to make life — and ourselves — more interesting?
I do not mean to suggest that the pandemic might not cause an increase in serious mental illness; that’s certainly possible. I’m simply saying that it’s premature to make that judgment. In the meantime, however, let’s not medicalize everyday stress. And let’s not dread boredom, but try to use it to our good.
*Dr. Richard A. Friedman is a psychiatrist.

Boris Johnson's Toxic Inheritance From Margaret Thatcher
Martin Ivens/Asharq Al-Awsat/Tuesday, 25 August, 2020
Pundits are rightly accused of exercising the wisdom of hindsight, but some political disasters really are inevitable and have been loudly predicted before the event.
The UK government’s most recent fiasco, over the grading of state examination results for 18-year-old school students, was one such event. It was an accident waiting to happen and everyone seemed to know it, except Boris Johnson’s ministers and the regulator in charge.
There’s a deeper lesson here for the ruling Conservative Party: If it wants to avoid being blamed for these regular bureaucratic crises — or, even better, if it wants more competent management of public services — it must give up its addiction to a highly centralized state, where the buck can only stop with the politician in charge.
Johnson says he wants his to be a transforming administration. For the country’s sake, one can only hope that he means it. The Conservatives have to learn the lesson that comes hardest to British politicians of all stripes by decentralizing powers far beyond the cloistered world of Whitehall, where civil servants and politicians exist cheek by jowl and compound each others’ policy mistakes.
The exam-grade debacle shows the system’s inadequacies. Back in early July, a House of Commons committee report, chaired by a feisty Tory MP, warned that the education regulator, Ofqual, was heading for trouble after the latter ingeniously decided to give an algorithm the job of deciding A-level exam grades. The report said the algorithm would favor the kids of rich parents taught in small classes in private schools. Bright children in big state schools would suffer. In August this prediction was amply fulfilled. Ofqual and the Education Secretary Gavin Williamson had sat on their hands and screwed up.
Williamson duly stuck the blame on Ofqual. In his self-serving view, he wasn’t politically accountable. Ministers set the policy, goes the theory, civil servants are responsible for implementation — and errors.
Yet it’s the politician’s job to intervene when emergencies loom. There’s no such thing as “arms length” in a crisis affecting anxious 18-year-olds with university offers to fill and their even more worried parents. Williamson and his ministry failed to act, even though he had the power to intervene. Eventually, he was forced to fall back on teacher estimates for the grades, such was the outcry.
The education secretary has form: He botched the reopening of schools in the summer term. Instead of taking headteachers into his confidence and providing reassurance about the health of teachers as well as children, he ran into the brick wall of militant trade unions. As a skillful political intriguer and Johnson supporter, he’s unlikely to be sacked. The prime minister and his chief adviser, Dominic Cummings, hate giving their enemies a scalp.
Conservative politicians ever since Margaret Thatcher have tried to shuffle off their responsibilities for state services in this way. Her government led the world in privatizing national industries, but never got to grips with the reform of public services.
The Iron Lady’s nemesis was the long dead Labour politician who set up Britain’s National Health Service and represented the spirit of the post-war welfare state, Aneurin Bevan. This fiery socialist famously announced that “the sound of a dropped bedpan in Tredegar” in his native Wales should reverberate around the Palace of Westminster. Seventy years on, ministerial accountability for “dropped bedpans” — or dropped exam grades for promising working class kids — still exists despite the best efforts of Thatcher’s own ideological bedfellows to avoid it.
Her solution was to invent arms-length bodies to run public institutions, often led by a businessman who allegedly “knew about the real world.” It wasn’t a bad idea in principle, and it made for an easier life for her ministers: At last there was someone else to blame when Mrs Smith’s hernia operation was postponed.
But, in practice, lines of responsibility will always be blurred and the political opposition, the press, and the public will always aim their brickbats at ministers when things go wrong. Some corporate bosses are also hopeless at making the trade-offs and compromises involved in providing a cash-limited, highly politicized public service. Cummings believes this system is bust, though he has yet to improve upon it.
Matthew Hancock, the health secretary, has taken drastic measures to discipline one underperforming state institution, Public Health England, the body responsible for looking after Brits’ wellbeing. It unwisely spurned private-sector offers to help with testing for the COVID virus at the height of the crisis and will now be rolled into a super-agency also responsible for test and tracing, and biosecurity.
It’s far from certain that this change will bring much improvement. The new agency will be placed in the hands of a telecoms executive, Dido Harding, who has no public health experience. In effect, it will be brought very close to the NHS and managed by Hancock. It’s another example of central government creep. Other countries with federal systems devolve powers to local authorities, so avoiding an overreliance on single institutions. That’s one long-term answer to the British disease of poor, unaccountable state services, but it also means changing the centralizing course adopted by governments of all parties for the last 80 years. Reinventing government is an arduous and thankless task. In theory, this government has the majority to do it, but until then the buck must stop with ministers. As Thatcher once said, “There is no alternative.”

Biden’s Loose Lips Could Sink His Chances
Bret Stephens/The New York Times/August, 25/2020
If Joe Biden isn’t careful, Donald Trump might have a new nickname for him: “Shutdown Joe.” Or maybe, “Shut Down Joe.” Those monikers came to mind after the former vice president’s biggest blunder in the campaign thus far.
I’m referring to Biden’s comment, in his interview last week with ABC’s David Muir, that if scientists advised him to shut down the country again to contain a winter surge of Covid-19 and the flu, “I would shut it down; I would listen to the scientists.” It’s the sort of remark that surely plays well with voters who already support him. It might even have notional majority support.
But it doesn’t help with the voters Biden needs to avoid antagonizing in swing districts.
Few stories bring that reality into sharper focus than Simon Romero’s report in Monday’s Times on New Mexico’s neck-and-neck congressional race between first-term Democratic incumbent, Rep. Xochitl Torres Small, and Yvette Herrell, her Republican challenger. New Mexico has trended Democratic in recent years, and a June poll had Biden with a comfortable lead in the state.
But Romero reports red-hot anger in the district over the restrictive coronavirus policies of the Democratic governor, Michelle Lujan Grisham, that have helped keep case counts low at a painful economic price. There is “open defiance by sheriffs, business owners and many others of Ms. Lujan Grisham’s policies.” Turnout in the GOP primary surged by more than 40 percent over 2016, as against a Democratic increase of 5 percent.
“The strategy of running hard to the right by avowing loyalty to Mr. Trump while blasting Democrats for problems associated with the pandemic,” Romero adds, “could be working for Ms. Herrell, who lost the 2018 race by fewer than 4,000 votes.”
What’s happening in Torres Small’s district, which in 2016 went for Trump by a 10-point margin, isn’t going to decide the presidential race, even in New Mexico. But it offers a taste of a powerful current of anxiety and resentment that Trump has positioned himself to exploit, and that — to judge by his shutdown remark — Biden doesn’t seem to grasp.
The anxiety is from people hanging on by their fingernails (if they’re still hanging on at all) to jobs, businesses, livelihoods and homes on account of a pandemic whose toll in lives and health can be weighed against the costs of fighting it. In the hierarchy of fears, what is Covid-19 to a healthy 35-year-old restaurateur next to the prospect of losing everything except a meager government check?
The resentment goes just as deep among those who feel talked down to by people whose own track record as experts leaves something to be desired. Remember when (on Feb. 29) the surgeon general tweeted, “Seriously people — STOP BUYING MASKS”? Remember when the most urgent national need was for more ventilators — until those fears proved largely unfounded? Remember the scientists who hypocritically failed to abide by the sort of strictures they demanded of the public?
None of this is a failure of science per se, or an excuse for reckless personal behavior. It is certainly no justification for Trump’s appalling management of the crisis, particularly his failure to promote and provide for adequate testing. But it is a failure by people who claim to speak, with unassailable authority, in the name of science. And loose talk of nationwide shutdowns plays into the fears of voters who feel they have been both impoverished and patronized.
The danger Biden now courts is twofold. He is promising to hand over his decision-making authority to unelected people who, whatever their education, expertise or virtues, haven’t gained the trust of fence-sitting voters.
And he is proposing to resort to a strategy that, as Wall Street Journal reporter Greg Ip reported on Monday, is now being viewed by some economists and even health experts as “an overly blunt and economically costly tool” that could have been avoided in favor of “alternative strategies that could slow the spread of the epidemic at much less cost.”
All of this creates a dangerous opening for Trump. Voters won’t necessarily turn to Biden if they feel he will merely rubber-stamp the same set of policies that they wanted to avoid in the first place. Democracies elect leaders to lead, not defer; to occasionally buck conventional wisdom, not parrot it.
Biden and his advisers may suppose they’re on a glide path to re-election against a manifestly flawed and failed incumbent. But they face an opponent who fights best when he’s cornered, and who will take the same ruthless political advantage of Biden’s line that George W. Bush’s campaign did of John Kerry’s calamitous classic about the Iraq war, “I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted against it.” The Hippocratic oath for the Biden campaign should be, “First, do no self-harm.”
The next time Biden is asked about lockdowns, he might cite a line from John F. Kennedy: “Scientists alone can establish the objectives of their research, but society, in extending support to science, must take into account its own needs.” That’s a line to win over a wavering voter.

The Greater Middle East: From the “Arab Spring” to the “Axis of Failed States”

دراسة قيمة عنوانها الشرق الأوسط الكبير من الربيع العربي إلى محور الجول الفاشلة

متوفرة بي دي أف وورد/الرابطين في أسفل
Anthony H. Cordesman/Centre For Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)/August 24/2020
Click below To Read The Report

https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states?fbclid=IwAR1TB15W8DMiZyG8mGJs4HmhagpSj4Tti-vTW7_KXgtsV5qU0zT35Q6yoaE

https://www.csis.org/analysis/greater-middle-east-arab-spring-axis-failed-states
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200824_MENA_Axis_Failed_States.pdf

We have come a long way from the hopes associated with Camp David, “Globalism,” “the end of history,” the end of the First Gulf War in 1991, and the first year of the Arab Spring in 2011 – almost all of it in the wrong direction. From a “realist” perspective, the greater Middle East has deteriorated over time, and in ways that go far beyond its conflicts, competing ideologies and faiths, and the petty power struggles of its ruling elites.
Accordingly, it is time to take a hard, blunt look at what has happened to country-after-country in the region. Far too many have become “failed states” in ways that go beyond the threat posed by Iran, extremism, and ethnic and sectarian divisions. They have failed to make adequate progress in civil and economic reforms, and they have stopped short of reducing corruption and incompetence in national politics and governance. These problems are not specific to any one nation. They have become regional – made worse in virtually every case by the impact of the crisis in petroleum export prices and the Coronavirus on the local and global economy.
Looking at the Real Causes of Failure
It may seem a bit brutal to illustrate failure by scoring the level of failure in each country in the region – essentially highlighting its worst defects – and it is inevitably somewhat unfair by ignoring the fact that the level of “failure” is not all that different from the levels of failure in large parts around the rest of the world.
The United States could easily be classed as a Category A to Category B failed state by the standards used in this analysis for its failure to achieve lasting results from its long wars, for its lack of progress in dealing with racism, and for the scale of its failures to use is wealth to deal with inequities in income. The EU would score just as badly for its failures relative to its opportunities, and both China and Russia have drifted into levels of authoritarianism that would push their ratings down much further to Category D or Category E.
It is time, however, to look beyond terrorism, extremism, and Iran’s hardline politics. These are all real issues, as are the near-term humanitarian problems caused by the conflicts and power struggles in countries like Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. At the same time, far too much of the analysis of the greater Middle East focuses on only the immediate issues of one country or group of countries; on the current threat from “terrorism” and “extremism”; and on the threat from Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian issue, or the latest national political and economic crisis.
Far too often, the importance of other factors is ignored – as is the behavior and status of most or all of the countries in the region. As is the case in the rest of the world, this leads to false hopes and dysfunctional efforts at finding real solutions. These hopes are compounded in many cases by assuming that the latest reform plan will actually be implemented and be successful in spite of long historical evidence indicating that such reform – and most changes in leadership – fail or fall far short of their announced goals.
This tendency to ignore the key causes of failure in a given state is compounded when the scale and impact of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal discrimination and violence is largely ignored; when divided nations are treated as if they were unified; and when only national averages for economic and civil development are examined.
The same is true when national gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita incomes are estimated using the purchasing power parity (PPP) method in spite of economic change, urbanization, and a shift to real market price. It is also true when gross corruption and poor distribution of income is ignored or when countries report more favorable data or no data at all. It is also true when budgets disguise the true scale of national security spending and the actual size of the allocation of resources to power elites or a given section of a nation’s population.
Far too many national statistics are rough estimates or politicized. Unemployment and health data are particularly unrealistic, as is reporting on the treatment of foreign labor. Reporting on polls of popular trust in governments, in the political process, in the security forces, in government services, and in merit-based employment is often deeply disturbing – as is the near indifference to population growth and the social impact of urbanization and economic change (although the work done by the UN Arab Development Reports on youth employment is a notable exception).
Population pressure and demographics receive too little attention. Most populations are extremely young by global standards, and both the young and the elderly are exceptionally dependent on the number of people who are actually gainfully employed. It is worth noting that the U.S. Census Bureau estimates of population growth for the Greater Middle East as shown in this analysis demonstrates a rise from 112.7 million in 1950, to 411.4 million in 2000, and to 598.9 million in 2029 – in spite of war after war, political turmoil, and the creation of massive refugee populations. [1]
Virtually all of the countries in the Greater Middle East suffer from corruption and failed governance, from a failure to modernize and open up their economy, and from population pressure and acute problems in dealing with a “youth bulge” and lack of jobs. Authoritarian excess and human rights abuses are the rule, rather than the exception. Major inequalities in income distribution and by faith and ethnicity are all too common.
Many countries in the region seem incapable of helping themselves. They have reached the point where outside aid tends to do more to prolong problems than solve them, and instead allows their problems to fester and grow – rather than lead to real progress and solutions. This become all too clear when one looks beyond the crisis of the day, month or year – and examines the ratings and longer term trends in the UN Arab Development Reports, IMF Article IV reports, World Bank “governance and ease of doing business” rankings, UN and other demographic data, reporting on corruption by Transparency International and other organizations. It becomes equally apparent when one examines public opinion polls, and the comparative data on human progress and conditions from UN, IMF, Work Bank, and CIA factbook reporting.
Arms races and conflicts waste critical resource, and they create streams of casualties and refugees. The level of waste, failures in security operations, and excessive repression are highlighted in UN, U.S. State Department reporting, as well as in NGO human rights reporting by organizations like Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch as well as in studies of internal tensions by groups like the Crisis Watch.
The amount of excessive military and security spending is partly revealed in reporting by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and IHS Janes. The actual level of excessive spending and value for money in military security spending would be far clearer if there was reporting on all countries and equal reporting on internal security forces and efforts, covert operations, and monetary payments to other state and non-state actors.
Ranking Each Country in the Greater Middle East
The rankings that follow are rough working estimates that do address the full range of such issues and judge each state by its actual progress over time, particularly since 2011. They include every country in the Middle East, and they reflect an attempt to summarize the collective impact of these long-term reasons for failure of a given country. They are limited by the fact that they are subjective, only highlight a few points in each case, cannot as of yet address the lasting impact of the Coronavirus crisis, and is highly uncertain even from a relatively short-term prognosis for the next five.
The order in which states are shown is semi-geographic to give some picture of how the level of “failure” in any given state interacts with the levels in neighboring countries. Each country is ranked by its performance on an international scale. The rankings for the level of failure range from A to F, with F being the worst. These rankings also take account of the very different gross national income (GNI) streams and per capita gross national incomes in each country. They are also more demanding for the wealthier petroleum exporting states than the poor states lacking in such resources and that had lower levels of development.
A brief narrative summary of the reasons for the ranking then follows, drawing heavily on recent World Bank and CIA reporting. The next category then displays the latest ranking of each country by international organizations and NGOs. These data are then summarized in the following categories: a summary data on population pressure from 1950 to the estimated total in 2050, a country’s total pre-Coronavirus GNI and GNI per capita, and a summarized five-year prognosis.
All of the data used are supported by reputable organizations like the CIA World Factbook, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base – which can be referenced at the end of the assessment under “Notes.”
1. Morocco
Ranking: Uncertain Success
Summary: A poor state in economic terms, but it has made real progress towards reform after 2011, especially in terms of low repression rates by regional standards. Changes to the government, efforts to create a new economic model, and efforts to deal with youth unemployment have helped. There is real progress in building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy, but “major economic and population challenges” – coupled with loss of tourism income from the Coronavirus crisis – make success uncertain.
Problems remain in the southern region – or Western Sahara – and with the Polisario Front and Algeria. Morocco also experiences high unemployment, low labor force participation, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the “judiciary.” Significant youth unemployment problem remains.
“After King Mohammed VI’s July 2019 call for a government reshuffle—adapted to meet his country’s pressing development challenges—in the second half of 2019, Saad Dine El Othmani, the head of Morocco’s government, presented a new cabinet line-up composed of 23 portfolios, streamlined from the 39 in the previous government. In it, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) leading the coalition has seven cabinet posts, while the liberal National Rally for Independents (RNI) led by Aziz Akhannouch has four, strategic portfolios, including Agriculture, Economy/Finance, and Industry. The Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS) withdrew from the coalition the week before the government was formed in October 2019 and most of other government members have a technocratic background.”
“Members of the Commission for the New Development Model led by former Interior Minister, Chakib Benmoussa, were appointed by the King in December 2019. The Commission has been conducting extensive consultations across Morocco to gather feedback and recommendations on development bottlenecks and suggested pathways to reform. Its task is to develop a comprehensive roadmap to deliver to the King by June 2020, with a new vision for Morocco’s future.”
“To tackle youth unemployment, King Mohammed VI has urged the Moroccan banking and financial sectors to develop solutions to facilitate youth entrepreneurship and open up access to finance. The Intelaka initiative was launched in February 2020, offering a new generation of guarantees and financing products for young entrepreneurs and very small enterprises. A $625 million Trust Fund has been set up to finance the initiative, spanning three years and financed equally by the government and the banking sector.”
“The Covid-19 epidemic has triggered a number of radical, preemptive measures to counter its progress. In March 2020, Morocco closed its land and maritime borders and suspended all international passenger flights to and from its airports. Other measures were taken to limit social interactions. An economic watch committee, chaired by the Minister of Economy, was set up to evaluate the impact of Covid-19 on the economy and adopt mitigating measures to support the segments of the economy affected. King Mohammed VI ordered the creation of a fund of 10 billion dirham ($1 billion) to upgrade health infrastructure, support vulnerable households and help crisis-hit economic sectors.”
“To help Morocco cope with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank proceeded with the restructuring of a US$275 million Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Loan with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (Cat DDO). The restructuring adds a health-related trigger mechanism to the operation to allow immediate funding under to address emergency measures.”
“Morocco’s economic growth has been on a downward trend for the last two years. Indeed, GDP growth decelerated sharply in 2019 to 2.3 percent, down from 3 percent in 2018. This slowdown was mainly driven by the contraction of agricultural output by 5.4 percent and modest non-agricultural GDP growth (3.3 percent in 2019 versus 3 percent in 2017). On the demand side, private consumption contributed the most to growth, boosted by higher salaries and low inflation. The contribution of net exports remained negative, reflecting the low competitiveness of exports and their dependence on energy imports. Thanks to prudent monetary policies and declining import prices, inflation has remained low and controlled under 2 percent. The unemployment rate remains elevated at 9.2 percent—and is significantly higher among women and youth—while labor force participation has been experiencing a protracted decline to below 46 percent.”
“Following five years of strong fiscal consolidation efforts , the fiscal deficit widened anew in 2019 to an estimated 4.1 percent of GDP, driven mainly by lower than forecasted corporate tax revenue and grants from the GCC, and by increased spending on goods, services and capital expenditures. The proceeds from privatization allowed the reduction of the government’s financing needs to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2019. Consequently, the central government debt-to-GDP ratio has slightly increased to 65.7 percent.”
“The Covid-19 pandemic outbreak and the effects of drought are expected to impact the Moroccan economy negatively in the medium-term, with the economy also expected to suffer a recession this year, the first in more than two decades. Real GDP is expected to recede by 1.7 percent in 2020. The country’s economic outlook remains subject to significant downside risks, including a longer, more severe epidemic.”
“The country’s current account expenditure/balance returned to narrowing its trajectory, after widening to 5.5 percent of GDP in 2018. Preliminary figures at end-2019 reveal that exports grew by 4.2 percent, primarily driven by an increase in automotive and aeronautics exports. This increase was also reflected in a rise of equipment imports, because of growing public and private sector investment. Despite a drop in remittances and in net foreign direct investment, the performance of tourism receipts (7.7 percent) and a reduction in energy imports (minus 7.2 percent, given the decline in oil prices) have supported the decline in the current account deficit to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2019. The exchange rate remains stable following the 2018 widening of the exchange rate band from ±0.3 to ±2.5, which has contributed to improving the economy’s shock absorption capacity.”
“Growth is projected to accelerate gradually over the medium term, mainly driven by more dynamic secondary and tertiary activities. Its outlook is subject to significant risks, however. External risks include weaker growth in the Euro area, geopolitical risks in the region, and the uncertain global trade and capital flow policy environments, as well as potential disruptions to tourism and trade, at least temporarily in light of the recent spread of the corona virus. Domestically, the main risks are clustered around delays in structural and financial sector reforms, including critical tax system reforms which could adversely affect fiscal space and heighten social tensions, thereby affecting growth and external balances. Conversely, lower international oil and butane gas prices could support an attenuation of macroeconomic imbalances, whereas greater regional integration could contribute to medium-term growth.”
International Rankings : The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is only 121 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a moderate 44.2. Morocco has moderate corruption by regional standards (80th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Morocco “Good” at 53rd out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: Morocco: 9.3 in 1950, 28.2 in 2000, 31.9 in 2010, 35.6 in 2020, and 42.0 estimated for 2050. Western Sahara: 9,000 in 1950; 336,000 in 2000; 490,000 in 2010; 652,000 in 2020; and 1.2 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $116.4 billion; GNI per capita = $3,190.
Five Year Prognosis: Morocco will be dependent on further reform, outside aid, and recovery of tourism.
2. Algeria
Ranking: Category B Failed State
Summary: Algeria suffers from serious population pressure, economic problems, and failures to create an effective system of governance to replace former military junta. The military still dominates key elements of power structure; rule of law is uncertain; and security services can be repressive.
“Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has since largely dominated politics. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 legislative elections led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths - many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000.”
“Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA, with the backing of the military, won the presidency in 1999 in an election that was boycotted by several candidates protesting alleged fraud, and won subsequent elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014. The government in 2011 introduced some political reforms in response to the Arab Spring, including lifting the 19-year-old state of emergency restrictions and increasing women's quotas for elected assemblies, while also increasing subsidies to the populace. Since 2014, Algeria’s reliance on hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance the large subsidies for the population has fallen under stress because of declining oil prices. Protests broke out across the country in late February 2019 against President BOUTEFLIKA’s decision to seek a fifth term. BOUTEFLIKA resigned on 2 April 2019, and the speaker of the upper house of parliament, Abdelkader BENSALAH, became interim head of state on 9 April. BENSALAH remained in office beyond the 90-day constitutional limit until Algerians elected former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE as the country's new president in December 2019.”
The “economy remains dominated by the state, a legacy of the country’s socialist post-independence development model.”
“In recent years the Algerian Government has halted the privatization of state-owned industries and imposed restrictions on imports and foreign involvement in its economy, pursuing an explicit import substitution policy. Trade deficit and Algeria’s hydrocarbon revenues have halved in the recent years, contributing to a paid decrease in its currency reserves, which albeit still remain at a very high level.”
“Algeria is over dependent on petroleum exports and has made limited progress in diversification. Many aspects of the economy and social programs are dominated by the state, and are highly inefficient. The unemployment rate reached 11.7 percent as of October 2018 and is higher among the youth (29 percent in April 2018), women (19.4 percent) and university graduates (18.5 percent) as a result of the skills mismatch in the labor market.”
“Following a year of political uncertainty and social unrest leading to the deceleration of economic activity, Abdelmadjid Tebboune won the December 2019 Presidential election. In 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak will slow down consumption and investment, while falling oil prices will cut into fiscal and export revenues. The new Government has the difficult task to maintain macroeconomic stability, respond to the public health crisis and pursue structural reforms.”
“GDP growth moderated to 0.9% in 2019, compared to 1.4% during the previous year. The oil sector has shown a lower average contraction in the first nine months of 2019 compared to the previous year (-4.3% against -6.4% in 2018). Meanwhile, non-hydrocarbon activity grew by 2.6% over the same period, down from 3.3% in 2018.”
“Algeria is facing a combined shock from halving oil prices, a public health crisis and the consequences of global economic disruptions following the COVID-19 outbreak. An oil price at US$ 30/barrel in 2020 would decrease Algeria’s total fiscal revenues by 21.2%. Despite cuts to public investment (-9.7%) and public consumption (-1.6%) envisaged by the 2020 Finance Law, the fiscal deficit would increase to 16.3% of GDP. Meanwhile, the sharp decline in export revenues (-51%) will lead the trade deficit to expand to 18.2% of GDP and the current account deficit to peak at 18.8% of GDP in 2020, despite efforts to contain imports and weak domestic demand.”
“GDP is currently projected to contract by 3%, in line with contracting private consumption and investment, as well as falling public investment, which represents 44% of total investment. COVID-19 containment measures such as restriction on movement and gatherings, compounded by high economic uncertainty, will discourage private consumption and investment.”
International rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 placed Algeria at a low to moderate 21.7. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a low 44.2. There is very low corruption by regional standards (30 th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Algeria “Poor” at only 157th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 8.9 in 1950, 30.6 in 2000, 36.0 in 2010, 43.0 in 2020, and 55.4 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $165.8 billion; GNI per capita = $3,970.
Five Year Prognosis: Algeria will experience continued instability and inadequate progress, but there are some elements of hope.
3. Tunisia
Ranking: Category A Failed State
Summary: Tunisia has some elements of real reform in government, but there is inadequate economic reform and population challenges coupled with loss of tourism income from the Coronavirus. Tunisia did adopt new constitution and held parliamentary and presidential elections Tunisia has more practical political cooperation than in most regional states.
But, Internal constraints, such as the fragmentation of the political party system and related difficulties in reaching consensus on key economic reforms, have combined with external constraints, such as conflict in neighboring Libya, to slow down economic recovery and generate growing social dissatisfaction among Tunisians with the lack of employment. Youth…have been particularly affected.” There is also weak economic growth and serious employment problems.
“The country's first president, Habib BOURGUIBA, established a strict one-party state. He dominated the country for 31 years, repressing Islamic fundamentalism and establishing rights for women unmatched by any other Arab nation. In November 1987, BOURGUIBA was removed from office and replaced by Zine el Abidine BEN ALI in a bloodless coup. Street protests that began in Tunis in December 2010 over high unemployment, corruption, widespread poverty, and high food prices escalated in January 2011, culminating in rioting that led to hundreds of deaths.”
“On 14 January 2011, the same day BEN ALI dismissed the government, he fled the country, and by late January 2011, a "national unity government" was formed. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in late October 2011, and in December, it elected human rights activist Moncef MARZOUKI as interim president. The Assembly began drafting a new constitution in February 2012 and, after several iterations and a months-long political crisis that stalled the transition, ratified the document in January 2014.”
“Parliamentary and presidential elections for a permanent government were held at the end of 2014. Beji CAID ESSEBSI was elected as the first president under the country's new constitution. Following ESSEBSI’s death in office in July 2019, Tunisia moved its scheduled presidential election forward two months and after two rounds of voting, Kais SAIED was sworn in as president in October 2019. Tunisia also held legislative elections on schedule in October 2019. SAIED's term, as well as that of Tunisia's 217-member parliament, expires in 2024.”
“Following an ill-fated experiment with socialist economic policies in the 1960s, Tunisia focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism, all of which have become central to the country's economy. Key exports now include textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum products, chemicals, and phosphates, with about 80% of exports bound for Tunisia's main economic partner, the EU. Tunisia's strategy, coupled with investments in education and infrastructure, fueled decades of 4-5% annual GDP growth and improved living standards. Former President Zine el Abidine BEN ALI (1987-2011) continued these policies, but as his reign wore on cronyism and corruption stymied economic performance, unemployment rose, and the informal economy grew. Tunisia’s economy became less and less inclusive. These grievances contributed to the January 2011 overthrow of BEN ALI, further depressing Tunisia's economy as tourism and investment declined sharply.”
“Tunisia’s government remains under pressure to boost economic growth quickly to mitigate chronic socio-economic challenges, especially high levels of youth unemployment, which has persisted since the 2011 revolution. Successive terrorist attacks against the tourism sector and worker strikes in the phosphate sector, which combined account for nearly 15% of GDP, slowed growth from 2015 to 2017. Tunis is seeking increased foreign investment and working with the IMF through an Extended Fund Facility agreement to fix fiscal deficiencies.”
The new government faces an economic situation that is highly vulnerable to a deterioration of the global economy due to the coronavirus pandemic and volatile oil prices. Tunisia has high twin deficits and debt, as well as limited buffers; whereas growth is anemic, employment is stagnant, and inflation is relatively high.
“A worsening pandemic would negatively impact tourism; exports and domestic demand, and consequently growth; employment; and household vulnerability. A sharp reversal of recent oil price dynamics would exacerbate current account and fiscal pressures.”
“The economy is projected to contract by 4% in 2020 in a scenario where COVID-19 spreads globally with disruptions to travel and trade, as well as social distancing behaviors, all of which impact economic growth. This forecast assumes 2 to 3 months of social distancing, travel restrictions over the summer resulting in a large contraction of the tourism sector, and the gradual coming online of the Nawara field. The outlook is subject to major downside risks related mainly to the coronavirus pandemic.”
“Inflation is expected to continue declining under an outlook of lower oil prices and a continued tight monetary policy. Inflation pressures could rise in the scenario of continued disruption of trade flows with Europe and China which could force importers to adjust their supply chains and procure in potentially higher cost countries. Poverty is projected to go above 3% in 2020 using the 3.2 U$ PPP per day line and around 0.3% using the international poverty line.”
“The key risks facing Tunisia relate to the COVID-19 pandemic and the volatility in global oil prices. A worsening of the global pandemic would result in a further deterioration of the global economic outlook, a persistent disruption in global trade and value chains, as well as longer than expected global and Tunisia-specific restrictions to travel and activity combined with social distancing behavior that would lower domestic consumption. This would adversely affect economic activity in Tunisia and in particular tourism and exports, thereby leading to an additional slowdown in growth, job creation, and government revenue, as well as potential price increases of imported goods leading to higher inflation. This along with a potential reduction in FDI and remittances due to the pandemic would have knock-on effects on the fiscal and current account balances and the foreign reserve position.”
“A reversal of the recent drop in global oil prices would affect fiscal and external accounts. A disruption of global financial markets and the economic situation in a few oil exporting MENA countries could increase difficulties to finance fiscal and external balance deficits, but Tunisia remains mostly dependent on multilateral financing. Domestically, there are additional risks relating to reform continuity (in light of recent elections and the installation of a new government), socio-political tensions, and a deterioration in security which would adversely impact investment and tourism. Spillovers of instability in neighboring countries could affect economic stability.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking for Tunisia in 2019 is 91st out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a moderate 56.3. Tunisia has moderate corruption by regional standards (74 th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Tunisia “Poor to Moderate” at 78th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 3.5 in 1950, 9.5 in 2000, 10.50 in 2010, 11.7 in 2020, and 12.7 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $37.4 billion; GNI per capita = $3.360.
Five Year Prognosis: Tunisia has some real hope, but it will be critically dependent on improvements in governance and economic reform, and global recovery from the Coronavirus.
4. Libya
Ranking: Category E Failed State
Summary: Libya is experiencing a serious civil war, as well as deep internal regional and tribal differences. The impact of a weak structure of governance and economy under previous dictatorship is compounded by large-scale outside interference. Some elements of economic recovery have been “short-lived, stalled in early 2019 by the most serious political crisis facing Libya since 2011.” The outbreak of the war around Tripoli in April 2019 prevented Libya from continuing its strong economic expansion.”
Libya needs massive reform of economy and governance. “Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, has struggled since 2014 given security and political instability, disruptions in oil production, and decline in global oil prices.
“The Libyan dinar has lost much of its value since 2014 and the resulting gap between official and black market exchange rates has spurred the growth of a shadow economy and contributed to inflation. The country suffers from widespread power outages, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing have all declined since 2011.” The “subsequent failure of the political rivals to reach a sustained peace deal have taken a heavy toll on the economy, which the Covid-19 pandemic is further exacerbating. In this context, the production and export of oil has almost come to a stop since January 18, 2020, due to the closure of oil ports and terminals.”
“Continuing political uncertainty makes economic stabilization, let alone recovery, unlikely. Growth remains subdued amid disinflation. Expenditure rigidity is keeping budget deficits high, even though repressed imports contribute to current account surpluses, easing pressure on foreign reserves… Political resolution is needed to implement the reforms required for private sector- driven growth and the generation of new jobs—the country’s only path toward sustainable, shared prosperity.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is only 119 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a very poor 6.9. Libya has very high corruption by regional standards (168th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Libya at 186th out of 190 countries, one of worst in the world.
Population Pressure in millions: 961,000 in 1950; 5.1 in 2000; 6.4 in 2010; 6.9 in 2020, and 9.6 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Corona Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $ billion; GNI per capita = $7,640.
Five Year Prognosis: The winner of the civil war will likely prove incapable of effective reform and change, or the country will remain an intractable mess.
5. Egypt
Ranking: Category C Failed State
Summary: Egypt has steadily drifted towards authoritarianism and repression. There is uncertain progress in economic reform and excessive military role in politics, economic, and military spending. Population pressure is high and over-reliant on aid and uncertain tourism income.
“In April 2019, Egypt approved via national referendum a set of constitutional amendments extending el-SiSi’s term in office through 2024 and possibly through 2030 if re-elected for a third term. The amendments would also allow future presidents up to two consecutive six-year terms in office, re-establish an upper legislative house, allow for one or more vice presidents, establish a 25% quota for female legislators, reaffirm the military’s role as guardian of Egypt, and expand presidential authority to appoint the heads of judicial councils.”
“The country’s fiscal accounts have improved, but remain under pressure, mainly due to underperforming tax revenues. The budget deficit declined to 8.1% of GDP in fiscal year 2019, from 9.7% a year earlier. While the primary surplus continued to increase in early-fiscal year 2020, preliminary data indicate that the revenues-to-GDP ratio decreased, especially from VAT, which reflects weaker private consumption… Job-creation has been rather subdued, with the share of employed individuals within the working-age population remaining low, at 39%, and may be hindered further by the adverse effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Egyptian economy, notably through its impact on domestic production, trade, tourism, and remittances.”
“Despite Egypt’s mixed record for attracting foreign investment over the past two decades, poor living conditions and limited job opportunities have contributed to public discontent.” Acute population pressure has increased the population to over 20 million and created major problems in funding civil programs and creating jobs. There has been some progress in implementing IMF reforms, but still many problems in creating and operating private businesses. Covid-19 has also impacted tourism income.
“The poverty rate–based on the national poverty line–increased from 27.8% in 2015 to 32.5% in FY2017/18. Egypt took a number of social safety net measures, including scaling up the existing cash transfer program,” but the impact is uncertain, and it will take success of actual reform to move Egypt towards status of success.
International Rankings : The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is only a low 116 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 placed Egypt at a low 30.8. Egypt has moderate to high corruption by regional standards (106th out of 198 countries) and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Egypt “Poor” at only 114th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 21.2 in 1950, 65.5 in 2000, 81.2 in 2010, 104.1 in 2020, and 168.9 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $292.2 billion; GNI per capita = $2,690.
Five Year Prognosis: Egypt remains a failed state unless repression is eased, and serious economic reform actually takes place.
6. Israel
Ranking: Category B Failed State
Summary: Israel is successful in most ways, but the failure of its political system to produce an effective and unified government in the recent elections and to deal with corruption, the impact of the Coronavirus, and the treatment of Palestinian areas, all lowers its ranking.
“ Israel and Palestinian officials signed a number of interim agreements in the 1990s that created an interim period of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. While the most recent formal efforts to negotiate final status issues occurred in 2013-2014, the US continues its efforts to advance peace. Immigration to Israel continues, with 28,600 new immigrants, mostly Jewish, in 2016.”
“Prime Minister Benjamin NETANYAHU has led the Israeli Government since 2009; he formed a center-right coalition following the 2015 elections. In December 2018 the Knesset voted to dissolve itself, leading to an election in April 2019. When that election failed to result in formation of a government, Israel held a second election in September 2019, which also failed to result in the formation of a government. On 11 December 2019, the Knesset voted to hold a third election on 2 March 2020.”
“The Israeli economy has undergone a dramatic transformation in the last 25 years, led by cutting-edge, high-tech sectors. Offshore gas discoveries in the Mediterranean, most notably in the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, place Israel at the center of a potential regional natural gas market. However, longer-term structural issues such as low labor force participation among minority populations, low workforce productivity, high costs for housing and consumer staples, and a lack of competition, remain a concern for many Israelis and an important consideration for Israeli politicians.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a very high 22. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a high 79.3. Israel has low corruption by regional standards. (35th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Israel “Very Good” at 35th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 1.3 in 1950, 6.1 in 2000, 7.4 in 2010, 8.7 in 2020, and 12.4 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $394.6 billion; GNI per capita = $43,290.
Five Year Prognosis: Israel could be a major success, but sufficient reform and change are unlikely – maintains the status quo.
7. Palestinian West Bank and Gaza
Ranking: Category D Failed State(s)
Summary: The Palestinian entities have weak and ineffective governance and political structures, which are divided between Gaza and the West Bank, and by factions in the governance and politics of each area. Each has an ineffective, weak to failed economy; serious elements of corruption; and problems with violence.
“Since 2014, Palestinian militants and the Israel Defense Forces have exchanged projectiles and air strikes respectively, sometimes lasting multiple days and resulting in multiple deaths on both sides. Egypt, Qatar, and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have negotiated multiple ceasefires to avert a broader conflict.” Strong possibility of new forms of futile violence.”
“Roughly 60% of the West Bank, remains under Israeli civil and military control. In early 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election. Attempts to form a unity government between Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political faction in the West Bank, and HAMAS failed, leading to violent clashed between their respective supporters and HAMAS's violent seizure of all military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Since 2007, the PA has administered parts of the West Bank under its control, mainly the major Palestinian population centers and areas immediately surrounding them. Fatah and HAMAS have made several attempts at reconciliation, but the factions have been unable to implement agreements…” Unemployment even in the West Bank is near or above 20%.
“The lack of progress towards peace and reconciliation – and levels of self-destructive violence in Gaza -- continue to create an unsustainable economic situation in the Palestinian territories. Economic momentum faltered during 2019. The slowdown was driven by a decline in private and public consumption and investment. The PA’s fiscal stress significantly heightened in 2019 over clearance revenues (taxes that the Government of Israel collects on behalf of the PA and later transfers to the PA).”
“Along with the rest of the global community, in March 2020 the West Bank and Gaza began dealing with the Coronavirus (COVID-19) health crisis. Since declaring a 30-day state of emergency on March 6, the PA has closed educational institutions, restricted movement, and banned large gatherings—in order to ensure social distancing practices. Cross-border movement has been almost entirely cut off.”
International Rankings : The UN does not rate human development, but it would be low in the West Bank and very low in Gaza. There are no World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018. Corruption is not rated, but likely very high in both West Bank and the Gaza; and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Palestine “Poor” at only 117th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: Gaza: 245,000 in 1950; 885,000 in 2000; 1,128,000 in 2010; 1,918,000. in 2020; and 3,054,000 estimated for 2050. West Bank: 771,000 in 1950; 1.9 in 2000; 2.4 in 2010; 2.9 in 2020; and 4.2 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $17.0 billion; GNI per capita = $3,720. (West Bank and Gaza for 2018)
Five Year Prognosis: Palestine will have continued and serious levels of failure, possibly dropping to Category F if a new wave of violence takes place.
8. Syria
Ranking: Category F Failed State
Summary: Syria may be in the final stages of its civil war, but the country has an extremely repressive government, which has committed acts of violence and state terrorism that will leave much of the population permanently hostile. The Assad regime’s acts of state terrorism since 2011 have probably killed more Syrians than the total deaths from all other non-state actors combined during 2011-2020. Syria faces corrupt governance, shattered economy that needs massive reform, ties to Iran and Russia that threat stability, and risk of links to Hezbollah leading to new military confrontation with Israel.
“ Political negotiations between the government and opposition delegations at UN-sponsored Geneva conferences since 2014 have failed to produce a resolution of the conflict. Since early 2017, Iran, Russia, and Turkey have held separate political negotiations outside of UN auspices to attempt to reduce violence in Syria. According to an April 2016 UN estimate, the death toll among Syrian Government forces, opposition forces, and civilians was over 400,000, though other estimates placed the number well over 500,000. As of December 2019, approximately 6 million Syrians were internally displaced. Approximately 11.1 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance across the country, and an additional 5.7 million Syrians were registered refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and North Africa. The conflict in Syria remains one of the largest humanitarian crises worldwide.”
“Now in its ninth year, the conflict in Syria continues to take a heavy toll on the life of and economy of the Syrian people. The death toll in Syria directly related to the conflict as of early 2016 was estimated at more than 400,000 (UN, Apr 2016), with many more injured, and lives upheaved. The social and economic impact is huge and worsening: the lack of sustained access to health care, education, housing, and food has exacerbated the effects of the conflict, pushing millions of people into unemployment and poverty. About 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced—more than a third of them children—and over 5.6 million officially registered as refugees (UNHCR, 2019) A severely degraded healthcare system makes Syrians extremely vulnerable to additional shocks, such as an outbreak of COVID-19. In addition, the severe decline in oil receipts and disruption of other trade have placed more pressure on Syria’s external balances, leading to a rapid depletion of its international reserves.”
“In 2017, the World Bank produced two reports on the impact of the Syrian conflict: (i) a Damage Assessment of Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama , and (ii) an Economic and Social Impact Analysis (ESIA) of the conflict on Syria, called the Toll of War . The reports estimate Syria’s cumulative GDP losses from 2011 to 2016 at US$226 billion, with the latter study finding that losses due to economic disruption exceeded those due to physical destruction by a factor of 20. The longer the conflict lasts, the more difficult recovery will be, as these losses become more persistent over time.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a very low 154 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is an extremely low 1.4. Syria has very high corruption by regional standards (178 th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Syria at “Poor” at only 176th out of 190 countries, one of worst in the world.
Population Pressure in millions: 3.5 in 1950, 16.5 in 2000, 22.2 in 2010, 19.4 in 2020, and 33.2 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $39.7 billion; GNI per capita = $1,820. (2007)
Five Year Prognosis: Syria will remain an intractable mess.
9. Lebanon:
Ranking: Category F Failed State
Summary: Lebanon has experienced decades of internal sectarian conflict, which have led to the creation of sectarian elites who govern and act to serve their own interests, as well as the empowerment of Hezbollah as a militaristic state supported by Iran. In spite of many promises of reform, Lebanon has collapsed because of massive corruption and ineffective leadership and governance, coupled with an economy that became the equivalent of a Ponzi scheme that made the country a mess before the Coronavirus pandemic and the explosion in Beirut Harbor. There is no emerging leader as an effective option for governance. Humanitarian aid will simply prolong failure. The is a serious risk that Hezbollah’s missile buildup and military efforts will trigger a grave military confrontation with Israel.
“The 1975-90 civil war seriously damaged Lebanon’s economic infrastructure cut national output by half, and derailed Lebanon's position as a Middle Eastern banking hub. Following the civil war, Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and financial infrastructure by borrowing heavily, mostly from domestic banks, which saddled the government with a huge debt burden. Pledges of economic and financial reforms made at separate international donor conferences during the 2000s have mostly gone unfulfilled, including those made during the Paris III Donor Conference in 2007, following the July 2006 war. The “CEDRE” investment event hosted by France in April 2018 again rallied the international community to assist Lebanon with concessional financing and some grants for capital infrastructure improvements, conditioned upon long-delayed structural economic reforms in fiscal management, electricity tariffs, and transparent public procurement, among many others.”
“The Syria conflict cut off one of Lebanon's major markets and a transport corridor through the Levant. The influx of nearly one million registered and an estimated 300,000 unregistered Syrian refugees has increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and public services. Lebanon continues to face several long-term structural weaknesses that predate the Syria crisis, notably, weak infrastructure, poor service delivery, institutionalized corruption, and bureaucratic over-regulation. Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon’s debt-to-GDP ratio, the third highest in the world; most of the debt is held internally by Lebanese banks.”
“These factors combined to slow economic growth to the 1-2% range in 2011-17, after four years of averaging 8% growth. Weak economic growth limits tax revenues, while the largest government expenditures remain debt servicing, salaries for government workers, and transfers to the electricity sector. These limitations constrain other government spending, limiting its ability to invest in necessary infrastructure improvements, such as water, electricity, and transportation.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a low to moderate 92 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is an extremely low 12.0. Lebanon has high corruption by regional standards (137th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Lebanon “Poor” at only 143rd out of 190 countries.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $53.1 billion; GNI per capita = $7,600.
Population Pressure in millions: 1.4 in 1950, 3.8 in 2000, 4.5 in 2010, 5.5 in 2020, and 5.6 estimated for 2050.
Five Year Prognosis: Lebanon will remain an intractable mess.
10. Turkey
Ranking: Category C Failed State
Summary: Turkey has a steadily more authoritarian rule and tilts towards an Islamic rather than secular government. Turkey experienced a shift from economic growth and reform to wasteful political and economic opportunism. The repression of Kurds as “terrorists,” the increasing Islamist tilt, and its role in Syria and Iraq makes Turkey a regional “spoiler” rather than an asset.
“On 15 July 2016, elements of the Turkish Armed forces attempted a coup that ultimately failed following widespread popular resistance. More than 240 people were killed and over 2,000 injured when Turkish citizens took to the streets en masse to confront the coup forces. The government accused followers of the Fethullah Gulen transnational religious and social movement (“Hizmet”) for allegedly instigating the failed coup and designates the movement’s followers as terrorists.”
“Since the attempted coup, Turkish Government authorities arrested, suspended, or dismissed more than 130,000 security personnel, journalists, judges, academics, and civil servants due to their alleged connection to Gulen's movement. Following the failed coup, the Turkish Government instituted a State of Emergency from July 2016 to July 2018. The Turkish Government conducted a referendum on 16 April 2017 in which voters approved constitutional amendments changing Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system. The amendments went into effect fully following the presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2018.”
“The overall macroeconomic picture is more vulnerable and uncertain, given rising inflation and unemployment, contracting investment, elevated corporate and financial sector vulnerabilities, and patchy implementation of corrective policy actions and
“There are also significant external headwinds due to ongoing geopolitical tensions in the subregion. The impact of the COVID-19crisis is expected to have a severely negative effect in Turkey, further weakening economic and social gains.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a moderate 59. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a moderate 43.8. Turkey has moderate to high corruption by regional standards (91th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Turkey “Very good” at 33rd out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 21.1 in 1950, 66.0 in 2000, 74.7 in 2010, 82.0 in 2020, and 89.3 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $741.9 billion; GNI per capita = $9,610.
Five Year Prognosis: Turkey will likely remain in Category C as long as Erdogan remains in power. However, increasing involvement in neighbors’ security affairs and growing economic strains could drop to Category D.
11. Jordan
Ranking: Uncertain Success
Summary: Jordan has limited resources but still demonstrates progress. There is moderate internal security effort, low repression, and some political and economic reform. Still, Jordan needs reform of the government and economy as well as more functional political parties. Jordan was hurt by the indirect impact of the Coronavirus and the crisis in petroleum economies.
“ King Hussein’s eldest son assumed the throne following his father’s death in 1999. He has implemented modest political reforms, including the passage of a new electoral law in early 2016 and an effort to devolve some authority to governorate- and municipal-level councils following subnational elections in 2017. In 2016, the Islamic Action Front, which is the political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, returned to the National Assembly with 15 seats after boycotting the previous two elections in 2010 and 2013.”
“Economic activity remained weak in Jordan. Real GDP growth during the first three quarters of 2019 stood at 1.9%, consistent with the trend over the past three years. Headline inflation remained subdued throughout 2019 with growth in consumer prices averaging at 0.8% compared to 4.5% in 2018. Similar trend in prices continued during the first two months of 2020. External sector imbalances narrowed significantly. The current account deficit (CAD) during 9M-2019 declined by almost 60% to US$ 1.08 billion (3.4% of GDP) compared to US$ 2.87 billion (9.3% of GDP) during the same time in 2018. This reduction has been primarily driven by a 15.1% contraction in the country’s trade deficit, particularly in the non-oil trade deficit.”
“Jordan’s near-term growth prospects has substantially weakened due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Jordan’s economic growth is projected to contract significantly to -3.5% of GDP in 2020. This assessment is assuming significant slowdown in the global and reduced domestic demand during 2020. As 2020 unfolds, a reduction in domestic economic activity is expected to become more intense as social distancing intensifies (full curfew was imposed indefinitely on March 21), having significant negative implications for domestic demand.”
“The coronavirus pandemic poses an immediate significant downside risk to the global economic recovery and to Jordan’s. This along with this heightened regional uncertainty pose further challenges for Jordanian economy. Given Jordan’s already elevated debt levels, policy responses are constrained by limited fiscal space and a COVID-19-induced sharp drop in capital flows to emerging markets as global risk aversion surges.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a low to moderate 92 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is high for the region: 60.6. Jordan has low corruption by regional standards (60 th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Jordan “Moderate” at 75th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 561,000 in 1950; 4.7 in 2000; 6.8 in 2010; 10.8 in 2020; and 15.6 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $43.4 billion; GNI per capita = $4,300.
Five Year Prognosis: The future of Jordan is uncertain.
12. Iraq:
Ranking: Category C Failed State
Summary: Iraq has not recovered from its war against ISIS; the government is still weak and unstable; and security forces have uncertain capability. There still are deep ethnic and sectarian divisions, and even further divisions within Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurdish areas and political structures. Iraq faces massive corruption at all levels, Iranian pressure, Turkish intervention in the north, instability in the Syrian border area near Turkey, and independent militias and remnants of ISIS that still remain a threat.
Weak recovery and reconstruction efforts in the areas hit hardest by fighting against ISIS. There is poor distribution of petroleum revenues, investments, and provision of many government services. Iran often exploits its ties to Iraq and only further aggravates security problems, as do Turkish military interventions against Kurdish groups located in Syria, and the unresolved governance and security situation in Western Iraq.
The grossly distorted and inflated state sector has far too many civil servants and weak, overstaffed state industries. Petroleum exports provide roughly 85% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. Iraq has an extremely large and inefficient state sector and government owned enterprises, which consume large portion of revenues with little productive output. The high levels of military and security spending involve significant waste.
“Iraq is making slow progress enacting laws and developing the institutions needed to implement economic policy, and political reforms are still needed to assuage investors' concerns regarding the uncertain business climate. The Government of Iraq is eager to attract additional foreign direct investment, but it faces a number of obstacles, including a tenuous political system and concerns about security and societal stability. Rampant corruption, outdated infrastructure, insufficient essential services, skilled labor shortages, and antiquated commercial laws stifle investment and continue to constrain growth of private, nonoil sectors. Under the Iraqi constitution, some competencies relevant to the overall investment climate are either shared by the federal government and the regions or are devolved entirely to local governments. Investment in the IKR operates within the framework of the Kurdistan Region Investment Law (Law 4 of 2006) and the Kurdistan Board of Investment, which is designed to provide incentives to help economic development in areas under the authority of the KRG.”
“…Iraqi leaders remain hard-pressed to translate macroeconomic gains into an improved standard of living for the Iraqi populace. Unemployment remains a problem throughout the country despite a bloated public sector. Overregulation has made it difficult for Iraqi citizens and foreign investors to start new businesses. Corruption and lack of economic reforms - such as restructuring banks and developing the private sector – have inhibited the growth of the private sector.”
“Iraq is in a fragile situation. It faces a difficult fiscal crunch, arising from the collapse in international oil prices coupled with persistent political and social turmoil. This situation is exacerbated by the rapid spread of COVID-19, which the country’s healthcare system has limited capacity and limited fiscal buffers to contain and manage.”
“In October 2019, young Iraqis took to the streets in mass protests to denounce rampant corruption, poor services, and high unemployment. These demonstrations exposed the fragility of the Iraqi socio-economic system. To appease demonstrators, the Government of Iraq (GOI) announced a stimulus package consisting of a considerable expansion in public sector employment, pensions, and transfers. This response was seen by some as ineffective, as boosting job creation, stimulating private sector participation, and enacting meaningful anti-corruption measures require longer-term structural reforms that did not feature in the package. Nevertheless, with record level oil production and agricultural yields, the expansion of electricity production, and fiscal loosening, overall GDP growth finished the year at 4.4%. Inflation remained subdued at an average of 0.2% in 2019. This was largely driven by cheaper imports from neighboring countries, prompting the GOI to raise tariffs and impose import bans on selected food items in response to calls from domestic producers.”
“The fiscal stimulus has reduced the 11.2% of GDP budget surplus in 2018 to 3% of GDP in 2019 and came at the expense of critical spending on both human capital and reconstruction. Indeed, although investment spending has slightly increased (by 5%), its execution rate has remained at only 45% of the amount budgeted. Most of the spending went to oil-related investments. Non-oil sector investment execution stood at a mere 18%, raising concerns over public service delivery, a rising infrastructure gap, and a stalled reconstruction program.”
“Going forward, the economic outlook for Iraq is challenging. The collapse in international oil prices and other unfavorable global conditions, including disruptions caused by the spread of COVID-19, are expected to hit Iraq hard, leading to a 5% contraction in its economy in 2020. In the absence of significant reforms to boost private sector participation, it will be difficult to jump-start the economy; growth is projected to gradually revert to its low-base potential of 1.9-2.7% in 2021–2022. The budget rigidities, compounded over the past two years, are expected to have detrimental fiscal effects amidst weaker oil-related revenues. At US$30 an oil barrel and in the absence of planned consolidation measures, the budget deficit was projected to surge to a staggering 19% of GDP by end-2020. As a result, the GOI is expected to face a severe financing gap which could not only lead it to postpone vital infrastructure projects in service delivery sectors, as well as postponing human capital programs, but also reduces the country’s ability to respond to post-COVID-19 recovery needs.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a low 120 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a very low 7.2. Iraq has very high corruption by regional standards (162nd out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Iraq only 172nd out of 190 countries, one of worst in the world.
Population Pressure in millions: 5.29 in 1950, 22.8 in 2000, 29.1 in 2010, 38.9 in 2020, and 63.0 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $233.0 billion; GNI per capita = $5,740.
Five Year Prognosis: Iraq has been in a state of crisis or conflict since 1980, and it is unclear whether Iraq can develop an effective central government and unify in spite of its sectarian and ethnic differences. Iraq has great potential but civil conflicts, links to Iran, and its possible role in a major regional conflict could reduce Iraq to a Category E or F level of failure.
13. Iran
Ranking: Category D to Category E Failed State
Summary: Iraq has a repressive theocracy and IRGC elite. It also has a deeply flawed justice system, rigged elections, and massive state support of political and military intervention and terrorism in other states. It is deeply corrupt with oil wealth and national income that flows to its clergy, IRGC, and client states.
Iran has evolved effective missile forces and hybrid warfare capabilities but at a high cost and with limited ability to escalate to a major conflict. Its interventions in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria have given it considerable influence but little clear strategic benefits, and its participation in a regional arms race against many of its Arab Gulf neighbors – and nuclear and long-range missile projects – impose major economic burdens and a serious risk of a major conflict. Again, however, they are without any clear and lasting strategic benefits to Iran.
At a domestic level, the government has faced growing popular demonstrations, and it still faces the problems imposed by decades of poor economic policies compounded by the impact of U.S. and UN sanctions, Coronavirus crisis, and petroleum price crisis. It has so far succeeded in repressing such resistance, and in rigging Iran’s latest election – but growing repression does not mean growing support.
“Government directly owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly controls many companies affiliated with the country's security forces. Distortions - including corruption, price controls, subsidies, and a banking system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans - weigh down the economy, undermining the potential for private-sector-led growth.” Spending on military and support of Hezbollah, Assad regime, and other interventions further limits development and broad distribution of income.”
“The recession in Iran accelerated in 2019/20 as US sanctions progressively tightened. Iran’s GDP contracted by 7.6% in the first 9 months of 2019/20 (Apr-Dec 2019) largely due to a 37% decline in the oil sector. Since the reintroduction of US sanctions in 2018, oil production has dwindled reaching a record low of 2 mbpd in December 2019. Non-oil GDP growth in Apr-Dec 2019 was close to zero, a marginal improvement compared to the sector’s 2.1% contraction in 2018/19. In the same period, non-oil industries grew by 2% driven by construction and the utilities sectors, while services value-added contracted by 0.2%. The recent COVID-19 outbreak has significantly disrupted trade, tourism and retail business during the busiest period for travel and commerce.
“Facing a growing pandemic, low oil prices and increasing sanctions, Iran’s GDP growth is projected to remain subdued in 2020/21-2022/23. The baseline outlook is primarily driven by COVID-19 outbreak reducing oil and non-oil GDP in 2020/21 and two subsequent years of modest recovery. Oil production in 2021/22 and 2022/23 is expected to grow in line with long term domestic consumption growth. The fiscal deficit is projected to widen as revenues fall short of targets and COVID-19 adds to expenditures. The 2020/21 draft budget, though contractionary in real terms, relies on optimistic assumptions. The expected widening budget deficit especially in light of COVID-19 and other exogenous shocks are likely to lead to further debt issuance and withdrawals from strategic reserves.”
“The current unique situation of Iran’s economy presents significant downside risks for the baseline forecast. The most significant risk is a stronger and more protracted impact of the COVID-19 outbreak through various channels including widescale contractions in commerce, tourism and trade as well as higher production costs. Persistence of lower oil prices and export volumes (e.g., due to a significant decline in China’s oil demand) would result in a substantially larger overall shock and fiscal deficit in 2020/21.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a moderate 65. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a low 15.9. Iran’s corruption ranking is high (146th out of 198 countries); and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Iran “Poor” at only 127th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 16.4 in 1950, 66.5 in 2000, 75.0 in 2010, 85.9 in 2020, and 98.6 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $446.2 billion; GNI per capita = $5,420.
Five Year Prognosis: Iran is expected to experience little change, with a serious possibility of war or major military clash with the U.S. or its neighbors.
14. Bahrain
Ranking: Category B to Category C Failed State
Summary: Bahrain has experienced progress in many areas, but its Sunni minority and ruling family are increasingly repressive in dealing with the native Shi’ite majority. Bahrain is also heavily dependent on Saudi aid and foreign workers at expensive of own citizens.
“ The Sunni royal family has long struggled to manage relations with its large Shia-majority population. In early 2011, amid Arab uprisings elsewhere in the region, the Bahraini Government confronted similar pro-democracy and reform protests at home with police and military action, including deploying Gulf Cooperation Council security forces to Bahrain. Failed political talks prompted opposition political societies to boycott 2014 legislative and municipal council elections. In 2018, a law preventing members of political societies dissolved by the courts from participating in elections effectively sidelined the majority of opposition figures from taking part in national elections. As a result, most members of parliament are independents. Ongoing dissatisfaction with the political status quo continues to factor into sporadic clashes between demonstrators and security forces.”
“Despite the Government’s past efforts to diversify the economy, oil still comprises 85% of Bahraini budget revenues. In the last few years lower world energy prices have generated sizable budget deficits - about 10% of GDP in 2017 alone. Bahrain has few options for covering these deficits, with low foreign assets and fewer oil resources compared to its GCC neighbors. The three major US credit agencies downgraded Bahrain’s sovereign debt rating to "junk" status in 2016, citing persistently low oil prices and the government’s high debt levels. Nevertheless, Bahrain was able to raise about $4 billion by issuing foreign currency denominated debt in 2017.”
“Other major economic activities are production of aluminum - Bahrain's second biggest export after oil and gas –finance, and construction. Bahrain continues to seek new natural gas supplies as feedstock to support its expanding petrochemical and aluminum industries. In April 2018 Bahrain announced it had found a significant oil field off the country’s west coast, but is still assessing how much of the oil can be extracted profitably.”
“In addition to addressing its current fiscal woes, Bahraini authorities face the long-term challenge of boosting Bahrain’s regional competitiveness — especially regarding industry, finance, and tourism — and reconciling revenue constraints with popular pressure to maintain generous state subsidies and a large public sector. Since 2015, the government lifted subsidies on meat, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline and has begun to phase in higher prices for electricity and water.”
“The government Fiscal Balance program (FBP), announced in 2018, accompanied by US$10 billion in GCC financial support will alleviate financing constraints in the aftermath of 2014 oil price shock. Key challenges facing Bahrain include the need to fully implement the FBP reforms. Bahrain will need to pursue energy subsidy reform and control large off-budget expenditures, while pursuing its diversification strategy…A key constraint is the limited room for budgetary expenditure cuts to achieve big gains, since they will largely need to come from reducing social spending. The second constraint relates to off-budget expenditures, which contribute around 5 percentage points to the overall deficit and may be difficult to cut. Third, the plan will need to be more ambitious on non-oil revenue generation.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a high 45 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a high 59.6. Bahrain has moderate corruption by regional standards (77th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Bahrain “Good” at 43rd out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 0.115 in 1950, 0.655 in 2000, 1.2 in 2010, 1.5 in 2020, and 1.8 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $ 36.3 billion; GNI per capita = $22,110.
Five Year Prognosis: Bahrain has high potential if it can reduce repression and heal divisions between its Sunni and Shi’ite population. Bahrain, however, may drop a rank to Category C failure without such change.
15. Kuwait
Ranking: Uncertain success to Category A Failed State
Summary: The feuding between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain has seriously undermined the already limited capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and left Kuwait more exposed to Iran.
Kuwait has a Popular Assembly, but its performance has been unstable, opposition is divided, and popular governance has limited impact. Some divisions in the royal family, such as illness and the age of ruler raise some succession issues. There is little repression of the native population, but there is poor treatment of foreign workers.
“An opposition coalition of Sunni Islamists, tribal populists, and some liberals, largely boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Faced with the prospect of painful subsidy cuts, oppositionists and independents actively participated in the November 2016 election, winning nearly half of the seats but a cohesive opposition alliance largely ceased to exist with the 2016 election and the opposition became increasingly factionalized. Since coming to power in 2006, the Amir has dissolved the National Assembly on seven occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly elections in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.”
Kuwait distributes petroleum wealth better than many neighbors, and there no major ethnic or sectarian divisions, but “Kuwait depends on its petroleum export income and that a large public sector employs about 74% of citizens, and an acrimonious relationship exists between the National Assembly and the executive branch that has stymied most economic reforms. Cuts in petroleum prices have pushed into deficit spending and diversification plans have largely failed and some have raised issues about waste and corruption.”
“Kuwait has a geographically small, but wealthy, relatively open economy with crude oil reserves of about 102 billion barrels - more than 6% of world reserves. Kuwaiti officials plan to increase production to 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020. Petroleum accounts for over half of GDP, 92% of export revenues, and 90% of government income.”
“Kuwait has failed to diversify its economy or bolster the private sector, because of a poor business climate, a large public sector that employs about 74% of citizens, and an acrimonious relationship between the National Assembly and the executive branch that has stymied most economic reforms. The Kuwaiti Government has made little progress on its long-term economic development plan first passed in 2010. While the government planned to spend up to $104 billion over four years to diversify the economy, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the economy, many of the projects did not materialize because of an uncertain political situation or delays in awarding contracts. To increase non-oil revenues, the Kuwaiti Government in August 2017 approved draft bills supporting a Gulf Cooperation Council-wide value added tax scheduled to take effect in 2018.”
“Subdued oil prices and lower oil production led to slower overall economic growth in 2019, but robust public spending and credit growth are expected to underpin non-oil growth through the medium term. The steep downturn in oil prices since March and slower global growth spurred by the coronavirus will be absorbed by fiscal and financial buffers, at the expense of sustainability and diversification. This underscores the need for implementing fiscal and structural reforms to diversify away from hydrocarbons, support private sector activity and lay the foundations for a more sustainable growth model… Notwithstanding Kuwait’s large oil reserves, the global shift to cleaner energy threatens economic and fiscal sustainability over the long term. Large financial assets underpin Kuwait’s economic resilience, but fiscal and structural reform are key to offset the risks of lower oil prices and uncertain output.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a high to moderate 57 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a moderate to high 49.5 but has dropped from 55.8 in 2008. Kuwait has moderate to high levels of corruption by regional standards (85nd out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Kuwait “Moderate to poor” at 83rd out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 0.145 in 1950, 2.0 in 2000, 2.5 in 2010, 3.0 in 2020, and 3.9 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $162.6 billion; GNI per capita = $34,290.
Five Year Prognosis: Kuwait’s mid-term potential is good if its royal family does not divide and the global petroleum market has at least a modest recovery.
16. Qatar
Ranking: Category A Failed State
Summary: Qatar has experienced significant progress in many areas, such as the rule of law, low levels of repression and security measures for native population, and some elements of political and governance reform, particularly in the treatment of foreign workers. Qatar has, however, overspent on infrastructure and showpiece projects, but its gas and oil exports protect the economy and deficits are not critical. Qatar is rated Category A largely because of its tensions with Saudi Arabia, UAE, on other neighbors. Qatari tolerance of media attacks on Saudi Arabia as well as its covert role in conflicts and civil tensions of other states has produced little success and has rather been largely disruptive.
“ Qatar did not experience domestic unrest or violence like that seen in other Near Eastern and North African countries in 2011, due in part to its immense wealth and patronage network. In mid-2013, HAMAD peacefully abdicated, transferring power to his son, the current Amir TAMIM bin Hamad. TAMIM is popular with the Qatari public, for his role in shepherding the country through an economic embargo by some other regional countries, for his efforts to improve the country's healthcare and education systems, and for his expansion of the country's infrastructure in anticipation of Doha's hosting of the 2022 World Cup.”
“Recently, Qatar’s relationships with its neighbors have been tense, although since the fall of 2019 there have been signs of improved prospects for a thaw. Following the outbreak of regional unrest in 2011, Doha prided itself on its support for many popular revolutions, particularly in Libya and Syria. This stance was to the detriment of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which temporarily recalled their respective ambassadors from Doha in March 2014. TAMIM later oversaw a warming of Qatar’s relations with Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in November 2014 following Kuwaiti mediation and signing of the Riyadh Agreement. This reconciliation, however, was short-lived. In June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the "Quartet") cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar in response to alleged violations of the agreement, among other complaints.”
“Saudi/UAE Boycott of Qatar has been counterproductive, but so have Qatari media attacks on neighbors. Covert Qatari efforts in other trouble regional states have had mixed success and been largely dysfunctional and disruptive. More broadly, boycotts have sharply undercut the already weak Gulf Cooperation Council security efforts, and instead has made Qatar dependent on support from the United States, Oman, and Turkey, while also promoting good relations with Iran.”
“ Qatar, the world’s fifth-largest gas producer, second-largest gas exporter, and largest LNG exporter, has seen tepid growth throughout 2019. This reflects sluggishness in the hydrocarbon (HC) and non-HC sectors. The HC sector has reflected production restraint and phasing of new projects, while the non-HC sector reflects a gradual winding down of a decade-long boom associated with the implementation of large infrastructure projects in preparation for the FIFA 2022 World Cup.”
“Growth is projected to stall in 2020 even with increased government spending to ease the economic impact of COVID-19 containment, and to rise towards 3% in the medium term driven by stronger activity in the service sector as the FIFA World Cup 2022 underpins a V-shaped recovery. Under the Qatar National Vision 2030, nearly QR60bn (US$16.4 billion) in infrastructure and real estate investments are planned over the next four years to help offset falling FIFA-investment spending and ensure a beneficial legacy. While envisaging large-scale LNG capacity expansion plans, which should increase gas liquefaction capacity by more than a third, exploitation of the North Field will be further delayed given adverse developments in gas prices.”
“Major external risks are materializing. Although Qatar is protected from spot oil price volatility through LNG long-term contracts, natural gas prices overall were already weak prior to the OPEC+ and COVID-19 shocks due to the mild winter in major markets and the overhang of previously isolated US gas supply coming onto the global market. The crash in hydrocarbon prices will lead to a renewed pressure on LNG pricing and volumes and deterioration in fiscal and external balances, particularly if government spending continues to rise over the medium term. Qatar’s low-cost dominance in LNG export markets is threatened by new and emerging producers, notably Australia, the USA, and over the coming years, Egypt and Mozambique.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a high 41 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is very high for the region: 74.5. Qatar has very low corruption by regional standards (30th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Qatar “Moderate to poor” at 77th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 25,000 in 1950; 640,000 in 2000; 1.7 in 2010; 2.4 in 2020; and 2.6 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Corona Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $171.9 billion; GNI per capita = $63,410.
Five Year Prognosis: Qatar’s potential is good if it can reconcile with neighbors and avoid clashes with Iran.
17. United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Ranking: Category A Failed State
Summary: The United Arab Emirates has not made major recent progress in political reform and has become more repressive. It has diversified more than most Gulf exporting counties and invested in its poorer northern emirates, but it has overspent on security and military forces while Dubai’s economy has become steadily more speculative.
The UAE overspends on military forces with limited security benefits, and at levels of GNP that put a strain on its economy. The leadership has been compromised by possible ties to arrests and deaths. Its role in the Yemeni civil war has so far been an expensive failure. The boycott of Qatar has also been counterproductive.
“Economic growth remained unchanged at 1.7% in 2019 as the pick-up in the HC sector was offset by a slowdown in the rest of the economy. Official estimates suggest non-oil real GDP growth slowed to 0.3% in Q2 2019. The slowdown in real estate continues due to oversupply and associated debt overhang — average residential prices fell in Q4 2019 by 7-7.5% y/o/y in Dubai and Abu Dhabi.”
“Growth in 2020 is subject to major uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic and low oil prices. Travel restrictions are hitting tourism, and social distancing will contract domestic consumption. Cognizant of these exposures, the authorities moved quickly to implement a containment strategy, cancel sporting events, and tighten travel procedures. Given the UAE’s status as a global logistics and reprocessing hub, a global slowdown and disruptions in supply chains will weigh heavily on the UAE’s non-oil sector, which was already facing persistently weak business sentiment and a prolonged real estate downturn.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a high 35 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is very high for the region: 83.2. The UAE has very low corruption by regional standards (21st out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates UAE “Very Good” at 16th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 72,000 in 1950; 3.2 in 2000; 8.4 in 2010; 10.0 in 2020; and 13.3 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $423.2 billion; GNI per capita = $43,470.
Five Year Prognosis: The UAE will decline to “Category B to Category C failure” status if it does not limit repression, stop feuding with Qatar, and take a more realistic and well managed approach to military spending and economic reforms.
18. Saudi Arabia
Ranking: Category A to Category B Failed State
Summary: Saudi Arabia has made important progress in social reform but not in political reform. It has become more repressive and experienced a decline in the rule of law. Its broad reform goals in its 2030 and other plans set good goals, but its execution is poor, wasteful, and often directed towards grandiose goals and projects of uncertain practical benefit.
Saudi Arabia overspends on military security forces with mixed actual security benefits, but it does face a continuing threat from Iran, terrorism and extremism. Military and security spending is a high percent of its GDP, which puts a serious strain on the economy. Efforts to create new Arab alliances have so far had largely a cosmetic impact, and its role in the boycotts against Qatar has further weakened the Gulf Cooperation Council. Leadership has been compromised by its role in repression, treatment of other members of the royal family, and possible ties to arrests and deaths.
Its role in the Yemeni civil war has so far been an expensive failure.
“The contracting oil sector led to sluggish growth in 2019, despite strong performance of non-oil sectors. The outlook for 2020 remains very weak in the wake of COVID-19 and oil supply shocks. Medium-term fiscal balances are estimated to continue in deficit— risking the ability in realizing Vision 2030 fiscal targets. Vision 2030 related reforms are critical for diversification, and progress was made on business environment reforms. COVID-19 response includes preservation of gains made in job creation for nationals in the private sector.”
“Growth stalled in 2019, driven largely by the deliberate oil production cuts in excess of those required under OPEC+ agreement, and lower oil prices. Overall, the economy grew by 0.3% in 2019 despite strong performance of non-oil sectors supported by private consumption and investments. The stronger non-oil sector offset the headwinds from oil, with December headline inflation recording a positive reading for the first time in a year.”
“Growth will initially pivot to higher oil production as announced in March 2020, pending further agreement with OPEC+ and G20 countries. Weaker growth is anticipated in the non-oil sectors reflecting low domestic demand as COVID-19 closures and suspensions disrupt critical sectors in the economy; these effects are assumed to be concentrated within 2020. Despite indicated spending cuts to weather the fall in oil receipts, the fiscal deficit is expected to widen in 2020. COVID-19 related health spending will be prioritized, for example a commitment to free treatment for all residents (not only nationals). The deficit narrows afterwards as oil prices moderately recover to levels well below consensus assumptions at the start of the year.”
“There are two major downside risks, both of which are materializing at the same time. First, the recent lapse of OPEC+ agreement places further downward pressure on oil prices as several main players reported plans of increased production, sometimes with huge discounts, to an existing sizeable market surplus. Saudi Arabia is participating in efforts to stabilize prices, through existing production coordination mechanisms (OPEC+) and the G20. Second, the continually downgraded global growth outlook due to COVID-19 and its impact on energy demand and hydrocarbon earnings. Moreover, limited information on the extent and duration of the outbreak makes it difficult to evaluate the indirect channels of impact in the economy, e.g. value chains and tradable sectors; preventive measures taken by the authorities, e.g. travel restrictions and the suspension of work for public and private sectors; or potential austerity measures in response to declining revenues.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a high 36. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is moderate to high: 65.9. Saudi Arabia has low to moderate corruption by regional standards (51st out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Saudi Arabia “Moderate” at 62nd out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 3.9 in 1950, 21.4 in 2000, 28.0 in 2010, 34.2 in 2020, and 46.9 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $ 800.9 billion; GNI per capita = $22,850.
Five Year Prognosis: Saudi Arabia will decline to “Category B to Category C failure” status if it does not limit repression and sectarian divisions, stop feuding with Qatar, and take a more realistic and well managed approach to it military spending, 2030 projections, and other economic reforms.
19. Oman
Ranking: Uncertain success
Summary: Oman has experienced slow but steady progress in development, political reform, and meeting popular needs over time. It is less repressive than most Gulf governments, and less corrupt. Oman is overdependent on oil and gas resources, which can generate between and 68% and 85% of government revenue, and its diversification efforts have so far had limited impact.
Oman has distanced itself from Saudi Arabia and UAE in the Gulf Cooperation, over the boycott of Qatar and in support of the war in Yemen. The crisis in world petroleum prices has affected Oman’s national budget, and its military spending consumes an exceptionally high percentage of GNP. Oman does actively seek to avoid confrontation with Iran.
“Inspired by the popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in January 2011, some Omanis staged demonstrations, calling for more jobs and economic benefits and an end to corruption. In response to those protester demands, QABOOS in 2011 pledged to implement economic and political reforms, such as granting Oman’s bicameral legislative body more power and authorizing direct elections for its lower house, which took place in November 2011. Additionally, the Sultan increased unemployment benefits, and, in August 2012, issued a royal directive mandating the speedy implementation of a national job creation plan for thousands of public and private sector Omani jobs.”
“As part of the government's efforts to decentralize authority and allow greater citizen participation in local governance, Oman successfully conducted its first municipal council elections in December 2012. Announced by the sultan in 2011, the municipal councils have the power to advise the Royal Court on the needs of local districts across Oman's 11 governorates.”
“Sultan QABOOS, Oman's longest reigning monarch, died on 11 January 2020. His cousin, HAYTHAM bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said, former Minister of Heritage and Culture, was sworn in as Oman's new sultan the same day.”
“Oman’s economy is expected to contract in 2020 due to the oil price slide and the COVID-19 public health response. An increase in gas output and infrastructure spending plans will help growth recover over 2021-22. Fiscal and external deficits will remain under strain due to low oil and gas prices. Rigid recurrent spending will keep public debt high, estimated to exceed 70% of GDP in 2020 and beyond. Real GDP growth is estimated to have decelerated to 0.5% in 2019, down from a recovery of 1.8% in 2018. This is largely driven by 1% (y/y) decline in oil production, capped by the since-lapsed OPEC+ production deal. The non-oil economy is estimated to have been subdued due to the slowdown in industrial activities and services sector. Inflationary pressures are estimated to remain muted at 0.1% in 2019, reflecting weak domestic demand and tame food and housing prices.”
“Low oil prices and the spread of COVID-19 are the key challenges that Oman will need to navigate in the short-run. With oil prices in the mid-$30s in 2020 and constrained oil demand, growth is expected to contract by 3.5%. Forty five percent of Omani exports (or 21.7% of GDP), mostly oil, go to China, the highest Chinese exposure among GCC. Low oil prices will create challenges to the implementation of supportive public spending for the country with already high deficits, more limited buffers and an elevated debt level. As such, the fiscal deficit is expected to markedly widen to over 17% of GDP in 2020, before starting to slightly narrow down over 2021-2022, assuming more favorable oil prices.”
“Key downside risks are reflected in further erosion of the fiscal balance, through far lower oil prices, exposure to China, and economic disruption to tourism due to COVID-19. Mitigation would be demonstrated by implementation of substantial fiscal measures to curtail the government deficits, a new push on privatization, and prioritizing capital projects. With its accumulated external debt, Oman will need a rapid normalization of emerging market funding conditions to finance the continued deterioration of the country's fiscal and external accounts. Significant new gas production in 2021 along with diversifying the economy in sectors such as manufacturing, tourism and fishing will support the growth momentum and lessen the risks. At the same time, enabling Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) to maintain or increase its oil and gas production has sizable investment needs. The pressure for job creation, resulting from the low employment rate of young Omanis, is a risk to public finances and the social situation.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a moderate to high 47 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is moderate to high: 62.5. Oman has low to moderate corruption by regional standards (56th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Oman “Moderate” at 68th out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: 489,000 in 1950; 2.4 in 2000; 3.0 in 2010; 3.6 in 2020; and 5.4 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $75.7 billion; GNI per capita = $15,330.
Five Year Prognosis: Oman’s potential is uncertain, and the new Sultan needs time to show his ability to lead the government.
20. Yemen
Ranking: Category F Failed State
Summary: Yemen’s decades of failure to develop an effective economy and meet popular needs have now been compounded by a major set of civil conflicts and the outside role of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran. Population pressure, lack of arable land and water, and uncertain future petroleum exports all key factors. There is little prospect for real unity even if some compromise is found between the Houthis and the UN-recognized government.
“Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Huthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014-present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.”
“Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH - inspired by similar demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing a power transfer deal. In November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following HADI's uncontested election victory in February 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process, including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.”
“The Huthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Huthis surrounded the presidential palace, HADI's residence, and key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to submit their resignations. HADI fled to Aden in February 2015 and rescinded his resignation. He subsequently escaped to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to protect the legitimate government from the Huthis. In March, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Huthis and Huthi-affiliated forces. Ground fighting between Huthi-aligned forces and anti-Huthi groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN brokered a months-long cessation of hostilities that reduced airstrikes and fighting, and initiated peace talks in Kuwait. However, the talks ended without agreement.”
“The Huthis and SALIH’s political party announced a Supreme Political Council in August 2016 and a National Salvation Government, including a prime minister and several dozen cabinet members, in November 2016, to govern in Sanaa and further challenge the legitimacy of HADI’s government. However, amid rising tensions between the Huthis and SALIH, sporadic clashes erupted in mid-2017, and escalated into open fighting that ended when Huthi forces killed SALIH in early December 2017. In 2018, anti-Huthi forces made the most battlefield progress in Yemen since early 2016, most notably in Al Hudaydah Governorate. In December 2018, the Huthis and Yemeni Government participated in the first UN-brokered peace talks since 2016, agreeing to a limited ceasefire in Al Hudaydah Governorate and the establishment of a UN Mission to monitor the agreement. In April 2019, Yemen’s parliament convened in Say'un for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. In August 2019, violence erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC) in southern Yemen. In November 2019, HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between them.”
“…Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.”
“However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country’s economic decline. … The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.”
“After almost five years of escalating conflict, Yemen continues to face an unprecedented humanitarian, social and economic crisis. Significant damage to vital public infrastructure has contributed to a disruption of basic services, while insecurity has delayed the rehabilitation of oil exports — which had been the largest source of foreign currency before the war — severely limiting government revenue and supply of foreign exchange for essential imports. The bifurcation of national capacity, including the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), between the conflicting parties, and ad hoc policy decisions by them further compound the economic crisis and humanitarian suffering from violence.”
“Economic and social prospects in 2020 and beyond are uncertain and hinge critically on the political and security situations. Affordability of food is a rapidly emerging threat to household welfare, as preexisting global food price increases and rial depreciation is now interacting with COVID-19 related trade restrictions by food exporters. Yemen’s import dependence is exacerbated by the impact of desert locusts on the cropping season. A cessation of the ongoing violence and eventual political reconciliation, including the reintegration of vital state institutions, would improve the operational environment for the private sector, facilitating the reconstruction of the economy and rebuilding of social fabric.”
“Yemen continues to face significant risks of renewed macroeconomic volatility. Without stable sources of foreign exchange, the Yemeni rial is vulnerable to downward pressures. KSA’s deposit, which financed essential imports, is close to depletion and increased hydrocarbon exports are highly uncertain due to the bleak outlook of the global oil market, and the fragmented multiple exchange rate regimes. A further rial depreciation would immediately have a knock-on effect on the prices of imported commodities with dire economic and humanitarian consequences. A COVID-19 related global and regional economic slowdown may affect Yemen through reduced remittances from the GCC.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is an extremely poor 177th. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is an extremely low 1.0. Yemen has very high corruption by regional standards (177th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Yemen only 187thth out of 190 countries, one of worst in the world.
Population Pressure in millions: 4.8 in 1950, 17.2 in 2000, 23.2 in 2010, 29.9 in 2020, and 46.1 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $27.6 billion; GNI per capita = $940. (2018)
Five Year Prognosis: Yemen will likely remain a tragedy.
21. Sudan
Ranking: Category E Failed State
Summary: Sudan is deeply divided along tribal, regional, and sectarian lines with an ineffective government and economy. It is critically dependent on outside humanitarian aid, faces major refugee problems, and has no clear substitute for the loss of petroleum income from the now independent South Sudan. It has a very low life expectancy and per capita income.
“ Following South Sudan's independence, conflict broke out between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states (together known as the Two Areas), resulting in a humanitarian crisis affecting more than a million people.”
“An earlier conflict that broke out in the western region of Darfur in 2003, displaced nearly 2 million people and caused thousands of deaths. While some repatriation has taken place, about 1.83 million IDPs remain in Sudan as of May 2019. Fighting in both the Two Areas and Darfur between government forces and opposition has largely subsided, however the civilian populations are affected by low-level violence including inter-tribal conflict and banditry, largely a result of weak rule of law. The UN and the African Union have jointly commanded a Darfur peacekeeping operation (UNAMID) since 2007, but are slowly drawing down as the situation in Darfur becomes more stable.”
“Sudan also has faced refugee influxes from neighboring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure, and denial of access by both the government and armed opposition have impeded the provision of humanitarian assistance to affected populations. However, Sudan's new transitional government has stated its priority to allow greater humanitarian access, as the food security and humanitarian situation in Sudan worsens and as it appeals to the West for greater engagement.”
“Sudan has experienced protracted social conflict and the loss of three quarters of its oil production due to the secession of South Sudan. The oil sector had driven much of Sudan's GDP growth since 1999. For nearly a decade, the economy boomed on the back of rising oil production, high oil prices, and significant inflows of foreign direct investment. Since the economic shock of South Sudan's secession, Sudan has struggled to stabilize its economy and make up for the loss of foreign exchange earnings. The interruption of oil production in South Sudan in 2012 for over a year and the consequent loss of oil transit fees further exacerbated the fragile state of Sudan’s economy. Ongoing conflicts in Southern Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile states, lack of basic infrastructure in large areas, and reliance by much of the population on subsistence agriculture, keep close to half of the population at or below the poverty line.”
“The secession of South Sudan induced multiple economic shocks. The most important and immediate shock was the loss of the oil revenue that accounted for more than half of Sudan’s government revenue and 95% of its exports. This has reduced economic growth, and resulted in double-digit consumer price inflation, which, together with increased fuel prices, triggered violent protests in September 2013. Continuous food price hikes were also the immediate cause of demonstrations that started in December 2018.”
“In 2013, the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan damaged both economies depriving Sudan of much needed pipeline revenues. The war in South Sudan also precipitated an increase in Sudan’s already large population of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) with Sudan now serving as a source, destination and transit country for irregular migration, including refugees and asylum-seekers using the East African North-bound migratory route through Libya to Europe. The country hosts an estimated 763 thousand South Sudanese refugees and 159 thousand refugees and asylum seekers from Eritrea, Syria, Yemen, and Chad. The recent peace accord between the warring parties brokered by Sudan and Ethiopia appears to be holding, but the war damaged oil infrastructure, further eroding revenue availability to Sudan.”
“Following the global oil price slump in 2015/2016, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to lower oil transit fees for South Sudanese oil via Sudan’s pipeline, as it became uneconomic to export it. In December 2016, they extended their 2012 agreement on oil for three years on the same terms, with the exception of provisions for the adjustment of transit fees in line with global oil prices.”
“Armed conflict in Sudan’s westernmost region of Darfur has subsided but many parts of the region remain precarious because of the proliferation of arms and banditry. Efforts to settle another conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile remain deadlocked.”
“Comprehensive U.S. sanctions on Sudan, levied in 1997 and expanded in 2006, were lifted in October 2017. This generated initial optimism, but foreign investors and commercial banks have been reluctant to reengage. Trade and financial transactions between Sudan and the World economy remain very limited as Sudan continues to be designated by the U.S. as a state sponsor of terrorism, preventing full normalization of relations with the U.S. While there was optimism late 2018 that talks to remove the designation are expected to begin soon, the protests that escalated in December 2018 might have hampered progress on the talks.”
International Rankings: The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is a very low 168. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is very low 5.8, but rising. Sudan has very high corruption by regional standards (173th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Sudan only 171st out of 190 countries, one of worst in the world.
Population Pressure in millions: 6.5 in 1950, 27.6 in 2000, 35.0 in 2010, 45.6 in 2020, and 89.3 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $18.3 billion; GNI per capita = $590.
Five Year Prognosis: Sudan will remain a marginal state without massive changes in governance and leadership.
22. Somalia
Ranking: Category D to Category F Failed State
Summary: Somalia has experienced decades of violent divisions and extremism in spite of extensive U.S. and international intervention. The country’s history also has decades without effective governance and development, internal divisions and fighting, and extremist threats dominated in recent times by Al Shabab. Some improvements in political unity and leadership are apparent in recent years, but the central government cannot even secure the capital. The presidential and parliamentary elections have been postponed. The Parliament forced Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire to leave office in July 2020, and his replacement is uncertain, while the prime minister role in most of the country is still highly uncertain.
Somalia’s economy badly needs modernization and development, and the government cannot collect adequate revenues. There is high population growth rate in spite of some of the worst humanitarian conditions in the world and some of the worst educational standards. Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and al-Sham remain threats. Mogadishu and other major cities have been subject to attack in 2020.
“In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed SIAD Barre ushered in an authoritarian socialist rule characterized by the persecution, jailing, and torture of political opponents and dissidents. After the regime's collapse early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy.”
“In May 1991, northern clans declared an independent Republic of Somaliland that now includes the administrative regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool. Although not recognized by any government, this entity has maintained a stable existence and continues efforts to establish a constitutional democracy, including holding municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections.”
“The regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug comprise a neighboring semi-autonomous state of Puntland, which has been self-governing since 1998 but does not aim at independence; it has also made strides toward reconstructing a legitimate, representative government but has suffered some civil strife. Puntland disputes its border with Somaliland as it also claims the regions of Sool and Sanaag, and portions of Togdheer. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort (primarily in south-central Somalia) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but when the UN withdrew in 1995, having suffered significant casualties, order still had not been restored.”
“In 2000, the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Djibouti resulted in the formation of an interim government, known as the Transitional National Government (TNG). When the TNG failed to establish adequate security or governing institutions, the Government of Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led a subsequent peace process that concluded in October 2004 with the election of Abdullahi YUSUF Ahmed as President of a second interim government, known as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic. The TFG included a 275-member parliamentary body, known as the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). President YUSUF resigned late in 2008 while UN-sponsored talks between the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) were underway in Djibouti.”
“In January 2009, following the creation of a TFG-ARS unity government, Ethiopian military forces, which had entered Somalia in December 2006 to support the TFG in the face of advances by the opposition Islamic Courts Union (ICU), withdrew from the country. The TFP was doubled in size to 550 seats with the addition of 200 ARS and 75 civil society members of parliament. The expanded parliament elected Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed, the former ICU and ARS chairman as president in January 2009. The creation of the TFG was based on the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which outlined a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government following national elections. In 2009, the TFP amended the TFC to extend TFG's mandate until 2011 and in 2011 Somali principals agreed to institute political transition by August 2012. The transition process ended in September 2012 when clan elders replaced the TFP by appointing 275 members to a new parliament who subsequently elected a new president.”
“Following more than two decades of conflict, a new federal government emerged in Mogadishu in 2012 within the framework established by the Provisional Constitution. Soon after, the international community agreed to the Somali New Deal Compact–an organizing framework (2014-2016) for assistance delivery to the country—with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in line with national priorities, increasing delivery through Somali institutions.”
“The compact was succeeded by the New Partnership for Somalia in 2017, following a peaceful transition of power in February 2017. The New Partnership for Somalia, followed by the Somali Partnership Forum in Brussels in July 2018, aligned with a National Development Plan , and outlines collective priority areas critical for development, including humanitarian issues, national security, inclusive politics, and economic recovery.”
“The country also faces a significant threat from a recent locust invasion and COVID-19. The Ministry of Agriculture declared a national emergency on February 2 following a locust invasion, which threatens food security. The United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects that the number of locusts could grow 400 times by June if not treated. FAO put out a $76 million appeal to fund the spraying of the affected areas with biopesticides. Spraying commenced in February, but might be disrupted due to COVID-19 related restrictions.”
“The first case of COVID-19 was reported on March 16. The Ministry of Health has suspended all international flights and restricted entry for all travelers from worst-hit countries through to March 30. All learning institutions are closed, and public meetings banned in a bid to curb the spread of the novel corona virus. The government has dedicated $5 million to cushion against further transmission. Somalia’s health indicators are among the worst in the world and COVID-19 cases threaten to stretch a fragile healthcare system. Somalia will benefit from the World Bank Group’s increased $14 billion package of fast-track financing to assist companies and countries in their efforts to prevent, detect and respond to the rapid spread of COVID-19.”
“Years of conflict and fragility have left Somalia’s economy with a range of challenges, including population growth outstripping economic growth, acute poverty and vulnerability, recurrent external trade and climate shocks. Weak fiscal space and institutions, active insurgency and an incomplete political settlement have also affected the country’s economic strength.”
International Rankings: There is no UN Human development ranking in 2019, but it would be very low. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a terrible 0.0. Somalia has extremely high corruption by regional standards (180th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Somalia 190th out of 190 countries, worst in the world.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $0.835 billion; GNI per capita = $130. (1990)
Population Pressure in millions: 2.4 in 1950, 7.5 in 2000, 9.80 in 2010, 11.8 in 2020, and 22.6 estimated for 2050
Five Year Prognosis: Somalia will remain an intractable mess.
Outside Powers Cannot Help a State That Will Not Help Itself
It should be obvious to anyone comparing the summary rankings in this overview that they deliberate set a high standard for success – although many of the hopes expressed in studies by regional experts like those in the UN Arab Development Reports, in setting goals for “Globalism,” and in reacting to the initial demonstrations and upheavals in the Arab Spring which set similar standards in the years before and sometime after 2011.
It should also be clear that any effort to summarize these many factors for even one country will inevitably be highly subjective and sometimes unfair. The key issue in assessing these countries, however, is how accurate they are in portraying the actual level of progress relative to the level that is necessary to meet the needs of a given nation’s people.
So far, many of the comments on these rankings have focused on the rationale that other causes of failure were more important; that the rankings do not cover the actions of outside states; that the state involved may have failed in some important respects but still deserve a different ranking; and that the summary prognoses are too short, too harsh and too glib. All of these criticisms are valid in some cases, but they do not address the reality that the greater Middle East should be judged by the kind of hopes for change and progress expressed early in the Arab Spring – which have still not been met – and that far too much of the region has truly become an “axis of failure.”
Here, it seems worth noting that the rankings in this paper do illustrate issues where a study of the impact of the Arab Spring by the World Bank that is excerpted in the Annex reaches very similar conclusions.
In any case, the key issue in evaluating each country is not the summary ranking, but the real world probability that a given nation will emerge out of its current problems in a way where it becomes capable of making sustained progress and achieving sustained success in meeting the needs of all of its people. No state in the world comes close to perfection in meeting these two goals, but many at least are trying and making progress. It is also a grim reality that in a world where aid resources are so limited, there is little real point in allocating aid to failed states that cannot – or will not – help themselves.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State.
Notes:
a. Economic data used in country summaries rely heavily on current Work Bank country summaries, CIA World Factbook rating, and IMF Article IV reporting. Quotes come from the most recent World Bank country summary or Economic Update, and CIA World Factbook Report as of August 17, 2020.
b. The sources of the data used in international rankings are: UN human development ranking is taken from http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries. Corruption rating taken from Transparency International Corruptions Perception Index, 2019, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/lby .Governance relies on a range of sources including World Back Worldwide Governance Indicators, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports.
The methodology used in the World Bank governance rankings is complex and while the percentile rank ranges from 0 to 100, the full data base and methodology should be consulted. See https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130
The data use for the World Bank Doing Business rankings are taken from its Ease of Doing Business Rankings for 2020: https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/Doing-Business-2020_rankings.pdf. These gross measures are not based on census data in many cases and differ sharply from source to source. The lack of truly comparable data for many countries on unemployment -- and youth unemployment in particular – is q critical problem compounded by the lack of data on participation in the labor force and how a country estimates who is search for work.
c. The population data are taken from the U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base, https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/informationGateway.php.
d. Gross National Income (GNI) – Atlas Method -- is chosen over GDP because to seems to represent that most realistic picture of actual income relating to the population that reflects real world incomes. The total GNI data are taken from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.CD. The GNI per capita data are taken from the World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD.
The income groupings use GNI per capita (in U.S. dollars, converted from local currency using the Atlas method) since they follow the same methodology used by the World Bank when determining it’s operational lending policy. While it is understood that GNI per capita does not completely summarize a country’s level of development or measure welfare, it has proved to be a useful and easily available indicator that is closely correlated with other, nonmonetary measures of the quality of life, such as life expectancy at birth, mortality rates of children, and enrollment rates in school.
There are some limitations associated with the use of GNI that users should be aware of. For instance, GNI may be underestimated in lower-income economies that have more informal, subsistence activities. Nor does GNI reflect inequalities in income distribution. Users should also note that the Atlas method used to convert local currencies into a common U.S. dollar is based on official exchange rates, which do not account for differences in domestic price levels. The Atlas method, with three-year average exchange rates adjusted for inflation, lessens the effect of exchange rate fluctuations and abrupt changes, but an alternative method would be to use the purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors of the International Comparison Program. To date, however, issues concerning methodology, geographic coverage, timeliness, quality and extrapolation techniques have precluded the use of PPP conversion factors for this purpose.
Please see the staff report “Per Capita Income: Estimating Internationally Comparable Numbers,” presented by the World Bank’s Executive Directors in 1989, which discusses in more detail the purpose, methodology, and limitations of using per capita income, selected alternative measures, and the proposed establishment of the system for grouping countries by income.
More information on the Bank's operational lending terms is given in Operational Policy 3.10.
Appendix A: World Bank on the Arab Spring
Countries experiencing conflicts in MENA since 2011 also experienced episodes of violence and wars during the preceding three decades on a local level. This is consistent with the global findings that 90 percent of the wars between 2000 and 2010 took place in countries that experienced civil wars in the preceding 30 years, showing that most countries do not really reach a post conflict phase, as argued in the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report on Conflict, Security, and Development. This points to a “conflict trap.”
… Once a country goes through a period of violence, its chances of relapsing into additional episodes of violence increase. This also shows that preventing internal conflicts is a question not of averting new conflicts but of “permanently ending the ones that have already started” over three or four decades through the accumulation of grievances…It is also a question of addressing the drivers of fragility that accumulate over de-cades of limited institutional capacity, gender gaps, and illicit financial flows, thus creating a situation of protracted fragility …
The 2011 uprisings across the Arab region appear as a protest against the erosion of the social contract and a symptom of growing fractures among different social, regional, or ethnic groups. The eroding legitimacy of the ruling elites in MENA countries fueled the outbreak of uprisings and later of violence. Accompanying the diminished state capacity was an attenuated social contract and the rise of nonstate — often armed — actors ,further questioning the state’s legitimacy….With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the political and economic transitions to adapt to the fall of the socialist state model by its allies in the MENA region led to exclusionary crony capitalism and a decline in inclusive and effective public services….The long- established power distribution excluded a large part of the population from economic opportunity and political participation…This has been the case for the populations in the south of Yemen, the Sunnis in Iraq after 2003, and the different non-Alawite communities in Syria since the 1970s.
The breakdown of the social contract between the people and the ruling elite was also a trigger to shifting alliances within the MENA region. Local nonstate actors and substate security forces found support from regional or international actors. This support deepened the divide between the people and the ruling elite and pushed disenfranchised local communities to voice their opposition against the exclusionary status quo even louder. This com-plex web of power networks, accentuated by the regional geo-politics of energy and oil, culminated with an internationalization of conflict that makes the MENA region today a theater of different proxy wars between global actors.22The uprisings illustrate the impact of dysfunction-al political economy dynamics on citizens’ trust in their governments and the legitimacy of the status quo.
In 2011, “the typical Arab protestor was single, educated, relatively young (younger than 44 years old), middle class, urban and male,” according to the Arab Barometer. The main demands voiced in these protests focused on better economic opportunities and socio economic justice—and expressed dissatisfaction with widespread corruption and political exclusion….Especially disenfranchised were millions of young people, in a region with the world’s biggest youth bulge. MENA recently recorded its highest unemployment among those aged 15–24 since the 1990s….It also has the world’s lowest rate of female labor force participation— only 14 percent in 2017, compared with 35 percent worldwide.
Igniting the protests was the inability of the region’s governments to address the demands and expectations of their educated young people—or to deliver basic services to some local communities. Regional proxy dynamics intertwined with the rise of local networks and nonstate armed actors and combined with the existing social fractures, adding fuel to the fire and eroding the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of the disenfranchised groups. As regional and global actors supported opposing sides to protect their geo-economic interests, violence spread vertically from the central to the local and horizon-tally between different local actors and communities, finally breaking out in civil wars. The spillover of these outbreaks of violence have affected other countries inside and outside the region, with some directly involved in the conflict.
In most situations, violence erupts as a result of the accumulation of many unaddressed grievances such as political exclusion of some segments of the population, injustice, or inequality. The joint United Nations–World Bank report, Pathways for Peace(2018) introduced the concept of “arenas of contestation,” spaces with an accumulation of risks and grievances that, left unaddressed, can trigger violent outbreaks. These arenas define the de facto balance of power and represent what different groups are willing to fight over: access to power, to land and natural resources, to services, and to responsive justice and security. Since the transitions to either peace or violence are a gradual process —rather than a one-time breaking point—the persistence of underlying grievances in these arenas and people’s strategies for coping with instability pushes a country to move into and out of violence. In MENA, the most recent violence expresses the explosion of unaddressed grievances around arenas that have been accumulating for decades, leading to the protracted conflicts in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
Once violence erupts, the incentive structures of the different players and actors change accordingly. That can create a self-sustained violent environment that survives on people’s acceptance of some informal actors as providers of security and services. Thus, many local and international actors benefit from continuing the conflict. Reconstruction efforts that fail to address this evolution of the power networks push countries to oscillate between temporary stabilization and recurrent episodes of violence in a “conflict trap,” since the structural issues and drivers of violence are not addressed. Breaking the cycle of violence can be achieved only if policymakers avoid rebuilding the institutions, networks, and dynamics responsible for and benefiting from the conflict, and instead focus on the key drivers and enablers of sustainable peace. The traditional reconstruction approach—emerging after the clear ending of a conflict and focused primarily on a clear and stable central government as the key counterpart for implementing a top-down approach to reconstruction—cannot lead to sustainable peace in today’s conflict situations. It most likely leads only to a temporary stabilization that does not address fully or effectively the conflict’s dynamics, causes, and consequences….
Source: Building for Peace: Reconstruction for Security, Equity, and Sustainable Peace in MENA, World Bank, pp. 12-13, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/747201593601797730/pdf/Building-for-Peace-Reconstruction-for-Security-Equity-and-Sustainable-Peace-in-MENA.pdf
[1] U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/region.php?T=13&RT=0&A=both&Y=1950,2000,2010,2020,2050&C=AG,BA,EG,GZ,IR,IZ,IS,JO,KU,LE,LY,MO,MU,QA,SA,SO,SU,SY,TS,TU,AE,WE,WI,YM&R.